## BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

- - -

In the Matter of the :
Application of Ohio Power :
Company to Establish a :

Company to Establish a :
Competitive Bidding : Case No. 12-3254-EL-UNC
Process for Procurement :

Process for Procurement : of Energy to Support its : Standard Service Offer. :

- - -

## PROCEEDINGS

before Mr. Jonathan J. Tauber and Ms. Sarah J.

Parrot, Hearing Examiners, at the Public Utilities

Commission of Ohio, 180 East Broad Street, Room 11-A,

Columbus, Ohio, called at 9:00 a.m. on Tuesday, June

25, 2013.

VOLUME II

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252 Tuesday Morning Session, 1 2 June 25, 2013. 3 4 EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the 5 record. Let's start this morning with brief 6 7 appearances of the parties, just names only, please, and we'll start again with the company and work our 8 9 way around the room. 10 MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor. On behalf of Ohio Power Company, Steven T. Nourse, 11 12 Daniel R. Conway. 13 MR. PETRICOFF: Thank you, your Honor. On behalf of Constellation Energy and Exelon 14 Generation, LLC, Howard Petricoff. 15 16 MR. LANG: On behalf of FirstEnergy 17 Solutions, Mark Hayden, Jim Lang, and Trevor 18 Alexander. MR. KURTZ: For OEG, Mike Kurtz. 19 20 MS. GRADY: For the residential 2.1 customers, Maureen Grady. 22 MR. PRITCHARD: For Industrial Energy 23 Users-Ohio, Matt Pritchard. 24 MR. REILLY: For the staff of the Ohio 25 PUCO, Steve Reilly.

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1
                  EXAMINER PARROT: Thank you.
 2
                  I believe Mr. Petricoff has our next
 3
     witness.
 4
                  MR. PETRICOFF: Yes, your Honor. At this
     time we'd like to call Dr. Jonathan Lesser to the
 5
 6
     stand. And while Dr. Lesser is coming to the stand,
 7
     I'd like to have marked as Exhibit 1 his direct
 8
     prepared testimony, and I would like to have marked
9
     as Exhibit 1A an errata sheet to that testimony.
10
                  EXAMINER PARROT: And, Mr. Petricoff,
11
     would you like to mark these as Exelon Exhibit 1 and
12
     1A?
13
                  MR. PETRICOFF: Yes, Exelon 1 and Exelon
14
     1A.
                  EXAMINER PARROT: That's what we'll do,
15
16
     thank you.
17
                  (EXHIBITS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
18
                  MR. PETRICOFF: And I have previously
19
     given copies to the court reporter.
2.0
                  EXAMINER PARROT: Please raise your right
2.1
     hand.
22
                  (Witness sworn.)
                  EXAMINER PARROT: Please be seated.
23
24
25
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1	JONATHAN A. LESSER
2	being first duly sworn, as prescribed by law, was
3	examined and testified as follows:
4	DIRECT EXAMINATION
5	By Mr. Petricoff:
6	Q. Would you please state your name and
7	business address for the record.
8	A. My name is Jonathan A. Lesser, my
9	business address is Continental Economics,
10	Incorporated, 6 Real Place, Sandia Park, New Mexico,
11	87047.
12	Q. And on whose behalf do you appear today?
13	A. I'm here on behalf of Constellation
14	NewEnergy and Exelon Generation, LLC.
15	Q. And do you have before you what has been
16	marked as Exelon Exhibit 1 and Exelon Exhibit 1A?
17	A. I do.
18	Q. Could you please describe Exelon
19	Exhibit 1.
20	A. Exelon Exhibit 1 is a copy of my direct
21	testimony in this case.
22	Q. And Exelon Exhibit 1A?
23	A. Exelon Exhibit 1A is the errata sheet
24	with several corrections to my testimony.
25	Q. Could you please explain the corrections

that you are offering to your direct prepared testimony.

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A. Yes. On page 6, lines 5 through 8 of my testimony, the sentence "The Commission itself has determined that AEP Ohio should not be able to participate in the SSO auctions until after it has completed corporate separation, which is scheduled to be finalized by December 31st, 2014," that sentence should be removed.

In 11-346-EL-SSO, et al., the Commission determined that AEP Ohio and its affiliates could participate in the auction prior to corporate separation.

The second change is on page 20, line 17, which is to remove the phrase, quote, "In 2015, when AEP Ohio's" end quote, and replace it with "Since AEP Ohio and its" end quote, for the same reasons, that AEP Ohio and its affiliates are allowed to participate.

And there's a typographical error on page 23, line 18. The apostrophe s after the word AEP Ohio should be removed.

Q. With those changes if I asked you all the other questions that are contained in your direct prepared testimony, would your answers be the same?

	256
1	A. They would.
2	MR. PETRICOFF: Your Honor, the witness
3	is available for cross-examination.
4	EXAMINER PARROT: Thank you.
5	Mr. Lang.
6	MR. LANG: No, thank you.
7	EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Kurtz.
8	MR. KURTZ: Thank you, your Honor.
9	
10	CROSS-EXAMINATION
11	By Mr. Kurtz:
12	Q. Good morning, Dr. Lesser.
13	A. Good morning, Mr. Kurtz.
14	Q. Very briefly, as I understand your
15	proposal, you would take the difference between the
16	energy clearing prices from the auction and compare
17	that to the actual FAC rates
18	A. That's correct.
19	Q. Okay. And you would then quantify a
20	dollar amount of money.
21	A. Correct.
22	Q. Okay. And you would take that dollar
23	amount and reduce the deferral that AEP Ohio is
24	booking in the 2929 case, the difference between 188

and RPM, so you would reduce the deferral by the

amount that the energy auction price is greater than the FAC.

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A. That's correct. In my opinion, that's just the most straightforward, easily administrative way of crediting back to customers any additional moneys that AEP would earn, in my view it's consistent with standard ratemaking which is to -- under cost-of-service ratemaking, because customers are paying embedded costs of capacity for AEP Ohio's legacy generation assets, they're entitled to the profits from wholesale energy sales as well as wholesale capacity sales.

And rather than trying to figure out who is best someone who might be an SSO customer but is not, once the regulatory asset is -- starts to be collected or someone who wasn't -- isn't an SSO customer but later is an SSO customer, in my view this is just an administratively simpler approach to do this.

- Q. Now, if we assume that the energy auction price is higher than the FAC so that there is a deferral, what will happen is mechanically the nonshopping customers, the SSO customers, would pay higher rates today, correct?
  - A. That's correct.

Q. Okay. And then in the future the deferral would be -- well, then the deferral would be reduced lowering the costs that all customers have to repay, shopping and nonshopping.

A. That's correct. But, again, it's -- and there might be other ways to sort of track the dollars to individual customers who are SSO customers.

For example, you might be able to credit it back against the FAC itself, the variable portion of the FAC, but, again, I just found that administratively the easiest approach would be just to do this credit rather than trying to affect the actual prices people are paying right now and, therefore, you know, skew some of the competitive markets and decisions of whether or not to shop.

Just reducing, in my view, that regulatory asset later on is just the simplest approach.

- Q. If the Commission were concerned about not having undue rate increases on SSO customers today, your proposal would not solve that problem, would it?
  - A. No, it would not.
- Q. Okay. Does your proposal assume that AEP Ohio wins all of the tranches in the auction?

A. No, not at all.

- Q. What if they don't win any tranches, would you be crediting back against the future deferral for moneys that AEP Ohio never received?
- A. Well, if AEP does not win any of the tranches in the auction, then that much energy -- and let's assume the price is above -- the auction price is above the FAC, then AEP will have that much additional energy which it can then sell in the wholesale market.

Now, as I explained in my testimony, if the auction price is -- clearing price is higher than the FAC, then AEP's, the variable costs, because AEP has high capital costs, low variable cost resources, is certainly going to be able to sell power into the wholesale market.

So, again, that money that's freed up for wholesale energy sales should properly be credited back to AEP customers -- AEP Ohio customers who are required under 10-2929 to pay for embedded capacity costs.

- Q. Do you know what type of customer is a nonshopping customer, as a general matter?
- A. There are -- probably the majority are residential customers. There are, you know, the

customers that are represented by you who are on the special IRP-D rates. There are also a few customers who are not allowed to shop because they're on the income -- I can't remember the exact name.

O. PIPP. The PIPP?

- A. Yeah, thank you.
- Q. So that's what I want to -- so you've really got the relatively nonsophisticated residential and low-income customers as well as the customers on reasonable arrangements who get discount off tariffs, which would be my client Timken as well as Eramet as well as Ormet, those type of customers. Would you agree with that? Those are the nonshopping customers --
- A. Right. The difference, of course, is that, for example, your clients, unlike, say, some of the PIPP customers, are perfectly capable of shopping if they so desire.
- Q. Right. Now, contrast what is the -- do you know the shopping percentages in the commercial class, for example?
- A. I don't know the percentage off the top of my head, no.
- Q. But, in any event, so the mechanics of your proposal would be -- the rates would go up on

the nonshoppers and then the money would be used to offset the deferral that all customers have to eventually repay.

A. That's right. And, of course, the nonshoppers are still, with the exception of the PIPP customers, can always go shopping.

MR. KURTZ: Thank you, Dr. Lesser.

EXAMINER PARROT: Ms. Grady.

MS. GRADY: Thank you, your Honor.

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## CROSS-EXAMINATION

By Ms. Grady:

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- Q. Good morning, Dr. Lesser.
- A. Good morning, Ms. Grady.
- Q. Can you turn to page 14 of your testimony.
  - A. I'm there.
  - Q. And in the example that you depict graphically at the top of that page the auction clearing price is less than the FAC?
    - A. That's right.
  - Q. Now, on the following page, on page 15, I want to direct your attention to lines 8 through 10, and you're explaining your example and your conclusion is that, and you're referring to -- and

I'm looking at lines 8 through 10, you say "In that case, SSO customers will lose all of the benefits of competition, or the amount Q\*." Do you see that?

A. Yes.

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- Q. And when you're referring specifically right there, you mean that customers would lose out on the benefits of an auction clearing price, in your example, that is lower than FAC; is that correct?
- A. That's correct. Because the -- if you artificially restrict the auction to imposing -- by imposing a reserve price at the FAC, what this example shows is that you're essentially reducing the number of bidders and increasing the regulatory uncertainty associated with the auction, and that can -- could in this example shift the supply curve inwards and result in what otherwise would be a below-FAC price to actually the FAC price, to private consumers of that law, that benefit.
  - Q. Thank you.

Now, on page 17 of your testimony you discuss the fact that IEU and OEG members can purchase electricity directly from CRES providers if they believe that the blended or full auction SSO price is too high; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Is the same statement true for residential customers?

2.1

- A. Other than the PIP customers, I believe that is true.
- Q. So your opinion is that residential customers could purchase electricity directly from CRES providers.
- A. That would be my opinion. I'm not aware of any residential customers or -- that have -- other than the PIPP customers where there's specific prohibitions against shopping by those residential customers.
- Q. And would it be your opinion also that individual residential customers could negotiate lower-priced contracts than the prices that prevail in an unfettered CBP because of their load factor?
- A. It's possible. I don't -- I really don't know. It would really depend on the customer and the CRES provider. My main point is that for residential customers they still have the option of shopping and with my crediting mechanism later on, all those customers will pay less whether they're shopping or not.
- MS. GRADY: That's all the questions I have. Thank you, Dr. Lesser.

264 1 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 2 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Pritchard. 3 MR. PRITCHARD: No questions, your Honor. 4 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Nourse or 5 Mr. Conway. MR. NOURSE: Yes, your Honor. 6 7 CROSS-EXAMINATION 8 9 By Mr. Nourse: 10 Q. Good morning, Dr. Lesser. Good morning, Mr. Nourse. 11 12 I'd first like to ask you, you're 13 representing Exelon and Constellation NewEnergy; is that correct? 14 That's correct. 15 Α. 16 And I want to start with the general 17 interests of the parties you're representing relative 18 to this case. 19 Α. Okay. 20 And so as a general matter does -- if it's okay, I'll just refer to it as "Exelon." 2.1 22 A. That's fine. Does Exelon benefit when bypassable rates 23 24 of AEP Ohio are increased or does that harm Exelon's interest? 25

A. Well, Exelon and Constellation are retail competitors, so if you increase the bypassable rates, then the potential benefits of shopping, and again holding all other things equal, will increase.

2.1

- Q. So higher bypassable charges of AEP Ohio would give more headroom for retail competition and, thus, would benefit or potentially benefit Exelon; do you agree?
- A. Again, if you hold everything else equal, then sure.
- Q. Okay. So that's the factor that I'm asking you about; bypassable rates, higher or lower, higher helps Exelon, correct?
- A. If you -- all other things equal, that's correct.
- Q. So how about the auction clearing price that results -- if that results in lower SSO rates for AEP Ohio, does that help Exelon compete?
- A. Well, you have to look at in the context of, you know, essentially your question is assuming that there's a lower SSO rate, but somehow the wholesale market rates don't change or, you know, that Exelon as a, say, bidder in the auction, which it can do, and therefore benefit from that, that if the auction clearing price is lower, then there's

less of an incentive to shop if you assume that the CRES provider cannot provide a similarly lower price, which is probably not the case.

2.1

The auction price is part of the market, it's a market price, so it's always going to be related to the price in the market offered by CRES providers. There's not a complete disconnect between those.

Q. Okay. So Exelon would like a higher auction clearing price as a supplier, but they'd like a higher bypassable rate as a competitor; is that fair?

THE WITNESS: Let me -- may I have that read again? Just see if I got that correct.

(Record read.)

- Q. "As a retail competitor" was the second part.
- A. As a retail competitor, holding all other things equal, Exelon would probably -- as a competitive supplier, would prefer a higher bypassable rate. In terms of would it prefer a higher auction price, you know, certainly as a seller in the auction to succeed, Exelon, like every other company, including AEP Ohio, would prefer a higher auction price.

- Q. Okay. Now, you testified recently in AEP Ohio's capacity charge case. Do you recall that?
  - A. T do.
- Q. And you also testified in AEP Ohio's ESP case. I'm sure you recall that.
  - A. Both cases, yes.
- Q. And in both of those cases you represented or testified on behalf of FirstEnergy Solutions, correct?
  - A. That's right.
- Q. Okay. And has your position changed from the positions you took in those proceedings on behalf of FirstEnergy Solutions?
- A. Could you be more specific on which positions? I covered a lot of ground in those case, so perhaps you'd be --
- Q. Have any of your positions that you're talking about in your testimony today, are they different than they were in those cases?
- A. I don't think so. I continue to believe that AEP Ohio should not be granted any embedded cost treatment of its capacity, but that ship has apparently sailed for now. And I believe in as much competition as possible.
  - Q. Okay. So just for the record, you do

2.1

disagree with the capacity charge decision that the Commission issued last summer insofar as it allows

AEP Ohio to recover what you would call above-market capacity charges, correct?

A. Yes. In combination with the Commission's order in 11-346 that allows AEP Ohio or its affiliates especially to participate in the auctions.

I see that as a gross cross-subsidy that should not be allowed by the Commission and I see AEP getting embedded capacity costs as inappropriate in general because, as I said in my testimony, they had already recovered all their stranded costs and really have no -- no right even as an FRR entity to collecting those funds.

Q. Okay, so --

- A. But, again, that ship has sailed.
- Q. But you still disagree with it and you disagree with the capacity deferral, and you'd like to find a way to get around that, correct?
- A. Well, if it were up to me and I was the one writing the Commission order, then I would have set the capacity price AEP could charge to the PJM market price. I would probably also allow 100 percent -- a 100 percent auction right away.

- Q. Okay. Now, did you have to get FirstEnergy Solutions' permission to file testimony in this case?
  - A. No, I did not.
- Q. You did not get their consent to testify on behalf of --
  - A. No, I did not.
  - Q. -- Exelon?
  - A. No.

- Q. Okay. And but you are advancing positions in this case that FES paid you to develop in the capacity and the ESP cases, correct?
- A. I don't really think so, Mr. Nourse.

  Again, I take no position in this testimony on those previous cases in terms of, I think you just mentioned the capacity price, I take no -- as I said in my testimony, I take no position on that except that the Commission has decided, I understand the decision is currently on appeal before the Ohio Supreme Court, but that's where we are.

So it really has nothing to do with AEP recovering stranded generation costs or being allowed to charge an embedded capacity cost basis, not in this testimony here.

Q. All right. Well, we'll get back to your

credit notion in a little bit.

2.0

So did you coordinate the development of your testimony with FES or the other intervenors in this case, or did Exelon develop it independent?

- A. I developed it independently and, of course, coordinated with Mr. Petricoff.
- Q. Okay. Let me ask you to turn to page 3 and 4 of your testimony. You summarize your positions I believe here in question and answer 6.
  - A. I see that.
- Q. So I'll ask you to clarify a couple of these items. If you look at item No. 4 on page 4, you are stating "The Commission should reaffirm its previous rejection of AEP Ohio's proposal to freeze its Base Generation Rate throughout the entire term of the ESP." Do you see that?
  - A. I do.
- Q. Okay. Now, is this a reference to the January through May 2015 time period?
  - A. No, it's not.
  - O. What is it a reference to?
- A. It's a reference to AEP's -- well, the statement in No. 4 speaks for itself, throughout the entire term of the ESP which is what AEP was proposing is to freeze its base generation rate for

that entire period.

