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BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the Application of Ohio)	
Power Company for Authority to)	
Establish a Standard Service Offer)	Case No. 13-2385-EL-SSO
Pursuant to §4928.143, Revised Code,)	
in the Form of an Electric Security Plan)	
~)	
In the Matter of the Application of Ohio)	
Power Company for Approval of Certain)	Case No. 13-2386-EL-AAM
Accounting Authority)	

OF JAMES F. WILSON

On Behalf of The Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel 10 West Broad Street, Suite 1800 Columbus, Ohio43215-3485

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May 6, 2014

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Direct Testimony of James F. Wilson
On Behalf of the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel
PUCO Case Nos. 13-2385-EL-SSO, et al.

1 I. INTRODUCTION

2

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- 3 Q1. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, POSITION AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
- 4 A1. My name is James F. Wilson. I am an economist and principal of Wilson Energy
- 5 Economics. My business address is 4800 Hampden Lane Suite 200, Bethesda,
- 6 MD 20814.

7

- 8 Q2. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS.
- 9 A2. I have thirty years of consulting experience to the electric power and natural gas
- industries. Many of my past assignments have focused on the economic and
- policy issues arising from the introduction of competition into these industries,
- including restructuring policies, market design, and market power. Other
- engagements have included contract litigation and damages; pipeline rate cases;
- 14 forecasting and market assessment; evaluating allegations of market
- manipulation; probabilistic modeling of utility planning problems; and a wide
- range of other issues arising in these industries. I also spent five years in Russia
- in the early 1990s advising on the reform, restructuring, and development of the
- Russian electricity and natural gas industries for the World Bank and other
- 19 clients. I have submitted affidavits and presented testimony in proceedings of the
- 20 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, state regulatory agencies, and a U.S.
- 21 district court.

ħ

1		I have been involved in electricity restructuring and wholesale market design for
2		over twenty years in PJM, New England, Ontario, California, Russia, and other
3		regions. With regard to the PJM system, I have been involved in a broad range of
4		market design, planning and capacity market issues over the past several years. I
5		hold a B.A. in Mathematics from Oberlin College and an M.S. in Engineering-
6		Economic Systems from Stanford University. My curriculum vitae, summarizing
7		my experience and listing past testimony, is Attachment JFW-1 attached hereto.
8		
9	Q3.	HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES
10		COMMISSION OF OHIO ("PUCO")?
11	A3.	Yes. I testified in Case No. 12-426-EL-SSO (the Application of The Dayton
12		Power and Light Company for approval of a Market Rate Offer); Case No. 12-
13		1230-EL-SSO (the application of The Ohio Edison Company, The Cleveland
14		Electric Illuminating Company, and The Toledo Edison Company for approval of
15		an Electric Security Plan); and Case No. 09-906-EL-SSO (the application of the
16		FirstEnergy Companies for approval of a Market Rate Offer).
17		
18	Q4.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?
19	A4.	In this proceeding AEP Ohio seeks approval of a new electric security plan
20		("ESP") for the period June 1, 2015 through May 31, 2018 (the "ESP Period").
21		My assignment was to review AEP Ohio's application, supporting testimony,
22		workpapers and discovery in this proceeding, focusing on the proposed Power

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1		Purchase Agreement Rider ("PPA Rider"). Under that rider, AEP Ohio would
2		collect from customers the costs (net of market revenues) associated with its
3		contractual arrangement ("ICPA")1 with the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation
4		("OVEC"). I was asked to review AEP Ohio's estimate of the cost to customers
5		under the proposed PPA Rider; to evaluate its potential impact on customer price
6		stability; to evaluate the PPA Rider as a regulatory mechanism for collection of
7		these costs; and to make recommendations with respect to the proposed PPA
8		Rider and the treatment of OVEC costs.
9		
10	II.	SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
11		
12	Q5.	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE OVEC ASSETS.
13	A5.	OVEC (together with a wholly-owned subsidiary) owns a transmission system
14		and two coal-fired power plants: the 1,086 MW Kyger Creek Plant at Cheshire,
15		Ohio, and the 1,204 MW Clifty Creek Plant located near Madison, Indiana. ² Both
16		plants began operation in 1955.
17		

¹ Amended and Restated Inter-Company Power Agreement ("ICPA"), OCC INT-1-10 attachment 3 pp. 36-89, available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=12594881.

