## BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

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In the Matter of the : Application of Ohio Power : Company to Establish a :

Company to Establish a :
Competitive Bidding : Case No. 12-3254-EL-UNC
Process for Procurement :

Process for Procurement : of Energy to Support its : Standard Service Offer. :

## PROCEEDINGS

before Mr. Jonathan J. Tauber and Ms. Sarah J.

Parrot, Hearing Examiners, at the Public Utilities

Commission of Ohio, 180 East Broad Street, Room 11-A,

Columbus, Ohio, called at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, June

24, 2013.

VOLUME I

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7 Monday Morning Session, 1 2 June 24, 2013. 3 4 EXAMINER TAUBER: Let's go on the record. The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio 5 6 has called for hearing at this time and place Case 7 No. 12-3254-EL-UNC being in the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company to Establish a 8 Cooperative Bidding Process for Procurement of Energy 9 10 to Support a Standard Service Offer. My name is Jon Tauber, with me is Sarah 11 Parrot, and we're the attorney examiners assigned by 12 the Commission to preside over this morning's 13 14 hearing. We'll take appearances and we'll start 15 16 with the company and we'll work our way around the 17 room. 18 MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor. On 19 behalf of Ohio Power Company, Steven T. Nourse, One 20 Riverside Plaza, Columbus, Ohio, 43215. And Daniel 2.1 R. Conway, law firm of Porter, Wright, Morris & 22 Arthur. I think you have the address. 23 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. 24 Mr. Petricoff. 25 MR. PETRICOFF: Thank you, your Honor.

On behalf of Constellation NewEnergy, and Exelon

Generation LLC, M. Howard Petricoff from the law firm

of Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, 52 East Gay Street,

Columbus, Ohio.

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EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

MR. ALEXANDER: Good morning. On behalf of FirstEnergy Solutions Mark A. Hayden, FirstEnergy Service Company, 76 South Main Street, Akron, Ohio, 44308. And also appearing Trevor Alexander and Jim Lang from the firm of Calfee, Halter & Griswold, 1405 East 6th Street, Cleveland, Ohio, 44114.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

MS. KYLER-COHN: Good morning. On behalf of the Ohio Energy Group, Michael Kurtz and Jody Kyler-Cohn from the law firm of Boehm, Kurtz & Lowry, 36 East Seventh Street, Cincinnati, Ohio, 45202.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

MS. GRADY: Thank you, your Honor. On behalf of the residential ratepayers of the Ohio Power Company, the Ohio Consumers' Counsel, Bruce J. Weston, Consumers' Counsel, by Maureen R. Grady, Associate Consumers' Counsel, 10 West Broad Street, Suite 1800, Columbus, Ohio, 43215.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

MR. PRITCHARD: On behalf of the

Industrial Energy Users of Ohio, I am Matt Pritchard 1 2 with the law firm McNees, Wallace & Nurick, 21 East 3 State Street, Columbus, Ohio. 4 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. 5 MR. REILLY: On behalf of the staff of 6 the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Michael 7 DeWine, Attorney General, William Wright, Section Chief, Steve Reilly, Assistant Attorney General, 180 8 East Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio, 43215. 9 10 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. Mr. Nourse. 11 12 MR. NOURSE: Mr. Conway. There he is. 13 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Conway. MR. CONWAY: Yes, your Honor. Are we 14 15 ready to proceed? 16 EXAMINER TAUBER: I believe we are. MR. CONWAY: Thank you, the first order 17 18 of business -- can we go off the record for just a 19 second? 20 EXAMINER TAUBER: Sure. Let's go off the 2.1 record. 22 (Discussion off the record.) 23 EXAMINER TAUBER: Let's go back on the

Mr. Conway.

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record.

under your supervision prepared direct testimony for this proceeding?

A. Yes.

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- Q. And do you have a copy of your direct testimony that was prepared for this proceeding with you?
  - A. I do.
- Q. And also do you have a copy of the company's application and exhibits that were previously filed in this docket?
  - A. Yes, I do.

MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, at this time I'd like to mark as AEP Ohio Exhibit No. 1 Dr. LaCasse's prefiled direct testimony.

EXAMINER TAUBER: So marked.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

- Q. And, Dr. LaCasse, do you have any additions or corrections to make to your prefiled direct testimony at this time?
  - A. No, I do not.
- Q. And if I were to ask you the questions that are contained in your prefiled direct testimony today, would your answers be the same as they appear in that document?
  - A. Yes, they would.

- Q. And are those answers true and correct to the best of your knowledge and belief?
  - A. Yes, they are.
- Q. Dr. LaCasse, with regard to the company's application that was previously filed in this case on I believe February 11th, I'm sorry, on December 21st of 2012, do you have that before you?
  - A. I do.

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- Q. And then if you could turn to Exhibit A attached to that application which is the bidding rules for the auctions under the competitive bidding process of Ohio Power Company dated December 21st, 2012; do you have that?
  - A. I do.
- Q. And if the parties had or the Examiners had questions for you today regarding that document, would you be able to provide answers and information regarding it?
  - A. Yes, I would.
- Q. And then if you could turn to Exhibit B to that application of December 21st, 2012, which is entitled "Rules and Protocols for Participation by Associated Bidders in Auctions Under Ohio Power Companies," that is AEP Ohio's, CBP dated December 21st, 2012, do you see that?

A. I do.

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- Q. And if the parties or the Examiners had questions regarding that document, would you be able to provide the answers and information regarding it?
  - A. Yes, I would.
- Q. And then if I would have you turn similarly to Exhibit D to that December 21st, 2012, application, which is entitled "Communications Protocols for Ohio Power Company," that is AEP Ohio competitive bidding process auctions, do you have that in front of you?
  - A. I do.
- Q. And would you also be able to provide answers or information regarding that document if the parties or the Examiners had questions regarding it?
  - A. Yes, I would.
  - Q. Okay.

MR. CONWAY: At this time, your Honor, our plan was not to mark as an exhibit the application or the supplement to the application, it was already submitted in this docket as part of the notice and comment phase of the docket, but we do have a witness here who can answer questions about those documents just identified, if there are questions about them.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Let's hold off at this 1 time and then we'll see if we need to for 2 3 clarification for ease; if we need to mark it, we'll 4 mark it but for this time, since we're just doing 5 scope of the items in the entry, we'll go with that. MR. CONWAY: Thank you, your Honor. 6 7 At this time, your Honor, we would move for the admission of Dr. LaCasse's prefiled direct 8 testimony which has been marked as AEP Ohio Exhibit 9 10 No. 1, and Dr. LaCasse is available for cross-examination. 11 12 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. 13 We'll just work our way around the room again, so we'll start with Mr. Petricoff. 14 15 MR. PETRICOFF: No questions, your Honor. 16 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Alexander? 17 MR. LANG: Could we have one minute, your 18 Honor? EXAMINER TAUBER: Sure. 19 20 (Discussion off the record.) 21 MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, are we on the 22 record? 23 EXAMINER TAUBER: Yeah, do we need to go 24 off? 25 MR. CONWAY: No. That's fine. On the

record, one matter that we have to present is a stipulation regarding FirstEnergy Solutions' cross-examination of Dr. LaCasse regarding

Ms. Noewer's prefiled direct testimony that

FirstEnergy Solutions has prefiled, and the gist of the stipulation is that we have a stipulation regarding a series, a short series of questions and answers for Dr. LaCasse that she would provide under cross-examination and in return for that stipulation what her cross-examination would be regarding one topical area by FirstEnergy Solutions.

We also have a stipulation or an offer by FirstEnergy Solutions to withdraw a limited portion of Ms. Noewer's prefiled direct testimony.

And so what we could do is simply have

Mr. Alexander read into the record what the

stipulation is on their part with regard to the

cross-examination if that would be acceptable to you.

And then he would explain the portions of the direct

testimony that are being withdrawn.

EXAMINER TAUBER: We can do that. Could the Bench get a copy of it?

MR. CONWAY: Yes.

MR. ALEXANDER: Your Honor, may I

approach?

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1 EXAMINER TAUBER: You may. 2 MR. ALEXANDER: Thank you, your Honor. 3 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Alexander. 4 MR. ALEXANDER: Mr. Conway's statements were correct. The questions and answers pursuant to 5 6 the stipulation were: 7 Question: Dr. LaCasse, you proposed that the auction manager be provided with the discretion 8 to modify the tranche size if there is a significant 9 load reduction in the future. 10 Answer: Yes. 11 12 Question: The auction manager will make this determination in consultation with staff. 13 14 Answer: Yes. Question: Will AEP Ohio have any role in 15 16 determining that the tranche size should be adjusted 17 or establishing the new tranche size? 18 Answer: No. Question: Did you prepare the AEP Ohio 19 20 response to FES interrogatory 1-001? 21 Answer: Yes. 22 And I've marked for identification FES 23 Exhibit 1 which is the response to FES interrogatory 24 1-01. 25 EXAMINER TAUBER: FES Exhibit 1?

17 1 MR. ALEXANDER: That's correct, your 2 Honor. 3 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 4 MR. ALEXANDER: And is the AEP Ohio 5 response to FES interrogatory 1-001 still true and 6 accurate? 7 Answer: Yes. 8 And that concludes the questions with 9 regard to the portion relating to Ms. Noewer's 10 testimony. We have revisions sort of throughout that document necessitated by the stipulation, so we 11 12 thought we would address that when Ms. Noewer is on 13 the stand. 14 EXAMINER TAUBER: Let's do that when she 15 is on the stand. 16 MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, I would rather 17 have some description of what it is they're 18 withdrawing, at least in general terms, and I'd be 19 happy to speak to it myself. 20 MR. LANG: I can do that. 21 EXAMINER TAUBER: We can address that 22 now. MR. LANG: That's fine. And it's 23 24 actually, of her testimony it's Roman numeral section 25 V and that requires actually on the first page on the

table of contents, lines 14 through 16 will come out, which is the section V. And then there's a change under her -- on page 3 and 4 which is the purpose of the testimony section, on line 17 it says "My testimony will address four areas," that will change to three.

And then there will be, on line 23 after the semicolon and before the three parentheses will be an "and," and then on lines 1 through 3 after retail rates they'll insert a period, and so the rest of that, that fourth point, will be deleted.

EXAMINER TAUBER: So everything line 2 on page 4 going down?

MR. LANG: Correct. And then line 3 through the period.

And then on page 13 the section that's Roman numeral V starting on line 10, that entire section gets deleted, so from line 10 down, all of page 14, and then page 15 through line 12.

MR. CONWAY: My understanding is that on the basis of that quid pro quo that FirstEnergy Solutions' cross of Dr. LaCasse is completed.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Is that correct?

MR. ALEXANDER: Yes, your Honor.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

19 1 Mr. Kurtz, Ms. Kyler. 2 MR. KURTZ: Thank you, your Honor. 3 4 CROSS-EXAMINATION 5 By Mr. Kurtz: Good morning, Ms. LaCasse. 6 Ο. 7 Α. Good morning. Do you know what the current market price 8 Ο. for capacity is in the AEP load zone? Approximately. 9 In other words, do you know what the PJM 10 RPM is for AEP's load zone today? 11 12 Α. No, I don't. 13 Ο. Do you know it's in the range of 20, 26 dollars a megawatt-day or thereabouts? 14 I think it would be higher than that. 15 Α. 16 Do you know what it would be, Ο. 17 approximately? 18 Not to provide a figure here. 19 Have you reviewed the testimony of AEP 20 Witness Roush and of OEG/OCC Witness Mr. Kollen where 2.1 the price of capacity embedded in the legacy 22 generation rates for nonshopping customers is either stated or can be calculated? 23 24 I read that testimony, yes. Α. 25 Q. Did you read Mr. Kollen's testimony where

he calculated the capacity costs embedded in one of the legacy rate schedules at \$343 a megawatt-day?

A. I read that, yes.

Q. Okay. Are you aware of any auction in the country where nonshopping customers would pay over \$300 a megawatt-day or well above the market price for capacity but then also pay a market price for some portion of their energy?

THE WITNESS: Could I have that question reread, please?

(Record read.)

- A. In most of the auctions for SSO type customers the product is a full requirements product where all the components are put together or supplied by the winners of the auction, so that it's not directly comparable in being able to compare what the cost of one component is or the cost of another. The only other auction that I know of where it is energy is in Illinois and I don't know what the capacity component is there.
- Q. So most auctions have a market price for energy and capacity; is that what you just testified to?
- A. Most auctions -- the product that is in most auctions is a combined product where typically

suppliers will have load-serving responsibility and will be LSEs and will provide all the product capacity, energy, ancillary services, and any other products that are required by the auction, the contract. The product in the case of -- in the case of the CBP for AEP Ohio is load following, but it is energy only.

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- Q. Let me go back to my first question. Do you know of any auction anywhere in the United States where customers are served at an above-market price for capacity but a market rate for part of their energy?
- A. I can only answer with respect to the characteristics of the product that I know of in the auction given that if it is a full requirements product, we don't know the components, and as I answered in most of those auctions, it is a full requirements product that has all of the services that are required by load serving entity.
- Q. Does that mean you don't know of any other auction that has characteristics similar to the one that we're dealing with here?
- A. I guess I'm saying that it's not a characteristic of the auction; a characteristic of the auction is that the product is simply a

load-following energy-only product.

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Q. Now, if the Commission were to say in an order that what we should do is have an auction only for capacity and that we should have a competitive declining clock auction for capacity but have energy continue to be priced at cost, would you -- would that be a good idea? Would you accept that on behalf of your client, AEP?

MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, I'm going to object at this point. This is well beyond the scope of Dr. LaCasse's testimony which is simply to support the competitive bidding process design and implementation for the auction that the Ohio Commission has prescribed as specified.

MR. KURTZ: I think my hypothetical question goes right to that topic.

MR. CONWAY: I think not. I think it goes well outside of it.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Could I have the question read back, please.

(Record read.)

MR. CONWAY: The other part of this is that Dr. LaCasse is not authorized to and is not able to negotiate some deal on some other hypothetical auction circumstance.

MR. KURTZ: I'll withdraw that portion of my question and just leave it up to the witness for her personal opinion.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Could you rephrase your question then, Mr. Kurtz.

MR. KURTZ: Yes.

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Q. (By Mr. Kurtz) If the tables were turned and the Commission said that there's going to be an auction for capacity so that customers will be guaranteed a rate reduction on the capacity component in their SSO service, instead of guaranteed rate increase on the energy component, would you think that that was a good idea?

MR. CONWAY: That's a mischaracterization, your Honor. And it calls for speculation. And I object to the line of questions. It's well beyond what her scope of testimony is here today.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Kurtz?

MR. KURTZ: She's testifying as to an energy-only auction that is a good idea to have customers pay for market prices for part of their energy and above market for the capacity component in their bill, she's testified that that's a good idea because it leads to a competitive market outcome, and

I just want to know if the shoe was on the other foot, if the tables were turned and it was a capacity auction where the market price for capacity is much lower than the embedded cost, would that also be a good competitive outcome.

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MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, the witness is not testifying for or against what the Ohio Commission ordered be done in this situation. She is simply taking what has been ordered, which is an energy-only auction or a series of energy-only auctions, and explained what she thinks would be an appropriate way to conduct, to design and implement those types of auctions.

She's not here to support or to advocate one way or another for the ultimate SSO product that we have before us in Ohio. She's simply focusing on how should the energy-only auctions be conducted.

So the premise to Mr. Kurtz's question is false and, like I said before, he's trying to get her to testify about matters which are well beyond her scope of her testimony and, frankly, she's -- he's asking her to testify about whether or not what the Commission has prescribed in this case, or in the converse case that's the hypothetical, would be a good idea. That's beyond her scope.

EXAMINER TAUBER: I'm going to sustain the objection. I just want to clarify that we're sustaining it, it's just beyond the scope I think of this hearing this morning, the subject matter we have before us, so I'm not going to rule any further than that as to just the scope of this hearing. Not necessarily of this proceeding.

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So with that notation, Mr. Kurtz.
MR. KURTZ: Thank you.

- Q. (By Mr. Kurtz) Ms. LaCasse, would you agree that reserve prices are common features to most auctions?
- A. Reserve prices are a concept that's well known in auction and have been used in auctions of all types. They're not necessarily used in auction for procuring supply for SSO customers, there are lots of examples where they're not used, but it's a well-known concept.
- Q. If I was selling this calculator on eBay, I could put a reserve price on eBay, can't I, on anything on eBay, that I won't sell it unless I get a minimum price?
- A. It is a feature, it is a common feature of some auctions, yes.
  - Q. Isn't it a common feature of most

auctions?

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- A. No. As I said, there are a number of auctions for procurement of supply for SSO-type customers that do not feature a reserve price such as the BGS auctions in New Jersey, most of the auctions that are held in Pennsylvania for those same kind of service.
- Q. Well, I thought we established earlier that this is the only auction you know of in the United States, in the history of the United States, where customers will pay above-market price for capacity and a market price for part of energy their energy, so with that premise maybe a reserve price would be a good, unique feature here in this hybrid situation, don't you think?
- A. So I don't think we've established what I know or don't know about what customers are paying here. As I said, the auction that we're considering here and for which -- and for which I have presented testimony is for the first CBP for AEP Ohio and as such is just a load-following, energy-only auction.
- Q. Are you familiar with the FirstEnergy auctions?
  - A. Yes, I am.
  - Q. How many auctions have they had for their

SSO service?

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- A. I don't know the exact number.
- O. Six? Seven?
- A. I don't know the exact number. Several.
- Q. Do you know how many auctions Duke has had for their SSO service?
- A. Fewer, but I don't know the exact number either.
- Q. Would you agree that the Ohio Commission knows how to conduct full auctions for energy and capacity for nonshopping customers? In other words, that process is something this Commission has done repeatedly without any flaws; would you agree with that?
- A. Certainly there is experience in Ohio on these types of auctions, yes.
- Q. So with that experience there's no reason for the AEP system to have any kind of practice, trial runs. You would agree that once there was a full auction for energy and capacity, the Commission would probably conduct that just as well as it's done for FirstEnergy and for Duke; wouldn't you agree?

  THE WITNESS: Can I have the question

THE WITNESS: Can I have the question reread, please?

(Record read.)

- A. I don't think it's a matter for my opinion. The auction first, this first CBP and the auctions under that CBP for AEP Ohio follow the Commission decision to have a load-following, energy-only auction prior to an auction that would have energy and capacity.
- Q. Have you attempted to quantify what you think the harm to the competitive market would be if a reserve price was set? In other words, a dollar amount.
  - A. No.

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Q. Well, let's just assume that the dollar amount of harm to the competitive market from setting a reserve price is a million dollars. And let's assume that for the seven-month period June 1, 2014, through 12/31/14, the harm to consumers is, as Mr. Kollen testified, 164 million. Would you think that the Commission should go forward with your recommendation to avoid a \$1 million harm to the market in order to impose a \$164 million harm to consumers?

MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, I would object to the question, it assumes facts that aren't in evidence and, in our view, have not been supported on either side of the balance.

MR. KURTZ: Well, your Honor, the 164 is in his prefiled testimony and the 1 million was a hypothetical.

EXAMINER TAUBER: I think we need to rephrase the question, maybe we can get around it.

Q. If the harm to the competitive market was less than \$164 million for the seven-month period I identified, would you recommend the Commission go forward with the auction without a reserve price?

THE WITNESS: Can I have that reread, please?

(Record read.)

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MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, could I have -- I'm sorry, Mr. Kurtz, but what is the period for the \$164 million harm?

MR. KURTZ: June 1, 2014, through 12/31/2014, the 60 percent phase.

A. What I address in my testimony is setting the starting price at the FAC or the energy component of the FAC, and the harm to that is not a harm to the competitive market, it is potentially a harm to customers in terms of the results of the auction.

So I don't understand the comparison between the harm to the competitive market versus the harm to customers. If what we're talking about is

setting, as I discuss in my testimony, the starting price, it is to be set at a point where it would be able to track the kind of robust supply that would yield prices that are consistent with market condition in the auction.

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- Q. I must have missed that part of your testimony where you're trying to protect consumers; can you point me to that?
- A. The portion of the testimony that I'm talking about is the setting of the starting prices, and it's the setting of the starting prices so that there is robust competition in the auction, and that along with the design of the descending clock auction would be what promotes to get a result that is consistent with market condition.
- Q. So your idea of helping consumers is to have a robust market even if it results in them paying higher rates than they're otherwise entitled to pay.
- A. Certainly the concerns about rates in terms of whether such a price is consistent with market condition would translate into rate increases or decreases for customers is an important one but that's not the topic of my testimony. Witness Mr. Roush will talk about the rate issues.

- Q. Did you read the testimony of the FirstEnergy witness?
  - A. I'm not sure I did.

- Q. You didn't read her testimony where she says that, along with the possible energy rate increases, customers should get a demand or capacity rate reduction by blending in 188.88 a megawatt-day? Did you not read her testimony?
- A. I'm aware of it, but I don't know the details.
- Q. Would you support that, that type of competition, where there was competition for both capacity and energy?

MR. CONWAY: Objection. Your Honor, once again, we're going far afield from Dr. LaCasse's scope of testimony. What she is doing is explaining and supporting how the Commission might and should go forward with an energy-only auction that the Commission has prescribed for AEP Ohio to be done.

MR. KURTZ: I'll withdraw that question. EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

Q. Now, you indicated you had not done any quantification of the harm to the competitive market by not having a reserve price. Have you done any quantification as to the harm to consumers by not

15 you are responding to the question earlier on

page 6, correct?

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- A. Yes.
- Q. And on page 6 you are asking what elements exist within the auction design to promote competition so the price is driven down; is that correct?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. And so one of the -- one of the elements that you identify to ensure that the auction is designed to promote competition and drive down the price is the suggestion on page 7 on lines 5 through 9 that the auction manager may reduce the tranche target; is that a fair characterization of your testimony?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. Now, with respect to that decision, that decision to reduce the tranche target, when would the decision to reduce the number of tranches be made?
- A. The decision would be made during the auction. It can also be prior to the auction depending on the indicative offers that are submitted with the part 2 applications.
- Q. So that decision could be before the start of the first round of the auction; is that correct?

1 A. Yes.

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- Q. And would that decision also -- could that decision also be made after the final round of the auction?
- A. I'll say that the precise methodology to be used for that would be decided and discussed with Commission staff, but certainly it would not -- my view is that, not "certainly," my view would be that it would not be after the last round of the auction.
- Q. Now, you indicated that this decision to reduce the number of tranches would be made in conjunction with the PUCO staff; is that correct?
  - A. The methodology to do so, yes.
- Q. How would you decide that the clearing prices were too high and, to use your words, and not consistent with market conditions?
  - A. Excuse me. Where are you reading from?
- Q. I'm reading from line 7 and 8 where you say "The Auction Manager would reduce the tranche target if needed to ensure a competitive bidding environment that would drive the price down to be consistent with market conditions." And so my question is: How would you decide that the clearing prices were too high and not consistent with market conditions?

A. What I mean by "needed to ensure competitive environment" is while the auction is still ongoing, that there's a sufficient amount of excess supply so that if we let the auction progress and take its course, that we expect the prices to be driven down to market conditions. It's not an assessment of the clearing price which would be in the final round and, again, that would occur before that point.

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- Q. And how would you determine that the price is consistent with market conditions?
- A. Again, in the course of the descending clock auction where the price starts at a high starting price and then declines during the auction to the final round, the determination to reduce the tranche target, so to increase the amount of excess supply, is made so that the environment is competitive enough to have the expectation that letting the auction run its course will result in a price that's consistent with market conditions.
- Q. And what would be the basis of your decision? Would you be looking at a forecast of market prices or something else to determine that the price is consistent with market conditions?
  - A. Again, in that determination to reduce

the tranche target the considerations are on the balance or the amount of excess supply that is in the auction compared to -- so the amount of supply in the auction that's being bid in compared to the number of tranches that are being procured.

- Q. So it has nothing to do with a market price, but it's the amount of supply is what your concern is with --
- A. Right. And given that it's at the -it's not in the last round of the auction; it's at a
  point before that, it's at prices that are still
  expected to come down as the auction progresses, and
  the purpose of having this look at the tranche target
  at that point is to make sure that at that point in
  the auction there still remains sufficient excess
  supply to drive down prices over the course of the
  following rounds.
- Q. Now, in the event that you reduced the tranche target, what would happen if the -- if when you're doing -- let me strike that.

Can you explain to me how this approach differs from setting a reserve price for the auction?

A. Well, there certainly are similarities here in the sense that when there is that consideration of whether to reduce the tranche

target, it is at some point in the auction so it is at some price point, and the expectation then is that the auction will continue to proceed to prices that are consistent with market, so at that point the price is above the price that would be expected to be consistent with market conditions, so it has an element of the reserve price to that.

The setting of a reserve price is a more general feature in the sense that there are some reserve prices, for example, that are stated such as in eBay, for example, where it is a fixed price that is explicitly announced where the purchase of the sale will not happen at that reserve price so this is not exactly like that.

- Q. I would like you to focus now on your testimony on page 9, and specifically I'm going to focus on lines 9 through 11, and there you indicate that AEP proposes to hold four auctions across three delivery periods. Do you see that?
  - A. I do.

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Q. And you also testify that the first auction will procure 10 percent of the hourly energy requirements of AEP's SSO customers. Can you tell me what is AEP's current expectation for when the 10 percent auction will be conducted?

A. I think the final orders from the Commission that were needed for that auction to go forward for the two dockets in the ESP II and corporate separation have been entered so it would depend on the decision of the Commission on the -- on this CBP application.

