1	BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO
2	
3	In the Matter of the :
4	Commission Review of the : Capacity Charges of Ohio : Case No. 10-2929-EL-UNC
5	Power Company and Columbus: Southern Power Company. :
6	
7	PROCEEDINGS
8	before Ms. Greta See and Ms. Sarah Parrot, Attorney
9	Examiners, and Commissioner Andre Porter, at the
10	Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 180 East Broad
11	Street, Room 11-A, Columbus, Ohio, called at 9:00
12	a.m. on Monday, April 23, 2012.
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851 1 Monday Morning Session, 2 April 23, 2012. 3 4 EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the 5 record. Before we get started with our next witness 6 let's take brief appearances of the parties. Again, 7 names only. Beginning with the company. 8 MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor. 9 Steven T. Nourse, Matthew J. Satterwhite, Daniel R. Conway, Christen Moore, Yazen Alami. 10 11 MS. KALEPS-CLARK: Thank you. Lija 12 Kaleps-Clark and M. Howard Petricoff on behalf of 13 RESA Constellation, Direct Energy, and Exelon. 14 MR. HAYDEN: Good morning, your Honors. On behalf of FES, Mark Hayden, Jim Lang, and David 15 16 Kutik. 17 MS. KINGERY: Good morning, your Honors. On behalf of Duke Energy Retail Sales and Duke Energy 18 19 Commercial Asset Management, Amy B. Spiller and 20 Jeanne W. Kingery. 21 MR. RANDAZZO: Good morning, your Honors. 22 On behalf of the Industrial Energy Users of Ohio, Sam 23 Randazzo and Frank Darr. 24 MR. KURTZ: For the Ohio Energy Group, 25 Mike Kurtz.

852 MR. YURICK: Mark Yurick and Zach Kravitz 1 2 on behalf of the Kroger Company. 3 MR. SUGARMAN: Roger Sugarman on behalf 4 of National Federation of Independent Businesses of 5 Ohio. 6 MR. CAMPBELL: For Interstate Gas Supply, 7 Andrew Campbell and Melissa Thompson. 8 MR. KERN: Kyle Kern and Melissa Yost on 9 behalf of the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel. 10 MR. JONES: Steve Beeler and John Jones 11 on behalf of staff. 12 EXAMINER PARROT: Thank you very much. 13 Mr. Nourse or Mr. Conway. 14 MR. CONWAY: Thank you, your Honor, at 15 this time the company calls Frank Graves. 16 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Graves, please 17 raise your right hand. 18 (Witness sworn.) 19 EXAMINER PARROT: Please be seated. 20 21 2.2 23 24 25

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1	FRANK C. GRAVES
2	being first duly sworn, as prescribed by law, was
3	examined and testified as follows:
4	DIRECT EXAMINATION
5	By Mr. Conway:
6	Q. Mr. Graves, could you state your name.
7	A. Yes. My name is Frank C. Graves.
8	Q. And by whom are you employed?
9	A. I am a principal with the consulting firm
10	The Brattle Group in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
11	Q. And, Mr. Graves, did you prepare
12	testimony on behalf of Ohio Power Company for this
13	proceeding?
14	A. I did.
15	MR. CONWAY: Your Honors, at this time I
16	would mark as AEP Ohio Exhibit No. 105, I believe it
17	is, Mr. Graves' prefiled testimony.
18	EXAMINER PARROT: So marked.
19	(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
20	Q. Mr. Graves, was this again, you
21	prepared this testimony?
22	A. I did.
23	Q. Do you have any additions or corrections
24	to make to the testimony at this time?
25	A. No, sir.

	854
1	Q. And if I were to ask you the questions
2	contained in the testimony today, would your answers
3	be the same?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. And are those answers accurate to the
6	best of your knowledge and belief?
7	A. Yes, they are.
8	MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, at this time I
9	would offer AEP Ohio Exhibit 105 into the record, and
10	Mr. Graves is available for cross-examination.
11	EXAMINER PARROT: Thank you.
12	Mr. Kutik.
13	MR. KUTIK: Thank you, your Honor.
14	
15	CROSS-EXAMINATION
16	By Mr. Kutik:
17	Q. Good morning. On page 5 of your
18	testimony, on line 14 you talk about AEP's position
19	as a compromise, correct?
20	A. Yes.
21	Q. And would it be fair to say that that
22	compromise is not part of this case?
23	A. I understand that to be true, yes.
24	Q. And essentially one of the choices that
25	the Commission will be making in this case is the

855 1 choice between a fully embedded cost capacity price 2 or potentially an RPM-based price, correct? 3 Α. Yes. 4 And RPM-based prices are essentially or Ο. 5 generally regarded as market-based prices, are they 6 not? 7 Α. Generally, sure, they're determined in a 8 market process with some administrative elements. 9 For example, FERC has determined that the Q. 10 prices resulting from RPM approximate a competitive 11 market. 12 Α. I'm not familiar with the specific FERC 13 opinion to that effect. 14 Have you studied the FERC opinions Q. 15 regarding RPM prices? 16 Α. Somewhat. I'm aware there's been some 17 discussion of it over time. 18 MR. KUTIK: Your Honor, may I approach, 19 please? 20 EXAMINER PARROT: You may. 21 MR. KUTIK: Your Honor, I would like to 2.2 have marked as FES Exhibit 118 a document bearing the 23 caption "PJM Interconnection Docket Numbers 24 ER05-1410-05, and EL05-14805," an order denying 25 rehearing issued from the FERC on November 15th of

856 2007. 1 2 EXAMINER PARROT: So marked. 3 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 4 Q. Mr. Graves, showing you what's been 5 marked for identification as Exhibit FES 118, do you 6 recognize this as an opinion of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission? 7 8 Α. Yes. 9 And it's an opinion that's discussing the Ο. 10 RPM process, is it not? 11 Α. Yes. 12 Ο. Let me direct you to page 12. Are you 13 there, sir? 14 Α. I am. 15 In paragraph 24 does it state "We Q. 16 conclude that the prices in RPM will be just and 17 reasonable because mitigation measures will constrain 18 sellers to submit bids that prevent the exercise of 19 market power with the result that prices will 20 approximate those of a competitive market"? Do you 21 see that? 2.2 Α. I do. 23 And you agree with that, do you not? 0. 24 Α. Well, I certainly agree that that's 25 FERC's opinion. I have not done an independent

857 assessment of whether it's equivalent to a 1 2 competitive market. 3 Ο. Okay. And the FERC has determined that 4 RPM prices or RPM-based prices are just and 5 reasonable, correct? 6 Α. Yes. And RPM is based on the premise that a 7 Q. 8 properly designed market will produce just and 9 reasonable rates, correct? 10 I guess I would invert the way that Α. 11 occurs. I think the presumption or the premise is 12 that a properly designed market does produce just and 13 reasonable rates and then there's a finding I quess in FERC's view RPM satisfies that standard. 14 15 Now, FERC, like this Commission, has an Q. 16 obligation to review rates to make sure that they are 17 just and reasonable, correct? Certainly. At the wholesale level. 18 Α. 19 Q. Pardon? 20 At the wholesale level. Α. 21 Yes. And that standard, that just and Ο. reasonable standard, does not compel approving rates 2.2 23 that are just cost based, correct? 24 Α. Correct. 25 Q. And in a competitive market for capacity

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1	prices don't differ based upon whether the plant
2	producing the capacity is new or old, correct?
3	A. In a market whether it's competitive or
4	not there's one price for the product at a time
5	unless there's a significant price discrimination or
6	market segmentation. So lacking that, whether or not
7	it's competitive, there's one price.
8	Q. So the answer to my question is yes.
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. And in a competitive market for capacity
11	the price doesn't differ whether the plant that's
12	producing the capacity is efficient or inefficient,
13	correct?
14	A. Okay.
15	Q. And competitive markets can produce
16	advantages to electricity customers in comparison to
17	cost-of-service regulation.
18	A. Sure, when they are truly competitive.
19	Q. For example, a competitive market with a
20	single clearing a single market clearing price can
21	force sellers to be more efficient in order to obtain
22	more profits, correct?
23	A. Yes. That can also be true under
24	regulation but it's true of markets.
25	Q. And it is also true that in a competitive