² OVEC Annual Report – 2012 p. 1, available at http://www.ovec.com/AnnualReport-2012-signed.pdf.

1	Qo.	PLEASE DESCRIBE AEP OHIO'S RELATIONSHIP WITH OVEC.
2	A6.	Under the ICPA, AEP Ohio, as a "Sponsoring Company," is entitled to a share
3		(19.93%) of the capacity and energy provided by the OVEC plants, and is also
4		allocated this same portion of OVEC fixed and variable costs. In Case No. 12-
5		1126-EL-UNC, AEP Ohio requested and received the PUCO's approval to
6		transfer its existing generating units and contractual entitlements to its affiliate,
7		AEP Generating Resources, Inc. However, AEP Ohio was unable to obtain the
8		consent necessary from the other OVEC sponsoring companies to transfer the
9		OVEC entitlement to its affiliate.
10		
11		Other companies in the AEP family are also parties to the ICPA and Sponsoring
12		Companies; AEP's total share of OVEC output is 43.47 percent. ³ In addition,
13		AEP companies own 43.47 percent of OVEC's stock.4

³ ICPA Article 1. In addition to AEP Ohio and its affiliates Appalachian Power Company and Indiana Michigan Power Company, the Sponsoring Companies under the ICPA are: Allegheny Energy Supply Company LLC, Buckeye Power Generating, The Dayton Power and Light Company, Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., FirstEnergy Generation, LLC, Kentucky Utilities Company, Louisville Gas and Electric Company, Monongahela Power Company, Peninsula Generation Cooperative, and Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company. OVEC 2012 Annual Report, p. 1.

⁴ OCC INT-1-10 attachment 3 (FERC filing of Amended and Restated Inter-Company Power Agreement), p. 10 of 115, footnote 3, available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=12594881.

1	<i>Q7</i> .	PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW AEP OHIO PROPOSES TO TREAT THE OVEC
2		ENTITLEMENT UNDER THE PROPOSED ELECTRIC SECURITY PLAN.
3	A7.	AEP Ohio does not propose to use the OVEC output to serve the loads of non-
4		shopping customers who remain under the Standard Service Offer ("SSO").
5		Instead, AEP Ohio plans to offer its share of the OVEC capacity and energy into
6		the PJM markets, consistent with the corporate separation plan approved in Case
7		No. 12-1126-EL-UNC.
8		
9		Under the proposed PPA Rider, AEP Ohio would collect from customers, on a
10		non-bypassable basis, its portion of the OVEC costs net of the energy and
11		capacity market revenues earned from selling its share of the OVEC output in the
12		PJM markets. Thus, the PPA Rider could increase or decrease customer bills,
13		depending upon whether the OVEC costs turn out to be greater or less than the
14		associated market revenues.
15		
16	Q8.	WHAT DOES AEP OHIO STATE AS THE REASON FOR TREATING THE
17		OVEC ENTITLEMENT IN THIS MANNER?
18	A8.	AEP Ohio witness Pablo A. Vegas states, "The Company is seeking to stabilize
19		customer rates by providing a hedge against market volatility." 5 AEP Ohio

⁵ Direct Testimony of Pablo A. Vegas in Support of AEP Ohio's Electric Security Plan, p. 13.