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- Q. Do you know what AEP's current expectation is regarding the delivery start date for the tranches procured under the 10 percent auction?
- A. I don't know that I can speak to AEP's expectation. Generally, I know there was timing that was identified as being six months after the final orders and I think the last order was April 24th, if my memory serves me correctly.
- Q. And you said six months after, it's your understanding that the target is six months after the April -- you said April 24th, 2013, order?
- A. Correct. And, again, it would depend on the Commission order in this -- for this application, any timing that the Commission would provide at that time.
- Q. So are you assuming that the delivery -that the auction will be conducted three months after
  the Commission's order and then another three months
  will lapse before the delivery start date occurs?

A. Three months after which Commission order? Sorry.

- Q. I think you referenced the Commission order in this case.
- A. I was referencing the Commission order in ESP II and the corporate separation case.
- Q. And perhaps I'm just confused here. So what you're saying is it is your current expectation that the 10 percent auction will be conducted within three months after the April 30 -- or, April 24th, 2013, Commission order; is that correct?
- A. I don't think I stated a timing for the auction to occur itself. I think you asked me about the start of the supply period. Again, I don't know the AEP Ohio's expectation in general, but I do know that in the rules, for example, that we referenced, that it would be six months more or less after the final order is in the corporate separation docket and the final order in the ESP 2, which I believe has been entered, and after there would be a final order in this CBP, so on this application.
- MS. GRADY: May I have that answer reread, please?
- 24 EXAMINER TAUBER: Yes.
- 25 (Record read.)

1 Now, when you refer to the supply period Ο. 2 starting, are you talking about the power -- are you 3 equating that to power will start flowing? 4 Α. I am, yes. 5 MS. GRADY: That's all the questions I 6 Thank you, Dr. LaCasse. have. 7 THE WITNESS: Thank you. EXAMINER TAUBER: 8 Thank you. 9 Mr. Pritchard? 10 MR. PRITCHARD: Thank you, your Honor. 11 12 CROSS-EXAMINATION 13 By Mr. Pritchard: 14 Good morning, Ms. LaCasse. Ο. 15 Α. Good morning. 16 You're familiar with the implementation 17 of competitive bid process auctions for establishing the procurement of default service for Ohio 18 utilities, correct? 19 2.0 Excuse me, can you say that again? Α. 2.1 Yes. You're familiar that there are 22 competitive bid process auctions for establishing default service for other Ohio utilities, correct? 23 24 Α. Yes.

And earlier you referenced that you were

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Q.

familiar with auctions that were being held in Duke and FE service territories, correct?

A. Yes.

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- Q. Would you say those auctions are working appropriately?
  - A. The results -- yes.
- Q. Would you believe that the current competitive market is functioning appropriately in Ohio?

MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, I'll object on the grounds of vagueness, ambiguity. What market is he talking about?

MR. PRITCHARD: Your Honor, Ms. LaCasse is talking about the harm that a reserve price would have on the competitive market in Ohio. If the Ohio competitive market is not functioning correctly currently, I'm not sure what the additional harm would be. I think as a prerequisite for that statement it implies that the current competitive market is working. I'm just trying to establish with the witness that there is no current harm that exists.

MR. CONWAY: I just would reiterate my objection, your Honor. I think it's vague. I think Dr. LaCasse's testimony is focused on the bidding

process and the auctions for the energy-only product, it's not -- well, she can answer, she can explain what it is, but I don't agree with his characterization that she's opining on competitive market in some broader, more general fashion, so I object to the question.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Could you rephrase your question, Mr. Pritchard?

- Q. (By Mr. Pritchard) What specific harm do you think will occur from an auction reserve price?
- A. What I discuss in my testimony is more precisely setting the starting price in reference to the FAC or the energy portion of the FAC, and I point out that the starting price is not a guess as to the closing price of the auction, but should be set at a high level to attract suppliers to the auction so that is the competition of the suppliers at the auction that will yield a price that is consistent with market conditions.

So if the starting price is not set in that manner, so if it is set in a manner that is not based on market data, is not sufficient to attract competition in the auction, it may instead deter participation in the auction and, therefore, there wouldn't be the competitive forces to drive the

auction, drive the price of the auction to a competitive level.

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- Q. So your, if I'm stating this correctly, your quantification of the harm is that there will not be sufficient competition at the auction if you set the reserve price at the FAC level. Is that a fair statement?
- A. It's not a quantification, it's a logical implication of not setting the starting price at a level that would attract competition so there may be suppliers that would have come to the auction and would have competed -- would have competed the price down that have other opportunities for participating in auction and selling supply and they may choose those opportunities over an auction with a starting price that's not sufficient.

They may make that determination even though -- and not come even though they would have been able to compete the price down.

- Q. So the harm that you're testifying to about using a reserve price set at the FAC level is just limited to the competition that would exist during the auctions, correct?
- A. The competition that exists during the auction determines the ultimate price, so it could be

that there's not sufficient supply for the auction to occur, it may be that prices are not driven down as much so it impacts the final price the more -- if there's not sufficient competition or robust supply that's attracted to the auction in the first round.

- Q. But you're not testifying that there will be any harm to competition outside of the auctions, correct?
- A. My testimony is about the auction under the CBP.
- Q. You have previous experience in conducting a competitive bid process auction in Ohio, correct?
  - A. Yes.

- Q. And you were the auction manager for a competitive bid process auction during FirstEnergy's rate stabilization plan, correct?
  - A. Yes.

MR. PRITCHARD: Your Honor, may I mark an exhibit?

EXAMINER TAUBER: You may.

MR. PRITCHARD: I'd like to have marked, this exhibit, as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 1. May I approach, your Honor?

EXAMINER TAUBER: You may.

45 The exhibit is so marked. 1 2 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 3 Ms. LaCasse, will you take a minute to Q. 4 review the document I've just handed you that's been marked as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 1. 5 Have you had time to review this 6 7 document? Is there a particular portion of the 8 Α. document? 9 10 Q. Do you recognize this document as being your direct testimony in the remand case involving 11 12 AEP Ohio's first electric security plan? 13 Α. Yes. Would you turn to page 2 of the document. 14 I'm there. 15 Α. 16 And would you review the first full Ο. 17 paragraph starting on line 10. 18 All right. Α. 19 Here you're describing your experience as 20 the auction manager for FirstEnergy's competitive bid 2.1 process auction during its rate stabilization plan, 22 correct? Correct. 23 Α. 24 And in that case, the FirstEnergy RSP 25 case, the Commission had approved rates under

FirstEnergy's rate stabilization plan and also ordered that a competitive bid process auction be held, correct?

A. Correct.

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- Q. And the Commission held that if the results of the competitive bid process auction were less than the approved rate stabilization plan rates, that they would then accept the auction results, correct?
  - A. Correct.
  - Q. And implicit -- or, strike that.

And, therefore, if the competitive bid auction results were greater than the rate stabilization plan results, they would not have accepted the results, correct?

A. Yes. I think it was a little bit more complicated than that, but that's the -- that's the general result, and in the first auction that was held the Commission did reject the results of the auction and the following year there was no auction because no one participated given that they knew there was going to be this kind of reserve price.

MR. PRITCHARD: I would strike everything after, well, I would strike the last half of the response relating to a second auction. I was only

asking her about the Commission's opinion about whether they would accept or reject the results of the first auction.

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MR. CONWAY: Well, your Honor, I think he asked the question and got a full answer to his question and the witness -- in the witness's view the additional information was necessary to provide context to the full answer.

EXAMINER TAUBER: The motion to strike is denied.

Q. In your experience with competitive bid process auctions in Ohio is it your opinion that the auctions represent a market determination of the costs associated with providing the relevant service including the related risks?

MR. CONWAY: Could I have the question reread, your Honor?

EXAMINER TAUBER: Yes.

(Record read.)

THE WITNESS: Sorry, one more time.

(Record read.)

A. I would say that those auctions would determine the -- would determine a competitive market price for the service that's offered. I'm not sure what the question means by "costs," so I'll just stop

there.

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Q. Sure, let me clarify. Would you turn to page 8 of the exhibit I handed you. Will you review the first paragraph on this page, lines 1 through 12.

So here you're generally testifying about one method an electric distribution utility can meet their default service obligation is to conduct a competitive bid process, correct?

- A. Correct.
- Q. And the bids that would result from a competitive bid process auction, you were testifying that one of the costs that would go into the bids would be the cost of the risks, correct?
  - A. Correct.
- Q. And that risk cost related to the fact that the bidders would be bidding on a fixed percentage of the load, typically 1 percent of the overall load, but the fact that that 1 percent would vary -- sorry, not that the 1 percent varied, but the overall load you served would vary with shopping, correct?
  - A. Correct.
- Q. So in addition to the cost of providing energy in a competitive bid process auction, you would also expect the clearing price to reflect a

risk premium for this risk we just talked about.

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- A. I would expect the bids in an auction to reflect all of the components of the product that bidders would supply, and if it is load following, then -- and the bidders are assuming the risk of shopping, that would be one of the components that they would consider.
- Q. And in this auction the product to be supplied is energy, correct?
- A. It is energy only and it is load following, that's correct.
- Q. So one of the costs would be the cost of energy, correct?
  - A. It's one of the -- it's one component, yes.
  - Q. And another component, since -- strike that.

And this auction, the energy-only auctions are load following, correct?

- A. Yes.
- Q. So in addition to the cost of energy in the clearing price bids, you would also expect a risk premium, correct?
- A. I just want to point out that, you know, the cost of energy is not necessarily one number, it

may be different across bidders, it may depend on their particular situation, on their particular supplier arrangements, on their particular reason for participating in the auction.

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So although I would assume that every bidder is going to take into consideration energy as part of the product that they have to supply and that they would also look at the fact that it is load following and consider that in forming their bid, I'm just weary of just thinking about it as a very simple equation like you pose in your question.

MR. PRITCHARD: Could you read back my question and then the answer?

(Record read.)

MR. PRITCHARD: I'd move to strike the response. I don't believe it's responsive to whether there is a risk premium that is in the bids.

MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, I think that the witness gave him an answer and explained it.

She's -- her answer explained that it's not a simple matter of arithmetic across the board but that it's a matter of each individual bidder's understanding of its costs and what it's willing to include in its bid and so I think it's an explanation that's responsive.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Motion to strike is

denied.

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Q. (By Mr. Pritchard) In that lengthy explanation I'm not sure if I heard the yes or no to this part of the question, but you testified that in an energy-only load shape auction you would expect there to be a risk associated with the load-following aspect of the auction, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And since this is a load-following auction, you would expect the bids to include a risk premium for this risk, correct?

MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, just one other objection, I think she's already -- she's already answered the question, I think. She said she's leery of treating this as a matter of simple arithmetic, and he is trying to get her to, I think, to agree that it is a matter of simple arithmetic.

MR. PRITCHARD: I just asked a yes/no question. I've already established that the basis, we've had a lengthy explanation of when you would or would not expect a risk premium, the witness gave a lengthy answer about what the market -- or, the cost of energy might be but she's not answered yes or no about -- to confirm that in this auction she would expect the risk premium to be included in the bids.

52 EXAMINER TAUBER: I'll allow the witness 1 2 to answer the question. 3 Do you want to have it read back? 4 THE WITNESS: Yeah, please. 5 (Record read.) Yes. 6 Α. 7 Q. Thank you. I believe in response to Mr. Kurtz's 8 question earlier you stated that you had not 9 quantified the potential harm to customers with not 10 including a reserve price at the FAC levels, correct? 11 12 Α. Yes. 13 Ο. So would it be fair to say that you have not done any analysis about whether the expected 14 clearing price in the auctions are at -- will be at 15 16 or above the FAC levels? 17 Α. Or below, no. 18 So you have no opinion about what the 19 ultimate clearing price in the auction will be, 2.0 correct? 21 Α. No. 22 MR. PRITCHARD: I have no further 23 questions, your Honor. 24 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. 25 Mr. Reilly?

MR. REILLY: Thank you, your Honor.

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## CROSS-EXAMINATION

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By Mr. Reilly:

are you not?

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Q. Good morning, Dr. LaCasse.

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A. Good morning.

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Q. I would like to talk to you for a moment about the end-of-auction procedures, if I could.

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You're familiar with the end-of-auction procedures,

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A. Yes.

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Q. Okay. Would you describe for us what happens if the last -- if in the last round of the

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auction the number of tranches bid falls short of the

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number of tranches available.

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A. In that case the bidders, when they

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reduce the number of tranches bid, supply what's

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called an exit price which is the last and best offer. So if in the last round of the auction there

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are fewer tranches bid than are available, there were

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in the penultimate round more tranches bid and

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available so there are a number of tranches that are

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withdrawn, and those tranches will have an exit price

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that is associated with them so that there would be a

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number of tranches that would be kept at supply in

increasing order of the exit price.

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So all the tranches bid at the price of the last round would be winning tranches and the additional tranches would be picked with the lowest exit price first.

- Q. And then what would be -- in that situation would you tell us what the auction clearing price would be?
- A. The auction clearing price would be the lowest price at which there's a balance of the number of tranches bid, the number of tranches supplied.
- Q. And so the auction clearing price would be at a price higher than the last round price; is that correct?
  - A. That's correct.

MR. REILLY: Thank you, Doctor.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

Mr. Conway, redirect?

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## REDIRECT EXAMINATION

By Mr. Conway:

Q. Dr. LaCasse, in the recent exchange towards the tail end of your cross-examination when you were talking to Mr. Pritchard one of the words

you used that I heard was "leery," and one of the 1 2 words that the court reporter heard apparently was 3 "weary." That you were weary of, I forget the exact 4 words, but the tendency to treat the, what the 5 bidders do as a matter of simple arithmetic as opposed to something more, as I heard it, more 6 7 specific to the bidders. Was the word "leery" or "weary"? Do you 8 recall? 9 I don't recall. 10 Α. 11 Q. Okay. 12 Α. They both express the sentiment. 13 Q. You're leery of doing what Mr. Pritchard suggested and you're weary of him doing it. 14 Of the question. 15 Α. 16 (Laughter.) 17 MR. CONWAY: No further questions, your 18 Honor. 19 EXAMINER TAUBER: Are there any questions 20 for recross? 21 (No response.) 22 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you, you may be 23 excused. 24 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 25 MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, at this time I

would again move for the admission of AEP Ohio 1 2 Exhibit No. 1 into the record. EXAMINER TAUBER: Are there any 3 4 objections to AEP Ohio Exhibit No. 1 which is Dr. 5 LaCasse's direct testimony? 6 (No response.) 7 EXAMINER TAUBER: Seeing none, it shall be admitted. 8 9 (EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 10 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Alexander. MR. ALEXANDER: At this time I move for 11 12 the admission of FES Exhibit No. 1. 13 EXAMINER TAUBER: Are there any objections to FES Exhibit No. 1, the interrogatory? 14 15 Seeing none, it shall be admitted. 16 (EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 17 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Pritchard. 18 MR. PRITCHARD: At this time I move for the admission of IEU-Ohio Exhibit 1 which is the 19 20 LaCasse testimony from 08-917. 21 MR. CONWAY: Yes, your Honor, I think 22 Mr. Pritchard quoted from the document the passages 23 he wanted to examine Dr. LaCasse about, there were a 24 few passages, fairly a small fraction of the body of 25 the document and I think the purpose was served in

1 that fashion, so I would object to allowing 2 the entire document to be injected into the record in 3 this case. I don't think it's necessary. 4 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Pritchard. 5 MR. PRITCHARD: With that clarification, as long as Mr. Conway does not have any objections to 6 7 using the transcript from today, I don't believe that the entire document needs to be admitted. 8 9 MR. CONWAY: Thank you. EXAMINER TAUBER: Okay, at this time we 10 will not admit IEU Exhibit No. 1. 11 12 Let's take a quick five-minute recess and 13 reconvene. 14 (Recess taken.) 15 EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the 16 record. 17 Mr. Nourse, you may call your next 18 witness. 19 MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor. 20 AEP Ohio calls David M. Roush. 21 EXAMINER PARROT: Please raise your right 22 hand. 23 (Witness sworn.) 24 EXAMINER PARROT: Please be seated. 25

1 DAVID M. ROUSH being first duly sworn, as prescribed by law, was 2 examined and testified as follows: 3 4 DIRECT EXAMINATION 5 By Mr. Nourse: Good morning, Mr. Roush. Can you state 6 Ο. 7 and spell your name for the record, please? 8 Sure. My named is David M. Roush, Α. R-o-u-s-h. 9 10 Ο. By whom are you employed and in what capacity? 11 12 I'm employed by American Electric Power 13 Service Corporation as Director of Regulated Pricing 14 Analysis. Did you prepare and cause to be filed 15 Q. 16 direct testimony in this case on June 14th, 2013? 17 Α. I did. 18 MR. NOURSE: Okay, your Honor, I'd like to mark Mr. Roush's prefiled testimony as AEP Ohio 19 2.0 Exhibit No. 2. 21 EXAMINER PARROT: So marked. 22 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 23 0. Mr. Roush, do you have any changes, 24 corrections, or updates to your written testimony? 25 Α. No, I do not.

59 1 Okay. If I were to ask you these same 2 questions under oath today, would your answers be the 3 same? 4 Yes, they would. Α. 5 MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I'd move for the admission of AEP Ohio Exhibit No. 2 subject to 6 cross-examination. 7 EXAMINER PARROT: Thank you, Mr. Nourse. 8 Mr. Petricoff? 9 10 MR. PETRICOFF: Thank you, your Honor. 11 12 CROSS-EXAMINATION 13 By Mr. Petricoff: 14 Good morning, Mr. Roush. 15 Α. Good morning. 16 I see from your testimony that you began 17 with American Electric Power in 1989? 18 That's correct. Α. 19 You were in rate analysis at that time? 2.0 That's correct. Α. 2.1 So you're familiar with the, what we'll 22 call the cost of service paradigm for pricing electric service. 23 24 The pre-'99 vintage traditional 25 ratemaking cost of service approach in Ohio, yes.

Q. And you're also familiar with the so-called hybrid system that came in after Senate Bill 3 and Senate Bill 221?

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- A. Generally, yes. There were kind of two different systems after Senate Bill 3 and then Senate Bill 221.
- Q. And you were a witness for AEP Ohio in both of the ESP 1 and 2 cases?
- A. That sounds right. I'm -- it's been a while. I'm trying to remember ESP 1 anymore.
- Q. Time goes by when you're having fun.

  We've spent a lot of time here on the ESP, I'll leave

  it for the jury to decide whether it was fun.

Let's go back and talk about the, what you called the traditional cost of service. In the traditional cost of service mechanism that AEP Ohio employed did they use a fuel adjustment clause?

- A. Pre-'99 there was the electric fuel component which was a slightly different construct than the fuel adjustment clause that's in place today but primarily it was there to recover fuel costs.
- Q. Right. And fuel costs are a variable cost as opposed to a fixed cost?
- A. I think in the EFC paradigm back in the '90s it might have been primarily variable costs

whereas today the FAC includes purchased power which is a -- has both fixed and variable components.

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- Q. Okay. Let's go back and talk about the pre-1999 just so we have a base we can measure against. The components that were in the fuel adjustment -- well, let me ask you this question:

  Does the company experience a cost for fuel prior to when the fuel is consumed?
- A. I'd say yes, generally. This kind of goes, you know, a little outside the scope of what I talk about in my testimony or what I did back then because, mercifully, I've never had to work on the Ohio EFC filings, I was more of a base rate guy, but my general understanding is you obviously have to buy the fuel and have it before you can burn it.
- Q. Let's go back and we'll talk about the base side because you're familiar with that. When a power plant is built, you would agree with me that it's a fixed cost because either the bonds that were issued to -- or the debt that was taken on as well as the equity to build the unit has to be paid whether the generation unit is used or not, correct?
- A. If you're saying there's a cost of owning a power plant that the company incurs even in a month when the unit may not run, then I would agree with

that.

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- Q. Okay. Do you have a different definition for fixed versus variable price components?
  - A. I'm sorry, different than what?
- Q. Than the one I've just described to you for the fixed. Let me rephrase the question.
  - A. Okay.
- Q. What is your definition of a fixed cost component for purposes of setting electric rates?

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, can I just get a clarification. I'm waiting to hear how this relates to his testimony. I don't think we have any fixed costs of a power plant being built by Ohio Power that are at issue in this case.

MR. PETRICOFF: These are background questions, I'm coming to that.

THE WITNESS: Can you remind me what the question was?

- Q. Actually, let me withdraw it and I'll ask you this one: What is your definition of a variable cost for ratemaking purposes?
- A. I guess this is going to -- will be an oversimplification, but generally it's going to be a

cost which varies with the kWh output of the plant.

- Q. Okay. And fuel would fit in that category?
- A. Fuel would fit in that category as would things like allowances.
- Q. And in the portion of the rate base -- in the portion of the rider that is proposed in this proceeding, the variable portion that you have, well, let me turn to this because I'll -- turn to Exhibit DMR No. 1.
  - A. I'm there.

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- Q. Okay. Now, you see where it says "fixed cost rider"?
  - A. Yes, I do.
- Q. What's your definition of "fixed cost" as you used in that exhibit?
- A. As used in that exhibit it's a set of very specific accounts that are included in the existing FAC and those were shown in Exhibit F to the company's supplement to application which was filed on February 11th. As I discuss in my testimony, the primary elements that are in that are the demand charges associated with OVEC and Lawrenceburg.
- Q. And those are fixed because they do not vary with the number of megawatt-hours that are sold?

- A. That is correct. They're fixed or demand charges under those purchase power agreements which do not vary with the kWh output of those units.
- Q. And it is at that variability that distinguishes the fixed cost riders that you have in G, when I say "G" here I'm referring to Column G, from the auction phase-in riders that you have in Column F.

THE WITNESS: Can you read that back, please? I'm sorry.

(Record read.)

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- A. I guess the distinction between the fixed cost rider which includes those fixed costs and the items shown in Exhibit DMR-1 on line 2 and 3 of Column F, those are variable costs, line 4 is kind of another distinct type of cost which is the auction costs.
- Q. Just for later reference when we go back, the auction costs are on row 3 as opposed to row 4?
- A. No. Row 4 are the, what we're terming the auction costs which were the items identified in Exhibit H to the company's supplement to the application which are things like the auction manager fees, the auction incidentals, the internal incremental auction costs.

Q. Okay.

2.0

- A. What's on line 3 is the actual procurement of the energy in the auction.
- Q. I see. Thank you. So with the exception of those items that went into the -- conducting the auction itself, the rest would be a variable cost.
- A. Yes, the items in Column F other than those costs would be variable.
- Q. Okay. Now let's go back to the -- to the cost in service days. Did the company earn a return on the variable costs that were collected through the fuel adjustment clause or the predecessor to the fuel adjustment clause?
- A. I guess I'm going to have to break that out to two periods because we're kind of covering two creatures. If you go back to the pre -- pre-2000 vintage EFC, the EFC would have been simply a cost recovery rider and then the company's return would have been part of its non-EFC rates.

When you go to -- when the FAC was introduced and implemented in 2009, I believe, again the company -- that rider is simply a dollar-for-dollar cost recovery rider with no return. So any return is kind of -- any return for the company is implicit in their, kind of the leftover

noncost-based component which is base generation rates.

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- Q. So, basically, in the EFC or in the later fuel adjustment the company is only reimbursed for its expenses, it is not earning revenue on the sale of energy and other variable costs. I'm sorry, not the sale of fuel and other variable costs.
- A. Can you take another whack at that one?

  I kind of got lost through the middle of it.
- Q. Sure. Sure. I tried to distinguish, and I was going to make it easy and do the pre-1999 and then the hybrid period but we can do them -- we can do them together.

I'm looking to see when the company earns money and when the company doesn't earn money. So my question to you is that in the, either the items that are in the fuel adjustment clause in the hybrid period or the EFC that preceded it, isn't it true that the company just gets reimbursed for its expenses, there is no revenue -- there is no margin or return?

- A. I believe that's correct. The EFC and the FAC are just dollar-for-dollar cost recovery riders, there was no return component.
  - Q. Okay. Now let's go back and this time I

want you -- these questions are just to the pre-1999 world. If you're an operator in the pre-'99 world and you know that the variable cost for turning on the next unit that you would need for -- to meet your expected demand is lower than what you could buy it for on the economy dispatch market, did you generate or did you buy?

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MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I would just object to the scope of his testimony. I don't think he's holding himself out as a fuel procurement expert or a plant operator or dispatch operator.

MR. PETRICOFF: Your Honor, he can tell me if he doesn't know and then we can equate his lack of knowledge and expertise when we equate his price projections.

THE WITNESS: Can you read it back for me, please?

(Record read.)

MR. NOURSE: Mr. Petricoff, can I clarify when you're talking about costs, variable costs being higher or lower than market rate, for what period of time are you talking about? Does that relate to the same period that the plant will run if you decide to

turn it on or off?

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- Q. I'm -- we're at 50,000 feet. I'm just asking in the dynamic as an operator when you saw that you had demand coming on and you knew that you could buy -- you could buy for less than you could generate, what was the prudent operator to do?
- A. I think we've kind of established right at the beginning I've been in rates since 1989, so I've never operated anything. But my fundamental understanding of economic dispatch is the decisions are made in a least-cost manner whether it's over a, you know, I know there are all kinds of other factors that have to be considered like the run time capability, the start-up time, that kind of stuff, there's all kinds of variables that enter into it, but the general philosophical concept is economic dispatch which is you use the least-cost resource.
- Q. And, in fact, isn't that the ratemaking philosophy behind the fact that items like fuel and other variable costs do not carry margin or return in them so as not to penalize the company or not to interfere with the decision in using the economic dispatching to get the lowest cost?

