## BEFORE

THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO
In the Matter of the Application of Aqua Ohio, Inc. and Aqua Ohio Wastewater, Inc. to Increase Its Rates and Charges for its Waterworks Service And Wastewater Service

Case No. 21-0595-WW-AIR
Case No. 21-0596-ST-AIR

## DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF
DYLAN W. D'ASCENDIS, CRRA, CVA PARTNER SCOTTMADDEN, INC.
_ Management policies, practice and organization
_ Operating income
_ Rate base
_ Allocations

X Rate of return
_ Rates and tariffs
_ Other

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## I. INTRODUCTION

## A. WITNESS IDENTIFICATION

## Q1. Please state your name and business address.

A. My name is Dylan W. D'Ascendis. My business address is 3000 Atrium Way, Suite 241, Mount Laurel, NJ 08054.

Q2. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?
A. I am a Partner at ScottMadden, Inc.

## B. BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS

Q3. Please summarize your professional experience and educational background.
A. I have offered expert testimony on behalf of investor-owned utilities in over 25 state regulatory commissions in the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Alberta Utility Commission, and one American Arbitration Association panel on issues including, but not limited to, common equity cost rate, rate of return, valuation, capital structure, class cost of service, and rate design.

On behalf of the American Gas Association ("AGA"), I calculate the AGA Gas Index, which serves as the benchmark against which the performance of the American Gas Index Fund ("AGIF") is measured on a monthly basis. The AGA Gas Index and AGIF are a market capitalization weighted index and mutual fund, respectively, comprised of the common stocks of the publicly traded corporate members of the AGA.

I am a member of the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts ("SURFA"). In 2011, I was awarded the professional designation "Certified Rate of Return Analyst" by SURFA, which is based on education, experience, and the successful completion of a comprehensive written examination.

I am also a member of the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts ("NACVA") and was awarded the professional designation "Certified Valuation Analyst" by the NACVA in 2015.

I am a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, where I received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economic History. I have also received a Master of Business Administration with high honors and concentrations in Finance and International Business from Rutgers University.

The details of my educational background and expert witness appearances are included in Appendix A.

## II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY

Q4. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?
A. The purpose of my testimony is to present evidence on behalf of Aqua Ohio, Inc. ("Aqua OH " or the "Company") about the appropriate capital structure and corresponding cost rates the Company should be given the opportunity to earn on its jurisdictional rate base.

## Q5. Have you prepared an Exhibit in support of your recommendation?

A. Yes. I prepared an exhibit, which contains Schedules DWD-1 through DWD-9, and has been prepared by me or under my direct supervision and control.

## Q6. What is your recommended cost of capital for Aqua $\mathbf{O H}$ ?

A. I recommend the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio ("PUCO" or the "Commission") authorize the Company the opportunity to earn an overall rate of return of $7.42 \%$ based on the expected capital structure of Aqua OH as of December 31, 2021. The ratemaking capital structure consists of $48.11 \%$ long-term debt at an embedded cost rate of $3.82 \%$ and
$51.89 \%$ common equity at my recommended common equity cost rate of $10.75 \%$. The overall rate of return is summarized on page 1 of Schedule DWD-1 and in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Summary of Overall Rate of Return

| Type of Capital | $\underline{\text { Ratios }}$ |  | Cost Rate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Long-Term Debt | $\underline{48.11 \%}$ |  | $3.82 \%$ |
| Weighted Cost Rate |  |  |  |
| Common Equity | $\underline{51.89 \%}$ |  | $10.75 \%$ |
|  | $\underline{1.84 \%}$ |  |  |
| Total | $\underline{100.00 \%}$ |  | $\underline{5.58 \%}$ |
|  |  |  | $\underline{7.42 \%}$ |

## III. SUMMARY

Q7. Please summarize your recommended common equity cost rate.
A. My recommended common equity cost rate of $10.75 \%$ is summarized on page 2 of Schedule DWD-1. I have assessed the market-based common equity cost rates of companies of relatively similar, but not necessarily identical, risk to Aqua OH . Using companies of relatively comparable risk as proxies is consistent with the principles of fair rate of return established in the Hope ${ }^{1}$ and Bluefield ${ }^{2}$ cases. No proxy group can be identical in risk to any single company, so there must be an evaluation of relative risk between the company and the proxy group to see if it is appropriate to make adjustments to the proxy group's indicated rate of return.

My recommendation results from the application of several cost of common equity models, specifically the Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") model, the Risk Premium Model ("RPM"), and the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"), to the market data of a proxy group of eight water companies ("Utility Proxy Group") whose selection criteria will be discussed below. In addition, I also applied the DCF, RPM, and CAPM to a proxy group

[^0]of domestic, non-price regulated companies comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group ("Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group").

The results derived from each are as follows:

## Table 2: Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate

| Discounted Cash Flow Model | $8.63 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Risk Premium Model | $11.11 \%$ |
| Capital Asset Pricing Model | $10.45 \%$ |
| Market Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non- | $\underline{10.87 \%}$ |
| Price Regulated Companies | $10.27 \%-10.66 \%$ |
| Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates  <br> Before Adjustments for Company-Specific Risk $0.25 \%$ <br> Size Adjustment $\underline{10.57 \%-10.96 \%}$ <br> Flotation Cost Adjustment $\underline{\underline{10.75 \%}}$ <br> Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates after <br> Adjustment  <br> Recommended Cost of Common Equity $\|$ |  |

After analyzing the indicated common equity cost rates derived through these models, the indicated range of common equity cost rates applicable to the Utility Proxy Group is between $10.27 \%$ and $10.66 \%$. This range is set by using the average model result ( $10.27 \%$ ) and the median model result ( $10.66 \%$ ).

The indicated range of common equity cost rates applicable to the Utility Proxy Group was then adjusted upward by $0.25 \%$ to reflect Aqua OH's smaller size relative to the Utility Proxy Group and by $0.05 \%$ to reflect flotation costs. These adjustments result in a Company-specific range of common equity cost rates between $10.57 \%$ and $10.96 \%$.

From this range of results, I recommend the Commission consider a common equity cost rate of $10.75 \%$, or the approximate midpoint, for use in setting rates for the Company.

## IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Q8. What general principles have you considered in arriving at your recommended common equity cost rate of $\mathbf{1 0 . 7 5 \%}$ ?
A. In unregulated industries, the competition of the marketplace is the principal determinant of the price of products or services. For regulated public utilities, regulation must act as a substitute for marketplace competition. Assuring that the utility can fulfill its obligations to the public, while providing safe and reliable service at all times, requires a level of earnings sufficient to maintain the integrity of presently invested capital. Sufficient earnings also permit the attraction of needed new capital at a reasonable cost, for which the utility must compete with other firms of comparable risk, consistent with the fair rate of return standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the previously cited Hope and Bluefield decisions. Consequently, marketplace data must be relied on in assessing a common equity cost rate appropriate for ratemaking purposes. Just as the use of the market data for the Utility Proxy Group adds reliability to the informed expert's judgment used in arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate, the use of multiple generally accepted common equity cost rate models also adds reliability and accuracy when arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate.

## A. BUSINESS RISK

Q9. Please define business risk and explain why it is important to the determination of a fair rate of return.
A. Business risk is the riskiness of a company's common stock without the use of debt and/or preferred capital. Examples of such general business risks faced by all utilities (i.e., electric, natural gas distribution, and water) include size, the quality of management, the regulatory environment in which utilities operate, customer mix and concentration of customers, service territory growth, and capital intensity. All of these have a direct bearing on earnings.

Consistent with the basic financial principle of risk and return, business risk is important to the determination of a fair rate of return, because the higher the level of risk, the higher the rate of return investors demand.

## Q10. What business risks do the water and wastewater industries face in general?

A. Water and wastewater utilities have an ever-increasing responsibility to be stewards of the environment from which water supplies are drawn in order to preserve and protect essential natural resources of the United States. This increased environmental stewardship is a direct result of compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act, as well as a response to continuous monitoring by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and state and local governments, of the water supply for potential contaminants and their resultant regulations. This, plus aging infrastructure, necessitate additional capital investment in the distribution and treatment of water, exacerbating the pressure on free cash flows arising from increased capital expenditures for infrastructure repair and replacement. The significant amount of capital investment and, hence, high capital intensity, is a major risk factor for the water and wastewater utility industry.

Value Line Investment Survey ("Value Line") observes the following about the water utility industry:

Following years and years of underinvestment, the nation found itself with an aging water infrastructure that is in poor condition. Many pipelines were installed 50 to 75 years ago. Badly in need of replacement, water utilities have been spending heavily to replace old assets. This high level of expenditures will have to be maintained for decades.

As we have highlighted in the past, one of the most significant factors in determining the profitability of a utility is the regulatory climate where it operates. Fortunately for the Water Utility Industry, state authorities and water utilities both realize what needs to be done and are working constructively to address the issues. Regulators agree that the outlays being made to upgrade the country's infrastructure are required, so they are allowing fair return on investment to be made. Having a positive relationship may seem reasonable, but this is not the case for gas and electric utilities. Conflicts are not unusual. ${ }^{3}$

The water and wastewater industry also experiences low depreciation rates. Depreciation rates are one of the principal sources of internal cash flows for all utilities (through a utility's depreciation expense) and are vital for a company to fund ongoing replacements and repairs of water and wastewater systems. Water / wastewater utility assets have long lives, and therefore have long capital recovery periods. As such, they face greater risk due to inflation, which results in a higher replacement cost per dollar of net plant.

Substantial capital expenditures, as noted by Value Line, will require significant financing. The three sources of financing typically used are debt, equity (common and preferred), and cash flow. All three are intricately linked to the opportunity to earn a

[^1]sufficient rate of return as well as the ability to achieve that return. Consistent with Hope and Bluefield, the return must be sufficient to maintain credit quality as well as enable the attraction of necessary new capital, be it debt or equity capital. If unable to raise debt or equity capital, the utility must turn to either retained earnings or free cash flow, ${ }^{4}$ both of which are directly linked to earning a sufficient rate of return. The level of free cash flow represents a utility's ability to meet the needs of its debt and equity holders. If either retained earnings or free cash flow is inadequate, it will be nearly impossible for the utility to attract the needed capital for new infrastructure investment necessary to ensure quality service to its customers. An insufficient rate of return can be financially devastating for utilities as well as a public safety issue for their customers.

The water and wastewater utility industry's high degree of capital intensity and low depreciation rates, coupled with the need for substantial infrastructure capital spending, require regulatory support in the form of adequate and timely rate relief, and in particular, a sufficient authorized return on common equity, so that the industry can successfully meet the challenges it faces.

## B. FINANCIAL RISK

## Q11. Please define financial risk and explain why it is important to the determination of a fair rate of return.

A. Financial risk is the additional risk created by the introduction of debt and preferred stock into the capital structure. The higher the proportion of debt and preferred stock in the capital structure, the higher the financial risk (i.e., likelihood of default). Therefore,

[^2]consistent with the basic financial principle of risk and return, investors demand a higher common equity return as compensation for bearing higher default risk.

## Q12. Can bond and credit ratings be a proxy for the combined business and financial risk

 (i.e., investment risk of an enterprise)?A. Yes, similar bond ratings/issuer credit ratings reflect, and are representative of, similar combined business and financial risks (i.e., total risk) faced by bond investors. ${ }^{5}$ Although specific business or financial risks may differ between companies, the same bond/credit rating indicates that the combined risks are roughly similar, albeit not necessarily equal, as the purpose of the bond/credit rating process is to assess credit quality or credit risk, and not common equity risk.

Q13. That being said, do rating agencies reflect company size in their bond ratings?
A. No. Neither S\&P nor Moody's have minimum company size requirements for any given rating level. This means, all else being equal, a relative size analysis needs to be conducted for companies with similar bond ratings.

## v. AQUA OH AND THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP

Q14. Are you familiar with the operations of Aqua $\mathbf{O H}$ ?
A. Yes. Aqua OH is a subsidiary of Essential Utilities, Inc. ("Essential"). The Company serves approximately 157,486 customers in Ohio. Aqua OH's common stock is not publicly traded.

5 Risk distinctions within S\&P's bond rating categories are recognized by a plus or minus, i.e., within the A category, an S\&P rating can be at A+, A, or A-. Similarly, risk distinctions for Moody's ratings are distinguished by numerical rating gradations, i.e., within the A category, a Moody's rating can be A1, A2 and A3.

Q15. Please explain how you chose your Utility Proxy Group.
A. The basis of selection for the Utility Proxy Group was to select those companies which meet the following criteria:
(i) They are included in the Water Utility Group of Value Line's Standard Edition or Small \& Midcap Edition (April 9, 2021);
(ii) They have $70 \%$ or greater of 2020 total operating income and $70 \%$ or greater of 2020 total assets attributable to regulated water operations;
(iii) At the time of preparation of this testimony, they had not publicly announced that they were involved in any major merger or acquisition activity (i.e., one publicly traded utility merging with or acquiring another);
(iv) They have not cut or omitted their common dividends during the five years ending 2020 or through the time of the preparation of this testimony;
(v) They have Value Line and Bloomberg Professional Services ("Bloomberg") adjusted betas;
(vi) They have a positive Value Line five-year dividends per share ("DPS") growth rate projection; and
(vii) They have Value Line, Zacks, Yahoo! Finance, or Bloomberg consensus five-year earnings per share ("EPS") growth rate projections.

The following eight companies met these criteria: American States Water Co., American Water Works Co., Inc., Artesian Resources Corporation, California Water Service Group, Global Water Resources, Inc., Middlesex Water Co., SJW Corp., and The York Water Co.

## Q16. Please describe Schedule DWD-2, page 1.

A. Page 1 of Schedule DWD-2 contains comparative capitalization and financial statistics for the Utility Proxy Group identified above for the years 2016 to 2020. During the five-year period ending 2020, the historically achieved earnings rate on book common equity for the group averaged $10.23 \%$. The average common equity ratio based on total permanent capital (excluding short-term debt) was $49.39 \%$, and the average dividend payout ratio was $58.61 \%$.

Total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization for the years 2016 to 2020 ranges between $3.73 x$ and $5.32 x$, with an average of $4.44 x$. Funds from operations to total debt range from $12.38 \%$ to $23.06 \%$, with an average of $18.33 \%$.

## VI. CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Q17. What capital structure ratios do you recommend be employed in developing an overall fair rate of return appropriate for the Company?
A. I recommend the use of Aqua OH 's actual expected capital structure for the test year ending December 31, 2021, which consists of $48.11 \%$ long-term debt and $51.89 \%$ common equity as shown on page 1 of Schedule DWD-1.

Q18. How does Aqua OH 's ratemaking common equity ratio of $51.89 \%$ compare with the equity ratios maintained by the companies in your Utility Proxy Group?
A. Aqua OH 's ratemaking common equity ratio of $51.89 \%$ is reasonable and consistent with the range of common equity ratios maintained, on average, by the companies in the Utility Proxy Group on which I base my recommended common equity cost rate. As shown on page 2 of Schedule DWD-2, the common equity ratios of the Utility Proxy Group range from $21.91 \%$ to $59.28 \%$ in 2020.

Q19. What long-term debt cost rate is most appropriate for Aqua $\mathbf{O H}$ in this proceeding?
A. Aqua $\mathrm{OH}^{\prime}$ 's actual expected long-term debt cost rate on December 31, 2021 of $3.82 \%$ is reasonable and appropriate as Aqua OH's cost of long-term debt in this proceeding.

## VII. COMMON EQUITY COST RATE MODELS

## Q20. Is it important that cost of common equity models be market based?

A. Yes. A public utility must compete for equity in capital markets along with all other companies of comparable risk, which includes non-utilities. The cost of common equity is thus determined based on equity market expectations for the returns of those comparable risk companies. If individual investors are choosing to invest their capital among companies of comparable risk, they will choose a company providing a higher return over a company providing a lower return.

## Q21. Are your cost of common equity models market-based models?

A. Yes. The DCF model is market-based because market prices are used in developing the dividend yield component of the model. The RPM is market-based because the bond ratings and expected bond yields used in the application of the RPM reflect the market's assessment of bond/credit risk. In addition, the use of Beta coefficients $(\beta)$ to determine the equity risk premium reflects the market's assessment of market/systematic risk, since Beta coefficients are derived from regression analyses of market prices. The Predictive Risk Premium Model ("PRPM") uses monthly market returns in addition to expectations of the risk-free rate. The CAPM is market-based for many of the same reasons that the RPM is market-based (i.e., the use of expected bond yields and Beta coefficients). Selection of the comparable risk non-price regulated companies is market-based because
it is based on statistics which result from regression analyses of market prices and reflect the market's assessment of total risk.

## A. DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL

## Q22. What is the theoretical basis of the DCF model?

A. The theory underlying the DCF model is that the present value of an expected future stream of net cash flows during the investment holding period can be determined by discounting those cash flows at the cost of capital, or the investors' capitalization rate. DCF theory indicates that an investor buys a stock for an expected total return rate, which is derived from cash flows received in the form of dividends plus appreciation in market price (the expected growth rate). Mathematically, the dividend yield on market price plus a growth rate equals the capitalization rate, i.e., the total common equity return rate expected by investors.

## Q23. Which version of the DCF model did you use?

A. I used the single-stage constant growth DCF model.

Q24. Please describe the dividend yield you used in your application of the DCF model.
A. The unadjusted dividend yields are based on the proxy companies' dividends as of April 5, 2021, divided by the average of closing market prices for the 60 trading days ending April 5, 2021. ${ }^{6}$

## Q25. Please explain your adjustment to the dividend yield.

A. Because dividends are paid periodically (quarterly), as opposed to continuously (daily), an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is often referred to as the discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF model.

6 See, Schedule DWD-3, page 1, Column 1.

DCF theory calls for the use of the full growth rate, or $\mathrm{D}_{1}$, in calculating the dividend yield component of the model. Since the various companies in the Utility Proxy Group increase their quarterly dividend at various times during the year, a reasonable assumption is to reflect one-half the annual dividend growth rate in the dividend yield component, or $\mathrm{D}_{1 / 2}$. Because the dividend should be representative of the next 12-month period, my adjustment is a conservative approach that does not overstate the dividend yield. Therefore, the actual average dividend yields in Column 1 on page 1 of Schedule DWD-3 have been adjusted upward to reflect one-half the average projected growth rate shown in Column 6.

Q26. Please explain the basis of the growth rates you applied to the Utility Proxy Group in your DCF model.
A. Investors with more limited resources than institutional investors are likely to rely on widely available financial information services, such as Value Line, Zacks, Yahoo! Finance, and Bloomberg. Investors realize that analysts have significant insight into the dynamics of the industries and individual companies they analyze, as well as companies' abilities to effectively manage the effects of changing laws and regulations, and everchanging economic and market conditions. For these reasons, I used analysts' five-year forecasts of EPS growth in my DCF analysis.

Over the long run, there can be no growth in DPS without growth in EPS. Security analysts' earnings expectations have a more significant influence on market prices than dividend expectations. Thus, the use of earnings growth rates in a DCF analysis provides a better match between investors' market price appreciation expectations and the growth rate component of the DCF.

## Q27. Please summarize the DCF model results.

A. As shown on page 1 of Schedule DWD-3, the mean result of the application of the singlestage DCF model is $9.11 \%$, the median result is $8.14 \%$, and the average of the two is $8.63 \%$ for the Utility Proxy Group. In arriving at a conclusion for the DCF-indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group, I have relied on an average of the mean and the median results of the DCF. This approach takes into consideration all the proxy companies' results, while mitigating the high and low outliers of those individual results.

## B. THE RISK PREMIUM MODEL

## Q28. Please describe the theoretical basis of the RPM.

A. The RPM is based on the fundamental financial principle of risk and return, namely, that investors require greater returns for bearing greater risk. The RPM recognizes that common equity capital has greater investment risk than debt capital, as common equity shareholders are behind debt holders in any claim on a company's assets and earnings. As a result, investors require higher returns from common stocks than from investment in bonds, to compensate them for bearing the additional risk.

While it is possible to directly observe bond returns and yields, investors' required common equity return cannot be directly determined or observed. According to RPM theory, one can estimate a common equity risk premium over bonds (either historically or prospectively) and use that premium to derive a cost rate of common equity. The cost of common equity equals the expected cost rate for long-term debt capital, plus a risk premium over that cost rate, to compensate common shareholders for the added risk of being unsecured and last-in-line for any claim on the corporation's assets and earnings in the event of a liquidation.

Q29. Please explain how you derived your indicated cost of common equity based on the RPM.
A. I relied on the results of the application of two risk premium methods. The first method is the PRPM, while the second method is a risk premium model using a total market approach.

## Q30. Please explain the PRPM.

A. The PRPM, published in the Journal of Regulatory Economics and The Electricity Journal $^{7}$, was developed from the work of Robert F. Engle, who shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2003 "for methods of analyzing economic time series with time-varying volatility ("ARCH")". ${ }^{8}$ Engle found that volatility changes over time and is related from one period to the next, especially in financial markets. Engle discovered that the volatility in prices and returns clusters over time and is therefore highly predictable and can be used to predict future levels of risk and risk premiums.

The PRPM estimates the risk / return relationship directly, as the predicted equity risk premium is generated by the prediction of volatility or risk. The PRPM is not based on an estimate of investor behavior, but rather on the evaluation of the results of that behavior (i.e., the variance of historical equity risk premiums).

The inputs to the model are the historical returns on the common shares of each company in the Utility Proxy Group minus the historical monthly yield on long-term U.S. Treasury securities through March 2021. Using a generalized form of ARCH, known as GARCH, I calculated each Utility Proxy Group company's projected equity risk premium

7 Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. See "A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities", Pauline M. Ahern, Frank J. Hanley and Richard A. Michelfelder, The Journal of Regulatory Economics (December 2011), 40:261-278 and "Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model for Estimating the Cost of Common Equity", Richard A. Michelfelder, Pauline M. Ahern, Dylan W. D’Ascendis, and Frank J. Hanley, The Electricity Journal (May 2013), 84-89.
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using Eviews ${ }^{\ominus}$ statistical software. When the GARCH Model is applied to the historical return data, it produces a predicted GARCH variance series ${ }^{9}$ and a GARCH coefficient ${ }^{10}$. Multiplying the predicted monthly variance by the GARCH coefficient, then annualizing $\mathrm{it}^{11}$, produces the predicted annual equity risk premium. I then added the forecasted $30-$ year U.S. Treasury Bond yield, $2.73 \%^{12}$, to each company's PRPM-derived equity risk premium to arrive at an indicated cost of common equity. The 30 -year Treasury yield is a consensus forecast derived from the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts ("Blue Chip") ${ }^{13}$. The mean PRPM indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group is $12.72 \%$, the median is $11.53 \%$, and the average of the two is $12.13 \%$. Consistent with my reliance on the average of the median and mean results of the DCF, I relied on the average of the mean and median results of the Utility Proxy Group PRPM to calculate a cost of common equity rate of $12.13 \%$.