1		witness William A. Allen states that "the primary function of the PPA rider is to
2		provide added price stability for customers through this ESP period."6
3		
4	<i>Q9</i> .	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE
5		POTENTIAL NET COST TO CUSTOMERS FROM THE PROPOSED
6		POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT RIDER.
7	A9.	AEP Ohio provided an estimate of the monthly net cost to customers under the
8		proposed PPA Rider through the ESP Period. Under AEP Ohio's estimate, the
9		cumulative net cost over the ESP Period would be \$52 million, or about \$1.4
10		million per month. AEP Ohio's estimate amounts to
11		output during the ESP Period. That is, OVEC's cost would exceed the market
12		value of the output by on average, and AEP Ohio's share of this
13		net cost would be collected from customers through the PPA Rider.
14		
15		I reviewed AEP Ohio's estimate and identified three assumptions that are
16		outdated or insufficiently supported. I revised these values to produce an estimate
17		that I believe is likely to be much closer to the future outcome if the proposed
18		PPA Rider is authorized by the PUCO. Specifically, I updated the projected
19		Energy Market Prices based on recent futures prices; revised the projected

⁶ Direct Testimony of William A. Allen in Support of AEP Ohio's Electric Security Plan, p. 11.

⁷ IEU INT-2-001, Competitively-Sensitive Confidential Attachments 1, 2, and 3.

1		Demand Charges to use the actual forecasts provided by OVEC; and revised the
2		projected OVEC plant generation to be more consistent with recent results.
3		Based on these adjustments I estimate the cost to customers under the PPA Rider
4		to be \$117 million over the ESP Period, considerably higher than AEP Ohio's
5		estimate. Under these assumptions, the cost of the OVEC output exceeds its
6		market value by \$19.22 per MWh on average over the ESP Period.
7		
8	Q10.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE
9		POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE PPA RIDER ON THE STABILITY OF
10		CUSTOMER RATES.
11	A10.	Customers under the proposed Standard Service Offer will be served under one-
12		and two-year full requirements contracts established through periodic auctions,
13		and, therefore, would not be exposed to substantial market price volatility.
14		
15		The proposed PPA Rider would be updated on an annual basis, so the net cost
16		incurred in one year would appear in customers' bills the next year. Due to the
17		one-year lag, the PPA Rider could potentially move contrary to, or in the same
18		direction as, market prices. In any case, the OVEC entitlement corresponds to
19		about five percent of AEP Ohio's customer load, and generation is about half the
20		customers' bill, so to the extent the PPA Rider affects the trajectory of the rates
21		customers pay, it would be a very modest impact.

1		Customers choosing competitive retail electric service would select among the
2		available offerings according to their preferences, and presumably would choose
3		offerings that hedge prices and provide greater stability to the extent that is
4		desired.
5		
6		I conclude that the potential for the proposed PPA Rider to contribute to price
7		stability is directionally doubtful (due to the one-year lag), and insignificant in
8		magnitude.
9		
10	Q11.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE PPA
11		RIDER AS A REGULATORY MECHANISM.
12	A11.	The proposed PPA Rider is an example of a "cost tracker" - a regulatory
13		mechanism through which the actual costs of a function performed or undertaken
14		by a utility are periodically passed through to customers, outside of a rate case.
15		State regulatory commissions typically approve cost trackers under extraordinary
16		circumstances, for costs that are largely outside the control of the utility and
17		unpredictable and volatile, such as fuel costs. However, AEP Ohio proposes to
18		recover all OVEC costs, including fixed costs and variable operations and
19		maintenance costs, net of market revenues, through the PPA Rider. This is not an
20		appropriate regulatory mechanism for such costs, which are neither outside utility
21		control, nor especially unpredictable.

