## BEFORE

## THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., for an Increase in Electric Distribution Rates.	) ) )	Case No. 17-0032-EL-AIR
In the Matter of the Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., for Tariff Approval.	) )	Case No. 17-0033-EL-ATA
In the Matter of the Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., for Approval to Change Accounting Methods.	) ) )	Case No. 17-0034-EL-AAM
In the Matter of the Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., for Approval to Modify Rider PSR.	) ) )	Case No. 17-0872-EL-RDR
In the Matter of the Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., for Approval to Amend Rider PSR.	) ) )	Case No. 17-0873-EL-ATA
In the Matter of the Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., for Approval to Change Accounting Methods.	) ) )	Case No. 17-0874-EL-AAM
In the Matter of the Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., for Authority to Establish a Standard Service Offer Pursuant to Section 4928.143, Revised Code, in the Form of an Electric Security Plan, Accounting Modifications and Tariffs for Generation Service.	) ) ) ) )	Case No. 17-1263-EL-SSO
In the Matter of the Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., for Authority to Amend its Certified Supplier Tariff, P.U.C.O. No. 20.	) ) )	Case No. 17-1264-EL-ATA
In the Matter of the Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., for Authority to Defer Vegetation Management Costs.	) ) )	Case No. 17-1265-EL-AAM
In the Matter of the Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., to Establish Minimum Reliability Performance Standards Pursuant to Chapter 4901:1-10, Ohio Administrative Code.	) ) ) )	Case No. 16-1602-EL-ESS

## DUKE ENERGY OHIO, INC.'S NOTICE OF FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION ORDER DIRECTING PJM INTERCONNECTION, L.L.C. NOT TO RUN ITS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION IN AUGUST 2019 AND REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE REGARDING WHETHER AN AMENDMENT TO DUKE ENERGY OHIO, INC.'S UPCOMING STANDARD SERVICE OFFER AUCTION SCHEDULE SHOULD OCCUR

### I. INTRODUCTION

Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., (Duke Energy Ohio) hereby notifies the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (Commission) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued an order on July 25, 2019, directing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., (PJM) *not* to run its Base Residual Auction in August 2019, as had been previously scheduled, in order to delay "until the Commission establishes [the applicable] rate" for the 2022-2023 delivery year.<sup>1</sup> A copy of this order is provided in Attachment A. The potential implications of this just-issued order, including the uncertainties it creates for the upcoming electric security plan (ESP) auction scheduled to be held by Duke Energy Ohio in September 2019 (which includes load for the same period), are set forth in the accompanying Memorandum. The Memorandum also outlines how the Duke Energy Ohio ESP auction schedule could be modified to mitigate the uncertainties created by the July 25 FERC order.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Order on Motion for Supplemental Clarification, No. EL16-49-000, at M 2, 14 (July 25, 2019).

Duke Energy Ohio is prepared to proceed pursuant to the ESP auction schedule previously approved in this proceeding, but the Commission may find that uncertainty as to the applicable PJM rate for a portion of the period covered by the September 2019 ESP auction warrants modifying the ESP auction schedule. Duke Energy Ohio welcomes guidance from the Commission on the most prudent course of action.

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Respectfully submitted, DUKE ENERGY OHIO, INC.

<u>/s/ Jeanne H. Kingery</u>
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#### **MEMORANDUM**

Having reviewed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) order issued on July 25, 2019 (the Order), directing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., (PJM) *not* to run its Base Residual Auction in August 2019,<sup>2</sup> Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., (Duke Energy Ohio) submits this Notice to (1) inform the Commission of the Order's potential implications for the upcoming, previously scheduled ESP auction that Duke Energy Ohio had planned to conduct in September 2019 and (2) request guidance as to whether the ESP auction scope should be adjusted accordingly.