1 market when sellers are working to minimize their 2 costs, the competition will keep prices as low as 3 possible, correct? 4 Yes, that's true, over the timeframes Α. 5 when those changes can be reflected if, for instance, 6 if prices are reset continuously, that happens fairly 7 well. If they're set at regular intervals, there can 8 be lags. 9 So a competitive market can result in Q. 10 benefits to consumers by having more efficient 11 sellers and lower prices, correct? 12 Α. Well, we have to be careful about what we 13 mean by "lower." They would be perhaps lower than 14 they might be absent competition, they might or might 15 not be lower than they would be under regulation. 16 Now, all CRES providers outside of Ο. 17 AEP Ohio pay RPM-based price for capacity, correct? 18 That's my understanding. Α. 19 And, in fact, that would be the case for Q. 20 all retail generation providers, whatever they may be 21 called, in other states in PJM that have retail 2.2 choice. 23 I believe that's correct. Α. 24 So but for locational pricing Ο. 25 differences, if AEP Ohio's proposal were accepted in

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1 this case, the CRES providers that would operate in 2 AEP's territory would be paying on a different basis than similar service providers in Ohio or the rest of 3 4 PJM, correct? 5 Yes, that's true, but of course AEP is Α. 6 operating on a different basis than the rest of PJM 7 also. 8 Ο. Well, let's talk about that. Once 9 capacity is committed, either through the RPM process 10 or an FRR plan, it's the same capacity service; is it 11 not? 12 Α. I need some clarification about what you mean by the "same service." 13 14 Well, a capacity supplier, whether it's Q. 15 under an FRR plan or participating in the RPM 16 process, is required to meet the same reliability 17 standards, correct? 18 I wouldn't say that. Α. 19 You think that's incorrect. Q. 20 I think it's an oversimplification. Α. The 21 capacity providers who supply power to RPM simply have to make their capacity available or face 2.2 23 penalties. 24 The FRR suppliers have to supply enough 25 capacity for however much load is in their FRR

territory regardless of whether they are serving that load or not, and they have a load obligation which just being a capacity supplier does not entail.

Q. Let's go back to my question. My
question is they have to meet the same reliability
standards, correct?

A. No. The FRR supplier has to meet a
reserve margin for its customers and the RPM capacity
supplier just has to provide their capacity into the
market and perform.

Q. Let's talk about the relationship between RPM-based pricing and AEP's embedded costs. Would it be fair to say it's your understanding that RPM clearing prices relative to Ohio, that is the rest of market prices, have been below AEP's embedded costs since 2007 through the present planning year?

A. I have not done a detailed study of priorembedded costs but I suspect that's true.

Q. And you would expect that to be the casethrough planning year 2014-'15.

21

A. Yes. Even more so than today.

Q. And you believe that would be the casefor planning year 2015 and '16.

24A.It's likely, but we don't know yet.25Q.But it's likely, you think.

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1 Α. Yes. 2 Q. Okay. Now, because AEP is an FRR entity 3 and has been, and under the theory that AEP could 4 seek some alternative price other than an RPM-based 5 price, would it be fair to conclude from the fact 6 that AEP Ohio did not apply for any different price for 2010 that AEP Ohio believed that the price it was 7 8 receiving for capacity prior to 2010 reflected fair 9 value of its capacity? 10 I assume you're referring to them Α. 11 proposing an alternative CRES price. 12 Ο. Yes. 13 I think that's inferring too much from Α. 14 their history because energy prices were also quite 15 high or considerably higher in the past years and 16 customer shopping is a function of both capacity and 17 energy prices, so whether or not RPM prices were compensatory wasn't by itself sufficient or 18 19 dispositive for them to worry about the adequacy of 20 that compensation. 21 So any inadequacy in the compensation 0. 2.2 would have been either masked by low shopping or 23 higher energy prices; is that what you're saying? 24 Α. Yes. Now, if the Commission determines that 25 Q.

1 the state compensation mechanism should be RPM-based 2 price, you would agree, would you not, that there would be more CRES providers serving customers in 3 AEP Ohio's territory than if the Commission adopted 4 5 embedded cost-based capacity prices? 6 I would expect that to be true. Α. 7 Ο. And if the state -- if the Commission 8 establishes an RPM pricing mechanism as the state 9 compensation mechanism, shopping customers would be 10 able to see market driven pricing for both capacity 11 and energy. 12 Α. Yes. To the extent they were flowed 13 through to -- the wholesale prices were flowed 14 through to them, yes. 15 In general would you agree that market Q. 16 prices -- or, market processes produce durable and 17 efficient competition? 18 Can I hear the question again? Α. 19 Sure. Q. 20 MR. KUTIK: May I have it read, your 21 Honor. 2.2 (Record read.) 23 So in my question delete "prices," to the Ο. 24 processes. 25 Α. Okay.

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1	Q. It's a little bit circular in that it
2	presumes the markets themselves are competitive, but
3	subject to the presumption that the market is
4	competitive it does
5	A. And will remain so, then those benefits
6	should be durable.
7	Q. Now, in Ohio and within AEP Ohio you're
8	not aware that there is any CRES supplier that
9	exercises market power.
10	A. No. I am not aware of any.
11	Q. And if we assume that there are over a
12	dozen CRES suppliers active in AEP, and if we assume
13	that they have roughly the same cost structure in
14	terms of the same cost components, you wouldn't
15	expect CRES providers to be receiving substantially
16	high margins, would you?
17	A. I would expect them to compete against
18	each other and drive down those margins. On the
19	other hand, I'm not sure how familiar the average AEP
20	Retail customer is with their market opportunities
21	and how sophisticated their analysis of the offers
22	that they receive might be. So I think they'll get
23	something in between their price to compare and the
24	market price.
25	Q. But certainly competition puts downward

1 pressure on margins; would you agree with that? 2 Right? 3 Α. Yes. 4 And you wouldn't expect a CRES provider Q. 5 participating in an RPM-based market to recover its 6 full embedded costs. 7 A CRES provider may not, in fact, have Α. any embedded costs in the sense of owned assets that 8 9 have a fixed cost to operate. They may be entirely 10 working through financial contracts. 11 Let's talk about the CRES providers, Ο. 12 then, that own generation assets. You wouldn't be 13 expecting them in an RPM-based market to be 14 recovering their full embedded costs, would you? 15 Α. It would be unlikely. It's not 16 impossible, but . . . 17 Ο. Now, most customers for retail generation service would consider price as part of their 18 19 decision whether to switch; you would expect that, 20 would you not? 21 Α. Sure. 2.2 Ο. And reasonable economic behavior for a 23 customer would be to choose retail electric service 24 based upon price. 25 Α. Yes, that's one factor, as we just

1 agreed.

2	Q. For example, industrial or commercial
3	firms, in looking whether to locate in the area or to
4	stay in the area, may consider their energy prices as
5	one factor. You would agree with that, right?
6	A. Sure, along with many others; labor
7	costs, taxes, lots of things, but electricity would
8	be a consideration.
9	Q. Now, as I understand your testimony, one
10	factor that you believe supports AEP's application
11	for the embedded cost recovery is that that type of
12	recovery is needed to maintain incentives for
13	investment in generation; that's one factor, correct?
14	A. It's a little oversimplified. There can
15	be incentives to invest under RPM and market
16	mechanisms as well, but ability to have fair recovery
17	of costs that were committed under a regime where
18	certain kinds of obligations prevailed is a influence
19	on whether suppliers will continue to invest.
20	If they feel the rules of the game are
21	unstable or changing adversely, that can affect their
22	willingness to invest.
23	Q. So one factor is the is whether AEP
24	will be incentivized to invest, correct?
25	A. In continuing with embedded rates?

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1	Q.	Yes.	
2	Α.	In principle, sure.	
3	Q.	Okay. Now, up until this year, as I	
4	think we may	y have agreed earlier, AEP Ohio has been	
5	charging RPN	M-based prices, correct?	
6	Α.	Yes, from 2007 to the present.	
7	Q.	And you're generally aware of what those	
8	prices have	been, correct?	
9	Α.	Yes.	
10	Q.	And, for example, in 2007-2008 they were	
11	in the mid-	\$40 per megawatt day?	
12	Α.	In the RPM zone AEP is in, correct.	
13	Q.	And for 2008-2009, same question, about	
14	120, 130 doi	llars.	
15	Α.	That's my understanding.	
16	Q.	2009-2010, same range.	
17	Α.	Roughly.	
18	Q.	And 2010-2011, over \$200.	
19	Α.	Yes, just slightly over 200.	
20	Q.	In 2011-2013 excuse me, 2011-2012,	
21	around 145.		
22	Α.	I believe that's right.	
23	Q.	In 2012-2013 the clearing price is about	
24	\$20?		
25	Α.	Yes, and about 33 the year after that.	