1	Q12.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE
2		PROPOSED PPA RIDER AND THE TREATMENT OF OVEC COSTS.
3	A12.	I recommend that the PPA Rider be rejected. The PPA Rider would impose the
4		net cost and risk associated with AEP Ohio's contractual relationship with OVEC
5		onto customers. This net cost could be considerable; by my estimate, \$117
6		million. In addition, to the extent this cost is passed through to customers, the
7		incentive to manage the costs is eliminated. And any incremental price stability
8		the arrangement might provide, which I consider very doubtful, would be
9		insignificant compared to the expected net cost, and risk of even higher cost.
10		
11		If, instead, the PUCO chooses to approve the PPA Rider in some form, then I
12		recommend that it be modified to reduce the cost and risk to customers and
13		restore some incentive to control costs. This could be accomplished by setting a
14		benchmark for the PPA Rider net cost and using a sharing mechanism for net
15		costs or benefits relative to the benchmark, rather than collecting 100% of the net
16		cost from customers. I describe how such an incentive mechanism could be
17		designed in the last section of my testimony.
18		
19	Q13.	HOW IS THE REMAINDER OF YOUR TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?
20	A13.	The next section of my testimony develops an estimate of the net cost to
21		customers under the proposed PPA Rider, revising AEP Ohio's estimate. In
22		Section IV, I evaluate the AEP witnesses' claim that the proposed PPA Rider

1		would contribute to customer price stability. Section V discusses the proposed
2		PPA Rider as an example of a cost tracker, and evaluates whether this is an
3		appropriate regulatory mechanism for the OVEC costs. The final section of my
4		testimony presents my recommendations for treatment of the OVEC costs.
5		
6	III.	ESTIMATED COST TO CUSTOMERS OF THE PROPOSED PPA RIDER
7		
8	Q14.	HAS AEP OHIO PREPARED AN ESTIMATE OF THE DOLLAR AMOUNTS
9		THAT WOULD BE COLLECTED FROM CUSTOMERS UNDER THE
10		PROPOSED PPA RIDER?
11	A14.	Yes. AEP Ohio provided an estimate of the monthly amounts under the proposed
12		PPA Rider for the ESP Period in its response to IEU INT-2-001, Competitively-
13		Sensitive Confidential Attachments 1, 2, and 3.
14		
15	Q15.	PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW AEP OHIO ESTIMATED THE PPA RIDER
16		AMOUNTS.
17	A15.	IEU INT-2-001 Competitively-Sensitive Confidential Attachment 1 ("PPA Rider
18		Estimate") shows estimated OVEC cost, revenue, and net cost on a monthly basis,
19		reflecting amounts allocated to AEP Ohio. Specifically, the PPA Rider Estimate
20		includes the following on a monthly basis:
21 22 23		 The OVEC MW capacity, and a forecast of capacity prices and revenues based on PJM's Reliability Pricing Model ("RPM") capacity construct;

1		ii.	The forecast OVEC Demand Charges;
2		iii.	The forecast OVEC energy output;
3 4		iv.	The forecast average Energy Market Prices earned for the output;
5 6		v.	The forecast OVEC Costs of generation, including fuel and non-fuel costs;
7		vi.	The resulting energy gross margin;
8		vii.	The total PPA Rider, reflecting all revenues minus all costs.
9			
10	Q16.	WHAT IS T	HE COST TO CUSTOMERS FROM THE PPA RIDER UNDER
11		AEP OHIO	S ESTIMATE?
12	A16.	The estimate	ed cost varies month to month, with the PPA Rider increasing
13		customers' b	ills in some months and reducing them in other months during the
14		ESP Period.	Cumulatively, AEP Ohio estimates that the PPA Rider will cost
15		customers ju	st over \$52 million during the 36 months of the ESP Period.
16			
17	Q17.	HAVE YOU	REVIEWED THE ASSUMPTIONS AND CALCULATIONS AEP-
18		OHIO USEI	D IN THE PPA RIDER ESTIMATE?
19	A17.	Yes. I review	ved the assumptions and calculations underlying AEP Ohio's estimate
20		based on the	PPA Rider Estimate and additional information provided in response
21		to data reque	sts.

