BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

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In the Matter of the 2015 :
Review of the Delivery :
Capital Recovery Rider :
Contained in the Tariffs :

of Ohio Edison Company, : Case No. 15-1739-EL-RDR

The Cleveland Electric : Illuminating Company, and : The Toledo Edison Company.:

PREHEARING CONFERENCE

before Mr. Gregory Price and Ms. Megan Addison,
Attorney Examiners, at the Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio, 180 East Broad Street, Room 11-A,
Columbus, Ohio, called at 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday,
November 30, 2016.

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1 Wednesday Morning Session, 2 November 30, 2016. 3 EXAMINER PRICE: Let's go on the record. 4 5 Good morning. The Public Utilities 6 Commission has set for hearing at this time and place 7 Case No. 15-1739-EL-RDR, being in the Matter of the 2015 Review of the Delivery Capital Recovery Rider 8 9 Contained in the Tariffs of Ohio Edison Company, The 10 Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, and The 11 Toledo Edison Company. 12 My name is Gregory Price. With me is 13 Megan Addison. And we are the Attorney Examiners 14 assigned to preside over today's prehearing 15 conference, not a hearing. 16 Let's begin by taking appearances, 17 starting with the company. 18 MS. HASBROOK: Yes, hello. Denise 19 Hasbrook, I'm an attorney with Roetzel & Andress. 20 And also on behalf of the companies is Erika 2.1 Ostrowski. And would you like me to introduce guests 2.2 as well? 23 EXAMINER PRICE: Sure. 24 MS. HASBROOK: All right. Peter Blasano 25 and Bob Endris are also present.

EXAMINER PRICE: Thank you.

Mr. Kumar.

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MR. KUMAR: Your Honor, on behalf of the residential consumers of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, The Toledo Edison Company, and the Ohio Edison Company, we have the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel by Bruce Weston and Ajay Kumar and Jodi Bair. And also with us today we have Larry Sauer.

EXAMINER PRICE: Mr. Beeler.

MR. BEELER: Thank you, your Honor. On behalf of the staff of the Public Utilities

Commission of Ohio, Ohio Attorney General Mike

DeWine, I am Steve Beeler, Assistant Attorney

General, 30 East Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215.

And with me today is Doris McCarter with the staff.

EXAMINER PRICE: Thank you. We have two pending motions before us today. We have a FirstEnergy motion for protective order that was filed on October 20, 2016, and we have a motion to compel discovery filed by Consumers' Counsel on July 20, 2016.

Mr. Kumar, Ms. Bair, since your motion was filed first, we'll take your motion up first.

Mr. Kumar, if you would like to briefly summarize

your arguments, or Ms. Bair, whoever is arguing this.

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MR. KUMAR: Well, your Honor, so would you like to hear the arguments on the motion to compel first?

EXAMINER PRICE: Yes. We'll take the motion to compel, and then we'll deal with the motion for protective order.

MR. KUMAR: Well, your Honor, in the motion to compel OCC is seeking discovery in accordance with our rights in the order that was the 10-388 SSO case where the Commission, I guess, created -- first created the DCR rider.

In that order the Commission determined that nonsignatory parties will have an opportunity to fully participate in any Commission proceeding resulting from the audit process including ample rights of discovery.

FirstEnergy's argument that OCC does not have full rights of intervention as a nonsignatory party to the stipulation I think is flawed. You know, this is a Commission proceeding that has resulted from the audit process, and we are simply seeking to exercise those rights as was articulated in the Commission order in 10-388.

EXAMINER PRICE: Mr. Kumar, it seems like

the best point the company makes is that there's -it's well established there's no right to discovery
where the Commission does not hold a hearing. We
have not been holding hearings in these audit cases
stemming out of a capital recovery rider. So would
you care to address why in this case you should be
entitled to discovery even though we may or may
not -- we have not set a hearing? And our past
practice in these cases has not been to set a
hearing.