Actually, let me rephrase that question, hopefully I can make it a bit shorter.

Isn't it true that from a ratemaking philosophy standpoint it is important not to put revenue or return in the variable costs so as not to give a perverse incentive for using the lowest available variable -- lowest available energy?

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MR. NOURSE: Well, your Honor, I object.

I think that you're failing to indicate whether we're now talking about traditional ratemaking philosophy or the current regulatory regime.

MR. PETRICOFF: From the beginning I said we're doing the traditional first.

MR. NOURSE: Thank you.

A. I'm kind of having a little trouble with this one because I think, you know, it's -- at one simple philosophical level I might be able to agree with you but there's also the philosophy of, you know, in environments where utilities are being, you know, even under the traditional paradigm are being asked to do RFPs and entering into significant purchase power contracts that I've seen utilities and others may take the policy or philosophy decision that there ought to be some recognition of a return component on significant PPAs.

So I'm having trouble just blanket agreeing with that as a universal philosophy.

Q. Is purchased power included in either the -- was purchased power included in the EFC for AEP Ohio during cost-of-service ratemaking?

- A. My recollection is that only a portion of purchased power was included in the EFC which would only be the energy or variable components to the extent there was capacity purchases or that it was a bundled product, it would only be the energy portion back then. But, like I mentioned earlier, I didn't do those filings, thank goodness.
- Q. Okay. Is it your opinion that Senate Bill 3 and Senate Bill 221 exhibit a -- let me take it back.

Is it your opinion that Senate Bill 3 and Senate Bill 221 established a requirement from the General Assembly that utility companies be able to earn a margin or a return when purchasing energy?

MR. NOURSE: Can I just clarify? You're asking for his opinion --

MR. PETRICOFF: His personal opinion.

MR. NOURSE: -- even though you referred to a legal requirement in the statute? Thank you.

MR. PETRICOFF: No, just his opinion.

A. I haven't read them in detail, to be able to say one way or the other, in a long time.

Q. Is it your opinion -- well, let me take it back.

Let's go back now and take a look at DMR-1.

A. I'm there.

- Q. Okay. Now, my understanding is that the numbers that we see here are for illustrative purposes, these are not projections that you have made.
  - A. Correct.
  - O. And --
- A. I apologize, I'll just clarify: Line 4 is based on a company projection. The auction costs, the incidentals, program manager fees.
- Q. Well, with the exception of line 4, the rest are for illustrative purposes, they're not part of a study or projection that you have made.
  - A. Correct.
- Q. Is Ohio Power or any other generating-owning affiliate of AEP allowed to bid in these upcoming energy auctions?
- MR. NOURSE: Again, I would object. That sounds a lot like a legal conclusion.
  - Q. To the best of your knowledge.
  - A. I don't know whether they're allowed or

not. I think between the auction manager and the lawyers and the Commission they'll figure that one out.

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- Q. Okay. Let's go back to DMR-1. If the auction closed at \$41 and 6 mils -- I'm sorry, if the auction closed at \$41.06 per megawatt-hour, would the price that would be charged customers be \$45.06 per megawatt-hour under your example?
- A. I haven't done the arithmetic, but that seems too high to me.
- Q. Okay. Well, let's do it together and maybe you can help me out. Basically, we're looking now at row 7, and this is the revenue requirement per megawatt-hour.
  - A. Okay, I see that.
- Q. And is the purpose of your exhibit here to show under the 60 percent auction as proposed by the company this would be the price that customers would pay for a megawatt-hour of energy?
- A. I guess not exactly. What this is showing is how you would compute all the elements including the auction purchase to come up with an illustration of the company's proposed auction phase-in rider or fixed-cost rider or the alternative we're showing here of the single rider. But once you

get to the bottom line there's still another step to translate that into retail rates for customers.

- Q. But that's just an allocation step, right? To know how much Homeowner A is going to pay or Company B is going to pay. Weighted average for what everyone's going to pay is the numbers that you have on row 7, correct?
- A. Weighted average based on this illustration, correct.

- Q. And what I'm saying is that -- and weighted average is what we're going to see at the end of the auction. We're going to get a weighted average cost per megawatt-hour, correct?
- A. I believe that's correct, but I believe you may be looking at the wrong number on the table. If you're looking at where the auction result would be plugged in, it would be in row 3, column E.
- Q. Right. And so the 6 cents basically is what is picking up the cost for paying for the auction itself, in essence.
  - A. I'm sorry? Six cents?
- Q. If you look at row 7, the difference between the \$40 that you have shown for the illustrative cost in column E, the difference between that number and the number in row 7, column F, is the

difference of the auction cost itself.

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- A. I think I'm with you but I'm going to try to play it back to make sure we're both on the same page. The three elements that come down to the 40.06 at the bottom are a certain amount of megawatt-hours under the FAC at \$40, a certain amount of megawatt-hours under the CBP at \$40, and then the auction costs. And so if you kind of -- if you attempted to kind of weight these, you'd say \$16 of the 40 is the FAC, \$24 is the auction, and .06 is the auction costs themselves.
- Q. But just looking at your example, the rows 2 and rows 3 are both at 40, so the only difference between that and the \$40.06 is the cost of having the auction.
- A. Correct. The auction costs on line 4 are roughly .06 per megawatt-hour in this illustration.
- Q. Now I want to take you on a hypothetical. Let's assume that the closing bid is \$41, everything else in terms of the costs for having the bid are just as you have projected, then the weighted average megawatt-hour that's going to have to be picked up by customers is going to be the \$41.06 plus the \$4 -- is the 46 plus the \$4 that we have in the fixed cost riders and that should give us the total of the --

MR. PETRICOFF: May I have a moment, please? I'll withdraw the question at the moment.

- Q. Now I'm ready again for you. Okay.

  Basically, we are going to leave, in the
  60 percent auction, we are going to leave 40 percent
  at the current FAC price; that's correct?
  - A. Correct.

Q. That's right.

And so if we are doing the math here to figure out what the difference would be, it would be line 3 in column E, and I told you to assume that that closing price came in at \$41 rather than the \$40 that you had. And assuming that we multiply it out times the .4 and the .6 and we include in the cost of the auction, subject to check, then we should come up with a price of \$44.60 -- I'm sorry, 66 cents; is that correct?

- A. That's correct.
- Q. And so the price to the -- or, the weighted average price to customers is basically up by 60 cents, correct? Under your example.
- A. Yes. Under my example and substituting in \$41 for the auction purchase costs would yield a 60-cent change in the bottom line value in column H, line 7.

Q. And if Ohio Power bid in and was the sole winner, that additional 60 cents would be revenue that would go to Ohio Power.

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- A. I guess I don't know because we already established that I have no -- I don't know whether Ohio Power would be in the auctions and that was something between the Commission and the lawyers, et cetera. And then I guess the other part of it is my understanding is Ohio Power wouldn't have any generation after corporate separation anyhow.
- Q. And in that case assume that Ohio Power or its affiliates are allowed to bid in, and for purposes of this example let's say they win the auction, they would be permitted to earn 66 cents more in revenue than they would have gotten if just the FAC would have remained in place.
- A. I guess, again, I'm still struggling with the hypothetical because I guess I've taken it as a given throughout my testimony that what the Commission ordered us to do in the ESP we have to do.
- Q. Okay. Well, I'm just looking at what the results would be following through your example. You would agree with me that if the bid came in at \$41, that customers would be paying more than they would be if the FAC was just left in place.

A. I guess if you're saying that solely in the context of this hypothetical illustration we're looking at right now, then that's the way the arithmetic works out. I guess I'm not saying that as a blanket statement that I've evaluated what a particular auction price means relative to what the FAC may do in the future.

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Q. Okay. But you would agree with me that it is possible under this paradigm that customers could pay more, that is SSOs, standard service customers could pay more for energy than they would under the FAC depending on how the bid came out as shown on column E, line 3 of your example.

MR. NOURSE: Object. Does this paradigm refer to the Commission's ESP decision?

MR. PETRICOFF: No. No. His chart, DMR-1.

THE WITNESS: Would you mind reading the question back, please?

(Record read.)

A. I guess let me break it into two parts.

The first part, is it possible that the auction is higher or lower than the FAC costs? I think those are possible. I'm certainly not an auction expert to be able to opine on what those numbers are going to

come out to be.

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So given that that's possible, if you go through your arithmetic as shown in Exhibit DMR-1, then could the answer be that the end result price in line 7, column H, is higher than the FAC price including the fixed cost elements of the FAC? Then that's possible.

I don't know what's probable because I have no opinion on where the auctions may come out.

- Q. And since it is possible that it could come up higher, then there's going to be additional revenue that's paid out by the customers for energy; isn't that correct?
- A. Customers' bills will be different, but again, I believe it's a function of what we've been ordered to do.
  - Q. So the answer is yes.

THE WITNESS: Can you read back the question prior?

(Record read.)

- A. Yes, it is possible that at the end of the day customers' rates could come out higher than they would have if there were no auction, but it's also possible that they'll be lower.
  - Q. And if it is higher, and if AEP or if

Ohio Power or one of its affiliates is the successful bid winner, then, unlike the FAC, Ohio Power is going to be able to earn a margin or a return on a sale of fuel.

- A. I guess I'm not there with you. As we kind of talked about earlier, we haven't established that Ohio Power would be in the auctions, and I don't know that one way or the other.
  - Q. Well, let --

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- A. And then the other part of it is that I think we have discussed that Ohio Power won't have generation post corporate separation.
- Q. Well, first of all on that, will we have an energy-only -- will we have an energy-only auction prior to corporate separation? Is it possible?
- A. I think I heard Dr. LaCasse indicate it's a function of six months after a couple orders plus also the outcome of this proceeding, so I thought I heard a six months after an April 24th date which would put us in November timeframe for flow, but then it's also contingent on this proceeding. So if it does happen, it would be for, at most, the last couple months of this year.
- Q. So the answer is: Possible, but you don't know. Possibly or possibly not.

- A. Can you go back one question, then?
- Q. Let's -- let me, I'm sorry. Let me withdraw the question and just ask you, maybe there's an easier way to get to this.

Let's go back and look at your DMR-1 exhibit, okay, and the first one is the -- that's the FAC variable cost, that's going to be the portion that remains in the -- being supplied under the FAC, correct?

A. Correct.

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- Q. And so that illustrative \$40 there represents what the actual, let's see, what the cost to AEP Ohio would be for the FAC with no margin or return.
  - A. Correct.
- Q. Okay. Now let's go down to row 3. Let's assume that that is \$41 because that's where the auction closed. If AEP's legacy facilities were being used, then there would be an extra dollar in revenue over what the out-of -- over what the costs would have been under the FAC.
- A. I guess the reason why I'm having trouble agreeing with you there is that, obviously, we touched on it a little bit on my very high level understanding of economic dispatch would be that the

\$40 in line 2 of the FAC energy cost when only 800,000 megawatt-hours are being supplied might be higher if more than 800,000 megawatt-hours were supplied.

Q. Well, I understand. But I'm just looking at your chart and I'm trying to get something more theoretical. So let's drop off the numbers and let's just look at this as a matter of economic logic.

We have a price that's in row 2, column E, which is your actual, if you will, out-of-pocket costs for the variable services supplied in the FAC, correct?

- A. That the level of megawatt-hours.
- Q. At that level, right.
- A. Okay.

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- Q. And in row 3 we have the same thing but it's the auction price, that's correct? That's what you're portraying here is it's the auction price that's in column E, row 3.
  - A. Yes, that's the auction price.
- Q. And you already told me that you agreed that it is possible that under the auction that number that's in E-3 could be higher than the number that's in E-2.
  - A. It could be higher or lower.

- Q. Could be higher or lower, okay.
- A. Or the same.

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Q. Right. Or the same, right.

Let's assume that it is higher. In that case if, in fact, the supplier under E-3 is Ohio Power, wouldn't they be earning the -- the extra money from the -- earning more money than they would have earned if they had supplied the same variable costs without the auction?

- A. And that's where I'm having trouble saying that with certainty because, as we kind of discussed, you know, the high level concept of economic dispatch, the actual cost of those additional megawatt-hours is potentially higher as well than the \$40 shown in line 2.
- Q. Oh, no, that's why we're doing this theoretically because these are just -- these are not real numbers or even projections, they're for illustrative purposes, and all I'm trying to get on the record here is to find out whether or not it is possible that if the auction price for FAC services closes above the FAC price to AEP, if there would be additional revenue that would be earned.
- A. And, again, I guess I'm trying to say, to clarify that the \$40 price shown in line 2 is only

for the 800,000 megawatt-hours. If we're following kind of that general economic dispatch theory, the next hundred thousand or 1.2 million megawatt-hours might be more expensive -- would be more expensive than the \$40, so I can't say for certainty that because the auction came in at 41 that there's any extra revenue above cost there.

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Q. Well, let me flip it. Can you say that Ohio Power, if it is the auction winner, could definitely not earn any more money than it would have earned had it just supplied the same service under the FAC?

THE WITNESS: Can you read that one back? (Record read.)

MR. NOURSE: And I would just object, your Honor. I think we've been talking about Ohio Power and its affiliates and then in that question he just said "Ohio Power" so I'm not sure what he's asking now.

MR. PETRICOFF: I thank counsel. I would like to amend the question to add "Ohio Power and/or its affiliates."

THE WITNESS: One more time, please.

(Record read.)

A. I can't say that one way or the other

because I don't know.

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- Q. Do you know whether it's a low probability that Ohio Power or its affiliates could earn more in the FAC auction than they could from the FAC alone?
- A. I don't know because there's so many variables that you'd have to consider. I mean, you know, the first of which is whether Ohio Power is even in the auction, the second variable of which is what's going on with FAC prices, what the auction outcome is, and then also what the indirect impact of any of that is on the shopping level. So it's that's a pretty complicated model that I can't do here on the stand.
- Q. Okay. Would you expect Ohio Power or its affiliates that have the legacy generation transferred to it to bid in an auction at a price below the variable FAC cost?
- A. That's not part of my day-to-day job so I can't tell you what they would do.
  - Q. So far you have -- I'm sorry.

Is it your understanding as a witness for the company that AEP Ohio believes that it should have the right to earn more than the FAC cost for FAC services if it supplies them under the auction?

THE WITNESS: Can you read that one back, please?

(Record read.)

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MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I'd just object. I think this is getting far afield from Mr. Roush's testimony. He's tried to explain his perspective I think over and over on what he does and doesn't know, what he does as his rate tariff job versus these market questions, and asking him to speak for a future affiliate that, you know, how they're going to participate in a particular auction, I mean, these are just very far afield, I think well beyond the scope of Mr. Roush's testimony.

MR. PETRICOFF: Your Honor, if I could be heard on this, this is the company's witness on this rate matter. I think it's a pretty straightforward question. If it's so -- if it's so tangential that they could earn, that's fine, I'm sure it's something they've thought about, and even though Mr. Roush may not have done the computations, I wouldn't be surprised if someone at AEP has done it and decided that this was something worth pursuing.

EXAMINER PARROT: The objection is overruled.

THE WITNESS: Can you read it back one

more time?

(Record read.)

A. I think I have to parse this out into my dummy's view of the world which is, as we've discussed several times, I don't know whether -- whether or who will be participating in the auction, whether Ohio Power, whether its affiliates, whether Ohio Power has generation even to participate, but my simple view is we're required to do the auctions.

If any entity, affiliated, nonaffiliated, wins a tranche in the auction, then they're entitled to payment of the auction clearing price. So that's my kind of simple view of it.

MR. PETRICOFF: I have no further questions. Thank you very much, Mr. Roush.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Alexander?

MR. ALEXANDER: Thank you, your Honor.

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## CROSS-EXAMINATION

By Mr. Alexander:

Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Roush.

You've previously reviewed FES Witness Noewer's testimony, in particular the chart in her testimony on page 9?

- A. That rings a bell from deposition but I do not have it with me.
- Q. Would it be helpful for you to review a copy of her prefiled testimony?
- A. Sure, if you're going to ask me questions about it, yeah. Thank you.
  - Q. Sure.

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Would you please focus your attention at the chart on page 9, line 19. Does this chart accurately reflect AEP Ohio's position on the mechanics of the blending methodology?

- A. Yes, I think it generally represents in kind of a percentage basis the three phases of the auction under the company's proposal.
- Q. AEP Ohio seeks 100 percent recovery of the fixed portion of the FAC through the end of the ESP period or May 31st, 2015?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. And AEP does not anticipate capacity pricing at 188 per megawatt-day until January 1st, 2015.
- A. Yes, but I'd kind of say it the flip, the company expects base generation rates to remain in effect until January 1st, 2015, at which time they will be reduced to reflect 188.88.

- Q. I believe you mentioned this response to a question from Mr. Petricoff, but you believe that base generation rates recover several types of leftover costs; is that correct?
- A. I guess it's kind of laid out on page 4, lines 8 through 12 of my testimony, where I kind of show you total generation and transmission rates, then you back out three riders which have very specifically identifiable costs and base generation rates are kind of the leftover.
- Q. And so just focusing now on what we're calling the leftover, so the costs that are still in base generation rates, you believe that CAT tax for generation service is conceptually recovered through base generation rates.
- A. Effectively by deduction, since it's not in the FAC or the AER or TCRR, again, remember all of this is under the foundation that we don't have cost-based rates in Ohio anymore.
- Q. And you similarly believe that uncollectibles for the FAC, the AER, and the TCRR are also recovered through base generation rates.
  - A. Yes.

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Q. And a return on equity for base generation service is also included in base

generation rates?

- A. I think, again, at the conceptual level, generally yes, since we're not exactly -- and we spent a lot of time with Mr. Petricoff on that we're not in a traditional cost-based world, so kind of you've got the aggregate of our G and T rates, we know what's in the FAC, the AER, and the TCRR, so there's probably something in base G for items like a return, but I can't specifically say how much or what the amount is.
- Q. Sure. And, again, conceptually you believe that fixed capacity costs are also recovered through base generation rates.
  - A. Yes, with all the same caveats.
- Q. And you believe that AEP Ohio recovers all energy costs exclusively through the variable portion of the fuel adjustment clause.
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And, therefore, AEP Ohio would recover no energy costs through base generation rates.
  - A. Correct.
- Q. In your testimony, staying at page 4, line 14, what you're discussing, the CAT tax, do you see that?
  - A. Yes, I do.

Q. You believe that the CAT tax is approximately .26 percent; is that correct?

A. I believe that's the rate.

Q. And other Ohio utilities or -- strike

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Q. And other Ohio utilities or -- strike that.

All other Ohio utilities include a CAT tax gross-up when translating auction results into retail rates; is that right?

- A. I believe that's the case.
- Q. And the other Ohio utilities also include a CAT tax gross-up for other riders like the FAC, the TCRR, and the AER; is that correct?
  - A. I believe they generally do, yes.
- Q. And at line 15, page 4, you address the cost of uncollectibles; do you see that?
  - A. Yes, I do.
- Q. AEP Ohio doesn't gross-up its generation related riders for uncollectibles?
  - A. No, it does not.
- Q. Other Ohio utilities gross-up their riders for uncollectibles or include a separate rider for uncollectibles?
  - A. That's my general understanding.
- Q. Do you know the cost of uncollectibles on a per megawatt-hour basis?

A. No, I do not.

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- Q. Can you give an estimate of the cost of uncollectibles?
  - A. Not sitting here today, no.
- Q. Would you agree that a rider permitting
  AEP Ohio to recover uncollectibles would address
  AEP Ohio's concern over these costs?
  - A. I think generally, yes.
- Q. And you believe that AEP Ohio's base generation price is roughly equivalent to \$314 a megawatt-day capacity pricing?
  - A. Give me a sec just to double-check.

Yes, based upon the data in my workpapers in this proceeding, the arithmetic would say that current base G is roughly \$314 a megawatt-day.

- Q. Please turn to your direct testimony, page 7, line 2.
  - A. I'm there.
- Q. In this section you're referencing the results of a 40 percent reduction to base generation rates, correct?
  - A. Correct.
- Q. And the results of the 40 percent reduction you believe would be approximately equal to \$188 a megawatt-day capacity pricing?

A. Correct, on average.

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- Q. And applying \$188 capacity pricing would result in a reduction from \$22.50 to \$13.50 per megawatt-hour.
- A. Correct. The company's current base G is roughly 22.50 a megawatt-hour, reducing it in January of '15 to reflect 188.88 would be the equivalent of roughly 13.50 a megawatt-hour, and just to be clear, on the previous page I discuss why I think this is really the base generation rate adjustment will be addressed in a different proceeding, we're providing it here for illustration.
- Q. You've jumped ahead of my outline. So AEP Ohio is anticipating another separate proceeding down the road which would address capacity pricing after January 1st, 2015?
- A. Would address just the rates. The adjustment to the base G rates. You know, clearly, you know, based on the advice of my counsel from reviewing all of the lengthy ESP documents they told me we've been directed to reduce base G rates to reflect 188.88 effective January 1, '15, so we're going to do that.
- So I anticipate filing another case where we file those adjusted rates.

Q. So AEP Ohio is not asking the Commission to establish those rates, and by "those rates" I mean rates after January 1st, 2015, in this proceeding.

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- A. Correct, we're not asking them to do so. But they're free to do whatever they do.
- Q. So back to page 7, line 2. So if the Commission-determined capacity cost is 13.50 per megawatt-hour, there's a \$9 per megawatt-hour spread between current base generation rates and the Commission determined capacity price; is that correct?
- A. Correct. There is that difference between current base generation rates and what the application of 188.88 would produce.
- Q. And a portion of this \$9 spread would compensate AEP Ohio for the CAT tax.
- A. Yes. I think conceptually, you know, to the extent that, you know, as we discussed earlier base G is kind of the Louie leftovers, so anything that's not being recovered through the FAC or the AER or the TCRR is conceptually being recovered through base G, and so that would include things like the CAT tax, uncollectibles, and I guess all of those things in aggregate are subject to the overall market rate offer test in the ESP.

Q. So just sort of to summarize, the \$9 spread we've identified between the capacity price and current base generation rates would compensate AEP Ohio for CAT tax, uncollectibles, and provide a profit margin to AEP Ohio.

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- A. Yes, including, among other things, it could reflect, you know, just overall differences between the, you know, the point estimate at a point in time when the Commission made the 188 determination, any difference in costs between that point estimate and what actual costs are on an ongoing basis.
- Q. And when you're referencing a difference in cost, that difference could be either positive or negative for AEP Ohio, correct?
  - A. It could be, but -- it could be.
- Q. And the Commission's determination in AEP Ohio's capacity case included a return on equity included in that \$188 a megawatt-day calculation, correct?
- A. I wasn't in that case so I don't know that I can say for certain what was all in that 188.88. I know in what the company originally filed which was the 355 or 330 depending on whether it had the energy credit or not, that calculation would have

had a return component in it. What was in the 188 I can't say.

- Q. Does a return on equity of 11.15 percent ring any bells?
  - A. No, it doesn't.

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- Q. Let me ask you like this: So if there were a return on equity in the 188 capacity value, the return on equity within the \$9 spread we just identified would be over and above the return on equity in the 188 capacity value, correct?
- A. I think conceptually -- conceptually, yes. If it were an apples-to-apples comparison. I just don't know whether it is or not.
- Q. Other than the CAT tax, uncollectibles, profit, any potential change in the Commission-determined 188 value, can you identify any other categories of costs which are included in that \$9 spread?
- A. Not sitting here today. Again, it's kind of that leftover.
- Q. Please turn your attention back to page 4, line 16 of your testimony.
  - A. I'm there.
- Q. In here you address whether base generation rates should fluctuate based on the energy

auction process, correct?

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- A. Correct.
- Q. And you believe that AEP Ohio currently recovers all energy costs through the variable portion of the fuel adjustment clause?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Now I'd like to switch your attention to the fixed portion of the fuel adjustment clause as proposed by AEP for a moment. Do you have the supplemental application with you on the stand?
  - A. Yes, I do.
- Q. Please turn your attention to Exhibit F.

  MR. ALEXANDER: Your Honor, I would like
  to mark an exhibit if I may.

EXAMINER PARROT: You may.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

Q. Mr. Roush, you've just been handed a copy of a document which has been marked as FES Exhibit 2.

EXAMINER PARROT: Yes, Exhibit 2.

MR. ALEXANDER: Thank you, your Honor.

- Q. FES Exhibit 2. Have you ever seen that document before?
  - A. Yes, I have.
  - Q. And what is this document?
  - A. It is the company's response to a

discovery request in FirstEnergy's second set, interrogatory No. 3 in that set.

- Q. And were you the individual responsible for creating this response?
  - A. Yes.

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- Q. Okay. Now, keeping this document and supplemental application Exhibit F in front of you, I'd like to discuss the six fixed cost lines which are identified on supplemental application Exhibit F. Do you see those?
  - A. Yes, I do.
- 12 Q. And are those lines 33, 35, 47, 50, 52, and 53?
  - A. Yes, they are.
  - Q. And each of those lines are proposed to be included in the fixed-cost rider.
    - A. That's correct.
  - Q. And each of these line items references a capacity-related charge?
    - A. That's correct.
- Q. And each of these line items would be included in FERC account 555.
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. Turning back to your testimony, page 8, line 8.