## Q31. Please explain the total market approach RPM.

A. The total market approach RPM adds a prospective public utility bond yield to an average of: 1) an equity risk premium that is derived from a beta-adjusted total market equity risk premium; and 2) an equity risk premium based on the S\&P Utilities Index.

Q32. Please explain the basis of the expected bond yield of $3.91 \%$ applicable to the Utility Proxy Group.
A. The first step in the total market approach RPM analysis is to determine the expected bond yield. Because both ratemaking and the cost of capital, including common equity cost rate,

[^3]are prospective in nature, a prospective yield on similarly-rated long-term debt is essential. I rely on a consensus forecast of about 50 economists of the expected yield on Aaa-rated corporate bonds for the six calendar quarters ending with the third calendar quarter of 2022, and the long-term projections for 2022 to 2026, and 2027 to 2031 from Blue Chip. As shown on Line No. 1 of page 3 of Schedule DWD-4, the average expected yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds is $3.44 \%$. In order to derive an expected yield on A2rated public utility bonds, I make an upward adjustment of $0.42 \%$, which represents a recent spread between Aaa-rated corporate bonds and A2-rated public utility bonds, in order to adjust the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield to an equivalent Moody's A2rated public utility bond. ${ }^{14}$ Adding that recent $0.42 \%$ spread to the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield of $3.44 \%$ results in an expected A2-rated public utility bond of $3.86 \%$.

Since the Utility Proxy Group's average Moody's long-term issuer rating is A2/A3, another adjustment to the expected A2-rated public utility bond yield is needed to reflect the difference in bond ratings. An upward adjustment of $0.05 \%$, which represents onesixth of a recent spread between A2- and Baa2-rated public utility bond yields, is necessary to make the A2-rated prospective bond yield applicable to an A2/A3-rated public utility bond. ${ }^{15}$ Adding the $0.05 \%$ to the $3.86 \%$ prospective A2-rated public utility bond yield results in a $3.91 \%$ expected bond yield for the Utility Proxy Group.

14 As shown on Line No. 2 and explained in Note 2 of page 3 of Schedule DWD-4.
15 As shown on Line 4 and explained in note 3, page 3 of Schedule DWD-4. Moody's does not provide public utility bond yields for A2/A3-rated bonds. As such, it was necessary to estimate the difference between A2-rated and A2/A3-rated public utility bonds. Because there are three steps between Baa2 and A2 (Baa2 to Baa1, Baa1 to A3, and A3 to A2) I assumed an adjustment of onesixth of the difference between the A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yield was appropriate.

Table 3: Summary of the Calculation of the Utility Proxy Group Projected Bond $\underline{\text { Yield }}{ }^{16}$

| Prospective Yield on Moody's Aaa-Rated Corporate <br> Bonds (Blue Chip) | $3.44 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Moody's <br> Aaa-Rated Corporate Bonds and Moody's A2-Rated <br> Utility Bonds | $0.42 \%$ |
| Adjustment to Reflect the Utility Proxy Group's <br> Average Moody's Bond Rating of A2/A3 | $\underline{0.05 \%}$ |
| Prospective Bond Yield Applicable to the Utility <br> Proxy Group | $\underline{\underline{3.91 \%}}$ |

To develop the indicated ROE using the total market approach RPM, this prospective bond yield is then added to the average of the three different equity risk premiums described below.

## Q33. Please explain how the beta-derived equity risk premium is determined.

A. The components of the beta-derived risk premium model are: 1) an expected market equity risk premium over corporate bonds, and 2) the Beta coefficient. The derivation of the betaderived equity risk premium that I applied to the Utility Proxy Group is shown on Lines 1 through 9 of page 8 of Schedule DWD-4. The total beta-derived equity risk premium I applied was based on an average of: 1) Ibbotson-based equity risk premiums; 2) Value Line-based equity risk premiums; and 3) Bloomberg-based equity risk premium. Each of these is described in turn.

Q34. How did you derive a market equity risk premium based on long-term historical data?
A. To derive a historical market equity risk premium, I used the most recent holding period returns for the large company common stocks from the Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation

16 As shown on page 3 of Attachment DWD-4.
("SBBI") 2021 Yearbook ("SBBI - 2021") ${ }^{17}$ less the average historical yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds for the period 1928 to 2020. The use of holding period returns over a very long period of time is appropriate because it is consistent with the longterm investment horizon presumed by investing in a going concern, i.e., a company expected to operate in perpetuity.

SBBI's long-term arithmetic mean monthly total return rate on large company common stocks was $11.94 \%$ and the long-term arithmetic mean monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds was $6.02 \%$ from 1928 to $2020 .{ }^{18}$ As shown on Line 1 of page 8 of Schedule DWD-4, subtracting the mean monthly bond yield from the total return on large company stocks results in a long-term historical equity risk premium of 5.92\%.

I used the arithmetic mean monthly total return rates for the large company stocks and yields (income returns) for the Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds, because they are appropriate for the purpose of estimating the cost of capital as noted in $\underline{\mathrm{SBBI}-2021 .{ }^{19}}$ The use of the arithmetic mean return rates and yields is appropriate because historical total returns and equity risk premiums provide insight into the variance and standard deviation of returns needed by investors in estimating future risk when making a current investment. If investors relied on the geometric mean of historical equity risk premiums, they would have no insight into the potential variance of future returns because the geometric mean relates to the change over many periods to a constant rate of change, thereby obviating the year-to-year fluctuations, or variance, which is critical to risk analysis.

[^4]Q35. Please explain the derivation of the regression-based market equity risk premium.
A. To derive the regression analysis-derived market equity risk premium of $8.83 \%$, shown on Line 2 of page 8 of Schedule DWD-4, I used the same monthly annualized total returns on large company common stocks relative to the monthly annualized yields on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds as mentioned above. The relationship between interest rates and the market equity risk premium was modeled using the observed monthly market equity risk premium as the dependent variable, and the monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aarated corporate bonds as the independent variable. I used a linear Ordinary Least Squares ("OLS") regression, in which the market equity risk premium is expressed as a function of the Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds yield:

$$
\mathrm{RP}=\alpha+\beta\left(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{Aaa} / \mathrm{Aa}}\right)
$$

## Q36. Please explain the derivation of a PRPM equity risk premium.

A. I used the same PRPM approach described previously to develop another equity risk premium estimate. The inputs to the model are the historical monthly returns on large company common stocks minus the monthly yields on Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds during the period from January 1928 through March 2021. ${ }^{20}$ Using the previously discussed generalized form of ARCH , known as GARCH, the projected equity risk premium is determined using Eviews ${ }^{\ominus}$ statistical software. The resulting PRPM predicted market equity risk premium is $9.40 \% .^{21}$

[^5]Q37. Please explain the derivation of a projected equity risk premium based on Value Line data for your RPM analysis.
A. As noted previously, because both ratemaking and the cost of capital are prospective, a prospective market equity risk premium is needed. The derivation of the forecasted or prospective market equity risk premium can be found in note 4 on page 9 of Schedule DWD-4. Consistent with my calculation of the dividend yield component in my DCF analysis, this prospective market equity risk premium is derived from an average of the three to five-year median market price appreciation potential by Value Line for the 13 weeks ending April 9, 2021, plus an average of the median estimated dividend yield for the common stocks of the 1,700 firms covered in Value Line's Standard Edition. ${ }^{22}$

The average median expected price appreciation is $29 \%$, which translates to an $6.57 \%$ annual appreciation, and when added to the average of Value Line's median expected dividend yields of $1.88 \%$, equates to a forecasted annual total return rate on the market of $8.45 \%$. The forecasted Aaa-rated bond yield of $3.44 \%$ is deducted from the total market return of $8.45 \%$, resulting in an equity risk premium of $5.01 \%$, shown on page 8 , Line 4 of Schedule DWD-4.

Q38. Please explain the derivation of an equity risk premium based on the S\&P 500 companies.
A. Using data from Value Line, I calculated an expected total return on the S\&P 500 using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. The expected total return for the S\&P 500 is $14.16 \%$. Subtracting the

22 As explained in detail in page 2, note 1 of Schedule DWD-5.
prospective yield on Aaa-rated Corporate bonds of $3.44 \%$ results in a $10.72 \%$ projected equity risk premium.

Q39. Please explain the derivation of an equity risk premium based on Bloomberg data.
A. Using data from Bloomberg, I calculated an expected total return on the S\&P 500 using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation, identical to the method described above. The expected total return for the S\&P 500 is $15.81 \%$. Subtracting the prospective yield on Aaa-rated Corporate bonds of $3.44 \%$ results in a $12.37 \%$ projected equity risk premium.

Q40. What is your conclusion of a beta-derived equity risk premium for use in your RPM analysis?
A. I gave equal weight to the six equity risk premiums in arriving at my conclusion of $8.71 \% .^{23}$

Table 4: Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium Using Total $\underline{\text { Market Returns }{ }^{24}}$

| Historical Spread Between Total Returns of Large <br> Stocks and Aaa and Aa2-Rated Corporate Bond <br> Yields (1928 - 2020) | $5.92 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Regression Analysis on Historical Data | $8.83 \%$ |
| PRPM Analysis on Historical Data | $9.40 \%$ |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total <br> Market Returns from Value Line Summary \& Index <br> less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields | $5.01 \%$ |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of <br> Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <br> Value Line for the S\&P 500 less Projected Aaa <br> Corporate Bond Yields | $10.72 \%$ |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of <br> Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <br> Bloomberg Professional Services for the S\&P 500 <br> less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields | $\underline{12.37 \%}$ |
| Average | $\underline{\underline{8.71 \%}}$ |

[^6]After calculating the average market equity risk premium of $8.71 \%$, I adjusted it by beta to account for the risk of the Utility Proxy Group. As discussed below, the Beta coefficient is a meaningful measure of prospective relative risk to the market as a whole and is a logical means by which to allocate a company's, or proxy group's, share of the market's total equity risk premium relative to corporate bond yields. As shown on page 1 of Schedule DWD-5, the average of the mean and median Beta coefficient for the Utility Proxy Group is 0.78 . Multiplying the Beta coefficient of the Utility Proxy Group of 0.78 by the market equity risk premium of $8.71 \%$ results in a beta-adjusted equity risk premium of $6.79 \%$ for the Utility Proxy Group.

Q41. How did you derive the equity risk premium based on the $S \& P$ Utility Index and Moody's A-rated public utility bonds?
A. I estimated three equity risk premiums based on S\&P Utility Index holding returns, and two equity risk premiums based on the expected returns of the S\&P Utilities Index, using Value Line and Bloomberg data, respectively. Turning first to the S\&P Utility Index holding period returns, I derived a long-term monthly arithmetic mean equity risk premium between the S\&P Utility Index total returns of $10.65 \%$ and monthly A-rated public utility bond yields of $6.49 \%$ from 1928 to 2020 , to arrive at an equity risk premium of $4.16 \% .{ }^{25}$ I then used the same historical data to derive an equity risk premium of $6.45 \%$ based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums. The final $S \& P$ Utility Index holding period equity risk premium involved applying the PRPM using the historical monthly equity risk premiums from January 1928 to March 2021 to arrive at a PRPM-derived equity risk premium of $4.77 \%$ for the S\&P Utility Index.

25 As shown on Line No. 1 on page 12 of Schedule DWD-4.

I then derived expected total returns on the S\&P Utilities Index of $10.54 \%$ and $9.56 \%$ using data from Value Line and Bloomberg, respectively, and subtracted the prospective A2-rated public utility bond yield $\left(3.86 \%{ }^{26}\right)$, which results in risk premiums of $6.68 \%$ and $5.70 \%$, respectively. As with the market equity risk premiums, I averaged each risk premium to arrive at my utility-specific equity risk premium of $5.55 \%$.

Table 5: Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium Using S\&P Utility Index Holding Returns ${ }^{27}$

| Historical Spread Between Total Returns of the S\&P <br> Utilities Index and A2-Rated Utility Bond Yields <br> $(1928-2020)$ | $4.16 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Regression Analysis on Historical Data | $6.45 \%$ |
| PRPM Analysis on Historical Data | $4.77 \%$ |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of <br> Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <br> Value Line for the S\&P Utilities Index less Projected <br> A2 Utility Bond Yields | $6.68 \%$ |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of <br> Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <br> Bloomberg Professional Services for the S\&P <br> Utilities Index less Projected A2 Utility Bond Yields | $\underline{5.70 \%}$ |
| Average | $\underline{\underline{5.55 \%}}$ |

## Q42. What is your conclusion of an equity risk premium for use in your total market approach RPM analysis? <br> A. The equity risk premium I applied to the Utility Proxy Group is $6.17 \%$, which is the average of the beta-derived and the S\&P utility equity risk premiums of $6.79 \%$ and $5.55 \%$, respectively. ${ }^{28}$

[^7]Q43. What is the indicated RPM common equity cost rate based on the total market approach?
A. As shown on Line No. 7 of Schedule DWD-4, page 3, I calculated a common equity cost rate of $10.08 \%$ for the Utility Proxy Group based on the total market approach of the RPM.

Table 6: Summary of the Total Market Return Risk Premium Model ${ }^{29}$

| Prospective Moody's A2/A3-Rated Utility Bond <br> Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group | $3.91 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium | $\underline{6.17 \%}$ |
| Indicated Cost of Common Equity | $\underline{\underline{0.08 \%}}$ |

Q44. What are the results of your application of the PRPM and the total market approach RPM?
A. As shown on page 1 of Schedule DWD-4, the indicated RPM-derived common equity cost rate is $11.11 \%$, which gives equal weight to the PRPM (12.13\%) and the adjusted market approach results (10.08\%).

## C. THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL

## Q45. Please explain the theoretical basis of the CAPM.

A. CAPM theory defines risk as the co-variability of a security's returns with the market's returns as measured by the Beta coefficient ( $\beta$ ). A Beta coefficient less than 1.0 indicates lower variability than the market as a whole, while a Beta coefficient greater than 1.0 indicates greater variability than the market.

The CAPM assumes that all other risk (i.e., all non-market or unsystematic risk) can be eliminated through diversification. The risk that cannot be eliminated through diversification is called market, or systematic, risk. In addition, the CAPM presumes that
investors require compensation only for systematic risk, which is the result of macroeconomic and other events that affect the returns on all assets. The model is applied by adding a risk-free rate of return to a market risk premium, which is adjusted proportionately to reflect the systematic risk of the individual security relative to the total market as measured by the Beta coefficient. The traditional CAPM model is expressed as:

|  | $\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{s}}$ |
| ---: | :--- |
| Where: $\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{s}}$ | $=\quad \mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{f}}+\beta\left(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{m}}-\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{f}}\right)$ |
| $\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{f}}$ | $=$ Return rate on the common stock; |
| $\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{m}}$ | $=\quad$ Risk-free rate of return; |
| $\beta$ | $=$Adjusted Beta coefficient (volatility of the <br> security relative to the market as a whole). |

Numerous tests of the CAPM have measured the extent to which security returns and Beta coefficients are related as predicted by the CAPM, confirming its validity. The empirical CAPM ("ECAPM") reflects the reality that while the results of these tests support the notion that the Beta coefficient is related to security returns, the empirical Security Market Line ("SML") described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. ${ }^{30}$ The ECAPM reflects this empirical reality. Fama and French clearly state regarding Figure 2, below, that " $[t]$ he returns on the low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low." ${ }^{31}$

Figure 2 http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/0895330042162430
Average Annualized Monthly Return versus Beta for Value Weight Portfolios
Formed on Prior Beta, 1928-2003


In addition, Morin observes that while the results of these tests support the notion that beta is related to security returns, the empirical SML described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. Morin states:

With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that ... low-beta securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than predicted. ${ }^{32}$

$$
* \quad * \quad *
$$

Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the expected return on a security is related to its risk by the following approximation:

$$
K=R_{F}+x \beta\left(R_{M}-R_{F}\right)+(1-x) \beta\left(R_{M}-R_{F}\right)
$$

[^8]where $x$ is a fraction to be determined empirically. The value of $x$ that best explains the observed relationship [is] Return $=0.0829+0.0520 \beta$ is between 0.25 and 0.30 . If $x=0.25$, the equation becomes:
$$
\mathrm{K}=\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{F}}+0.25\left(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{M}}-\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{F}}\right)+0.75 \beta\left(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{M}}-\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{F}}\right)^{33}
$$

Fama and French provide similar support for the ECAPM when they state:
The early tests firmly reject the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM. There is a positive relation between beta and average return, but it is too 'flat.'... The regressions consistently find that the intercept is greater than the average risk-free rate... and the coefficient on beta is less than the average excess market return... This is true in the early tests... as well as in more recent cross-section regressions tests, like Fama and French (1992). ${ }^{34}$

Finally, Fama and French further note:
Confirming earlier evidence, the relation between beta and average return for the ten portfolios is much flatter than the Sharpe-Linter CAPM predicts. The returns on low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low. For example, the predicted return on the portfolio with the lowest beta is 8.3 percent per year; the actual return as 11.1 percent. The predicted return on the portfolio with the highest beta is 16.8 percent per year; the actual is 13.7 percent. ${ }^{35}$

Clearly, the justification from Morin, Fama, and French along with their reviews of other academic research on the CAPM, validate the use of the ECAPM. In view of theory and practical research, I have applied both the traditional CAPM and the ECAPM to the companies in the Utility Proxy Group and averaged the results.

## Q46. What Beta coefficients did you use in your CAPM analysis?

A. With respect to the Beta coefficient, I considered two methods of calculation: 1) the average of the Beta coefficients of the Utility Proxy Group companies reported by Bloomberg Professional Services; and 2) the average of the Beta coefficients of the Utility Proxy Group companies as reported by Value Line. While both of those services adjust

[^9]their calculated (or "raw") Beta coefficients to reflect the tendency of the Beta coefficient to regress to the market mean of 1.00 , Value Line calculates the Beta coefficient over a five-year period, while Bloomberg's calculation is based on two years of data.

## Q47. Please describe your selection of a risk-free rate of return.

A. As shown in Column 5 on page 1 of Schedule DWD-5, the risk-free rate adopted for both applications of the CAPM is $2.73 \%$. This risk-free rate of $2.73 \%$ is based on the average of the Blue Chip consensus forecast of the expected yields on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds for the six quarters ending with the third calendar quarter of 2022, and long-term projections for the years 2022 to 2026 and 2027 to 2031.

Q48. Why is the yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds appropriate for use as the riskfree rate?
A. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury Bonds is almost risk-free, and its term is consistent with the long-term cost of capital to public utilities measured by the yields on A2-rated public utility bonds, the long-term investment horizon inherent in utilities' common stocks, and the long-term life of the jurisdictional rate base to which the allowed fair rate of return (i.e., cost of capital) will be applied. In contrast, short-term U.S. Treasury yields are more volatile and largely a function of Federal Reserve monetary policy.

Q49. Please explain the estimation of the expected risk premium for the market used in your CAPM analyses.
A. The basis of the market risk premium is explained in detail in note 1 on page 2 of Schedule DWD-5. As discussed previously, the market risk premium is derived from an average of:
(i) Ibbotson-based market risk premiums;
(ii) Value Line data-based market risk premiums; and
(iii) Bloomberg data-based market risk premiums.

The long-term income return on U.S. Government Securities of $5.05 \%$ was deducted from the SBBI-2021 monthly historical total market return of $12.20 \%$, which results in an historical market equity risk premium of $7.15 \% .{ }^{36}$ I applied a linear OLS regression to the monthly annualized historical returns on the $\mathrm{S} \& \mathrm{P} 500$ relative to historical yields on long-term U.S. Government Securities from SBBI - 2021. That regression analysis yielded a market equity risk premium of $9.54 \%$. The PRPM market equity risk premium is $10.46 \%$ and is derived using the PRPM relative to the yields on long-term U.S. Treasury securities from January 1926 through March 2021.

The Value Line-derived forecasted total market equity risk premium is derived by deducting the forecasted risk-free rate of $2.73 \%$, discussed above, from the Value Line projected total annual market return of $8.45 \%$, resulting in a forecasted total market equity risk premium of $5.72 \%$. The $\mathrm{S} \& \mathrm{P} 500$ projected market equity risk premium using Value Line data is derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of $2.73 \%$ from the projected total return of the $\mathrm{S} \& \mathrm{P} 500$ of $14.16 \%$. The resulting market equity risk premium is $11.43 \%$.

The S\&P 500 projected market equity risk premium using Bloomberg data is derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of $2.73 \%$ from the projected total return of the $\mathrm{S} \& \mathrm{P} 500$ of $15.81 \%$. The resulting market equity risk premium is $13.08 \%$.

These six market risk premiums, when averaged, result in an average total market equity risk premium of $9.56 \%$.

Table 7: Summary of the Calculation of the Market Risk Premium for use in the CAPM ${ }^{37}$

[^10]| Historical Spread Between Total Returns of Large <br> Stocks and Long-Term Government Bond Yields <br> $(1926-2020)$ | $7.15 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Regression Analysis on Historical Data | $9.54 \%$ |
| PRPM Analysis on Historical Data | $10.46 \%$ |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total Market <br> Returns from Value Line Summary \& Index less <br> Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields | $5.72 \%$ |
| Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of <br> Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Value | $11.43 \%$ |
| Line for the S\&P 500 less Projected 30-Year Treasury <br> Bond Yields | $\underline{\underline{\text { Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of }}}$Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <br> Bloomberg Professional Services for the S\&P 500 <br> less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields |
| Average | $\underline{\underline{9.56 \%}}$ |

Q50. What are the results of your application of the traditional and empirical CAPM to the Utility Proxy Group?
A. As shown on page 1 of Schedule DWD-5, the mean result of my CAPM/ECAPM analysis is $10.45 \%$, the median is $10.45 \%$, and the average of the two is $10.45 \%$. Consistent with my reliance on the average of mean and median DCF results discussed above, the indicated common equity cost rate using the CAPM/ECAPM is $10.45 \%$.