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- Q. Right. But you're referencing the Commission's ruling and using that language so I'm trying to understand what -- let me ask you to flip back to page 25 at the end of your testimony, I believe page 25, lines 3 through 5, you say beginning January 1st, 2015, 100 percent AEP Ohio's SSO load will be auctioned off and the Commission has set the capacity cost to 188.88 per megawatt-day. Do you see that?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. That's a reference to base generation rates for January through May 2015?
- A. It would affect base generation rates, yes.
- Q. Yeah. And so is it your understanding that the company under the ESP order, as you understand it, the company has to reduce its base generation rates prior to January 1st, 2015?
- A. May I see the copy of the rehearing order?
- Q. Actually, I'll go ahead and make it an exhibit because I'm going to use that anyway.
  - A. All right.
    - MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I'd like to mark

272 1 as AEP Ohio, is it Exhibit 3? 2 EXAMINER PARROT: Yes. So marked. 3 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 4 MR. PETRICOFF: Counsel, is this the 5 rehearing order of February the 23rd? MR. NOURSE: This is the entry on 6 7 rehearing of January 30th, 2013, in the 11-346, et al. cases, the ESP proceeding. 8 9 MR. PETRICOFF: We've got three entries 10 on rehearing, so this was January 30th? MR. NOURSE: Yes. 11 12 (By Mr. Nourse) Is that the rehearing Q. 13 entry, Dr. Lesser, that you wanted to consult? 14 Α. Yes. 15 Q. Okay. I think we had a question pending, but I can --16 17 Would you mind repeating the question? Α. 18 Okay. So I was trying to clarify your 0. 19 statement in testimony here about freezing the base 20 rate throughout the entire term and -- as opposed to 2.1 scaling it back to the 188 level as you reference on 22 page 25 of your testimony beginning January 1st, 2015. And my question was whether it was your 23 24 understanding of the orders, the ESP orders, that

AEP Ohio needs to reduce its base generation rates

prior to January 1st, 2015.

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A. Well, I don't address this directly in my testimony in terms of, say, the rate blending process. The problem is that the base generation rate, as AEP represented that rate in the ESP hearings, is somewhat different than how it's been represented in this proceeding.

In this proceeding you're representing the base generation rate as solely consisting of capacity costs. In the ESP proceeding you didn't do that, you said there's energy, capacity, and ancillary services costs included in the base generation rate, but none of them are cost based.

So in my view all I'm saying is that the base generation rates should not be frozen for the period of the auction during the auction process which is what the Commission said.

Now, in terms of how to reduce those base generation rates or change them, either you could use the FERC -- the formula rate approach AEP has, which changes every year and thus changes throughout the auction process, and then in 2015 it's very clear that the only legitimate price is \$188.88 per megawatt-day as the capacity component of the base generation rate.

Now, that component, what AEP proposed is to, in fact, not base the base generation rate on that \$188 value, but said we're going to use the 2014 FERC costs in 2015, which is clearly inappropriate.

Q. Okay. Well, you know, I'm going to avoid getting too far into your characterizations of what we said in that case and what we're saying in this case; I'll let our witnesses' testimony stand. And you certainly had an opportunity, Exelon did, to cross-examine our witnesses on those kind of points.

But all I was asking you about was your understanding of the Commission order, since you're making a statement here on page 4 as one of your recommendations and you're citing the Commission order, so it's a very simple question. And I don't think any of the stuff you -- points you made in your answer really went to response to that question.

A. Well, I would disagree with you, and you can certainly make a motion to strike my answer if you think it's nonresponsive, but I think I answered your question citing to the Commission order which says, and I quote, "We find that AEP Ohio's request to continue to freeze base generations through the auction process is inappropriate and should be rejected."

Now, at the time this was written, and to this day, we still have not set a time what will the specific timing of the auction process be, that's part of this proceeding. So the Commission cannot, obviously cannot point to a specific time frame, they simply said this is the -- during the auction process, presumably in this proceeding we'll find out what that timing is.

- Q. Okay. But you're -- so would you agree, then, that based on the ESP order you don't glean a conclusion that there's a particular time, other than January 1st, 2015, by which the company has to reduce its base rates to reflect 188?
  - A. I have no opinion on that.
- Q. Okay. Thank you. That will shorten things up quite a bit. I'm going past a couple pages of notes.

All right. Can I ask you to turn to page 12 of your testimony here.

A. I'm there.

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Q. And in question and answer 17, my understanding of this statement, you're basically saying that it would not be a failure of the auction if it produces a rate higher than the FAC because the results of a competitive SSO energy auction are

completely different from AEP Ohio's variable costs.

Is that an accurate summary?

2.0

- A. I think that's an accurate summary.
- Q. So you're saying there's no reason to link energy auction prices with the FAC cost recovery, correct?
- A. No. I'm saying that the mere fact that an auction process results in auction clearing prices that are higher than the FAC does not mean that auction has failed. Assuming that the auction manager, whoever you decide to hire as the auction manager, determines that the auction was competitive, was well run, all the different characteristics they would evaluate, then that's a -- if that's a competitive result, that's not an indication of failure.
- Q. Okay. But here in answer 17 you're saying that those are completely different, quote/unquote, the two items, FAC cost on one hand and competitive market auction price on the other hand, correct?
- A. I'm saying that the results of a competitive auction, yes, are different than AEP Ohio's variable costs.
  - Q. They're two different things, completely

different. That's what you're saying, correct?

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- A. I believe I've answered your question.
- Q. And I asked you if I was correct or not that you're saying they're two different things, they're completely different.
- A. Well, I believe you're attempting to take my answer out of context. Again, I'll state it that AEP's FAC, its variable costs under schedule F of its application are different than the results of a competitive auction.

Now, if AEP happens to win in the auction, that -- there presumably is some relationship between AEP's costs, variable costs, and what it would bid in the auction, but in general the mere fact that, again, if I see -- observe that a competitive auction results in a price greater than AEP's FAC, that does not mean the auction has failed.

- Q. Is your credit recommendation linked to an AEP affiliate winning auction tranches?
  - A. No, it's not.
- Q. Okay. On page 11 of your testimony you state -- you're referencing an OEG argument there starting at line 7.
  - A. I'm there.
  - Q. The quid pro quo for receiving a

cost-based rate for legacy generation is the provision of energy from these coal units at cost. Do you see that?

A. I do.

- Q. Okay. Is that quid pro quo argument, is that something you agree with, first of all?
- A. Yes, I do agree with it as -- because all customers, both shopping and nonshopping, have been ordered by the Commission to pay AEP's embedded capacity costs contrary to what I believe is a correct decision. Then those customers under, and let's just focus on nonshopping customers, those customers under the traditional regulatory compact essentially have a claim to the variable cost energy.
- Q. Okay. So you kind of answered my next question. So you're saying this quid pro quo theory is really grounded in the traditional regulatory compact; is that fair?
- A. In terms of -- yeah, I think that's a reasonably fair statement.
- Q. And is that traditional regulatory compact quid pro quo, is that the basis for your -- underlying your credit recommendation as well?
- A. Actually, the credit recommendation, I mean, that can certainly be part of it, but it also

goes directly to the calculation of the net embedded capacity costs, which is that if AEP is selling capacity either at -- in the auction and if AEP wins the auction tranches and sells it at above its FAC, then the way AEP would calculate the net embedded capacity cost under the FERC formula rate would, in fact, credit back those additional revenues.

And if AEP did not win the auction and the result was above the FAC, then AEP, again, is freed up to sell that additional energy into the wholesale market, which will be at a higher price than its FAC. And, again, therefore SSO customers and all customers should be credited back all of those profits AEP earns.

- Q. Okay. So if AEP or its affiliates don't win any auction tranches, or certainly if they don't win all of the tranches, either way, your credit proposal would capture and impute, really assume that there would be market sales for all of those same megawatt-hours at the same price that the auction clears at; is that correct?
  - A. No, that's not correct.
  - Q. Okay. Please explain.
- A. What I'm saying is let's take the example of AEP not winning any auction tranches, but the

auction is nevertheless above AEP's FAC. In that case, as I argue in my testimony, the market -- wholesale market price is almost certainly going to be higher than AEP's FAC because AEP's high capital cost generation, the trade-off with that is it has low variable costs.

In that case AEP would be selling that energy into the market and earning a profit, and so what I do is approximate that by the difference between the auction clearing price and the FAC.

- Q. Right. That's what I just said. You're assuming that all the same megawatt-hours that were sold in the auction can be sold at the exact same price in the market for the same period, correct?
- A. Yeah, I'm essentially making that simplifying assumption.
- Q. Okay. So under the ESP order and the capacity order as you understand them today does AEP or its affiliates have to disgorge off-system sales profits or margins and credit them to retail ratepayers?
- A. The way AEP -- the way the Commission derived the 188.88 per megawatt-day value includes a credit for off-system wholesale energy sales as well as wholesale capacity sales and ancillary service

revenues, so my mechanism simply is an administrative mechanism to try to address the concerns raised by some of the parties that retail customers should not be required to pay above -- above AEP's FAC costs for energy when they're forced to also pay the embedded costs.

- Q. Okay. So your point about the capacity charge order is that the Commission incorporate an energy credit?
  - A. Correct.

- Q. For the capacity that was priced in that order; is that correct?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. And the capacity that was priced in that order was what capacity?
- A. The AEP capacity that is used to provide FRR service.
- Q. Specifically was the capacity pricing that was decided in the 10-2929 case for shopping capacity?
  - A. It was.
- Q. And it was not applicable to nonshopping capacity as part of the order.
- A. I would disagree with that. No, I believe that that same price should be applied to

nonshopping capacity and I believe that's the basis for the FirstEnergy blending proposal which is not exclusive of my crediting mechanism at all.

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- Q. Okay. Well, I understand you may believe that it should be applied to nonshopping capacity, but I was asking you as we sit here today and as we look at the capacity orders what's your understanding, does it apply -- not looking at the ESP order which did different things, but the capacity decision, did it apply to nonshopping capacity?
- A. The capacity order, in my understanding, applied to shopping customers. The capacity order was silent on its application to nonshopping SSO customers. However, charging a different price to customers for capacity is price discrimination and should not be allowed.
- Q. Okay. Are you stating that as a matter of your understanding of Ohio law? Your price discrimination statement.
- A. I'm stating price discrimination is anticompetitive, therefore, to the extent that Ohio policies is to promote electric -- retail electric competition under SB 3 and SB 221, pricing discrimination is counterproductive and will restrict

competition, therefore, it's not whether Ohio law specifically prevents price discrimination, federal antitrust law certainly prevents price discrimination.

- Q. Okay. So you're making statements of federal and Ohio law.
- A. No, I'm not, sir. What I'm saying is -I'll go back to my initial statement that from a -if the policy of the state of Ohio is to promote
  retail electric competition, which is how I interpret
  SB 3 and SB 221, then price discrimination does not
  promote retail competition.
- Q. Okay. So you're making an economic theory point.
  - A. That's correct.

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Q. Okay. So, and in that economic theory is it also correct that in order to conclude there's price discrimination in any context, you also have to conclude that the two situations being compared are similarly situated and they're comparable circumstances?

MR. PETRICOFF: Could I have that question read back?

(Record read.)

A. Your question is so vague I can't answer.

Perhaps you can try to be a little clearer on what you mean by "comparable circumstances." Are you talking about economically comparable or legally comparable?

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- Q. Well, I'm asking you to explain your statement about price discrimination and your economic point that -- you just said it was an economic point, so we don't need to talk about the legal distinction at this point, to explain your statement about price discrimination. And isn't it true that just because you have two different prices doesn't mean there's discrimination unless there's like and contemporaneous service and there are comparable circumstances involved and comparable services?
- A. If the services are the same -- so let -for example, I think it's easiest to answer your
  question with just an example. AEP provides -- is an
  FRR provider or FRR entity so it's providing capacity
  support to all customers whether they receive
  power -- buy power from CRES providers or they buy
  power under the default service from --
- Q. Dr. Lesser, I'm not asking you for any extended example here or hypothetical. I asked you a simple question about the theory that you just

stated.

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MR. PETRICOFF: Your Honor, the witness has been interrupted mid answer. He should be permitted to complete his answer.

EXAMINER PARROT: Please continue,
Dr. Lesser.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Honor.

Well, you're talking about a comparable product, that's why I'm using that example. It's the same exact capacity that's being provided to all customers. Therefore, charging one set of customers a price of \$188 and another set of customers a price of 350 or 250, or who knows what is in the base generation rate, but if it's a different price than 188, that's price discrimination.

- Q. Okay. Well, that --
- A. And that's anticompetitive.
- Q. Yeah. Okay. Was that your position in the ESP and the capacity cases?
  - A. That's been my constant position, yes.
  - Q. Did the Commission adopt that position?
- A. No. I believe the Commission erred in not adopting that position.
- Q. All right. I don't believe they erred on that point but let's move on since we disagree.

Let me get back to my original question that started all this, Dr. Lesser, and I asked you if your understanding of the ESP order requires AEP Ohio or its affiliates to disgorge off-system sales margins or credit them to retail customers as it stands today.

- A. I don't know if AEP is legally required to do that under the ESP orders. Under standard regulatory practice if customers are going to be required by the Commission to pay embedded capacity costs, then the quid pro quo, as I explain in my testimony, is that customers receive also receive the profits earned by AEP on wholesale energy sales that are supported by those retail customers who are forced to pay embedded capacity costs.
- Q. Okay. So by your answer, and my question was about the ESP order and your understanding of it, are you saying the Commission didn't follow standard regulatory practice in the ESP order? Is that what --
- A. You're asking me a legal question. I'm not -- I'm not saying that at all. I'm just telling you, and as I've answered, under traditional regulation here's what would apply.

Now, the Commission in 10-2929, when it

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determined a capacity price, considered wholesale energy sales margins, profits, and credited those back against AEP's full-embedded capacity costs.

That is certainly proper, that's -- that is consistent with the FERC formula rate. It's not what AEP initially wanted in the 10-2929, but that's what the Commission did.

Q. Okay. But let's clarify that and then we'll get back to my other question again.

So the 10-2929 decision and the energy credit that was applied to price shopping capacity included off-system sales margins as part of the credit -- the energy credit mechanism, correct?

A. That's correct.

MR. PETRICOFF: Your Honor.

Q. And that's -- what you're citing as your reliance to support your theory in this case that there should be a capture of off-system sales margins and an offsetting credit to the benefit of retail customers.

MR. PETRICOFF: Your Honor, I want to object. That's a mischaracterization of the testimony, unless counsel wants to indicate where in his testimony he makes that statement.

MR. NOURSE: His verbal testimony today,

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I think he just cited that as an example when I asked him about whether the company's required to share or, not just share, disgorge off-system sales margins to retail customers and he cited that as an example.

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MR. PETRICOFF: In that case, your Honor, I want to object. These questions are far off the written testimony. We are now delving into a discussion about what the 10-2929 order did or didn't do; that's outside the scope of the hearing.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, he's making a very novel crediting argument here and he's relying on principles that don't match up with the Commission's existing orders, that are binding and applicable, so I'm entitled to explore that.

EXAMINER PARROT: Overruled.

- Q. (By Mr. Nourse) So, Dr. Lesser, you mentioned the energy credit from the 10-2929 case. Is it your understanding that the energy credit that the staff contractor, Energy Ventures Analysis, had recommended and the Commission adopted included off-system sales margins in -- as part of the credit?
- A. I don't believe the Commission actually adopted the specific value that staff came up with.
- Q. Okay. Dr. Lesser, I've got the opinion and order here in the 10-2929 case.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I'd like to mark that as an exhibit, AEP No. 4.

EXAMINER PARROT: So marked.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

- Q. And I'd ask you to turn to page 34.
- A. Did you say "34," sir?
- Q. 34, yes.

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- A. Thank you.
- Q. And can you read the bottom paragraph on page 34 that carries over to page 35 and tell me whether that refreshes your recollection about whether the Commission adopted EVA's energy credit methodology.
- A. Do you want me to read that into the record or just read it to myself?
- Q. Read it to yourself and see if it refreshes your recollection.
- A. Well, on page 25 of this order it states that staff's alternative recommendation is \$146.41 per megawatt-day, so -- and based on what you had me look at on pages 34 and 35, the Commission is saying it finds on the whole that staff's recommended energy credit is reasonable, but that the Commission, in adopting 188.88 per megawatt-day, as far as I can tell, that's not the same as 146.41 per megawatt-day.

Q. Okay. Well, do you recall how -- let me ask you this way: Is it your understanding that as part of the staff's recommendation and as part of the Commission's approach in deciding the capacity charge case they adopted a demand charge as step 1, they applied an energy credit as step 2, and then they came up with 188.88 as the net capacity charge? Is that your understanding?

- A. Not -- no, not really.
- Q. What's incorrect about that?
- A. Well, I think you're oversimplifying the first step of setting the demand charge. You're grossly oversimplifying that.
  - Q. How so?
- A. The demand charge that staff came up with, as I recall, and I certainly don't have staff's testimony in front of me so I'm recalling from memory, included numerous adjustments to AEP Ohio's proposed number, which was \$355 per megawatt-day.
- Q. Right. So since we're on that same section at page 34, you're referring to Staff Witness Smith who sponsored the demand charge portion of the analysis.
  - A. Where are you reading, sir?
  - Q. The first full paragraph on page 34.

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It's talking about the Staff Witness Smith's demand charge testimony.

A. All right.

- Q. And if you read that whole paragraph, you'll see that there's specific adjustments made to staff's demand charge and they come up with an adjusted demand charge as step 1. That's what I was referring to before.
  - A. All right.
- Q. And then step 2 is the energy credit.