1	Q18.	BASED ON YOUR REVIEW, WHAT DO YOU CONCLUDE ABOUT AEP
2		OHIO'S PPA RIDER ESTIMATE?
3	A18.	Most of the assumptions appear to be accurate and reliable. A few assumptions,
4		such as the capacity price forecast, could be updated but would have only a small
5		impact on the results. However, three important assumptions appear to be overly
6		optimistic and lead to substantially understating the likely cost of the PPA Rider
7		to customers. Specifically, the following three assumptions have large impacts on
8		the estimated cost, and do not appear to be sufficiently supported:
9 10		 \$10 million in annual demand charge savings based on "lean improvements/process optimization;"
11		ii. The Energy Market Price assumptions; and
12		iii. The OVEC Energy (generation) assumptions.
13		
14	Q19.	HAVE YOU PREPARED A PPA RIDER ESTIMATE BASED ON
15		ALTERNATE VALUES FOR THESE ASSUMPTIONS?
16	A19.	Yes I have.
17		
18	Q20.	FIRST PLEASE DESCRIBE THE OVEC DEMAND CHARGES AND THE
19		REDUCTION FOR "LEAN IMPROVEMENTS/PROCESS OPTIMIZATION".
20	A20.	OVEC's demand charges collect the fixed costs associated with OVEC's
21		generation and transmission assets and operations. OVEC provided AEP Ohio

1		with projections of future demand charges based on such costs.8 However, AEP
2		Ohio did not use these projections in its PPA Rider Estimate; instead, AEP Ohio
3		reduced the OVEC demand charges by approximately \$10 million per year based
4		on assumed "lean improvements/ process optimization."
5		
6	Q21.	HOW DID AEP OHIO SUPPORT THE ASSUMED REDUCTION FOR LEAN
7		IMPROVEMENTS/PROCESS OPTIMIZATION?
8	A21.	AEP Ohio did not support this reduction. In response to a data request and
9		request for production of documents, AEP Ohio was unable to produce any
10		documents describing the lean improvements or process optimization. 9 Further,
11		AEP Ohio stated that neither it nor OVEC was committed to making these cost
12		reductions. Nor would AEP Ohio commit to reducing the PPA Rider by these
13		cost savings even if the savings were not accomplished.
14		
15		I also note, as discussed in more detail later in this testimony, that to the extent
16		any such cost savings would be passed through the PPA Rider as AEP Ohio
17		proposes, neither AEP Ohio nor OVEC would realize any benefit from the
18		savings, and, therefore, neither AEP Ohio nor OVEC would have any incentive to
19		achieve the savings.

⁸ OCC INT-11-272 part a, attached hereto, with other non-confidential data responses, in Attachment JFW-2.

⁹ OCC INT-11-272, OCC RPD-11048 (Att. JFW-2).

1	Q22.	WHAT VALUES DID YOU USE FOR THE OVEC DEMAND CHARGES IN
2		YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE COST TO CUSTOMERS OF THE PPA RIDERS
3	A22.	I used the demand charges that were provided by OVEC, eliminating the
4		reduction for "lean improvements/process optimization."
5		
6	Q23.	PLEASE EXPLAIN THE SECOND ASSUMPTION YOU MENTIONED,
7		WHICH HAS TO DO WITH ENERGY MARKET PRICES.
8	A23.	The PPA Rider Estimate is based on monthly Energy Market Prices, which are
9		weighted averages based on hourly prices and a forecast of hourly OVEC
10		generation. 10 AEP Ohio states that the hourly prices are based on forward prices
11		retrieved from "several different exchanges" in August 2013, and converted to
12		hourly prices using "proprietary algorithms." I AEP Ohio states that these prices
13		are intended to represent the "ADHUB" (AEP-Dayton Hub) delivery location. 12
14		The hourly prices were provided in a data request. 13 AEP Ohio states (in
15		responses dated April 2, 2014) that these values still represent AEP Ohio's
16		expectations of forward energy competitive prices. 14 AEP Ohio further states (in

¹⁰ OCC INT-11-275 part d (Att. JFW-2).

OCC INT-5-090 parts a, c (Att. JFW-2).

¹² OCC INT-5-090 part b (Att. JFW-2).

¹³ OEG INT-2-006 Competitively-Sensitive Confidential Attachment 1.

Direct Energy Services LLC 1NT-1-003.c (Att. JFW-2).