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MR. KUMAR: Well, your Honor, I think I look back specifically while the rules do create certain rules for discovery in the 10-388 order, they do say that -- they don't say -- the Commission doesn't say hearing. They say in any Commission proceeding that results from the audit process, and they say that in that process that nonsignatory parties will have ample rights of discovery. So even outside of what the rules allow in the Ohio Administrative Code, I feel that our rights of discovery are guaranteed by the Commission order in 10-388.

EXAMINER PRICE: So you care not to address my question about whether or not a hearing -- you should be entitled to discovery with or without a

hearing?

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MR. KUMAR: I think -- I think that OCC has maintained that we still have discovery rights, and we still have the opportunity to determine I guess sort of the validity of the assessments that were incurred in the audit and that even though there may not be a hearing in this case, I think discovery is still necessary for OCC to determine the validity of the audit report.

In fact, if you look at the appendix to the audit report, the documents that OCC is seeking are directly referenced in the audit report. In fact, there is an entire appendix that lists the questions that were asked by the auditor to FirstEnergy and references to the full requests being available in the electronic workpapers and it's simply these sorts of documents OCC is seeking in order to, you know, assess the validity of the audit report.

I think that despite the fact there isn't going to be a hearing, I think that OCC still would like to go through and those sort of discovery rights would be necessary if we were even just filing comments.

EXAMINER PRICE: Thank you.

Company.

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MR. KUMAR: Your Honor --

EXAMINER PRICE: I think that's plenty.

Thank you. We've read your pleadings. I just wanted to ask a few questions.

Company.

MS. HASBROOK: Yes, yes. And our position, of course, is set forth in our briefs, and so I won't restate it here but two main points. First of all, it goes to your question which was that there is no proceeding resulting from the audit process as -- as stated in the August 24 -- 25, 2010, order as being the nonsignatories. That's the trigger for them to be able to have ample rights for discovery.

And then, secondly, that the scope is overly broad even if that first position, which we believe is extremely strong, would happen to fail.

And going right to the issue that you addressed about the proceeding, we cited on pages 9 and 10 the In Re: Chapter 4901-1 and 4901-3 and other statutes case where the OCC advanced the very same position that it is advancing here. They want a proceeding to be broad and the definition to be broadened for the same reasons and that is because they felt they had the

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right to just get more information.
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And the Commission rejected that argument and said that, no, that there has to be a hearing and if you took OCC's view, then the outcome of many cases would be slow. So we can find no exception of that -- that ruling or any other place.

EXAMINER PRICE: Let's talk about the cases that you cite to in support of your proposition that where there is no hearing there should be no opportunity for discovery. The first one is that PIPP case. Now, that PIPP case did not involve an audit, did it?

MS. HASBROOK: No, no, it did not, no.

EXAMINER PRICE: It involved just an automatic adjustment on a 45-day timeline to the companies' rates.

MS. HASBROOK: That's right.

EXAMINER PRICE: And it's not practical we would have discovery in a 45-day timeline; is that right?

MS. HASBROOK: That's right, nor would there be a hearing schedule.

EXAMINER PRICE: But there is no 45-day timeline in this case.

MS. HASBROOK: That's right but --

EXAMINER PRICE: Let's talk about the other two. You cite to two accounting authority cases. Isn't it true that when the Commission authorizes a deferral under the accounting statute, the ultimate ratemaking treatment of that deferral is determined in another proceeding?

MS. HASBROOK: Yes, uh-huh.

EXAMINER PRICE: And so in this proceeding though we are making rates because we're setting the rates for the actual DCR case; is that correct?

MS. HASBROOK: Yes.

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EXAMINER PRICE: So those cases could be distinguished because those cases don't involve actual ratemaking.

MS. HASBROOK: Uh-huh, uh-huh.

EXAMINER PRICE: You make a point in your briefs, and you say it repeatedly, that this is a voluntary audit process. I think you say that three or four times. It's only voluntary because we've agreed to this DCR mechanism; is that correct?

MS. HASBROOK: Yes, and that it has been extended, yes, yes, by agreement.

EXAMINER PRICE: If we didn't have the DCR mechanism with the voluntary audit process, you

would recover these capital investments through a
distribution rate case; is that correct?