868 And 2014-2015 about \$150. 1 Ο. 2 Α. That's my recollection. Now, it would be improper for AEP Ohio to 3 Q. 4 switch off opportunistically between the higher of 5 RPM-based prices and embedded cost prices, correct? 6 I agree with that as a general principle. Α. I don't believe that describes their decisions in 7 8 this case, but I agree that it's improper to 9 opportunistically do so. 10 And currently would it be fair to say Q. 11 that AEP Ohio is long on capacity? 12 Α. Yes. 13 In fact, Ohio is long on capacity. Ο. 14 I don't know that's true of every zone. Α. 15 I think there are some in the Alleghenies that are 16 tight but the AEP zone is long. 17 Ο. PJM, that's long as well on capacity, 18 correct? 19 Yes, for a few years forward. Α. 20 And, in fact, the PJM market with its Q. 21 reliance on RPM has been functioning effectively 2.2 since 2007. 23 That's a pretty broad statement. Do you Α. 24 mean in regard to what? 25 Well, do you have your deposition, sir? Q.

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1	A. I do.	
2	MR. KUTIK: Your Honors, may I approach?	
3	EXAMINER PARROT: You may.	
4	Q. Would you turn to page 14 of your	
5	deposition, please. Are you there, sir?	
6	A. Yes.	
7	Q. Let me direct you to line 14, and would	
8	it be correct that you testified as follows:	
9	Question: "Now, would be it correct to say that you	
10	believe that the PJM capacity markets have been	
11	functioning effectively since 2007?"	
12	Answer: "Yes, I agree with that."	
13	That was your testimony, correct?	
14	A. I'm sorry, just on my copy that isn't on	
15	page 14. Can you give me just one minute here to	
16	find that.	
17	Oh, it's on the bottom. I'm sorry. Yes.	
18	Q. Now	
19	MR. CONWAY: Excuse me.	
20	A. Wait, I'm sorry, I'm still yeah, I'm	
21	sorry, for me that's on 15.	
22	Yes, I agree with that, still your	
23	previous question that I don't believe was about PJM	
24	capacity markets, I believe you said were PJM markets	3
25	functioning effectively.	

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1	MR. CONWAY: Excuse me, Mr. Kutik,
2	because I'm having a little difficulty following
3	along, could you give me a cite to the deposition
4	transcript?
5	MR. KUTIK: Sure. The deposition
6	transcript, the version I'm looking at is on page 14,
7	line 14.
8	May we go off the record, your Honor?
9	EXAMINER PARROT: Yes.
10	(Discussion off the record.)
11	EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the
12	record.
13	Q. Now, these markets have been have
14	brought forward a large amount of new capacity
15	resources, correct?
16	A. Certainly.
17	Q. And the RPM options are designed to
18	ensure that there's an adequate supply of reserve
19	margins three years following.
20	A. Precisely.
21	Q. And in that regard they have done very
22	well.
23	A. I agree.
24	Q. PJM has more reserves committed under the
25	base residual auction than the target reserve

871 1 requirement. 2 Α. Yes, about 4 percent right now. And this is true through 2014-2015. 3 Ο. 4 Α. Yes. 5 Now, you're familiar with recent Q. 6 predictions of the capacity available in the PJM 7 projections or predictions made by NERC, correct? 8 Α. Yes, their long-term supply adequacy 9 study. 10 And their predicted margin as a whole Q. 11 will have a 20 to 30 percent margin over a projected peak of 168 gigawatts. 12 13 Yes, I recall something about that. Can Α. 14 you be specific about the year that is the reference 15 point? I think that's a 2015 or '16 outlook but I'm 16 not positive. 17 Ο. Okay. That's about 13 gigawatts relative to a 15 percent reserve, correct? 18 19 Yes, almost 13. Α. 20 And there will be 5 to 9 gigawatts of new Q. 21 generation likely come on line at PJM over the next 2.2 three to four years. 23 I believe that's true. Α. 24 So that at least through 2015-2016 you 0. 25 have no concern about the capacity shortfall within

872 1 PJM. 2 Α. Yes, that's correct. There are other 3 changes that you didn't describe such as perhaps 20 4 gigs of retirement, but I think on net there still is 5 an adequate reserve margin. 6 And indeed you don't expect there will Ο. 7 come a time when RPM will fail in its purpose to 8 ensure sufficient and reliable capacity. 9 Α. I agree with that. 10 Now, AEP, starting in 2015, the 2015-'16 Q. 11 year, will have no long-term commitment to anyone or 12 any area under AEP's current plan, correct? 13 You mean AEP generation or --Α. 14 AEP Ohio. Q. 15 AEP Ohio. They would have no supply Α. 16 obligations. 17 Ο. And as part of the RPM process -- I'll 18 back up. You understand that AEP Ohio intends to 19 participate in the RPM process beginning with the 20 planning year 2015-2016. 21 I do. Α. And in that regard, as a participant in 2.2 Ο. 23 that process AEP Ohio's incentives will be no 24 different than any other generators within PJM. 25 Α. We'll go back, I think we're confusing

suppliers and generators, I mean suppliers and 1 2 distributors. AEP Ohio won't have any supply 3 obligations so they won't be comparable to other 4 generators in PJM. 5 All right. Now, your practice group was Q. 6 retained to do an evaluation of RPM, correct? 7 Α. Yes, The Brattle Group has evaluated PJM's RPM model twice. 8 9 And with respect to the most recent Ο. 10 report that was a report in 2011, correct? 11 Α. Yes, August of this last year. 12 Ο. And that report is attached to 13 Mr. Stoddard's testimony, correct? 14 Α. I believe so. 15 Q. You did not author that report. 16 Α. Correct. 17 Ο. There were others at Brattle that did 18 that. 19 Α. Yes. 20 The report was prepared by Brattle in the Q. 21 regular course of its business. 2.2 Α. Of course. 23 And it has been maintained by Brattle in Ο. 24 the regular course of its business. 25 It's available from Brattle if people Α.

874 1 want it. In that sense, sure, it's maintained I 2 guess you could say. 3 Ο. And you would consider that report to be 4 an authoritative source of data, analysis, and 5 conclusions about the efficacy of the PJM RPM 6 process, correct? 7 Α. Yes. Absolutely. 8 Ο. You've relied on that in your work, that 9 report. 10 Yes. Several times. Α. 11 Ο. And you would have no hesitation asking the Commission to rely on that report. 12 13 Α. Correct. 14 Now, I think you mentioned earlier that Ο. 15 one of the things that would support AEP's 16 application to receive embedded cost recovery for 17 capacity was the expectation that AEP had when it 18 made certain either investment decisions or made 19 certain decisions to spend moneys to construct or 20 acquire plants; fair to say? 21 I don't know that I described it as AEP's Α. expectation, but -- because I don't know how to 2.2 23 describe those, not being an insider, but there are 24 obligations as an FRR provider which shaped some of 25 the needs and commitments they made.

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1	Q. Well, isn't it true that you believe that
2	AEP Ohio's facilities were under a regulatory compact
3	that providers for the recovery that provides for
4	recovery of the cost of these assets in return for
5	the company's duty to provide service to all
6	customers?
7	A. Yes, that's generally true.
8	Q. And you believe that AEP Ohio should be
9	allowed to recover its embedded costs from CRES
10	providers because AEP Ohio built or acquired its
11	fleet under criteria that sought to minimize the
12	riskiness and cost of service over long-term horizons
13	such as decades or the life of those assets.
14	A. Yes, that's correct.
15	Q. Now, AEP voluntarily elected to be an FRR
16	entity, correct?
17	A. Yes.
18	Q. And would you agree with me that an FRR
19	entity might or operating to be an FRR entity
20	might make sense for a vertically integrated entity
21	within PJM?
22	A. Sure.
23	Q. And that election was made in 2007,
24	correct?
25	A. Yes.