## D. COMMON EQUITY COST RATES FOR A PROXY GROUP OF DOMESTIC, NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES BASED ON THE DCF, RPM, AND CAPM

Q51. Why did you also consider a proxy group of domestic, non-price regulated companies?
A. In the Hope and Bluefield cases, the U.S. Supreme Court did not specify that comparable risk companies had to be utilities. Since the purpose of rate regulation is to be a substitute for the competition of the marketplace, non-price regulated firms operating in the competitive marketplace make an excellent proxy if they are comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group being used to estimate the cost of common equity. The selection of
such domestic, non-price regulated competitive firms theoretically and empirically results in a proxy group which is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group.

Q52. How did you select non-price regulated companies that are comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group?
A. In order to select a proxy group of domestic, non-price regulated companies similar in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group, I relied on the Beta coefficients and related statistics derived from Value Line regression analyses of weekly market prices over the most recent 260 weeks (i.e., five years). Using these selection criteria resulted in a proxy group of 20 domestic, non-price regulated firms comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group. Total risk is the sum of non-diversifiable market risk and diversifiable company-specific risks. The criteria used in the selection of the domestic, non-price regulated firms was:
(i) They must be covered by Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition);
(ii) They must be domestic, non-price regulated companies, i.e., non-utilities;
(iii) Their Beta coefficients must lie within plus or minus two standard deviations of the average unadjusted Beta coefficient of the Utility Proxy Group; and
(iv) The residual standard errors of the Value Line regressions which gave rise to the unadjusted Beta coefficients must lie within plus or minus two standard deviations of the average residual standard error of the Utility Proxy Group.

Beta coefficients are a measure of market or systematic risk, which is not diversifiable. The residual standard errors of the regressions were used to measure each firm's company-specific, diversifiable risk. Companies that have similar Beta coefficients and similar residual standard errors resulting from the same regression analyses have similar total investment risk.

Q53. Have you prepared a schedule which shows the data from which you selected the 20 domestic, non-price regulated companies that are comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group?
A. Yes, the basis of my selection, and both proxy groups' regression statistics, are shown in Schedule DWD-6.

Q54. Did you calculate common equity cost rates using the DCF, RPM, and CAPM for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group?
A. Yes. Because the DCF, RPM, and CAPM have been applied in an identical manner as described above, I will not repeat the details of the rationale and application of each model. One exception is in the application of the RPM, where I did not use public utility-specific equity risk premiums, nor did I apply the PRPM to the individual companies.

Page 2 of Schedule DWD-7 contains the derivation of the DCF cost rates. As shown, the indicated common equity cost rate using the DCF for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group, is $11.51 \%$.

Pages 3 through 5 of DWD-7 contain the data and calculations that support the $10.85 \%$ RPM cost rate. As shown on Line No. 1 of page 3 of Schedule DWD-7, the consensus prospective yield on Moody's Baa-rated corporate bonds for the six quarters ending in the third quarter of 2022, and for the years 2022 to 2026 and 2027 to 2031, is $4.36 \% .^{38}$ Because the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group has an average Moody's bond rating of Baa1, a downward adjustment of $0.13 \%$ to the prospective Baa2-rated bond yield is necessary to reflect the difference in bond ratings. ${ }^{39}$ Subtracting $0.13 \%$ from the prospective Baa2-rated bond yield of $4.36 \%$ is $4.23 \%$.

[^11]When the beta-adjusted risk premium of $6.62 \%{ }^{40}$ relative to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group is added to the prospective Baa1-rated corporate bond yield of $4.23 \%$, the indicated RPM cost rate is $10.85 \%$.

Page 6 contains the inputs and calculations that support my indicated CAPM/ECAPM cost rate of $10.30 \%$.

Q55. What is the cost rate of common equity based on the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group?
A. As shown on page 1 of Schedule DWD-7, the results of the DCF, RPM, and CAPM applied to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group are $11.51 \%, 10.85 \%$, and $10.30 \%$, respectively. The average of the mean and median of these models is $10.87 \%$, which I used as the indicated common equity cost rate for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group.

## VIII. CONCLUSION OF COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BEFORE ADJUSTMENT

Q56. What is the indicated range of common equity cost rates before adjustments?
A. Based on the results of the application of multiple cost of common equity models to the Utility Proxy Group, my recommended range of ROEs attributable to the Utility Proxy Group is between $10.27 \%$ (average of all model results) and $10.66 \%$ (median of model results).

I used multiple cost of common equity models as primary tools in arriving at my recommended common equity cost rate, because no single model is so inherently precise that it can be relied on solely to the exclusion of other theoretically sound models. The use of multiple models adds reliability to the estimation of the common equity cost rate, and
$40 \quad$ Derived on page 5 of Schedule DWD-7.
the prudence of using multiple cost of common equity models is supported in both the financial literature and regulatory precedent.

As discussed previously, after determining the indicated range of ROE attributable to a comparable group, there must be an evaluation of relative risk between that group and the target company to determine whether it is appropriate to apply adjustments to the comparable group's indicated ROE to better reflect the target company's specific risks.

## IX. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE COMMON EQUITY COST RATE

## A. SIZE ADJUSTMENT

Q57. Does Aqua OH's smaller size compared with the Utility Proxy Group increase its business risk?
A. Yes. Aqua OH's smaller size relative to the Utility Proxy Group companies indicates greater relative business risk for the Company because, all else being equal, size has a material bearing on risk.

Size affects business risk because smaller companies generally are less able to cope with significant events that affect sales, revenues, and earnings. For example, smaller companies face more risk exposure to business cycles and economic conditions, both nationally and locally. Additionally, the loss of revenues from a few larger customers would have a greater effect on a small company than on a bigger company with a larger, more diverse, customer base.

As further evidence illustrates that smaller firms are riskier, investors generally demand greater returns from smaller firms to compensate for less marketability and liquidity of their securities. Duff \& Phelps' 2020 Valuation Handbook - U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital ("D\&P - 2020") discusses the nature of the small-size phenomenon,
providing an indication of the magnitude of the size premium based on several measures of size. In discussing "Size as a Predictor of Equity Premiums," D\&P - 2020 states:

The size effect is based on the empirical observation that companies of smaller size are associated with greater risk and, therefore, have greater cost of capital [sic]. The "size" of a company is one of the most important risk elements to consider when developing cost of equity capital estimates for use in valuing a business simply because size has been shown to be a predictor of equity returns. In other words, there is a significant (negative) relationship between size and historical equity returns - as size decreases, returns tend to increase, and vice versa. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original) ${ }^{41}$

Furthermore, in "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence," Fama and French note size is indeed a risk factor which must be reflected when estimating the cost of common equity. On page 38 , they note:
. . . the higher average returns on small stocks and high book-to-market stocks reflect unidentified state variables that produce undiversifiable risks (covariances) in returns not captured in the market return and are priced separately from market betas. ${ }^{42}$

Based on this evidence, Fama and French proposed their three-factor model which includes a size variable in recognition of the effect size has on the cost of common equity.

Also, it is a basic financial principle that the use of funds invested, and not the source of funds, is what gives rise to the risk of any investment. ${ }^{43}$ Eugene Brigham, a wellknown authority, states:

A number of researchers have observed that portfolios of small-firms (sic) have earned consistently higher average returns than those of large-firm stocks; this is called the "small-firm effect." On the surface, it would seem to be advantageous to the small firms to provide average returns in a stock market that are higher than those of larger firms. In reality, it is bad news for the small firm; what the small-firm effect means is that the capital

[^12]market demands higher returns on stocks of small firms than on otherwise similar stocks of the large firms. (emphasis added) ${ }^{44}$

Consistent with the financial principle of risk and return discussed above, increased relative risk due to small size must be considered in the allowed rate of return on common equity. Therefore, the Commission's authorization of a cost rate of common equity in this proceeding must appropriately reflect the unique risks of Aqua OH , including its small size, which is justified and supported above by evidence in the financial literature.

## Q58. Should the Commission consider Aqua OH as a stand-alone company?

A. Yes, it should. Because it is Aqua OHs rate base to which the overall rates of return set forth in this proceeding will be applied, they should be evaluated as a stand-alone entity. To do otherwise would be discriminatory, confiscatory, and inaccurate. It is also a basic financial precept that the use of the funds invested give rise to the risk of the investment. As Brealey and Myers state:

The true cost of capital depends on the use to which the capital is put.
***

Each project should be evaluated at its own opportunity cost of capital; the true cost of capital depends on the use to which the capital is put. (italics and bold in original) ${ }^{45}$

Morin confirms Brealey and Myers when he states:
Financial theory clearly establishes that the cost of equity is the riskadjusted opportunity cost of the investors and not the cost of the specific capital sources employed by the investors. The true cost of capital depends on the use to which the capital is put and not on its source. The Hope and Bluefield doctrines have made clear that the relevant considerations in calculating a company's cost of capital are the alternatives available to

44 Eugene F. Brigham, Fundamentals of Financial Management, Fifth Edition (The Dryden Press, 1989), at 623.

Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, McGraw-Hill, Third Edition, 1988, at pp. 173, 198.
investors and the returns and risks associated with those alternatives. ${ }^{46}$
Additionally, Levy and Sarnat state:
The firm's cost of capital is the discount rate employed to discount the firm's average cash flow, hence obtaining the value of the firm. It is also the weighted average cost of capital, as we shall see below. The weighted average cost of capital should be employed for project evaluation... only in cases where the risk profile of the new projects is a "carbon copy" of the risk profile of the firm ${ }^{47}$

Although Levy and Sarnat discuss a project's cost of capital relative to a firm's cost of capital, these principles apply equally to the use of a proxy group-based cost of capital. Each company must be viewed on its own merits, regardless of the source of its equity capital. As Bluefield clearly states:

A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; ${ }^{48}$

In other words, it is the "risks and uncertainties" surrounding the property employed for the "convenience of the public" which determines the appropriate level of rates. In this proceeding, the property employed "for the convenience of the public" is the rate base of Aqua OH . Thus, it is only the risk of investment in Aqua OH that is relevant to the determination of the cost of common equity to be applied to the common equity-financed portion of that rate base.

In addition, in the Fama and French article previously cited, the authors ${ }^{49}$ proposed that their three-factor model include the SMB (Small Minus Big) factor, which indicates

[^13]that small capitalization firms are more risky than large capitalization firms, confirming that size is a risk factor which must be taken into account in estimating the cost of common equity.

Consistent with the financial principle of risk and return discussed previously, and the stand-alone nature of ratemaking, an upward adjustment must be applied to the indicated cost of common equity derived from the cost of equity models of the proxy groups used in this proceeding.

Q59. Is there a way to quantify a relative risk adjustment due to Aqua $\mathbf{O H}$ 's small size relative to the Utility Proxy Group?
A. Yes. The Company has greater relative risk than the average company in the Utility Proxy Group because of its smaller size compared with the group, as measured by an estimated market capitalization of common equity for Aqua OH (whose common stock is not publicly traded).

Table 8: Size as Measured by Market Capitalization for the Company and the Utility Proxy Group

|  | Market <br> Capitalization* <br> (\$ Millions) | Times Greater Than <br> the Company |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Aqua OH | $\$ 447.841$ |  |
| Utility Proxy Group Median | $\$ 1,610.897$ | 3.6 x |
| *From page 1 of Schedule DWD-8. |  |  |

The Company's estimated market capitalization was at $\$ 447.841$ million as of April 5, 2021, compared with the median market capitalization of the Utility Proxy Group of $\$ 1.6$ billion as of April 5, 2021. The Utility Proxy Group's market capitalization is 3.6 times the size of Aqua OH 's estimated market capitalization.

As a result, it is necessary to upwardly adjust the indicated range of common equity cost rates to reflect Aqua OH's greater risk due to its smaller relative size. The determination is based on the size premiums for portfolios of New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ listed companies ranked by deciles for the 1926 to 2020 period. The average size premium for the Utility Proxy Group with a market capitalization of $\$ 1.6$ billion falls in the $6^{\text {th }}$ decile, while Aqua OH 's market capitalization of $\$ 447.841$ million places the Company in the $9^{\text {th }}$ decile. The size premium spread between the $6^{\text {th }}$ decile and the $9^{\text {th }}$ decile is $0.92 \%$. Even though a $0.92 \%$ upward size adjustment is indicated, I apply a size premium of $0.25 \%$ to Aqua OH's indicated range of common equity cost rates.

Q60. Since Aqua OH is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Essential, why is the size of Essential not more appropriate to use when determining the size adjustment?
A. As discussed above, the return derived in this proceeding will not apply to Essential as a whole, but only Aqua OH. Essential is the sum of its constituent parts, including those constituent parts' returns on common equity. Potential investors in Essential are aware that it is a combination of operations in each state, and that each state's operations experience the operating risks specific to their jurisdiction. The market's expectation of Essential's return is commensurate with the realities of its composite operations in each of the states in which it operates.

## B. FLOTATION COST ADJUSTMENT

## Q61. What are flotation costs?

A. Flotation costs are those costs associated with the sale of new issuances of common stock. They include market pressure and the essential costs of issuance, (e.g., underwriting fees and out-of-pocket costs for printing, legal, registration, etc.).

Q62. Why is it important to recognize flotation costs in the allowed common equity cost rate?
A. It is important because there is no other mechanism in the ratemaking paradigm with which such costs can be recovered. Because these costs are real and legitimate, recovery of these costs should be permitted. As noted by Morin:

The costs of issuing these securities are just as real as operating and maintenance expenses or costs incurred to build utility plants, and fair regulatory treatment must permit recovery of these costs....

The simple fact of the matter is that common equity capital is not free....[Flotation costs] must be recovered through a rate of return adjustment ${ }^{50}$

Q63. Should flotation costs be recognized only when there was an issuance during the test year or there is an imminent post-test year issuance of additional common stock?
A. No. As noted above, there is no mechanism to recapture such costs in the ratemaking paradigm other than an adjustment to the allowed common equity cost rate. Flotation costs are charged to capital accounts and are not expensed on a utility's income statement. As such, flotation costs are analogous to capital investments reflected on the balance sheet. Recovery of capital investments relates to the expected useful lives of the investment. Since common equity has a very long and indefinite life (assumed to be infinity in the standard regulatory DCF model), flotation costs should be recovered through an adjustment to common equity cost rate even when there has not been an issuance during the test year or in the absence of an expected imminent issuance of additional shares of common stock. Historical flotation costs are a permanent loss of investment to the utility and should be accounted for. When any company, including a utility, issues common stock, flotation

[^14]costs are incurred for legal, accounting, printing fees and the like. For each dollar of issuing market price, a small percentage is expensed and is permanently unavailable for investment in utility rate base. Since these expenses are charged to capital accounts and not expensed on the income statement, the only way to restore the full value of that dollar of issuing price with an assumed investor required return of $10 \%$ is for the net investment, $\$ 0.95$, to earn more than $10 \%$ to net back to the investor a fair return on that dollar. In other words, if a company issues stock at $\$ 1.00$ with $5 \%$ in flotation costs, it will net $\$ 0.95$ in investment. Assuming the investor in that stock requires a $10 \%$ return on his or her invested $\$ 1.00$ (i.e., a return of \$0.10), the company needs to earn approximately $10.5 \%$ on its invested $\$ 0.95$ to receive a $\$ 0.10$ return.

Q64. Do the common equity cost rate models you have used already reflect investors' anticipation of flotation costs?
A. No. All of these models assume no transaction costs. The literature is quite clear that these costs are not reflected in market prices paid for common stocks. For example, Brigham and Daves confirm this and provide the methodology utilized to calculate the flotation adjustment. ${ }^{51}$ In addition, Morin confirms the need for such an adjustment even when no new equity issuance is imminent. ${ }^{52}$ Consequently, it is proper to include a flotation cost adjustment when using cost of common equity models to estimate the common equity cost rate.
$51 \quad$ Brigham and Daves 342.
52 Morin 327-30.

## Q65. How did you calculate the flotation cost allowance?

A. I modified the DCF calculation to provide a dividend yield that would reimburse investors for issuance costs in accordance with the method cited in literature by Brigham and Daves as well as Morin. The flotation cost adjustment recognizes the costs of issuing equity that were incurred by Essential since January 2019. Based upon the issuance costs shown on page 1 of Schedule DWD-9, an adjustment of $0.05 \%$ is required to reflect the flotation costs applicable to the Utility Proxy Group.

Q66. What is the indicated cost of common equity after adjustments for size and flotation costs?
A. After applying the $0.25 \%$ upward adjustment for Aqua OH's smaller size and the $0.05 \%$ flotation cost adjustment to the indicated range of equity cost rates between $10.27 \%$ and $10.66 \%$ applicable to the Utility Proxy Group, an adjusted range of common equity cost rates between $10.57 \%$ and $10.96 \%$ applicable to Aqua OH results. From that range, I recommend the Commission approve an ROE of $10.75 \%$.

## X. CONCLUSION

Q67. What is your recommended return on investor-supplied capital for Aqua OH ?
A. Given the expected actual capital structure ending December 31, 2021 which consists of $48.11 \%$ long-term debt at an embedded debt cost rate of $3.82 \%$ and $51.89 \%$ common equity at my recommended ROE of $10.75 \%$, I conclude that an appropriate return on investorsupplied capital for the Company is $7.42 \%$. A common equity cost rate of $10.75 \%$ is consistent with the Hope and Bluefield standard of a just and reasonable return which ensures the integrity of presently invested capital and enables the attraction of needed new capital on reasonable terms. It also ensures that Aqua OH will be able to continue
providing safe, adequate, and reliable service to the benefit of its customers. Thus, it balances the interests of both customers and the Company.

Q68. In your opinion, is your proposed common equity cost rate of $\mathbf{1 0 . 7 5 \%}$ fair and reasonable to Aqua $\mathbf{O H}$, its shareholders, and its customers?
A. Yes, it is.

Q69. Does this conclude your direct testimony?
A. Yes, it does.

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the Direct Testimony of Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA, CVA Partner Scottmadden, Inc. was served by electronic mail to the following persons on this 12th of July, 2021:

John Jones
Chief, Public Utilities Section
Office of Ohio Attorney General
30 East Broad Street, 16th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
John.Jones @ OhioAttorneyGeneral.gov
Amy Botschner O'Brien
Ambrosia E. Wilson
Ohio Consumers' Counsel
65 E. State Street, 7th Fl.
Columbus, Ohio 43215
Amy.botschner.obrien@occ.ohio.gov
Ambrosia.wilson@occ.ohio.gov
/s Christopher L. Miller
Christopher L. Miller
One of the Attorneys for Aqua Ohio, Inc. and Aqua
Ohio Wastewater, Inc.

## Summary

Dylan is an experienced consultant and a Certified Rate of Return Analyst (CRRA) and Certified Valuation Analyst (CVA). He has served as a consultant for investor-owned and municipal utilities and authorities for 13 years. Dylan has extensive experience in rate of return analyses, class cost of service, rate design, and valuation for regulated public utilities. He has testified as an expert witness in the subjects of rate of return, cost of service, rate design, and valuation before 30 regulatory commissions in the U.S., one Canadian province, and an American Arbitration Association panel.

He also maintains the benchmark index against which the Hennessy Gas Utility Mutual Fund performance is measured.

## Areas of Specialization

| $\square$ | Regulation and Rates | Financial Modeling | $\square$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Utilities | Valuation | Rate of Return |  |
| Mutual Fund Benchmarking | $\square$ | Regulatory Strategy | $\square$ |
| Cost of Service |  |  |  |
| Capital Market Risk | $\square$ | Rate Case Support |  |

## Recent Expert Testimony Submission/Appearances

Jurisdiction

- Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities
- New Jersey Board of Public Utilities
- Hawaii Public Utilities Commission
- South Carolina Public Service Commission
- American Arbitration Association


## Topic

Rate of Return
Rate of Return
Cost of Service, Rate Design
Return on Common Equity
Valuation

## Recent Assignments

- Provided expert testimony on the cost of capital for ratemaking purposes before numerous state utility regulatory agencies
- Maintains the benchmark index against which the Hennessy Gas Utility Mutual Fund performance is measured
- Sponsored valuation testimony for a large municipal water company in front of an American Arbitration Association Board to justify the reasonability of their lease payments to the City
- Co-authored a valuation report on behalf of a large investor-owned utility company in response to a new state regulation which allowed the appraised value of acquired assets into rate base


## Recent Publications and Speeches

- Co-Author of: "Decoupling, Risk Impacts and the Cost of Capital", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Pauline M. Ahern. The Electricity Journal, March, 2020.
- Co-Author of: "Decoupling Impact and Public Utility Conservation Investment", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Pauline M. Ahern. Energy Policy Journal, 130 (2019), 311-319.

■ "Establishing Alternative Proxy Groups", before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 51st Financial Forum, April 4, 2019, New Orleans, LA.
■ "Past is Prologue: Future Test Year", Presentation before the National Association of Water Companies 2017 Southeast Water Infrastructure Summit, May 2, 2017, Savannah, GA.