  And you agree that, bottom line on page 34 says

  "...we find that EVA's methodology should be
  adopted...," and it goes on at the top of page 35 to
  make a single adjustment to the staff's energy credit
  based on the Wheeling Power Company's allocation of
  \$5, and then they go on to apply the 147.41 to the
  net effect of a net capacity charge of 188.88 per
  megawatt-day, so that's what I was describing before.
  Does that refresh your recollection?
- A. Well, I'm reading the order, so I, you know, I'm -- if you want to look at it that way, that's fine, you subtract off an energy credit.

  Fine. That's consistent with what I'm recommending in this case --
  - Q. Okay.

A. -- that there be a energy credit. I'm not basing my credit on this decision. What I'm saying is that it's consistent with using -- putting in an energy credit that was done also in this case and accepted by the Commission.

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Q. Okay. Well, if one aspect of this is if the staff's energy credit already included -- it already attributed off sales -- excuse me. Let me back up and start over on this question.

If the staff's energy credit that the Commission adopted in that 10-2929 case also incorporated SSO margins, standard service offer margins, as part of that calculation, wouldn't that undercut rather than be consistent with your crediting proposal?

- A. I'm sorry, under included SSO margins?
- Q. You just stated --
- A. So you're saying that -- let me see if I understand your question. You're saying that staff's calculation includes margins made on sales to SSO -- retail SSO customers rather than not -- than wholesale customers. Is that what . . .
- Q. If the staff's energy credit included across-the-board margins on SSO and off-system sales, ironically we're talking about SSO and OSS being the

two categories, but yes.

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- A. I don't recall. I'd have to review the staff's testimony and all the workpapers at this point. I just don't recall.
- Q. And if it did, would you agree that undercuts your credit rather than being consistent?
- A. No, not at all, because you're, again, you're misinterpreting my testimony. What I'm suggesting is that staff's, as I recall, the staff analysis did not take into account auction revenues. The staff -- so, in other words, the staff didn't assume that, for example, AEP would be winning, say, tranches in an auction or not winning tranches in an auction and then selling that additional power. So it doesn't affect my recommendations whatsoever.
- Q. But your auction tranches that you're using as an example there, those are chunks of power, chunks of energy that were previously served by AEP Ohio as SSO, nonshopping load, correct?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. So if the staff's energy credit in the capacity charge proceeding already incorporated SSO margins in calculating their energy credit, wouldn't it be double-counting to try to do that again here?
  - A. Nice try, but no. You're completely

wrong, because the SSO, the way the staff calculated -- in that case we weren't looking at auction prices clearing above the FAC. In the ESP cases the ESP price -- the SSO price within the ESP is based on AEP Ohio's FAC, not a blending of the -- of an above-market auction price on top of that FAC.

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- Q. So are you saying you don't think the staff, when it calculates a margin, would back out the cost which is identical to the fuel cost that goes through the FAC? Isn't that the definition of a margin?
- A. That would be part of the margin estimate is what the variable costs are.
- Q. Okay. You spoke of this trade-off that relates back to your regulatory compact notion that paying for capacity entitles someone to low-cost or cost-based energy, correct?
- A. That would be my interpretation of the regulatory compact, yes. One part of it, certainly.
- Q. Okay. And is it your understanding that the Commission incorporated that traditional regulatory compact theory in the ESP orders?
- A. I have no opinion on what the Commission did or did not incorporate. The regulatory compact, as you recall, is not written down law anywhere, it's

an unwritten rule. So whether the Commission in its decision incorporated an unwritten rule, you'd have to ask the Commission.

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- Q. It's an unwritten rule for traditional regulatory jurisdictions, correct?
- A. It's a -- well, it applies a little more broadly than that probably, but it certainly applies to traditional regulation and traditional regulation includes being guaranteed full cost recovery.
- Q. And would you characterize the Senate
  Bill 221 regulatory regime in Ohio as a
  traditional -- as traditional regulation?
- A. Well, the idea behind SB 221 was to promote retail competition, but, you know, since AEP is -- seems to have been fighting it bitterly, AEP has wanted to recover its costs that it could recover in a traditional regulatory environment. That's the whole purpose for your 10-2929 case where you asked for full embedded cost recovery based on various theories on your requirements as an FRR entity somehow being different than everyone else providing capacity, you know, and receiving a wholesale market price.
- Q. Okay. Well, I understand, as we've gone over several times, that you disagree with the

Commission's decision in the capacity case, but what I'm asking you is whether the Senate Bill 221 regulatory regime is traditional regulation, in your view. Yes or no?

- A. It's not traditional regulation.
- Q. Okay.

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- A. It was designed to encourage a move to full retail competition.
- Q. So even if we look to a state or a jurisdiction that employs traditional cost-based rate of return regulation principles, is it common or uncommon to capture 100 percent of off-system sales margins in those jurisdictions and credit them entirely to retail customers?
  - A. I'm sorry, in a traditional system?
  - O. Yeah.
    - A. That's quite common.
    - Q. To capture 100 percent.
- A. That's often the case, especially in cases -- well, before there were really wholesale markets and you had just economy energy transactions, utilities would always credit all the revenues back to customers.
- Q. Is that the case for AEP, AEP East companies, to your knowledge, that they all --

- A. No. There's a wholesale market in PJM. But, again, in my view AEP should be credit -- as long as AEP is being paid its full embedded costs, the quid pro quo of that is to credit back to those customers the additional wholesale energy margins that AEP earns from sales into the market.
- Q. Okay. So that's the theory you're resting your credit recommendation on.
  - A. That's one of them, yes.

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- Q. What are the other theories?
- A. Well, again, you just asked me about the regulatory compact.
  - Q. Okay. That's the main rationale, right?
- A. Well, to essentially to prevent -- to try to come up with a way to forward competition in competitive markets to get us through this transition to full competition while not, you know, addressing OEG's concerns and IEU's concerns and OCC's concerns that SSO customers will be further harmed.
- Q. So how about a -- how about a less-pervasive purchase that AEP Ohio would make not, say, from a large energy auction like we're talking about but just a purchased power transaction? Do you follow me?
  - A. I'm not sure what you mean by

"less-pervasive purchase."

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- Q. Well, not as many tranches, a more routine purchased power contract that AEP Ohio purchases energy to support SSO load, that's very common; would you agree?
- A. I don't know if AEP, what -- you know, other than OVEC, I'm not sure what AEP's purchased power contracts are.
- Q. Okay. But if AEP Ohio makes a purchase externally rather than generating its own electricity and recovering fuel costs related to that, is it your understanding they're permitted to recover purchased power costs through the fuel adjustment clause?
- A. If the purchased power is found to be prudent, then AEP should be allowed to recover that.
  - Q. Okay.
- A. So presumably AEP would be purchasing power when the cost is, in fact, less than the variable cost of its own generating units.
- Q. And does that mean that the generating units wouldn't run or they would support any contractual or wholesale obligations that may be out there, or does it just mean that they're not charged to ratepayers because they're not the lowest cost in the stack?

1 Well, it could mean a variety of things. Α. 2 I mean, you don't tag electrons so you can't say that 3 this electron from this plant is serving this 4 customer. It could mean that AEP is using that 5 generation for some other reliability-related 6 purpose; it just depends. 7 Okay. Have you done any financial impact analysis of your proposed credit on AEP Ohio? 8 9 No, I have not. Α. Do you have any idea how much it would 10 Ο. cost? 11 12 No, because I don't know what the auction 13 clearing prices will be. And I don't know what AEP's future FAC will be either. 14 Do you know what the capacity deferral 15 Q. 16 amount is? 17 In total? No. Α. 18 And does -- could your credit actually 19 exceed the amount of the deferral or completely 20 extinguish the deferral under your proposal?

A. I would very much doubt that.

Q. But you'd very much like that, wouldn't you?

A. Would I like that?

Q. Yeah.

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A. What I like or don't want -- like is immaterial.

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- Q. Okay. That's not what your recommendation is all about, reducing the deferral?
- A. My recommendation is not to eliminate the deferral account.
- Q. Okay. Well, it's pretty transparent to me that you linked these two up. Why did you link -- why did you link this energy auction result to eliminating the capacity deferral?
- A. First off, you're mischaracterizing my testimony. I did not say eliminate the capacity deferral anywhere in my testimony.
  - Q. Reducing it or eliminate.
- A. I would reduce the deferral based on this credit because I believe that is an administratively simple approach to address the problem that OEG, IEU, and OCC have raised, that rather than trying to map the credits back to specific SSO customers because whoever -- who is an SSO customer can change over time, in my view establishing this credit would not affect -- would not distort market prices, it would not distort the auction, it would allow for a competitive auction to take place, but it would recognize that if the auction prices are, in fact,

higher than the FAC, that some of that -- that money should go back to benefit customers, and I thought the easiest administrative way to do that is just to credit it against whatever the regulatory asset will be because at this point we don't know how much that regulatory asset will total, we don't know how the Commission will have AEP recover it over what time period.

- Q. Okay. Well, being easy doesn't necessarily mean that it's fair or logical or legal or anything else, does it? Just because it's easy.
- A. Well, I would suggest that AEP Ohio's approach is one of the most convoluted solutions possible, but that's my own opinion.
  - Q. So you're just deflecting --
- A. I think it's logical. I think it's administratively simple, which is important, it is an important consideration when you're doing rate regulation to have something that's understandable, and it's certainly logical and it's appropriate.
- Q. Okay. Well, it would be easy to take a pile of money off of a table that wasn't yours either, but that doesn't make it right, does it?

  MR. PETRICOFF: Objection.

Argumentative.

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EXAMINER PARROT: Sustained.

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- Q. Dr. Lesser, doesn't your credit proposal just transfer money from AEP to auction suppliers?

  Isn't that the net effect?
  - A. No. That's completely wrong.
- Q. The alternative that you're addressing from OEG and IEU is that AEP would continue to serve the energy load at the cost, presumably at or near the cost that it has in the past and would otherwise incur; that's the proposal -- that's the proposal you're addressing with your alternative credit.
  - A. No, you've got that --
- Q. I thought that's what you just stated in your answer.
- A. No, it's not what I just stated,

  Counselor. You're misinterpreting what I said. We haven't -- there is going to be an auction for some of the SSO load, 10 percent, then 60 percent, then 100 percent.

If AEP wins tranches in that auction, it will serve that load at whatever the auction price -- auction clearing price is. That clearing price could be below the FAC, it could be above the FAC, I don't know what the clearing price is going to be. Just like your witness Dr. LaCasse said yesterday, she

didn't know what the clearing price would be.

So I'm not proposing to take money and put it into the hands of auction suppliers; that makes no sense.

- Q. You're advocating that we do the auction, if it produces higher rates, the auction suppliers would have a margin on that or else they wouldn't have bid in voluntarily, and you're saying AEP and any of its affiliates would be obligated, then, to sell all the same power into the market at the same exact price and then disgorge the entire margin for the benefit of retail customers just to be able to offset the higher price that the auction suppliers would be offering through the auction.
- A. I'm not saying -- I'm not suggesting any obligation on AEP's part to sell power into the wholesale market. I'm saying that AEP Ohio would be, under -- I would assume would be receiving additional revenues above its variable costs that would otherwise collect through the FAC if the market price in the auction was higher than the FAC.

Therefore, in my view, it's appropriate to credit back those additional revenues earned by AEP Ohio or its affiliates back to customers.

Q. So your only difference between my

statement and your answer is that you're not obligating AEP to go sell it, but you're assuming that that would happen and you're imputing that margin as a credit to offset the very real costs that are involved with the capacity deferrals, correct?

- A. Only -- there's only an offset if the auction price, clearing price, is greater than the FAC. If the auction price is the same as the FAC or below, there's no credit whatsoever.
- Q. Right. And everything else I said was correct, that's the only thing you wanted to add.
- A. I'm making an assumption that the market price AEP would receive is either the auction price or is a wholesale market price that would be -- approximate that auction clearing price.
- Q. Okay. And if there were no concerns like those that have been raised from OEG and IEU about the potential for the auction clearing price to be above the legacy fuel rate price, you wouldn't even need to go down this road about pursuing the credit, would you?
- A. So you're saying if we somehow knew that the auction price was going to be at or below the FAC price? Yeah, that's correct.
  - Q. No, what I'm asking is, you know, the

Commission chose to order the energy auctions as part of the ESP, correct?

A. That's correct.

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- Q. And is it your recollection that the Commission rejected the notion that there would be any rate impacts related to the auction as a reason not to do the auction?
- A. Well, the Commission has language about rate caps, I believe there's a figure, a 12 percent value that was discussed yesterday.
- Q. Okay. That's not what I'm talking about. Just let me ask you this way: The reason you're doing your credit is to avoid an adverse impact on retail customers of the energy auction, correct?
- A. No. That's not correct. The purpose of the crediting mechanism is -- needs to be considered in the context of full transition to competition. So we have less than 24 months where -- before there's full, complete competition, retail competition.

  That's the ultimate goal that has to be recognized.

What I'm suggesting is that in this transition we want to preserve the auction because that's part of the transition to competition, but at the same time I'm trying to recognize that, well, because of the auction customers may be further

impacted, SSO customers may be further affected by higher prices than they would otherwise pay if there was no auction and were just paying the FAC.

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So if the -- if the SSO rate was the traditional, you know, we're paying embedded capacity and we're paying the variable costs under, say that's the old brick cost-of-service method, because the auction could result in higher prices, here's a way to provide some protection down the road to customers without skewing the resulting market prices, without damaging the auction or preventing the auction from being cleared, and getting us to that transition.

- Q. Thank you. You say the things I say more eloquently with more words but I think we're agreeing on some things.
  - A. I get paid by the word, Counselor.
- Q. Okay. Let me actually change topics here and ask you to turn to pages 24 and 25 of your testimony, the, I guess the final topic you address here regarding the FAC fixed-cost rider and the demand charge recovery. Are you there?
  - A. I'm there.
  - Q. Okay.

MR. PETRICOFF: I'm sorry, Counselor, what page was that?

MR. NOURSE: 24 and 25, it's Roman numeral IV.

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- Q. Okay. So you're basically saying for the last five months of the ESP, the January through
  May 2015 period, that you don't believe the fixed or nonenergy component of the FAC should be recovered?
- A. There should be no FAC starting -- fixed or variable starting January 1st, 2015, because 100 percent of the power will be supplied by auction and the Commission set the price at 188, so all -- everyone who's supplying power in the auction will be supplied by capacity by AEP during that five-month period at the 188 price.

So the Commission set the price, there's no other additional cost to recover.

- Q. Well, there will be an FAC at a minimum for over/underrecoveries during that period; is that correct?
- A. If we ignore that the complexities of the administrative portion, if, for example, it had fully recovered exactly, then there would be no FAC, but you're absolutely right, there is -- there could be an administrative, you know, essentially balancing the remainder out.
  - Q. Okay. But to clarify, your point here in

Roman numeral IV relates to January through May 2015 period, you're not advocating that prior to January 2015 the company should not be permitted to recover its demand charges in the FAC, are you?

A. Unless it's found that the company's proposal to split up the FAC into that fixed component is, in fact, double recovering capacity that's already included in the base generation rate, if that's the case, then yes, I would oppose that, but I have no evidence of that.

So assuming that the existing FAC is just split off into fixed and variable components that the company would otherwise recover, then that's fine.

MR. NOURSE: Thank you, Dr. Lesser.

That's all I have.

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EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Reilly.

MR. REILLY: We have nothing, your Honor.

EXAMINER PARROT: Any redirect,

Mr. Petricoff?

MR. PETRICOFF: Could I have a couple minutes first?

EXAMINER PARROT: You may. Actually, let's go off the record and we'll take a five-minute break.

(Recess taken.)

EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the record.

3 Any redirect?

MR. PETRICOFF: Yes, your Honor. I have a couple of questions.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

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By Mr. Petricoff:

- Q. Dr. Lesser, earlier today Mr. Nourse asked you questions concerning your opinion of the Commission's order as it applies to capacity in the docket 10-2929 and the docket 11-346 cases. Were the answers you'd given your personal answers or the opinions of the Exelon Generation Company, Constellation NewEnergy Corporation?
  - A. Those were just my personal views.
- Q. And do you happen to know whether Exelon Generation and Constellation NewEnergy have appealed the capacity decisions in 10 --
  - A. I don't believe they have.
- Q. Also, Mr. Nourse asked you some questions concerning the 10-2929 opinion and I think that was -- gave you AEP Exhibit 4. Do you still have that with you?
  - A. I do.

- Q. Does AEP Exhibit 4, the 10-2929 opinion, address the capacity or rates for nonshopping customers?
- A. No. It was solely focused on shopping -- or, shopping customers.
- Q. Did it address having a capacity -- I'm sorry, a fuel adjustment or energy auction for SSO customers?
- A. No, it came out, gosh, six months before the orders on -- for auctions started coming out.
- Q. In fact, let's get that date specifically on the record, if you have it in front of you. Do you see what the date was for the 10-2929 decision you were referring to?
- A. Yes. It says it was dated July 2nd, 2012.
- Q. Okay. And do you still have with you AEP Exhibit No. 3?
  - A. I do.

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- Q. And what's the date of that opinion?
- A. That's dated January 30th, 2013. So approximately seven months later.
- Q. In your opinion, did the 10-2929 case foresee an energy auction and prescribe how it should be priced?