1 Ο. By AEP. 2 As an FRR entity the AEP companies were 3 not obligated to use their own generation resources 4 to fulfill their FRR capacity obligations. 5 Α. That's my understanding. 6 Now, as you mentioned earlier, you were Ο. 7 not a -- you're not an AEP insider. 8 Α. Correct. 9 Have you -- I take it, though, that you Ο. 10 have studied various filings that AEP has made in 11 which it declared what its intentions and 12 expectations have been. 13 No. I've discussed that question with Α. 14 AEP staff but I don't recall reading specific 15 documents that describe those intentions or 16 expectations. 17 Ο. Well, for example, statements that AEP 18 makes in its 10-K might be statements that we could 19 rely upon regarding their intention or expectations, 20 correct? 21 One would hope. Α. 2.2 Or statements that were made by AEP Ohio Q. 23 in briefs to this Commission or to the Ohio Supreme 24 Court could be equally relied upon, correct? 25 Α. Sure, taken in context.

877 1 Ο. Sure. 2 Now, you don't know whether AEP Ohio has built or acquired any generation since it became part 3 4 of an FRR entity, correct? 5 I believe they acquired some gas plants Α. 6 in 2007 which would have been right around the time 7 of becoming an FRR entity, but I don't know if it was 8 right before or shortly after. 9 Well, you were aware that in Ohio there Ο. is something called SB 3? 10 11 Α. Yes. And there was something called SB 221. 12 Ο. 13 Α. Yes. 14 And both of those dealt with the Ο. 15 deregulation of the electric market in Ohio. 16 Α. I understand that. 17 Ο. And if AEP Ohio acquired certain plants 18 between those two bills, the enactment of those two 19 bills, would it be fair to say that AEP Ohio would 20 have an expectation that generation service would be 21 priced at market rates? 2.2 Α. I think that's a little overreaching from 23 my understanding of what AEP expected or could have 24 expected. 25 Q. Okay.

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1	A. I believe SB 3 indicates that the market
2	rates would apply but there are broader terms to how
3	regulatory transitions are made and I don't know that
4	that describes everything that AEP expected.
5	Q. Okay. Well, would you agree that
6	merchant plants acquired during that time would have
7	been acquired with the attendant risks that market
8	rates for generation service would produce revenue
9	below the level needed to support the investments?
10	A. Yes, that's certainly possible.
11	Q. And, in fact, isn't it true that AEP,
12	indeed, had that expectation that there could be such
13	a risk?
14	A. Again, I'm not the proper witness for
15	that.
16	MR. KUTIK: Your Honor, may I approach?
17	EXAMINER PARROT: You may.
18	MR. KUTIK: And before I do I would like
19	to have marked as FES Exhibit 119 a document from the
20	Ohio on the Ohio Supreme Court docket Case No.
21	09-2298, a case captioned Columbus Southern Power
22	Company versus the Public Utilities Commission, this
23	document is entitled Merit Brief and Appendix of
24	Appellant Columbus Southern Power Company.
25	EXAMINER PARROT: So marked.

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1	(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)	
2	Q. Mr. Graves, showing you what's been	
3	marked as Exhibit 118, this appears to be a brief of	
4	the Columbus Southern Power Company, correct?	
5	A. Yes, it does.	
6	Q. And it appears to have been filed	
7	March 19, 2010?	
8	A. Yes.	
9	Q. And I want to refer you to page 3 of the	
10	brief.	
11	A. Okay, I have it.	
12	Q. Is it true that at page 3 of the brief	
13	Columbus Southern Power Company states as follows:	
14	"In the intervening years between the enactment of	
15	SB 3 and SB 221, CSP acquired two generating	
16	facilities, the Waterford Energy Center (Waterford)	
17	was purchased on September 28th, 2005, and the	
18	Darby Electric Generating Station (Darby) was	
19	purchased on April 25, 2007," and then there's a	
20	cite.	
21	A. I see that.	
22	Q. At the time Waterford and Darby were	
23	purchased, CSP's expectation under the then-current	
24	legal structure of regulation in Ohio was that	
25	generation service would be priced at market rates	

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starting at the end of 2008 and that electric utilities would continue to be permitted to freely transfer generating asset units to and from the distribution utility without approval of the Commission.

In other words, CSP purchased Waterford and Darby as, quote, merchant plants, end quote, and undertook the attendant risks that market rates for generation would produce revenue below the level needed to support the investments either during a given time period or overall during the remaining life of the plants.

This situation stands in stark contrast to a regulated utility's investment in the purchase or construction of similar generating units where the regulated utility would be guaranteed not only the return of the investment but also the opportunity to earn a reasonable return on that investment.

19That's what CSP said, correct?20A. Yes.21Q. So would you agree with me that CSP22appears to have had the expectation that they would

23 incur the risk that revenues would be below necessary 24 to recover their investment?

25

A. That's certainly consistent with the

1 passage we just read. 2 Ο. Now, as of 2007, as we've just talked, 3 Ohio had laws establishing a competitive retail 4 generation market. 5 Yes, I agree with that. Α. And those laws envisioned that EDUs were 6 Ο. supposed to operate their generation operations 7 8 separately from their distribution operations. 9 Α. Yes. And there was a transmission -- excuse 10 Ο. 11 me, a transition mechanism established as part of the 12 process of setting up a competitive retail market. 13 I understand that to be true. Α. 14 And you're aware of the existence of such Ο. 15 a thing but you're not necessarily familiar with the 16 details. 17 Α. That's correct. 18 Ο. And you would expect that the transition 19 process would permit companies like AEP Ohio to 20 recover stranded costs. 21 Yes, that would be conventional. Α. 2.2 Ο. And stranded costs might be referred to 23 as the difference between market -- a market value of 24 the asset and the book value of an asset. 25 Α. Yes, on a present-value basis over the

remaining useful life of the asset. 1 2 Ο. And the book value would be based upon 3 depreciated costs. 4 Α. Normally. 5 And the market value could be determined Ο. 6 by the expected cash flows of revenues of sales into 7 the market. 8 Α. Yes, over all the remaining future years of useful life. 9 10 Q. And it might be a fair concept to think 11 that the appropriate way to recover stranded costs 12 would be the difference between market rates and 13 unbundled generation rates. 14 That's one way to do it. It's sort of a Α. 15 lost revenue approach which would do it in realtime, 16 or as costs were incurred, it more commonly is done on a present-value basis on an estimated basis. 17 18 You're aware that, are you not, that AEP Ο. 19 in its so-called ETP case initially proposed 20 recovering its stranded costs on the method that I 21 have just described? 2.2 Α. On a lost revenue basis? 23 Ο. Yes. 24 Generally I understand that to be true, Α. 25 but I'm not a historian in that process.

883 1 And whatever your familiarity is, you Ο. 2 understand that AEP waived its right to recover those 3 stranded costs in that way; fair to say? 4 At the level of secondhand knowledge, I Α. 5 agree with that. 6 Now, as of 2015-2016, that planning year, Ο. 7 CRES providers in AEP Ohio will not be paying for 8 capacity based upon a long-term average cost. 9 Correct. They'll be paying the RPM price Α. 10 which is a one-year price. 11 Right. And the RPM price is determined Ο. 12 using something called net CONE. 13 That is a factor in the determination. Α. 14 And the net of net CONE is taking the Q. 15 gross CONE and netting out the net margin of energy 16 and ancillary service sales over a three-year 17 look-back, correct? 18 Yes, that's the way PJM calculates that Α. 19 CONE. 20 And by three-year look-back, it's Q. 21 basically the average or the weighted average of the 2.2 last three years' energy and ancillary service sales. 23 MR. CONWAY: Objection. 24 Ο. Correct? 25 Α. My understanding is --

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1	EXAMINER PARROT: Grounds, Mr. Conway.
2	MR. CONWAY: It's a misleading question.
3	MR. KUTIK: I'm not sure that's an
4	evidentiary basis, your Honor, as an argument for
5	brief.
6	EXAMINER PARROT: The objection is
7	overruled.
8	You may answer, Mr. Graves.
9	A. I'm not sure what you meant by a
10	"weighted average," but my understanding is that PJM
11	does a look-back to three prior years based on what
12	the type of technology, that is the CONE technology,
13	would have been expected to earn as energy and
14	ancillary service revenues in the past, given the
15	prices that prevailed in PJM.
16	Q. Now, I want to go through with you some
17	of the timing of AEP's activities. We've already
18	mentioned that up until this year AEP was charging
19	CRES providers an RPM-based price, right?
20	A. Yes.
21	Q. And RPM first elected to be an FRR entity
22	in 2007.
23	A. AEP.
24	Q. AEP, excuse me.
25	A. Yes.