A. I'm there.

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- Q. Now, in this section of your testimony you are discussing the proposed split of the fuel adjustment clause; is that correct?
  - A. Correct.
- Q. And you believe that the recovery of fixed costs is consistent with AEP's historic treatment of market purchases to serve retail customers in the past, correct?
- A. Correct. Generally when the company bought energy in the market to serve its retail loads to displace a generating unit, kind of an economy-type purchase, that market purchase would replace the fuel cost of the unit but it wouldn't change the fact that those fixed costs that we've identified remained entirely within the FAC.
- Q. And what this sentence is referring to is purchased power expenses included in FERC account 555.
  - A. Yes, generally. Yes.
- Q. And at page 8, line 19, you reference contracts with OVEC and Lawrenceburg. Each of those contracts includes both capacity and energy?
  - A. That's correct.
  - Q. And AEP Ohio traditionally includes FERC

account 555 purchased power in its fuel adjustment clause?

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- A. Correct, as shown in Exhibit F, all of those items are included in the fuel adjustment clause.
- Q. And, in fact, the OVEC and Lawrenceburg costs you identify on page 8 are recovered through FERC account 555 in the fuel adjustment clause currently, correct?
- A. Just a slight wording change, they're in account 555 and they are recovered through the FAC currently, yes.
- MR. ALEXANDER: Your Honor, may I mark another exhibit?

EXAMINER PARROT: You may.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

- Q. Mr. Roush, I've just handed you a document which has been marked as FES Exhibit 3, which is Dr. Pearce's testimony in the AEP Ohio 10-2929 case. Dr. Pearce was the witness responsible for calculating AEP Ohio's formula rate in that case; is that correct?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. I'd like to turn your attention to Exhibit KDP-4, page 14, line 11.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Can you repeat that?

MR. ALEXANDER: Sure. It's Exhibit

KDP-4, page 14, line 11.

A. I'm there.

Q. And Dr. Pearce at this reference is including purchased power costs from FERC account 555 into AEP Ohio's formula capacity rate?

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, can you read that back?

(Record read.)

- A. Yes, it appears at this point in the calculation Dr. Pearce was including elements of -- or, including account 555 in the calculation of the formula rate. What I can't tell from this page is how it was -- how the split between demand and energy was done, demand or fixed energy and variable was done.
- Q. And when you say you can't tell, do you mean beyond the detail provided at columns 2 and 3 at the workpaper level? Is that what you mean?
- A. Correct. I can only see this at the three-digit 555 level, I can't see the detail like we just discussed in Exhibit F with all the little seven-digit account level.
  - Q. In Dr. Pearce's -- or, do you know if

- Dr. Pearce's formula rate calculation ties to AEP Ohio's 2010 FERC Form 1?
  - A. I would assume that it does.
- Q. So the fixed portion of purchased power costs from FERC account 555 were included in AEP Ohio's proposed \$355 per megawatt-day capacity charge?
- A. It appears from looking at this that, in general, they would have been included in the company's proposal.
- Q. And if you could turn your attention to Exhibit KDP-6.
  - A. I'm there.

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- Q. And does this page show how those numbers flow through into the \$355 number reached by Dr. Pearce?
  - A. I think generally it appears to, yes.
- Q. And so all six line items proposed to be included in the fixed portion of the fuel adjustment clause were included in AEP Ohio's formula rate proposal in Case No. 10-2929.
- A. I think it's, as we mentioned, I can't -- without seeing the account level detail work, I can't say that with a hundred percent certainty, but it appears that they were all included in the company's

proposed calculation which wasn't ultimately adopted.

- Q. You just said AEP Ohio's proposal was not ultimately adopted. The Commission ultimately ordered AEP Ohio to charge \$188 per megawatt-day for capacity; is that right?
- A. That's my basic understanding, the Commission determined a 188.88 cost of capacity related to shopping customers.
- Q. Under your formula, your proposed formula, AEP Ohio would recover both the 188.88 and the fixed capacity charge -- or, strike that -- and the fixed portion of the fuel adjustment clause after January 1st, 2015, correct?
- A. Under the company's proposal in this proceeding we continue to collect the fixed-cost rider for the first five months of 2015 and reduce base generation rates to reflect 188.88 consistent with the order.
- Q. And you believe that AEP Ohio should be permitted to recover both the fixed portion of the fuel adjustment clause costs and the 188 formula rate because you do not know what costs were included in the Commission's calculation of the \$188 value.
- A. Not exactly, and just to clear up the 188 in my mind isn't a formula rate because there isn't a

formula anymore, it's just a determined number, but generally the fixed component of the FAC has been there all along and is a prudently incurred cost that should continue to be collected.

The other part of it, it is true that I can't say what's in the 188.88 that the Commission determined relative to capacity for shopping customers, and counsel advised me that 188.88 is what we need to reduce our base G rates to reflect beginning January of '15. So I, you know, I don't see a disconnect.

- Q. At a high level, there are basically two parts to generation service, energy and capacity, correct?
  - A. Yes. Generally.

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- Q. So if there's to be an energy-only auction, the capacity to serve that load must come from somewhere.
- A. The capacity for all of AEP Ohio customer load comes from the FRR obligation through the end of May of '15.
- Q. You've reached my next point. So the capacity must come from somewhere and due to AEP Ohio's FRR election, it must come from AEP Ohio, correct?

- A. That's correct, through May of '15.
- Q. And you were a witness in AEP Ohio's ESP 2 proceeding?
  - A. Yes.

- Q. And in AEP Ohio's ESP application

  AEP Ohio proposed to conduct a 5 percent energy-only auction.
- A. That's probably right but for some reason the percentage sounds funny to me.
- Q. And in that ESP proceeding in its testimony, AEP Ohio proposed to provide capacity for the 5 percent energy-only auction at its cost for capacity, or \$255; is that correct?
- A. That doesn't sound right. I think -- I know that somewhere as part of the ESP there was an offer to provide capacity at 255, but I don't know that there was the dots connected to say that that 255 was our cost. I think it was just an offer.
- Q. Okay. So you recall that in the capacity case there was an offer to provide capacity for that 5 percent energy auction at \$255 a megawatt-day?
- A. I believe it was in the ESP case, but I recall an offer of capacity at 255. I don't remember if it was linked to the 5 percent auction or whether it was distinct. My memory's not -- not there

because I've been focused on what was ultimately ordered.

MR. ALEXANDER: Your Honor, may I approach?

EXAMINER PARROT: You may. Please mark them one by one.

- Q. Mr. Roush, you've just been handed a document which has been premarked as -- for identification purposes as FES Exhibit 4 and is titled "Direct Testimony of Robert P. Powers in Support of AEP Ohio's Modified Electric Security Plan." Do you have that document in front of you?
  - A. Yes, I do.

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- Q. And you also -
  EXAMINER PARROT: It will be so marked.

  (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
- Q. And you've also been handed a document which has been premarked for identification as FES Exhibit 5 which is labeled "FES 107". Do you have that document in front of you?
  - A. Yes, I do.

EXAMINER PARROT: So marked.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

EXAMINER PARROT: Actually just for

clarity of the record, that's an interrogatory from

the 11-346 proceeding, correct?

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- Q. Mr. Roush, if you could look at FES Exhibit 5, the third page of that exhibit, OCC interrogatory 2-038, subpart B. Do you see that response?
  - A. Yes, I do.
- Q. And that request asks "Is the Company proposing to charge for capacity support for the auction load? If so, what is the proposed capacity price and who would be charged for capacity support?"

  Is that correct?
  - A. That's what the question reads.
- Q. And that question relates to the partial SSO auction prior to 2015.
  - A. Yes, it does.
- Q. And the response to that request references the company's response to interrogatory 2-37a; is that correct?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. And if you turn to the preceding page in FES Exhibit 5, you will see the response to interrogatory 2-37a. Are you there?
  - A. I'm there.
- Q. And that response references Company
  Witness Powers' testimony at page 19, line 22; is

that correct?

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- A. Yes, it does.
- Q. And if you could turn your attention to FES Exhibit 4.
  - A. I'm there.
- Q. And is that a copy of page 19 of Mr. Powers' testimony in the ESP proceeding?
  - A. Appears to be.
- Q. And if you focus on line 22, at this portion of AEP Ohio's testimony does it offer to provide capacity support for the auction load at \$255 per megawatt-day?
- A. It says that but it certainly seems confusing to me because the sentence right before it's talking about a hundred percent auction beginning in January of '15, so that certainly seems about as clear as mud to me.
- Q. Was that the offer to provide capacity at \$255 per megawatt-day that you were referring to in your previous answer?
- A. That's the offer I recall and it was during the hundred percent energy auction period. I didn't recall anything related to that -- related to the 5 percent auction. So kind of reading page 19 at the bottom seems consistent with refreshing my memory

that we offered a 255 a megawatt-day beginning

January 2015 and we believed that that was below our

cost.

Q. If you could go back to FES interrogatory 5 or, excuse me, strike that.

If you could go back to FES Exhibit 5 and focus on the response to interrogatory 2-38.

A. Uh-huh.

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- Q. That question relates to the partial SSO auction prior to 2015, correct?
- A. It appears to but is, I mean, it appears to but if you kind of follow the chain, it seems kind of odd because it's pointing back to the testimony talking about the hundred percent auction, so I don't know.

MR. ALEXANDER: Your Honor, at this time
I would like to move for administrative notice of FES
Exhibit 107 which was marked for identification as
FES Exhibit 5 and the selected portion of the Powers
testimony which was marked as FES Exhibit 4 as shown
through the document marked for identification as
FES 6 these were -- FES Exhibit 107 was marked and
admitted in the ESP proceeding, it relates to AEP
Ohio previously discussed handling this capacity
pricing issue, and so we're going to ask for

administrative notice of FES Exhibits 4 and 5 at this point.

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EXAMINER PARROT: You're not planning to move these in as admission for the record?

MR. ALEXANDER: Just administrative notice would be fine, your Honor, or just move them in, if you would prefer.

EXAMINER PARROT: We've already gone through the trouble of marking them, I guess I'm just wanting to understand your basis for your request for administrative notice.

Does the company have any response? Any objection?

MR. NOURSE: Are we asking to resolve that issue in the middle of cross-examination, your Honor?

EXAMINER PARROT: I don't know if we need to but --

MR. NOURSE: I suggest we pick it up at the end.

EXAMINER PARROT: That's fine, let's do that.

MR. ALEXANDER: Since it was administrative notice, I didn't know when to handle it, so thank you, your Honor.

- Q. (By Mr. Alexander) I'd like to move on to a new topic. At page 6, line 20 of your testimony you propose an illustration reducing base generation rates by 40 percent. Do you see that?
  - A. Yes, I do.
- Q. When does AEP Ohio -- we previously discussed AEP Ohio anticipates that the exact mechanism by which this will take place will be a later case; is that right?
- A. Yeah, my understanding is that we will have to file at some time next year our proposed reduction to base G rates for Commission approval.
- Q. Okay. So AEP Ohio anticipates filing that later proceeding in the year 2014?
- A. That's my general guess that it would be, you know, sometime well in advance of when the changes are to take place on 1/1/15.
- Q. Right, because the change is supposed to take place on January 1st, 2015, correct?
  - A. Correct.
- Q. Okay. So if base generation rates were reduced by 40 percent across the board, that would retain the existing rate relationships between classes.
  - A. That's correct, and that was one of the,

you know, one of the concepts that I've laid out here in my testimony is that if the auction phase-in rider loses its rate zone differentiation beginning 1/1/15, that that's a big enough step or a big enough progress to take at one point in time, and that by just saying, you know, like I did here for illustration, just reduce all the base generation rates by 40 percent, that ensures that all customers are seeing those reductions and there is no alignment issue, that ultimately the resolution of how capacity type costs should be set in the full requirements auction that's expected to happen beginning in June of '15, figuring we're taking a big step with the auction phase-in rider that it was better to sort this other element out once you got to June of '15. MR. ALEXANDER: Could you repeat just the

MR. ALEXANDER: Could you repeat just the first word of that response?

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- Q. And the current rate relationship between classes are not market based, correct?
- A. Correct, as we've been discussing regarding base generation rates kind of as we've gone through all of the discussion today, they're kind of a leftover product, for lack of a better word, so they're not necessarily in alignment with what would

be the results of a full requirements competitive bid.

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- Q. And the last cost-of-service study was conducted in the early-'90s?
- A. That's correct, the last class cost-of-service studies were done in the '90s for each of the companies' cases.
- Q. And you agree that it would be -- it is important to transition to a market-based rate relationship between classes.
- A. Yes, it is important to make that transition, and we've been kind of taking baby steps along the way for a lot of years and I think continue to take steps to get there so that hopefully by June of '15 we don't have any transition issues.
- Q. And I believe you sort of touched on this in one of your previous answers, the reason you're not proposing to transition to a market-based rate relationship between classes in this case is the principle of gradualism, correct?
- A. I think that's a fair summary because we're proposing to eliminate particularly the rate zone relationships and the auction phase-in rider come January of '15; that's kind of a big enough step not to get too far ahead of ourselves.

- Q. And right now Ohio Power and Columbus Southern customers have different size fuel adjustment clauses, correct?
- A. Correct. They have different fuel adjustment clause rates as well as different base generation rates.
- Q. Page 5, line 19 of your testimony. You reference a portion of the Commission's ESP 2 decision. Do you see that?
  - A. Yes, I do.
- Q. And you are not providing an opinion in this case that the Commission actually made that determination, are you?
- A. I'm not. I'm relying on the advice of counsel that read those documents and all the aspects of it and then using that information to develop the rest of my testimony.
- Q. And, similarly, at page 6, line 1 of your testimony you reference a portion of the Commission's ESP decision, a separate portion. You are not providing an opinion in this case that the Commission actually made that determination, correct?
- A. I apologize, I missed the reference at the beginning of the question.
  - Q. Page 6, line 1. It's actually a

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carryover from page 7 -- or, excuse me, page 5, line 21.

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- A. That's correct, I'm not interpreting the order, I'm relying on my advice of counsel based on the orders as a whole.
- Q. You're relying exclusively on how your counsel has instructed you with regard to those two statements.
  - A. With regard to those two statements, yes.
- Q. Now, as you discussed with Mr. Petricoff,
  AEP Ohio proposes to implement the auction results
  through the variable portion of the fuel adjustment
  clause, correct?
- A. I guess technically as part of the auction phase-in rider, but . . .
- Q. Thank you for the correction. You're correct.

AEP Ohio plans to allocate the revenue requirement for the auction phase-in rider differently between the Ohio Power and CSP rate zones; is that correct?

A. That's correct. If you kind of go to page 9, bottom of page 9, top of page 10 of my testimony, I basically discuss that you can take the, just like we do today currently with the FAC, you've

got the bundle of costs but then when you set the rate for each rate zone, you maintain a historical differential between the two prices.

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I'm suggesting that for the auction phase-in rider you can do the same thing through the end of '14 so you've got one auction, one price from the auction, and then you take those dollars and tilt the rate so that the CSP rate area is -- rate zone price is a little higher and the OP rate zone price is a little lower, just like the current FAC.

- Q. Okay. So AEP Ohio is proposing to, in your words, tilt the rate throughout the period through the end of the ESP period.
- A. Through December of '14. So not quite the end.
- Q. So let's do a hypothetical here. Suppose that the auction result comes in at 4 cents, all right? If the 4 cents was allocated equally between the two rate zones, proportionally between the two rate zones, then that would have a narrowing effect, it would bring the rate zones closer together. But if that 4 cents is tilted, in your words, then it will keep the respective relationship between the CSP and the Ohio Power rate zone; is that correct?
  - A. I think that's a decent summary. Yeah.

The current FAC, for example, the cost is maybe in your example 4 cents, the FAC cost today might be 4 cents, but the actual rates for CSP might be 4.2 cents and it might be 3.8 for OP, and doing the same kind of thing is what we're proposing to continue through December '14.

- Q. So the auction would not have any narrowing effect on the difference between the charges for those two rate zones.
- A. That's correct. And that's why we're saying continue that through December '14, then allow that differential to expire at the end of '14 at the same time you're reducing base generation rates by about 40 percent, so that's a good time to do both things simultaneously so that if there are impacts of getting rid of that differential, they should be mitigated somewhat by the base generation rate reduction.
- Q. And how are the allocation factors for each rate zone calculated?
- A. They're based on historical relationships. If you look in each of the companies' quarterly fuel filings, you come up with a total FAC cost and then you assign a certain percentage of the cost to one rate zone and a certain percentage to the

other and then divide by each rate zone kWh to come up with the rates.

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- Q. AEP Ohio proposes to reconcile the CBP results and the auction costs in the auction phase-in rider on a monthly basis; is that correct?
- A. Not exactly. The company would obviously, for accounting purposes, have to track over/underrecovery on a monthly basis, but I think we anticipate that we would continue quarterly filings to adjust the rate itself.
- Q. The other part of the auction phase-in rider are the energy costs which are currently in the fuel adjustment clause, correct?
- A. I guess just to be clear there are three pieces in the auction phase-in rider; the auction purchase, the auction costs which are like the auction manager, that kind of stuff, and then the energy or variable component which is basically the existing FAC elements excluding the fixed costs.
- Q. I'll rephrase the question. The existing FAC is currently reconciled on a quarterly basis, correct?
  - A. Correct.
- Q. Will the auction phase-in rider be audited by the staff in the same manner as the fuel

118 1 adjustment clause? 2 Α. I certainly expect so. And will the fixed-cost rider be audited 3 Ο. 4 by staff in the same manner as the fuel adjustment clause? 5 6 I certainly expect so. 7 MR. ALEXANDER: Thank you, Mr. Roush. 8 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 9 EXAMINER PARROT: All right. Let's go off the record briefly. 10 (Discussion off the record.) 11 12 EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the 13 record. At this point we're going to take a lunch 14 recess and we'll reconvene at 2:15. 15 16 (Lunch recess taken.) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

119 Monday Morning Session, 1 2 June 24, 2013. 3 4 EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the 5 record. Mr. Kurtz. 6 7 MR. KURTZ: Thank you, your Honor. 8 9 DAVID M. ROUSH 10 CROSS-EXAMINATION 11 By Mr. Kurtz: 12 Good afternoon, Mr. Roush. 13 Α. Good afternoon. I'd like to ask you about the fixed cost 14 15 portion of your testimony. As I understand it right 16 now, AEP Ohio is recovering approximately \$8 million 17 a month or \$96 million a year in fixed costs included 18 in its purchased power -- fixed costs included in its FAC; is that correct? 19 20 That's probably a decent round number. 2.1 The nonenergy fixed cost component of the FAC is 22 around 90 -- in the neighborhood of \$96 million a 23 year. 24 Okay. And I think we learned from FES 25 Exhibit No. 3 that in the calculation of the 188 rate

AEP Ohio included 59.29 million of purchased power fixed demand costs in that calculation, correct?

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- A. No, absolutely incorrect. I can't tell you how the 188 was determined. I can tell you that there was a level of costs included in the company's \$355 a megawatt-day proposal but I can't speak to what was ultimately included in the 188.
- Q. Well, are you saying you don't know how the Commission got to the 188?
  - A. No, I don't. I wasn't in that case.
- Q. Well, you would agree that Mr. Pearce included the 59.29 million of purchased power fixed demand costs in his calculation, correct?
- A. In Dr. Pearce's Exhibit KDP-4, page 14, there was 59.29 million of demand fixed costs included based on the 12 months ended December 31, 2010. As we discussed earlier with Mr. Alexander, I can't say that all of those amounts are related to the items identified that are fixed costs in the FAC.
- Q. So you don't know if it's all Lawrenceburg and OVEC?
  - A. I do not, and I suspect it is not.
- Q. You think it includes more than Lawrenceburg and OVEC.
  - A. It very well could.

- Q. Well, that would make it even worse, wouldn't it, from the perspective of the double recovery perspective?
  - A. No, I don't see that at all.
- Q. Did the Commission explicitly exclude these types of costs from its calculation of the 188?
- A. As I've indicated earlier, I don't know how the Commission arrived at the 188.88.
- Q. Do you know how -- do you know if the OVEC costs are escalating every month or every year? The fixed costs associated with the OVEC purchase.
- A. Your question was are those escalating every month and every year?
  - Q. Yes.

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- A. Not to my knowledge.
- Q. So the massive environmental spending upgrades at the OVEC plants, Pussy Creek and Kyger Creek are the environmental costs are not flowed through to the owners through the purchase -- through the purchase adjustment?
- A. I'm not sure what you're specifically addressing. I don't have any detail on the calculation of the OVEC demand charge.
- Q. AEP Ohio owns about 43 percent of OVEC, doesn't it?

A. It has some ownership stake, I don't know the percentages.

- Q. Do you know if Mr. Akins is the chairman of the board of OVEC?
- A. I haven't looked at the board of OVEC so I don't know.
- Q. Do you know if OVEC has a -- must upgrade its coal plants for the M-A-C-T, MACT, and other environmental rules like all the other generation owners in the country?
- A. To the extent they're a generation owner, they have to comply with environmental RECs.
- Q. And do you know if those environmental capital costs are reflected in the purchased power demand charge that AEP is recovering through the FAC?
  - A. Which environmental demand costs?
- Q. OVEC's environmental demand costs to meet environmental requirements.
- A. To the extent they have environmental costs, I assume those would be reflected in their bills.
- Q. Right now is it correct that about half of the AEP Ohio load is -- in terms of megawatt-hours is shopping and about half is SSO? I think you used 24 million megawatt-hours in your Exhibit 1; was that

just illustrative or was that --

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- A. As we discussed, Exhibit 1 is illustrative, my recollection of those, I think I saw a Commission report from like March of this year that showed it was -- that shopping was approaching 50 percent, but I don't know the exact number.
  - Q. On megawatt-hours?
  - A. I believe that's what it was on.
  - Q. Okay.
  - A. It's a public document.
- Q. Now, your position on the FAC, the fixed portion of the FAC is that AEP Ohio should continue to recover the 96 million or whatever that number turns out to be in the future through March 31, 2015, correct?
- A. No. My position is the fixed cost component should be continued to be collected through May 31, 2015.
  - Q. What did I say?
  - A. March.
- Q. Oh, May 31. Okay. So through May 31, 2015, that 96 million or whatever the number turns out to be should be recovered in the FAC, correct?
- A. The roughly 8 million a month should be recovered through the company's proposed fixed-cost

rider which is one element of the existing FAC.

- Q. Now, your position is that AEP Ohio should recover that 96 million through the FAC no matter how big the standard offer load is; isn't that right? Or small.
- A. Well, as those costs have been in the FAC since the beginning of the FAC, the costs are part of the dollar amount, the roughly 8 million a month, is in the FAC calculation regardless of the level of load.
- Q. So just an extreme hypothetical to demonstrate a point, if you had just Ms. Grady on the system and she was the only one left, you would be charging her \$96 million a year for that fixed component? She's your only SSO customer. Is that the way the mechanics would work? I know it's an exaggerated example but isn't that the way the mechanics would work?
- A. I think the arithmetic would work that way; I agree with you it's an exaggerated example.
- Q. I'm assuming the 12 percent price cap doesn't kick in as you propose. If it did, then she would be saved by that, wouldn't she?

In other words, your recommendation to apply the 12 percent price cap to the -- well, no, I

guess she wouldn't be saved because your 12 percent price cap would only apply to the extent that the auction exceeds the FAC, it wouldn't cover this, right?

A. No, no, that's incorrect.

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- Q. Okay. Let me skip around, but would Ms. Grady be saved or would she not be saved by paying the 96 million under your 12 percent price cap proposal?
- A. Under my recommendation on page 11 of my testimony where the Commission apply the 12 percent rate cap to increases, any potential increases resulting from the implementation of the auction phase-in rider and fixed-cost rider relative to the current FAC as of June 2013, under that mechanism Ms. Grady, in this grantedly absurd hypothetical, would be capped by the 12 percent rate cap and only see an increase based on the 12 percent rate cap.
- Q. Okay. And that would just simply mean the \$96 million would be added to the deferral and all ratepayers would pay it. Is that the way the mechanics work on that?
- A. It would be part of the 12 percent rate cap deferrals and I don't know that the Commission has determined how those will be dealt with.

- Q. Well, aren't you asking that those amounts be deferred and recovered at a later date to the extent that the Commission authorized, to the extent the 12 percent price cap is exceeded, you defer those amounts for later recovery, correct?
- A. That's my understanding of the Commission's order, yes.

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- Q. So if we had the -- if the last woman standing was Ms. Grady, she would be protected by the 96 million, but then you would just recover it from all other consumers at a later date through a deferral. Correct?
- A. To the extent there are Commission authorized deferrals, the company would expect to get recovery of those, yes.
- Q. Okay. And your proposal to recover the full 96 million applies notwithstanding or regardless of how big the SSO load is and regardless of how much energy is served via auction. You get the full 96 no matter what.
- A. We have contractual commitments to purchase that power and to pay those fixed costs and we would expect to collect those costs.
- Q. Now, the AEP Ohio fuel adjustment clauses have -- they adjust quarterly or every six months? I

forget.

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- A. The FAC adjusts quarterly.
- Q. And the last quarterly adjustment was a pretty big bump upward, wasn't it?
- A. I don't recall off the top of my head because the -- we've had two adjustments placed into affect this year, the first quarter and the second quarter, and we've already filed the third quarter, so I'm just not remembering the numbers.
- Q. Is your FAC going up because coal and natural gas prices are going up or because the 96 million is being recovered by fewer megawatt-hours because of the loss of load to shopping?
- A. I don't think I agree our FAC is going up, and I don't know the basis of what each element -- what direction each element of the FAC is going.
- Q. If the Commission determined that yes, in fact, part of the purchased power demand costs were included in the 188 and it wanted to avoid this last-man-standing issue, would one sort of typical ratemaking method be to allocate the 96 million between the shopping load and the nonshopping load?
- A. I struggle with what is a typical ratemaking method in an ESP environment in Ohio.