On June 1, 2017, Duke Energy Ohio filed an application for approval of its standard service offer (SSO) for the period between June 1, 2018, and May 31, 2024 (the Application).<sup>3</sup> Duke Ohio proposed to implement this SSO in the form of an electric security plan (ESP). The Application docket was ultimately consolidated with numerous other dockets and resolved in a Stipulation that the Commission approved and adopted on December 19, 2018.<sup>4</sup> Among other things, the Stipulation recommended approval of the Application (subject to amendments in the Stipulation) for the period of June 1, 2018, through May 31, 2025.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Order on Motion for Supplemental Clarification, No. EL16-49-000, at ¶ 2 (July 25, 2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., Case No. 17-1263-EL-SSO, Application (June 1, 2017). <sup>4</sup>Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., No. 16-1602-EL-ESS, et al., Stipulation and Recommendation (April 13, 2018); Opinion and Order) (approving and adopting stipulation) (Dec. 19, 2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Stipulation, at 4.

As approved, the ESP provided that Duke Energy Ohio would conduct an auction in September 2019 for 17% of the load during the period from June 2020 to May 2023.<sup>6</sup> As planned, this auction would have occurred *after* PJM's Base Residual Auction for the 2022-2023 delivery year, which was originally scheduled to occur in May 2019, and then rescheduled to August 2019.<sup>7</sup> Thus, at the time of the September 2019 ESP auction, Duke Energy Ohio would have already known the applicable PJM rates for the entire time period at issue (June 2020 to May 2023). However, proceedings at FERC have disrupted the planned sequence.

In the Order, FERC directed PJM not to conduct the Base Residual Auction scheduled for August 2019 because FERC had not yet decided upon the applicable rate. In June 2018, FERC found that PJM's rate was unjust and unreasonable, and instituted proceedings to determine a just and reasonable replacement rate.<sup>8</sup> In the meantime, PJM requested permission to run the August 2019 auction pursuant to its existing tariff and rate, but FERC rejected its proposal and instructed PJM to postpone the auction altogether, explaining that "on balance, delaying the auction until the Commission establishes a replacement rate will provide greater certainty to the market than conducting the auction under the existing rules."<sup>9</sup>

While Duke Energy Ohio is prepared to conduct the September 2019 ESP auction as scheduled, it would be doing so without knowing the applicable PJM rate for a substantial part of the covered period (the 2022 to 2023 delivery year). This would create substantial uncertainty and confusion among bidders. The uncertainty could lead to some potential participants refraining from participation or including additional risk premiums in their bidding strategies for this period.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Stipulation, Attachment A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Order at ¶ 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Order, at ¶ 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Order, at ¶ ¶¶ 13-14.

The ESP auction timetable could, however, be modified to eliminate the uncertainty caused by the parallel FERC proceedings without delaying the September auction altogether. Instead, Duke Energy Ohio could limit its September ESP auction to 17% of the load during the period from June 2020 to May 2022 (not 2023). If it limits the September auction in this manner, Duke Energy Ohio would correspondingly adjust for 17% of the load for the remaining period (June 2022 through May 2023) after a final PJM rate is established, as contemplated in the Order. Doing so would delay the auction of a portion of the 2022-2023 load "until the Commission establishes a replacement rate," and thereby "provide greater certainty to the market than conducting the auction under the existing" timetable.

Given that the applicable PJM rate for the 2022-2023 delivery year will probably not be known by September 2019, Duke Energy Ohio seeks guidance from the Commission as to whether the previously approved ESP auction schedule should be modified.

#### DUKE ENERGY OHIO, INC.

<u>/s/ Jeanne W. Kingery</u> Rocco O. D'Ascenzo (0077651) Deputy General Counsel Elizabeth H. Watts (0031092) Associate General Counsel Jeanne W. Kingery (0012172) Associate General Counsel

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#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Notice was served via electronic mail or ordinary mail on the following parties this 29<sup>th</sup> day of July 2019.

<u>/s/ Jeanne W. Kingery</u> Jeanne W. Kingery

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## 168 FERC ¶ 61,051 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: Neil Chatterjee, Chairman; Cheryl A. LaFleur, Richard Glick, and Bernard L. McNamee.