- Co-author of: "Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model ${ }^{T M}$, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University, Pauline M. Ahern, and Frank J. Hanley, The Electricity Journal, May, 2013.
- "Decoupling: Impact on the Risk and Cost of Common Equity of Public Utility Stocks", before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 45th Financial Forum, April 17-18, 2013, Indianapolis, IN.

| SPONSOR | Date | CASE/APPLICANT | Docket No. | SUBJECT |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Regulatory Commission of Alaska |  |  |  |  |
| Alaska Power Company | 09/20 | Alaska Power Company; Goat Lake Hydro, Inc.; BBL Hydro, Inc. | Tariff Nos. TA886-2; TA6-521; TA4-573 | Capital Structure |
| Alaska Power Company | 07/16 | Alaska Power Company | Docket No. TA857-2 | Rate of Return |
| Alberta Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR Distribution \& Transmission, Inc. | 01/20 | AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR <br> Distribution \& Transmission, Inc. | 2021 Generic Cost of Capital, Proceeding ID. 24110 | Rate of Return |
| Arizona Corporation Commission |  |  |  |  |
| EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc. | 06/20 | EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc. | Docket No. WS-01303A-200177 | Rate of Return |
| Arizona Water Company | 12/19 | Arizona Water Company - Western Group | Docket No. W-01445A-19- $0278$ | Rate of Return |
| Arizona Water Company | 08/18 | Arizona Water Company - Northern Group | Docket No. W-01445A-180164 | Rate of Return |
| Colorado Public Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Summit Utilities, Inc. | 04/18 | Colorado Natural Gas Company | Docket No. 18AL-0305G | Rate of Return |
| Atmos Energy Corporation | 06/17 | Atmos Energy Corporation | Docket No. 17AL-0429G | Rate of Return |
| Delaware Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Delmarva Power \& Light Co. | 11/20 | Delmarva Power \& Light Co. | Docket No. 20-0149 (Electric) | Return on Equity |
| Delmarva Power \& Light Co. | 10/20 | Delmarva Power \& Light Co. | Docket No. 20-0150 (Gas) | Return on Equity |
| Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | 11/13 | Tidewater Utilities, Inc. | Docket No. 13-466 | Capital Structure |
| Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia |  |  |  |  |
| Washington Gas Light Company | 09/20 | Washington Gas Light Company | Formal Case No. 1162 | Rate of Return |
| Federal Energy Regulatory Commission |  |  |  |  |
| LS Power Grid California, LLC | 10/20 | LS Power Grid California, LLC | Docket No. ER21-195-000 | Rate of Return |
| Florida Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Tampa Electric Company | 04/21 | Tampa Electric Company | Docket No. 20210034-EI | Return on Equity |
| Peoples Gas System | 09/20 | Peoples Gas System | Docket No. 20200051-GU | Rate of Return |
| Utilities, Inc. of Florida | 06/20 | Utilities, Inc. of Florida | Docket No. 20200139-WS | Rate of Return |
| Hawaii Public Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Launiupoko Irrigation Company, Inc. | 12/20 | Launiupoko Irrigation Company, Inc. | Docket No. 2020-0217 / <br> Transferred to 2020-0089 | Capital Structure |
| Lanai Water Company, Inc. | 12/19 | Lanai Water Company, Inc. | Docket No. 2019-0386 | Cost of Service / Rate Design |
| Manele Water Resources, LLC | 08/19 | Manele Water Resources, LLC | Docket No. 2019-0311 | Cost of Service / Rate Design |
| Kaupulehu Water Company | 02/18 | Kaupulehu Water Company | Docket No. 2016-0363 | Rate of Return |
| Aqua Engineers, LLC | 05/17 | Puhi Sewer \& Water Company | Docket No. 2017-0118 | Cost of Service / Rate Design |
| Hawaii Resources, Inc. | 09/16 | Laie Water Company | Docket No. 2016-0229 | Cost of Service / Rate Design |
| Illinois Commerce Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Utility Services of Illinois, Inc. | 02/21 | Utility Services of Illinois, Inc. | Docket No. 21-0198 | Rate of Return |


| SpONSOR | Date | CASE/APPLICANT | Docket No. | SUBJECT |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois | 07/20 | Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois | Docket No. 20-0308 | Return on Equity |
| Utility Services of Illinois, Inc. | 11/17 | Utility Services of Illinois, Inc. | Docket No. 17-1106 | Cost of Service / Rate Design |
| Aqua Illinois, Inc. | 04/17 | Aqua Illinois, Inc. | Docket No. 17-0259 | Rate of Return |
| Utility Services of Illinois, Inc. | 04/15 | Utility Services of Illinois, Inc. | Docket No. 14-0741 | Rate of Return |
| Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Aqua Indiana, Inc. | 03/16 | Aqua Indiana, Inc. Aboite Wastewater Division | Docket No. 44752 | Rate of Return |
| Twin Lakes, Utilities, Inc. | 08/13 | Twin Lakes, Utilities, Inc. | Docket No. 44388 | Rate of Return |
| Kansas Corporation Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Atmos Energy | 07/19 | Atmos Energy | 19-ATMG-525-RTS | Rate of Return |
| Kentucky Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Bluegrass Water Utility Operating Company | 10/20 | Bluegrass Water Utility Operating Company | 2020-00290 | Return on Equity |
| Louisiana Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Southwestern Electric Power Company | 12/20 | Southwestern Electric Power Company | Docket No. U-35441 | Return on Equity |
| Atmos Energy | 04/20 | Atmos Energy | Docket No. U-35535 | Rate of Return |
| Louisiana Water Service, Inc. | 06/13 | Louisiana Water Service, Inc. | Docket No. U-32848 | Rate of Return |
| Maryland Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Washington Gas Light Company | 08/20 | Washington Gas Light Company | Case No. 9651 | Rate of Return |
| FirstEnergy, Inc. | 08/18 | Potomac Edison Company | Case No. 9490 | Rate of Return |
| Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities |  |  |  |  |
| Unitil Corporation | 12/19 | Fitchburg Gas \& Electric Co. (Elec.) | D.P.U. 19-130 | Rate of Return |
| Unitil Corporation | 12/19 | Fitchburg Gas \& Electric Co. (Gas) | D.P.U. 19-131 | Rate of Return |
| Liberty Utilities | 07/15 | Liberty Utilities d/b/a New England Natural Gas Company | Docket No. 15-75 | Rate of Return |
| Minnesota Public Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Northern States Power Company | 11/20 | Northern States Power Company | Docket No. E002/GR-20-723 | Rate of Return |
| Mississippi Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Atmos Energy | 03/19 | Atmos Energy | Docket No. 2015-UN-049 | Capital Structure |
| Atmos Energy | 07/18 | Atmos Energy | Docket No. 2015-UN-049 | Capital Structure |
| Missouri Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Spire Missouri, Inc. | 12/20 | Spire Missouri, Inc. | Case No. GR-2021-0108 | Return on Equity |
| Indian Hills Utility Operating Company, Inc. | 10/17 | Indian Hills Utility Operating Company, Inc. | Case No. SR-2017-0259 | Rate of Return |
| Raccoon Creek Utility Operating Company, Inc. | 09/16 | Raccoon Creek Utility Operating Company, Inc. | Docket No. SR-2016-0202 | Rate of Return |
| Public Utilities Commission of Nevada |  |  |  |  |
| Southwest Gas Corporation | 08/20 | Southwest Gas Corporation | Docket No. 20-02023 | Return on Equity |
| New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |


| SPONSOR | Date | Case/Applicant | Docket No. | SUBJECT |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aquarion Water Company of New Hampshire, Inc. | 12/20 | Aquarion Water Company of New Hampshire, Inc. | Docket No. DW 20-184 | Rate of Return |
| New Jersey Board of Public Utilities |  |  |  |  |
| Atlantic City Electric Company | 12/20 | Atlantic City Electric Company | Docket No. ER20120746 | Return on Equity |
| FirstEnergy | 02/20 | Jersey Central Power \& Light Co. | Docket No. ER20020146 | Rate of Return |
| Aqua New Jersey, Inc. | 12/18 | Aqua New Jersey, Inc. | Docket No. WR18121351 | Rate of Return |
| Middlesex Water Company | 10/17 | Middlesex Water Company | Docket No. WR17101049 | Rate of Return |
| Middlesex Water Company | 03/15 | Middlesex Water Company | Docket No. WR15030391 | Rate of Return |
| The Atlantic City Sewerage Company | 10/14 | The Atlantic City Sewerage Company | Docket No. WR14101263 | Cost of Service / Rate Design |
| Middlesex Water Company | 11/13 | Middlesex Water Company | Docket No. WR1311059 | Capital Structure |
| New Mexico Public Regulation Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Southwestern Public Service Company | 01/21 | Southwestern Public Service Company | Case No. 20-00238-UT | Return on Equity |
| North Carolina Utilities Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Piedmont Natural Gas Co.lnc. | 03/21 | Piedmont Natural Gas Co., Inc. | Docket No. G-9, Sub 781 | Return on Equity |
| Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC | 07/20 | Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC | Docket No. E-7, Sub 1214 | Return on Equity |
| Duke Energy Progress, LLC | 07/20 | Duke Energy Progress, LLC | Docket No. E-2, Sub 1219 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua North Carolina, Inc. | 12/19 | Aqua North Carolina, Inc. | Docket No. W-218 Sub 526 | Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 06/19 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. | Docket No. W-354 Sub 364 | Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 09/18 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. | Docket No. W-354 Sub 360 | Rate of Return |
| Aqua North Carolina, Inc. | 07/18 | Aqua North Carolina, Inc. | Docket No. W-218 Sub 497 | Rate of Return |
| North Dakota Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Northern States Power Company | 11/20 | Northern States Power Company | Case No. PU-20-441 | Rate of Return |
| Public Utilities Commission of Ohio |  |  |  |  |
| Aqua Ohio, Inc. | 05/16 | Aqua Ohio, Inc. | Docket No. 16-0907-WW-AIR | Rate of Return |
| Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Valley Energy, Inc. | 07/19 | C\&T Enterprises | Docket No. R-2019-3008209 | Rate of Return |
| Wellsboro Electric Company | 07/19 | C\&T Enterprises | Docket No. R-2019-3008208 | Rate of Return |
| Citizens' Electric Company of Lewisburg | 07/19 | C\&T Enterprises | Docket No. R-2019-3008212 | Rate of Return |
| Steelton Borough Authority | 01/19 | Steelton Borough Authority | Docket No. A-2019-3006880 | Valuation |
| Mahoning Township, PA | 08/18 | Mahoning Township, PA | Docket No. A-2018-3003519 | Valuation |
| SUEZ Water Pennsylvania Inc. | 04/18 | SUEZ Water Pennsylvania Inc. | Docket No. R-2018-000834 | Rate of Return |
| Columbia Water Company | 09/17 | Columbia Water Company | Docket No. R-2017-2598203 | Rate of Return |
| Veolia Energy Philadelphia, Inc. | 06/17 | Veolia Energy Philadelphia, Inc. | Docket No. R-2017-2593142 | Rate of Return |
| Emporium Water Company | 07/14 | Emporium Water Company | Docket No. R-2014-2402324 | Rate of Return |
| Columbia Water Company | 07/13 | Columbia Water Company | Docket No. R-2013-2360798 | Rate of Return |
| Penn Estates Utilities, Inc. | 12/11 | Penn Estates, Utilities, Inc. | Docket No. R-2011-2255159 | Capital Structure / Long-Term Debt Cost Rate |


| SPONSOR | Date | Case/Applicant | Docket No. | SUBJECT |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| South Carolina Public Service Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Blue Granite Water Co. | 12/19 | Blue Granite Water Company | Docket No. 2019-292-WS | Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 02/18 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. | Docket No. 2017-292-WS | Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 06/15 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. | Docket No. 2015-199-WS | Rate of Return |
| Carolina Water Service, Inc. | 11/13 | Carolina Water Service, Inc. | Docket No. 2013-275-WS | Rate of Return |
| United Utility Companies, Inc. | 09/13 | United Utility Companies, Inc. | Docket No. 2013-199-WS | Rate of Return |
| Utility Services of South Carolina, Inc. | 09/13 | Utility Services of South Carolina, Inc. | Docket No. 2013-201-WS | Rate of Return |
| Tega Cay Water Services, Inc. | 11/12 | Tega Cay Water Services, Inc. | Docket No. 2012-177-WS | Capital Structure |
| Tennessee Public Utility Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Piedmont Natural Gas Company | 07/20 | Piedmont Natural Gas Company | Docket No. 20-00086 | Return on Equity |
| Public Utility Commission of Texas |  |  |  |  |
| Southwestern Public Service Company | 02/21 | Southwestern Public Service Company | Docket No. 51802 | Return on Equity |
| Southwestern Electric Power Company | 10/20 | Southwestern Electric Power Company | Docket No. 51415 | Rate of Return |
| Virginia State Corporation Commission |  |  |  |  |
| Virginia Natural Gas, Inc. | 04/21 | Virginia Natural Gas, Inc. | PUR-2020-00095 | Return on Equity |
| Massanutten Public Service Corporation | 12/20 | Massanutten Public Service Corporation | PUE-2020-00039 | Return on Equity |
| Aqua Virginia, Inc. | 07/20 | Aqua Virginia, Inc. | PUR-2020-00106 | Rate of Return |
| WGL Holdings, Inc. | 07/18 | Washington Gas Light Company | PUR-2018-00080 | Rate of Return |
| Atmos Energy Corporation | 05/18 | Atmos Energy Corporation | PUR-2018-00014 | Rate of Return |
| Aqua Virginia, Inc. | 07/17 | Aqua Virginia, Inc. | PUR-2017-00082 | Rate of Return |
| Massanutten Public Service Corp. | 08/14 | Massanutten Public Service Corp. | PUE-2014-00035 | Rate of Return / Rate Design |

Basis of Selection for the Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies ..... DWD-6
Cost of Common Equity Models Applied to the Comparable Risk Non-Price Regulated Companies ..... DWD-7
Estimated Market Capitalization for Aqua Ohio, Inc.and the Proxy Group of Eight Water CompaniesDWD-8
Derivation of Flotation Cost Adjustment ..... DWD-9

Aqua Ohio, Inc. Recommended Capital Structure and Cost Rates
for Ratemaking Purposes
at December 31, 2021

| Type Of Capital | Ratios (1) | Cost Rate |  | Weighted Cost Rate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Long-Term Debt | 48.11\% | 3.82\% | (1) | 1.84\% |
| Common Equity | 51.89\% | 10.75\% | (2) | 5.58\% |
| Total | 100.00\% |  |  | 7.42\% |

Notes:
(1) Company-provided.
(2) From page 2 of this Schedule.

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Brief Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate

| Line No. | Principal Methods | Proxy Group of Eight <br> Water Companies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. | Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1) | 8.63\% |
| 2. | Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2) | 11.11\% |
| 3. | Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3) | 10.45\% |
| 4. | Market Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies (4) | 10.87\% |
| 5. | Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate before Adjustment for Unique Risk | 10.27\%-10.66\% |
| 6. | Business Risk Adjustment (5) | 0.25\% |
| 7. | Flotation Cost Adjustment (6) | 0.05\% |
| 8. | Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate after Adjustment | 10.57\%-10.96\% |
| 9. | Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate | 10.75\% |

Notes: (1) From Schedule DWD-3.
(2) From page 1 of Schedule DWD-4.
(3) From page 1 of Schedule DWD-5.
(4) From page 1 of Schedule DWD-7.
(5) Business risk adjustment to reflect Aqua OH's unique risk compared to the Utility Proxy Group as detailed in the accompanying direct testimony.
(6) From page 1 of Schedule DWD-9.


## Capital Structure Based upon Total Permanent Capital for the

Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies
2016-2020, Inclusive
American States Water Company
Long-Term Debt
Preferred Stock
Common Equity
$\quad$ Total Capital
American Water Works Company, Inc.
Long-Term Debt
Preferred Stock
Common Equity
$\quad$ Total Capital

| $\underline{2020}$ | $\underline{2019}$ | $\underline{2018}$ | $\underline{2017}$ | $\underline{2016}$ | 5 YEAR <br> AVERAGE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 40.72 \% | 31.87 \% | 36.54 \% | 37.75 \% | 39.40 \% | 37.26 \% |
| 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 59.28 | 68.13 | 63.46 | 62.25 | 60.60 | 62.74 |
| 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |


| 59.93 \% | 58.59 \% | 56.55 \% | 55.81 \% | 54.74 \% | 57.12 \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.05 |
| 40.05 | 41.38 | 43.40 | 44.12 | 45.17 | 42.83 |
| 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 |


| Long-Term Debt | 45.96 \% | 47.65 \% | 43.42 \% | 42.17 \% | 42.71 \% | 44.38 \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Preferred Stock | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 54.04 | 52.35 | 56.58 | 57.83 | 57.29 | 55.62 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |


| California Water Service Group |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Long-Term Debt | 46.04 \% | 50.90 \% | 52.74 \% | 43.40 \% | 45.83 \% | 47.78 \% |
| Preferred Stock | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Common Equity | 53.96 | 49.10 | 47.26 | 56.60 | 54.17 | 52.22 |
| Total Capital | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |

Global Water Resources, Inc.
Long-Term Debt
Preferred Stock
Common Equity
Total Capital

Middlesex Water Company
Long-Term Debt
Preferred Stock
Common Equity
Total Capital

SJW Group
Long-Term Debt
Preferred Stock
Common Equity
Total Capital

The York Water Company
Long-Term Debt
Preferred Stock
Common Equity
Total Capital

| 78.09 \% | 82.31 \% | 80.43 \% | 88.50 \% | 88.27 \% | 83.52 \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 21.91 | 17.69 | 19.57 | 11.50 | 11.73 | 16.48 |
| 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |


| 44.61 \% | 42.20 \% | 38.94 \% | 38.65 \% | 38.91 \% | 40.66 \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0.33 | 0.37 | 0.59 | 0.64 | 0.68 | 0.52 |
| 55.06 | 57.43 | 60.47 | 60.71 | 60.41 | 58.82 |
| 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 |


| 59.79 \% | 59.05 \% | 32.67 \% | 48.20 \% | 50.69 \% | 50.08 \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 40.21 | 40.95 | 67.33 | 51.80 | 49.31 | 49.92 |
| 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |


| 46.31 \% | 42.95 \% | 42.52 \% | 43.02 \% | 42.60 \% | 43.48 \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 53.69 | 57.05 | 57.48 | 56.98 | 57.40 | 56.52 |
| 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |

Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies
Long-Term Debt
Preferred Stock

Common Equity
Total Capital

| 52.68 \% | 51.94 \% | 47.98 \% | 49.69 \% | 50.39 \% | 50.54 \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.07 |
| 47.28 | 48.01 | 51.94 | 50.22 | 49.51 | 49.39 |
| 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% | 100.00 \% |

Source of Information
Annual Forms 10-K
Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model for the
Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies
$\underset{\sim}{\infty}$
 $\Sigma$

 $[5]$

Bloomberg
Projected Five
Year Growth
in EPS ơ
8
0



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## NA= Not Available

(1) Indicated dividend at 04/05/2021 divided by the average closing price of the last 60 trading days ending 04/05/2021 for each company.

## (2) From pages 2 through 9 of this Schedule.

(3) Average of columns 2 through 5 excluding negative growth rates.
(4) This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclu
This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclusion of growth rate (from column 6) x column 1 to
reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the continuous payment. Thus, for American
States Water Company, $1.74 \% \times(1+(1 / 2 \times 5.70 \%))=1.79 \%$. States Water Company, $1.74 \% \times(1+(1 / 2 \times 5.70 \%))=1.79 \%$. (5) Column $6+$ column 7.
Value Line Investment Survey www.zacks.com Downloaded on 04/05/2021 Bloomberg Professional Services
$\ddot{0}$
$\stackrel{0}{0}$
$\underset{z}{0}$
Proxy Group of Eight Water
Companies
American States Water Company
American Water Works Company, Inc.
Artesian Resources Corporation
California Water Service Group
Global Water Resources, Inc.
Middlesex Water Company
SJW Group
The York Water Company


| (\$MILL.) |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  |
| Cash Assets | 7.1 | 1.3 | 36.7 |
| Accts Receivable | 23.4 | 20.9 | 29.2 |
| Other | 101.0 | 100.3 | 91.2 |
| Current Assets | 131.5 | 122.5 | 157.1 |
| Accts Payable | 59.5 | 55.6 | 63.8 |
| Debt Due | 40.3 | 5.3 | .4 |
| Other | 46.8 | 55.1 | 54.4 |
| Current Liab. | 146.6 | 116.0 | 118.6 |


|  |  |  |  |  |  | Shares of American States Water have not performed well lately. Over the |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | not performed well lately. Over the past three-month period, the price of the |
| Rev |  |  |  |  |  | stock has declined about 2\%. By com- |
| Earn |  |  |  |  |  | parison, the S\&P 500 Index has increased |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Divid |  |  |  |  |  | $7 \%$, a difference of nearly 900 basis points. Meanwhile, a major rate case is pending. California is a state where water util- |
| Book |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | QUARTERLY REVENUES ( $\$$ mill |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | ities file a petition to raise prices once |
|  |  | 106.9 | 124.2 | 1110 |  | ery three years. Last summer, the Gold- |
|  | 101.7 | 24.7 | 4.5 | . |  | States Water Company (GSWC) |
| 2020 | 109.1 | 21.3 | 33.6 | 4.2 | 488.2 | ted the papers for rate hikes |
| 20 | 115 | 125 | 145 | 120 | 505 | over the years 202 |
| 2022 | 118 | 127 | 148 | 122 | , |  |
|  |  |  | 嗗 |  |  | te this year, at the earliest. Our |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | nings assumptions are based |
| 2018 | 29 | . 44 | 62 | . 37 | 1.72 | able ruling, as relat |
| 2019 | 35 | 72 | 76 | 45 | 2.28 | gulators has been mostly positive. An |
|  |  | 69 | 72 | 5 | 2.33 | nexpectedly harsh decision would |
|  |  | . 6 | 75 | . 53 |  |  |
|  | 48 | . 72 | 78 | . 57 |  | Earnings should advance at a decent clip both this year and next. The company's year-over-year share net will likely |
| $\begin{array}{\|c} \text { Cal- } \\ \text { endar } \end{array}$ | Y DIVIDENDS |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Mar | Jun. 30 | ep. 30 | Dec. 31 |  |  |
|  | . 24 | 242 | 255 | 55 | 99 | increase 3\% in 2021. (U) |
|  | . 255 | 255 | 275 | 275 |  | e earnings growth slow in the yea |
| 2019 | . 275 | . 27 | . 305 | . 305 | 1.16 | re new rates are determined.) In 2022, |
| 2020 | . |  |  |  |  | , |
| 202 | . 335 |  |  |  |  |  |

water \& wastewater services to U.S. military bases through its ASUS subsidiary. Sold Chaparral City Wtr. of AZ. (6/11). Employs 841. BlackRock, Inc. owns $15.9 \%$ of out. shares; Vanguard, 11.9\%; off. \& dir. 1.0\%. (4/20 Proxy). Chairman: Lloyd Ross. Pres. \& CEO: Robert Sprowls. Inc: CA. Address: 630 East Foothill Blvd., San Dimas, CA 91773. Tel: 909-394-3600. Internet: www.aswater.com.