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1
             Α.
                  No, not at all.
                   MR. PETRICOFF: No further questions,
 2
 3
      thank you.
 4
                   EXAMINER PARROT: Any recross, Mr. Lang?
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                   MR. LANG: No, your Honor.
                   EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Kurtz, Ms. Grady,
 6
 7
      Mr. Pritchard?
                  MR. PRITCHARD: None.
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 9
                   EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Nourse?
10
                   MR. NOURSE: No, thank you.
                   EXAMINER PARROT: You're excused. Thank
11
12
      you, Dr. Lesser.
13
                   Mr. Petricoff.
                   MR. PETRICOFF: Yes, your Honor, at this
14
      time we would like to move for admission of Exelon
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16
      Exhibit No. 1 and I assume there's no reason to move
17
      for 1A.
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                   EXAMINER PARROT: Well.
                   MR. PETRICOFF: Well, go ahead, let's put
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20
      them both in.
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                   EXAMINER PARROT: Okay. Any objections
22
      to the admission of either Exelon Exhibit 1 or 1A?
23
                   MR. NOURSE: No.
24
                   EXAMINER PARROT: Hearing none, Exelon
25
      Exhibits 1 and 1A are admitted.
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1 (EXHIBITS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.)

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EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Nourse, with respect to your exhibits, I don't believe they are Commission orders, I don't believe it's necessary to move them into the record. They are Commission orders and stand for themselves. I believe it would be appropriate to mark them for purposes of --

MR. NOURSE: They were mainly for purposes of cross-examination.

EXAMINER PARROT: Exactly.

MR. NOURSE: How about if we take administrative notice of them.

EXAMINER PARROT: We can do that.

MR. NOURSE: If we're going to do that I guess it probably makes sense to, because we're going to also talk about it with the next witness, take administrative notice of the opinion and order in the ESP as well as the entry on rehearing in the 10-2929 case, so that it rounds it out. The entry on rehearing in the 10-2929 case I'm talking about the October 17th, 2012, entry on rehearing. Thank you, your Honor.

EXAMINER PARROT: Okay. That's fine.

Anything further from Mr. Petricoff?

MR. PETRICOFF: No, your Honor.

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313 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Lang? 1 2 MR. LANG: Thank you, your Honor. 3 FirstEnergy Solutions would call Sharon Noewer. 4 EXAMINER TAUBER: Ms. Noewer, please 5 raise your right hand. (Witness sworn.) 6 7 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. 8 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 9 MR. LANG: And, your Honor, if I could 10 approach, we do have premarked copies of her testimony --11 12 EXAMINER TAUBER: You may. 13 MR. LANG: -- with the changes discussed 14 yesterday morning. 15 16 SHARON I. NOEWER 17 being first duly sworn, as prescribed by law, was examined and testified as follows: 18 DIRECT EXAMINATION 19 20 By Mr. Lang: 2.1 Ms. Noewer, can you introduce yourself, Ο. 22 please? Yes. My name is Sharon Noewer, I'm the 23 Α. 24 Director of Competitive Market Policies for 25 FirstEnergy Solutions.

MR. LANG: Your Honors, we'd like to mark Ms. Noewer's prefiled testimony and we'll indicate the changes to it as FES Exhibit 7, please. EXAMINER TAUBER: So marked.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

- Ms. Noewer, do you have before you what's been marked as FES Exhibit No. 7 as your prefiled testimony?
  - Yes, I do. Α.

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- Q. Was this prepared by you or under your supervision?
  - Α. Yes, it was.
- And as was discussed yesterday, there were some changes and deletions from your testimony that resulted from discussions with AEP. Could you cover those again so that it's clear in the record, please.
- Sure. Turning to page 1 starting with Α. line 14 through the end of line 16, that should be stricken.
- Going to page 3, line 17, the fourth -the fifth word in, "four" should be changed to the word "three."
- Line 23 on that page right before the number 3 should be inserted the word "and."

On the top of page 4 beginning at the end of line 1 there should be a period after the word "rates." And the whole rest of that sentence including the "and," all of line 2, and line 3 through the end of the sentence with the word "auction" should be deleted.

Turning to page 13 starting at line 10 through line 22, that should be deleted. All of page 14 would be deleted. And then page 15, line 1 through the end of line 12 should be deleted.

- Q. Thank you. And would you have any other corrections to make to your testimony?
- A. I have one typographical error that I wanted to correct on page 11, line 20. It now reads "The FCR and APR should rejected," and I want to inserted the word "be" between "should" and "rejected" so it will read "should be rejected."
- Q. If I were to ask you the questions in your testimony with the modifications that you've just stated, would you provide the same answers?
  - A. Yes.

MR. LANG: Your Honors, the witness is available.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

Mr. Petricoff?

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1	MR. PETRICOFF: No questions, your Honor.
2	EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Kurtz?
3	MR. KURTZ: Just a couple.
4	
5	CROSS-EXAMINATION
6	By Mr. Kurtz:
7	Q. Good morning.
8	A. Good morning.
9	Q. Would you characterize your proposal
10	similar to the blending envisioned through the MRO
11	process?
12	A. I would say it's similar to that, yes.
13	Q. How so?
14	A. Well, when you have an MRO, what you're
15	doing is blending in percentage that you get in an
16	auction that's usually energy and capacity with the
17	existing rates if it's a partial auction.
18	Q. So the main difference would be that with
19	an MRO blending you would blend in actual market
20	capacity rates whereas you're proposing to blend in
21	what is higher than market, the 188 for capacity.
22	A. That's correct, as the Commission
23	determined.
24	Q. Right. So an MRO blending would be
25	better for consumers, all else equal, than your

317 1 proposal, would you agree? 2 I don't know what "all else equal" means, 3 Mr. Kurtz, but I do agree that the 188 is above 4 market capacity, yes. 5 But your proposal is, well, for consumers who -- you would agree that your proposal is better 6 for consumers than AEP's proposal for nonshopping 7 8 consumers. 9 Α. Yes. 10 Q. Okay. MR. KURTZ: Thank you. Those are all my 11 12 questions. 13 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. 14 Ms. Grady? MS. GRADY: No questions, your Honor. 15 16 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Pritchard? MR. PRITCHARD: No questions, your Honor. 17 18 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Nourse? 19 MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor. 2.0 21 CROSS-EXAMINATION 22 By Mr. Nourse:

- Q. Good morning, Ms. Noewer.
- 24 A. Good morning.

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Q. I want to first talk about FES's interest

in this case and positions overall. So does FES have an interest in AEP Ohio's bypassable rates going up or going down?

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A. Well, FES's interest is making sure that the AEP rates transition to market, whether that's up or down, and FES is both a retail supplier and a wholesale supplier, so we also have an interest in this case in understanding what AEP will be translating the auction results into retail rates so that consumers, when they look at AEP's rates and they make their shopping decisions, they can have a good understanding of what that is and we can help them with that.

In terms of the wholesale side, what we're interested in in this case is understanding what the competitive bid process itself will look like to make sure that it's fair and nondiscriminatory so we can participate in that.

Our other interest in this case in our blending proposal, which we think is the most reasonable, is that customers have the opportunity to take advantage of market-based pricing and whether that is, you know, higher or lower or bypassable in this case is -- our interest is moving to market.

Q. So is your third point there -- you

mentioned retail, you mentioned wholesale, and then you mentioned AEP Ohio customers, is that third point, is that something different than your wholesale and retail interests, you're just looking out for our customers' interests independent of FES's?

A. I think it's all related because when I think about the competitive marketplace, to the extent that the auctions don't get blended in accordance with FES's proposal and the Commission's decision is my fair reading of what's in those orders, then customers might in the end pay more or the auctions might fail because they pay more because the blending isn't done properly.

I think that gives customers, then, a sour taste about the competitive market, so in that case I really do believe that customers' view of the competitive market are inextricably linked to FES as a wholesale and retail provider.

And, in addition to that, I mean, you know, in parts the competitive market -- if AEP's proposal is accepted in this case, it would have an additional, at least in my illustrative example, roughly \$180 million in a subsidy that other market participants don't get, so -- like FES. So we have a

number of interests in this case and they're all linked together in terms of pursuing a viable and robust competitive market.

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- Q. All right. So breaking it down with the retail interest, you're indifferent as to whether the price to compare goes down or up as long as there's good competition; is that your answer?
- A. I'm interested in having the price to compare reflect market as indicated in our proposal.
- Q. In FES's financial interests it's okay if AEP Ohio's price to compare goes down, you're indifferent to that, is that what you're saying?
- A. No, I said that overall in my view there's many more reasons to consider for FES's interests than just the price to compare. Notably the ones I raised about the additional subsidy that I think has broader implications than your narrow question to me on just the price to compare.
- Q. So on the wholesale side would you say that FES would be more interested in bringing in a lower clearing price in order to facilitate competition or would it be more interested in getting a higher auction clearing price?
- A. We're interested in the market working, whatever that means, because any time you use the

word "higher" or lower," you're comparing it to something, and in this case and in every case what we're interested in is moving the market, whatever that means, higher or lower.

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- Q. And is it your general understanding that the -- between the capacity decision and the ESP decision for AEP Ohio the Commission has adopted a plan to move AEP Ohio fully to market?
- A. I think the Commission has set forth in their ESP a plan to move AEP to market.
  - Q. Do you agree with that plan?
- A. I think that as we both know those issues were really litigated quite extensively and that some are also on appeal, so I can't say that I fully agree with the Commission's plan. What my proposal in this case does is implement what I believe is a fair reading of the Commission's orders in this case on how to transition the auctions to market. And I think it actually has the plan that adheres to the Commission's orders and interested individuals in this case, which is moving towards a market-based system.
- Q. Okay. We'll get to your reading of the Commission order shortly, but are you implementing the plan that the Commission's adopted or are you

trying to add to the plan?

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- A. I'm implementing the plan.
- Q. And you're not trying to add to it?
- A. No, I don't believe I'm trying to add to it. My reading of the Commission's orders, I've set forth what I believe is FES's proposal, the most reasonable proposal, to implement the Commission's orders.
- Q. Okay. Now, you're recommending a lower base G and a reduction to the fixed costs currently recovered through the FAC, correct?
- A. What I'm recommending is a blending of the auction, so you have a 10 percent energy auction, and as AEP Ohio recognizes, there's two pieces to generation service, there's energy and then there's the capacity to support that auction. So that's been recognized in the case.

And what I'm suggesting is that all of that ought to be blended in per the Commission's order with the base generation rates and the fixed -- and all of the FAC.

Q. Okay. But what I'm getting at is, just a background question, so your recommendation to reduce the FAC, to reduce base G, would you agree that both of those have the impact of lowering the price to

compare for AEP Ohio?

- A. When you say "reducing," what, again, I'm referring to is the blending in of the 10 percent as indicated by the Commission's order, but I do think the effect of the blend will be to reduce the price to compare.
- Q. And the FAC is the other part of my question.
  - A. I thought I addressed both of those.
- Q. Both of your recommendations reduce the price to compare; is that correct?
- A. Well, I won't know what the -- there's two pieces to the FAC, the FCR, the fixed cost component; my recommendation is to blend that down as a part of the FAC. The variable portion, I don't know what the auction clearing price will be for energy so I can't really say what will happen with that piece.
- Q. But you're reducing what it otherwise would have been if both components were in, correct?
- A. I'm reducing for the base generation replacing the 10 percent with the Commission-ordered 188.88 per megawatt-day which would reduce the base generation rate, it would keep the base generation rate for the nonauction portion frozen, but it would

blend in the 10 percent. And then for the FCR, which is the fixed portion of the FAC, it would as well blend in 10 percent.

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- Q. Right. So both of your recommendations would reduce the price to compare, correct?
- A. I have more recommendations than that, which is why I keep going back to this, but for those pieces, yes, the piece that I do not know is that the variable portion of the FAC will have the auction results blended there. Since I don't know what the auction results will be, I don't know if that piece will be higher or lower.
- Q. Okay. Now, you've been with FES since 1998; is that correct?
- A. I started with FES, at that time it was known as FirstEnergy Services, then it became FirstEnergy Solutions, but I've been with that general entity that entire time, yes.
- Q. Okay. And what did FES do before it received the legacy generation assets from FirstEnergy utilities?
  - A. Before 1998?
- Q. No. All right, let me back up. When did FES receive the generation -- legacy generation assets from the FE utilities?

- A. I'm not sure of the exact date.
- Q. Well, it was after 1998, wasn't it?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. So what did FES do between '98 and whenever it was they received the legacy assets?
- A. What do you mean, what did we do? I'm confused.
- Q. What was FES's business? What was its role within FirstEnergy?
- A. We were a retail provider, CRES provider, in Ohio and Pennsylvania.
  - Q. Okay. Thank you.

So do you in your position advise folks within the FES organization that are involved with marketing and sales to retail customers?

A. I don't advise them in their business practices. I'm not a part of the retail group. I do work with them if there are questions about policies at the regulatory level that they need to be aware of.

For example, Ohio now has this retail markets investigation, so we work with the retail group to understand if there are some rules or practices or standards that are confusing that we as a group then would need to know what those were and

would take those to the workshop so that we could incorporate it. But I don't advise them about their business.

- Q. So you work with competitive policy issues in the regulatory arena; is that accurate?
- A. Regulatory arena and then also the FERC and RTOs are part of my responsibility.
- Q. Okay. Are you involved with things like the Commission investigation involving renewable energy credits for FirstEnergy?
  - A. For FirstEnergy, no.

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- Q. And FES's involvement in that docket.
- A. I don't know that we're an intervenor in that docket or that we're a party to that case.
  - Q. Do you know what case I'm talking about?
- A. I think I do. It was in the news the last couple of days, if that's the one you're referring to.
- Q. What was the news item you were referring to?
- A. There was -- I don't know the details but I recall the news item I read was that there was a request, it may actually have been by Ohio Power, to participate in that case that I had thought was already concluded, but I'm not that close to the

details.

- Q. Okay. Now, you mentioned part of your answer earlier about FES's interest in this case, you mentioned the wholesale aspect of the business, correct?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And I believe you stated, you can correct me if I'm summarizing this wrong, but you're looking out to make sure that AEP, the GenCo as AEP Ohio does generation divestiture, that there's no unfair subsidies or anticompetitive impacts; is that fair?
  - A. Could you repeat that question?
- Q. Okay. Why don't you remind me of what you said earlier about FES's wholesale interest in this case.
- A. Okay. Well, really there are two. The first is that in this case, which is the CBP process, we're interested in making sure that the auctions are conducted in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner so that we can be a participant. We have a good understanding of what the details of those are.

And the other thing that I mentioned was that in this case, if you look at my example that I have attached to my testimony, if, in fact, the AEP proposal is accepted by the Commission, then they

would be receiving roughly, there's a lot of assumptions in there, it's illustrative, but \$180 million in additional that the Commission did not authorize which is a subsidy which other competitors in the market like FES, not just as a wholesale supplier but also a retail supplier, don't have.

- Q. Okay. And since you mentioned that exhibit let's talk about that a little bit. You're talking about Attachment 2?
  - A. The calculation is on Attachment 2.
- Q. Okay. The bottom line grand total there under your analysis is 180 million, approximately?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And that's the amount which you're claiming in your prior answer would be unfair to receive by AEP or its affiliates, correct?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And that would also be the same kind of estimate of the financial impact on AEP Ohio of your recommendations, correct?
- A. Compared to what it has proposed in this case, not compared to what I believe the Commission ordered.
  - Q. Right. So compared to the company's

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position and yours, the impact would be approximately \$180 million according to your estimate.

A. Yes.

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- Q. Okay. Now, you mentioned the wholesale interest about avoiding this flow of \$180 million which you believe is inappropriate, and you indicated that FES had not had any kind of a similar advantage. Now, you were with FES during the 2006 through 2008 period I gather?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And so is it your recollection that FES, during a transition to competition for FirstEnergy, had served the SSO load and collected all of the retail SSO revenues that the FirstEnergy utilities collected and were passed through? Is that true?
- A. I don't think I understand what you just said.
- Q. Okay. Let me break it down. So during 2006 through 2008, which in Ohio we affectionately refer to as the "rate stabilization period"; are you familiar with that?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And so during that period is it your understanding that FirstEnergy Solutions had a FERC-approved contract to get -- supply the capacity

and energy for the entire SSO load in exchange for which they got to receive a pass-through of the FirstEnergy utilities' SSO revenue? Is that accurate?

- A. During that period I was in the retail group; I don't know what was going on in the wholesale side of the business during that time. I think in this case what I'm referring to is what the implementation of the Commission's order in this case and the \$180 million represents what I believe the Commission has ordered and doesn't have anything to do, in my view, with past history.
- Q. I understand we disagree on that point, Ms. Noewer.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I'd like to mark as the next AEP Ohio exhibit a document which would be, I believe it's No. 5.

EXAMINER TAUBER: You're up to 5. The exhibit is so marked.

MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor. (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

- Q. Ms. Noewer, do you have the document marked AEP Ohio Exhibit 5?
- A. Yes.

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Q. And would you agree this is a contract,

an electric power supply agreement between

FirstEnergy Solutions, seller, and FirstEnergy

Operating Companies, buyer?

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- A. I have never seen this before. That's what the title is.
- Q. Okay. And if you turn to page 2 under the term, part A, does that indicate that the term is 2006 through 2008?

MR. LANG: Your Honor, at this time I would object on several bases; number one, with respect to this document she hasn't -- she stated she's never seen it before, she's not a witness in the position to authenticate the document, and more generally, we're going down a road which is irrelevant to the issues presented in this case. Your Honor had in the entry of May 23rd identified specific issues in this case that deal with the implementation of Commission orders for AEP.