MS. HASBROOK: Yes, most likely.

EXAMINER PRICE: And in a distribution rate case, Consumers' Counsel would have full opportunity to conduct discovery on the capital investments; is that correct?

MS. HASBROOK: Yes, uh-huh.

EXAMINER PRICE: So is it your position -- and the distribution rate case we're going -- we would have evidentiary hearings; is that correct?

MS. HASBROOK: I'm sorry?

EXAMINER PRICE: We would have an evidentiary hearing, correct?

MS. HASBROOK: Yes.

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EXAMINER PRICE: So is it your position that the DCR proceedings, No. 1, they're entitled to less due process? There's no requirement for a hearing; is that correct?

MS. HASBROOK: I -- I disagree with the less due process for a hearing.

EXAMINER PRICE: You think they are entitled to a hearing?

MS. HASBROOK: Well, no, but if it's set,

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then everything -- then everything would fall into
place in a due process manner.
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EXAMINER PRICE: Do you think that in the DCR cases there is less scrutiny of the investments than there would be in a rate case?

MS. HASBROOK: No, no. I believe that they are equal.

EXAMINER PRICE: Do you believe there is less -- but you do think there is less opportunity for participation by other parties than in the distribution rate case.

MS. HASBROOK: Yes. And I believe that that's what the August 25, 2010, order was stressing.

EXAMINER PRICE: Well, the August 25,

2010, order said ample rights of discovery.

MS. HASBROOK: When there is a proceeding.

EXAMINER PRICE: Well, we are in a proceeding. We've finished the audit phase. I think the -- but, now, we're into -- the audit has been filed. So I agree with you that they don't have a right to participate in the audit phase. But the audit has been filed, and, now, we are on to adjudicating whether the audit is proper so why would they have less rights than in any other case they

would have?

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MS. HASBROOK: In the five years that this has been pending, a hearing schedule has never been set. It has never been turned into a proceeding as defined in the case that we cite. The 4901 case does help with that definition. So since that has never — the Commission does not have a hearing schedule, has never opened a process here, a procedure, then — then it's premature. It just has not come to that point. All we have right now is a filed audit which, by the way, was filed after this motion to compel — or after the discovery was served upon us. So, yes, we do have an audit but there is no proceeding on that audit.

EXAMINER PRICE: How can they -- how can they meaningfully file comments on the audit report if you don't respond to their discovery requests? I mean, the purpose of having comments would be to decide whether or not to hold a hearing, right?

MS. HASBROOK: Well, it --

EXAMINER PRICE: And so how can they -how can they comment upon an audit report when they
can't do any discovery regarding what's in the audit
report?

MS. HASBROOK: Well, and that goes to the

alternative position. So our first position is that this is not a proceeding. But if it was found to be a proceeding, then the scope of the -- of the discovery was set forth in the -- in the determination as to how the participants could -- could discover in the November -- November 14 entry and then the entry appointing Blue Ridge.

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So in that case -- in that situation, they were limited to conclusions and findings of the audit report. So this would be a different case, and this was our offer to settle, that would be if the -- if the questions had been worded of please provide all the backup information for this finding on page 2, paragraph 6, but instead what we have is just this overbroad where it is not as expressly stated on the conclusions and findings.

of the discovery requests you claim is overly broad is simply a request to be served with all the discovery the staff served on you. Isn't it routine in Commission proceedings for the companies, and every other party, to serve upon all the parties to the proceeding all responses to all discovery requests? In the 30 -- 20, 30 years we've been doing this, hasn't that always been the practice?

MS. HASBROOK: That -- yes, that is for --

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EXAMINER PRICE: How can that be overly broad if that's just normal Commission practice?

MS. HASBROOK: Well, our position as to

what we would produce was based upon their -- their roles as nonsignatories. So that could be a negotiation point but at that point all -- all discussions at least fell through. And so it was also linked to many other much broader requests, as you well know. That was only one of them. We did produce the e-mails which is also something that we felt was the communications and would be -- could be discoverable if they were in the position of participants which that is our first statement, that they are not.