Calpine Corporation, Dynegy Inc., Eastern Generation, LLC, Homer City Generation, L.P., NRG Power Marketing LLC, GenOn Energy Management, LLC, Carroll County Energy LLC, C.P. Crane LLC, Essential Power, LLC, Essential Power OPP, LLC, Essential Power Rock Springs, LLC, Lakewood Cogeneration, L.P., GDF SUEZ Energy Marketing NA, Inc., Oregon Clean Energy, LLC and Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

Docket Nos. EL16-49-000

EL18-178-000 (Consolidated)

## ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL CLARIFICATION

(Issued July 25, 2019)

1. On April 10, 2019, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 212 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure,<sup>1</sup> seeking clarification of the Commission's order issued in this proceeding on June 29, 2018 (Motion).<sup>2</sup> In its Motion, PJM states that it intends to run its Base Residual Auction (BRA) in August 2019

<sup>1</sup> 18 C.F.R. § 385.212 (2019).

<sup>2</sup> Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (2018) (June 2018 Order), reh'g pending.

(August 2019 BRA) for the 2022-2023 delivery year under its existing tariff.<sup>3</sup> PJM seeks confirmation that, to the extent the Commission has not established a replacement rate prior to the August 2019 BRA, any replacement rate later established would be applied prospectively and would not require PJM to rerun the August 2019 BRA.<sup>4</sup> PJM also requests that, should the Commission not wish PJM to run the August 2019 BRA under its existing rules, the Commission affirmatively so state in ruling on the Motion.<sup>5</sup>

2. For the reasons discussed below, we deny PJM's Motion and direct PJM not to run the BRA in August 2019.

# I. <u>Background and Motion</u>

3. In the June 2018 Order, the Commission found PJM's Tariff unjust and unreasonable and unduly discriminatory because it fails to protect the capacity market from the price-suppressive impacts of out-of-market support to new and existing resources.<sup>6</sup> The Commission also instituted a paper hearing, under section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),.<sup>7</sup> to determine the just and reasonable replacement rate. Initial and reply testimony were submitted on October 2, 2018, and November 6, 2018, respectively. Commission action on the paper hearing remains pending.

4. Subsequently, in the Waiver Order, the Commission granted PJM's request to waive the auction timing requirements of its Tariff to allow for a delay of the 2019 BRA for the 2022-2023 delivery year from May 2019, to August 14-28, 2019.<sup>8</sup> PJM sought to

<sup>3</sup> Motion at 3 (citing *PJM Interconnection L.L.C.*, 164 FERC ¶ 61,153 (2018) (approving PJM's waiver request to move the 2019 BRA to August 14-28, 2019) (Waiver Order)).

<sup>4</sup> Motion at 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Id.* at 6, n.16.

<sup>6</sup> June 28 Order, 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, at P 5.

<sup>7</sup> 16 U.S.C. § 825e (2012).

<sup>8</sup> Waiver Order, 164 FERC ¶ 61,153, at P 1. Specifically, PJM was granted waiver of Attachment DD, at: (i) section 5.4(a) (requiring that the BRA be conducted in May three years prior to the relevant delivery year); (ii) section 5.10(a)(vi)(B) and 5.10(d) (requiring PJM to post by February 1 before the BRA the Variable Resource

move the BRA, in part, to ensure that it had sufficient time to conduct the auction based on the just and reasonable replacement rate established in this proceeding.<sup>9</sup>

5. In its Motion, PJM states that, because the Commission has not yet issued a replacement rate, PJM intends to conduct the August 2019 BRA under its existing rules, notwithstanding the Commission's determination in the June 2018 Order that those existing rules are unjust and unreasonable. PJM asserts that, without a replacement rate or an alternative directive from the Commission, PJM is required to operate under its existing Tariff, i.e., the filed rate.<sup>10</sup>

6. PJM states that confidence in the auction results is critical for all participants, especially potential new entrants..<sup>11</sup> In order to ensure certainty in the outcome of the August 2019 BRA, PJM requests that the Commission clarify that any replacement rate ultimately adopted in this proceeding operate prospectively and that the results of the August 2019 BRA not be made subject to refund. On the issue of refunds, PJM notes the Commission is not required to order refunds in all cases..<sup>12</sup> PJM asserts that, here, refunds would not be warranted because the basis of the underlying complaint is that the relevant rates are too low, not too high, which is a required finding for refunds under section 206 of the FPA..<sup>13</sup>

## II. <u>Responsive Pleadings</u>

7. Comments generally supportive of the Motion were submitted by American Municipal Power, Inc., Dominion Energy Services, Inc., Exelon Corporation, EDP Renewables North American LLC, FirstEnergy Utility Companies, and Talen PJM

<sup>9</sup> *Id.* P 13.