This, the supply agreement, if this is the supply agreement between FES and the FE utilities, doesn't have anything to do with that.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, the fact that she's not seen it, it doesn't matter. That's why I asked her first if she was aware of that arrangement; she wasn't, so that's why I'm using it to have the

discussion.

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As far as the relevance, yes, she in her testimony, and again just verified on the stand, that she's making an allegation that it would be unfair for AEP Ohio to receive SSO revenue -- excuse me, for the AEP GenCo to get pass-through revenue as a part of the Commission-approved order, so I think it's certainly fair to remind her, if she really didn't already know, that this situation existed for FirstEnergy.

I don't think there's any -- I don't think counsel for FES could contest the authenticity of these documents. I've got a FERC order as well that we can try out, if we need to, that verifies the same thing.

MR. LANG: And again, your Honor, his argument is she's not familiar with this transaction so he's trying to use a document that she's not familiar with to further examine the transaction.

But, you know, in the larger picture this doesn't have anything to do with this case, it doesn't have anything to do with an auction process, and the transition from rates using auction process to market.

EXAMINER TAUBER: At this time I think

the witness opened the door by testifying towards the competitive process in the markets, however, we are in kind of a gray area right now, we'll see where you're going, Mr. Nourse, with this, and I assume this is going toward retail rate prices.

MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor. I've only got a couple quick questions on this. The first was the term of 2006 through 2008.

Q. (By Mr. Nourse) Do you see that, Ms. Noewer, page 2, paragraph 1A?

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- A. I see that it says "...shall begin on January 1st, 2006, or such later effective date authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and unless terminated by mutual agreement of the Parties shall remain in effect until December 31st, 2008."
- Q. Okay. And if you turn to page 4, paragraph 4A, can you refer to that.
  - A. Yes, I see it.
- Q. Okay. And is it true and accurate that the first sentence indicates that the FirstEnergy utilities will pay FirstEnergy Solutions an amount up to, but not exceeding, the amount of money that buyer, which is FirstEnergy utilities, bills its retail customers taking capacity and energy from

FirstEnergy utilities as the generation charge, fuel cost adder, and rate stabilization charge under the buyer's retail tariffs and special contracts approved by the PUCO?

A. You read that correctly. You inserted a couple words differently explaining who the buyer and seller were.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Yes.

- A. But generally.
- Q. So were you with FirstEnergy Solutions during the 2006 through 2008 period?
  - A. Yes.

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- Q. In what capacity?
- A. I was in the retail group in sales and marketing.
- Q. Okay. So you shifted back and forth between retail and regulatory policy through your tenure at FES?
- A. There really wasn't a competitive market policy group at FES until 2011. It was a newly formed group. We had in prior periods, you know, still tracked regulatory activities in the retail group and in another area.
  - Q. Okay. Thank you.

    And, Ms. Noewer, are you aware of the

stranded cost recovery that the FirstEnergy utilities received following the enactment of Senate Bill 3 in 1999 in Ohio?

- A. Not specifically.
- Q. I'm not sure what you mean by that, but are you aware that FirstEnergy utilities received approximately \$6 billion from ratepayers to write down the generation assets that FES owns today?

MR. LANG: Further objection on the basis of relevance and mischaracterization.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Nourse.

MR. NOURSE: Again, your Honor, she raised the issue of unfair receipt of ratepayer money and unfair competitive advantage merely by getting the revenues passed through that the Commission already approved in the ESP order, and so I think it's fair game to simply point out that FirstEnergy Solutions, what they've received in a similar context.

MS. GRADY: Your Honor, we would join in that objection. I think we're getting way far afield, we're talking about retail rates in competitive auction specifically related to AEP Ohio, not FirstEnergy.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, to talk about

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what's fair you have to talk about an equal treatment, you have to talk about both sides of the equation, and, again, this is not -- this is a background point which she should already be aware of and be able to acknowledge so that we can move on.

EXAMINER TAUBER: At this point I think the way the question was worded it was directed outside the scope of this hearing. Perhaps you can rephrase based on the explanation you just provided, Mr. Nourse.

MR. NOURSE: Sure.

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Q. (By Mr. Nourse) So, Ms. Noewer, are you aware that the FirstEnergy utilities received approximately \$6 billion relating to the generation assets that FES now owns today?

MR. LANG: Further objection, again.

Again, it's a mischaracterization. There was a write-down, but it's a gross mischaracterization with regard to the assets of the -- what at the time were the FE utilities many years ago. And, again, it's outside the scope of this hearing.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I think it's a simple question, you know, we're all talking about regulatory fairness and part of the regulatory history in Ohio is Senate Bill 3 and part of the path

to competition that Ms. Noewer's trying to address and argue for equal footing on has to be -- has to be discussed in that context. It's only fair. You can't just look at AEP Ohio with blinders on and ignore what happened in the other utilities in Ohio.

EXAMINER TAUBER: I'm going to allow this question.

Do you need it read back?

THE WITNESS: Yes, please.

(Record read.)

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THE WITNESS: Could you read it again just a little slower.

(Record read.)

- A. I don't know the details of those cases enough to know whether that's a correct statement or not. I don't know.
- Q. And is it the dollar amount that you don't know or is it the general idea that there was a write-down or a reduction in the net book value of the generation assets; which part?
- A. It was actually more than that. I don't know the amount. I don't know what the reduction in the net book, if there was one, that occurred. And I don't know -- specifically you asked about whether or not they were the same assets, and I don't know that.

So those are three of the things that I don't know.

Along with I don't know what the details of the cases
were.

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- Q. So are you the ranking regulatory officer within FES or do you report to somebody else in the regulatory side of FES?
- A. I do have a Vice President of Strategy and Planning that is my boss that has regulatory as part of her responsibilities.
- Q. But you're the highest person that has regulatory responsibility alone?
- A. My area of concentration is regulatory. I would not go so far as to say I have regulatory without my vice president and president included in that.
- Q. Okay. Let me ask you to assume for the next couple questions that FirstEnergy Solutions -- well, let me back up.

So the generation assets that FES owns today, are you unsure whether they used to be owned by the FirstEnergy utilities?

A. Yes. Absolutely. I mean, I've been through four mergers, I don't know what assets were part of that or not part of that, bought/sold since then, I really don't know.

Q. Okay. I understand they may hold additional or other generation assets, but is it your understanding that a portion of the fleet that FES owns came from the FirstEnergy utilities?

- A. I don't specifically know. I assume that there are some.
  - Q. Okay. Let me change topics.

With respect to auction design and the issues that you're addressing in your testimony that do not relate to the retail rate issues, for example, I guess since you eliminated Roman numeral V in your table of contents, Roman numeral VI falls in that category I believe; is that correct?

- A. It falls in what category?
- Q. Relating to auction design and wholesale procurement in a competitive bidding process.
  - A. Yes, I think all of this does, yes.
- Q. Okay. So do you have any formal training or experience with conducting either energy auctions or any wholesale power auction?
- A. I have not conducted any wholesale power auctions. I have been involved in retail power auctions with customers when I was in the retail group. I also have all of my years of experience at FES. We've participated in many auctions, so I have

a good understanding of what the auction process is.

I've testified in Pennsylvania in two cases, default service cases, where I dealt with auction issues as well as in Ohio here in the Dayton Power & Light case we dealt with auction issues as well and I was a witness. So I'm very familiar with it.

- Q. So you've never designed or conducted an auction, either an energy auction or a wholesale power auction?
- A. I think I said I've never designed an auction but I certainly have provided input onto the structure of an auction that makes sense, and I have implemented a retail auction and participated in one with customers.
- Q. And you say you provided input into the structure of an auction, what is that referring to?

  Comments in a docket somewhere or --
  - A. Comments or testifying on behalf of FES.
- Q. Okay. Now let's get to the ESP orders; you mentioned several times your understanding of the ESP orders. And I guess a place to start is your question and answer line 19 on page 6 that carries over to the top part of page 7. Do you see that?
  - A. Yes.

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Q. Okay. So it's your -- it's your understanding, interpretation, of the ESP orders that AEP Ohio is required to reduce its base generation rate prior to January 1st, 2015, correct?

A. The way I would characterize it is I believe that it's the Commission's order that it blend its base generation rate with the auction so that the 188.88 for capacity which is required to support the 10 percent auction and the Commission determined that the 188.88 per megawatt-day is AEP's cost of capacity and you need capacity to support the auction, so the only question is, then, how do you blend that in.

And so you blend it in with the base generation rate and you blend that with the FAC as well, and that's what FES's proposal is.

Q. We're probably going to be here all day if we can't do simple, direct questions and answers and if you want to repeat your general position every time I ask you a specific question. So let me ask you to try to do that so we can move forward.

MR. LANG: Objection to the argument provided by counsel. If he can ask his next question.

Q. So, Ms. Noewer, you stated a couple

concepts there that you're saying that you think your particular form of blending is required under the Commission's orders. Can you point to me anywhere in the orders that talk about this blending that you've laid out in your testimony?

- A. I lay it out in my testimony the different cites where I refer to the Commission's order, so if you look at page 7, the top of page 7, AEP Ohio's request to continue to freeze base generation rates through the auction process is inappropriate and should be rejected. So that was one of the places that I refer to here that's in the Commission's order.
- Q. Okay, let's take that one individually since -- and my question was whether there's something in the Commission orders that endorses a requirement to blend generation, base generation rates, and so you're saying that the holding that you're quoting on page 36 and 37 of the entry on rehearing in your mind requires the blending that you've laid out in your testimony.
- A. I think it holds to the blending in AEP-Ohio's request to freeze base generation and in the section of the Commission's order where it talks about the auction it refers to these paragraphs, and

so yes, I do believe that the Commission is -- what the Commission's objectives are in this case, their goals and objectives --

Q. Okay.

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- A. -- our blending proposal fits with that.
- Q. Okay. Well, that might be a different statement than what you made, but I'm asking you whether the order itself supports your base G blending. So you're --
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Let's take this item that you cited here from page 37 of the entry on rehearing. So the statement is "AEP Ohio's request to continue to freeze base rates through the auction process." Now, do you know what AEP Ohio's request was being addressed as part of this particular passage in the order?
- A. Yeah, I do believe that AEP Ohio was requesting some clarification related to a portion of the ESP, and the Commission did not limit its finding to that. It talked about through the auction process and "auction's" plural.
- Q. Yeah, so AEP Ohio, to your understanding, was asking that the base G be frozen for the entire ESP term; is that correct?

- A. I don't think that's what I said.
- Q. Well, I didn't say you said that. But I'm asking you if that's your understanding of the request that was being addressed in this passage.
- A. I was just reading what the Commission's order said that they find that AEP Ohio's request to continue to freeze through the auction process is inappropriate and should be rejected.
- Q. Okay. Do you think when interpreting

  Commission orders language should be read in context

  or out of context?
- A. In general I would think in context, which is really an issue that I have with AEP's proposal is I think that these particular sections, which I cite, which really are the basis for the blending proposal that I've proposed, are ignored.
- Q. Okay. Well, you can state that, and you've stated that several times, but I'm asking you to go beyond that and actually look at the interpretation you're advocating here and that you've opened up through these selective quotations --

MR. LANG: Your Honor, again, Mr. Nourse likes to talk in between questions, state his own arguments. I would object to his argumentative approach to the witness. If he could ask a

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question --

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2 EXAMINER TAUBER: I will sustain.

MR. LANG: -- I think that would be the best approach.

EXAMINER TAUBER: I will sustain the objection.

Mr. Nourse.

MR. NOURSE: Okay.

- Q. So my question was do you know what the AEP Ohio request was that this passage is addressing, specifically what did the company ask for?
- A. I remember reading it. I don't remember exactly at this point.
  - Q. Okay.
- A. I do know, however, the finding referred to the entire term regardless of what AEP was asking.
- Q. So if the Commission rejected the notion of freezing base G for the entire ESP term, how does that translate into the blending that you're advocating to fluctuate with each of the energy auctions that were required?
- A. The portion of the order that this is addressed in was referring to the energy auctions, so when the request was to freeze the base generation, which, in fact, in my proposal I do freeze the

nonauction portion of the base generation rates, it's only blending in the auction results and the 188.88 that goes along with the auction percentage blend. So that's what my proposal does. So it's a freeze and blend.

- Q. Okay. Well, you stated that you think that there needs to be capacity that supports the energy auction and now you're talking about the capacity that goes along with the auction percentage blend, and what I'm asking you is where does that concept come from? The Commission ordered energy-only auctions, correct?
- A. They did indicate energy-only auctions, but AEP Ohio as well in the ESP case supported and understood and presented the fact that the energy-only auctions need capacity support with them, and that was discussed yesterday --
  - Q. Okay.

- A. -- with Mr. Roush.
- Q. Well, I'll let the record stand on that point, but let me ask you your understanding. What does an energy auction mean to you? What does that mean?
- A. Well, it's clear that the energy-only auction that they're procuring, AEP is procuring in

this case is for energy, but that doesn't dispute the fact that when you have an energy auction, it requires capacity support, and it's in keeping with the Commission's order as well as what their goals and objectives are for customers to be able to take advantage of market-based rates.

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It would not have expanded the auctions to 10 and 60 percent without expecting that customers would be able to take advantage of market-based pricing for that entire time.

- Q. Okay. Well, again, that's your opinion, but what I was asking you about was the energy auction, not the rest of that. So, Ms. Noewer, didn't AEP Ohio already have the obligation to provide capacity and to provide default generation service to anyone who doesn't shop in their territory?
- A. They do have the FRR responsibility to provide the capacity support. What I'm referring to is that the exhibits that were introduced yesterday with Mr. Roush clearly indicate that for the energy auction that they would provide capacity support, at that point it was at 255, and in this case the Commission determined that that price should be 188. So AEP's cost of capacity for auction should be 188.

Their cost of capacity, period.

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- Q. Yeah, so the 255, the component of the ESP application that AEP Ohio offered for \$255 per megawatt-day capacity support but was referred to as a discount in the testimony, based on the company's position that cost was higher, correct?
- A. I don't know exactly how it was characterized. It probably was as a discount to the 355, but the 355 was what Witness Pearce said was AEP's cost of capacity which, again, Witness Smith from the staff generally agreed with the same amount except he had a few changes to that, and it was from there, then, the Commission applied the energy credit and came up with 188. So the Commission has determined that the price of capacity is 188 for AEP, period.
- Q. Okay. Well, that determination was for shopping capacity, correct?
- A. No. I think in the 10-2929 it was for the state compensation mechanism but it said in that order that they would refer to the 11-346 for incorporation of that order into whatever decisions were made there, and it's clear on the entry on rehearings, and I do quote some different portions of the order as well, that -- where AEP actually

requested of the Commission to confirm that the state compensation mechanism was only for shopping customers, and the Commission denied that request.

And that's in my testimony.

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- Q. Okay. Let's go back to the 255, which is what I was asking you about. You referred to the 255 as a connection with your blending and why you're connecting that with an energy auction, correct?
- A. I'm not referring specifically to the 255 as the connection, I'm referring to the discovery as well as Powers' testimony that offers and recognizes that there would be capacity support for the auction.
- Q. Well, I'm not going to -- okay, I'm not going to argue about what his testimony was, it's already been taken administrative notice, we'll argue about that later, but all I'm asking you is about the 255. Was that an offer by the company as part of the total package in the ESP filing that was not accepted, by the way, but also was only for the term of January through May 2015? That's your recollection.
- A. I do recall that the 5 percent auction was not accepted by the Commission and that they did expand it to the 10 percent and 60 percent auctions.
  - Q. But I'm asking you about the 255

capacity -- what we call the discounted capacity support for SSO service during the period of the 100 percent auction from May to -- from January to May 2015. Is that your recollection of what the 255 number came from?

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- A. I don't recall that specific time period.

  I think regardless of what that was, it was an energy-only auction and the point is that AEP recognized that there needed to be support for that.
- Q. Okay. Well, you're saying because there were two components in the ESP plan that relate to the same period of time, January through May 2015, you're saying that's a recognition by AEP that there needs to be support for the energy auction? Is that what your testimony is?
- A. I'm not sure how you characterized that so I'll repeat it in my words. I think in my view the discovery and Powers' testimony indicated and recognized the fact that when there's an energy-only auction, that AEP recognized that it needed capacity support, and once you -- once you admit and recognize that an auction needs capacity support, the only question left is at what price.

And in the Commission's order they have set forth that AEP's cost of capacity is 188, so

that's how I get to the 188 per megawatt-day, and that's what's set forth in my testimony.

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Q. Okay. Well, that's fine. We'll move on.
I think we disagree but I appreciate your
explanation.

So going back to your interpretation of the order somehow supporting your blending proposal, I'd like to ask you about the frozen base G concept that's in the ESP orders. Do you recall that frozen base G component of the ESP was something that the Commission discussed in various places in the ESP orders?

A. I do recall that the Commission did discuss frozen base generation and I think, as I pointed out, and as you did, that you need to consider things in context and I think you need to consider pages 36 and 37 of the Commission's order which talks about the auction and denies AEP's request to continue to freeze base generation rates.

In my example I do freeze the base generation rates, I don't lower it for the nonauction portion. It's only for the auction that I blend it in.