So I'm not disagreeing with you that that would be discoverable for -- or could be for a participant but, again, that circles back to our first argument that they are not a participant and they are not a signatory.

EXAMINER PRICE: This is our fourth or fifth audit proceeding or -- since we instituted the DCR and this is the first time the dispute has come up. Has the company responded to OCC discovery

requests in the past audit proceedings?

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MS. HASBROOK: I would have to consult in order to honestly answer that question.

MR. KUMAR: Yes. Your Honor, we have -they have responded to our discovery requests in the
past.

MS. HASBROOK: So -- and, I'm sorry, I missed what you said.

EXAMINER PRICE: He said "yes."

MS. HASBROOK: The answer is yes, but those were more tailored -- those were tailored in the manner that we're -- that the order is -- we're advocating.

EXAMINER PRICE: Your initial position is absolute that they have no right to discovery, but you responded in the past.

MS. HASBROOK: Well, and that's because of the August 25, 2010, order giving them ample rights to discovery when there is a proceeding and our belief that there is no proceeding.

EXAMINER PRICE: Mr. Kumar, you can have the last word.

MR. KUMAR: Well, first of all, your
Honor, with regards to the fact that these are overly
broad, these are the four standard discovery requests

that OCC makes in many audit cases with many companies. In fact, I made these same requests earlier this year in a case with Duke. And so -- EXAMINER PRICE: You can't hold Duke against them.

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MR. KUMAR: I would argue that these are not overly broad. In fact, these are standard OCC discovery requests that we made -- we often make in these DCR and AEP's -- I believe we have made in the past AEP DIR. They may have differed from the specific requests we made in this past DCR case, but they are sort of standard, run-of-the-mill discovery that OCC does in many of the cases that we participate in before this proceeding.

Additionally, I think this is -- this is actually -- this circumstance is similar to a -- the company cites 4901.16 with regards to this motion to compel as well, and I think it's similar to a -- very, very similar to a case that came up earlier this year with AEP, their fuel adjustment clause case.

EXAMINER PRICE: That is a public records request. We'll get to that shortly. Don't they make a good point though you have very limited rights in this proceeding up to the filing of the audit report?

MR. KUMAR: Your Honor, I think if you go back and look at the original second supplemental stipulation in the 10-388 case, the Commission set aside a very specific process for signatory parties to participate. It was like a 120-day timeline and specifically --

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EXAMINER PRICE: That's what I said, up to the filing of the audit report.

MR. KUMAR: I think there may be some questions as to now that that process was set aside, I believe the 2012, 2013, and 2014 audits, I think, I'm not sure whether that process is still in place for I guess the 2015 audit because the Commission order never went that far. So I think it's possible that 2015 audit we may have more -- greater rights of discovery, but I would also concede that, you know, the audit report was filed months ago, and our discovery requests are still valid.

I would disagree that this is not a proceeding. I think that any case in front of the Commission that has a filed docket, is an open docket, is a proceeding regardless of whether there is a hearing or not.

EXAMINER PRICE: So I guess my question is are you looking for an expansive ruling saying you

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have discovery rights prior to the filing of the audit report, or are you content with a discovery ruling that would give you discovery rights upon the filing of the audit report?
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MR. KUMAR: I'm not sure that we're looking for an expansive ruling. However, the OCC may not concede that our discovery rights are limited — are limited before the audit report is filed when we're simply asking for the same discovery requests, the same discovery that's being served by staff and the auditor just contemporaneously as is standard in any base rate proceeding, any proceeding where we're examining the capital costs that a company has incurred.

EXAMINER PRICE: And actually, Mr. Kumar, OCC's position is we shouldn't have these DCR mechanisms at all; isn't that correct?

MR. KUMAR: I believe the office has taken a --

EXAMINER PRICE: And your position is the audits are insufficient. We should just do this through distribution rate cases because of the difficulties in participating in these audits; is that correct?