Q. I'll give you that.

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Now, you're familiar with the Ormet Aluminum recently filed application to amend its special contract?

- A. I know they filed something; I haven't read it.
- Q. One of the things is they want to get market access beginning, when, very soon? 1/1/15; is that it?
  - A. I don't know, I haven't read it.
- Q. Oh, 1/1/14. Well, let's assume it's 1/1/14 and that load shops. That would -- that would dramatically reduce the amount of SSO load left to pay your 96 million, wouldn't it?
- A. If a large customer shopped, that would reduce the SSO load.
- Q. And, therefore, increase the \$96 million proportionally on everyone else?
- A. It wouldn't increase the fixed cost amount. It would change the per-unit rate.
- Q. Resulting in a rate increase on everybody else. For you to get your same 96 million from fewer megawatt-hours, you have to charge more per megawatt-hour, correct?
  - A. I thought that's what I just said.

- Q. Okay. Let's talk about the OVEC purchase. So you are aware that AEP Ohio's part owner of OVEC; is that correct?
- A. That's my general understanding, but I'm not an expert on the corporate structure of OVEC.
- Q. Do you know if the capacity component you're recovering in the FAC, is that a cost-based capacity component?
- A. I believe it's a FERC-approved cost base rate.
- Q. So the energy associated with that is cost based as well?
  - A. I believe that's the case.
- Q. What does AEP Ohio do with the cost-based energy it gets from OVEC that it doesn't need to serve SSO load?
- A. I don't know that that circumstance exists, so I don't know that I can follow your hypothetical.
- Q. Well, let's assume that part of the OVEC energy, the cost-based OVEC energy, was not needed to serve SSO load. You don't run it in the ground, you resell it in the market, correct, to the extent that it clears, right?

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I would object,

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same as earlier. Mr. Roush is not a fuel procurement or a plant operator or, you know, anything other than what he's held himself out in his testimony to be, a very experienced rate and tariffs guy. So I think we're getting beyond his testimony and beyond what he can testify to.

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MR. KURTZ: Well, if that's true, then I question the integrity of his testimony about why the \$96 million should continue to be recovered through the FAC from the nonshopping load.

MR. NOURSE: That's a different matter, your Honor. That's a rate design, rate recovery issue.

EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Roush, please answer the question to the best of your ability.

THE WITNESS: Can you read it.

(Record read.)

A. I guess my simple view goes back to the view we talked about earlier with Howard is that the -- there's kind of a general overall economic dispatch and if the OVEC is the cheapest energy, it goes to SSO load, and if it's not, it doesn't.

Q. (By Mr. Kurtz) And if it doesn't, you sell it into the market at the prevailing market price.

A. I don't know for sure.

- Q. Did you sponsor a response to FES interrogatory 1-12? It's the makeup of the, yeah, the confidential version that shows the components of the FAC for July '12 through March 2013.
  - A. Yes, I prepared that.
- Q. Okay. Can you confirm that the OVEC demand charge is the bulk of the 96 million that we're talking about here?

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I object. If we're going to be getting into confidential materials, I think we should do it in a sealed transcript and there certainly not everybody that's in the room right now is cleared to do that.

MR. KURTZ: That's why I said in a very general sense was it the bulk of the 96.

MR. NOURSE: Well, that statement even, Mr. Kurtz, I think is questionable. I think if you're going to get into this document and ask qualitative questions like that, quantitative questions, we need to be in a sealed transcript.

MR. KURTZ: Your Honor, I think all I would like to do is have him identify this exhibit and then have it entered into evidence as then I don't even need to ask questions about it and I'll

132 make copies at the break. I only have the one right 1 2 Should I have him identify it? 3 EXAMINER PARROT: Yes, please. 4 MR. KURTZ: May I approach? 5 EXAMINER PARROT: You may. 6 Ο. (By Mr. Kurtz) Mr. Roush, is that the 7 document you prepared? Yes, it is. 8 Α. 9 MR. NOURSE: Mr. Kurtz, can I see that? 10 Just make sure we're looking at the same document. 11 Thank you. 12 MR. KURTZ: Your Honor, I'll have copies 13 made at the break. MR. NOURSE: And I would note, just to be 14 15 clear, that this needs to be a sealed exhibit, 16 submitted under seal, and if you're distributing any 17 copies, could you just let me do that so I can make 18 sure people are authorized? 19 MR. KURTZ: Absolutely. 20 MR. NOURSE: Thank you. 21 MR. KURTZ: I guess that will be marked 22 as OEG Exhibit 2. 23 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 24 I'd like to turn to the 12 percent price 25 cap, Mr. Roush. Just mechanically, this would --

there were four items identified in the Commission's rehearing order that would go towards the 12 percent price cap; is that correct? And I think those were the RSR, the DIR, the PTR, and the GRR.

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- A. That is correct; the RSR, the DIR, the PTR, and the GRR.
- Q. Okay. So what we would do is we would take the, let's just use residential for example, take the average residential -- take a residential by customer bill and apply those four riders to it which are operational, I guess, RSR, the DIR, and then once their total bill got increased by more than 12 percent, you cap them and then defer that amount; is that the way it works mechanically?
- A. That's close. Let me try to see if we can get it a little more precise. You would look at that customer's bill based on August 2012 rates and then apply 12 percent to that bill to come up with a dollar amount, let's just say it's \$10. Then you would look at their bill today and say have they seen an increase due to those four items, the RSR, the DIR, the PTR, and the GRR, have they seen an increase due to those items that exceeds \$10? And if they have, then they would be capped and the amount above the cap would be deferred.

Q. Okay. And your proposal would be to expand those four items to include the auction, the difference between what the auction would exceed the FAC as well as the fixed component of the FAC?

- A. Generally, yes, but let me make sure the mechanics are right. You would look at the auction the sum of the auction phase—in rider and fixed cost rider, compare that to the June 2013 FAC rate, and say that value went up a dollar a megawatt—hour or down a dollar a megawatt—hour, either way, you would compare that amount, that amount would be part of the computation of the 12 percent cap as well.
- Q. Okay. Your average residential price is about 13 cents a kilowatt-hour; is that correct? For SSO load.
- A. That's a rough ballpark all-in rate for an SSO customer.
- Q. Okay. So 12 percent of that, assuming it was 13 cents, would be 1.56 cents per kilowatt-hour?
  - A. Your arithmetic's correct.
- Q. Okay. How far are you into the

  12 percent now for, just ballpark, for an average
  residential customer? What does the DIR and the RSR
  amount to as a percent of their August 2012 bill?

A. For a Columbus Southern Power rate zone customer, residential customer again we're talking about here, for a Columbus Southern rate zone residential customer using a thousand kilowatt-hours, a winter bill they're paying about \$7.95 and for a summer bill they're paying about \$8.49.

- Q. So those are dollars per megawatt-hour that they're paying for those two riders? The RSR and the DIR?
- A. Since I did a 1 megawatt-hour customer, that's kind of how the arithmetic works out, yeah.
- Q. So actually what was the August 2012 starting rate? They're paying 13 cents now and it includes those charges, the August 2012 number would be lower and I think that I did the price cap wrong, I included things we're trying to guard against.
- A. A thousand kilowatt-hour customer in the Columbus Southern Power rate zone, in the winter months their 12 percent increase cap is \$14.53, in the summer it is \$15.93.
- Q. Okay. So it looks like you're about just over halfway towards the 12 percent cap, approximately?
- A. Looks like -- looks like a little over halfway for a CSP rate zone thousand kilowatt-hour

customer.

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- Q. If the Commission adopts your 12 percent price cap applied to the auction as well as the fixed component, how much extra deferral would be added?
  - A. I don't know.
- Q. So it's really just -- it's a methodology, you haven't attempted to quantify how much additional deferral the Commission would be potentially authorizing.
- A. Without knowing what the auctions are going to come out at, not knowing where the FAC might be going, not knowing where the DIR might be going, I can't quantify that.
- Q. So how can the Commission judge whether it's reasonable if it doesn't have an idea as to the magnitude of the number?
- A. I think in the same way they authorized the 12 percent cap in the first place, you know, they felt that was a level that was reasonable to institute and they've asked us to monitor what's going on under that, and we filed, you know, a document to that effect and are continuing to monitor that, so.
- Q. Well, I can understand the 12 percent, but how -- but if the Commission doesn't know how

much money that generates for later recovery from all consumers with -- plus interest, how can the Commission determine whether this proposal now is reasonable?

- A. To me, some of it goes right back to what you just walked me through which is that we're not even halfway to the cap for a Columbus Southern Power rate zone customer so there's headroom. The secondary part of it is, you know, the Commission has made a determination and ordered us to do these auctions so we're doing the auctions, and what this does is provide an additional rate mitigation tool to an unexpected, you know, to any potential unexpected outcome, so.
- Q. But you understand the result of the OEG and OCC and IEU reserve price recommendation would be no rate increase on consumers as a result of these auctions and, therefore -- and no deferral. If there's no rate increase, there's nothing to defer. Do you understand that would be the result of our proposal?
- A. To be honest, I haven't been keeping up with this whole reserve price dialogue. That would be better for Dr. LaCasse.
  - Q. Simply saying that the starting price of

the auction would be the FAC for the respective load zones, so people would not get a rate increase but may get a rate decrease if the auction's unsuccessful. That's the reserve price I'm talking about.

- A. I haven't really contemplated that. I've been focused on what the company's proposed.
- Q. You didn't read Mr. Murray or Mr. Kollen's testimony?
- A. I flipped through it, but didn't really focus on it.
  - Q. Okay.

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- A. They weren't addressing me.
- Q. You've -- just a couple of small points.

  You've laid out two different scenarios to recover

  the fixed cost component either in a separate rider

  or roll it into the, I don't know what you called it,

  the overall auction rider; is that correct?
- A. I guess we laid out our proposal to include the fixed cost in a separate fixed cost rider to allow for kind of transparency and matching up of the non -- of the variable costs with the auction purchase costs, and then we also, in Exhibit DMR-1, laid out the same thing could be done within a single rider. One would arguably call that maybe a

purchased power rider.

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- Q. Yeah, a single rider. Either way, you get your fixed -- your full fixed cost recovery, correct?
- A. Correct. The company would continue to collect the fixed cost as we have been doing since 2009.
- Q. Okay. One last little area. When you -you discussed what the rate would be beginning

  January 1, 2015, through May 31, '15, when the
  capacity component in the SSO rate would fall to 188

  a megawatt-day, correct?
- A. This is your assumed 40 percent reduction going from \$22.50 a megawatt-hour to \$13.50 a megawatt-hour or \$9 a megawatt-hour reduction.

At page 6 and continuing on to page 7 of my testimony I discuss the reduction of the base G rates January of 2015 to reflect 188.88, yes.

Q. And I guess using simple algebra I think we can conclude, I think Mr. Alexander did or somebody did, you're assuming that the generation rate on average in the SSO tariffs is \$314 a megawatt day, that's the same 40 percent reduction to get you to 188; is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Can you read that one back

for me? Sorry.

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(Record read.)

A. Kind of. The current base G rates, whatever they are, whatever's in them, whatever's not in them, they're kind of -- I think we talked about them being left over sort of prego, are currently the base G rates are around 22.50 a megawatt-hour.

What I then did was directly compute using the 188, that a rate based on 188.88 for capacity only is roughly 13.52 a megawatt-hour and so that difference from 22.50 to 13.52 is the difference between base G rates, whatever they are, and 188.88 capacity rate.

- Q. In order for the staff or somebody to audit you to make sure that going from 22.50 to 13.50 was correct, and that -- in terms of what's in the base G rate, I forget the phrase, or whatever's in there, the prego, wouldn't it be, instead of trying to audit the prego, if the Commission wants customers to pay 188.88 a megawatt day beginning January 1, why don't you just charge customers 188.88 a megawatt-day instead of trying to untangle the prego?
- A. I guess a couple answers to that. One is I think that's effectively what I did. And, two, because I directly computed, said here's your SSO PJM

5 CP times 188.88 times 365 days in a year gives me a total dollars divided by the annual energy gives me a revenue requirement in dollars per megawatt-hour.

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Now, from a very practical standpoint let's go back to, pardon me, Ms. O'Grady, but I'm going to use you as an example -- I'm sorry,

Ms. Grady, sorry. For residential customers we don't have metering on those customers to be able to measure a PJM 5 CP for every single residential customer directly and bill them based on their PJM 5 CP without using load profiling.

So currently their rate is a -- their residential rate is generally a dollar per kilowatt-hour rate and so I would expect it to continue to be a dollar per kilowatt-hour rate the same way things are done in the auctions.

Q. I understand the residential dollar per megawatt-hour rate, that's the way rates are everywhere across the country because residential customers don't have demand meters. But for those customers with demand meters don't you -- if the Commission wants them to pay 188.88 a megawatt-day, why don't you just charge them 188.88 a megawatt-day? There would be nothing to untangle, no prego to unscramble.

A. That would only work for nonshopping interval metered customers and, again, I think it's better addressed once you get to June of 2015 when you're doing the full requirements auction rather than to do that in that five-month period, that small five-month period January to May of 2015.

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- Q. Well, you would agree that it would be important for the company not to overrecover during that five-month period and for consumers not to overpay, wouldn't you?
- A. I guess in general it's hard not to agree with that statement, but then again, I look at the same way that when you get to the in-state, when you have full requirements auctions and the way that those auctions are split into capacity and energy and then there's not a separate 188.88 rate or whatever the number is for the other utilities in Ohio, there's not a separate rate for that that's computed for every individual customer, there's a value that's computed for like all transmission voltage customers. So I guess I don't know that I have to get all the way to where you're at to address things appropriately.
- Q. Okay. Last thing, mechanics.

  Pre-divestiture the SSO load is served from the AEP

Ohio power plants which the utility continues to -continues to own, correct? I mean the FAC is derived
from the AEP Ohio power plants plus your purchase
contracts, correct?

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- A. I think pre-corporate separation things are operated as they always have and that SSO load is served from AEP Ohio power plants and purchase contracts and economy purchases when those are appropriate.
- Q. Let's assume that the OEG, OCC, IEU position is accepted by the Commission and that none of the competitive bidders can beat the FAC reserve price. Under that hypothetical wouldn't AEP Ohio just continue serving the nonshopping load just like it always has with no change?

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I would object. I think that's beyond the scope of his testimony and it's really just contingent future hypothetical that he's not made any determinations on.

EXAMINER PARROT: Response.

MR. KURTZ: Well, I think it's a fairly simple question that anybody who works for AEP ought to know the answer to. Whether it's beyond the scope, I think he's testifying as to why an energy-only auction or the mechanics of how it would

work and how the fixed component would be broken out, he testifies to -- testifies right here on page 3 where the components of the existing bill, full adjustment, alternative energy rider, transmission, and base generation rates, this is squarely within his testimony.

THE WITNESS: Can you please reread it?

(Record read.)

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, what were the last three words.

(Record read.)

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(Discussion off the record.)

- A. I'm not sure. I guess the best answer I can give you is maybe through the end of '13. I certainly haven't thought about what impacts that would have post-corporate separation.
- Q. Now, same hypothetical pre-corporate separation but the Commission doesn't accept our proposal and the auction clears at a price above the FAC, do you have that hypothetical in mind?

In other words, the position you're arguing for although I'm assuming the price is above the FAC, I know we don't know that.

I think I'm with you so far. 1 2 Okay. Now, AEP Ohio is allowed to bid on 3 the auction load, correct, with the 80 percent 4 participation cap? 5 MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I object. He's asking for a legal conclusion. This witness has not 6 7 offered an opinion on that subject. MR. KURTZ: I'm not asking -- I certainly 8 didn't want to ask a legal opinion. Just asking if 9 he knows. 10 11 EXAMINER PARROT: Rephrase. 12 MR. NOURSE: He asked if he's permitted. 13 Thank you. 14 MR. KURTZ: That's legality? 15 EXAMINER PARROT: Please rephrase. 16 Is Ohio Power allowed to bid on the 17 auction pre-divestiture, pre-corporate separation? 18 MR. NOURSE: Same objection. 19 EXAMINER PARROT: Are you asking for a 20 legal opinion? 21 MR. KURTZ: No. 22 EXAMINER PARROT: Please state that. 23 Q. On a nonlegal basis do you have an 24 opinion whether AEP Ohio can bid on the auction,

pre-corporate separation?

A. I don't know. We talked about this earlier. I don't know what's permitted and that's not something I normally deal with in my day-to-day activities.

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- Q. Okay, if you don't know, that's fine.

  Post-corporate separation what is AEP

  Retail or AEP Generation Resources, AEP Unregulated,
  where is the power going, generation going? It's

  AEP?
  - A. I believe it's AEP Generation Resources.
- Q. Okay. AEP. Post-divestiture is AEP

  Generation Resources allowed to bid on the Ohio Power auctions, if you know?
- A. I don't know. That's a whole other corporate entity and I don't normally deal with those folks.
- Q. So you don't know if they can bid on the auctions?
- A. I haven't kept up with all the -- all the documents in all these proceedings related to who can and can't bid.
- Q. Okay, but you know that AEP Generation
  Resources is contractually obligated to, on a
  pass-through basis, provide all the energy and
  capacity and ancillaries and everything that AEP Ohio

the utility needs to serve the nonshopping load.

MR. NOURSE: Now, I object. Again, I think that misstates the contract and you're getting into FERC regulated and, you know, contracts that are actually pending before the FERC and, again, a future hypothetical involving an entity Mr. Roush said he doesn't work with or follow and asking the same question is really a legal question.

MR. KURTZ: Well, Mr. Nourse.

EXAMINER PARROT: Do you care to

rephrase?

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Q. Okay. Do you think it's important for the Commission to understand how the SSO load will be served post-corporate separation? I mean, the electricity has to come from somewhere. Don't you understand it's going to come from AEP Generation Resources to AEP Ohio to the SSO load on a straight pass-through basis at the PUCO authorized tariff rates?

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor --

A. Now you're getting --

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I object. I think we have a compound question now and he's really getting into things that were addressed and litigated in the ESP decision that the Commission did

understand and did address in its orders.

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MR. KURTZ: I think it's relevant to the Commission ruling on auctions post-divestiture and now Mr. Nourse doesn't want their witness to talk about what the company would look like post-divestiture even though their auction proposal goes in that time period.

EXAMINER PARROT: The objection's overruled.

THE WITNESS: Can you reread the question for me, please?

(Record read.)

A. Let me try to parse that into two pieces. Yes, I believe the Commission needs to understand how SSO load is being served whether it's through auction or otherwise.

The secondary part is I understand there is a filing pending before FERC for the power supply for the nonauction SSO load, and that's I think about all I can say about that.

Q. Assume -- I don't want a legal opinion on any of this, just assume that AEP Generation

Resources can bid into the auction and the auction clears at a price above the FAC. Would you agree that AEP Generation Resources would be selling the

same energy to the same customers but at a higher price?

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Honor.

MR. NOURSE: Again, your Honor, I object. He's not been offered as an operational witness or a purchased power expert or how, you know, the AEP GenCo would supply any contractual obligations it has, whether it's through existing resources, other purchases, other financial agreements, that's just beyond the scope of his testimony.

MR. KURTZ: If he doesn't know, then . . .

EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Roush, please answer the question.

THE WITNESS: Please repeat it.
(Record read.)

A. I guess we've covered this a couple times. I'm not sure I know one way or the other regarding the assumption. And then the second part of it is it seems like that's a overall -- an oversimplification of the circumstance. I think the world changes, as far as Ohio Power's concerned, December 31, 2013, when corporate separation happens or is proposed to happen.

MR. KURTZ: No more questions, your

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1	EXAMINER PARROT: Ms. Grady?
2	MS. GRADY: Thank you, your Honor.
3	
4	CROSS-EXAMINATION
5	By Ms. Grady:
6	Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Roush.
7	A. Good afternoon. And I apologize for
8	calling you by the wrong name earlier.
9	Q. That's all right, as long if I call you
10	"O'Roush" and you take no offense.
11	A. No offense whatsoever.
12	Q. Yes. I want to go to your testimony at
13	page 4 and down at the bottom of the page you were
14	questioned by Mr. Alexander with respect to the
15	statements that you make on lines 23 through 25. Do
16	you recall that cross?
17	A. Yes, I do.
18	Q. And you indicated that your testimony was
19	solely based on your advice by counsel. Correct?
20	A. The statements made kind of halfway
21	through line 23 on page 4
22	Q. Yes.
23	A through most of the way through line 3
24	on page 5 are based upon the advice of my counsel.
25	And I needed that information in order to prepare the

rest of my testimony.

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- Q. Now, did you have occasion to read the Commission's ESP decision?
  - A. Back when it was issued, yes.
- Q. And do you recall parts of that decision where the Commission would have determined that the retail SSO generation service is bundled generation service that is different than the wholesale capacity service? Do you recall that?
- A. Not specifically. I know there are lengthy orders and I read them a long time ago so I don't -- I didn't pore back over those before this proceeding, I trust my counsel.
- Q. Now, Mr. Roush, would it be also -- would it be also your opinion that the difference between retail SSO generation service and wholesale capacity service that that difference justifies selling capacity to CRES providers at RPM while charging SSO customers at the company's cost of capacity?

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I object. I think we're just getting into issues that were litigated and decided in the ESP case and that's certainly not why Mr. Roush is here to testify and shouldn't be the subject of debate or testimony in this proceeding. Especially considering that

rehearing's already been completed and appeals are pending currently before the Supreme Court of Ohio.

EXAMINER PARROT: Response, Ms. Grady.

MS. GRADY: Well, your Honor, it's within his testimony. He's relying on legal advice. And in Ohio there is a wide-open cross rule so I believe it's a fair question to ask.

THE WITNESS: Can you please reread it.

(Record read.)

- A. I don't know, I haven't given that any really thought. I've been focused on what SSO customers would pay as a result of the required auctions.
- Q. Let's go for a moment to your testimony, then, on page 6, and you've had some questions about this as well and I wanted to focus down at the bottom about your -- what you say is the most straightforward approach to ensure that all customers benefit from the ESP-required adjustment. Do you recall the questions I believe by several counsel as to -- as to what you're proposing here?
  - A. I recall those questions generally.
  - Q. Was it generally your testimony that this

would be an issue that the Commission would have to address in a future case as opposed to this case?

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- A. Yes, I think if you go up a couple lines in my testimony on page 6, line 16, I say "While the Company does not believe that implementation of this Base Generation Rate adjustment process on 1/1/15 is necessarily right for review in this case, I can make some simplifying assumptions and offer an illustrative approach without prejudice to the ultimate approach to be subsequently taken on this issue."
- Q. Given your understanding and your proposal, is it safe to say that in this future proceeding that the percentage reduction would be an issue that would be discussed as opposed to accepting your 40 percent calculation?
- A. I guess I believe when we file to implement the Commission-required adjustment to our base generation rates, that whatever issues are raised at that point will be raised at that point.
- Q. Now, in the 10-2929, the capacity case, is it your understanding that AEP claimed that its cost of capacity was on average 355.72 a megawatt-day? And if you need a reference, that would be in FES Exhibit No. 3, KDP-6.

A. In that proceeding, which obviously I think I mentioned earlier I wasn't a part of, it looks like in Exhibit KDP-6, it looks like based on 2010 data that the capacity rate that was computed there was 355.72 per megawatt-day in section 1, and then in section 2 there was another one with, looks like it's labeled with an energy credit of 338.14 per megawatt-day.

Q. And would you agree with me that, subject to check, that the 188.88 megawatt-day is about 47 percent less than the 355.72 per megawatt-day?

THE WITNESS: Would you mind reading that back?

(Record read.)

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- A. If I did the math right on the stand I get 46.9 percent less and that's part of why I have a real hard time with the 188 saying that that's fully compensatory.
- Q. Is it your understanding that the company's testimony in the 10-2929 case was that the base generation rates produced revenues for the company that recovered its 355.72-megawatt a day cost?
- A. I don't recall the company's testimony in that case.

- Q. Would it be your presumption that the company would set its base generation rates so that it could recover its fully embedded cost of capacity?
- A. Somewhere other than Ohio, yes. In Ohio I think base generation rates are cost based so it's kind of hard to make that claim in Ohio.
- Q. And you don't know whether or not the company made that claim in the 10-2929 case.
  - A. No. Again, I wasn't in that proceeding.
- Q. Let's go for a moment to your DMR-1 exhibit.
  - A. I'm there.

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- Q. Now, these figures for your -- these are an illustrative example for a monthly -- monthly revenue requirement, are they not?
- A. Correct. This is an illustration for one month.
- Q. Okay. Now, if we look at column E, row 2, for the purposes of this illustration you assume that you had an FAC energy price of \$40 a megawatt-hour; is that right?
- A. Correct. And that's where it can get a little confusing. Generally the way the FAC is computed is you look at the dollars and then you convert it to a cost per megawatt-hour, so I tend to

look at column F more than I do column E and doing the computations.

- Q. Sure. Now, if we looked at column E and row 3, you assume there that there's a clearing price for the 60 percent energy auction of \$40 a megawatt-hour, correct?
  - A. Correct.