Q. So how long is the base G frozen under your proposal?

- Well, the base G is frozen for the 1 2 percentage of nonauction, so varying percentages for 3 the period up to January 1st, 2015. 4 Well, taking away part of the base G and 5 then reducing it and then blending it together doesn't mean it's frozen, does it? 6 7 The rate for the nonauction portion, I haven't reduced it. 8 9 Yeah. So the base G -- but you're 10 blending it together so you come up with a new base G, right? 11 12 Α. Blended together, yes. 13 Ο. And that's a reduced base G, right? It is, yes. 14 Α. 15 Q. So how long is base G frozen under your 16 proposal? 17 Α. For the nonauction portion of the --18 No. Q. 19 -- up until January 1st of 2015. 20 Q. I'm asking you about the final product. 2.1 You just said you blend them together to come up with
  - A. I've already answered that.

of the base G remain frozen under your proposal?

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Q. No, I don't think you have.

a reduced base G, so how long does the final product

- A. It stays frozen for the nonauction portion until January 1st of '15. You blend in the auction portion, both the base Gen and the FAC get blended, and then you come up with a result as shown on my pages. It might be helpful to look at the attachments, you can see the difference in prices.
- Q. Okay. So the base G -- let me ask you this directly and you can tell me if I'm wrong or not. Based on your recommendation the base G would only stay frozen until the FirstEnergy auction delivery period?

## A. What?

MR. LANG: I'm sorry, I have to object.

Just as to form when he's referring to base G, we've been going back and forth between like base generation concept and the actual base generation rate and I just, it's unclear in the record what we're talking about.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  NOURSE: Let me rephrase that question.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

Q. So under your proposal, Ms. Noewer, how long does the base generation rate remain frozen is my question? And my proposed answer -- you tell me if this is wrong, my understanding of your testimony

is that the base generation rate only remains frozen until the very first energy auction delivery period; is that correct?

A. No.

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Q. Okay. So you're proposing to reduce the base generation rate before or after that date?

The base generation rate gets blended in

- with the auction percentage and that gets blended with the current base generation rate. I am not changing the rate for the nonauction portion.

  Overall when you combine the auction result and the reduction in the capacity and the base generation rate for the 188, the result of adding those two together is a decreased overall rate.
- Q. Starting on the first energy auction delivery date?
- A. I'm not sure what "the first energy auction delivery date" is.
- Q. The very first. I'm not saying "FirstEnergy."
  - A. That's what confusing me.
- Q. The very first energy-only auction. There are multiple energy auctions.
- Okay, let me try again, Ms. Noewer. This is really just a clarification of your testimony so

I'm not sure why this is so difficult. The -- today
AEP Ohio charges a base generation rate; do you
understand that?

A. Yes, I do, and I have that listed on Attachment 1, base generation rate, 22.86.

- Q. Okay. So when under your proposal, no matter what you call it, no matter what your formula is for blending, when does that base generation rate today, 22.86, get reduced?
- A. If you look at my Attachment 1, that first blending approach, the price for auction

  Phase I for the base generation for the base generation line is 90 percent, so it's 20.57. So it shows you there the combined freezing the generation, base generation, at 22.86, combined with the auction blending will reduce the overall base generation component to 20.57.

And then what you have to do is add back a component which is on line 16 for capacity at 188 per megawatt-day for that base generation component.

- Q. So those changes under your recommendation occur as of the initial energy-only auction delivery period, correct?
- A. The changes as I've described in Attachment 1, that's what auction Phase I is.

1 Q. Okay.

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A. The one thing that I would say, just to clarify, under base generation from listening to Mr. Roush's testimony yesterday, there were a couple of components that he referred to as being included in base generation, the CAT, which is the commercial activity tax --

Q. I'm not asking you about that. If your council wants to cover that on redirect, perhaps if it's within the scope of cross, he can, but Ms.

Noewer, so what I'm asking you is so based on your answer that the base rates as they exist today are only frozen under your proposal as of the point of the initial energy-only auction, what I want to ask you about is whether in your review of the ESP orders do you agree that there are multiple references, I'm not going to go through them all now unless you want to, to frozen base G being a component of the ESP plan? Do you recall that?

A. That was a long question with some commentary at the beginning. I don't think I agreed with the way you characterized what my position was at the beginning, but if I answer the last part of it which was the question, I do recall that in the orders there were places that referred to frozen base

generation rates.

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- Q. Okay. And under the Commission's orders and those references to the frozen base G component of the ESP, is it your understanding that the Commission was only referring to the period leading up to the initial energy-only auction?
- A. I'm not sure I understand the question. What I believe is that the Commission considered frozen base generation rates and indicated to AEP in its order, as I say in my testimony, that we find that AEP Ohio's request to continue to freeze base generation rates throughout the auction process is inappropriate and should be rejected. So that's my position, that I believe that, that no, the Commission believed that through the auction process they should not be completely frozen, therefore, blending in the auction
  - Q. Okay.
  - A. -- and the 188.
- Q. I'm not asking you to go back to your favorite quote from the order. What I'm asking you is all the other references to base G being frozen as a component of the ESP that the Commission adopted, and all those references in the order, is it your testimony and your understanding that in each one of

those places the Commission is referring to a period that begins at the beginning of the ESP term and ends with the initial auction -- energy-only auction delivery period?

- A. I don't know that I can say without going back to read the order. I don't believe so because, again, you can't just take part of the order and not all of the order.
  - Q. Thank you.

Now, do you know when the Commission established the retail stability rider as part of the ESP whether it assumed or modeled any base G revenue reductions like the ones you're recommending?

- A. Whether who modeled, excuse me?
- Q. Whether the Commission in developing the RSR had assumed or incorporated the base G reductions that you're recommending.
- A. I wouldn't characterize what I'm recommending as a base G reduction. I consider it to be a blending of the auction. But, no, further than that I don't recall specifically what had been modeled.
- Q. Well, you agree that your recommendation reduces AEP Ohio's base G revenue, correct?
  - A. As you blend in the auction, yes.

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Q. In fact, you've shown that in part of your exhibit of the 180 million we talked about earlier, correct?

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- A. Right. But I think it's important to tie it to the auction.
- Q. And did the Commission, in establishing the RSR, incorporate your interpretation by reducing base G revenues as part of the RSR? Do you know?
- A. I don't know that the Commission considered -- what they considered in terms of blending in the auction results and its impact on the RSR. I do know that, you know, the Commission indicated that when they expanded the auctions to 10 and 60 percent, that clearly it expected that customers would be able to take -- benefit or have the benefit of market-based prices for those auctions and the market-based advantages of having both energy and capacity blended in. I think that's why in the order they refer to having the auctions as being a nonquantifiable benefit.

## Q. Okay.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I tried to, you know, indulge the witness but she keeps going back and making other points when I ask her questions, so she did answer my question in the first sentence and

then she added some extraneous points after that. 1 2 I'd move to strike the rest of the answer after the 3 first sentence. 4 EXAMINER TAUBER: I'm going to deny the 5 motion to strike but I will remind the witness that if you can answer the question with "yes," "no," or 6 "I don't know," and then provide a brief context as 7 8 necessary. 9 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. 10 EXAMINER TAUBER: Okay. Ms. Noewer, do you still have the ESP 11 opinion and order up there with you? If you don't 12 13 have it, we can provide a copy. 14 MR. LANG: You're asking the 11-346 15 opinion and order? 16 MR. NOURSE: The ESP opinion and order. 17 MR. LANG: And that's not one you guys 18 have marked yet, right? 19 MR. NOURSE: Well, we just did 2.0 administrative notice. We marked a couple of them, I think Exhibits 3 and 4, 3 was the entry on 2.1 22 rehearing --23 That's what I have, the entry on 24 rehearing. 25 Q. Well, I've got a copy of the opinion and

order if you don't or your counsel doesn't want to provide it.

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MR. ALEXANDER: It's marked up.

MR. LANG: We don't have a clean.

Q. All right. I really just want to ask you about page 35, so I don't know if you have a clean copy of that page.

MR. ALEXANDER: Yeah.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

- Q. Ms. Noewer, if there are any notes from your counsel in there, just please don't refer to them or read them out loud. Okay. So page 35, are you familiar with this table at the top of the page where the Commission laid out its adjustments and RSP development? RSR, excuse me.
- A. I read it at some point. I don't recall.

  MR. NOURSE: Okay. Well, I'd like to

  mark an exhibit, your Honor, that uses this

  information.
- Q. And I'd like to discuss with you -MR. NOURSE: This would be AEP Ohio
  Exhibit 6, I believe.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

Q. Okay. So you see this table that I've handed you replicates a portion of the table that's

in the Commission order and we'll walk through that in a minute. The first line retail nonfuel generation revenues is the same as the opinion and order table. And then there's a line 4, total AEP Ohio load, and it's 48,000 megawatts. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

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- Q. Is that your understanding of the AEP Ohio connected load, it's approximately 48,000 megawatts?
- A. I would have said 48 million megawatt-hours.
  - Q. Okay, 48 million megawatt-hours.
  - A. That's not what this says.
- Q. I'm sorry. I guess this is in thousands just like the Commission table. The Commission table says all figures in millions but then it has -- we have the million dollars marked here.

Okay, so but you agree that
48,000 megawatts or 48 million megawatts is the -I'm used to saying 48 gigawatts, 48,000 gigawatts,
right? Is that the same thing?

- A. 48,000 gigawatt-hours would be --
- Q. I'm sorry, okay. So all we've done here is you see the shopping load of 52, 62, and

72 percent?

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- A. I see that.
- Q. Okay.
- A. But I don't see it in the Commission's table.
- Q. And if you wouldn't mind turning back to page 34 if it's there, that statement is made on page 34 in the latter part of the middle paragraph, it says "Therefore, we will estimate shopping in the first year at 52 percent, increase it for years two and three to 62 and 72 percent." Do you see that?
  - A. Yes, I do see that.
- Q. So those are the shopping levels that the Commission assumed in developing the RSR. And so --
- A. I would say that the 52 percent is overstated since the current shopping is, as I state in my table, is 49 percent.
  - Q. Yeah, and these were assumptions, okay.
  - A. Okay.
- Q. So the megawatt, the next line 7 is just a function of the 52 percent of 48 is 25 and so on. Do you see that?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And do you accept those numbers, subject to check?

- A. I'm not sure what that means.
- Q. Okay. Well, does 52 percent of 48 sound about like 25?
  - A. Yes.
  - Q. And does 48 percent of 48 sound about like 23?
    - A. I think you said -- what did you just say?
      - Q. In line 9, the residual SSO load --
- 10 A. Oh.

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- Q. -- is the balance of a hundred percent,
  48 percent, and 48 percent of 48 is about 23,
  correct?
- 14 A. Yes.
  - Q. Okay. So can you glance at the rest of those numbers and see if you think they're reasonable.
    - A. Yes.
    - Q. Okay. So the final line, 12, is simply the product of the generation, the nonfuel generation revenues, which is the same thing as base G revenues, that the Commission used to develop the RSR and that shows that the retail nonfuel generation rate was frozen at \$22.80 per megawatt-hour throughout the entire term; is that true?

A. The math works out looks like correctly on your exhibit. I don't know how that related to the table on page 35, I haven't --

Q. Okay.

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- A. -- cross-checked that, nor do I know that that was -- your conclusion was correct.
- Q. Okay. Well, you can look at the order and the context there, but what I'm representing is the table shows the Commission's adjustments as it says in the lead-in paragraph, the adjustments in its development of the RSR and that's where we started with this line of questioning.

So my question, then, is would it be fair to answer my earlier question whether the Commission reduced the base G in developing the RSR, the answer would be no, not based on this table or the opinion and order passages we just looked at?

- A. I'm sorry, was that a question?
- Q. Yeah.
- A. Could you restate that?
- Q. Okay, sure. So I'd asked you about whether you understood whether the Commission had reduced base G revenues in developing the RSR, and you didn't know, so we went through this exercise and did the math based on the table and the passage in

the opinion and order, so now that we've done that exercise would you agree it doesn't appear the Commission reduced base G revenue when it developed the RSR?

- A. I have not studied the whole order related to the RSR and how it was calculated so I've just been following along with your example. I don't know. I haven't studied it recently. I'm not sure that I can draw the same conclusion you are. I don't know.
- Q. Okay. But this table and the top line of the table on page 35 of the opinion and order does indicate the nonfuel generation revenues, correct?

  Those are what was used to develop the RSR amount at the bottom line of that table; is that correct?
- A. I don't know, Mr. Nourse. I really don't know. I see what it's listed here, I haven't studied it, I haven't read the whole thing. Again, I don't know. I see that it says here retail stability rider amount, that's the best that I can say.

I don't know if later in the order it makes some comment on this or what these resulting paragraphs that follow it and precede it mean and say. I haven't gone back to review the RSR calculations.

Q. Understood. And that's why my question was based on this table and the passages we just reviewed, would you agree that the Commission did not incorporate base revenue reductions in developing the RSR?

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MR. LANG: Objection, asked and answered.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Sustained.

- Q. Okay, Ms. Noewer, do you know if the Commission assumed declining revenues for base G when it did the MRO test in the ESP decision?
- A. I don't recall the specifics of the MRO versus the ESP test. I focused on the auction process and blending that we refer to in this CBP case, I didn't broaden it further than that in my review for my testimony.
- Q. Okay. So you did not review the entirety of the orders when you reached your conclusion about interpreting the passage that you cite in your testimony.
- A. I didn't say that I didn't read them. I said I didn't go back and study the details of the calculations for the RSR or for the others. If I stated it differently in my prior answer, that's not exactly what I meant. I didn't study each of the pieces that aren't relevant today.

Q. Okay. Can you turn to page 8 of your testimony. And down near the bottom of the page you make a statement about blending with increasing percentages of market-based pricing for generation service, in line 20 there. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

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- Q. So this has been FES's position throughout the capacity and ESP and now this case, that there should be market-based generation prices and market-based capacity prices, correct?
- A. It's FES's position as we've talked through this cross-examination, too, that moving to market is important and we think that the Commission's orders maybe not as quickly or in the same manner as we would agree moving AEP toward market. So I think, yes, market-based pricing is consistent with our philosophy.
- Q. But this idea of linking up market-based capacity pricing with the energy-only auction, I mean, that's your idea, right? That's your proposal. It's not something that the Commission required in the opinion and order or the entry on rehearing, is it?
- A. I think that the portions of my testimony that I quoted to you that are inherent in here talk

about both; talking about the auction itself, not freezing base generation rates. That's all energy and capacity as well as the FAC being the energy and capacity portion. All three of the components. So I -- no, I disagree.

- Q. So to you energy-only means energy plus capacity? Both should be based at market rates?
- A. Well, in this case energy-only auction is for the energy portion and because the energy auction, as AEP recognizes, needs capacity support, the question is what is the price. And the Commission has determined that the price for capacity for AEP is 188, so I would not still consider the 188 to be market based, but irregardless, the Commission determined that, so I believe that, yes, the Commission's order and FES's proposal meets with what the Commission's goals and objectives in the orders say.
- Q. But when the Commission ordered energy-only auctions, and you're saying now it's inherent that you need capacity to support that, you're suggesting that the capacity that would otherwise be provided already without an additional order from the Commission in the order needs to be pulled out of base G and provided on this

market-based rate; isn't that what you're
recommending?

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A. It's not just the base G, it's also the capacity that's in the non -- in the fixed portion of the FAC, so the FCR, all of the six items there that are in the FCR are also capacity, so it's both the base G which is capacity and the other items that Mr. Roush noted, and then the FCR portion.

And no, I don't believe that it's just my view. I do believe that it was AEP Ohio's view which we talked about earlier in Powers' testimony and then the discovery that was entered in as these exhibits yesterday.

- Q. Okay. I'll ask you to turn to page 18.

  Now, you state on line 12 and line 23 that the energy auctions are, quote, destined to fail, unquote, and would be, quote, preordained to fail, unquote, if the auction has to come out lower than AEP Ohio's FAC rates. Do you see that?
- A. I do say that they -- it's the most likely outcome. That's on lines 9 and 10. And that's a concern. I do believe that our proposal is the most reasonable proposal customers have and the opportunity for auctions to be favorable and a result that will actually be instituted.

Q. Okay. But, again, those are not my words. You said that the auction would be destined to fail and preordained to fail if it has to beat the FAC rate, correct?

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A. And my word are "the most likely outcome." I can't possibly know exactly what the energy auction result would be, whether it would be higher or lower than today.

What I'm saying is that FES's proposal is the proposal that is most reasonable.

- Q. Okay. But did you perform an analysis to support this conclusion that the auction's destined to fail?
- A. The analysis -- not specifically about what the auction would be and how the price would come out, but my analysis does show on Attachments 1 and 2 how I believe our proposal, which accounts for an assumption on the auction, would benefit customers.
- Q. Well, yeah, the rate reductions you advocate for outside of the auction context, outside of the auction clearing price, are not what I'm asking you about. I'm asking you about the auction clearing price which I believe is what you're discussing in the context of the OEG starting price

proposal, and you concluded that they are destined to fail.

Now, my question is: What analysis did you perform to support this conclusion? In other words, do you have a projected auction clearing price that you assumed in reaching that conclusion?

MR. LANG: Just an objection to the characterization, again. They've gone back and forth, Mr. Nourse keeps saying "destined to fail," the witness keeps saying "the likely outcome" which is in her testimony. He keeps ignoring that part.

But I think, again, putting the characterization to the side, the actual question that he asked, I think if we can have her answer that question, that would be great.

THE WITNESS: Could you reread it, please?

(Record read.)

- A. No, I don't have a projected auction price.
- Q. Okay. So you don't really know whether it is the most likely outcome that the auction clearing price will be above or below the FAC, do

you?