MR. KUMAR: Yes, your Honor, that is

exactly the position that my office has articulated I believe in innumerable cases.

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EXAMINER PRICE: Certainly FirstEnergy's
ESP which was recently argued --

MR. KUMAR: Yes, your Honor.

EXAMINER PRICE: -- and lengthily argued by all of us.

MR. KUMAR: Ad nauseam.

EXAMINER PRICE: Ad nauseam, okay.

At this time OCC's motion to compel will be granted. The company is directed to respond to the discovery requests immediately. To the extent that the discovery requests implicate confidential information, the parties are directed to enter into confidentiality agreements. I would caution the parties this is not a time to be breaking new ground and new terms in these confidentiality agreements.

As we just mentioned, we just had a lengthy ESP proceeding with very high levels of confidentiality.

There is no need to relitigate this. The parties will respond back to the Examiners within one week as to whether the confidentiality agreements have been entered into, and the companies are directed to respond to all nonconfidential discovery requests within that one-week period. You can

respond to anything that you have confidentiality information once you get the confidentiality agreements in place.

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Any questions regarding that ruling?

MR. KUMAR: We have already sent

FirstEnergy a protective agreement that we've signed with them in the past so.

EXAMINER PRICE: Okay. I would just like to point out that we do believe that it's clear the Commission intended in 10-388 that OCC and other nonsignatory parties have limited rights to -- or the extraordinary participation in the audit process up until the filing of the audit, but clearly the Commission when it said ample discovery was intending that there be discovery after the filing of the audit report.

MS. HASBROOK: Could I just have a clarification for future?

EXAMINER PRICE: Sure.

MS. HASBROOK: Is the -- is the ruling then affecting before audit reports are filed for -- EXAMINER PRICE: The ruling is that since the audit report is filed you need to respond to discovery.

MS. HASBROOK: That's because that's

where we are right now.

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EXAMINER PRICE: Because that's where we are right now.

MS. HASBROOK: I understand.

EXAMINER PRICE: Okay. Then let's take up your motion for protective order.

MS. HASBROOK: Thank you. Well, our motion for protective order, of course, is based upon some of the same arguments, but it's also based upon and more heavily relying upon 4901.16. When we look at public records, of course, that is there were amendments 4905.05 and 4901.12 in 1996 that directly referred to 149.43 and Title 49 and that's when 4901.16 was added and became very relevant whether it is a public record.

So our -- our position is that the information is not a public record, and if it was, there is a privilege established by 4901.16 that no employee or agent can divulge any information acquired by them in respect to any transaction for -for the utility. This is consistent with 4901-1-24(G) that information submitted to staff but not filed with the docketing division does not constitute a public record.

It also coincides with -- with the ruling

that we just -- just had regarding a difference in treatment after the audit report is docketed and in regard to how it was before -- treated before. The Commission looked at 4901.16 in the context of 4901-21-24(G) in that 49 -- in that -- In Re: Chapter 4901-1/4901-3 case we cite in our motion where it sided with Ohio Edison and said that it was correct in stating that 4901.16 means a utility that submits confidential information may do so without first filing any protective order.

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issue just describing how routinely before the

Commission when something is docketed, you have to

file for protective order, but if you give something

to the staff and it's stamped confidential, staff

will not disclose it without giving you prior notice

and an opportunity at that point to file a protective

order, which I believe is what happened in this

proceeding; isn't that correct, Mr. Beeler?

MR. BEELER: Yes.

EXAMINER PRICE: Thank you. I mean, that's more of a process question than a -- whether substantively something is protected from disclosure in the public records.

Let's talk about that Ohio Power case

that Mr. Kumar touched on briefly. I'll let you have the firsts bite at that apple. Why -- ironically in that Ohio Power case the Attorney Examiners initially ruled that the material should not be disclosed and were overruled by the Commission on an interlocutory appeal. Why are my hands not tied by that Ohio Power case? Isn't this case virtually on all four corners with the Ohio Power case? The audit report has been filed.