<sup>10</sup> Motion at 3, 6 (citing *Elec. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC*, 774 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).

<sup>11</sup> *Id.* at 4-5.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at 5-7.

<sup>13</sup> Id. at 7-8 (citing City of Anaheim v. FERC, 558 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2009) and 16 U.S.C. § 824e(b)).

Requirement curves to be used in the BRA and the Preliminary PJM Region Peak Load Forecast for the delivery year; and (iii) requiring any seller seeking an exception to the BRA must-offer requirement on the basis of the deactivation of its resource to submit a preliminary written request by the September 1 preceding the BRA, and provide confirmation by December 1).

Companies (PJM Entities); the Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA); Direct Energy Business Marketing, LLC and Direct Energy Business, LLC (Direct Energy); and the American Wind Energy Association and the Solar Council (Clean Energy Entities). The Illinois Attorney General's Office (Illinois AG) submitted comments regarding existing flaws in the capacity market.

8. PJM Entities agree with PJM's Motion, but assert that the auction should be delayed if the Commission does not grant PJM's clarification. PJM Entities argue that running the auction without granting PJM's clarification would undermine the very certainty the BRAs are designed to provide.<sup>14</sup>

9. EPSA supports PJM's Motion. EPSA largely reiterates PJM's arguments and adds that delaying the August 2019 BRA beyond August 2019 could have "serious market impacts," especially if the auction is delayed to May 2020, taking nearly a full year off the three year forward period.<sup>15</sup>

10. Direct Energy agrees that the auction should be run in August 2019. It asserts that the forward capacity auction was designed to provide market participants with important price signals that are necessary for resource investment and retirement decisions and for load serving entities that procure capacity on behalf of customers. Direct Energy states that further delaying the August 2019 BRA would negatively impact the market by providing no indication of the capacity price for the relevant delivery year, thus requiring retail suppliers to forecast prices without a cleared market, and also could impact the 2020 BRA, eroding market confidence. Direct Energy states that, while further delaying the auction may be beneficial to some entities impacted by the replacement rate, such as PJM Entities, that is not the case for all resources in PJM...<sup>16</sup> Direct Energy explains that load serving entities that do not own generation and are serving customers outside of state sponsored wholesale procurements rely on the forward capacity auction price signals to index electricity offers to customers. According to Direct Energy, other mechanisms are not available to protect default service customers from capacity market outcomes, given

<sup>15</sup> EPSA Answer at 3.

<sup>16</sup> Direct Energy Comments at 3-4 (referencing PJM Entities' request to delay the auction if the Commission does not grant PJM's Motion).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> PJM Entities' Answer at 3. PJM Entities' Answer included a cross-motion to move the August 2019 BRA to April 2020. This order does not address PJM Entities' cross-motion or EPSA's May 9, 2019 answer to the cross-motion.

that the Commission has not yet set a replacement rate. Direct Energy states that running the August 2019 BRA under the current rules will have little impact on clearing prices.<sup>17</sup>

11. Clean Energy Entities support PJM's Motion, adding that further delays would postpone the necessary forward price signals that market participants rely on and could risk interfering with the May 2020 BRA.<sup>18</sup>

12. The Illinois AG requests that, if the Commission grants PJM's Motion, the Commission address flaws in the existing capacity market rules that facilitate market power abuse by requiring PJM to release generator bidding data and to replace the algorithm that PJM uses to increase clearing prices above the highest bid.<sup>19</sup>