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- Q. And as such then you are assuming that the cost to procure the 1.2 million megawatt-hours through the 60 percent auction would be \$48 million; is that right? With the math.
  - A. Correct.
- Q. And since you are assuming an FAC of \$40 a megawatt-hour, the cost to supply the same 1.2 million megawatt-hours from the company's generation would also be 48 million?
- A. Not correct. I think we kind of had this dialogue earlier, that kind of -- you know, and again this is the rate person's simplified view of economic dispatch is that the -- you know, if all 2 million megawatt-hours were under the FAC, there would have been some more expensive units that would have been needed to use to meet that full 2 million megawatt-hours so that number would have been the FAC number, if you had the whole 2 million in the FAC,

may have been higher than \$40.

MS. GRADY: That's all the questions I

have, Mr. Roush, thank you.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Pritchard?

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## CROSS-EXAMINATION

By Mr. Pritchard:

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- Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Roush.
- A. Good afternoon.
- Q. I have a couple questions to follow-up on Mr. Kurtz's discussion about the 12 percent rate cap. You propose that -- strike that.

In the Commission's order in the AEP ESP case, the Commission determined that four riders would count towards the 12 percent rate cap, correct?

- A. Correct. The RSR, I think it was actually in the entry on rehearing where it was clarified that that was the RSR, the DIR, the PTR, and the GRR.
- Q. And your proposal in this case is to also have the auction phase-in rider and fixed-cost rider count towards the 12 percent rate cap, correct?
- A. Correct, but not the entire dollar amount of those riders, only the amount of those riders

158 relative to the current today, June 2013, FAC rate. 1 2 MR. PRITCHARD: Your Honor, may I mark an 3 exhibit? 4 EXAMINER PARROT: You may. 5 MR. PRITCHARD: I believe I'm up to Exhibit 3. 6 7 EXAMINER PARROT: 2. MR. PRITCHARD: 2? Sorry. 8 May I approach the witness, your Honor? 9 10 EXAMINER PARROT: You may. (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 11 12 (By Mr. Pritchard) Do you have in front of you what's been marked as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 2? 13 Yes, I do. 14 Α. 15 And is this a response to a discovery 16 request from FirstEnergy Solutions? 17 Yes, it is, in their third set. Α. 18 And you are identified as the responsive witness. 19 20 Α. Yes, that's correct. 2.1 And in this request FirstEnergy Solutions 22 requested typical bill impacts, correct? Correct. 23 Α. 24 And in response you provided the 25 discovery the typical bill impacts included an

application of the 12 percent rate cap, correct?

- A. That is correct.
- Q. And this language about halfway through the response where it says "...the Company's recommended application of the 12 percent rate cap."
- A. It's what I said is that we just discussed with including the two split-up riders that are currently in the FAC. It's referencing my testimony at page 11, yes.
- Q. Well, could you clarify what is meant by "Company's recommended application of the 12 percent rate cap"?
- A. It's what I say in my testimony on page 11.
- Q. So just to be clear, this is referencing that in addition to the four riders we just went through, the increase from the August 2012 levels of the fixed-cost rider and the auction phase-in rider would also count in the 12 percent rate cap, correct?

  THE WITNESS: Can you read that one back,

(Record read.)

- A. For some reason the words aren't sounding right to me so I'll try --
  - Q. I can rephrase it I think to make it a

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please?

little more clear.

In addition to the four riders that the Commission identified in the entry on rehearing, the company's recommended approach would also be to include two additional riders towards the 12 percent rate cap, the fixed cost recovery rider, and the auction phase-in rider with the caveat that the last two riders you'd only be measuring the difference between August 2012 levels to the current levels, correct?

- A. Close but not quite correct. It would be measuring the auction phase-in rider and fixed-cost rider relative to the June 2013 FAC, not back to August 2012 levels.
  - Q. Thank you for that clarification.

MR. PRITCHARD: Your Honor, at this time may I have a document mark as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 3?

EXAMINER PARROT: You may.

MR. PRITCHARD: And may I approach, your
Honor?

EXAMINER PARROT: You may.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

- Q. Mr. Roush, do you have in front of you what has been marked as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 3?
  - A. Yes, I do.

- Q. Would you take a minute to review this and let me know if this appears to be the bill impact analysis, a portion of the bill impact analysis that was in response to discovery, with the caveat that I added some page numbering at the bottom of the page.
- A. This appears to be one section of the voluminous attachment to that discovery response.
- Q. And this would be the portion that's related to the Columbus Southern Power rate zone typical bills as of August 2012, correct?
  - A. Correct.
- Q. And if we look at the top of the first page, we'll see a column with a hundred kilowatt-hours, next column with 250 kilowatt-hours, third column with 500 kilowatt-hours; these represent the varying billing usages to determine the typical bill impacts, correct?
- A. Correct, for a residential customer on RR1.
- Q. Correct. And if we look at the bottom of the page, we see a calculation of the total bill for the hundred kWh customer that would have been \$17.58, correct?
  - A. Correct.
  - Q. And at the very last row represents

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12 percent of the total bill, so for this first customer 12 percent of \$17.58 is shown at the bottom in the \$2.11 figure, correct?

A. Correct.

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- Q. Would you turn to the page that's been marked as 14.
  - A. I'm there.
- Q. And at the top left corner, this is where the rate impacts to the GS-4 customers start, correct?
- A. Correct. That's a Schedule GS-4 customer typical bill.
- Q. And if you turn to page 16, I'm going to go through a hypothetical example here, but the impacts on page 16 are for GS-4 customers as well, correct?
  - A. Correct.
- Q. And if I look at the first customer usage on this page, they have a 20,000 demand of kVA, a 20,000 demand kilowatts, and energy consumption of 13 million kilowatt-hours, correct?
  - A. Correct.
- Q. And if I look down at the bottom of the page, this typical customer's monthly bill in August of 2012 would have been \$756,074.82, correct?

A. Correct.

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- Q. And 12 percent of that number is \$90,728.98, correct?
  - A. Correct.
- Q. And doing some rough math here on the stand, the 12 percent rate cap, or a 12 percent rate increase would be \$846,802, correct?
- A. You're saying their total bill with a 12 percent rate increase would have been 846,803.80?
- Q. Give or take a few dollars but in that range, correct?
  - A. Correct.
- MR. PRITCHARD: Your Honor, may I mark another document as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 4?

EXAMINER PARROT: You may.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

- Q. Would you take a minute to review what's been handed to you as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 4, and let me know, again with the caveat of the numbering I added to the pages, if this appears to be a true and accurate representation of a typical bill impact analysis that you produced in response to the discovery request we went through.
  - A. It appears to be.
  - Q. Thank you.

And would you turn to the page -- or before we move on, these -- this represents the Columbus Southern Power rate zone current rates, correct?

- A. Correct, rates as of the filing of the testimony June 2013.
- Q. Would you turn to the page that's been marked as 32.
  - A. I'm there.

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- Q. And the column on the far left represents that same typical bill for the same usage characteristics of the GS-4 customer we went through, correct?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. And if we look at the bottom, we see a total bill for this typical customer of 913,798 cents -- sorry, let me strike that. The total bill for this customer is \$913,798.46, correct?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. And I believe we established a second ago on the last document that a total 12 percent rate increase for this customer would have been on the range of 846,000, correct? On the total bill basis.
  - A. Correct. 846,803.80.
  - Q. Would you accept, subject to check, that

this customer's -- this typical customer's bill since
August 2012 has gone up by roughly 20 percent?

A. Yes.

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Q. Thank you.

MR. PRITCHARD: Your Honor, may I have -- or, may I mark another exhibit?

EXAMINER PARROT: You may.

MR. PRITCHARD: I believe I am up to 5.

EXAMINER PARROT: Yes, you are.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

- Q. Mr. Roush, do you have in front of you what's been marked as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 5?
  - A. Yes, I do.
- Q. Would you take a minute and review this document, determine if it's a true and accurate representation of typical bill impacts that you produced in response to discovery, again with the caveat that I added some numbering to the pages?
- A. It appears to be one section of the total response.
- Q. Would you turn to the page that's been marked as 50.
  - A. I'm there.
- Q. And if we look at the far right column, we'll find a GS-4 customer with the same usage

characteristics as the Columbus Southern Power customer that we discussed earlier, correct?

A. Correct.

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- Q. And let me jump back one step. This document represents the Ohio Power Company rate zone typical bills as of August 2012, correct?
  - A. Correct.
- Q. And the typical bill for this customer with a demand of 20,000 kW and an energy usage of 13 million kilowatt-hours, the total bill in August 2012 was \$756,575.60, correct?
  - A. Correct.
- Q. And 12 percent of that is the \$90,789.07 number, correct?
  - A. Correct.
- MR. PRITCHARD: Your Honors, may I mark another exhibit?
- 18 EXAMINER PARROT: You may.
- MR. PRITCHARD: May I have this document marked as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 6?
- 21 EXAMINER PARROT: So marked.
- 22 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
- Q. Mr. Roush, do you have in front of you what's been marked as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 6?
- 25 A. Yes, I do.

- Q. Would you take a minute and review this document to determine if it's a fair and accurate representation of your response to discovery, again with the caveat that I have added some page numbers to the document?
- A. It appears to be a fair representation of a portion of my response, again.
- Q. And this document represents the typical bill impacts with current rates for customers in the Ohio Power Company rate zone, correct?
- A. Correct. The current rates as of June 2013.
- Q. Would you turn to the page that's been marked as 69.
  - A. I'm there.
- Q. And if we look at the far right column we'll again see a typical bill for a customer with the same usage characteristics that we've been discussing, correct?
- A. Correct, 20 megawatts and 13 million kilowatt-hours.
- Q. And if we look at the total bill with current rates, we'll see that this typical customer's bill is \$925,405.79 per month, correct?
  - A. Correct.

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Q. And this -- would you accept, subject to check, that this is roughly a 22 percent increase over the August 2012 levels on a total-bill basis?

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- A. Yes, and that's the result of the items which are subject to the cap which have changed and items that are not -- are outside of the cap which have changed.
- Q. Correct. The value at the bottom is just a total bill basis not necessarily in regards to the 12 percent rate cap that the Commission ordered, correct?
- A. If the 12 percent rate cap had applied, then that value at the bottom would have been adjusted to reflect that.
- Q. Correct. For instance, the total bills impacts that we have here include not only the rate stability rider, the distribution investment rider, but they include all the riders of the company, correct?
- A. Correct. This is a total bill so it includes the retail stability rider and the distribution investment rider and other riders such as the phase-in cost recovery rider that's not part of the cap computation, and ongoing changes in fuel and transmission and Universal Service Fund and

Advanced Energy Fund, all those items, yes.

- Q. And we have gone through here on the record a typical bill for customers on the GSR tariff with a 20-megawatt demand and 13 million kilowatt-hours usage but for any of the listed typical bills we could go through and calculate the increase that customers on the SSO have seen since August 2012, correct?
- A. Yes, you could do that, the calculation we walked through for other -- any of the other typical bills shown here, yes.

MR. PRITCHARD: Your Honors, may I have another document marked as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 7?

EXAMINER PARROT: So marked.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

MR. PRITCHARD: May I approach, your

Honor?

EXAMINER PARROT: You may.

- Q. Mr. Roush, do you have in front of you what's been marked as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 7?
  - A. Yes, I do.
- Q. Does this appear to be the Ohio Power Company's application to update its transmission cost recovery rider in Case No. 13-1406-EL-RDR, the application and several schedules?

- A. Yes, that's what it appears to be.
- Q. Are you familiar with Ohio Company

  Power's -- are you familiar that the TCRR is updated
  on an annual basis?
  - A. Generally, yes.

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- Q. And that you understand that the typical bills that we just went through include current charges, correct?
- A. In IEU Exhibit 4 and 6 it included current charges.
  - Q. Correct. But it --
- A. And other -- IEU Exhibit 5 and 3 it included August 2012 charges.
- Q. Correct. But neither of those documents would have included an application such as the TCRR application if those rates had not yet been approved, correct?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q. Are you familiar with the application that I've handed you?
- A. I was aware it was filed. I have not reviewed it.
- Q. Do you have any understanding of whether Ohio Power Company is seeking to increase its transmission charges through its application?

- A. Just from sitting here on the stand today reviewing this document it appears that they are.
  - Q. Would you turn to page 4 of the document.
  - A. I'm there.

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- Q. And here at paragraph 10 it's reflecting a request to increase the revenue that's collected through the TCRR by \$57 million representing an average increase of 33.24 percent, correct?
- A. That seems like a pretty fair paraphrase of paragraph 10 on page 4.
- Q. Would you turn to Schedule B-2 in the exhibit I handed you.
  - A. I'm there.
- Q. And if we look down at the line that says "GS-4," and look to the far right, that reflects a -- that would reflect a 42 percent increase for GS-4 customers in the TCRR, correct?
- A. There are two GS-4 lines but they both show that type of increase in the TCRR in isolation, but I'd flip to Schedule B-5, page 2 of 4, it shows the increases on the total bill basis to be somewhere less than 6 percent -- 6-1/2 percent or below, 6.7 or below.
- Q. You anticipated my next question. So if we look at page 2 of 4 in Schedule B-5, we can go

down and find that same GS-4 customer typical bill that we went through a second ago with the 13 million kilowatt-hour usage and a 20-megawatt demand and see that the increase in the monthly TCRR charges proposed in the application is 35,489, correct?

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- A. That's what the document shows.
- Q. And if we turn to page 4 of 4 in Schedule B-5, we could find for a Columbus Southern Power Company customer the same typical usage characteristics that we went through on the record, that the increase proposed for this customer is \$35,489 a month, correct?
- A. It's the same value, and just to be clear, it's the Columbus Southern rate zone, Columbus Southern Power rate zone.
- Q. And just a couple more questions on the 12 percent rate cap. I believe in response to Mr. Kurtz's question you indicated that you had not calculated whether the 12 percent rate cap under the company's proposal would be triggered, correct? Let me rephrase.

In response to Mr. Petricoff you indicated that -- in response to Mr. Petricoff you indicated that you had no opinion about whether -- what the clearing price of the FAC auction would be,

correct?

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- A. I have no opinion what the clearing price of the competitive bid process auction would be.
- Q. And because you do not know where the auction results are going to come out, you are not able, sitting here today, to offer an opinion about whether under the company's proposed application of the 12 percent rate cap, whether or not that would be triggered, correct?
- A. Correct, because there are too many moving parts. You've got the auction outcomes, which I have no idea what the auctions are going to come out, then you also have what's the FAC going to do in the future, what's the DIR going to do in the future, those other two riders that don't have any values currently, what they may do in the future, the PTR and the GRR. So because of all those moving parts the best I could do, and that's what was provided in IEU-Ohio Exhibit 2 or in response to discovery that's been marked as IEU-Ohio Exhibit 2 was I ran a couple hypothetical scenarios.

And so I don't know what the outcome ultimately will be because there are just too many moving parts and too many potential variables.

MR. PRITCHARD: Thank you. I have no

further questions.

EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Reilly.

MR. REILLY: Thank you, your Honor.

## CROSS-EXAMINATION

By Mr. Reilly:

- Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Roush.
- A. Good afternoon.
- Q. If I could direct your attention to page 8 of your testimony, your prefiled testimony, on that page you're talking about existing contractual commitments in your answer to question 13. Do you see that?
  - A. Yes, I do.
- Q. Okay. Am I correct that those existing contractual commitments will extend beyond 2014 into 2015?
- A. Correct. I believe the Lawrenceburg contractual commitment extends till 2017 timeframe and I think the OVEC is kind of an ongoing one.
  - Q. It has no ending date, in other words.
- A. I'm not aware of one. I'm just not sure of that, sir.
- Q. Okay. Can you tell me, would that mean that in 2015 the company would be obligated to

purchase more than a hundred percent of its power requirements?

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- A. I don't believe so and here's why: I believe, and we talked a little bit earlier briefly about corporate separation and these new FERC agreements, I believe the purchased power obligation that's currently Ohio Power's will become a purchased power obligation of the Gen Resources entity so because of that Gen Resources may end up having to buy more from these two contracts than the amount of load it is providing to Ohio Power to meet its SSO obligations. So that's kind of the way I view it in my simplified view.
  - Q. Are you sure of that?
- A. I'm pretty sure of that because my recollection was as part of the corp. separation that Ohio Power Company, the only purchased power agreements it was left with were things associated with renewables, so I'm pretty sure but I can't say a hundred percent.
- Q. If you could flip to page 10, does that mean there would be -- there would be nothing going into the fixed-cost rider?
- A. No, because the obligation that -- this is again my simplified view of the world, Ohio

Power's obligation to continue to meet its SSO load after corp. separation, and this is -- I'm sure it's not precisely right legal terms and all those kinds of things, Gen Resources will kind of step in and be fulfilling those obligations for Ohio Power which is now -- would now just be a wires entity.

So Gen Resources will still be incurring those costs, Gen Resources will send a bill to Ohio Power consistent with the current FAC type mechanism, and since those costs were in the FAC, they'd send a bill to Ohio Power for the FAC costs.

- Q. Okay. So as I understand it, as I understand your testimony, ultimately Ohio Power is going to pay the costs associated with the power purchases reflected in your answer to question 13, correct?
- MR. NOURSE: I'm sorry, Mr. Reilly, did you say question 13?
- MR. REILLY: Yes, we're talking about -20 let me.
  - MR. NOURSE: Yeah, it was the reference I didn't get.
  - Q. If I could direct your attention, sir, in the answer to question 13 on page 8, you're discussing -- you're discussing purchased power

commitments to Ohio Valley Electric and Lawrenceburg generating plant or from --

A. Yes.

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- Q. Excuse me, from Ohio Valley Electric and Lawrenceburg generating plant. As I understand your testimony, the -- you believe the cost of that power will be picked up in the near future here by Gen Resources; is that correct? And then passed through to Ohio Power; is that correct?
- A. Correct. These are purchased power contracts between Ohio Power and OVEC and a generating company, Lawrenceburg, and under corp. separation it's proposed, to the best of my recollection, those contracts would, just like the power plants, transfer over to AEP Generating Resources and then AEP Generating Resources is responsible for continuing to provide our SSO power to Ohio Power through May of 2015, energy through December 2014, but they continue to provide capacity through May of 2015.
- Q. So Ohio Power will be picking up the tab for the purchased power from OVEC and Lawrenceburg, correct? That's the way -- am I correct?
- A. Generally correct, just like in the FAC today the capacity costs will all be there and then

the energy costs kind of as we've been talking about on an economic dispatch basis, to the extent the energy costs are there, they're also part of the FAC while there's energy being provided which, obviously, that ends at the end of 2014.

- Q. Let me direct your attention to page 106 of your testimony.
  - A. Yes, sir.

- Q. And your answer to the question appearing on -- beginning on line 8, you break the FAC down into two components, do you not?
- A. Yes, sir, I split the FAC into those nonenergy or fixed costs and the energy or variable costs.
- Q. Okay. Under your proposal how would the costs associated with renewable power purchases -- with a renewable purchase power agreement be handled?
- A. There's kind of two parts to that. Just like it's being done today, when the renewable power purchases of the company are part of the total FAC, but then the REC component of that renewable purchase goes into the -- I always get the acronym wrong, it's the AER, the alternative energy rider, so you take the total renewable purchase, split it into the, primarily, energy value and then the REC value, the

REC value is in the alternative energy rider, the energy value is in the FAC.

- Q. How does it get split up in the FAC?
- A. If you go to Exhibit F to our supplement to application --
  - Q. Give me a second.
  - A. Sure.

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- O. Go ahead.
- A. Basically everything except the REC value I believe would show up in line 43 of Exhibit F, which is account 5550047, Purchased Power Wind, and then there's another account at the very bottom, account 5550109 which is Purchased Power Solar, so those accounts would have everything but the REC value because the REC value is being recovered in the alternative energy rider.

MR. REILLY: Thank you, Mr. Roush.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

EXAMINER PARROT: Any redirect?

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, can we take a

short break? Five minutes?

EXAMINER PARROT: Yes, let's take a

five-minute break. Thank you.

24 (Recess taken.)

25 EXAMINER PARROT: Go back on the record.

1 Mr. Nourse.

2 MR. NOURSE: No redirect, your Honor,

3 thank you.

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4 EXAMINER PARROT: Very good. So with

5 that would you care to move your exhibit, Mr. Nourse?

MR. NOURSE: Yes. AEP Ohio renews its

7 motion to admit Exhibit No. 2.

8 EXAMINER PARROT: Are there any

objections to the admission of AEP Exhibit No. 2?

(No response.)

11 EXAMINER PARROT: Hearing none, it shall

12 be admitted.

(EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.)

EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Alexander.

15 MR. ALEXANDER: FES moves FES Exhibits 2

and 3. And during the break Mr. Nourse and I spoke

about FES Exhibits 4 and 5 and we have agreed that

18 the Commission can take administrative notice of

19 those exhibits. With regard to FES Exhibit 4, which

20 is Mr. Powers' direct testimony, it will be

21 administrative notice of the entire direct testimony

rather than just the one page that was actually

23 marked as an exhibit here.

24 EXAMINER PARROT: All right. And then

25 FES Exhibit 6 which was the transcript?

181 1 MR. ALEXANDER: We're not moving that, 2 your Honor. 3 EXAMINER TAUBER: We're just looking at 4 FES Exhibit 2 and 3. 5 EXAMINER PARROT: Are there any objections to the admission of FES Exhibits 2 or 3? 6 Let's start with that. 7 8 MR. NOURSE: No, your Honor. 9 EXAMINER PARROT: Okay. Hearing none, FES Exhibits 2 and 3 shall be admitted. 10 (EXHIBITS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 11 12 EXAMINER PARROT: Are there any 13 objections to the Bench taking administrative notice with respect to Exhibits 4 and 5? 14 15 MR. NOURSE: No, your Honor, just to 16 clarify that it's not really going to be Exhibit 4 17 anymore, it's going to be the entire Powers' 18 testimony, correct? 19 EXAMINER PARROT: Yes. Thank you for 20 that clarification, Mr. Nourse. 21 MR. NOURSE: No objection. 22 MR. REILLY: Your Honor, staff does not object but we would like to have the case number 23 24 again. 25 MR. ALEXANDER: It's 11-346.

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                   EXAMINER PARROT: Et al.
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                   MR. REILLY: Thank you.
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                   EXAMINER PARROT: All right. With that
       we will take administrative notice of all of
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      Mr. Powers' testimony in those proceedings, and then
       as well the response to OCC interrogatories 2-036
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 7
      through 038.
                   Mr. Kurtz, do you have copies at this
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 9
      point?
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                   MR. KURTZ: Yes, they were provided to
      Mr. Nourse.
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                   MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I will
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       distribute those as soon as I have a moment.
                   EXAMINER PARROT: I would like to see it
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15
      before we proceed.
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                   MR. NOURSE: Certainly. I've got the
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       same thing with red print so I'm going to actually
18
      hand out --
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                   EXAMINER PARROT: Do we have the redacted
20
      version that we can docket publicly?
                   MR. NOURSE: No. No. It's all -- unless
21
22
      you want to just take all the numbers out; we can
23
      provide you one like that.
24
                   EXAMINER PARROT: Give me a moment,
25
      please.
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MR. NOURSE: For the other parties I just need to check my list again and ask you if you need a copy since you already have one.

MR. REILLY: Could we have a moment, your Honor?

EXAMINER PARROT: Yes.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Let's go off the

record.

(Discussion off the record.)

10 EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the

11 record.

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All right, Mr. Kurtz, did you care to move for the admission of OEG Exhibit 2?

MR. KURTZ: Yes, your Honor, on a confidential basis.

16 EXAMINER PARROT: Okay.

MR. NOURSE: And I'll just note, your Honor, for the record, I'm not sure we did it on the record, but the company considers this information confidential and competitively sensitive. We did provide a copy to the staff based on the understanding that RC 4901.16 would apply and that we would get three days' notice if there were a public record request for this.

It is conspicuously marked "confidential"

and I will be distributing it to all the parties that are cleared under the protective agreement as soon as I have a break to be able to check the names and do that.

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MR. REILLY: Your Honor, we would certainly acknowledge that the Commission's practice has been three days' notice and that we believe -- I believe it is now whenever a request would come in the Commission's policies and practice at that time would be the ones that would be ruling from the Commission's standpoint and the staff's standpoint. We have no reason to believe they would be any different from what Mr. Nourse said.

MR. NOURSE: Or that the statute would change, but that's fine, I understand. Thank you, Mr. Reilly.

EXAMINER PARROT: So, Mr. Nourse, is it your intention then to move for protective order at this point in the proceeding?

MR. NOURSE: Yes.

EXAMINER PARROT: Or did you wish to file something?

MR. NOURSE: I'm happy to do that. Do you want me to just do it orally?

EXAMINER PARROT: That's fine with me.

MR. NOURSE: This data is detailed cost data by account and we believe the time period involved and given the GenCo, you know, taking over these assets the first of the year, in a few months, this is competitively sensitive and it would adversely impact the financial interests of the GenCo and we believe it has economic value, that we've taken efforts, reasonable precautions to try to protect the confidentiality of the information and it should be considered a trade secret under the Commission's rule and Ohio case law.

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EXAMINER PARROT: Thank you.

Now, it sounds like not all of the parties have seen the document yet.

MR. NOURSE: Well, the parties that actually have executed confidentiality agreements have already received this in discovery, it's the exact same document.

EXAMINER PARROT: Okay.