## climb $6 \%$.

Dividend growth prospects seem to be somewhat brighter. At the company's August board meeting, we think the distribution per share will be raised $\$ 0.03$, a $9 \%$ increase. This is near the very high end of the range for water utilities.
The company's nonregulated operations offer some potential upside. Through its ASUS business, the company operates water systems at U.S. Army installations. ASUS has been reasonably successful in winning its share of the many contracts the military has put out for bid. With more privatizations of these facilities planned, this segment could provide higher-margined revenues. That's because returns here are not capped, so there isn't a limit on profitability.
These neutrally ranked shares do not have appeal, at this time. Despite lagging the market, AWR is only ranked to perform in line with the major indexes in the year ahead. Moreover, over the pull to 2024-2026, total return potential is wellbelow the Value Line median, as the equity is already in its Target Price Range. James A. Flood

April 9, 2021

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| (\$MILL.) |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  |
| Cash Assets | 158 | 91 | 576 |
| Accts Receivable | 301 | 294 | 321 |
| Other | 322 | 900 | 1009 |
| Current Assets | 781 | 1285 | 1906 |
| Accts Payable | 175 | 203 | 189 |
| Debt Due | 1035 | 814 | 1611 |
| Other | 884 | 1028 | 1081 |
| Current Liab. | 2094 | 2045 | 2881 |


| ANNUAL RATES <br> of change (per sh) Revenues "Cash Flow" <br> Earnings <br> Dividends <br> Book Value |  | Past <br> 10 Yrs. | Past Est'd '18-'20 <br> 5 Yrs. to ' $24-26$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 3.0\% | $\begin{array}{lll}\text { \% } & 3.5 \% & 4.5 \% \\ 7.0 \% & 6.5 \%\end{array}$ |  |  |
|  |  | 8.0\% |  |  |  |
|  |  | 10.5\% | \% 8.0\% |  | 8.5\% |
|  |  | 11.0\% | \% 11.5\% |  | 8.5\% |
|  |  | 3.5\% | - 4.5\% |  | 5.0\% |
| Cal- | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) Mar. 31 Jun. 30 Sep. 30 Dec. 31 |  |  |  | Full Year |
| endar |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2018 | 761 | 853 | 976 | 850 | 3440 |
| 2019 | 813 | 882 | 1013 | 902 | 3610 |
| 2020 | 844 | 931 | 1079 | 923 | 3777 |
| 2021 | 880 | 995 | 1140 | 995 | 4010 |
| 2022 | 935 | 1055 | 1200 | 1050 | 4240 |
| Calendar |  |  |  |  | Full <br> Year |
|  | Mar. 31 Jun. 30 Sep. 30 Dec. 31 |  |  |  |  |
| 2018 | . 59 | . 91 | 1.03 | . 62 | 3.15 |
| 2019 | . 62 | . 94 | 1.33 | . 54 | 3.43 |
| 2020 | . 68 | . 97 | 1.46 | . 80 | 3.91 |
| 2021 | . 73 | 1.05 | 1.60 | . 87 | 4.25 |
| 2022 | . 80 | 1.15 | 1.70 | . 95 | 4.60 |
| al- | QUART | ERLY DIVID | DENDS | D | Full |
| endar | Mar. 31 | Jun. 30 | Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Year |
| 2017 | . 375 | . 415 | . 415 | . 415 | 1.62 |
| 2018 | . 415 | . 455 | . 455 | . 455 | 1.78 |
| 2019 | . 455 | . 50 | . 50 | . 50 | 1.96 |
| 2020 | . 50 | . 55 | . 55 | . 55 | 2.15 |
| 2021 | . 55 |  |  |  |  |

BUSINESS: American Water Works Company, Inc. is the largest investor-owned water and wastewater utility in the U.S., providing services to approximately 15 million people in 46 states. Nonregulated business assists municipalities and military bases with the maintenance and upkeep as well. Regulated operations made up $86 \%$ of 2020 revenues. New Jersey is its largest market accounting
American Water Works completed another very successful year in 2020. Due in part to a strong fourth quarter, the water utility managed to post an impressive $14 \%$ share-earnings increase over 2019. One of the most attractive qualities about this industry is that the demand for water is relatively inelastic. Hence, the pandemic has had no real impact on the company.
The earnings picture remains bright. American Water has an aggressive acquisition policy (more below). This, plus solid cost controls, an expanding rate base, and the stable need for water, should ensure solid yearly earnings per share increases for the foreseeable future. We think the company's share net will rise $8 \%$ both this year and in 2022. Through 2024 to 2026, we estimate growth here should be in the $7 \%-10 \%$ range, a much higher rate than the typical utility.
The company ought to continue to following what has been a successful strategy. Management has been acquiring small, independent water districts for many years. Indeed, in 2020, 23 such purchases were made. Domestically, there are
for $24.5 \%$ of regulated revenues; Pennsylvania, $22.5 \%$; Missouri, $10.6 \%$. Has 6,800 employees. The Vanguard Grp, owns $11.7 \%$ of outstanding shares; BlackRock, Inc., $8.1 \%$; officers \& directors, less than $1.0 \%$. ( $3 / 21$ Proxy). President \& CEO: Susan N. Story. Chairman: George MacKenzie. Address: 1 Water Street, Camden, NJ 08102. Tel.: 856-346-8200. Internet: www.amwater.com.
literally thousands of these undersized water entities that are run by local municipalities. Often they are inefficient and undercapitalized. American Water can merge these operations into its existing business and attain significant economies of scale. As a result, the utility's margins should continue to widen annually as long as this policy is in place.
Capital expenditures are large, but manageable. Like others in the group, the company is spending heavily to upgrade its pipelines and other assets. Also, most of the acquisitions require investment to ensure that they are in compliance with federal mandates. Over the past 10 years, capital outlays have totaled $\$ 28$ billion. Out to mid-decade, annual outlays may average $\$ 2.2$ billion to $\$ 2.5$ billion. The balance sheet will likely handle this without deteriorating much.
These shares are timely. Since our January report, the equity has underperformed the market indexes by about 750 basis points. Thus, the premium investors usually have to pay for this industry standout has declined to some degree.
James A. Flood
April 9, 2021

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Note: No analyst estimates available.


BUSINESS: Artesian Resources Corp. operates as the parent holding company of five regulated public utilities: Artesian Water Company, Inc., Artesian Water Pennsylvania, Inc., Artesian Water Maryland, Inc., Artesian Wastewater Management, Inc., and Artesian Wastewater Maryland, Inc.; and three non-regulated subsidiaries: Artesian Utility Development, Inc., Artesian Development Corp., and Artesian Storm Water Services, Inc. Its principal subsidiary, Artesian Water Company, Inc., distributes and sells water, including water for public and private fire protection, to residential, commercial, industrial, municipal, and utility customers in Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. It provides wastewater services to customers in Delaware. In addition, it provides contract water and wastewater operations, and water, sewer and internal Service Line Protection Plans. Artesian Water produced approximately $86 \%$ of 2020 consolidated operating revenues. Has 235 employees. Chairman, C.E.O. \& President: Dian C. Taylor Address: 664 Churchmans Rd., Newark, DE 19702. Tel.: (302) 453-6900. Internet: www.artesianresources.com.

April 9, 2021

## TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURN

Dividends plus appreciation as of 2/28/2021

| 3 Mos. | $\mathbf{6}$ Mos. | $\mathbf{1}$ Yr. | $\mathbf{3}$ Yrs. | $\mathbf{5}$ Yrs. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $0.73 \%$ | $6.58 \%$ | $10.82 \%$ | $20.40 \%$ | $49.21 \%$ |

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| CH | 15 | N |  | $\underline{\square}$ | NYS | CWT |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CENT } \\ & \text { ICE } \end{aligned}$ | $6,1$ | P／E RATIO | $31$ | （Trailin | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ing: } 29.0 \\ & \text { an: } 24.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { RELATIV } \\ & \text { P/E RATI } \end{aligned}$ | $1.4$ | DIV＇D YLD | $1.6$ | $0$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ALU } \\ & \text { LINE } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 19／21 | High： Low： | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 19.8 \\ & 16.9 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 19.4 \\ & 167 \end{aligned}$ | 19.3 16.8 | $\begin{aligned} & 23.4 \\ & 18.4 \end{aligned}$ | $26.4$ | $\begin{aligned} & 26.0 \\ & 19.5 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 36.8 \\ & 22.5 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 46.2 \\ & 32.4 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 49.1 \\ & 35.3 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 57.5 \\ & 44.6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 57.4 \\ & 39.7 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 60.5 \\ & 51.8 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | Target 2024 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Price } \\ & 2025 \end{aligned}$ | Range 2026 |
| SAFET |  | Lowered 7 |  | LEGEN | S |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $-120$ |
|  |  | Lowered |  |  | by | spsh |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －100 |
| TE |  | were |  | $\ldots{ }_{R e}^{d i n}$ | ve Pric | Strength |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －80 |
| BETA | （1．00 | arket） |  | $2 \text {-for- } 1 \mathrm{spl}$ | $6 / 11$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ，＇ |  |  |  |  |  | 64 |
| 18－Mon | nth Targ | Price | Range | Sha | a | recter |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 白的， |  |  |  |  |  | 48 |
| Low－High | h Mid | int (\% | Mid） |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 川世 | $l^{\prime \prime \prime \prime \prime}$ | 1,171 | ， |  |  |  |  |  |  | 48 -32 |
| \| \$43-\$81 | $\$ 62$ | 10\%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 足 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -32 -24 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ＂川11 | $1^{1 \prime \prime}$ | 111 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －20 |
|  |  |  | n'l Total |  | ハ1＇ | ＇II | ハ＇י＂ | ，11 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －16 |
| High | Price 65 | ain <br> 5\％） | Return 6\％ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ＊＊ |  |  |  |  |  | －12 |
| High Low | $\begin{aligned} & 65 \\ & 45 \end{aligned}$ | 15\%) | $\begin{gathered} 6 \% \\ -3 \% \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ＊＊ | ＊＊＊＊＊ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Institut | tional D | ecision |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | THIS | L ARITH．＊ |  |
|  | 2 Q2020 | 3 Q2020 | 4 Q 2020 | Percent |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | STOCK 16.6 | INDEX 50.1 |  |
| to Buy to Sell | 109 107 | 101 | 122 91 | shares <br> traded |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 yr. 3 yr. | 16.6 51.7 | 50.1 45.4 |  |
| Hld＇s（000） | 35580 | 36492 | 37534 |  |  |  |  |  | 14 |  |  | ｜l｜$\\|$ |  |  |  |  |  | 5 yr ． | 142.7 | 108.8 |  |
| 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | ${ }^{\text {© V VA }}$ | JE LINE PU | J．LLC | 24－26 |
| 8.72 | 8.10 | 8.88 | 9.90 | 10.82 | 11.05 | 12.00 | 13.34 | 12.23 | 12.50 | 12.29 | 12.70 | 13.89 | 14.53 | 14.72 | 15.78 | 16.00 | 15.95 | Reve | s per sh |  | 16.30 |
| 1.52 | 1.36 | 1.56 | 1.86 | 1.93 | 1.93 | 2.07 | 2.32 | 2.21 | 2.47 | 2.22 | 2.34 | 3.00 | 3.11 | 3.14 | 3.88 | 3.45 | 3.55 | ＂Cas | ow＂per s |  | 3.75 |
| ． 74 | ． 67 | ． 75 | ． 95 | ． 98 | ． 91 | ． 86 | 1.02 | 1.02 | 1.19 | ． 94 | 1.01 | 1.40 | 1.36 | 1.31 | 1.97 | 1.90 | 2.00 | Earn | per sh A |  | 2.25 |
| ． 57 | ． 58 | ． 58 | ． 59 | ． 59 | ． 60 | ． 62 | ． 63 | ． 64 | ． 65 | ． 67 | ． 69 | ． 72 | ． 75 | ． 79 | ． 85 | ． 92 | ． 98 | Div＇d | cl＇d per sh | ${ }^{\text {B }}$－ | 1.15 |
| 2.01 | 2.14 | 1.84 | 2.41 | 2.66 | 2.97 | 2.83 | 3.04 | 2.58 | 2.76 | 3.69 | 4.77 | 5.40 | 5.65 | 5.64 | 5.93 | 5.25 | 5.50 | Cap＇ | ending p |  | 5.85 |
| 7.90 | 9.07 | 9.25 | 9.72 | 10.13 | 10.45 | 10.76 | 11.28 | 12.54 | 13.11 | 13.41 | 13.75 | 14.44 | 15.19 | 16.07 | 18.30 | 18.35 | 18.25 | Book | lue per sh |  | 19.80 |
| 36.78 | 41.31 | 41.33 | 41.45 | 41.53 | 41.67 | 41.82 | 41.98 | 47.74 | 47.81 | 47.88 | 47.97 | 48.01 | 48.07 | 48.53 | 50.33 | 51.00 | 52.00 | Comm | Shs Ou | ＇g D | 53.00 |
| 24.9 | 29.2 | 26.1 | 19.8 | 19.7 | 20.3 | 21.3 | 17.9 | 20.1 | 19.7 | 24.8 | 29.6 | 26.9 | 30.3 | 39.3 | 24.9 | Bold figu | ures are | Avg | ＇I P／E Ra |  | 24.0 |
| 1.33 | 1.58 | 1.39 | 1.19 | 1.31 | 1.29 | 1.34 | 1.14 | 1.13 | 1.04 | 1.25 | 1.55 | 1.35 | 1.64 | 2.09 | 1.29 | Value | Line | Relativ | P／E Ratio |  | 1.30 |
| 3．1\％ | 2．9\％ | 3．0\％ | 3．1\％ | 3．1\％ | 3．2\％ | 3．4\％ | 3．5\％ | 3．1\％ | 2．8\％ | 2．9\％ | 2．3\％ | 1．9\％ | 1．8\％ | 1．5\％ | 1．7\％ | estim | ates | Avg An | ＇I Div＇d Yie |  | 2．1\％ |
| CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 12／31／20 <br> Total Debt $\$ 1156.2$ mill．Due in 5 Yrs $\$ 357.0$ mill． <br> LT Debt $\$ 781.1$ mill．LT Interest $\$ 40.0$ mill． <br> （Total interest coverage： 5.2 x ）（ $46 \%$ of Cap＇l） |  |  |  |  |  | 501.8 | 560.0 | 584.1 | 597.5 | 588.4 | 609.4 | 666.9 | 698.2 | 714.6 | 794.3 | 815 | 830 | Reve | （\＄mill）${ }^{\text {E }}$ |  | 865 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 36.1 | 42.6 | 47.3 | 56.7 | 45.0 | 48.7 | 67.2 | 65.6 | 63.1 | 96.8 | 97.0 | 105 | Net Pro | （\＄mill） |  | 120 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 40．5\％ | 37．5\％ | 30．3\％ | 33．0\％ | 36．0\％ | 35．5\％ | 30．1\％ | 24．5\％ | 19．1\％ | 11．1\％ | 21．0\％ | 21．0\％ | Incom | Tax Rate |  | 21．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 7．6\％ | 8．0\％ | 4．3\％ | 2．7\％ | 4．3\％ | 6．1\％ | 3．5\％ | 3．1\％ | 5．8\％ | 3．3\％ | 5．0\％ | 5．0\％ | AFUDC | \％to Net | ofit | 5．0\％ |
| Pension Assets－12／20 \＄716．8 mill． |  |  |  |  |  | 51．7\％ | 47．8\％ | 41．6\％ | 40．1\％ | 44．4\％ | 44．6\％ | 42．7\％ | 49．3\％ | 50．2\％ | 45．9\％ | 44．5\％ | 43．5\％ | Long | m Debt R |  | 38．0\％ |
|  |  |  | blig．\＄83 | 33.9 mill． |  | 48．3\％ | 52．2\％ | 58．4\％ | 59．9\％ | 55．6\％ | 55．4\％ | 57．3\％ | 50．7\％ | 49．8\％ | 54．1\％ | 55．5\％ | 56．5\％ | Comm | Equity R |  | 62．0\％ |
| Pfd Stock None |  |  |  |  |  | 931.5 | 908.2 | 1024.9 | 1045.9 | 1154.4 | 1191.2 | 1209.3 | 1440.2 | 1566.7 | 1702.4 | 1685 | 1675 | Total | pital（\＄mil） |  | 1700 |
| Common Stock 50，330，000 shs． |  |  |  |  |  | 1381.1 | 1457.1 | 1515.8 | 1590.4 | 1701.8 | 1859.3 | 2048.0 | 2232.7 | 2406.4 | 2650.6 | 2675 | 2700 | Net P | （\＄mill） |  | 2850 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 5．5\％ | 6．3\％ | 6．0\％ | 6．3\％ | 5．2\％ | 5．5\％ | 7．1\％ | 5．9\％ | 5．5\％ | 7．0\％ | 6．5\％ | 7．0\％ | Retur | n Total Ca |  | 8．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 8．0\％ | 9．0\％ | 7．9\％ | 9．1\％ | 7．0\％ | 7．4\％ | 9．7\％ | 9．0\％ | 8．1\％ | 10．5\％ | 10．5\％ | 11．0\％ | Return | n Shr．Equ |  | 11．5\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 8．0\％ | 9．0\％ | 7．9\％ | 9．1\％ | 7．0\％ | 7．4\％ | 9．7\％ | 9．0\％ | 8．1\％ | 10．5\％ | 10．5\％ | 11．0\％ | Return | n Com Eq | quity | 11．5\％ |
| MARKET CAP： $\mathbf{\$ 2 . 8}$ billion（Mid Cap） |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 2.3 \% \\ 71 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 3.4 \% \\ 62 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 3.4 \% \\ 56 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 4.1 \% \\ 55 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.0 \% \\ 71 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 2.4 \% \\ 68 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.7 \% \\ 51 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.0 \% \\ 55 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.2 \% \\ 60 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.0 \% \\ 43 \% \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 5.5 \% \\ 48 \% \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 5.5 \% \\ 49 \% \end{array}$ | Retained to Com Eq All Div＇ds to Net Prof |  |  | 5．5\％ |
| CURRENT POSITION （SMILL．） |  |  | 2018 | 2019 12／31／20 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 51\％ |


| （\＄MILL．） |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Cash Assets | 47.2 | 42.7 | 44.6 |
| Other | 141.5 | 142.0 | 221.4 |
|  | 188.7 | 184.7 | 266.0 |
| Current Assets | 95.6 | 108.5 | 131.7 |
| Accts Payable | 170.0 | 197.0 | 375.1 |
| Debt Due | 55.6 | 53.2 | 81.9 |
| Other | 321.2 | 358.7 | 588.7 |


| ANNUAL RATES Pastof change（per sh）${ }^{\text {a }}$ Y |  |  | Past Est＇d＇18－＇20$5 \text { Yrs. to '24-26 }$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Revenues |  | 3．5\％ | $\begin{array}{ll}4.0 \% & 1.5 \% \\ 8.0 \% & 2.0 \%\end{array}$ |  |  |
| ＂Cash Flow＂ Earnings |  | 6．0\％ |  |  |  |
|  |  | 5．0\％ | 8．0\％ |  | 2．0\％ |
| Earnings |  | $3.0 \%$$5.0 \%$ | 5．0\％ |  | 6．5\％ |
| DividendsBook Value |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cal－ endar | QUARTERLY REVENUES（\＄mill．）${ }^{\text {E }}$ |  |  |  | Full Year |
|  | Mar． 31 | Jun． 30 | Sep． 30 | Dec． 31 |  |
| 2018 | 134.6 | 174.9 | 221.3 | 167.4 | 698.2 |
| 2019 | 126.1 | 179.0 | 232.6 | 176.9 | 714.6 |
| 2020 | 125.6 | 175.5 | 304.1 | 189.1 | 794.3 |
| 2021 | 155 | 205 | 255 | 200 | 815 |
| 2022 | 160 | 205 | 260 | 205 | 830 |
| Cal－ endar | EARNINGS PER SHARE A |  |  |  | Full Year |
|  | Mar． 31 | Jun． 30 | Sep． 30 | Dec． 31 |  |
| 2018 | d． 02 | ． 31 | ． 75 | 32 | 1.36 |
| 2019 | d． 16 | ． 35 | ． 88 | ． 24 | 1.31 |
| 2020 | d． 42 | ． 11 | 1.94 | ． 31 | 1.97 |
| 2021 | ． 08 | ． 45 | ． 95 | ． 42 | 1.90 |
| 2022 | ． 10 | ． 45 | 1.00 | ． 45 | 2.00 |
| Cal－ endar | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ${ }^{\text {B }}$ |  |  |  | Full |
|  | Mar． 31 | Jun． 30 | Sep． 30 | Dec． 31 | Year |
| 2017 | ． 18 | ． 18 | ． 18 | ． 18 | ． 72 |
| 2018 | ． 1875 | ． 1875 | ． 1875 | ． 1875 | ． 75 |
| 2019 | ． 1975 | ． 1975 | ． 1975 | ． 1975 | ． 79 |
| 2020 | ． 2125 | ． 2125 | ． 2125 | ． 2125 | ． 85 |
| 2021 | ． 230 |  |  |  |  |


| （A）Basic EPS．Excl．nonrecurring gain（loss）： | $\begin{array}{l}\text { available．} \\ \text {（C）Incl．intangible assets．In＇} 20: \$ 27.6 \text { mill．}\end{array}$ |
| :--- | :--- | （B）Dividends historically paid in late Feb．，

BUSINESS：California Water Service Group provides regulated and nonregulated water service to 492，600 customers in 100 com－ munities in the state of California．Accounts for about 94\％of total customers．Also operates in Washington，New Mexico，and Hawaii． Main service areas：San Francisco Bay area，Sacramento Valley， Salinas Valley，San Joaquin Valley \＆parts of Los Angeles．Ac－ California Water Service Group reported solid financial results to wrap up 2020．The West Coast water service provider generated revenues of $\$ 189$ million in the December period，or a $7 \%$ annual increase，thanks largely to rate hikes associated with the recently ap－ proved general rate case．Meanwhile， fourth－quarter share profits of $\$ 0.31$ ， which were also buoyed by benefits from the general rate case decision，specifically
higher operating income and lower taxes， logged a healthy $29 \%$ advance compared to the year－earlier tally．
California Water is on a buying spree． The company＇s subsidiary，Hawaii Water Service，announced that it has received ap－ proval to acquire the assets of Kapalua Water and Kapalua Waste Treatment Company，which will add roughly 1,000 service connections in the area．In addi－ tion，a deal has been inked to purchase the water system assets of Skylanda Mutual Water Company．Pending regulatory ap－ proval，the transaction，which would add almost 19,000 service connection in Cali－ fornia，is expected to be finalized early
next year．Overall，tuck－in acquisitions
quired Rio Grande Corp；West Hawaii Utilities（9／08）．Revenue breakdown，＇20：residential， $70 \%$ ；business， $18 \%$ ；industrial， $4 \%$ ； public authorities， $5 \%$ ；other $3 \%$ ．Off．and dir．own $1 \%$ of common stock（4／20 proxy）．Has 1，184 employees．Pres．and CEO：Martin A．Kropelnicki．Inc．：DE．Addr．： 1720 North First St．，San Jose，CA 95112－4598．Tel．：408－367－8200．Internet：www．calwatergroup．com．
will probably be a staple in the company＇s long－term growth strategy．
The company is in the early innings of a massive infrastructure improve－ ment program．Indeed，management is taking an aggressive approach to upgrad－ ing and revamping its aging water delivery，transportation，and treatment facilities．For this year，its capital spend－ ing budget for infrastructure－related projects is approximately $\$ 285$ million． Over the pull to 2025，the company is like－ ly to invest upwards of $\$ 700$ million．Last－ ly，California Water has already been given the green light by the California Public Utilities Commission to tap the debt and equity markets．
We continue to like this issue for sub－ scribers with a short－term investment horizon．The stock has been raised one notch on our Timeliness Ranking Scale，to 1 （Highest）and，thus is slated to outpace the broader market averages over the com－ ing six to 12 months．On the other hand， buy－and－hold accounts should turn the page，as total return potential out to 2024－ 2026 is unenticing at recent levels． Nicholas P．Patrikis