## III. <u>Discussion</u>

13. For the reasons discussed below, we deny PJM's Motion and provide additional guidance. First, we deny PJM's request to clarify that any replacement rate ultimately adopted in this proceeding operate prospectively and would not require PJM to rerun the August 2019 BRA. We will not rule prematurely on the issue of any appropriate remedy prior to rendering a determination on the merits of a replacement rate.<sup>20</sup>

14. Second, we direct PJM not to conduct the 2019 BRA in August. In rendering this determination, we take into account considerations such as the magnitude of the tariff process at issue-the BRA, a major feature of the PJM market-and the corresponding interest of market participants who make resource investment and retirement decisions based on price signals. We recognize the importance of sending price signals sufficiently in advance of delivery to allow for resource investment decisions. However, we believe that in the circumstances presented here, on balance, delaying the auction until the Commission establishes a replacement rate will provide greater certainty to the market than conducting the auction under the existing rules.

<sup>17</sup> *Id.* at 4-6.

<sup>18</sup> Clean Energy Entities Comments 3-4.

<sup>19</sup> Illinois AG Answer at 3.

<sup>20</sup> See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 149 FERC ¶ 61,252, at P 9 (2014) (rejecting, as premature, a request that the Commission rule on refunds in advance of a technical conference and prior to the Commission's order on the merits).

The Commission orders:

(A) PJM's Motion is hereby denied, as discussed in the body of this order.

(B) PJM is hereby directed to not hold the 2019 BRA scheduled for August 14-28, 2019.

By the Commission. Commissioners LaFleur, Glick, and McNamee are concurring with separate statements attached.

(SEAL)

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr., Deputy Secretary.

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Calpine Corporation, Dynegy Inc., Eastern Generation, LLC, Homer City Generation, L.P., NRG Power Marketing LLC, GenOn Energy Management, LLC, Carroll County Energy LLC, C.P. Crane LLC, Essential Power, LLC, Essential Power OPP, LLC, Essential Power Rock Springs, LLC, Lakewood Cogeneration, L.P., GDF SUEZ Energy Marketing NA, Inc., Oregon Clean Energy, LLC and Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

EL18-178-000 (Consolidated)

(Issued July 25, 2019)

LaFLEUR, Commissioner, concurring:

1. Today's order provides PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) guidance regarding whether to run its August 2019 Base Residual Auction (BRA). While we deny PJM's Motion, we affirmatively provide PJM with its requested guidance. I am voting for today's order to give PJM clarity on its proposal to run the August 2019 BRA and to avoid their running an auction that the Commission may ultimately find unjust and unreasonable.

2. I write separately, however, to underscore my dissent on the June 2018 Order that declared PJM's Tariff unjust, unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory and proposed a replacement rate structure of the Commission's design.<sup>1</sup>

3. As noted in my dissent, I objected not just to the substance of the order but also to its process and timeline. In the June 2018 Order, the Commission proposed a hastily designed and thinly sketched proposal conjured without any engagement with PJM stakeholders. The Commission – in my view, incorrectly – believed that a 90 day paper hearing would be sufficient to build a record, receive feedback from the states and other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (2018) (June 2018 Order) (LaFleur, Comm'r, dissenting), reh'g pending.

stakeholders, and set the just and reasonable replacement design for the market. Now, more than a year after the Commission upended the PJM capacity market with no clear path to repairing it, we have still not acted to resolve the foreseeable and avoidable uncertainty created by our own actions. At the time, I called the June 2018 Order an act of regulatory hubris; however, given the passage of time, the uncertainty created by the Commission might better be labeled an act of regulatory malpractice. The Commission, whatever concerns it has with the PJM capacity market, should not have put PJM, the states and customers served by its markets, and its stakeholders in this position.