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MS. HASBROOK: It is not because, first of all, what is being requested is very different than the Ohio Power case. And what is being requested here is — is not draft reports that were foundations for that report or — or any information regarding — that would otherwise be discoverable. It is — it is a direct end run around really the statute where if you don't get it from the one source, then you'll get it from the staff. So what is — it's the nature of what is being requested here that makes this so different and plus this is not a — this is — we do not believe this is a rate case. This is — this is a rider. And so it is a different type of — different type of proceeding as well.

EXAMINER PRICE: How is the information

different than in the -- I understand that it's -that the AEP case primarily involved the draft audit
report and communications back and forth between the
staff and the company. How is the information
requested in this case any different?

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MS. HASBROOK: Well, it's far broader. I mean, it is asking for all of the -- all of the material that was submitted underlying the entire audit and -- and just everything between staff of what flowed. So in that -- in this position it's not to test any type of draft report, how did things change, and why did they change. It's really just to become the auditor themselves.

And 4901.16 doesn't make differentiations on that. I would consider this to be, you know, a privileged statute where you really are not required to redact and parse through and see what information is -- is, you know, may be -- may be troublesome. It's everything that is going to the staff. So we are -- we are under the belief that in exchanging it in the first place we would be more open, more candid. We are not going to put protective orders on the --

EXAMINER PRICE: We expect you to be open and candid all the time.

MS. HASBROOK: Well, of course, but there could be that procedure.

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EXAMINER PRICE: With your regulator.

MS. HASBROOK: And we are not saying otherwise, but the procedure or protective order that you talked about before is -- is not something we utilized here. We don't want to slow the process down. And the draft report from the Ohio Power Company was the staff to the company also. It was not -- it was not the other way around. It wasn't the underlying data and information that the company was freely sharing with staff without any redactions and discussions, just handing it over in total reliance on 4901.16. I mean, the key is it's the company to staff and not the staff to the company.

EXAMINER PRICE: Well, actually in the AEP case it was company to staff communications, but it wasn't workpapers. It was just --

MS. HASBROOK: In the AEP case?

EXAMINER PRICE: In the AEP case.

MS. HASBROOK: The AEP case also has that phraseology it is very narrow and it is a very unique situation, and we certainly would highlight that when we move to the AEP case.

EXAMINER PRICE: Mr. Kumar.

MR. KUMAR: Well, of course, I would disagree with FirstEnergy's characterization. I think the -- actually the discovery requests and the public -- nature of the public records request we submitted in the AEP FAC case is actually very, very similar. In fact, we asked for all communications between the auditor and staff and the companies, and we asked for those draft audit reports. That's the -- pretty much the same thing we were asking for here.

Additionally --

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EXAMINER PRICE: She says it's much broader, that you are asking for all the workpapers that the company -- and other documents the company gave to you. Does breadth matter, Mr. Kumar?

MR. KUMAR: I'm sorry, your Honor?

EXAMINER PRICE: Does -- if it's a public record, it's a public record or does the breadth of the request matter?

MR. KUMAR: Well, I would also disagree.

I don't think the breadth of the request matters

because I think public records requests are

fundamentally under a different proceeding outside of
the scope of discovery. In fact, I think there is a

case from the Ohio Supreme Court Deilbert V Summit

County where an attorney sought public records or a federal audit report from a Summit County government that was relevant to federal litigation that that attorney was involved in. And the Supreme Court determined that -- of course, this is civil litigation, that a person may inspect a public record -- inspect a copy of public record as defined in Revised Code 49 -- 149.413 irrespective of his or her purpose for doing so.

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And separately as a matter of public policy, if the intent is to use public records in litigation were relevant to their availability, the burden on government entities to ensure the records — the requested records were not in any way connected to ongoing potential litigation would be exceedingly onerous.

So we don't believe this is an end run around discovery. We believe the public records request is entirely separate of the discovery process, but the Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that even if such a thing were to exist, that the public records request is an entirely separate cause of action.