April 9， 2021

${ }^{\mathbf{A}}$ No. of analysts changing earn. est. in last 29 days: 0 up, 0 down, consensus 5 -year earnings growth $15.0 \%$ per year. ${ }^{\mathbf{B}}$ Based upon one analyst's estimate. $\mathbf{C}_{\text {Based }}$ upon one analyst's estimate.

| ANNUAL RATES |  |  |  |  |  | ASSETS (Smill.) | 2018 | 2019 | 12/31/20 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| of change (per share) |  |  | 5 Yrs . | 1 Yr . |  | Cash Assets | 12.8 | 7.5 | 18.0 |
| Sales |  |  | -- | 4.0\% |  | Receivables | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.1 |
| "Cash Flow" |  |  | -- |  |  | Inventory | . 0 | . 0 | . 0 |
| Earnings |  |  | -- | -50.0\% |  | Other | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.4 |
| Dividend |  |  | -- | 1.0\% |  | Current Assets | 17.3 | 12.3 | 23.5 |
| Book Value |  |  | -- | 24.5\% |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fiscal Year | QUARTERLY SALES (\$mill.) |  |  |  | Full Year | Property, Plant \& Equip, at cost | 312.1 | 326.3 | 340.2 |
|  | $1 Q$ | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12/31/18 | 7.4 | 10.8 | 9.0 | 8.3 | 35.5 | Net Property | 227.1 | 233.6 | 238.9 |
| 12/31/19 | 7.7 | 9.2 | 9.9 |  | 35.5 | Other | 18.1 | 20.2 | 21.0 |
| $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline 12 / 31 / 20 \\ 12 / 31 / 21 \end{array}$ | 8.2 | 9.9 | 10.8 | $9.7$ | 38.6 | Total Assets | 262.5 | 266.1 | 283.4 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fiscal Year | EARNINGS PER SHARE |  |  |  | Full Year | LIABILITIES (\$mill.) |  |  |  |
|  | $1 Q$ | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q |  | Accts Payable <br> Debt Due <br> Other | . 0 | 1.0 .1 | . 2.0 |
| 12/31/17 | -- | . 02 | . 06 | 15 | . 23 |  | 9.0 | 9.0 | 9.9 |
| 12/31/18 | . 02 | . 10 | . 03 | -- | . 15 | Current Liab | 9.6 | 10.1 | 12.4 |
| 12/31/19 | . 02 | . 04 | . 05 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { d. } 01 \\ & \text { d. } 01 \end{aligned}$ | . 10 |  |  |  |  |
| 12/31/20 | . 02 | d. 01 | . 05 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12/31/21 | d. 01 | . 04 | . 06 |  |  | LONG-TERM DEBT AND EQUITY <br> as of $12 / 31 / 20$ |  |  |  |
| Calendar | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID |  |  |  | Full Year |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q |  | Total Debt $\$ 114.7$ mill. Due in 5 Yrs. $\$ 17.4$ mill. |  |  |  |
| 2018 | . 071 | . 071 | . 071 | . 071 | . 28 | LT Debt $\$ 112.7$ mill. Including Cap. Leases $\$ .1 \mathrm{mi}$ |  |  |  |
| 2019 | . 072 | . 072 | . 072 | .072.072 | $\begin{aligned} & .29 \\ & .29 \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |  |
| 2020 | . 073 | . 072 | . 073 |  |  | Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals None |  |  |  |
| 2021 | . 073 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| INSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS |  |  |  |  |  | Pension Liability None in '20 vs. None in '19 |  |  |  |
|  | 2Q'20 |  | 3Q'20 | 4Q'20 |  | Pfd Stock None |  | Pfd Div'd Paid None |  |
| to Buy |  | 33 | 18 |  | 26 | Common Stock 22,588,000 shares |  | (22\% of Cap'l) |  |
| to Sell |  | 22 | 33 |  | 21 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hld's(000) |  | 8849 | 7844 |  | 595 |  |  |  |  |  |

BUSINESS: Global Water Resources, Inc. is a water resource management company that owns, operates, and manages 16 water, wastewater, and recycled water utilities in strategically located communities, principally in metropolitan Phoenix, Arizona. It seeks to deploy its integrated approach, Total Water Management, a term used to mean managing the entire water cycle by owning and operating the water, wastewater, and recycled water utilities within the same geographic areas in order to both conserve water and maximize its total economic and social value. The company uses Total Water Management to promote sustainable communities in areas where growth outpaces the existing potable water supply. Global Water recycles nearly one billion gallons of water annually. In February 2021, Global Water agreed to acquire two small water utility companies, Twin Hawks Utility, Inc. and Rincon Water Company. The acquisitions will add approximately 93 water connections. Has 79 employees. Chairman, C.E.O. \& President: Ron L. Fleming Address: 21410 N. 19th Avenue \#220, Phoenix, AZ 85027. Tel.: (480) 360-7775. Internet: www.gwresources.com.
E.B.

April 9, 2021

## TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURN

Dividends plus appreciation as of 2/28/2021

| 3 | Mos. | $\mathbf{6}$ Mos. | 1 Yr. | $\mathbf{3}$ Yrs. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | 5 Yrs.

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| MODL ESEX WATER NDQ－MSEX |  |  |  | TER | NDQ-MSEX |  | RECENT PRICE |  | $80.66$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \text { P/E } & 36.7\left(\begin{array}{l} \text { Trailing: } 37.0 \\ \text { RATIO } \\ \text { Median: } 23.0 \end{array}\right) \end{array}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { RELATIVE } 1.68 \\ & \text { P/E RATIO } 1.68 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\text { DIV'D } \quad 1.4 \%$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { VALUE } \\ & \text { LINE } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | High： Low： | $\begin{array}{r} 19.3 \\ 14.7 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 19.4 \\ & 16.5 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 19.6 \\ & 17.5 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 22.5 \\ & 18.6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 23.7 \\ & 19.1 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 28.0 \\ & 21.2 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 44.5 \\ & 25.0 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 67.7 \\ & 51.0 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 85.9 \\ & 67.1 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { Target Pri } \\ 2024 \mid 20 \end{array}$ | Range 2026 |
|  |  |  |  | LEGENDS <br> 1．20 x Dividends p sh <br> divided by <br> $\ldots$ Iterest Rate <br> Options：Yelative Price Strength <br> Shaded area indicates recession |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －100 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 80 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | Options：Yes <br> Shaded area indicates recession |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 64 |
| $\begin{array}{ll} \hline \text { 18-Month Target Price Range } \\ \text { Low-High } & \text { Midpoint (\% to Mid) } \\ \$ 58-\$ 106 & \$ 82(0 \%) \end{array}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 碞 |  |  |  |  |  | 48 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 11י｜ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 24 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | ，1min | ，1以い |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －24 |
|  |  |  | Total |  | ｜m＇${ }^{1}$ | ，\｜ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －16 |
|  | rice |  | turn | II＂ | 年 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | －12 |
| $\begin{array}{\|l\|l} \text { High } \\ \text { Low } \end{array}$ | 75 | 50\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\because$ | $\cdots$ |  |  |  |  |  | \％TOT．RETURN $2 / 21-8$ |  |  |
| Institut | ional D | ecision |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 20220 | 30220 | 40220 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | STOCK IND |  |
| to Buy | 68 | 52 | 67 | shares |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{rr}17.2 & 50.1 \\ 103.1 & 45.4 \\ 188\end{array}$ |  |
| to Sell Hld＇s $(000)$ | $\begin{array}{r} 55 \\ 10359 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 69 10357 |  | traded |  |  | ｜杖 | 川1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{lr}103.1 & 45.4 \\ 168.7 & 108.8\end{array}$ |  |
| 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | © VALUE LINE PUB．LLC 24－26 |  |  |
| 6.44 | 6.16 | 6.50 | 6.79 | 6.75 | 6.60 | 6.50 | 6.98 | 7.19 | 7.26 | 7.77 | 8.16 | 8.00 | 8.42 | 7.72 | 8.10 | 8.45 | 8.70 | Revenues per sh <br> ＂Cash Flow＂per sh <br> Earnings per sh A <br> Div＇d Decl＇d per sh ${ }^{\text {Bn }}$ |  | 9.15 |
| 1.33 | 1.33 | 1.49 | 1.53 | 1.40 | 1.55 | 1.46 | 1.56 | 1.72 | 1.84 | 1.97 | 2.17 | 2.24 | 2.89 | 2.90 | 3.25 | 3.15 | 3.25 |  |  | 3.70 |
| ． 71 | ． 82 | ． 87 | ． 89 | ． 72 | ． 96 | ． 84 | ． 90 | 1.03 | 1.13 | 1.22 | 1.38 | 1.38 | 1.96 | 2.01 | 2.18 | 2.25 | 2.35 |  |  | 2.70 |
| ． 67 | ． 68 | ． 69 | ． 70 | ． 71 | ． 72 | ． 73 | ． 74 | ． 75 | ． 76 | ． 78 | ． 81 | ． 86 | ． 91 | ． 98 | 1.04 | 1.10 | 1.15 |  |  | 1.35 |
| 2.18 | 2.31 | 1.66 | 2.12 | 1.49 | 1.90 | 1.50 | 1.36 | 1.26 | 1.40 | 1.59 | 2.91 | 3.08 | 4.40 | 5.11 | 6.04 | 5.50 | 5.50 | Cap＇ISpending per sh Book Value per sh |  | 6.25 |
| 8.26 | 9.52 | 10.05 | 10.03 | 10.33 | 11.13 | 11.27 | 11.48 | 11.82 | 12.24 | 12.74 | 13.40 | 14.02 | 15.17 | 18.57 | 19.81 | 19.45 | 19.60 |  |  | 20.85 |
| 11.58 | 13.17 | 13.25 | 13.40 | 13.52 | 15.57 | 15.70 | 15.82 | 15.96 | 16.12 | 16.23 | 16.30 | 16.35 | 16.40 | 17.43 | 17.47 | 17.75 | 17.85 | Commo | Shs Outst＇g ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | 18.00 |
| 27.4 | 22.7 | 21.6 | 19.8 | 21.0 | 17.8 | 21.7 | 20.8 | 19.7 | 18.5 | 19.1 | 25.6 | 28.4 | 22.2 | 29.7 | 30.1 | Bold figures are Value Line estimates |  | Avg Ann＇I P／E Ratio Relative P／E Ratio Avg Ann＇I Div＇d Yield |  | 24.0 |
| 1.46 | 1.23 | 1.15 | 1.19 | 1.40 | 1.13 | 1.36 | 1.32 | 1.11 | ． 97 | ． 96 | 1.34 | 1.43 | 1.20 | 1.58 | 1.56 |  |  | 1.30 |  |  |
| 3．5\％ | 3．7\％ | 3．7\％ | 4．0\％ | 4．7\％ | 4．2\％ | 4．0\％ | 4．0\％ | 3．7\％ | 3．7\％ | 3．3\％ | 2．3\％ | 2．2\％ | 2．1\％ | 1．6\％ | 1．6\％ |  |  | 2．1\％ |  |  |
| CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of $12 / 31 / 20$ <br> Total Debt $\$ 282.5$ mill．Due in 5 Yrs $\$ 43.7$ mill． <br> LT Debt $\$ 273.2$ mill．LT Interest $\$ 7.5$ mill． <br> （Total interest coverage： 7.3 x ） <br> （44\％of Cap＇l） |  |  |  |  |  | 102.1 | 110.4 | 114.8 | 117.1 | 126.0 | 132.9 | 130.8 | 138.1 | 134.6 | 141.6 | 150 | 155 |  |  | Reven | （\＄mill） | 165 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 13.4 | 14.4 | 16.6 | 18.4 | 20.0 | 22.7 | 22.8 | 32.5 | 33.9 | 38.4 | 40.0 | 42.0 |  |  | Net Pr | it（\＄mill） | 49.0 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 32．7\％ | 33．9\％ | 34．1\％ | 35．0\％ | 34．5\％ | 34．0\％ | 32．7\％ | 2．8\％ | 2．8\％ | 2．8\％ | 21．0\％ | 21．0\％ | Income | Tax Rate | 21．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 6．1\％ | 3．4\％ | 1．9\％ | 1．7\％ | 1．9\％ | 2．7\％ | 3．1\％ | 1．4\％ | 3．4\％ | 3．9\％ | 2．5\％ | 2．5\％ | AFUDC | \％to Net Profit | 2．5\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 42．3\％ | 41．5\％ | 40．4\％ | 40．5\％ | 39．4\％ | 37．9\％ | 37．5\％ | 37．8\％ | 41．5\％ | 44．0\％ | 42．5\％ | 41．5\％ | Long－T | m Debt Ratio | 40．0\％ |
| Pension | Assets－ | 2／20 \＄ | ． 9 mill |  |  | 56．6\％ | 57．4\％ | 58．7\％ | 58．8\％ | 59．8\％ | 61．5\％ | 61．8\％ | 61．6\％ | 58．2\％ | 55．7\％ | 57．0\％ | 58．0\％ | Commo | Equity Ratio | 60．0\％ |
|  |  |  | blig．\＄1 | 15.9 mill． |  | 312.5 | 316.5 | 321.4 | 335.8 | 345.4 | 355.4 | 370.7 | 404.1 | 556.7 | 621.5 | 610 | 600 | Total C | pital（\＄mill） | 630 |
|  |  |  | ＇d：\＄． 1 |  |  | 422.2 | 435.2 | 446.5 | 465.4 | 481.9 | 517.8 | 557.2 | 618.5 | 705.7 | 796.6 | 800 | 815 | Net Pla | （\＄mill） | 835 |
| Comm | Stock | 473，000 | 0 shs． |  |  | 5．2\％ | 5．4\％ | 5．9\％ | 6．3\％ | 6．6\％ | 7．1\％ | 6．9\％ | 8．9\％ | 6．7\％ | 6．8\％ | 7．0\％ | 7．5\％ | Return | n Total Cap＇l | 8．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 7．5\％ | 7．8\％ | 8．7\％ | 9．2\％ | 9．6\％ | 10．3\％ | 9．8\％ | 12．9\％ | 10．4\％ | 11．0\％ | 11．5\％ | 12．0\％ | Return | oshr．Equity | 13．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 7．5\％ | 7．8\％ | 8．7\％ | 9．3\％ | 9．6\％ | 10．3\％ | 9．9\％ | 13．0\％ | 10．4\％ | 11．1\％ | 11．5\％ | 12．0\％ | Return | O Com Equity | 13．0\％ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 1．0\％ | 1．4\％ | 2．4\％ | 3．1\％ | 3．5\％ | 4．3\％ | 3．8\％ | 7．0\％ | 5．4\％ | 5．8\％ | 6．0\％ | 6．0\％ | Reta | to Com Eq | 6．5\％ |
| MARKE | CAP： | 1.4 billion | （Mid－C | ap） |  | 87\％ | 83\％ | 73\％ | 67\％ | 63\％ | 58\％ | 62\％ | 46\％ | 48\％ | 48\％ | 49\％ | 49\％ | All Div＇ | s to Net Prof | 50\％ |


| CURRENT POSITION （\＄MILL．） | 2018 | 2019 | 12／31／20 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cash Assets | 3.7 | 2.2 | 4.5 |
| Other | 27.1 | 26.9 | 29.6 |
| Current Assets | 30.8 | 29.1 | 34.1 |
| Accts Payable | 19.3 | 23.3 | 30.4 |
| Debt Due | 55.8 | 27.2 | 9.3 |
| Other | 19.3 | 14.5 | 17.1 |
| Current Liab． | 94.4 | 65.0 | 56.8 |


| ANNUAL RATES | Past | Past |  |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| Est＇d＇18＇20 |  |  |  |
| of change（per sh） | 10 Yrs． | 5 Yrs． | to＇24－26 |
| Revenues | $2.0 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ |
| ＂Cash Flow＂ | $7.5 \%$ | $10.5 \%$ | $3.5 \%$ |
| Earnings | $9.0 \%$ | $12.5 \%$ | $4.5 \%$ |
| Dividends | $3.0 \%$ | $5.0 \%$ | $5.5 \%$ |
| Book Value | $5.5 \%$ | $8.0 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ |


| Cal－ endar |  | 5．5\％ |  | \％ | ， |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | QUARTERLY REVENUES（\＄mill．） Mar． 31 Jun． 30 Sep． 30 Dec． 31 |  |  |  | Full Year |
| 2018 | 31.2 | 34.9 | 38.7 | 33.3 | 138.1 |
| 2019 | 30.7 | 33.4 | 37.8 | 32.7 | 134.6 |
| 2020 | 31.8 | 35.3 | 39.9 | 34.6 | 141.6 |
| 2021 | 33.0 | 37.0 | 44.0 | 36.0 | 150 |
| 2022 | 34.0 | 38.0 | 45.0 | 38.0 | 155 |
| $\begin{gathered} \text { Cal- } \\ \text { andar } \end{gathered}$ endar | EARNINGS PER SHARE AMar． 31 Jun． 30 Sep． 30 Dec． 31 |  |  |  | Full Year |
| 2018 | ． 27 | ． 52 | ． 74 | ． 43 | 1.96 |
| 2019 | ． 39 | ． 49 | ． 66 | ． 46 | 2.01 |
| 2020 | ． 44 | ． 55 | ． 72 | ． 47 | 2.18 |
| 2021 | ． 45 | ． 55 | ． 73 | ． 52 | 2.25 |
| 2022 | ． 47 | ． 57 | ． 76 | ． 55 | 2.35 |
| al－ | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID Bı |  |  |  | Full |
| endar | Mar． 31 | Jun． 30 | Sep． 30 | Dec． 31 | Year |
| 2017 | ． 21125 | ． 21125 | ． 21125 | ． 22375 | 86 |
| 2018 | ． 22375 | ． 22375 | ． 22375 | ． 24 | ． 91 |
| 2019 | ． 24 | ． 24 | ． 24 | ． 2562 | 98 |
| 2020 | ． 2562 | ． 2562 | ． 2562 | ． 2725 | 1.04 |
| 2021 | ． 2725 |  |  |  |  |

BUSINESS：Middlesex Water Company engages in the ownership and operation of regulated water utility systems in New Jersey，Del－ aware，and Pennsylvania．It also operates water and wastewater systems under contract on behalf of municipal and private clients in NJ and DE．Its Middlesex System provides water services to 61,000 retail customers，primarily in Middlesex County，New Jersey．In
Shares of Middlesex Water continue to march higher．The equity established yet another all－time high in early Febru－ ary，but has since retracted modestly to slightly above $\$ 80$ per share．Still，the stock is up about $10 \%$ in price since our early－January review，keeping intact its enviable multiyear price ascent．Based on our Timeliness ranking scale，MSEX shares are slated to outperform（1：High－ 6 est）the broader market over the coming six to 12 months．Thus，they may pique the interest of near－term accounts．
The stage is set for respectable top－ and bottom－line growth this year．Fa－ vorable operating trends，which were evi－ dent in the fourth quarter，are likely to persist over the near－to intermediate－ terms．These include increased residential and wholesale water consumption owing to more people staying at home and greater handwashing frequency，as well as an ex－ panding customer base in its Delaware water system．A recently inked contract with Highland Park in its New Jersey sys－ tem is a positive，too．Adding it all up，rev－ enues are poised to expand $6 \%$ ，to $\$ 150$

2020，the Middlesex System accounted for $59 \%$ of operating reve－ nues．At 12／31／20，the company had 348 employees．Incorporated： NJ．President，CEO，and Chairman：Dennis W．Doll．Officers \＆ directors own $3.1 \%$ of the com．stock；BlackRock Inst．Trust Co．， $7.7 \%$（4／20 proxy）．Add．： 485 C Route 1 South，Suite 400，Iselin，NJ 08830．Tel．：732－634－1500．Int．：www．middlesexwater．com．
a $3 \%$ earnings advance，to $\$ 2.25$ per share． From a financial perspective，the com－ pany ought to be a stable performer over the pull to mid－decade．Modest revenue and earnings growth is likely on tap for 2022．Meanwhile，significant infra－ structure spending may well overflow into the 3－to 5－year time frame．Management has laid out a budget of nearly $\$ 300$ mil－ lion through its Water For Tomorrow pro－ gram，which aims to upgrade watermains， piping，and wastewater treatment facilities．Most recently，the company an－ nounced a $\$ 10$ million investment to im－ prove its drinking water infrastructure in New Jersey．Overall，aggressive spending ought to eventually curb unnecessary op－ erating costs，and may well facilitate addi－ tional rate hikes going forward．
Shares of Middlesex Water are cur－ rently trading beyond the upper end of our 3－to 5－year Target Price para－ meters．This is so even after modestly lift－ ing our P／E multiple to 24x．All in all，sub－ scribers with an investment horizon of 18 months or longer can find more－attractive options elsewhere，at this juncture．
Nicholas P．Patrikis
April 9， 2021

## 

early May．


| (SMILL.) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cash Assets | 420.7 | 17.9 | 9.3 |
| Accts Receivable | 19.2 | 36.3 | 58.1 |
| Other | 62.8 | 67.8 | 59.9 |
| Current Assets | 502.7 | 122.0 | 127.3 |
| Accts Payable | 24.9 | 34.9 | 34.2 |
| Debt Due |  | 22.3 | 76.2 |
| Other | 139.1 | 177.4 | 240.4 |
| Current Liab. | 164.0 | 234.6 | 350.8 |


with Connecticut Water (10/19) which provides service to approx. 138,000 connections with a total population of 450,000 people. Has 361 employees. Officers and directors own $8.3 \%$ of outstanding shares (3/21 proxy). Chairman \& CEO: Eric Thornburg. Incorporated: California. Address: 110 West Taylor Street, San Jose, CA 95110. Telephone: (408) 279-7800. Internet: www.sjwater.com.
include paying down outstanding obligations, various capital expenditures, and general corporate purposes.
The long-term growth narrative remains largely unaltered. Increased residential and wholesale water consumption, alongside periodic rate hikes, ought to keep revenues moving in the right direction. SJW Group's diverse geographical footprint is advantageous, and should expand further down the road. From an operational standpoint, robust capital spending on infrastructure upgrades ought to boost efficiency, as much of these costs can eventually be passed along to the consumer.
Unranked SJW shares are a bit more appealing for patient accounts following their recent step back in price. At recent levels, capital appreciation potential out to mid-decade is slightly above average, thus presenting a decent entry point for interested subscribers to start building a position. What's more, the dividend yield is now comfortably above the Value Line median, and ranks among the top payers in the Water Utilities Industry. Nicholas P. Patrikis