4. I believe it is essential that PJM have an opportunity to engage with its stakeholders on a redesign of this magnitude. In particular, I think that PJM would be well-served by engaging with the states that regulate its member companies to ascertain their long-term commitment to the mandatory capacity market for resource adequacy, as opposed to state selection of preferred resources to meet state initiatives. As I said in my earlier dissent, I believe that an ill-considered replacement market design that imposes choices on the states without adequately accounting for their input could ultimately lead to the unplanned demise of the capacity market.<sup>2</sup>

5. The concerns raised in my earlier dissent have only been reinforced by what has transpired during the past year. The PJM capacity market is unable to move forward until it receives guidance from the Commission. I hope the Commission is able to give PJM some clarity of direction soon. In the meantime, I am reluctantly voting to suspend the August 2019 BRA.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

Cheryl A. LaFleur Commissioner

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> *Id.* (LaFleur, Comm'r, *dissenting* at 5).

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Calpine Corporation, Dynegy Inc., Eastern Generation, LLC, Homer City Generation, L.P., NRG Power Marketing LLC, GenOn Energy Management, LLC, Carroll County Energy LLC, C.P. Crane LLC, Essential Power, LLC, Essential Power OPP, LLC, Essential Power Rock Springs, LLC, Lakewood Cogeneration, L.P., GDF SUEZ Energy Marketing NA, Inc., Oregon Clean Energy, LLC and Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

EL18-178-000 (Consolidated)

(Issued July 25, 2019)

GLICK, Commissioner, concurring:

1. The position in which the Commission finds itself today is the predictable consequence of the profound lack of reasoned decisionmaking in the June 2018 Order.<sup>1</sup> As I explained in my dissent, it was readily apparent at the time that the Commission had neither a coherent, well-supported theory of why the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) tariff was unjust and unreasonable nor a clear, well-articulated vision for how to remedy the perceived deficiencies.<sup>2</sup> One year later, Commissioner LaFleur's description of the June 2018 Order as "regulatory hubris".<sup>3</sup> seems more apt than ever after the Commission

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (2018), reh'g pending.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> *Id.* (Glick, Comm'r, dissenting at 2-13).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> *Id.* (LaFleur, Comm'r, dissenting at 5) ("The majority is proceeding to overhaul the PJM capacity market based on a thinly sketched concept, a troubling act of regulatory hubris that could ultimately hasten, rather than halt, the re-regulation of the PJM market.").

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has shown an absence of leadership that has caused us to drift rudderless into the position in which we find ourselves today.

2. Even so, the Commission still has not demonstrated that it appreciates the extent of the uncertainty that was created by the June 2018 Order, which has only been compounded by the Commission's continuing failure to implement a remedy on a timeline even remotely close to what it promised.<sup>4</sup> PJM, its market participants, and the 65 million customers in the region deserve treatment far better than what they have received from the Commission over the past fifteen months. At a time when leadership and decisiveness are necessary, indecision and inaction are all they have received.

3. But we are where we are. Although I continue to believe that the existing tariff is just and reasonable,<sup>5</sup> I agree with my colleagues that PJM should further postpone the 2019 Base Residual Auction. The short-term palliative effect of running the auction next month would be outweighed by the long-term uncertainty created by running an auction—and allocating capacity commitments—under tariff provisions that the Commission has found unjust and unreasonable. Doing so would raise serious questions about the legality of the auction and the resulting capacity commitments, further adding to the list of issues that will be litigated for years to come.

4. I hope that today's order proves to be the nadir in this saga and we can soon begin repairing the damage created by the June 2018 Order. If ever the Pottery Barn Rule.<sup>6</sup> applied to a regulatory proceeding, it is this one. Commissioner McNamee misunderstands this point. It was the Commission—not PJM—that made the finding.<sup>7</sup> that has prevented PJM from running its capacity auction. And it has been the Commission—not any party to this proceeding—that has failed to act, even though we are now more than six months past the date promised in the June 2018 Order. Meanwhile, neither the facts nor the law have changed and the time for deliberation has long passed. The Commission is now fully responsible for the damage done to date and whatever comes next.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Id. P 172 (stating that the Commission plans to issue a subsequent order by January 4, 2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> *Id.* (Glick, Comm'r, dissenting at 9-12).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* 150 (2004) (describing the "Pottery Barn Rule: You break it, you own it").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Specifically, it was the Commission's action under section 206 of the Federal Power Act, not PJM's section 205 filing, that deemed PJM's tariff unjust and unreasonable.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