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- A. No, I clearly don't know what the energy-only auction price would be. My point is that that, in conjunction with the proper blending, would be the best outcome for customers and most likely for customers to see a benefit.
- Q. So, but again, clarifying your most likely outcome statement, you're not speaking to the outcome of the auction in this section, you're not speaking to the auction clearing price's relation to being above or below the FAC; is that correct?
- A. If we look at page 18, what we're referring to here is about the cap proposal or IEU and OEG's proposal, so in that case what this is referring to is the energy auction itself, and if, in fact, there's a cap on the auction, that it might reduce bidder interest which would, in fact -- would be more likely to cause the auction to fail. So it's more than just whether the price would be higher or lower, it's also the mechanics of the auction.
- Q. But doesn't the question of whether the cap will render it most likely destined to fail, isn't that question of what the cap is in relationship to the FAC rate the key point to support any conclusions in this regard?

A. I think it's definitely one of those.

It's also how the auction mechanics work, though,
that if there's a cap, that right off the bat you get
bidder, you know, bidder concerns about starting out
at that starting point and then you definitely go
down from there. So it's both.

- Q. But there is a starting price to the auction in any case, correct?
- A. There is, but as Dr. LaCasse said yesterday, you set that price sufficiently high to bring in bidder interest. So when it's set at like the FAC rate which is a lower rate, it can impact bidders coming to the table at all regardless about whether or not the ultimate result will be lower.
- Q. That's only true, isn't it, Ms. Noewer, if the FAC rate is lower than what the auction manager would otherwise select as the auction starting price?
  - A. Could you repeat that?

    MR. NOURSE: Can you read it back.

    (Record read.)
  - A. I think that's true.
- Q. And you would try to disguise such an energy auction failure scenario through reducing rates unrelated to energy, correct?

A. I don't understand the question.

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- Q. You would like to mask or offset the energy price -- auction clearing price being higher than the FAC by reducing SSO rates that are unrelated to energy; isn't that your proposal?
- A. I think that mischaracterizes my testimony. I've already described that my testimony is that it is the proposal that most reasonably meets the goals and objectives of the Commission in the orders and, no, I don't think it's a matter of masking or disguising.
- Q. But you're so concerned about that because you want to create headroom or a cushion for the energy auction to come in above the FAC; do you not?
- A. I'm not trying to force a result, so no,
  I'm not trying to force headroom. I'm just trying to
  allow the market-based mechanism of an auction to
  work in these two paragraphs by not setting an
  artificial cap.

And, in addition to that, I'm attempting as best we can to do a fair reading of the Commission's orders and implement what I believe is a reasonable and the most reasonable approach to implementing those orders in this case.

376 MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor. 1 2 That's all the questions I have. 3 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. 4 Mr. Reilly. 5 MR. NOURSE: Thank you, Ms. Noewer. THE WITNESS: Thank you. 6 7 MR. REILLY: We have nothing, your Honor. EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Lang, redirect? 8 9 MR. LANG: One second, your Honor. EXAMINER TAUBER: Sure. Let's go off the 10 record. Let's take five minutes. 11 12 (Recess taken.) 13 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Lang? 14 MR. LANG: No redirect, your Honor. 15 Thank you. 16 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. 17 Thank you. You may be excused. 18 THE WITNESS: Thank you. MR. NOURSE: Your Honor? Oh, I'm sorry. 19 20 When you're done, I've got a comment. 21 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Lang. 22 MR. LANG: If we could move FES Exhibit 23 No. 7 into the record, please. 24 EXAMINER TAUBER: Are there any 25 objections to FES Exhibit No. 7?

377 1 MR. NOURSE: No. 2 EXAMINER TAUBER: Hearing none, it shall 3 be admitted into the record. 4 (EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 5 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Nourse. MR. NOURSE: We'd like to move AEP Ohio 6 7 Exhibit 5 and 6. EXAMINER TAUBER: Are there any 8 objections to AEP Ohio Exhibits No. 5 and No. 6? 9 MR. LANG: We have objections to 10 Exhibit 5 as not properly authenticated and not 11 12 relevant to the proceeding, your Honor. 13 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Nourse, do you have 14 a response? 15 MR. NOURSE: Yeah, your Honor, I mean, 16 this is a FERC-approved contract that I would have 17 expected Ms. Noewer to be familiar with since she 18 worked at FirstEnergy, but the fact she wasn't, I 19 still was able to use it to ask her questions and, 2.0 you know, I don't know if Mr. Lang is saying he 21 questions the authenticity or just wants to keep it 22 out of the record, but, you know, that's really a 23 relevancy argument, not an authenticity argument. 24 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Lang? 25 MR. LANG: Your Honor, the only thing we

know about this document is what Mr. Nourse is willing to tell us about it. The witness did not testify to anything about the document other than the fact that he read a couple -- he read some words from it and she said that he read it correctly.

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EXAMINER TAUBER: I think the transcript should reflect everything we need from this document so at this time we're not going to admit it in the record. We'll go ahead and admit AEP Exhibit No. 6 into the record.

MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor.

(EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.)

EXAMINER PARROT: Did you say you had a comment, Mr. Nourse?

MR. NOURSE: About the scheduling, I don't know if you were thinking about taking a lunch break, but we do, of course, we have another witness that probably might be an hour, we don't know what other questions there are, but the company also wanted to discuss and kind of finalize its request for rebuttal testimony, discuss that over lunch. So I don't know if it makes sense to do Mr. Murray and then take a break and come back or just take a break now and do all the above when we come back.

EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go off the

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       record.
 1
 2
                    (Discussion off the record.)
 3
                   EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the
 4
       record.
 5
                   At this point we're going to take a
       15-minute break and then reconvene at that point.
 6
 7
       Thank you.
 8
                    (Recess taken.)
 9
                   EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the
       record.
10
                   Mr. Pritchard, I believe you have our
11
12
       last witness of the day anyway.
13
                   MR. PRITCHARD: Thank you, your Honor.
       At this time Industrial Energy Users of Ohio would
14
       like to call Kevin Murray to the stand.
15
16
                   EXAMINER PARROT: Please raise your right
17
       hand.
18
                   (Witness sworn.)
19
                   EXAMINER PARROT: Thank you.
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1	KEVIN M. MURRAY
2	being first duly sworn, as prescribed by law, was
3	examined and testified as follows:
4	DIRECT EXAMINATION
5	By Mr. Pritchard:
6	Q. Mr. Murray, would you state your name and
7	business address for the record?
8	A. My name is Kevin Murray. My business
9	address is McNees, Wallace & Nurick, 21 East State
10	Street, 17th floor, Columbus, Ohio, 43215.
11	Q. And on whose behalf are you testifying
12	here today?
13	A. The Industrial Energy Users-Ohio.
14	MR. PRITCHARD: At this time, your
15	Honors, I'd like to mark the direct testimony of
16	Kevin Murray as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 8.
17	EXAMINER PARROT: So marked.
18	(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
19	Q. Mr. Murray, do you have in front of you
20	your prefiled direct testimony?
21	A. Yes, I do.
22	Q. Do you have any corrections?
23	A. No, I do not.
24	Q. Was this testimony prepared on your
25	behalf or, sorry, by you or under your

381 supervision? 1 2 Α. It was prepared by me. 3 If I asked you all the questions in your 4 prefiled testimony today, would you give the same 5 answers? Yes, I would. 6 7 MR. PRITCHARD: I tender the witness for 8 cross-examination. 9 EXAMINER PARROT: Thank you, Mr. Pritchard. 10 Mr. Petricoff? 11 MR. PETRICOFF: No questions, your Honor. 12 13 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Lang? 14 MR. LANG: No, thank you. EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Kurtz? 15 16 MR. KURTZ: No questions, your Honor. 17 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Conway or 18 Mr. Nourse. 19 MR. CONWAY: Thank you, your Honor. 20 21 CROSS-EXAMINATION 22 By Mr. Conway: 23 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Murray. 24 A. Good afternoon. 25 Q. Just a few questions regarding your

background experience, Mr. Murray. You went to the University of Cincinnati and got a degree, an engineering degree there?

- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And did you do research on competitive bidding processes in the course of your formal education at UC?
  - A. No, I did not.
- Q. And you didn't take any coursework in that subject matter, did you?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. Have you designed and implemented competitive bidding processes for the procurement of default service for electric utilities?
- A. I have been active in proceedings in which the design of competitive bidding process has been in play, primarily here at the Commission.
- Q. But you have not been the person principally responsible for the design and implementation of any competitive bidding process for procurement of default service, have you?
- A. That's correct; I've provided input but I have not been responsible for the design.
  - Q. Or implementation, right?
  - A. That's correct.

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- Q. And, of course, then I take it then you haven't served as an auction manager for any competitive bid auction.
  - A. That's correct.

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- Q. Okay. Now, I believe around page 8 of your testimony you indicate that -- well, you describe your recommendation that the energy-only auctions approved by the Commission for AEP Ohio should use separate reserve prices for the CSP and Ohio Power rate zones to reflect the fact that each company currently has a separate FAC rate; is that right?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. And so that by that recommendation I take it that you would set a reserve price at the FAC rate currently in effect for each rate zone at the time that the auction is held; is that right?
- A. Actually, my testimony talks about using the forecasted FAC rate.
  - Q. Okay.
- A. So I believe we know, for example, what the actual projected fuel cost is for the -- working from memory here I think it's July through September 2013 period. My recommendation would require the Commission to do a bit more

information-gathering in terms of looking at what the fuel rate would be to link up with the delivery period whenever the auction takes place.

- Q. Let me see if I understand this. Correct me if I got it wrong, but what you would do is you would set a reserve price at the forecasted FAC rate for each rate zone prior to the -- when the auctions are held; is that right?
  - A. That's correct.

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- Q. Okay. And would you agree that setting and then publicizing a reserve price before the auction has started will affect bidder interest as some of the other witnesses have testified?
  - A. It certainly may.
- Q. And would you -- when you say it "may," I assume you mean there's some probability or there's some chance that it would?
- A. Well, if you presume that the reserve price is lower than what the auction manager would set as a otherwise beginning starting price, it obviously may detract from bidder interest, there may be some bidders that simply say at that price I'm not going to participate.
- Q. And you may have answered my next question, then. So you would agree that doing that,

setting a reserve price prior to the auctions that you recommend be held, might cause some potential bidders to decide not to participate in the auction.

- A. Absolutely.
- Q. Okay. A few questions about the fuel adjustment clause and its components. You're familiar, of course, with -- well, let me not prejudge it.

Are you familiar with the orders that the Commission issued in the AEP Ohio's first and second ESP cases?

- A. I've certainly reviewed them in the past.
- Q. Okay. And in the first ESP is it your understanding that the Commission approved a fuel adjustment clause for AEP Ohio, actually for each of the two companies that have since been merged, CSP and OPCo, that allowed, among other things, for recovery of purchased power expenses for each company?
  - A. That's my recollection.
- Q. Okay. And included within those purchased power expenses that were approved for recovery through the fuel adjustment clauses were demand charges or fixed costs, right?
  - A. I don't recall.

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O. You don't recall?

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- A. That's correct, I don't recall.
- Q. Okay. And then in the ESP 2 case is it your understanding that the Commission reauthorized the use of the fuel adjustment clause for AEP Ohio?
- A. Just so we're clear, when you say "ESP 2 case," which case are you referring to?
- Q. I'm referring to the case that has as one of its numbers 11-346, if that helps.
- A. The Commission authorized the continuation of a fuel adjustment clause mechanism for AEP.
- Q. And is it your understanding that the Commission's approval was for a fuel adjustment clause that was the same as the FAC that was approved in the first ESP?
  - A. I don't recall.
- Q. Okay. Let me ask you about your estimate of the range of expected bids for the energy auctions that AEP Ohio may be holding. I think you discuss it at least in part at or around page 10 of your testimony. Actually, Mr. Murray, I think you start the discussion at page 9 where you discuss, as I understand it, your analysis of a comparison of the AEP Ohio FAC rates versus the likely results of an

energy-only auction.

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And as I understand your testimony, you develop an estimate that the range of bids that you expect would result from the auctions would be in the range of \$46.37 to \$48.30 per megawatt-hour; is that correct or did I misstate your testimony?

A. I think there needs to be a clarification. What I did was estimate a bidding price that would result if you did an auction for delivery of power for the July through September period, and it's my understanding that the company's proposing to do a different — the initial auction will be for a different delivery period.

So what I attempted to do was compare current prevailing market prices to the actual fuel cost that the company has filed in its most recent case to update its FAC.

- Q. So you didn't really come up with an estimate then of what the range of expected bids might be for, say, the 10 percent auction that will be held sometime possibly fourth quarter this year or thereabouts?
- A. That's correct. Because, again, we don't have -- as I recommend in my testimony, we set a reserve price based upon the forecasted FAC to be in

effect for the delivery period and we don't have that number as a part of the record in this case.

MR. CONWAY: I'm sorry. Could you read that back for me, please?

(Record read.)

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- Q. Okay. So the exercise that you've conducted really is illustrative of what would happen in your view if we were having an auction that would have a delivery period of, I think you said third quarter 2013 and comparing that to what the expected FAC rate is for third quarter?
- A. Yeah. As illustrated on my Exhibit KMM-2, what I have done is compare prevailing market prices for -- energy market prices for July, August, and September versus what the company projected its actual fuel costs to be during that same period.
- Q. Okay. And is it your -- I mean, is it your view that it's -- what you have done provides an illustration of what the results would produce for the auctions that are scheduled either on the 10 percent side auction, say fourth quarter of this year, some point in the fourth quarter of this year, and then, secondly, the 50 percent incremental auction starting sometime in the third quarter, second, third quarter of next year?

- A. No. Again, I have not attempted to look forward and project what the results of an auction for those delivery periods would be.
- Q. Okay. You have an attachment or an exhibit to your testimony where I believe you explain how you develop the \$46.37 to \$48.30 range for the expected results of an auction for delivery in the third quarter of this year; is that right?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. And what you did is you weighted the on-peak and off-peak price for each of the three months that you evaluated and then averaged them; is that right?
- A. That was the starting point of the calculation.
- Q. Okay. And I noticed that the on-peak prices were substantially higher than the off-peak prices for the three months; is that accurate?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And the on-peak prices for the three months look to me, and would you agree with me, that they were more volatile than the off-peak prices? The on-peak prices were more volatile than the off-peak prices for the three months.
  - A. I don't know that I agree with that.

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What I took was trade data as reported off of the Intercontinental Exchange for trade date June 10th. I didn't attempt to look at whether or not on-peak prices were more volatile than off-peak prices.

- Q. Okay, that's fair, you didn't look at it.

  But the values that you show, they start out at

  \$40.60 on-peak for -- at the low end for the

  September month for the period, and they are as high
  as \$54 for the July month of the period, which is a

  difference of about 13-1/2 dollars, right?
  - A. That's correct.

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- Q. And then on the off-peak period there's a low, again, for the September period month of \$28.55 and a high of \$31.85 for the July, period, right?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. And the difference between that high and low is, oh, somewhere less than two-and-a-half dollars?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. So my observation was, would you agree with me, that the on-peak prices are, they fluctuate more widely than do the prices for the off-peak?
- A. Again, I don't necessarily agree with you. I think you're confusing the issue of

volatility with relative pricing. The fact that the prices fluctuate over the summer are a function of the fact that power prices tend to be weather driven and people are projecting we'll have hot temperatures in July and August; that drives the market price for power.

You can have equal degrees of volatility in off-peak to the extent that there's volatility and underlying inputs like natural gas prices.

- Q. Okay. I was just trying to -- I was just observing that the range and the difference in the price was lower both absolutely and as a percentage on the off-peak compared to the on-peak periods. Would you agree with that?
- A. Yeah. And if we had -- if I had attempted to look at a different time period, for example, say the fall months, there would have been more compression between the on-peak and off-peak price, they would be closer together.
- Q. More compression in the range for, say, any three-month period in the fall like October,

  November, December, there would be less -- you would expect less of a range between the high and the low both for the on-peak and the off-peak during those months?

A. Absolutely. But you have to recognize that I was comparing this to AEP's forecasted fuel FAC rate which includes purchased power for the same period of time. So you would expect to see the similar type of pattern in the forecasted FAC rate as it varies over time.

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- Q. And the summer months of, well, the months of July, August, and September, those are three of the months that occur during the peak period of consumption by AEP Ohio's customers, right?
- A. July and August certainly are; I think September actually falls outside of what's classified as the peak period.
- Q. Okay. But two out of the three months you would agree are peak monthly periods for consumption, right?
- A. Historically, and you would expect that to be the case if weather is normal.
- Q. Okay. And if you had looked at 12 months worth of prices, would you expect that they -including the 3 months you used but also the other 9
  months within the 12-month period that included those
  3 months, would you expect that the balance of the
  months would have prices which on the on-peak side of
  it are lower than the prices that you have selected

for the 3 months that you studied?

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- A. The current market trends for power, if you went out and looked at the, for example, the winter of 2014, you would certainly see numbers that in an absolute sense are lower than the projected market prices for the summer of 2013. But there's a generally upwardly increasing trend in power prices as you go forward. It generally mimics a forward price curve for natural gas prices.
- Q. But nominally the prices are lower than the monthly season on-peak prices for the remainder of the 12 months projected out?
  - A. I didn't do that calculation.
  - Q. Okay. The --
- A. It's publicly available data, so certainly anybody that wants to can do that calculation fairly easily.
- Q. Which months of the year do you see the highest level of demand for AEP Ohio's service area?
- A. Historically it's been the summer months if there's normal weather.
  - Q. And which months are those?
  - A. June, July, and August.
- Q. Okay. And then what period will be served by the upcoming auctions? What monthly

period? I mean, beginning to end.