April 9, 2021

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## Cash Assets

 Accounts Receivable InventOther
Current Assets
Accts Payable Debt Due Other

| Accts Payable | 3.0 | 3.4 | 6.5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Debt Due | 1.0 | 6.5 |  |
| Other | 6.8 | 5.3 | 5.5 |
| Current Liab. | 10.8 | 15.2 | 12.0 |

ANNUAL RATES Past Past Est'd '17-'19 of change (per sh) 10 Yrs. 5 Yrs. to '24-26 Revenues "Cash Flow" Earnings Dividends

| -- | -- | 5. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 4.8 | 4.4 | 45.2 |
| . 9 | 1.0 | 01.0 |
| 3.3 | 4.0 | 05.1 |
| 9.0 | 9.4 | $4 \quad 16.3$ |
| 3.0 | 3.4 | 46.5 |
| 1.0 | 6.5 | 5 |
| 6.8 | 5.3 | 35 |
| 10.8 | 15.2 | 212.0 |
| Past | Past Est'd '17-'19 |  |
| Yrs. | 5 Yrs. | to '24-26 |
| 3.0\% | 2.5\% | 4.0\% |
| 6.0\% | 5.5\% | 6.5\% |
| 6.0\% | 6.0\% | 6.5\% |
| 3.0\% | 4.0\% | 6.0\% |
| 4.5\% | 4.0\% | 4.0\% |


| Cal- <br> endar | QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) <br> Mar.31 |  |  | Full <br> Jun. 30 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2018 | 11.6 | 12.0 | 12.7 | 12.1 | 48.4 |
| 2019 | 11.8 | 13.0 | 13.7 | 13.1 | 51.6 |
| 2020 | 12.9 | 13.3 | 14.3 | 13.4 | 53.9 |
| 2021 | 13.0 | 13.5 | 14.5 | 13.5 | 54.5 |
| 2022 | 13.5 | 13.7 | 15.0 | 13.8 | 56.0 |
| Cal- | EARNINGS PER SHARE A |  |  |  |  |
| endar | Mar.31 Jun. 30 Sep. 30 | Dec. 31 | Full |  |  |
| Year |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2018 | .20 | .26 | .29 | .29 | 1.04 |
| 2019 | .22 | .28 | .35 | .26 | 1.11 |
| 2020 | .31 | .32 | .36 | .28 | 1.27 |
| 2021 | .28 | .35 | .37 | .35 | 1.35 |
| 2022 | .30 | .36 | .38 | .36 | 1.40 |
| Cal- | QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID B | Full |  |  |  |
| endar | Mar.31 | Jun.30 | Sep.30 | Dec.31 | Year |
| 2017 | .1602 | .1602 | .1602 | .1666 | .647 |
| 2018 | .1666 | .1666 | .1666 | .1733 | .673 |
| 2019 | .1733 | .1733 | .1733 | .1802 | .70 |
| 2020 | .1802 | .1802 | .1802 | .1874 | .73 |
| 2021 | .1874 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

BUSINESS: The York Water Company is the oldest investor-owned regulated water utility in the United States. It has operated continuously since 1816. As of December 31, 2020, the company's average daily availability was 35.6 million gallons and its service territory had an estimated population of 202,000. Has more than 72,600 customers. Residential customers accounted for $66 \%$ of 2020 reve-
York Water delivered decent top- and bottom-line results to conclude 2020. In the December period, revenues of $\$ 13.4$ million rose $2 \%$, year over year, while earnings of $\$ 0.28$ advanced $8 \%$. For the full year, the regulated water utility benefited from rate increases, higher residential water consumption due to more people staying at home, and strong customer base expansion. Capital investment was robust in 2020 , as the company spent more than $\$ 30$ million on infrastructure upgrades such as standpipe replacements and raw water pumping station and wastewater treatment improvements.
Our preliminary 2022 financial projections suggest modest expansion is likely to persist. For the current year, we are maintaining our revenue call of $\$ 54.5$ million, but are adding a nickel to our earnings forecast, to $\$ 1.35$ per share. For next year, we anticipate low singledigit top- and bottom-line growth of $3 \%$ and $4 \%$, respectively.
The long-term outlook is bright, as well. Water consumption ought to remain stable, and possibly trend higher, as York's customer base expands further. In
nues; commercial and industrial (26\%); other ( $8 \%$ ). It also provides sewer billing services. Incorporated: PA. York had 108 full-time employees at 12/31/20. President/Chief Executive Officer: J.T. Hand. Officers/directors own $1.3 \%$ of the common stock ( $3 / 21$ proxy). Address: 130 East Market Street, York, Pennsylvania 17401. Telephone: (717) 845-3601. Internet: www.yorkwater.com.
addition, the company is likely to keep its foot on the gas in terms of capital investments, as its aging infrastructure demands increased attention. This ought to precipitate periodic rate hikes, which help to alleviate some of these expenses. The stock is trading around recently minted all-time high territory. Underpinning the investment community's notable enthusiasm of late, in our view, is a combination of strong quarterly operating performances and a broad-based flight-to-safety approach amidst an uncertain, albeit improving economic backdrop. York Water is indeed a noncyclical, conservative security, as its water utility operations stand at the core of everyday life, and are largely immune to economic shocks.
We do not recommend starting a position at the recent quotation. On the contrary, committed investors may want to consider locking in some profits following the multiyear price ascent. Moreover, the equity is pegged as a year-ahead market performer, and offers limited price upside over the pull to 2024-2026. The dividend yield leaves much to be desired, too.
Nicholas P. Patrikis
April 9, 2021

## early May.

(B) Dividends historically paid in late February,

June, September, and December.
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Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Summary of Risk Premium Models for the Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies

Proxy Group of<br>Eight Water<br>Companies

Predictive Risk
Premium Model
(PRPM) (1)
12.13 \%

Risk Premium Using
an Adjusted Total
Market Approach (2)
10.08 \%

Average $\xlongequal{11.11} \%$
Notes:
(1) From page 2 of this Schedule.
(2) From page 3 of this Schedule.
Derived by the Predictive Risk Premium Model (1)
$\sqrt{6}$



## $12.72 \%$

$11.53 \%$
$\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\circ}$
$\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\mathrm{N}}$
$\stackrel{7}{\mathrm{~N}}$
$\sigma$

| ミ |  |  | त̊ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\bigcirc$ |  |  <br>  <br>  |  |  |
| $\stackrel{\square}{\square}$ |  |  |  |  |

[^18]Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies

[^19]Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use of a Risk Premium Model Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

| Line No. |  | Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. | Prospective Yield on Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (1) | 3.44 \% |
| 2. | Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds and A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds | 0.42 (2) |
| 3. | Adjusted Prospective Yield on A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds | 3.86 \% |
| 4. | Adjustment to Reflect Bond Rating Difference of Proxy Group | 0.05 (3) |
| 5. | Adjusted Prospective Bond Yield | 3.91 \% |
| 6. | Equity Risk Premium (4) | 6.17 |
| 7. | Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate | 10.08 \% |

Notes: (1) Consensus forecast of Moody's Aaa Rated Corporate bonds from Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (see pages 10 and 11 of this Schedule).
(2) The average yield spread of A2 rated public utility bonds over Aaa rated corporate bonds of $0.42 \%$ from page 4 of this Schedule.
(3) Adjustment to reflect the A2/A3 Moody's LT issuer rating of the Utility Proxy Group as shown on page 5 of this Schedule. The $0.05 \%$ upward adjustment is derived by taking $1 / 6$ of the spread between A2 and Baa2 Public Utility Bonds $(1 / 6 * 0.27 \%=0.05 \%)$ as derived from page 4 of this Schedule.
(4) From page 7 of this Schedule.

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Interest Rates and Bond Spreads for Moody's Corporate and Public Utility Bonds

## Selected Bond Yields



## Selected Bond Spreads

A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds Over Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds:

$$
0.42 \%(1)
$$

Baa2 Rated Public Utility Bonds Over A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds:

$$
0.27 \%(2)
$$

Notes:
(1) Column [2] - Column [1].
(2) Column [3] - Column [2].

Source of Information:
Bloomberg Professional Service

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies


## Numerical Assignment for Moody's and Standard \& Poor's Bond Ratings

| Moody's Bond <br> Rating | Numerical Bond <br> Weighting |  <br> Poor's Bond <br> Rating |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aaa | 1 | AAA |
| Aa1 | 2 | AA+ |
| Aa2 | 3 | AA |
| Aa3 | 4 | AA- |
| A1 | 5 | $\mathrm{~A}+$ |
| A2 | 6 | A |
| A3 | 7 | $\mathrm{~A}-$ |
| Baa1 | 8 | $\mathrm{BBB}+$ |
| Baa2 | 9 | BBB |
| Baa3 | 10 | $\mathrm{BBB}-$ |
| Ba1 |  |  |
| Ba2 | 11 | $\mathrm{BB}+$ |
| Ba3 | 12 | BB |
| B1 | 13 | $\mathrm{BB}-$ |
| B2 | 14 | $\mathrm{~B}+$ |
| B3 | 15 | B |
|  | 16 | $\mathrm{~B}-$ |

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Judgment of Equity Risk Premium for the Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies

| Line <br> No. |  | Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. | Calculated equity risk premium based on the total market using the beta approach (1) | 6.79 \% |
| 2. | Mean equity risk premium based on a study using the holding period returns of public utilities with A2 rated bonds (2) | 5.55 |
| 3. | Average equity risk premium | 6.17 \% |

Notes: (1) From page 8 of this Schedule.
(2) From page 12 of this Schedule.

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach
Using the Beta for the
Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies

| Line No. | Equity Risk Premium Measure | Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ibbotson-Based Equity Risk Premiums: |  |  |
| 1. | Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1) | 5.92 \% |
| 2. | Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data (2) | 8.83 |
| 3. | Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3) | 9.40 |
| 4. | Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index (4) | 5.01 |
| 5. | Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line S\&P 500 Companies (5) | 10.72 |
| 6. | Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S\&P 500 Companies (6) | 12.37 |
| 7. | Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium | 8.71 \% |
| 8. | Adjusted Beta (7) | 0.78 |
| 9. | Forecasted Equity Risk Premium | 6.79 \% |

Notes provided on page 9 of this Schedule.

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach
Using the Beta for the
Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies
Notes:
(1) Based on the arithmetic mean historical monthly returns on large company common stocks from Ibbotson® SBBI® 2021 Market Report minus the arithmetic mean monthly yield of Moody's average Aaa and Aa2 corporate bonds from 1928-2020.
(2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of large company common stocks relative to Moody's average Aaa and Aa2 rated corporate bond yields from 1928-2020 referenced in Note 1 above.
(3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is discussed in the accompanying direct testimony. The Ibbotson equity risk premium based on the PRPM is derived by applying the PRPM to the monthly risk premiums between Ibbotson large company common stock monthly returns and average Aaa and Aa2 corporate monthly bond yields, from January 1928 through March 2021.
(4) The equity risk premium based on the Value Line Summary and Index is derived by subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of $3.44 \%$ (from page 3 of this Schedule) from the projected 3-5 year total annual market return of 8.45\% (described fully in note 1 on page 2 of Schedule DWD-5).
(5) Using data from Value Line for the S\&P 500, an expected total return of $14.16 \%$ was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of $3.44 \%$ results in an expected equity risk premium of $10.72 \%$.
(6) Using data from the Bloomberg Professional Service for the S\&P 500, an expected total return of $15.81 \%$ was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of $3.44 \%$ results in an expected equity risk premium of $12.37 \%$.
(7) Average of mean and median beta from Schedule DWD-5.

Sources of Information:
Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2021 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley \& Sons, Inc. Industrial Manual and Mergent Bond Record Monthly Update.
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, April 1, 2021 and December 1, 2020
Bloomberg Professional Service

## Consensus Forecasts of U.S. Interest Rates and Key Assumptions

| Interest Rates | -------------------------------------Hverage For Week Ending----------------------------------------------- Latest Qtr |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly Avg. |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { 2Q } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3 Q \\ \mathbf{2 0 2 1} \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4 Q \\ 2021 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1 Q \\ 2022 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2 Q \\ 2022 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3 Q \\ 2022 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & ------ \text { Av } \\ & \text { Mar } 26 \end{aligned}$ | Mar 19 | Mar 12 | Mar 5 | Feb | Jan | Dec | 1Q 2021* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Federal Funds Rate | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Prime Rate | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| LIBOR, 3-mo. | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.23 | 0.20 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Commercial Paper, 1-mo. | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Treasury bill, 3-mo. | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| Treasury bill, 6-mo. | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Treasury bill, 1 yr. | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Treasury note, 2 yr . | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.14 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 |
| Treasury note, 5 yr . | 0.84 | 0.85 | 0.82 | 0.73 | 0.54 | 0.45 | 0.39 | 0.61 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| Treasury note, 10 yr . | 1.65 | 1.66 | 1.57 | 1.49 | 1.26 | 1.08 | 0.93 | 1.32 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Treasury note, 30 yr . | 2.35 | 2.41 | 2.30 | 2.25 | 2.04 | 1.82 | 1.67 | 2.08 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
| Corporate Aaa bond | 3.15 | 3.23 | 3.13 | 3.06 | 2.84 | 2.64 | 2.52 | 2.88 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
| Corporate Baa bond | 3.63 | 3.71 | 3.62 | 3.52 | 3.30 | 3.14 | 3.03 | 3.36 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.4 |
| State \& Local bonds | 2.75 | 2.74 | 2.72 | 2.77 | 2.63 | 2.65 | 2.70 | 2.68 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.2 |
| Home mortgage rate | 3.17 | 3.09 | 3.05 | 3.02 | 2.81 | 2.74 | 2.68 | 2.88 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 |
|  |  |  |  | -Histor |  |  |  |  | Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | 1Q | 2 Q | 3Q | 4Q | $1 Q$ | 2Q | 3Q |
| Key Assumptions | $\underline{2019}$ | $\underline{2019}$ | $\underline{2019}$ | $\underline{2020}$ | $\underline{2020}$ | $\underline{2020}$ | $\underline{2020}$ | 2021** | $\underline{2021}$ | 2021 | 2021 | 2022 | $\underline{2022}$ | $\underline{2022}$ |
| Fed's AFE \$ Index | 110.4 | 110.6 | 110.5 | 111.4 | 112.4 | 107.3 | 105.2 | 103.4 | 104.0 | 103.9 | 103.9 | 103.6 | 103.5 | 103.4 |
| Real GDP | 1.5 | 2.6 | 2.4 | -5.0 | -31.4 | 33.4 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 8.1 | 6.9 | 4.8 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 2.7 |
| GDP Price Index | 2.5 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | -1.8 | 3.5 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| Consumer Price Index | 3.5 | 1.3 | 2.6 | 1.0 | -3.1 | 4.7 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| PCE Price Index | 2.5 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.3 | -1.6 | 3.7 | 1.5 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 |

Forecasts for interest rates and the Federal Reserve's Major Currency Index represent averages for the quarter. Forecasts for Real GDP, GDP Price Index and Consumer Price Index are seasonally-adjusted annual rates of change (saar). Individual panel members' forecasts are on pages 4 through 9. Historical data: Treasury rates from the Federal Reserve Board's H.15; AAA-AA and A-BBB corporate bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and are 15+ years, yield to maturity; State and local bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, A-rated, yield to maturity; Mortgage rates from Freddie Mac, 30-year, fixed; LIBOR quotes from Intercontinental Exchange. All interest rate data are sourced from Haver Analytics. Historical data for Fed's Major Currency Index are from FRSR H.10. Historical data for Real GDP and GDP Chained Price Index are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Consumer Price Index (CPI) history is from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). *Interest rate data for 1Q 2021 based on historical data through the week ended March 26. **Data for 1Q 2021 for the Fed's AFE \$ Index based on data through the week ended March 26. Figures for 1Q 2021 Real GDP, GDP Chained Price Index and CPI and PCE Price Index are consensus forecasts from the March 2021 survey.


## Long-Range Survey:

The table below contains the results of our twice-annual long-range CONSENSUS survey. There are also Top 10 and Bottom 10 averages for each variable. Shown are consensus estimates for the years 2022 through 2026 and averages for the five-year periods 2022-2026 and 2027-2031. Apply these projections cautiously. Few if any economic, demographic and political forces can be evaluated accurately over such long time spans.

|  |  |  |  | Average For The Year - |  | 2026 | Five-Year Averages |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |  | 2022-2026 | 2027-2031 |
| 1. Federal Funds Rate | consensus | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 1.8 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 0.2 | 0.7 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 1.3 | 2.5 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 1.2 |
| 2. Prime Rate | CONSENSUS | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 3.9 | 4.9 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 5.4 | 4.4 | 5.4 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 3.4 | 4.5 |
| 3. LIBOR, 3-Mo. | consensus | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 2.2 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 0.5 | 1.0 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 1.6 | 2.7 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 1.6 |
| 4. Commercial Paper, 1-Mo | consensus | 0.3 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 2.1 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 0.4 | 0.9 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 2.5 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 1.7 |
| 5. Treasury Bill Yield, 3-Mo | consensus | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 1.9 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 0.3 | 0.7 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 1.4 | 2.5 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 1.3 |
| 6. Treasury Bill Yield, 6-Mo | CONSENSUS | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 2.0 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 0.3 | 0.8 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 2.6 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 1.4 |
| 7. Treasury Bill Yield, 1-Yr | CONSENSUS | 0.3 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 2.1 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 0.5 | 1.0 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 1.6 | 2.7 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 1.6 |
| 8. Treasury Note Yield, 2-Yr | consensus | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 2.3 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 1.8 | 2.9 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 1.7 |
| 9. Treasury Note Yield, 5-Yr | consensus | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 2.5 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 1.1 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 2.1 | 3.1 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 1.9 |
| 10. Treasury Note Yield, 10-Yr | consensus | 1.3 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 2.8 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 1.7 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 3.5 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 2.2 |
| 11. Treasury Bond Yield, 30-Yr | consensus | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 3.6 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.5 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 4.3 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.1 | 2.9 |
| 12. Corporate Aaa Bond Yield | consensus | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 4.5 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 3.1 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 5.0 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 2.4 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 3.9 |
| 13. Corporate Baa Bond Yield | consensus | 3.9 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 4.6 | 5.4 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 4.3 | 4.7 | 5.2 | 5.6 | 5.9 | 5.1 | 6.0 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 3.5 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 4.9 |
| 14. State \& Local Bonds Yield | CONSENSUS | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.3 | 3.9 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 3.1 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 3.8 | 4.3 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 3.6 |
| 15. Home Mortgage Rate | CONSENSUS | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 4.7 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 3.5 | 3.9 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 4.4 | 5.2 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.4 | 4.2 |
| A. Fed's AFE Nominal \$ Index | CONSENSUS | 107.2 | 107.0 | 106.5 | 106.4 | 106.6 | 106.7 | 106.7 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 109.0 | 108.9 | 108.8 | 108.9 | 109.5 | 109.0 | 110.2 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 105.4 | 105.2 | 104.4 | 103.8 | 103.7 | 104.5 | 103.0 |
|  |  |  | ----- Y | r-Year, | - ------- |  | Five-Yea | verages |
|  |  | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2022-2026 | 2027-2031 |
| B. Real GDP | CONSENSUS | 3.2 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.1 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 3.8 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 2.4 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 2.6 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 1.8 |
| C. GDP Chained Price Index | CONSENSUS | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
| D. Consumer Price Index | consensus | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.2 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
| E. PCE Price Index | consensus | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
|  | Top 10 Average | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.4 |
|  | Bottom 10 Average | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.9 |

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Derivation of Mean Equity Risk Premium Based Studies
Using Holding Period Returns and
Projected Market Appreciation of the S\&P Utility Index
Line No. $\left.\begin{array}{c}\text { Implied Equity Risk } \\ \text { Premium }\end{array}\right]$

Equity Risk Premium based on S\&P Utility Index
Holding Period Returns (1):

| 1. | Historical Equity Risk Premium | $4.16 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :---: |
| 2. | Regression of Historical Equity Risk <br> Premium (2) | 6.45 |
| 3. | Forecasted Equity Risk Premium Based on <br> PRPM (3) | 4.77 |
| 4. | Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on <br> Projected Total Return on the S\&P Utilities <br> Index (Value Line Data) (4) | 6.68 |
| 5. | Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on <br> Projected Total Return on the S\&P Utilities <br> Index (Bloomberg Data) (5) |  |

Index (Bloomberg Data) (5)
5.70

Average Equity Risk Premium (6)

Notes: (1) Based on S\&P Public Utility Index monthly total returns and Moody's Public Utility Bond average monthly yields from 1928-2020. Holding period returns are calculated based upon income received (dividends and interest) plus the relative change in the market value of a security over a one-year holding period.
(2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of the S\&P Utility Index relative to Moody's A2 rated public utility bond yields from 1928-2020 referenced in note 1 above.
(3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is applied to the risk premium of the monthly total returns of the S\&P Utility Index and the monthly yields on Moody's A2 rated public utility bonds from January 1928 - March 2021.
(4) Using data from Value Line for the S\&P Utilities Index, an expected return of $10.54 \%$ was derived based on expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A2 rated public utility bond yield of $3.86 \%$, calculated on line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule results in an equity risk premium of $6.68 \%$. ( $10.54 \%-3.86 \%=6.68 \%$ )
(5) Using data from Bloomberg Professional Service for the S\&P Utilities Index, an expected return of $9.56 \%$ was derived based on expected dividend yields and longterm growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A2 rated public utility bond yield of $3.86 \%$, calculated on line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule results in an equity risk premium of $5.70 \%$. $(9.56 \%-3.86 \%=$ 5.70\%)
(6) Average of lines 1 through 5.
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use
of the Traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model (ECAPM)





Proxy Group of Eight Water
Companies
American States Water Company
American Water Works Company, Inc.
Artesian Resources Corporation
California Water Service Group
Global Water Resources, Inc.
Middlesex Water Company
SJW Group
The York Water Company
Mean
Average of Mean and Median
Notes on page 2 of this Schedule.