MR. NOURSE: Actually, I believe we sent it to staff, too but that's the case. It doesn't have the OEG Exhibit No. 2 at the top.

EXAMINER PARROT: So with that are there any objections to AEP's motion for protective order with respect to OEG Exhibit 2?

Volume I Ohio Power Company 186 1 (No response.) 2 EXAMINER PARROT: Hearing none, OEG 3 Exhibit 2 is admitted into the record. It will also 4 be granted protective status for a period of 18 5 months from today's date. MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor. 6 (EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 7 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Pritchard, that 8 9 leaves you. 10 MR. PRITCHARD: Yes, I would move for the admission of IEU-Ohio Exhibits 2 through 7. 11 12 EXAMINER PARROT: Are there any 13 objections to the admission of IEU Exhibits 2 through 7? 14 15 MR. NOURSE: No, your Honor. 16 EXAMINER PARROT: All right. Hearing 17 none, IEU Exhibits 2 through 7 are admitted. 18 (EXHIBITS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 19 EXAMINER PARROT: Thank you, Mr. Roush, 20 you are excused. 21 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 22 EXAMINER PARROT: Anything else from the 23 company?

MR. NOURSE: Not at this time, your

24

25

Honor.

187 1 EXAMINER PARROT: All right. 2 EXAMINER TAUBER: Our next witness, 3 Ms. Grady. 4 MS. GRADY: Yeah, we would call Mr. Lane 5 Kollen to the stand, please. EXAMINER TAUBER: Please raise your right 6 7 hand. 8 (Witness sworn.) 9 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. 10 LANE KOLLEN 11 12 being first duly sworn, as prescribed by law, was examined and testified as follows: 13 DIRECT EXAMINATION 14 15 By Ms. Grady: 16 Good afternoon, Mr. Kollen. Q. 17 A. Good afternoon. 18 Can you state your name and business 19 address for the record, please. 20 Α. Yes. My name is Lane Kollen. My 2.1 business address is J. Kennedy and Associates 22 Incorporated, 570 Colonial Park Drive, Suite 305, 23 Roswell, Georgia, 30075. 24 For purposes of this proceeding, by whom 25 are you employed and in what capacity?

I'm employed by J. Kennedy and 1 Α. 2 Associates, Incorporated. I am a principal of that 3 firm and vice president. 4 And for purposes of testifying today, on 5 whose behalf are you testifying? My testimony today is on behalf of the 6 Α. 7 OCC and the OEG. Now, Mr. Kollen, do you have any 8 Q. 9 additions, corrections, or deletions to your 10 testimony? I do not. 11 Α. 12 And if I were to ask you today the 13 questions that are posed in your testimony, would 14 your answers be the same? 15 Α. Yes. 16 MS. GRADY: Your Honor, at this time I 17 would offer Mr. Kollen up for cross-examination. 18 EXAMINER TAUBER: One quick housekeeping matter, is the exhibit marked OCC and OEG Exhibit 1? 19 20 MS. GRADY: Yeah, we can call it Joint Exhibit 1. 21 22 EXAMINER TAUBER: Okay. Thank you. 23 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 24 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Petricoff. 25 MR. PETRICOFF: Yes, your Honor.

## CROSS-EXAMINATION

By Mr. Petricoff:

- Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Kollen.
- A. Good afternoon.
- Q. I just have a few questions for you. The first one is, have you ever conducted a competitive retail energy auction?
  - A. No.
- Q. Have you ever attended a competitive retail --
  - A. No.
  - Q. -- energy auction?
  - A. No.
- Q. I'm looking at page 3 of your testimony, on line 14 you give your first recommendation is that the Commission set the starting price for the CBP energy-only auction at the FAC price for each zone and then, continuing down -- first of all, let me stop. Do you see where I'm referring to on your testimony?
  - A. I do.
- Q. Okay. And then continuing on it says
  "The Commission should ensure that customers are
  benefited, and not harmed, during the transition to a
  competitive" -- I'm sorry "comprehensive auctions

that will commence on January 1st, 2015."

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Now, with that as background, is the goal of your suggestion that customers be benefited and not harmed or is the goal to set the auction starting price at the FAC?

- A. The goal is that customers not be harmed, and the way that we see that working out is to set the starting price or the reserve price at the fuel adjustment clause rate for the rate zone, and if the competitive bids come in lower, then customers of course would get the lower bid.
- Q. If, in fact, there were other techniques that would make sure that customers wouldn't be harmed and, in fact, would benefit other techniques in administering this program and auction, would that be -- would it be acceptable to switch those other techniques out for the -- actually, let me start this over again.

Is it -- let me try it this way: Is it your testimony that there will be no negative impact in starting the auction at the FAC rate?

A. I don't know how you would define "negative impact," but it may very well be that there would be no bids, in that case then Ohio Power would have to stand behind and continue to supply pursuant

to its contract with AEP Generation Resources.

- Q. Do you believe that the structure of a competitive bid auction has an effect on the closing price?
  - A. You mean the clearing price?
  - Q. Clearing price, yes.
  - A. Yes.

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- Q. Okay. And so if the contemporary thought was that in order to get to a lower, I would call it closing but we'll use your terminology, clearing price you had to start with a higher price, would you object to that assuming that we reached the other goal which is that customers aren't -- are benefited and not harmed?
- A. I don't think I really have enough information there because I would look at it as a total economic package. For example, if the capacity pricing was marked consistent with the energy pricing, that might be one way to achieve the totality of the economic package.

If, on the other hand, as some parties may have suggested, where any excess clearing price over the fuel adjustment clause rate would simply be deferred, I wouldn't agree that that's a comparable economic package.

1	Q. But assuming that there was a comparable
2	economic package that was applied so that customers
3	weren't harmed and possibly would benefit, that would
4	be sufficient to meet your needs with or without the
5	reserve price being at the FAC price.
6	A. Well, you know, it's like beauty; it's in
7	the eye of the beholder. You know, the goal is that
8	customers not be harmed, and I put a recommendation
9	on the table that I think will achieve that goal.
10	There are other recommendations on the table that may
11	or may not do that.
12	MR. PETRICOFF: I have no further
13	questions. Thank you very much.
14	THE WITNESS: You're welcome.
15	EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.
16	Mr. Alexander.
17	MR. ALEXANDER: Very briefly.
18	
19	CROSS-EXAMINATION
20	By Mr. Alexander:
21	Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Kollen.
22	Have you reviewed the rules attached to
23	AEP Ohio's application as Exhibit A with regard to
24	what happens if an auction fails?
25	A. I believe I did review that portion of

193 1 it, and my understanding is that at that time, then, 2 Ohio Power would continue to serve the SSO load 3 pursuant to its contract with AEP Generation 4 Resources. 5 0. At what price? I believe the fuel adjustment clause 6 7 price. 8 MR. ALEXANDER: No further questions. 9 Thank you. 10 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. Mr. Pritchard? 11 MR. PRITCHARD: No questions, your Honor. 12 13 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Nourse? 14 Mr. Conway. 15 MR. CONWAY: Thank you, your Honor. 16 17 CROSS-EXAMINATION 18 By Mr. Conway: 19 Good afternoon, Mr. Kollen. 2.0 Α. Good afternoon. 21 I have a couple more questions about your 22 background. You went to the University of Toledo and received a bachelor's degree from Toledo; is that 23 24 right? 25 A. I did, yes.

Q. And then did you receive any other degrees besides your bachelor's degree from Toledo?

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- A. Yes; I have an MBA from the University of Toledo as well.
- Q. Then you attended Luther Rice University. Did you receive a degree from Luther Rice?
- A. I did, yes. A Master of Arts in Theology.
- Q. And did you take courses at either of those institutions that addressed competitive bidding processes?
- A. I don't think very many universities or colleges offer those courses.
- Q. Okay. So since then, after your educational endeavors, in your work experience have you designed and implemented competitive bidding processes for the procurement of default services for electric utilities?
  - A. I have not.
- Q. And you haven't done that for any gas utilities either, have you?
  - A. That's right.
  - Q. Or any other type of utility, right?
- A. That's correct.
  - Q. And you haven't served as an auction

manager for any competitively bid auction; is that right?

A. That's true.

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- Q. Okay. One of your recommendations,
  Mr. Kollen, as I understand it, is that the
  energy-only auctions approved by the Commission
  should be held separately for the CSP and Ohio Power
  rate zones; is that right?
  - A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. And you make this recommendation, as I understand your testimony, because the price to beat for these energy-only auctions, in your view, would differ significantly for each rate zone?
- A. Yes. In fact, they do. It's about a \$6 per megawatt-hour differential right now with Ohio Power being a lower fuel adjustment clause than Columbus Southern Power, the two different rate zones, and the reason for having the two separate auctions is because of that price differential.
- Q. So the answer to the question is yes, that's correct, I understand your proposal accurately, and then the explanation, right, that you provided?
- A. The answer is yes, my proposal is two separate rate zones for the reason that I just gave.

Q. And your conclusion is that -- or your view is that if the energy-only auctions aren't held separately for each rate zone, the clearing price may lead to unduly high energy rates for Ohio Power; is that the bottom line?

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- A. I think that's right. Or, another possibility is the rejection of a bid that might be a winning bid for Columbus Southern Power because it's more than Ohio Power but less than the fuel adjustment clause for CSP.
- Q. What's your understanding of how the FAC rates are currently established for the two rate zones?
- A. It's as Mr. Roush described. I did research that to some extent prior to filing my testimony, and he did accurately describe it.
- Q. Okay. And could you just summarize for me right now what that is?
- A. Yes. And, in fact, I did review some of the company's filings as well with the PUCO, but essentially the fuel adjustment recovery amounts are determined, those dollars are allocated to the two different rate zones and then divided through by the energy for each one of the rate zones.
  - Q. And the part of it that interests me at

this point is the allocated through part that you referenced. How is that done with your -- as you understand it?

- A. My understanding is that that is some specified percentage. The source of that percentage I'm not familiar with.
- Q. Did you listen to Mr. Roush's testimony today from beginning to end?
  - A. I believe so.

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- Q. Did you hear him explain that or did he explain what that basis was? Whether it was some historical relationship that was being maintained or something else?
- A. He did say that, and that is correct to my understanding. Again, I don't know what the source of it is beyond the fact that it's a historical relationship.
- Q. And my understanding from your criticism or from your recommendation, which for the separate auctions, which I think is described at the tail end of your testimony, your concern is that without doing the separate auctions this historical-based allocation approach might not be maintained; is that it?
  - A. No, that's not the problem. The problem

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is that what otherwise might be a winning bid might be rejected, in the case of CSP. For example, if the fuel adjustment clause rate is \$36 for right now and a bid came in and -- for Ohio Power it's 30 and a bid came in for CSP at 34, you would want to take it but for Ohio Power you would not want to take it.

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Or, alternatively, if you blended the rate somehow, then it would penalize Ohio Power and accept the CSP customers in that rate zone.

- Q. And how would it hurt Ohio Power if the rate were allocated in some fashion blended as you just described?
- A. Well, the bid would not have otherwise been taken for Ohio Power. In other words --
- Q. If that -- can I just stop you? I'm sorry to interrupt you, I'll let you continue, but you say if the bid is not taken for Ohio Power, is that because the reserve price has been established and it doesn't meet the reserve price test or is it some other reason?
  - A. No; it would be that reason.
  - Q. Okay. I see. Okay. Continue.
  - A. Well, that completes my answer.
- Q. Okay. Let's assume that the reserve price recommendation is not adopted, in that instance

would you be -- would you be accepting of a single auction in that instance with the results of the auction allocated to the two rate zones in a similar fashion to the way the procurement costs under the fuel adjustment clause are allocated to the two rate zones currently?

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- A. Well, the primary reason for having the differential is for the price to beat, and I haven't given it much further thought beyond that, so I can't really respond.
- Q. Okay. It's the two recommendations are tied together for you which I didn't understand previously. They're tied together; is that right?
  - A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. All right. Just to be clear about it, if we were to hold two auctions, separate auctions for the rate zones, and the bidders came in a robust manner to the auction and bid in and we didn't have the reserve price element to it but we did have two separate auctions, would you expect that if they were conducted on the same day with the same product specifications, all the circumstances and criteria for the auction being the same, that they would produce very similar, if not identical, results?
  - A. I think that may be within the range of a

reasonable expectation of outcome, not necessarily true but probably reasonable.

- Q. Mr. Kollen, are you familiar with the Commission's orders in the ESP 1 case and the ESP 2 case?
  - A. More so with the ESP 2 case.
- Q. You have some familiarity with or understanding of the ESP 1 order but you're more familiar with -- more knowledgeable about the second order?
  - A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. Do you know, with regard to the ESP 1 order, whether the Commission authorized a fuel adjustment clause for the two companies -- excuse me, authorized fuel adjustment clauses for the two companies, CSP and Ohio Power Company, that allowed for the recovery of purchased power expense?
  - A. That's my recollection.
- Q. And, in fact, included within the FAC expenses that the ESP 2 order were those same purchased power expenses?
- A. I don't know that that was addressed in the ESP 2 order.
- Q. Well, did the ESP 2 order, in your understanding, reauthorize the FAC that had been

previously authorized by the ESP 1 order?

- A. Yes, that was a component of the ESP 2 order in the sense of continuing a fuel adjustment clause. At the same time, though, certain of those costs, the fixed costs, of the purchased power were apparently included in the capacity charge determination that had been made in the 10-2929 case.
- Q. And is it your understanding that the Commission adjusted or made a revision to the FAC that it had previously authorized in ESP 1 in its ESP 2 order?
- A. I don't recall that there were any exceptions in the ESP 2 order to the fuel adjustment clause.
- Q. And then in the ESP 1 order is it your understanding that the purchased power expenses that were authorized for inclusion in the FAC in that proceeding included fixed costs or demand charges?
- A. I don't know. I haven't investigated that.
- Q. General question, Mr. Kollen. Pretty high level. A utility such as AEP Ohio self-services to their customers, right?
  - A. Yes, that's correct.
  - Q. And so a customer who purchases standard

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service offer service from AEP Ohio pays AEP Ohio for that service, right?

- A. Very high level, yes.
- Q. Okay.

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- A. Or very low level depending on your perspective, but the answer is still yes.
- Q. Okay. And when customers purchase SSO service, they don't actually purchase the assets of the utilities used to provide the service, right?
  - A. That's true.
- Q. I want to ask you some questions regarding your rate impacts analyses and conclusions, rate impacts of the competitive bid process.

Do you have your testimony in front of you?

- A. T do.
- Q. Could you turn to, I believe it's roughly pages 12 through 15.
  - A. Yes.
- Q. At this part of your testimony, as I understand it, you explain the extent to which you think customers could be harmed if AEP Ohio's proposed competitive bid process isn't modified in the fashion that you also recommend; is that right?
  - A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. And I believe, my understanding is at this point in your testimony you make a comparison of AEP Ohio's average FAC rates for a period or periods to energy-only rates that you base upon auction results that FirstEnergy or perhaps FirstEnergy and Duke Energy Ohio utilities experienced; is that a fair summary of what you're doing?

- A. Yes. With the exception of the "perhaps" it's a definite, that's exactly what I did.
- Q. Okay. The reason that I hesitate is that the first couple pages you seem to have Duke Energy in the picture, by the time I get to about the third or fourth page, page 15 and 16, it's all FirstEnergy, I don't see much discussion about Duke at that point.
  - A. That's right, and that was intentional.
  - O. Yeah.

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And background question, Mr. Kollen.

What is the period or periods during which
auction-procured energy products will be delivered to
AEP Ohio as a result of the competitive bid process
that the Commission presumably will approve as a
result of this case?

- A. I think the first period for the 10 percent is a 22-month period and --
  - Q. And could you tell me what the months are

for that that you have in mind?

- Well, I think that was described in one of your witnesses' testimony and that would run from whenever the auction delivery date started, the first one, the 10 percent auction, through May 31 of '15.
  - Ο. Okay.

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- And then the incremental 50 percent would Α. run from June 1 of '14 through May 31 of '15. And then the final one would run five months, if I understand correctly.
- Now, let me go back to the first auction delivery period which I think you referenced testimony by someone else, perhaps Dr. LaCasse or Mr. Roush, and you didn't actually specify a month that you had in mind, maybe that's because it's a little bit up in the air, but did you have a month in mind? You said 22 months at some point.
- I believe the 22 months came from Α. Ms. LaCasse's testimony, but the month starting would be six months after the final order in the corporate separation case.
- So I mean did you have in mind October, for example, October of 2013 as a possible start time or some point after that?
  - Α. I did not have a particular month in mind

and that's why when I quantified the harm I stated it on an annualized basis rather than a defined time period.

- Q. You stated it on an annual basis for the 10 percent auction; is that right?
  - A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. You didn't state it on a annual basis for the subsequent incremental 50 percent auction, did you?
- A. No, I did not. I quantified that for a seven-month period running from June 1 of '14 through December 31 of '14.
- Q. And within that seven-month period you aggregated the portion of the delivery which resulted from the 10 percent auction; is that right?
  - A. Yes.

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- Q. Okay. So there's a seven-month period June 2014 through the end of the year 2014, that's one piece of your analysis, and then the first piece of your analysis ends in May of 2014 but it's not clear quite what the beginning month is in that period; is that right?
- A. Right. That's because I don't get to define that and it hasn't been defined other than six months after the final -- the date of the final order

in the corporate separation case.

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- Q. Okay. So the \$47 million figure that you come up with, that's an annual figure, right?
  - A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. And it ends in -- the actual period for that that relates to that figure ends in May of 2014 and begins sometime before that, right?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. So it's not going to be 12 months though, is it?
  - A. No, I don't think it will.
- Q. It will be some shorter period than 12 months, correct?
- A. I think it will, yes. In fact, I think I footnoted that in the testimony.
- Q. I didn't read the footnote. What's that say?
  - A. Well, let's see if I can find it.
  - Q. Sorry.
- A. Well, apparently I moved it up into the text and just simply simplified it by referring to the annualized quantification.
- Q. Could you give me the page and line number where you're referring to right now?
  - A. Yes. I'm looking at page 15, lines 14

through 16 -- actually 12 through 16: "If the Company's energy-only auction results are similar to FirstEnergy's, and the 10 percent market energy blending is applied, this would increase the cost to the SSO customers over both rate zones by approximately \$24.73 per megawatt-hour, or \$47 million annually."

- Q. Okay. I did actually read that part, so I apologize for telling you I didn't. But it still doesn't provide any explanation about the fact that the 47 million is an annual figure and it's going to surely be less than that for this circumstance because you're not going to get 12 months of the 10 percent auction before the end of May of 2014, right?
- A. That's true. It will be less than the \$47 million depending on the number of months.
  - Q. Okay.

- A. That's why I used that terminology; annually.
- Q. So if it starts, if delivery starts in January of 2014, it will be five months, if it starts in December, it will be six months, right?
  - A. Sure. It's exactly right.
  - Q. And did you hear testimony earlier today

that the six-month period after the April 24th date would be the end of October?

A. I did not hear that.

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Q. You didn't hear that? Okay.

In any event, the comparison you make is a value that you get -- you extract from the FirstEnergy utilities' auction, is that the January 2013 auction that you used?

- A. Yes, it was.
- Q. And then you take that extracted value and then you compare that to a FAC value for AEP Ohio, right?
  - A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. And where -- and the FAC value comes from what period of time?
- A. It was the 12 months ending the second quarter of 2013.
  - Q. Okay.
- A. I took the average of the quarterly rates for each one of the rate zones.
- Q. At this point obviously we don't know what the FAC values are going to be for the, say November 2013 earliest date you could have deliveries happen apparently, through the May of 2015 periods, right?

- A. Right. Those would be projections. I used the most recent available actual information.
- Q. So would it be fair to say that your use of the 12-month period ended June 2013 to come up with a FAC rate, it's a proxy for the actual FAC rates that will occur in the end of 2013 through May of 2015 period, right?
- A. May of '14, you mean, or if you want to go all the way through the energy auction periods, May of '15.
  - Q. Yeah.

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- A. Depends on which period you're looking at, but the answer would be yes.
- Q. Okay, well, the auctions themselves are going to procure power that would be delivered for periods beginning at three different points, say December, November-December at the earliest in 2013, that 10 percent auction product will be delivered all the way through May of 2015, right?
  - A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. Okay. And it's going to be a fixed price for that period, right?
  - A. T --
  - Q. Okay.
- A. It's a load-shaped product.

- Q. All right. Okay, it's load shaped but the price itself is fixed, right?
- A. I don't know what they're going to bid in. I mean, we can come up with a fixed price, an average.
- Q. Okay. So you don't know what the bid specs. are for the bid product at that point.
- A. No; they are as reflected in Ms. LaCasse's exhibit.

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- Q. At any rate, then we have another auction for delivery of a supply that starts in June of 2014 and that 50 percent increment, that gets delivered through May of 2015 also, right?
  - A. Yes, that's my understanding.
- Q. And then that's going to be finally a product for deliveries starting in January of 2015 and then through May of 2015.
  - A. That's my understanding, yes.
- Q. But the first two products, they actually have a delivery term that starts, say,

  November-December of 2013 but it goes till May of

  2015, or from June of 2014 through May of 2015,

  right?
  - A. Yes, that's my understanding.
    - Q. Okay. So then you make an estimate of

what customers would pay for auction-procured energy for both the 10 percent and then the incremental 50 percent auctions using the FirstEnergy January 2013 auction results, right?

A. Yes.

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- Q. And that FirstEnergy auction in January was a full-requirements auction, right?
  - A. My understanding is that it was.
  - Q. I mean, do you have that -- I mean --
  - A. Yes.
    - Q. Is that your understanding?
- A. Yes, it is.
  - Q. It's not an energy-only auction then, right?
  - A. That's right, and that's why I backed out the capacity component.
  - Q. Okay. Okay. So then just in broad strokes, to get to the way you make your calculation, at least the way I understand your calculation, Mr. Kollen, you take this average FAC rate based on the 12-month period ended June of 2013 and that gives you on the one hand a \$32 and some cents per megawatt-hour price, right?
- A. Rate for the fuel adjustment clause, that's correct.

- Q. Okay. And then you also have this residual value or however you want to describe it, the calculated value that you extract from the FirstEnergy auction results of 56 dollars 83, 84 cents, right?
- A. Yeah, I wouldn't call it a residual value. I'd call it the energy value.
  - Q. Okay. That's the energy value.
  - A. Yes.

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- Q. In your view, right?
- A. Yes. And I explain the methodology that I used to get there.
- Q. And then you take, as I understand it, you just subtract the two values and that gets you roughly 24-1/2 dollars and then you multiply that times -- for the 10 percent auction, your estimate of what the megawatt-hours for the nonshopping load will be; is that right?
- A. Yeah. It wasn't really my estimate, it was the company's estimate, and then I -- for two different time periods, '14 and '15, and I simply took the average of that.
- Q. And you applied the average to each of the auction periods that you evaluated, right?
  - A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. So I mean that was your choice, that wasn't the company's choice, was it?

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- A. That's true, but the starting point was the company's estimate.
- Q. Okay. Going back to the \$47 million annual figure that you mentioned at lines 15 to 16 on page 15, that -- if that annual impact runs from October through May of 20 -- October 2013 through May of 2014, that would be seven months, right?
- A. Yes. Well, October 1 through May 31 would be eight months.
- Q. Okay. I'm sorry, I meant to -- if it's at the end of -- when we were talking about it before, I think we had agreement that the testimony was that the six-month period after the April 24th date would be the end of October; is that right?
- A. I think that's what you represented and I accepted it for purposes of the question.
  - Q. Okay.
- A. I don't have an independent knowledge of it.
- Q. I apologize for a misstatement I just made. The delivery period starts in November,

  November 1, then it would last for seven months,

right?

- A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. And you don't have any reason to believe that the delivery period for that 10 percent auction is going to start any earlier than November, do you?
  - A. I don't have any reason.
- Q. Okay. And so the \$47 million annual impact you mentioned for that seven-month period, it's going to be something a little more than half of what you calculated on an annual basis, right?
  - A. That's right, yes.
- Q. Okay. And then, as I understand it, for the June 2014 through December 2014 period when the 60 percent, well, when the 50 percent incremental energy auction product is being delivered, it looked to me like you just scaled up what you had done for the 10 percent auction.
  - A. Yes, that's correct.
  - Q. Okay.
- A. By the way, I found the footnote, it's on page 4 with respect to the allocation.
- Q. Well, I didn't read that one, so thank you. I'll take a look at it later.
- A. I parked it in the summary instead of in the detailed calculations.

Q. All right. So for the seven-month period -- let's go back to the 10 percent auction. The seven-month period where the auction is at the 10 percent level, 7/12s of 47 million, that's about 27 million, right?

A. Yes.

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Q. Okay. And for the next period, the next seven-month period which includes the incremental 50 percent auction which, luckily, is also seven months of the -- so the scaling up is pretty simple, you just multiply it by 6, right?

A. Yes.

Q. So 6 times 27 is what?

A. It comes pretty darn close to 164 million.

- Q. So you already figured that out for the seven-month period, okay. Now, back to the \$56.83-1/2 -- excuse me, \$56.83-1/2 per megawatt-hour value you got from the FirstEnergy auction, if you used a lower value for that energy product, of course, the impact results would also similarly be reduced if you held everything else the same, right?
- A. Yes. And, similarly, if you used a larger energy value, the harm would be greater, but --

- Q. God forbid we increase it any more.
- A. That would be not good, yes.
- Q. That would be unfortunate, wouldn't it? Okay.
  - A. It would.