1		responses dated April 21, 2014) that it has not updated its forecasts of OVEC
2		generation, costs, or revenues. ¹⁵
3		
4	Q24.	DOES THE OUTPUT OF THE OVEC PLANTS EARN THE AD HUB
5		PRICE?
6	A24.	No; OVEC is a separate pricing point in PJM, and the locational marginal prices
7		("LMPs") at the OVEC point are generally different from prices at other points,
8		due to differences in losses and congestion. In response to a data request, AEP
9		Ohio provided average monthly LMPs for the OVEC point and also for the AEP
10		Gen Hub. 16 I accessed the underlying data directly from PJM for these points and
11		also for the AEP-Dayton Hub aggregate point, which is the basis for AD Hub
12		forward prices. Based on this data I was able to confirm the information provided
13		in the data response and also compare LMPs at the OVEC point to the AD Hub
14		values.

¹⁵ OEG INT-8-006, OEG INT-8-007, OEG INT-8-008 (Att. JFW-2).

¹⁶ OCC INT-5-107 Supplement Attachment 1 (Att. JFW-2).

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1 Q25. HOW DO LMPS AT THE OVEC POINT COMPARE TO THE AD HUB

2 LMPS?

3 A25. Over the past three years, LMPs at the OVEC point have averaged about

\$1.50/MWh lower than the AD Hub LMPs. The differential varies by month and

5 across peak and off-peak hours, as summarized in Table 1.

6

4

Table 1: Average LMP Differences, OVEC and AD Hub, 2011-2013						
		Peak Hou	rs	Of	f-Peak Ho	ours
	AD Hub	OVEC	Difference	AD Hub	OVEC	Difference
January	37.00	35.34	1.67	32.53	31.19	1.34
February	34.92	33.19	1.73	30.92	29.63	1.29
March	37.21	35.70	1.51	31.00	29.81	1.19
April	37.85	36.50	1.35	30.95	30.00	0.95
May	41.32	39.49	1.83	31.14	29.86	1.29
June	43.04	40.22	2.82	29.23	27.59	1.64
July	54.23	50.37	3.86	34.89	32.75	2.14
August	39.11	36.96	2.15	29.42	28.05	1.37
September	36.84	34.71	2.13	29.15	27.76	1.39
October	37.22	35.69	1.53	31.42	30.22	1.20
November	37.56	35.99	1.57	31.96	30.76	1.20
December	35.89	34.22	1.67	30.74	29.54	1.20
Source: Hourly LMP data accessed using PJM DataMiner tool.						

7

8

Direct Testimony of James F. Wilson
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1	Q26.	HOW DO RECENT AD HUB ENERGY PRICES COMPARE TO THE
2		ENERGY MARKET PRICES USED IN THE PPA RIDER ESTIMATE?
3	A26.	The Energy Market Prices in the PPA Rider Estimate are significantly different
4		from (and generally higher than) current AD Hub forward prices. I retrieved the
5		AD Hub forward prices for peak and off-peak hours during the ESP Period from
6		CME Group ¹⁷ three times: on April 9, April 23, and May 6. I used the May 6
7		values because they resulted in greater total value for the OVEC output over the
8		ESP Period.
9		
10		The average monthly prices used by AEP Ohio in the PPA Rider Estimate, and
11		average monthly prices recalculated based on the recent AD Hub futures prices,
12		are summarized in Exhibit No. JFW-1. The price patterns shown in Exhibit No.
13		JFW-1 reflect weighted average monthly values based on AEP Ohio's forecast of
14		OVEC hourly generation quantities.
15		
16		The monthly average prices based on recent AD Hub prices are generally much
17		lower than the Energy Market Price values that AEP Ohio used in the PPA Rider
18		Estimate. The exception is the values for the months of January and February.