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1	Q. And AEP Ohio, or the AEP East companies,	
2	submitted a plan to be an FRR entity in 2007, that	
3	plan went through May of 2012, correct?	
4	A. Yes, it's initially a five-year	
5	commitment.	
6	Q. And in the spring of 2009 AEP East	
7	companies then filed another FRR plan for the	
8	planning year 2012-2013, correct?	
9	A. Right. Because you have to do it three	
10	years ahead, which would have then been 2009 for	
11	2012-2013.	
12	Q. And the spring of 2010 they submitted a	
13	plan for 2013-2014, correct?	
14	A. That's my understanding.	
15	Q. And in November 2009 they submitted a	
16	petition to the FERC to seek compensation for	
17	capacity from CRES providers on a basis other than	
18	RPM pricing, correct?	
19	A. I think that actually occurred in 2010,	
20	but	
21	Q. Excuse me. Thank you.	
22	A. Otherwise I believe that's correct.	
23	Q. Thank you for that correction.	
24	So in November of 2010 that filing, that	
25	would have been the first time that AEP had indicated	L

that it wanted to charge a price for capacity other 1 2 than an RPM-based price. 3 Α. As far as I'm aware that would have been 4 the first time. There may have been other 5 discussions, exchanges, but I'm not aware of them. 6 Now, prior to that filing by AEP in 0. 7 late-2010 a CRES provider would have had no incentive 8 to opt out of AEP's FRR plan, correct? 9 A CRES provider would not have had an Α. 10 incentive to become be an FRR provider in lieu of 11 released capacity from AEP, if that's what you mean. 12 Q. Because it's RPM-based prices, correct? 13 Α. Up until then, yes. 14 Now, one of the things that we might do Ο. 15 to judge the reasonableness of capacity prices that 16 should be paid by shopping customers would be to look 17 at the capacity prices that are paid by nonshopping customers in AEP Ohio, correct? 18 19 They should be equivalent I believe. Α. 20 And would it be fair to say that you Q. 21 don't know what part of the rates that nonshopping 2.2 customers would pay that would be designated for the 23 recovery of capacity costs? 24 That's true, I have not seen a specific Α. 25 breakdown of that.

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887 1 And you don't believe that that Ο. 2 calculation would be necessarily a difficult 3 calculation for the company to do. 4 I think it could be done. I don't know Α. 5 whether it would be difficult or not. It would 6 involve untangling how the ESP rate has been set over 7 time and what components of it were related to 8 capacity elements, but it could be done. 9 It wouldn't be hard to back out the Ο. 10 generation component of the rates less the fuel 11 adjustment costs, correct? 12 Α. That would be an approximation, that 13 would not be terribly difficult. 14 MR. KUTIK: One minute, your Honor. 15 I have no further questions. Thank you, 16 Mr. Graves. 17 EXAMINER PARROT: Thank you. 18 Ms. Kaleps-Clark. 19 MS. KALEPS-CLARK: I just have a few 20 questions. 21 2.2 CROSS-EXAMINATION 23 By Ms. Kaleps-Clark: 24 Good morning, Mr. Graves. My name is Ο. Lija Kaleps-Clark and I'm here on behalf of RESA, 25

888 Exelon, Constellation, and Direct Energy. 1 2 Α. Good morning. 3 Mr. Graves, have you ever worked for or Ο. 4 been employed by a retail power marketer or a 5 competitive retail electric supply provider? 6 Α. Yes. 7 Q. You have. When were you employed? 8 Α. In the early-2000s. 9 And how long was that employment? Ο. 10 Α. A few months at a time, a couple of 11 times. 12 Ο. Okay. Now, have you ever served any 13 power or made sales for --14 Let me clarify. I'm sorry. When I mean Α. 15 "employed by," I was not literally an employee of 16 such firms; I've never done that. 17 Ο. Okay. 18 But I've assisted them as a consultant. Α. 19 And my question was your clarification. Q. 20 So have you ever been an employee of a wholesale 21 power marketer or generator? 2.2 Α. No. 23 Okay. So have you ever served any power Ο. 24 or made sales for a load-serving entity? 25 Α. No.

Q. So do you have any direct experience in
 selling power for suppliers?

A. No, just working with such parties, butnot direct experience.

Q. Okay. So do you know whether it's possible for shopping customers to terminate their contracts with CRES providers?

A. I don't know that there's a general rule for that. I would think that it could be arranged as a contractual matter so there could be market "out" clauses going in either direction for the supplier and the purchaser.

Q. And do you know whether customers, shopping customers, may contain provisions for price adjustments in their contracts with CRES providers?

A. Again, there's no necessity that that be the case, but I would be very surprised if there aren't such contracts.

Q. And in a competitive market would a CRES provider need to be concerned about losing customers to another CRES provider with, let's say, a better offer?

A. Well, subject to having entered a
contract with -- in permanent relations with the
customer, they would have to consider that. They

890 1 would have the opportunity in their contract to price 2 in a premium for that if they were able to negotiate So it could be a risk that they can price, but 3 one. 4 it's a risk they might have. 5 But you would agree that in order to keep Q. 6 customers a CRES provider would be motivated to offer a lower price than their competitor. 7 8 Α. Sure. 9 Okay. And would that include passing Q. 10 through a lower capacity price? 11 You mean lower than the other CRES Α. 12 provider is offering? 13 Ο. Correct. 14 It's -- that could be part of it. Α. Ι 15 wouldn't expect retail contracts to be generally 16 specific as to the sources of the cost that's being offered or the price that's being offered. It would 17 18 reflect all sorts of managerial capabilities, risk 19 management service features, lots of things, and I 20 don't know the capacity component could be broken out 21 but I would say they would try to be as low as 2.2 possible without being more low than necessary. 23 Okay. So to the extent that a CRES Ο. 24 provider could beat out the competition by offering a 25 lower capacity charge, would you agree that they

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1	would likely do so in a competitive market?
2	A. Again, I would say yes in the qualified
3	sense that they would be offering as low a price as
4	they could which would reflect lots of components in
5	it. I don't think they would literally discount
6	capacity as well as cost to them, but they might have
7	other margins that they can eat into and try to make
8	those as lean as reasonable.
9	Q. Okay. So moving on, Mr. Graves, are you
10	familiar with the reliability assurance agreement, or
11	the RAA?
12	A. Only in general terms.
13	Q. Would you agree that the RAA governs the
14	provision of capacity under the FRR alternative?
15	A. That's my understanding.
16	Q. Okay. So would you agree that the price
17	AEP Ohio charges CRES providers for capacity supply
18	is determined by the RAA?
19	A. Subject to regulatory implementation of
20	the RAA, yes.
21	Q. Okay. Now, would you agree that your
22	testimony is based on the premise that AEP Ohio is
23	entitled under the RAA to recover for its capacity
24	and embedded costs?
25	A. That's going a little farther. I'm not

1 offering a legal opinion as to whether the RAA 2 endorses that. I'm actually more offering the opinion of an economist that it would be reasonable 3 4 to do so. I do understand the RAA to have a 5 provision that a cost-based alternative is one of the 6 possibilities. 7 But you do agree that the RAA is what Ο. 8 governs what capacity charge AEP Ohio can charge CRES 9 providers, correct? 10 Yes, I believe it has to fit within one Α. 11 of three broad styles of justification. 12 Q. So, Mr. Graves, throughout your testimony 13 you state that RPM pricing is not an appropriate 14 basis to compensate AEP Ohio for capacity because 15 it's a short-term rate that does not reflect the cost 16 of serving long-term obligations AEP Ohio faces in an 17 FRR. Is that a fair characterization? 18 Yes, that's pretty close to what I said. Α. 19 Mr. Graves, do you know whether AEP Ohio Q. 20 has made a commitment to PJM to participate in the 21 upcoming RPM auctions for the 2015-2016 delivery 2.2 year? 23 I understand it has. Α. 24 And do you know how long that is for, how 0. 25 many years?