With regards to FirstEnergy's claim that these records are protected under state law, I think

this case is just way too similar to what happened in the Ohio Power FAC case. Under these specific -- and I'm quoting the Commission's order here. Under these specific circumstances where the draft audit report has been provided to AEP Ohio for review, that's what happened in this case, where the final audit report has been presented to the Commission and filed in the dockets, and our public records request was made after the report was filed in the dockets, the Commission finds that the release of the draft audit report and related communications, and that's what we are simply asking for here, those workpapers are simply related communications that between -- that are referenced in the audit report in that appendix that I mentioned earlier. It's not inconsistent with the purposes of Revised Code 4901.16. And so, you know, I think that it's appropriate that the public records request is -- should be granted.

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EXAMINER PRICE: Final word.

MS. HASBROOK: Yes, yes. This -- this is very different from what was -- what was requested in Columbus -- in the AEP case and the Ohio Power. First of all, you know, when we look at it, we're -- we're not just looking for communications. It's every -- every document -- when you read 1 through 4,

every document that was given in the course of this audit is what is being requested. And so it is -- it is way broader than that. But we go back to the fact that what was requested in the AEP and Ohio Power case was the draft audit reports that -- and then the eventual report was filed, the final was filed with the docketing division, so that part was public.

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Now, the Commission had to mean something when it made it clear that the decision to release a specific draft report here should not be construed as precedent for any other case. So that — that is strong language. And 4901.16 has to mean something, and it is extremely clear that the staff shall not divulge information. A very specific, by the Commission's own statement, exception was made for a draft report that then became a filed and docketed report this year.

And we believe that this is not a precedential case that assists this in any way or advances it in any way.

EXAMINER PRICE: Thank you. As my colleague has pointed out, our interpretation of 4901.16 has been to preclude premature disclosure of information except through the established Commission processes and protect companies from people leaving

draft audit reports around -- laying around at cocktail parties or disclosing them for improper purposes.

2.1

redactions.

I don't think that it is appropriate to distinguish between the breadth of the request or to make an argument that these workpapers which were communicated to the staff are any different than the related communications that Mr. Kumar points out.

Accordingly, the motion for protective order will be denied. FirstEnergy should respond to -- or staff, I'm sorry, my mistake. Staff should respond to the public records request within 10 days unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.

There is a question of confidential information. Do you have with you the redactions that you would make in the event that you believe certain of this information is confidential and for that reason not subject to the public records log?

MS. HASBROOK: We do not have the

EXAMINER PRICE: If you can provide those redactions to staff within 48 hours, by let's say noon on Friday, the staff can --

MS. HASBROOK: There's one file has hundreds of thousands of documents in it -- line

items, I'm sorry, line items, so it will be a 1 2 monumental task to do these redactions in 48 hours. EXAMINER PRICE: I think you should have 3 had this done when you came to the conference. 4 5 think you are lucky you are getting 48 hours. However, we will make it Monday at noon. If your 6 7 backup plan was this was confidential, you should have brought those -- should have been prepared to 8 9 identify what's confidential while we were here so we could deal with it. 10 11 Provide that to the staff by Monday at 12 If the staff has any disputes, the attorney, 13 as to what's been claimed confidential, the Examiners 14 will review it in camera and issue a subsequent 15 ruling after that. 16 Any questions? 17 MS. HASBROOK: No. Thank you. 18 EXAMINER PRICE: Seeing none, we're 19 adjourned for the day. Thank you all. 20 (Thereupon, at 10:36 a.m., the hearing 2.1 was adjourned.) 22 23 24

25

CERTIFICATE I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings taken by me in this matter on Wednesday, November 30, 2016, and carefully compared with my original stenographic notes. Karen Sue Gibson, Registered Merit Reporter. (KSG-6278)

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Case No(s). 15-1739-EL-RDR

Summary: Transcript In the Matter of the 2015 Review of the Delivery Capital Recovery Rider Contained in the Tariffs of Ohio Edison Company, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, and The Toledo Edison Company, hearing held on November 30, 2016. electronically filed by Mr. Ken Spencer on behalf of Armstrong & Okey, Inc. and Gibson, Karen Sue Mrs.