- A. For the Phase I auction it's difficult to say because that's a function of when the Commission issues an order and how quickly thereafter you can conduct and implement an auction.
- Q. Let's assume just for purposes of discussion that the earliest it could be is November as a beginning point and then we'll just assume that it is November for purposes of our discussion, okay? In that instance what monthly periods will be covered by the 10 percent, the 50 percent, and the 40 percent auctions?
- A. I'd have to go back and look at the company's proposal to refresh my memory.
- Q. Well, isn't it true that the 10 percent auction lasts until May 15, 2015, and starts whenever, you know, the Commission completes its work here and the auction is conducted?
- A. Again, I don't recall the specific details, I'd have to go back and look at the company's proposal. My recollection is the timing of the auctions is laddered.
  - O. Laddered?
  - A. Yeah.
  - Q. Okay. So --

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A. And at the end they run through delivery through May of 2015.

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- Q. Okay. So the 10 percent auction then, assuming it starts -- delivery starts in November at the earliest, it will go from November of 2013 to May of 2015, right?
- A. That's my recollection but, again, I think that's one of the issues that's perhaps up for debate in the context of this proceeding.
- Q. Okay. And then with regard to the incremental 50 percent energy-only auction, the schedule at this point for that auction is that it will begin so that deliveries start in June of 2014 and then continue until May of 2015, right?
- A. My recollection is delivery certainly starts in June of '14. I don't recall the end date but I'll accept your characterization.
- Q. You don't have any reason to think it's anything different than --
- A. No. Again, my recollection is the auctions were structured as laddered and run through the end of the May 2015 delivery period.
- Q. And then the 100 percent auction will be conducted so that deliveries begin in January of 2015 and continue through May of 2015, right?

Α. That's correct.

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- Okay. So even though the auctions are laddered in the fashion we just discussed or that they -- they're likely to be or they're tentatively scheduled to be laddered in the fashion that we just discussed, the earliest under the illustration we just described is, the earliest it would start is November of this year, 2013, and the latest for any of the auctions is -- all the auction is then May of 2015 for delivery, right?
- Again, you asked me to presume November for the earliest date.
  - Q. Okay.
- So it's going to be a function of when the Commission issues an order and how quickly the company can respond to that order.
- Sure. Okay. But if we do assume that it Q. takes place along that -- along that timeline, how many of the months for any of the auctions will -how many months out of that period, that November of 2013 through May of 2015 period, will be composed of the months of July, August, September?
- Α. Math on the fly was never a strong suit so let me think about this here.
  - Q. Sure. Take your time.

- A. If we presume a starting delivery period of November 1 running through May of 2015, you would actually only have the three summer months of 2014 in the delivery period.
- Q. Okay. And so the balance of the months in any of the delivery period will be off-peak months, seasonally off-peak months, right, for AEP Ohio?
  - A. That's correct.

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- Q. Okay. And so if we were to weight the price for the expected results of the competitively bid auctions using all of the months within which deliveries are going to be made, you would expect, then, that because you only include one summer-peaking season worth of months in it and include, then, the remainder of the months in the delivery periods which are composed of off-peak months, that the weighted average price throughout the auction period would then be less than an average weighted price that only relied upon monthly prices from the peak period, the peak summer period, correct?
- A. I don't understand your question in part because you were referring to off-peak months and in my analysis I was looking at off-peak and on-peak

prices which relates to the time of day.

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Q. Okay. Well, I wasn't referring to that.

I was referring to the use of -- in the weighting process, not just the three months that you selected, the July, August, September months, which include at least two, if not three, of the summer-peaking months for the company, but rather included all the months of the delivery period that's going to result from the auctions.

And my question is: If you used pricing from all of the months of the delivery period of the auction, would you agree with me that you would then having weighted all those months in the calculation, come up with a lower value than if you only used three months including being, or being July, August, and September?

A. I haven't done that calculation and, again, I think I testified and agreed that generally prices in the -- on-peak prices in the summer tend to be higher than the remainder of the year but the trend line of market prices going forward is escalating over time.

So, again, somebody could pretty easily do that calculation; I did not for the purpose of my testimony today.

- Q. And why is it that you did not?
- A. We really have nothing to compare it to.

  We don't have AEP's forecasted fuel rate for the

  comparable period, so I would produce a number that

  is a number but really can't do anything with it. My

  recommendation is that the Commission dig into what

  AEP's forecasted fuel rate is for the relevant

  delivery period and use that to establish the reserve

  price.
- Q. Well, did you look at the monthly period of, like a prior selection of months for which you had FAC rates and also then monthly competitively priced energy rates that covered a period prior to the three months that you did evaluate so that you could have assessed how the FAC rate compared to the pricing from periods other than the peak-month periods that you looked at?
  - A. No.
  - Q. Okay. You didn't consider doing that.
- A. Again, I didn't believe it was necessary. The relevant observation is what is AEP's forecasted fuel cost going to be on a going-forward basis, not what they've been in the past, and we simply don't have that information.
  - Q. And would you agree with me that your --

the comparison that you conducted is biased because of the selection of months that you made focusing only on the summer -- summer-peak demand months?

A. No, I wouldn't agree.

- Q. Okay. Let me ask you a few questions, then, about the 20 to 25 percent adder that you used to gross up the per megawatt-hour energy prices from the AEP-Dayton hub to the final price, the prices you used to compose your range. First of all, you used -- you settled on a 20 to 25 percent markup, right?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. And where you got that is from the recent FirstEnergy auction; is that right?
- A. Actually, no. I got that from the testimony of Teresa Marrinan that was filed in Dayton Power & Light's proposed electric security plan proceeding in which she did an analysis of auction results from both recent FirstEnergy as well as Duke Energy Ohio auctions and came up with a weighted average of -- markup of 1.24 percent.

Her testimony in that case was uncontested.

Q. And what was the type of auction that Ms. Marrinan was looking at?

1 It was an auction to secure default generation service for standard service offer load in 2 3 the case of FirstEnergy and Duke that is a full 4 requirements auction so it includes not only energy 5 but capacity as well, but she stripped out the capacity numbers to calculate her markup of the 6 7 energy prices. MR. CONWAY: Thank you, Mr. Murray. 8 9 That's all I have, your Honor. 10 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Reilly. MR. REILLY: We have nothing, your Honor. 11 EXAMINER PARROT: Any redirect, 12 13 Mr. Pritchard? MR. PRITCHARD: May I have one minute 14 with the witness? 15 16 EXAMINER PARROT: You sure may. 17 (Off the record.) 18 MR. PRITCHARD: Just one question, your 19 Honor. 2.0 21 REDIRECT EXAMINATION By Mr. Pritchard: 22 Mr. Murray, do you recall a question by 23 24 Mr. Conway about whether or not your analysis would 25 be biased because it included summer months?

A. Yes, sir.

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- Q. And do you recall answering no, that you do not believe it was biased?
  - A. Yes, I do.
- Q. Could you explain why you do not think it would be biased?
- A. Again, my comparison was market prices for July, August, and September as reflected on the Intercontinental Exchange to the company's forecasted FAC rate or underlying fuel cost in their FAC rate for the same delivery period.

the forecasted FAC rate includes

projected purchased power costs which in summer

months are going to be higher, normally, than what

you would see in winter or spring or fall months.

Again, my analysis was trying to do an

apples-and-apples comparison to the best extent

possible which is why I focused on the summer months.

MR. PRITCHARD: No further questions.

EXAMINER PARROT: Any recross,

Mr. Petricoff?

MR. PETRICOFF: No, your Honor.

EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Lang?

MR. LANG: No, thank you.

EXAMINER PARROT: Ms. Grady?

403 1 MS. GRADY: No, your Honor. 2 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Conway? 3 MR. CONWAY: Maybe just a couple 4 questions to follow up on that redirect. 5 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 6 7 By Mr. Conway: 8 Mr. Murray, did you evaluate the purchased power elements within the fuel adjustment 9 clause for the period that you reviewed and compare 10 it to purchased power costs included in other periods 11 12 prior to that period? 13 Α. No. 14 Okay. So you don't know whether, in 15 fact, purchased power costs included in the fuel 16 adjustment clause were higher or lower than they were 17 in prior periods. 18 That's correct; I didn't do that 19 analysis. 2.0 MR. CONWAY: Nothing further, your Honor. 21 Thank you. 22 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Reilly? MR. REILLY: We have nothing, your Honor. 23 24 EXAMINER PARROT: Thank you, Mr. Murray. 25 You are excused.

Mr. Pritchard?

2 MR. PRITCHARD: At this time IEU-Ohio

3 | would move for admission of Exhibit 6.

EXAMINER PARROT: Are there any

5 objections to the admission of IEU Exhibit 8?

MR. PRITCHARD: My apologies.

MR. CONWAY: No, your Honor.

EXAMINER PARROT: Hearing none, IEU

Exhibit 8 is admitted.

(EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.)

EXAMINER PARROT: I believe that was our

last witness.

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Mr. Nourse.

MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor. The company would like to ask for permission to address a single set of issues on rebuttal, and I'd like to propose two alternatives. We could file written rebuttal testimony and the topic that we'd like to address is really focused on Dr. Lesser's credit proposal which is not something that was reflected in any of the comments or queued up previously in this docket so we had no way of knowing that it would be proposed or an opportunity to address it in our, you know, in our direct testimony. So we do want to have an opportunity to address it beyond just the

cross-examination method.

And so I have two proposals, actually the first one would be to take administrative notice of certain documents, which I'll go through in a second, from the capacity proceeding, the 10-2929 case, and if, you know, if we take that approach, then we could forego filing rebuttal testimony in this case and, you know, coming back for another hearing and so it might speed things along.

But if you don't like option A, our option B would be to have, you know, file testimony and come back for a rebuttal phase of the hearing.

The documents from the 10-2929 case that we'd like to, you know, take administrative notice of would be the direct testimony of staff witness Ryan Harter, Staff Witness Emily Medine, and then the rebuttal testimony of Company Witness Nelson and Company Witness Allen. So those basically those four pieces of testimony.

And then also the cross-examination transcripts for those four pieces of testimony, those witnesses, and the exhibits, you know, that were admitted in connection with the cross-examination that were admitted in those transcript portions.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Just to clarify, the

request for administrative notice is limited to those four witnesses and then the corresponding transcripts and exhibits associated with the testimony.

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MR. NOURSE: That's correct. Which, you know, all that testimony or a portion of the witnesses' testimony deals with the energy credit.

MR. PRITCHARD: Your Honor, to the extent you're considering taking administrative notice of these specific testimonies, I think it would be easier to take administrative notice of the entire records, because without reviewing the exact portions here I'm not sure, for instance, if our witness has addressed some of the issues that were in here, therefore, the cross and testimony might -- of our position might be somewhere else in the record and without taking some time to think about it and review it, I'm not sure what exactly would be coming in and what wouldn't be.

MR. NOURSE: Well, your Honor, if I could just briefly address that. I mean, again, we're putting this out as an alternative to the company filing rebuttal. So it's already an established record that we would, you know, rely on those testimonies and related cross and exhibits in lieu of filing rebuttal testimony, so I don't think it's

particularly pertinent to have IEU testimony come in in connection with our rebuttal.

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But, you know, those witnesses were the ones that addressed the energy credit that we'd like to be able to rely on in lieu of filing rebuttal testimony here.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Petricoff.

MR. PETRICOFF: A couple of thoughts.

First, I appreciate the company's offering two ways of approaching this because I think that if we can avoid rebuttal testimony, it's good for all parties given the amount of time.

Also, we think that this may be a tempest in a teapot in terms of that, the narrow issue.

That being said, I think maybe the way to approach this is I assume that we're -- what we're going to see is that when we get the initial briefs, that they will have citations to that, to those testimonies, then I assume if we're going to have reply briefs in this case, maybe at that time what we ought to do is have a very liberal policy about taking judicial notice about anything else in the record if we are now going to re-litigate portions or at least compare memories or interpretations of the 10-2929 case.

1 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

was a doctor or Mr. but Smith's --

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Any other parties wish to weigh in?

MR. LANG: Your Honor, on behalf of

FirstEnergy Solutions, we actually think what
Mr. Nourse has proposed is pretty reasonable. The
one thing we might suggest is kind of looking at the
calculation that was done in the 10-2929 case, I
believe we had admitted Dr. Pearce's direct testimony
already as an exhibit. The one piece that's probably
missing would be, I can't remember if he was -- if he

MR. LANG: -- direct.

MR. NOURSE: He didn't address the energy credit but he was demand charge only. Staff had a clean break between those two topics.

MR. LANG: Yeah, I think there was an issue and I remember it being in the Commission entry as to kind of the, I guess I was going to say overlap, but the lack of an overlap on kind of energy and capacity, so I think it is, and the energy credit is like being applied to that.

But with that one suggestion we think it's a fair proposal.

MS. GRADY: Your Honor, if we could weigh in. We are not in favor of the proposal to take administrative notice. I think Mr. Pritchard raised the fairness issue. If we're going to be considering bits and pieces of the record in 10-2929, it would seem in all fairness that other pieces that other parties might want to put in the record should be given administrative notice as well.

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I think it's a somewhat skewed picture of what occurred in 10-2929, it was a very complex case with many issues and the issues are very much related to the issues presented in this case, so I would agree with Mr. Pritchard that if we're going to start -- if we're going to go that route, then we need to talk about taking administrative notice of the entire case.

MR. REILLY: Your Honor, if I could just respond to that, and I just raise the point of experience having been in a case where that was done, its complexities that when you finally get around to briefing that are -- I don't think anybody can anticipate them all at this point. And my understanding of the 10-2929 case, although I wasn't in it, is that it was a highly complex case.

carefully honed I think to try to simplify it. I think that's defeated by taking -- whatever the Bench does, taking administrative notice of the whole 10-2929 record.

MR. NOURSE: Yeah, and I just would like to add that, you know, I agree with Mr. Reilly that it was a huge record and just taking the whole thing is probably, you know, overblown and could create or cause parties to raise issues that aren't really at issue here.

What we, you know, again stated would be -- this relates to the energy credit issue and as it relates to Dr. Lesser's credit proposal would be the testimony that the Commission addressed and adopted in the capacity charge decision. And we certainly want to keep the issues narrow and what they are already, we're not trying to add issues.

But, again, Dr. Lesser raised a proposal that was not previously in any comments or any positions that have been stated in the docket here, so we had no way of knowing he would argue that and, you know, do need an opportunity to respond since we are the, you know, we bear the burden of proof and et cetera.

So I think, again, it's a limited

proposal in the context of being in lieu of rebuttal.

I agree with Howard's approach that --

Mr. Petricoff's suggestion, rather, that if parties want to ask permission to bring in other stuff later in the reply phase of briefing, and they can justify why they need to do that, you know, that would be something the Bench could give permission for at that point based on demonstrated good cause.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the record.

All right. We have considered both proposals. We do appreciate I guess what I would call AEP's creativity in proposing the first alternative that was mentioned, we appreciate that, but in light of the fact that we had some objection to that proposal from IEU and OCC, perhaps staff to some extent anyway, and the Bench is unwilling to take administrative notice of the entire capacity docket, we are going to adopt your second proposal which was to kind of use our traditional process and have a witness prefile rebuttal testimony and we will reconvene, then, at a later date to deal with that

testimony.

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So with that, in terms of a schedule, I think what we would perhaps propose, if the company could file by the end of the day, close of business Thursday of this week, and then we could reconvene next Tuesday, July 2nd. Does that work for parties?

MR. NOURSE: I'm not sure if two days is enough, your Honor. I was going to suggest next week. I think we can do it by the end of this week, Friday, and still come back next week for hearing.

EXAMINER PARROT: I'm just hesitant

because next week is a holiday week and I just don't

know what availability is going to be, otherwise I

think we would have the flexibility, but with that in

mind I don't know -- are counsel even around next

week?

MR. KURTZ: Not July 2.

EXAMINER PARROT: Okay.

MR. ALEXANDER: And, your Honor, I understand there may be a conflict --

EXAMINER PARROT: Actually, I'm sorry, let's go off the record briefly to talk schedules and then we'll come back.

(Discussion off the record.)

EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the record. All right. After some discussion of witness availability and the parties' availability for rebuttal testimony, we have agreed that the company will file its rebuttal testimony by the close of business on July 2nd, and we will reconvene on Monday, July 15th at 10:00 o'clock.

I will have to check on availability of this room. I'm going to hope that it's open and we will be meeting in this room on that date, but I will confirm that with all of you by electronic mail. And if there's nothing else today, we are adjourned until the 15th. Thank you.

(Hearing adjourned at 1:56 p.m.)

Armstrong & Okey, Inc., Columbus, Ohio (614) 224-9481

## CERTIFICATE

I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings taken by me in this matter on Tuesday, June 25, 2013, and carefully compared with my original stenographic notes.

Maria DiPaolo Jones, Registered Diplomate Reporter and CRR and Notary Public in and for the

My commission expires June 19, 2016.

(72730-MDJ)

State of Ohio.

Armstrong & Okey, Inc., Columbus, Ohio (614) 224-9481

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Summary: Transcript in the matter of Ohio Power Company hearing held on 06/25/13 - Volume II electronically filed by Mrs. Jennifer Duffer on behalf of Armstrong & Okey, Inc. and Jones, Maria DiPaolo Mrs.