¹⁷ CME Group is the world's leading and most diverse derivatives marketplace. The AD Hub futures prices accessed were PJM AEP Dayton Hub Day-Ahead Calendar-Month 5 MW Futures, Peak and Off-Peak (contracts D7 and R7), available at http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/electricity/pjm-aep-dayton-hub-peak-calendar-month-day-ahead-lmp-swap-futures_contract_specifications.html.

years reflect a much larger differential to the prices in adjacent months than they
have in the past, likely reflecting the events of the last winter, when cold weather
and natural gas pipeline constraints contributed to very high energy prices on
some winter days.
WHAT ENERGY MARKET PRICES DID YOU USE TO ESTIMATE THE
COST TO CUSTOMERS UNDER THE PPA RIDER?
I used the May 6 AD Hub prices, adjusted based on the typical LMP differentials
to the OVEC point shown in Table 1 above. These are prices at which the OVEC
output could be sold forward at the present time, and they are a reasonable
estimate of the future prices OVEC could achieve for its output.
CAN THE OVEC PLANTS EARN REVENUES IN ADDITIONAL PJM
MARKETS, OTHER THAN THE CAPACITY AND ENERGY MARKETS?
Some plants can sell various ancillary services, such as operating reserves and
regulation. However, older coal plants generally do not have the flexible
operating characteristics required to offer such services. The OVEC plants earned
no ancillary services revenues in 2012 or 2013, 18 and no estimate of such
revenues was included in the PPA Rider Estimate.

¹⁸ IEU INT-2-014, IEU INT-2-015 (Att. JFW-2).

1	Q29.	YOU HAVE UPDATED THE ENERGY MARKET PRICE ASSUMPTION
2		BASED ON RECENT FORWARD PRICES FOR AD HUB; WHAT OTHER
3		PRICES GO INTO THE PPA RIDER ESTIMATE, AND DID YOU UPDATE
4		THEM?
5	A29.	The other prices that enter into the estimate are 1) capacity prices and 2) coal
6		prices, which determine the OVEC generation costs. I did not update these other
7		prices as they are reasonably accurate and any update would make only a small
8		difference.
9		
10		Capacity prices have already been established for the first two years of the ESP
11		Period, so the values in the PPA Rider Estimate are correct. The value for the
12		third year (2017/18) will be established in an RPM auction to be held in May,
13		2014 with the results announced May 23. AEP Ohio's estimate for this price –
14		is higher than many observers expect for the upcoming auction.
15		For example, UBS expects \$80/MW-day for the applicable region. ¹⁹ Updating
16		the assumed capacity price for 2017/18 from
17		would increase the estimated cost to customers by approximately
18		however I have not included this adjustment in my estimate. I understand that I

¹⁹ UBS Global Research, US Electric Utilities & IPPs: Flattening our PJM Capacity Price Forecast, April 22, 2014 (stating expectations of \$80/MW-day for the RTO region), and Re-Thinking the Capacity Downside Case in PJM, April 28, 2014 (stating the same expectations).

may be asked to update my estimate of the cost to customers of the proposed PPA
Rider based on the actual capacity price for 2017/18 when it becomes available.
I have also not updated the coal prices used in the PPA Rider Estimate. The
market assumptions used in the PPA Rider Estimate were established in August,
2013. ²⁰ Coal prices are much more stable than electric energy or natural gas
prices, and have not changed much since last August. I reviewed the coal cost
assumptions and recent coal forward prices, and concluded there was no need to
update the coal cost assumptions.
The Clifty Creek plant receives most of its coal supply under
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The Clifty Creek plant receives most of its coal supply under Futures contracts have been defined for a few different standard
Futures contracts have been defined for a few different standard
Futures contracts have been defined for a few different standard coals, but there is no futures contract for Illinois Basin coal. However, coal

²⁰ OCC-INT-5-90 (Att. JFW-2).

²¹ OCC-RPD-5-035, Competitively-Sensitive Confidential Attachments 1 and 2, Article V.