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- Q. So if we reduced it by, say, \$10 a megawatt-hour, that would have a substantial impact on the impact analysis, correct?
  - A. Sure.
- Q. And so if we reduced it by \$10 and then multiplied it by the 1.9 million megawatt-hours that you calculated as the average amount of nonshopping load, that would be about \$19 million, right?
  - A. I think that's about right.
- Q. And then, of course, if we increased it, say, to \$20, that is increased the reduction to \$20 from 56.83, if we reduced it by \$20 a megawatt-hour, the impact would be \$38 million, right? \$20 times 1.9 million.
- A. I think maybe I went a little bit too quickly on the response to your prior answer. You said that if we reduced it from \$56 to \$46, in other words, \$10.
  - Q. Right.
  - A. The differential would be less than half

of the \$24.73 that I cite on line 15. And so if the annualized amount is 47 million, I would expect it, you know, a reduction of \$10 would maybe be 26 million or something like that, not 19.

- Q. Well, I'm not sure I understood you but the figures I was quoting to you were probably annual figures, right?
  - A. Yes.

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- Q. And is your response that they need to be also similarly prorated down to the seven-month period; is that what you're saying?
- A. Well, they need to start out with annual numbers and if you want to prorate to the seven months, then you would do that, yes.
  - Q. Okay. Fair enough.

And then, similarly, if the -- not to belabor the point, but if we go to the 50 percent incremental auction and we were to reduce the -- if it turned out that the energy -- the energy-only auction price were \$10 or \$20 lower than the \$56 per megawatt-hour that you used, the impact analysis would be also similarly affected, right?

- A. Yes. By definition.
- Q. Okay. And then on the other side going to the FAC energy component rate value that you

utilize, if it turns out that it's higher than the value -- if the actual FAC rates during the period when the auctions are taking place are actually higher than the value that you developed using the average from the 12 months ended June of 2013, that would also further reduce the impact of your -- the impact of your analysis; is that right?

- A. Right. And, similarly, if they're lower, then it would increase the harm.
  - Q. Right.

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- A. It goes either way.
- Q. Have you read IEU Witness Murray's testimony?
  - A. I did.
- Q. And you're aware that he conducted also, I wouldn't call it a similar impact analysis but he did make some similar observations, similar in type, but the energy-only auction value that he came up with was more in the \$46 range, are you aware of that?
- A. I am. I don't know what the difference is.
- Q. Okay. Maybe we can explore that just a little bit. At any rate, Mr. Murray came up with a value that is \$10 per megawatt-hour lower than the

\$56 per megawatt-hour figure that you've used, right?

A. Yes. I do know how he came up with it, it just came back to me. What he did was he used, if I recall correctly, a fuel adjustment clause rate and then added the 25 percent premium to it. So, in other words, the \$36 for Columbus Southern effectively became \$45 or \$46, roughly, and that's how he derived his market energy rate.

Q. Okay.

Q.

A. I think the approach that I took is more reasonable and reflects actual market pricing, but that's how he did it so I do know I can reconcile between the two different values.

Okay. Thank you, that's helpful.

- Now let me turn to the 19 million megawatt-hours that you have used as the starting point for your estimate of the nonshopping load that normally gets served by the auction-procured energy, okay?
  - A. Okay.
- Q. All right. The 19 million megawatt-hours per year value is what? Where did you get that?
- A. The company provided 2014 and 2015 nonshopping energy basically, SSO energy, and what I did was I took the average of those two projections

from the company.

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- Q. Okay. So the end result is 19 million on average, right?
  - A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. Okay. So it would be reasonable, would it not, to, I don't know if we're interpolating or extrapolating here, but it would be reasonable to extrapolate that the two values were roughly 17 million for 2013 and 21 million for 2014, right?
  - A. Could you repeat that?
- Q. Well, you came up with an average of 19 million megawatt-hours per year covering the 2013 and 2014 period, right?
- A. Yes. Either that or the '14 or '15 period.
  - O. It's 2013 and '14.
- A. Okay, apparently you've looked at my workpapers.
- 19 Q. I did, yes.
- 20 A. Good.
- 21 Q. It's not '14 and '15, it's '13 and '14.
- 22 A. That's fine.
- Q. And if you'd like to look at them, I'd be happy to get them for you.
  - A. No, that's fine.

- Q. Okay. And so then I inferred from that that the values that led to the average would have been somewhere around 21 million for 2013 and 17 million for 2014.
- A. That sounds about right, but it's in the workpapers.
  - Q. Right.
  - A. Yes.

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- Q. All right. But, at any rate, if you average 21 million and 17 million, you get 19 million, right?
  - A. You do.
- Q. And, of course, we know that the -- that the migration continues as we speak, right?
  - A. I would think so.
- Q. So what's happening is we're going from higher levels of nonshopping load to reduced -- increasingly reduced levels of nonshopping load as time goes by, right?
  - A. I would think so.
  - Q. Okay.
- A. The other way of stating that is more shopping as time goes on.
- Q. So, at any rate, based on the inference that I drew, the nonshopping load that you used for

2013 is about 4 million megawatt-hours higher than the amount you used for 2014, right?

- A. I think that's right.
- Q. Okay.

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- A. I didn't really view it that way, I was trying to get just an average.
- Q. Yeah. I noticed that, and I, I don't know why, but I instinctively went in the direction that I did which was to ask the question, well, which way is this nonshopping load going, directionally. Is it going down, or is it going up? Must be going down so that's why I focused on it.

But let me get to the point of it. Most of the period that you analyzed is actually in 2014, right?

- A. Well, I analyzed on an annualized basis because I didn't know when in 2013 the 10 percent tranche would commence.
  - Q. Yeah.
- A. So I simply looked at it on an annualized basis, and that then would cover the -- some portion of '13 and five months of '14.
- Q. Well, in the example I've been describing to you we have two months in 2013 and 12 months in 2014 of this auction delivery period that we're

looking at. So in that example you'd agree obviously most of the time for the delivery is going to be in 2014, not 2013.

- A. I would agree there's more months in 2014 than there will be in 2013 for the delivery periods; there's no question about that. And, remember, I did preface this, I said it's difficult to quantify precisely how much the harm is, but I took a, I think a reasonable approach to make a quantification, and it could be more or less.
- Q. Do you think it would be, or would you agree it would be more reasonable to simply use the value, the average amount of nonshopping load for 2014 and just, you know, skip the 2013 part of it to use for your analysis since we have all this, we have the continuing decline of the nonshopping load, and since most of the period under review is 2014?
- A. Well, you could certainly do that calculation. I would simply say that these were projections by the company and I just simply took the average as a proxy for the overall time period.
- Q. Okay. But would you agree with me that if we simply used the 2014 value, the 17 million megawatt-hour value, and plugged it into the analysis, it would tend to shave off another

10 percent off of your impact, your adverse impacts, that you've calculated? 19 over 17, roughly, you know, something over 10 percent.

- A. Well, it would be scaled down, there's no question about that. Because this is a harm to the SSO customers. If you have fewer customers or fewer sales, obviously, the harm is less.
- Q. Yeah. And let me just, not to beat a dead horse here too long, but in 2014 even when most of the -- in the heaviest part of the energy procurement at the total of 60 percent level, that is with the incremental 50 percent procurement, it's mostly at the tail end -- or, that's not fair. It's in the second half of 2014, is it not?
- A. The final seven months is 60 percent, the first five is 10.
- Q. So maybe even taking the average megawatt-hours for 2014 for the nonshopping load is really not a fair way to approach it, it ought to be weighted towards whatever is the nonshopping load at the end of 2014, right?
- A. Well, we can do all of these different sensitivity analyses. I did what I did and I think it's a reasonable quantification of potential harm, and we can scale the SSO load up or down.

Q. Yeah.

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A. If you believe that, you know, the shopping load will continue to grow, and I think that's a reasonable assumption, then you can refine the analysis and reduce the harm. You can change the prices. You can increase the harm, you can reduce the harm. You can make different permutations of this.

It's simply an attempt to demonstrate that it was significant harm, and even if you scale it down somewhat, it's still significant harm.

- Q. Well, we don't want to be unduly alarmist about what we're recommending or what we're doing, do we?
- A. Well, I think what we want to do is we want to get to a reasonable resolution of this that doesn't harm SSO customers.
- Q. Let me go to another aspect of the analysis, I'm just about finished with it, but --
  - A. I've heard those stories before.
- Q. -- and that's the value you extracted from the FirstEnergy utilities' auction results, okay?
  - A. Okay.
    - Q. You came up with a deduction of I think

- \$2.36 that you backed out of the all-in price from the FirstEnergy utilities' auction; is that right?
  - A. I think that's right.

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- Q. Okay. And that was based on a capacity price that prevailed or prevails when? Now?
- A. I believe it was the '14-'15 delivery period.
  - Q. So you think that it was --
- A. I would have to go back, though, and confirm, but that's my recollection.
- Q. You wouldn't probably, maybe you will, would you be willing to accept, subject to check, that what you used was the capacity price, the RPM price, for the 2013-'14 delivery period?
  - A. I may have.
- Q. Okay. Which is 24-1/2 bucks, roughly? On a dollars per megawatt-day basis.
- A. I knew that's what you meant. That's very close.
- Q. Okay. And then is it your understanding or do you have an understanding about what the RPM price is scheduled to be for the 2014-'15 period?
- A. Yes. It goes up to about \$126 per megawatt-day.
  - Q. And then what happens in 2015-'16?

- A. I think it drops down to about \$60.
- Q. During the 2014-'15 period that would --where it goes up to \$126, that would cover the June 2014 through May 2015 period?
  - A. Yes, it would.

- Q. So don't you think it would have been more appropriate to use that capacity price, \$126 per megawatt-day capacity price, then the \$24-1/2 per megawatt-day capacity price?
- A. Well, it was a three-year auction product that FirstEnergy was competitively bidding so it covered really all of those time periods, and --
  - Q. I'm sorry, you said it covered?
  - A. It covered multiple PJM delivery years.
- Q. The capacity price deducted covered multiple periods or the auction itself?
  - A. No; the auction product itself.
  - Q. Okay. I'm sorry.
- A. And because we were dealing with the data, the company's projections of the nonshopping load, everything was done on a consistent data basis.

Now, we could have moved it forward in time or we could have selected a subset of the future period. There's a number of different ways you could do the analysis, I'm the first one to admit that and

agree to that, but what I did was take an analysis and say this is the harm that could be visited upon SSO customers. We can make that more or less depending on the assumptions.

- Q. Wouldn't you agree with me that not using the \$126 per megawatt-day value for the 2014-'15 period at June 2014 through May 2015, that not using that value has rendered your offset from the FirstEnergy price inaccurate?
- A. No. I wouldn't agree with that. I would suggest to you that if you wanted to modify the analysis, you could take a three-year, three-delivery-year average of the RPM. If you wanted to do that, you could.
  - Q. I'm sorry.

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- A. You could have taken a three-year average if you wanted to do that.
- Q. The three-year average of the -- on the one hand the \$25 per megawatt-day and on the second hand the \$126 per megawatt-day and on the third hand the capacity price for the third year?
  - A. Right.
- Q. Because what you said was \$60, I think, right?
  - A. That's right.

Q. But let me ask you about that if you don't mind.

Isn't the price that applies to the FirstEnergy utilities the ATSI, the ATSI price?

- A. I believe so.
- Q. And didn't that come in at an eye-popping level, it kind of surprised people here at the Commission and elsewhere?
  - A. No.

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- Q. It was more than \$60, wasn't it?
- A. No, no, I'm not sure it was the ATSI price. In fact, I don't think it was.
- Q. Okay. But, okay, at any rate, we should come up with some -- if we're going to follow your approach, we need to deduct a number that reflects the actual capacity prices that were prevailing for the FirstEnergy utilities' all-in full-requirements auction, right?
- A. Right. You can do that over the entirety of the auction period. I just used the '13-'14 12-month period because that was what I had data for, and I chose to make everything consistent in the computations that I made.
- Q. Okay. And then, finally, well, actually, not finally --

1 A. Promises, promises.

- Q. Did you review the bid specifications for the FirstEnergy utilities' argument which defined what the SSO supply included, that is what was the different components of it and what the companies were supplying and what the bidders had to include to -- had to agree to furnish and then bid on to supply?
  - A. Not with that level of specificity.
- Q. Okay. So you don't know whether there was anything else other than energy on the one hand and capacity product on the other hand that had to be supplied by the bidders.
- A. Well, if there were additional ancillary services to be provided or what?
- Q. Exactly. Were there any other ancillary services or transmission services?
  - A. I didn't look at it that specifically.
- Q. Okay. If there were, it would affect your calculations, right?
  - A. It might marginally.
  - Q. Okay.
    - A. But I don't think very significantly.
- Q. All right. Do you recall testimony by

  Mr. Roush in response to several inquiries by counsel

in which he explained that the energy procured for the fuel adjustment clause, to provide that supply through the company's generation, was supplied on an economic basis?

- A. I think he said that he was not a generation planner and he didn't really have anything beyond a very basic understanding of the process.

  But he did refer to an economic dispatch of the company's generation resources.
- Q. Well, is it your understanding that energy is supplied to the company's SSO customers on an economic basis by the company's owned generation?
- A. It's a combination of resources both owned generation and purchases, and some of it is must run and some of it is economically dispatched.
  - O. Yeah.

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- A. I'm reasonably familiar with the interconnection agreement and the operation of the AEP system.
- Q. Is it your understanding that the energy displaced by the 10 percent auction, for example, would be, hopefully I'll say this correctly, it will be displacing energy that will be procured through the FAC at the high end in costs on the stack of energy available to the company to purchase through

the FAC mechanism?

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- A. Well, first of all, it depends on whether or not it's purchased from a third party as opposed to AEP Generation Resources. And then second of all it would depend on the allocation of the fuel costs by AEP.
- Q. I'm sorry, I'm talking about the way the fuel adjustment clause works right now.
  - A. Oh, oh.
- Q. Okay. Is it your understanding that the energy being supplied to the company's customers that's being managed or it's being procured through the fuel adjustment clause or through the mechanism that feeds the fuel adjustment clause, that that energy is supplied on an economic basis to the company and, as a result, when you displace part of it, for example through the 10 percent auction, that what's going to happen is that the more expensive pieces of energy available will be displaced first as opposed to the most expensive?
- A. I don't know that that will happen.

  Typically that's the way a fuel adjustment clause would work.
  - Q. Okay.
  - A. But I don't know if that would happen. I

haven't seen any testimony to that effect.

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- Q. If that were the case, if it were done on that basis, not on some average basis, would you agree that the impact analysis that you've come up with would end up overstating the impacts?
- A. Not necessarily, because the displacement as I understand it from the company's proposal is to blend the fuel adjustment rate, in other words, whatever is in the fuel adjustment rate, with the cost of the auction purchases, and that really depends on what ends up in that fuel adjustment clause rate. I don't know what will end up in there.

Under an economic dispatch you would expect purchases at whatever price because they will become a take-or-pay type of purchase that it would displace generation and you would hope that it would displace it at the margin, but we don't know that, and plus there's the interaction of the interconnection agreement as well which will remain in effect through the end of the year.

Q. But if, in fact, what would happen is that the most expensive sources of the company's owned generation were displaced first, then it would be overstating the impacts to assume that an average -- an average price is being displaced.

A. I don't think I can agree with that hypothetical. To the extent that there's excess generation, then that simply means there's less generation being sold in the market or to the sister companies, and there may be, in fact, even a fuel increase rather than a reduction on an average per kilowatt-hour basis.

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- Q. In response to a question from Mr. Alexander earlier, FirstEnergy Solutions' counsel, I believe you stated that the proposed CBP rules, which are Exhibit A to the application in this case, say that AEP Ohio would purchase energy from AEP GenCo under its contract using existing FAC prices. Do you recall that Q and A?
- A. I recall a Q and A of that nature, but I don't recall that there was a Q and A with respect to purchasing at existing FAC prices. I think what I -- I think what were described was that there would be some cost-based, in other words, AEP/Ohio Power would pay AEP Generation Resources, Inc. on a cost basis computed in the same manner that the fuel adjustment clause presently is computed.
- Q. Do you have Exhibit A to the CBP rules in front of you?
  - A. I do not.

MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, may I approach?

EXAMINER TAUBER: You may.

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Q. I'm going to hand you Exhibit A,
Mr. Kollen, to the CBP rules which were filed with
the companies' application on December 21st, 2012.

MR. CONWAY: My plan is not, again, your Honors, is not to mark it as an exhibit, it's already been filed in the docket.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Correct. You're referring to Attachment A?

MR. CONWAY: Yes.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Or Exhibit A?

MR. CONWAY: Yes. Thank you.

- Q. (By Mr. Conway) And the question I have for you is that if you could look through the rules and show me where you found -- where you find support for the statement that AEP GenCo would be contractually obligated to provide SSO energy at the FAC rate if the auction fails.
- A. First of all, my understanding was informed through responses to discovery, and I don't have those with me that I can refer to, but nevertheless, that was my understanding that AEP Generation Resources was responsible pursuant to contract with AEP/Ohio Power to provide all SSO load

requirements other than the CBP energy-only. And you'll have to give me a moment.

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Okay, let me just make sure I understand the question. Your question is where in the auction rules does it say that if the auction fails, that AEP Generation Resources will supply AEP/Ohio Power? Or was your question something different?

- Q. My question is based on an exchange you had with Mr. Alexander where I believe, what I recall you saying is that -- to a question what happens if the auctions don't end up procuring power, either because of the reserve price or for some other reason they fail, either in whole or in part, what happens, and I thought you said that what happens is that AEP GenCo ends up supplying power at the FAC rate.
- A. Well, I said that AEP/Ohio Power then has to supply the SSO load and that it has a contract with AEP Generation Resources to provide that capacity and energy.
  - Q. At the FAC rate I thought you said.
- A. At the cost which would be comparable to the FAC rate.
- Q. Maybe not. So you're saying it's not the FAC rate or it is?
  - A. Well, there won't be a FAC any longer so

how can it be the FAC rate? That's why I said it was comparable.

- Q. Okay. Could you turn to article 7, contingency plans of the Exhibit A --
  - A. Yes.

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- Q. -- to the competitive bidding process rules?
  - A. Okay.
- Q. What does it indicate -- if you could read, excuse me, if you could read 7.1.2 and then when you've finished reading that, let me know.
  - A. Okay, do you want me to read it out loud?
- O. No --
  - A. Is that what you --
  - Q. -- I want you to read it to yourself just to familiarize yourself with it. Or refamiliarize yourself with it.
    - A. Okay. I've read it.
    - Q. Okay. So under this contingency provision, if not all available tranches are procured in an auction, if the auction fails in whole or in part, the first thing that happens is the unfilled tranches will be offered in the next auction process under the CBP, right?
      - A. That's what it says. That's inconsistent

with my recollection of the company's responses to discovery, but that's what it says.

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- Q. And that in between when the next auction process is completed or up until that time what does the first bullet point say that will be the mechanism for procuring energy for the load?
- A. Well, it says that the corresponding energy load in the PJM-administered markets.
- Q. So the energy will be purchased at market prices then; is that right?
- A. Well, this is under a contingency plan as defined in article 7.1.1.
- Q. But I suppose the -- okay, it's 7.1.2 that we were looking at, right?
- A. Yeah. And, you know, I mean, this is certainly taken out of context. I mean, it's under an article 7 entitled "Contingency Plans" and, you know, I will readily admit that I haven't reviewed this document in that level of detail, but I, quite frankly, am relying on discovery responses and to the extent that those discovery responses are inconsistent with this, then that's unfortunate.
- Q. I mean, you indicate at page 21 of your testimony, do you not, lines 5 through 7, that if the auctions fail, that what will happen is that AEP Ohio

will continue to provide energy to its standard service offer customers at the FAC rates through December 31, 2014, and then the way it will do that is that AEP Ohio will continue to obtain all of its energy from AEP Generation Resources.

- A. Right. And that's my understanding from the responses to discovery based upon a contractual arrangement between AEP/Ohio Power and AEP Generation Resources.
- Q. And do you have the discovery responses you keep referring to up there?
  - A. No, I said I don't.
- Q. Okay. But the provision in article 7 that is 7.1.2 does address this topical area, does it not?

MR. KURTZ: Your Honor, could I interpose an objection at this point? I object to counsel's use of the proposed bidding rules that AEP Ohio has submitted which is, of course, the issue in this case as being a definitive -- definitive pronouncement of how things will occur and using it to, therefore, cross-examine the witness.

The proposed rules are just proposed and that's what we're here to decide.

MR. CONWAY: Well, your Honor, actually

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the subject that I've been addressing with him is his comment which is not to worry if the auctions don't work out because we'll just default, we'll go back to AEP Ohio and AEP Generation Resources and energy supplied at a FAC rate and the basis for it, as I understand it, was his understanding that the competitive bidding process rules provided that -- for that result.

And so I think it's -- I don't think it's improper to explore with him the basis for his assurance that if the auctions fail, a particular result that he's enamored with will occur.

MR. KURTZ: That mischaracterizes his testimony because he said he's relying on two things, discovery responses and the FERC contract, FERC pro -- proposed FERC contract between AEP Ohio and AEP Generation Resources that was submitted to FERC to effectuate the ESP 2 decision of this Commission where post-divestiture AEP Ohio would have generation supply to carry out this Commission's ESP plan.

MR. CONWAY: Well, now Mr. Kurtz is testifying again.

EXAMINER TAUBER: I think at this point the area we've ventured into is outside the scope, not necessarily of this proceeding, but of this

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hearing, the narrow three issues that we're here for. So I'm going to sustain the objection.

MR. CONWAY: All right.

- Q. (By Mr. Conway) Mr. Kollen, is it your expectation that AEP Generation Resources will be leaving its assets idle and unhedged to address the contingency that one of these future auctions will fail?
- A. I have not inquired into AEP Generation
  Resources' fuel and operating procedures. All I know
  is that there's a contract, a proposed contract
  between the two entities to provide whatever energy
  is necessary for the SSO load, that's what I know.

MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, I have no further cross-examination.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

Before we go on to Mr. Reilly, I just want to go back, backtrack a little bit on the blending that you touched on. You mentioned asymmetrical blending. What do you mean by "asymmetrical blending"? Are you talking about the capacity and energy not being the same percentage?

THE WITNESS: Yea.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Or not being market

25 based?

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THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct.

Essentially, when you've got the long-standing base generation charge that would cover the capacity costs, that's not being reduced until January 1 of 2015, and effectively that's the analog of a cost-based rate even though it was, you know, established over many years and it isn't a

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market-based rate.

And it's very high. And it drops down to \$188 per megawatt-day on January 1st so that you get a closer matching on that date, still not a market-based capacity rate in conjunction with the market-based energy rate but at least it's better than over the next number of months through the end of '14, because you have this base G rate that, you know, depending on which number you use, is \$340 per megawatt-day or \$350 per megawatt day.

The market rate right now is in the range of \$25 per megawatt-day, it goes up temporarily to about \$125 and then back down to \$60. So you can see that there's a real mismatch where you have this 10 percent tranche of energy-only products being matched with a legacy rate that is largely cost based.

EXAMINER TAUBER: So let me make sure I'm

not mischaracterizing your testimony. So the position you're advocating is to have a -- similar to an MRO or market rate offer percentages, so it would be 90 percent energy, 90 percent capacity.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

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EXAMINER TAUBER: And in light of the Commission's capacity decision in the capacity order you're suggesting that it be 188.88 for the 10 percent?

THE WITNESS: Yeah, that would be one solution to the problem. That would bring a closer match. The other option, which is the one that I explicitly addressed in my testimony, is leaving the base G alone, or the capacity component alone as the Commission did under one interpretation of the ESP 2 order. I know it's not the interpretation that FES has, but -- and then coupling that with a cost-based fuel adjustment clause type of rate.

So, in other words, either match it on a cost basis, capacity and energy, or match it on an energy basis, capacity and energy, but to mismatch it this way ends up being a higher result than either of the other two ways.

And FirstEnergy Solutions has a different proposal that would result in a matching and I would

244 find that acceptable, or our proposal which I find 1 2 acceptable. 3 EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. 4 THE WITNESS: You're welcome. 5 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Reilly. MR. REILLY: No questions, your Honor, 6 thank you. 7 EXAMINER TAUBER: Redirect, Ms. Grady? 8 9 MS. GRADY: No, no thank you, your Honor. EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. 10 Thank you. You may be excused. 11 12 THE WITNESS: You're welcome. Thanks. 13 MS. GRADY: Your Honor, at this time we would move for the admission of Joint Exhibit No. 1. 14 15 EXAMINER TAUBER: Are there any 16 objections to OCC and OEG Joint Exhibit No. 1? 17 (No response.) 18 EXAMINER TAUBER: Hearing none, it shall be admitted into the record. 19 2.0 (EXHIBITS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 21 EXAMINER TAUBER: Let's go off the record 22 real quick. (Discussion off the record.) 23 24 EXAMINER TAUBER: Let's go back on the 25 record.

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                    We'll adjourn for today and reconvene
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       tomorrow morning at 9:00 a.m. Thank you.
                    (Hearing adjourned at 5:54 p.m.)
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## CERTIFICATE

I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings taken by me in this matter on Monday, June 24, 2013, and carefully compared with my original stenographic notes.

Maria DiPaolo Jones, Registered Diplomate Reporter and CRR and Notary Public in and for the State of Ohio.

My commission expires June 19, 2016.

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Armstrong & Okey, Inc., Columbus, Ohio (614) 224-9481

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