Richard Glick Commissioner

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Calpine Corporation, Dynegy Inc., Eastern Generation, LLC, Homer City Generation, L.P., NRG Power Marketing LLC, GenOn Energy Management, LLC, Carroll County Energy LLC, C.P. Crane LLC, Essential Power, LLC, Essential Power OPP, LLC, Essential Power Rock Springs, LLC, Lakewood Cogeneration, L.P., GDF SUEZ Energy Marketing NA, Inc., Oregon Clean Energy, LLC and Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

EL18-178-000 (Consolidated)

(Issued July 25, 2019)

McNAMEE, Commissioner, concurring:

1. I approve today's order because it is important that the regulated community be afforded certainty that PJM's capacity auction cannot be run under rules the Commission deemed unjust and unreasonable. Although I was not a member of the Commission when it issued the June 2018 Order,<sup>1</sup> and am therefore the only current member who was unable to engage in deliberations leading to that order, I am sympathetic to the large degree of uncertainty this proceeding has brought to the PJM community. However, I write separately today because I disagree with certain characterizations put forth in my colleagues' concurrences.

2. In particular, one of the concurrences invokes the "Pottery Barn Rule," stating "[t]he Commission is now fully responsible for the damage done to date and whatever comes next." Though it may be rhetorically satisfying, this statement is misleading. To suggest the Commission is the source of the problems presently facing PJM is to ignore nearly a decade of proceedings attempting to address the interaction between competitive markets and out-of-market subsidies. More importantly, such a statement only makes sense if one ignores the impetus behind PJM's original filing in Docket No. ER18-1314-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (2018) (June 2018 Order).

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000, which was PJM's desire to address issues arising from state out-of-market support for generation resources in its footprint.

3. At that time—April 2018—PJM argued "[t]he time has come . . . to fill this gap in the PJM Tariff" and "[d]oing nothing . . . is not an option.".<sup>2</sup> In addition, PJM's April 2018 filing stated:

Some may argue that no action is needed at this time because capacity commitments in PJM are well above the installed reserve margin, and because the PJM Region continues to see new entry. This argument ignores the current drivers of new entry in PJM  $\ldots$ ; and falsely suggests that there are times during the business cycle when it is appropriate to distort markets.<sup>3</sup>

4. As discussed in the June 2018 Order, the Commission engaged in a thorough analysis and considered the pleadings of dozens of participants and ultimately determined that PJM's tariff was unjust and unreasonable because the current MOPR "fails to mitigate price distortions caused by out-of-market support granted to [non-natural gas-fired] new entrants or to existing capacity resources of any type.".<sup>4</sup> As a Commission, we must fulfill our statutory duties, letting our decisions be led by the law and the facts in each case before us.

5. With every proceeding, the Commission strives to ensure rates that are just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory. In that respect, this proceeding is no different. I commit to continuing to work diligently to address this matter—and all matters—pending before the Commission.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

Bernard L. McNamee Commissioner

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> PJM April 9, 2018 Filing, Docket No. ER18-1314-000, at 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Id. at 36-37 (footnote omitted).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> June 2018 Order, 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 at P 5. The finding in the June 2018 Order was based not only on PJM's filing but also a complaint from 2016 in Docket No. EL16-49-000, which was consolidated with Docket No. ER18-1314-000 by the June 2018 Order. *Id.* P 6.

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## Case No(s). 17-0032-EL-AIR, 17-0033-EL-ATA, 17-0034-EL-AAM, 17-0872-EL-RDR, 17-0873-EL-ATA, '

Summary: Notice Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.'s Notice of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order Directing PJM Interconnection L.L.C. Not to Run Its Previously Scheduled Base Residual Auction in August 2019 and Request for Guidance Regarding Whether An Amendment to Duke Energy, Inc.'s Upcoming Standard Service Offer Auction Schedule Should Occur electronically filed by Dianne Kuhnell on behalf of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. and Rocco D'Ascenzo and Kingery, Jeanne W.