893 1 Five years, I believe. Α. 2 Q. Now, is it also your understanding that AEP Ohio has been compensated by CRES providers for 3 4 capacity at the RPM auction price from 2007 until 5 this year? 6 Yes, to the extent there's been CRES Α. 7 providers in this time. 8 Ο. But that's what they've been charged. 9 Α. Yes. 10 So your discussion in your testimony that Q. 11 embedded cost is the only just and reasonable rate 12 CRES providers should pay for AEP Ohio's long-term 13 obligations in the FRR entity is really only 14 applicable for the next three years until June 1st, 2015? 15 16 Yes, I'm referring to the time when Α. 17 they're an FRR provider and transitioning out of 18 that. 19 Okay. Now, in your testimony you discuss Q. 20 the importance of AEP Ohio recouping its embedded 21 cost of capacity from CRES providers, again, because 2.2 of AEP Ohio's long-term planning commitment as an FRR 23 entity, correct? 24 Yes, and more broadly the set of risks Α. 25 and obligations that FRR entails which are not just

1 long-term but they're also different intertemporally 2 even in the short period of time than, for instance, 3 being a CRES provider. 4 Q. So do you anticipate a shortage of 5 capacity in the next three years in the PJM region 6 that's covering AEP Ohio's load? No, I don't think this is about assuring 7 Α. 8 supply adequacy. 9 You don't think that this just and Ο. 10 reasonable rate is about securing supply adequacy? 11 I don't think there's a supply adequacy Α. 12 problem to worry about over the next few years, but 13 just and reasonable rates do affect supply adequacy 14 when supply is needed. 15 Q. Okay. Now, turning to page 15 of your 16 testimony --17 Α. Okay. -- at the top of page 15 you state that 18 Ο. 19 AEP Ohio would be bearing a disincentive to develop 20 future capacity, because it would know that there are 21 future "free-riders" that are expecting to pay RPM auction prices rather than the full embedded cost for 2.2 23 that capacity. It's not a direct quote but is that 24 essentially what you're saying? 25 Yes. When there's an issue of having to Α.

develop capacity at a cost that might be bypassable,
 that creates a disincentive.

Q. So based on this statement do you recognize that starting in the 2015-2016 delivery years AEP Ohio will be bearing a disincentive to develop future capacity because it will be charging CRES providers the RPM auction price?

A. In principle, yes. In practice, no, because I don't think there's any capacity they need to develop in that time frame. I'm not aware of any that they've identified as essential for that purpose except possibly continuing to maintain their plans for FRR obligations during that time.

Q. So to the extent that capacity would be required, do you think that there is a disincentive to develop that capacity under the RPM auction prices?

A. If capacity were required and could be developed as quickly as, say, next year or something like that, a very small supplementation for emergency capacity, and then it was going to be priced at RPM price, sure, I would think there would be a disincentive to do that.

24 Q. So starting in 2015-2016 you think there 25 will continue to be a disincentive, you said within

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896 1 the next year. 2 Α. No, I was referring to the transition out 3 of FRR from 2015-'16 on the prices be set by RPM and 4 then the incentives are to develop capacity that 5 satisfies that, that's economical within that price 6 range. 7 MS. KALEPS-CLARK: No further questions, 8 thank you. 9 EXAMINER PARROT: Thank you. 10 MR. HAYDEN: Your Honor, may we get 11 Mr. Graves a mic that works, please? 12 EXAMINER PARROT: Ms. Kingery. 13 MS. KINGERY: Thank you, your Honor. 14 15 CROSS-EXAMINATION 16 By Ms. Kingery: 17 Ο. My name is Jeanne Kingery and I'm here representing Duke Energy Retail Sales and Duke Energy 18 19 Asset Management. 20 How do you do. Α. 21 I just have a few questions for you. Q. 2.2 Α. Thank you. 23 A detailed description of your experience Q. 24 is attached to your testimony, correct? 25 Α. Yes.

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1	Q. And although that description identifies
2	financial analysis as one of your areas of expertise,
3	in this case you are not offering any opinions as to
4	the formulas used by AEP Ohio to develop a cost-based
5	capacity rate, correct?
6	A. That's right. I have not reviewed the
7	calculations that AEP has done, I'm familiar with
8	them at a high level but I'm not sponsoring or
9	affirming them.
10	Q. So just to clarify, to the extent you are
11	comparing and contrasting AEP Ohio's retail rates
12	with its proposed capacity charge of 355 per
13	megawatt-day, that comparison is based solely on what
14	AEP Ohio has told you, correct?
15	A. Can I hear that again just to make sure
16	I'm responding to what you asked.
17	Q. Yes. To the extent that you are using
18	the figure of 355, \$355 per megawatt-day in your
19	analysis and comparing that with, for example, its
20	retail rates, you're merely relying on what they have
21	told you about the development of the 355.
22	A. Mostly relying on that, but I'm also I
23	also find it consistent with some of the analyses
24	done by intervenors who attempted to unpack the
25	capacity component of rates and found that on average

898 they were similar to the 355, but generally it's the 1 second -- it's other evidence that I did not 2 3 personally develop. 4 Q. But as to the development of the \$355, 5 for that piece of it you're relying on what AEP Ohio 6 told you, as opposed to having done an independent 7 analysis of that figure. 8 Α. Certainly. I understand it to be derived 9 from Form 1 components and those are what I 10 understand to be normal cost of service components, 11 but I haven't validated those inputs. 12 Ο. All right. Thank you. 13 If you'd look at page 8 of your 14 testimony. 15 Α. Sure. 16 Ο. Are you there? 17 Α. I am. 18 On line 4 you discuss AEP Ohio having a, Ο. 19 quote, longer, more binding reliability obligation as 20 an FRR utility than the CRES providers incur as 21 short-term load serving entities. Did I read that 2.2 correctly? 23 You did. Α. 24 Isn't it true that after May 31, 2015, Ο. AEP Ohio will not have any long-term binding broad 25

899 1 reliability obligations? That's correct. AEP Ohio will not except 2 Α. 3 insofar as they're obliged to -- no, I'm sorry, 4 that's right. They will not. 5 Q. Okay. Thank you. 6 And an FRR entity is not obligated to use its own generating resources to fulfill its FRR 7 8 capacity obligation, correct? That's my understanding. 9 Α. 10 Q. Okay. You have testified as an expert 11 witness before the FERC, correct? 12 Α. Yes. 13 And, in fact, your experience identifies Ο. 14 market competition as one of your areas of expertise, 15 correct? 16 Α. Yes. 17 Ο. So as we've discussed, AEP Ohio's status as an FRR entity will end May 31, 2015, correct? 18 19 Α. Yes, I agree that. 20 And it is AEP Ohio's intention to 0. 21 transfer its generating assets to an affiliate 2.2 effective January 1, 2014, correct? 23 That's my understanding. Α. 24 Ο. And is it your understanding that two 25 plants will be going to regulated affiliates and the

1 balance will go to a nonregulated affiliate? 2 Α. Yes, Amos and Mitchell units will go to 3 APCo and Kentucky Power and the rest will go to AEP 4 Gen. 5 Thank you. So between the time of that Q. 6 transfer and the end of its FRR obligations, is it 7 your understanding that AEP Ohio intends to rely on a 8 purchased power agreement with AEP generation 9 resources? 10 Α. I believe that's correct. I have not 11 studied that contractual arrangement, but I 12 understand that AEP GenCo, will sell power back to 13 AEP Ohio on a cost basis to close out its FRR 14 obligations. 15 With your credentials I expect that 0. 16 you're aware of the FERC's Edgar standards, correct? 17 Α. Yes. And isn't it true that the Edgar 18 Ο. 19 standards relate to the FERC's approval of purchased 20 power agreements with affiliates? 21 Yes, that's generally true. Α. 2.2 So a purchased power agreement between Ο. 23 AEP Ohio and its affiliated owner of the generating 24 assets in place after corporate separation would be 25 subject to the Edgar standards, correct?