²² See, for instance, U.S. Energy Information Administration, *Coal News and Markets Archive*, available at http://www.eia.gov/coal/news_markets/archive/

1		
2		and prices for Appa achian coals have a so been stable
3		recently. Consequently, the coal prices estimates used in the PPA Rider Estimate
4		likely would not change much if revisited at this time.
5		
6	Q30.	PLEASE EXPLAIN THE THIRD ASSUMPTION YOU MENTIONED: THE
7		OVEC GENERATION FORECAST.
8	A30.	The PPA Rider Estimate uses a forecast of hourly OVEC generation over the ESP
9		Period, which determines the energy market earnings (price times quantity). The
10		forecast of hourly OVEC generation was provided in response to a data request. ²⁴
11		The forecast suggests much higher generation than the OVEC plants have
12		achieved in recent years. Specifically, while the OVEC plants' output allocated to
13		AEP-Ohio (based on its 19.93% share of OVEC output ²⁵) was 1,952,385 MWh
14		and 1,985,352 MWh in 2012 and 2013, respectively,26 AEP Ohio forecasts
15		in 2016, and even higher values in 2017 and 2018. AEP Ohio's
16		forecast of OVEC generation for 2016 through 2018 is also much higher than it
17		expects for the months of 2015 that are part of the ESP Period.

²³ OCC-RPD-5-035, Competitively-Sensitive Confidential Attachment 3, Article V.

²⁴ OCC INT-11-275 Competitively Sensitive Confidential attachment in response to part f.

²⁵ IEU INT-2-003 (Att. JFW-2).

²⁶ IEU INT-2-020, IEU INT-2-021 (Att. JFW-2).

1	Q31.	HOW DOES AEP OHIO EXPLAIN THE HIGHER OVEC GENERATION
2		FORECAST?
3	A31.	With respect to the summer months, AEP Ohio states that the higher generation
4		forecast reflects higher expected energy market prices, while costs increase to a
5		much lesser extent. ²⁷
6		
7	Q32.	DO YOU ACCEPT THIS EXPLANATION?
8	A32.	No. As explained above, AEP Ohio's assumed Energy Market Prices, which are a
9		key determinant of the generation quantities, are generally higher than recent
10		forward prices. AEP Ohio's models would likely forecast substantially lower
11		OVEC generation, if updated with the latest AD Hub prices.
12		
13		Exhibit JFW-2 shows the monthly Energy Market Price, OVEC Cost (per MWh),
14		and generation, from the PPA Rider Estimate. It shows that even using AEP's
15		estimated Energy Market Prices, the assumed increase in the Energy Market Price
16		between summer 2015 and summer 2016 is less than
17		price also increases, yet the assumed generation increases by a substantial
18		amount. In addition, this exhibit shows that the assumed generation does not
19		appear to be highly correlated with the energy price - OVEC cost differential.
20		Indeed, some of the months with the highest generation have relatively low price

²⁷ OCC INT-6-114 (Att. JFW-2).

1		- cost differentials. Accordingly, I do not see a basis for AEP Onto s forecast of a
2		very large increase in OVEC generation in 2016-2018 compared to recent years,
3		or expectations for 2015.
4		
5	Q33.	WHAT VALUES DID YOU USE FOR THE OVEC GENERATION?
6	A33.	To adjust the assumed OVEC generation to be more consistent with historical
7		values, I reduced the forecast OVEC generation in 2016 to 2018 by 20% in peak
8		hours and 40% in off-peak hours. I made no adjustment to the forecast 2015
9		values, which are much lower and generally in line with recent outcomes. The
10		OVEC generation in the PPA Rider Estimate, and the reduced values I used, are
11		illustrated in Exhibit No. JFW-3.
12		
13		This adjustment still results in annual OVEC generation in excess of the recent
14		historical values, as shown in Table 2.
15		
16		Note also that changing the OVEC generation also changes the weighted-average
17		monthly prices based on the updated AD Hub values; because I have reduced off-
18		peak generation more than on-peak generation, the monthly weighted average
19		prices are somewhat higher. This price pattern was also shown in Exhibit No.
20		JFW-1.

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