Notes:
(1) The market risk premium (MRP) is derived by using six different measures from three sources: Ibbotson, Value Line, and Bloomberg as illustrated below:

Historical Data MRP Estimates:
Measure 1: Ibbotson Arithmetic Mean MRP (1926-2020)
$\begin{array}{lr}\text { Arithmetic Mean Monthly Returns for Large Stocks 1926-2020: } & 12.20 \% \\ \text { Arithmetic Mean Income Returns on Long-Term Government Bonds: } & 5.05\end{array}$
Arithmetic Mean Income Returns on Long-Term Government Bonds:
5.05

MRP based on Ibbotson Historical Data:
7.15 \%

Measure 2: Application of a Regression Analysis to Ibbotson Historical Data (1926-2020)
$9.54 \%$
Measure 3: Application of the PRPM to Ibbotson Historical Data:
(January 1926 - March 2021)
$10.46 \%$

Value Line MRP Estimates:
Measure 4: Value Line Projected MRP (Thirteen weeks ending April 09, 2021)
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Total projected return on the market 3-5 years hence*: } & 8.45 \%\end{array}$
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):
MRP based on Value Line Summary \& Index:
2.73
*Forcasted 3-5 year capital appreciation plus expected dividend yield
Measure 5: Value Line Projected Return on the Market based on the S\&P 500

| Total return on the Market based on the S\&P 500: | $14.16 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2): | 2.73 |
| MRP based on Value Line data | $11.43 \%$ |

Measure 6: Bloomberg Projected MRP
Total return on the Market based on the S\&P 500: $\quad 15.81 \%$
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):

| MRP based on Bloomberg data | $\frac{2.73}{13.08} \%$ <br> Average of Value Line, Ibbotson, and Bloomberg MRP: <br> 9.56$\%$ |
| ---: | :--- |

(2) For reasons explained in the direct testimony, the appropriate risk-free rate for cost of capital purposes is the average forecast of 30 year Treasury Bonds per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts. (See pages 10-11 of Schedule DWD-4.) The projection of the risk-free rate is illustrated below:

| Second Quarter 2021 | $2.40 \%$ |
| ---: | :--- |
| Third Quarter 2021 | 2.50 |
| Fourth Quarter 2021 | 2.50 |
| First Quarter 2022 | 2.60 |
| Second Quarter 2022 | 2.70 |
| Third Quarter 2022 | 2.70 |
| 2022-2026 | 2.80 |
| 2027-2031 | 3.60 |
|  | $=$2.73 |

(3) Average of Column 6 and Column 7.

Sources of Information:
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, April 1, 2021 and December 1, 2020
Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2021 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley \& Sons, Inc.
Bloomberg Professional Services

Aqua Ohio, Inc. Basis of Selection of the Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Utility Proxy Group

The criteria for selection of the proxy group of twenty non-price regulated companies was that the non-price regulated companies be domestic and reported in Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition).

The Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group were then selected based on the unadjusted beta range of $0.43-0.75$ and residual standard error of the regression range of 3.0062-3.5854 of the Utility Proxy Group.

These ranges are based upon plus or minus two standard deviations of the unadjusted beta and standard error of the regression. Plus or minus two standard deviations captures $95.50 \%$ of the distribution of unadjusted betas and residual standard errors of the regression.

The standard deviation of the Utility Proxy Group's residual standard error of the regression is 0.1448 . The standard deviation of the standard error of the regression is calculated as follows:

Standard Deviation of the Std. Err. of the Regr. = Standard Error of the Regression $\sqrt{2 N}$
where: $N=\quad$ number of observations. Since Value Line betas are derived from weekly price change observations over a period of five years, $\mathrm{N}=259$

$$
\text { Thus, } 0.1448=\frac{3.2958}{\sqrt{518}}=\frac{3.2958}{22.7596}
$$

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Basis of Selection of Comparable Risk Domestic Non-Price Regulated Companies

| $[4]$ |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | [1] | [2] |  |  |

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Proxy Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies
Comparable in Total Risk to the
Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies

|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies | $\begin{gathered} \text { VL Adjusted } \\ \text { Beta } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Unadjusted } \\ \text { Beta } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Residual Standard Error of the Regression | Standard Deviation of Beta |
| Adobe, Inc. | 0.75 | 0.61 | 3.2593 | 0.0813 |
| Balchem Corporation | 0.70 | 0.54 | 3.5216 | 0.0879 |
| Bio-Rad Labs | 0.75 | 0.58 | 3.2201 | 0.0804 |
| CSG Systems Int'l | 0.75 | 0.60 | 3.1995 | 0.0798 |
| Citrix Sys. | 0.70 | 0.47 | 3.4840 | 0.0869 |
| Dollar General Corporation | 0.65 | 0.46 | 3.1921 | 0.0797 |
| Ennis, Inc. | 0.80 | 0.66 | 3.3410 | 0.0834 |
| Heartland Express | 0.70 | 0.54 | 3.0069 | 0.0750 |
| Intel Corp. | 0.80 | 0.67 | 3.5783 | 0.0893 |
| Keysight Technologies | 0.85 | 0.73 | 3.5026 | 0.0874 |
| Lancaster Colony Corp. | 0.70 | 0.50 | 3.0103 | 0.0751 |
| Lilly (Eli) | 0.75 | 0.59 | 3.0669 | 0.0765 |
| Smucker (J.M.) | 0.65 | 0.45 | 3.0463 | 0.0760 |
| Schneider National, Inc. | 0.80 | 0.65 | 3.4534 | 0.0894 |
| Bio-Techne Corp. | 0.80 | 0.67 | 3.2475 | 0.0810 |
| Tyler Technologies | 0.75 | 0.56 | 3.2350 | 0.0807 |
| United Parcel Serv. | 0.80 | 0.63 | 3.0112 | 0.0751 |
| Walgreens Boots Alliance | 0.85 | 0.71 | 3.4851 | 0.0870 |
| Werner Enterprises | 0.75 | 0.58 | 3.3887 | 0.0846 |
| West Pharmaceutical Services Inc | 0.85 | 0.70 | 3.1887 | 0.0796 |
| Average | 0.76 | 0.60 | 3.2719 | 0.0818 |
| Proxy Group of Eight Water |  |  |  |  |
| Companies | 0.75 | 0.59 | 3.2958 | 0.0824 |

Source of Information:
Valueline Proprietary Database, March 2021

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Summary of Cost of Equity Models Applied to Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies

| Principal Methods |  | Proxy Group of Twenty NonPrice Regulated Companies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1) |  | 11.51 \% |
| Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2) |  | 10.85 |
| Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3) |  | 10.30 |
|  | Mean | 10.89 \% |
|  | Median | 10.85 \% |
|  | Average of Mean and Median | 10.87 \% |

Notes:
(1) From page 2 of this Schedule.
(2) From page 3 of this Schedule.
(3) From page 6 of this Schedule.
DCF Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the

| $\underset{\sim}{\infty}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\Sigma$ |  | ஃ゚ <br>  |


| Aqua Ohio, Inc. |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CF Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies |  |  |  |  |
| [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] |
| Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS | Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS | Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS | Bloomberg Projected Five Year Growth in EPS | Average Projected Five Year Growth Rate in EPS |
| 14.00 \% | 19.00 \% | 17.80 \% | 17.27 \% | 17.02 \% |
| 13.50 | NA | 24.00 | 7.93 | 15.14 |
| 11.50 | NA | 17.80 | 28.75 | 19.35 |
| 10.00 | NA | NMF | NA | 10.00 |
| 9.00 | 5.30 | 10.70 | 9.60 | 8.65 |
| 13.00 | 10.80 | 13.57 | 10.57 | 11.99 |
| 3.00 | NA | 5.00 | NA | 4.00 |
| 10.00 | NA | 12.50 | NA | 11.25 |
| 7.00 | 7.50 | 5.43 | 5.24 | 6.29 |
| 17.00 | 10.40 | 12.41 | 10.41 | 12.56 |
| 6.50 | NA | 3.00 | NA | 4.75 |
| 9.00 | 12.20 | 11.60 | NA | 10.93 |
| 2.50 | 1.60 | NMF | 1.65 | 1.92 |
| 2.50 | 14.00 | 15.25 | 14.48 | 11.56 |
| 12.50 | 15.00 | 15.00 | 19.03 | 15.38 |
| 10.50 | 15.00 | 10.00 | 20.15 | 13.91 |
| 8.00 | 8.70 | 10.06 | 8.04 | 8.70 |
| 6.00 | 6.80 | 3.63 | 4.74 | 5.29 |
| 9.50 | 10.00 | 11.34 | 9.52 | 10.09 |
| 17.00 | 22.60 | 22.60 | 17.21 | 19.85 |



[^20](1) The application of the DCF model to the domestic, non-price regluated comparable risk companies is identical to the application of the DCF to the utility proxy group. The projected growth rate in EPS, which is calculated by averaging the 5 year projected growth in EPS provided by Value Line, Bloomberg, www.zacks.com, and www.yahoo.com (excluding any negative growth rates) and then adding that growth rate to the adjusted dividend yield.

Value Line Investment Survey www.zacks.com Downloaded on 04/05/2021 Bloomberg Professional Services

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate
Through Use of a Risk Premium Model
Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

| $\underline{\text { Line No. }}$ |  | Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. | Prospective Yield on Baa2 Rated Corporate Bonds (1) | 4.36 \% |
| 2. | Adjustment to Reflect Proxy Group Bond Rating (2) | (0.13) |
| 3. | Prospective Bond Yield Applicable to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group | 4.23 |
| 4. | Equity Risk Premium (3) | 6.62 |
| 5. | Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate | 10.85 \% |

Notes: (1) Average forecast of Baa2 corporate bonds based upon the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts dated April 1, 2021 and December 1, 2020 (see pages 10 and 11 of Schedule DWD-4). The estimates are detailed below.

| Second Quarter 2021 | $3.90 \%$ |
| ---: | :--- |
| Third Quarter 2021 | 4.00 |
| Fourth Quarter 2021 | 4.10 |
| First Quarter 2022 | 4.20 |
| Second Quarter 2022 | 4.30 |
| Third Quarter 2022 | 4.40 |
| 2022-2026 | 4.60 |
| 2027-2031 | 5.40 |
| Average |  |

(2) To reflect the Baa1 average rating of the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, the prosepctive yield on Baa2 corporate bonds must be adjusted downward by $1 / 3$ of the spread between A2 and Baa2 corporate bond yields as shown below:

|  | A2 Corp. Bond <br> Yield | Baa2 Corp. <br> Bond Yield | Spread |  |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Mar-2021 | 3.37 | $\%$ | 3.74 | 0.37 |
| Feb-2021 | 3.03 | 3.42 | 0.39 |  |
| Jan-2021 | 2.84 | 3.24 | 0.40 |  |
|  | Average yield spread |  | 0.39 |  |$\%$

(3) From page 5 of this Schedule.

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for the
Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies

| Moody's |
| :---: |
| Long-Term Issuer Rating |
| April 2021 |

Standard \& Poor's
Long-Term Issuer Rating
April 2021

| Proxy Group of Twenty NonPrice Regulated Companies | Long- <br> Term <br> Issuer <br> Rating | Numerical <br> Weighting (1) | Long-Term Issuer Rating | $\begin{gathered} \text { Numerical } \\ \text { Weighting (1) } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Adobe, Inc. | A2 | 6.0 | A | 6.0 |
| Balchem Corporation | NA | -- | NA | -- |
| Bio-Rad Labs | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| CSG Systems Int'l | NA | -- | BB+ | 11.0 |
| Citrix Sys. | Baa3 | 10.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Dollar General Corporation | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Ennis, Inc. | NA | -- | NA | -- |
| Heartland Express | NA | -- | NA | -- |
| Intel Corp. | A1 | 5.0 | A+ | 5.0 |
| Keysight Technologies | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Lancaster Colony Corp. | NA | -- | NA | -- |
| Lilly (Eli) | A2 | 6.0 | A+ | 5.0 |
| Smucker (J.M.) | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Schneider National, Inc. | NA | -- | NA | -- |
| Bio-Techne Corp. | NA | -- | NA | -- |
| Tyler Technologies | NA | -- | NA | -- |
| United Parcel Serv. | A2 | 6.0 | A- | 7.0 |
| Walgreens Boots Alliance | Baa2 | 9.0 | BBB | 9.0 |
| Werner Enterprises | NA | -- | NA | -- |
| West Pharmaceutical Services Inc | NA | -- | NA | -- |
| Average | Baa1 | 7.8 | BBB+ | 8.0 |

Notes:
(1) From page 6 of Schedule DWD-4.

Source of Information:
Bloomberg Professional Services

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach
Using the Beta for
Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the Proxy Group of Eight Water Companies
$\left.\begin{array}{cll}\text { Line No. } & \text { Equity Risk Premium Measure } & \begin{array}{c}\text { Proxy Group of } \\ \text { Twenty Non-Price } \\ \text { Regulated }\end{array} \\ \text { Companies }\end{array}\right]$

Notes:
(1) From note 1 of page 9 of Schedule DWD-4.
(2) From note 2 of page 9 of Schedule DWD-4.
(3) From note 3 of page 9 of Schedule DWD-4.
(4) From note 4 of page 9 of Schedule DWD-4.
(5) From note 5 of page 9 of Schedule DWD-4.
(6) From note 6 of page 9 of Schedule DWD-4.
(7) Average of mean and median beta from page 6 of this Schedule.

Sources of Information:
Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2021 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley \& Sons, Inc.
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, April 1, 2021 and December 1, 2020
Bloomberg Professional Services
Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Traditional CAPM and ECAPM Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the

| Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price Regulated Companies | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Value Line <br> Adjusted Beta | Bloomberg Beta | Average <br> Beta | Market Risk <br> Premium (1) | Risk-Free Rate <br> (2) | Traditional CAPM Cost Rate | ECAPM Cost Rate | Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (3) |
| Adobe, Inc. | 0.75 | 0.87 | 0.81 | 9.57 \% | 2.73 \% | 10.48 \% | 10.93 \% | 10.70 \% |
| Balchem Corporation | 0.70 | 0.73 | 0.72 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 9.62 | 10.29 | 9.95 |
| Bio-Rad Labs | 0.75 | 0.70 | 0.72 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 9.62 | 10.29 | 9.95 |
| CSG Systems Int'l | 0.75 | 0.91 | 0.83 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 10.67 | 11.08 | 10.87 |
| Citrix Sys. | 0.70 | 0.61 | 0.66 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 9.04 | 9.86 | 9.45 |
| Dollar General Corporation | 0.70 | 0.67 | 0.69 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 9.33 | 10.07 | 9.70 |
| Ennis, Inc. | 0.80 | 0.82 | 0.81 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 10.48 | 10.93 | 10.70 |
| Heartland Express | 0.70 | 0.76 | 0.73 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 9.71 | 10.36 | 10.04 |
| Intel Corp. | 0.80 | 0.96 | 0.88 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 11.15 | 11.43 | 11.29 |
| Keysight Technologies | 0.85 | 0.79 | 0.82 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 10.57 | 11.00 | 10.79 |
| Lancaster Colony Corp. | 0.70 | 0.71 | 0.71 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 9.52 | 10.21 | 9.87 |
| Lilly (Eli) | 0.75 | 0.73 | 0.74 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 9.81 | 10.43 | 10.12 |
| Smucker (J.M.) | 0.70 | 0.50 | 0.60 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 8.47 | 9.43 | 8.95 |
| Schneider National, Inc. | 0.80 | 0.72 | 0.76 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 10.00 | 10.57 | 10.29 |
| Bio-Techne Corp. | 0.80 | 0.92 | 0.86 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 10.96 | 11.29 | 11.12 |
| Tyler Technologies | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 9.90 | 10.50 | 10.20 |
| United Parcel Serv. | 0.80 | 0.85 | 0.83 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 10.67 | 11.08 | 10.87 |
| Walgreens Boots Alliance | 0.75 | 0.80 | 0.78 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 10.19 | 10.72 | 10.45 |
| Werner Enterprises | 0.75 | 0.78 | 0.76 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 10.00 | 10.57 | 10.29 |
| West Pharmaceutical Services Inc | 0.85 | 0.76 | 0.80 | 9.57 | 2.73 | 10.38 | 10.86 | 10.62 |
| Mean |  |  | 0.76 |  |  | 10.11 \% | 10.66 \% | 10.31 \% |
| Median |  |  | 0.76 |  |  | 10.00 \% | 10.57 \% | 10.29 \% |
| Average of Mean and Median |  |  | 0.76 |  |  | 10.06 \% | 10.62 \% | 10.30 \% |
|  | From Sched From Sched Average of | DWD-5, note DWD-5, note M and ECAPM |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Derivation of Investment Risk Adjustment Based upon
Ibbotson Associates' Size Premia for the Decile Portfolios of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ

Aqua Ohio, Inc.



Source of Information: Company SEC filed documents

This foregoing document was electronically filed with the Public Utilities

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## Case No(s). 21-0595-WW-AIR

Summary: Testimony of Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA, CVA electronically filed by Ms. Nicole R Woods on behalf of Aqua Ohio, Inc.


[^0]:    1 Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). ("Hope") Bluefield Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1922). ("Bluefield")

[^1]:    3 Value Line Investment Survey, April 9, 2021.

[^2]:    4 Free Cash Flow = Operating Cash Flow (Funds From Operations) minus Capital Expenditures.

[^3]:    $9 \quad$ Illustrated on Columns 1 and 2 of page 2 of Schedule DWD-4.
    10 Illustrated on Column 4 of page 2 of Schedule DWD-4.
    11 Annualized Return = (1+Monthly Return $)^{\wedge} 12-1$.
    12 See, Column 6 of page 2 of Schedule DWD-4.
    13 Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 1, 2020 at p. 14 and April 1, 2021 at p. 2.

[^4]:    17 SBBI Appendix A Tables: Morningstar Stocks, Bonds, Bills, \& Inflation 1926-2020.
    18
    19

    As explained in Note 1 on page 9 of Schedule DWD-4.
    SBBI-2021, at 10-22-10-23.

[^5]:    20 Data from January 1928-December 2020 is from SBBI-2021. Data from January - March 2021 is from Bloomberg Professional Services. Shown on Line No. 3 on page 8 of Schedule DWD-4.

[^6]:    23
    24
    See, Line No. 7 on page 8 of Schedule DWD-4. As shown on page 8 of Attachment DWD-4.

[^7]:    26 Derived on Line No. 3 of page 3 of Schedule DWD-4.
    27 As shown on page 12 of Attachment DWD-4.
    28 As shown on page 7 of Schedule DWD-4.

[^8]:    32 Morin, at 175.

[^9]:    33 Morin, at 190.
    Fama \& French, at 32.
    lbid., at 33.

[^10]:    36 SBBI - 2021, at Appendix A-1 (1) through A-1 (3) and Appendix A-7 (19) through A-7 (21). 37 As shown on page 2 of Schedule DWD-5.

[^11]:    38
    Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, December 1, 2020, at p. 14 and April 1, 2021, at p. 2. As demonstrated on Schedule DWD-7, page 3, note 2.

[^12]:    41
    42
    43
    Duff \& Phelps 2020 Valuation Handbook - U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital, Wiley 2018, at 4-1. Fama \& French, at 25-43.
    Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1996), at 204-205, 229.

[^13]:    $46 \quad$ Morin, at 523.
    47 Haim Levy \& Marshall Sarnat, Capital Investment and Financial Decisions, Prentice/Hall International, 1986, at 465.
    Bluefield, at 6.
    Fama \& French, at 39.

[^14]:    50 Morin 321.

[^15]:    (A) Primary earnings. Excludes nonrecurring $\quad$ (B) Dividends historically paid in early March, (C) In millions, adjusted for split gains/(losses): '05, 13c; '06, 3¢; '08, (14¢); '10, June, September, and December. - Div'd rein- (D) Includes intangibles. As of 12/31/20; \$1.1 (23c); '11, 10c. Next earnings report due mid- vestment plan available. May.
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[^16]:    | (A) Diluted earnings. Excludes nonrecur. | ings report due mid-May. | $12 / 31 / 20: \$ 1.559$ billion, $\$ 8.59 /$ share. |
    | :--- | :--- | :--- |
    | losses: '00, $\$ 4.62 ;$; $09, \$ 2.63 ;$; $111, \$ 0.07$. Disc. |  |  |
    | (B) $)$ Dividends paid in March, June, September, | (E) Pro forma numbers for '06 \& 07. |  |

    $\begin{array}{ll}\text { losses: '08, } \$ 4.62 \text {; '09, } \$ 2.63 ; \text { '11, } \$ 0.07 \text {. Disc. } & \text { (B) Dividends paid in March, June, September, } \\ \text { oper.: '06, }(\$ 0.04) \text {; '11, } \$ 0.03 \text {; '12, ( } \$ 0.10 \text { ); } \\ \text { and }\end{array}$ 13,(\$0.01). GAAP used as of 2014. Next earn- (C) In millions. (D) Includes intangibles. On
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[^17]:    | (A) Diluted earnings. Excludes nonrecurring | may not add due to rounding. | (C) In millions. |
    | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
    | losses: $05, \$ 1.09 ;$; $06, \$ 16.36 ; ' 08, \$ 1.22 ; ' 10$, | (B) Dividends historically paid in early March, |  |
    | (D) Paid |  |  | $\$ 0.46$. GAAP accounting as of 2013. Next June, September, and December. - Div'd rein-

    (D) Paid special dividend of $\$ 0.17$ per share on earnings report due early May. Quarterly egs. vestment plan available.
    (E) Suspended due to recent CTWS merger.

[^18]:    NMF = Not Meaningful Figure
    The Predictive Risk Premium Model uses historical data to generate a predicted variance and a GARCH coefficient. The historical data used are the equity risk premiums for the first available trading month as reported by Bloomberg Professional Service.
    $\left(1+(\text { Column [3] } * \text { Column [4]) })^{\wedge 12}\right)-1$.
     Column [5] + Column [6].

    | $\ddot{0} \Xi$ |
    | :--- |
    |  |

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[^19]:    American States Water Company American Water Works Company, Inc. Artesian Resources Corporation California Water Service Group Global Water Resources, Inc. Middlesex Water Company

    SJW Group

[^20]:    Proxy Group of Twenty Non-Price
    Regulated Companies
    Adobe, Inc.
    Balchem Corporation
    Bio-Rad Labs
    CSG Systems Int'l
    Citrix Sys.
    Dollar General Corporation
    Ennis, Inc.
    Heartland Express
    Intel Corp.
    Keysight Technologies
    Lancaster Colony Corp.
    Lilly (Eli)
    Smucker (J.M.)
    Schneider National, Inc.
    BioTechne Corp.
    Tyler Technologies
    United Parcel Serv.
    Walgreens Boots Alliance
    Werner Enterprises
    West Pharmaceutical Services Inc