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1	A. I don't want to offer a legal opinion on
2	that but it wouldn't surprise me if that's true.
3	Q. And I'm not in these questions asking for
4	any legal opinion.
5	A. Okay.
6	Q. As a nonlawyer would you agree with me
7	that it is true that the premise of the Edgar
8	standards is to ensure that affiliate power sales
9	transactions are above suspicion such that the market
10	would not be distorted and ratepayers would be
11	protected?
12	A. You know, I don't recall the specific
13	motivational language for the Edgar standards but
14	generally they are designed to assure that there's
15	not self-dealing favoritism in intercompany transfers
16	and they are comparable to what could have taken
17	place in a market process.
18	Q. So under Edgar, as you say, then, the
19	FERC would look at whether or not there is direct
20	head-to-head competition between the affiliate and
21	nonaffiliated entities, correct?
22	MR. CONWAY: Objection. Relevance.
23	Whatever FERC process applies to whatever purchased
24	power arrangement is put in place between Genco and
25	AEP Ohio will be reviewed by FERC and it's not a

1	matter that is relevant to this proceeding.
2	MS. KINGERY: Your Honor, this goes to
3	factors that will be relevant to the cost that AEP
4	has to pay to its affiliate in order to obtain
5	capacity in that bridge period, and this is a period
6	that we have talked about at great length during this
7	hearing. So I believe that the factors that will be
8	relevant are also relevant to our discussion today.
9	MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, if I might,
10	whatever purchased power arrangement is put in place,
11	again, will be subject to the FERC's review, it won't
12	be subject to this Commission's review, and so
13	debates about what ought to be in that contract or
14	what ought not be in the contract, whether such a
15	contract, whatever its form, would comply with or not
16	comply with a standard that the FERC will apply to it
17	when it reviews it is simply not relevant to this
18	proceeding.
19	MS. KINGERY: And I'm not asking the
20	witness to talk about what might be approved, what
21	might not be approved, merely what costs may be
22	passed on under that agreement to the CRES providers
23	during the bridge period.

24 EXAMINER PARROT: The objection is25 overruled.

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903 1 You may answer, Mr. Graves. 2 Α. Can I hear the question again? 3 (Record read.) 4 It's been a while since I've done an Α. 5 Edgar matter, but my recollection is they would look 6 at whether there was competition or whether, if there 7 had been competition, it would produce a similar 8 result. And it's specific to the type of service 9 being sought, it's not just a general question of 10 whether there's a market alternative, it has to be 11 matched to the transaction in question. 12 But they would look at the intent of 13 competition or the equivalent result of competition 14 in my recollection, but it's been a while since I've 15 done that. 16 Just one more question on this issue. Ο. 17 And is it your understanding they also look for 18 benchmark evidence of price, terms, and conditions of 19 sales by nonaffiliated sellers? 20 MR. CONWAY: Objection, your Honor. Same 21 objection. 2.2 EXAMINER PARROT: Overruled. 23 MR. CONWAY: We're not litigating the 24 FERC approval process. 25 EXAMINER PARROT: You may answer,

1 Mr. Graves. 2 Α. Yes, that's my understanding as part of that process of identifying whether it's equivalent 3 4 to a market alternative. 5 0. Thank you. 6 Would you agree, sir, that in the near term it is probable that competition will be stifled 7 8 in AEP Ohio's service territory under its proposal in 9 this proceeding? 10 I assume you're referring to retail Α. 11 competition. 12 Q. Yes. 13 No. I wouldn't agree with that. Α. I think 14 there will be less activity by CRES providers, but 15 that doesn't mean there won't be competition. There 16 could still be opportunities to be profitable even 17 under the terms that are more expensive than CRES 18 providers would like, and I don't regard the simple 19 transfer of AEP's capacity at RPM prices to be 20 fostering competition, that's just replacing 21 suppliers with another capacity. 2.2 Ο. But you have testified, I believe -- I'm 23 looking here at page 12 of your testimony, I'll wait 24 till you get there. I'm looking at line 21. "It is 25 very likely that there would be less near-term CRES

905 1 activity under AEP Ohio's proposal...." 2 Α. Yes, and I'm sticking with that. 3 Q. Okay. 4 I'm just not defining "activity" as Α. "competition." 5 6 Okay. All distribution utilities in Ohio Ο. 7 now operate in PJM, correct? 8 Α. To my knowledge. 9 And no other distribution utility in Ohio Ο. 10 charges CRES providers for capacity based on cost of 11 service, correct? 12 Α. I'm not aware of any. I'm not aware of 13 any other FRR distribution companies, either. 14 And as of the 2015-2016 planning year, no Ο. 15 Ohio utility will be an FRR entity, correct? 16 Α. Yes. That's right. 17 Q. Turning to page 15 of your testimony. 18 Okay, I have it. Α. 19 On line 10 you talk about CRES providers Q. 20 appearing to be, quote, seeking a lower of cost or 21 market. Is that correct? 2.2 Α. Yes, that is. 23 Thank you. In essence you're saying it's Ο. 24 opportunistic, correct? That the CRES providers are 25 trying to be opportunistic.

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1	A. Sure. I understand why but I think
2	that's fair.
3	Q. And if AEP Ohio were charging RPM-based
4	rates when their embedded costs were lower, it would
5	be similarly opportunistic? In other words, if the
6	table were turned, would it also be opportunistic?
7	A. Yes, I think if we were in a situation
8	where embedded cost rates were below RPM and AEP was
9	asking for the higher of cost or market, that would
10	be opportunistic on behalf of AEP.
11	Q. And, sir, do CRES providers at this point
12	have the ability to opt out of AEP Ohio's FRR plan
13	and self-supply?
14	A. Not for the next three years.
15	Q. And similarly, if we look at page 14 of
16	your testimony
17	A. Okay.
18	Q on line 20 you talk about CRES
19	providers having little or no incentive to contract
20	forward for FRR capacity, correct? I guess that's
21	actually line 21.
22	A. I see that.
23	Q. But, again, they would have to make that
24	decision three years in advance, correct?
25	A. Yes.

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1	MS. KINGERY: I have no further
2	questions.
3	EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Randazzo?
4	MR. RANDAZZO: Thank you.
5	
6	CROSS-EXAMINATION
7	By Mr. Randazzo:
8	Q. Mr. Graves, I'm general counsel for the
9	Industrial Energy Users of Ohio.
10	A. Okay.
11	Q. And I'd like to talk to you a little bit
12	about some of your testimony, but before I begin I've
13	got a question for you on principle, I guess.
14	If the retail rates that AEP Ohio
15	collects from nonshopping customers, the level of
16	those rates for the generation supply component was
17	set based upon a benchmark against market-based
18	prices including the capacity price established by
19	RPM, would that be inconsistent with your
20	understanding of the way that AEP's prices have been
21	set?
22	MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, could I have
23	that question read back?
24	(Record read.)
25	MR. CONWAY: I'll object, form of the

1 question. I can't understand it. So that's my 2 objection. Not a good question. 3 MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, if I may, I 4 would like an instruction from the Bench to 5 Mr. Conway, the process requires one to state an 6 objection, there's a basis, it needs to be requested. 7 Mr. Conway has a persistent habit of trying to guide 8 the witness and argue. I have a lot of 9 cross-examination and I would ask for an instruction 10 from the Bench. 11 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Randazzo, do you 12 have a response to his objection? 13 MR. RANDAZZO: Yes, I do, your Honor. 14 This witness has throughout his testimony 15 stated that embedded capacity pricing is appropriate 16 because that was -- that's the way that rates were 17 set and that's what AEP expected. I'm asking him now 18 if the way that rates were actually set, to the 19 extent that those rates were set based upon 20 benchmarking against a competitive market price 21 including RPM, if that were the case, would that 2.2 affect his view. 23 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Graves, you may 24 answer the question. 25 Α. Okay. I understand that the nonshopping

1 customer's rate is based on a blend of adjusted prior 2 ESP rates and competitive benchmark price which is a 3 fraction of the total factor that determines an MRO, 4 and if the ESP is less than that, then it's deemed 5 acceptable, I believe. So there is some influence of competitive 6 7 benchmark pricing in the ESP. 8 Ο. (By Mr. Randazzo) And for purposes of --9 do you understand that for purposes of that 10 benchmarking that AEP Ohio has historically used PJM 11 RPM capacity prices to calculate the benchmark price? 12 Α. I haven't reviewed the way they've done 13 it in comprehensive history, but I'm aware that 14 that's been the case in recent filings, and it 15 wouldn't surprise me. 16 Now, is it your understanding that AEP Ο. 17 has taken the position that the revenues available 18 from nonshopping rates for the generation supply 19 component include a capacity charge equivalent to 20 approximately \$356 per megawatt-day? 21 I understand that to be the opinion of Α. 2.2 witness Mr. Allen that the G component of the ESP 23 rate is approximately the same as the CRES embedded 24 rate. 25 Q. Okay. So if that were true, if the

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1	rates the revenues produced by the generation
2	supply rate for nonshopping customers included the
3	equivalent of a 356 per megawatt-day capacity charge,
4	it is true, is it not, sir, that the rates and the
5	capacity revenue provided by those rates generated
6	substantially more revenue for AEP Ohio than would
7	have been generated had the capacity component been
8	set based upon RPM?
9	A. These are the rates for nonshopping
10	customers you're referring to?
11	Q. That's correct, sir, yes.
12	A. As a general matter that sounds right.
13	If the nonshopping rate was lower, it would have
14	generated less revenue.
15	Q. And do you have any sense of how much
16	revenue AEP Ohio collected as a result of the 355 or
17	356 per megawatt-day capacity charge that would not
18	have been collected had the capacity charge been set
19	based on RPM?
20	MR. CONWAY: Objection. Object to the
21	form of the question. There's no \$355 per
22	megawatt-day capacity charge set up in the retail
23	rates as a separate rate.
24	MR. RANDAZZO: Will you stipulate to
25	that?

911 MR. CONWAY: The retail rates do not 1 2 include --3 MR. RANDAZZO: Will you stipulate to what 4 you just said? 5 MR. CONWAY: I said what I said. MR. RANDAZZO: Will you stipulate to 6 that? 7 8 EXAMINER PARROT: The objection is 9 overruled. 10 You may answer, Mr. Graves. Do you need 11 the question reread? 12 Α. Yes, I would. 13 (Record read.) 14 And, again, we're talking about from Ο. 15 nonshopping customers. 16 Right. I'm not aware of a calculation to Α. 17 that. I think it would require specifying a lot of 18 things, what timeframe you're talking about, what 19 else would have changed in the rates, whether energy 20 prices would have been different if the capacity 21 prices had been different, so it would take a lot of 2.2 specification that we haven't considered. 23 Okay. And you talked with Mr. Kutik a Ο. 24 little bit about some of the history. In Ohio's transition plan are you aware, and I'm talking about 25

1 the transition plan associated with the 2 implementation of the electric -- Mr. Kutik called it 3 deregulation, I call it restructuring, but the 4 legislation that implemented Ohio's customer choice 5 law, are you aware of how the collection of stranded 6 costs or transitioned revenues was constructed? 7 Α. I believe generally there was an 8 opportunity to have a generation transition charge of some kind and there I believe were hearings about 9 10 whether there were stranded costs and whether such 11 amounts should be amortized through, I forget, 2005 12 or something like that. 13 Ο. Right. 14 Beyond that kind of general level of Α. 15 detail I don't know the specifics. 16 Okay. And can I -- I'd like to explore Ο. 17 one other aspect of this with you to test your 18 understanding of this if a claim for transition 19 revenue was granted by the Commission, do you have 20 any understanding as to whether or not the collection 21 of the transition costs occurred from both shopping 2.2 and nonshopping customers? 23 I don't know the specifics of the Ohio Α. 24 policy in that regard. As a general rule transition 25 charges are collected as nonbypassable charges so

913 1 they're borne by both shopping and nonshopping 2 customers. 3 Okay. And it wouldn't surprise you if Ο. 4 that were the case in Ohio I take it. 5 Α. Right. 6 Ο. Okay. 7 The rates are distorted if that's not the Α. 8 case so it would not be consistent with trying to 9 induce effective retail competition. 10 Now, from your -- by the way, I have to Q. 11 tell you, it's not often that I run into a witness 12 who has credentials that exceed the length of his 13 testimony. Very impressive. 14 Sorry about that. Α. 15 Q. Very impressive. 16 It's a long résumé. Α. 17 Q. But I assure you I read them. 18 In Ohio are you aware that there is 19 competition between municipal electric utilities and 20 investor-owned electric utilities? 21 Can you be more specific as to what type Α. 2.2 of competition you're talking about? 23 Ο. Retail. 24 Α. I do not know the extent to which 25 municipal utilities are protected from or allowed to

914 1 participate in retail competition in Ohio. 2 Ο. Will you accept, subject to check, that 3 the City of Columbus has a municipal electric 4 utility? 5 Sure. Α. 6 How about the City of Westerville, Ohio? Ο. Westerville? 7 Α. 8 Ο. Yes. 9 I believe they do. Α. 10 Will you accept, subject to check, that Q. 11 both of those communities are located within the 12 footprint of AEP Ohio? 13 Α. Sure. 14 Does AEP Ohio's -- does the FRR election Ο. 15 that you understand that AEP Ohio made extend to load 16 within municipal utilities? 17 Α. Can I hear the question again? 18 (Record read.) 19 That's a question better directed at AEP Α. 20 witnesses. I don't know for sure whether they're 21 considered part of the FRR obligation or not. 2.2 Ο. Okay. So if municipal utilities, 23 electric utilities, serving retail customers in AEP's 24 service territory are not subject to the FRR election that you understand AEP Ohio made, then the municipal 25

1 utilities would be free to secure capacity from the 2 RPM market, right? Under those conditions, that sounds 3 Α. 4 right. 5 Right. And if they are subject to AEP, Ο. what you understand was AEP Ohio's election, they 6 would be obligated to secure capacity from AEP, 7 8 right? 9 To the extent they hadn't opted to cover Α. 10 themselves and in effect become their own FRRs or --11 Well, they'd have to, if they're going to Ο. 12 do their own FRR, they would have had to have made 13 that election before -- within a certain period of 14 time, correct? 15 MR. CONWAY: Objection. I don't think 16 the witness was finished with his answer before Mr. Randazzo interjected. 17 I apologize. Please continue. 18 Q. 19 Yes, they would have had to have made Α. 20 that election three years in advance or so of the 21 time they wanted to begin doing it. 2.2 Ο. So, let's see, if it's appropriate, in 23 your judgment, based upon your just and reasonable 24 standard, that CRES suppliers pay an embedded 25 capacity charge when they are serving retail

1 customers that were formerly served by AEP Ohio, 2 would the same logic extend in the circumstance where a municipal electric utility is serving a retail 3 customer that was formerly served by AEP Ohio? 4 5 So this municipal utility has a retail Α. 6 arm that is in effect a CRES provider itself? 7 No, the municipal utility serves retail Q. 8 customers and customers that the -- the customers 9 have the ability to either elect service from 10 AEP Ohio or the municipal electric utility. The 11 municipal electric utility service retail customers. In that circumstance, based upon your 12 13 notion of just and reasonable, would it be necessary 14 to charge the municipal electric utility a capacity 15 charge in circumstances where the retail customer 16 moved from AEP Ohio to the municipal utility and that 17 capacity charge is specified at an embedded cost 18 Is that the logical implication of your view? rate? 19 It's a pretty rich hypothetical so let me Α. 20 just make sure I can reconstruct it a little bit 21 here. We have a customer who is a nonshopping AEP 2.2 customer who decides to become a customer of a 23 municipality and is apparently able to elect to do 24 so, or at least we're assuming that that's the case, 25 and pay whatever the municipal electric charge is for

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917 1 its capacity. 2 Q. Right. 3 Α. And so then the question is should the 4 municipal electric company have to pay AEP the same 5 rate as the CRES providers? 6 Ο. Yes. 7 Α. It seems to me to be a much richer 8 problem and it's very hard for me to give you an 9 answer because --10 I noticed. Q. 11 -- under the rest of the terms of the Α. 12 contract between the AEP and the municipality and 13 what other assumptions are being made about the 14 municipality covering specific capacity costs of AEP, 15 maybe they have a contract that's five years old, ten 16 years old, maybe unit specific. 17 Q. Okay. 18 I don't know the terms and I wouldn't Α. 19 want to suggest that those contracts should be 20 overridden because of this switching here but, so I 21 can't offer a categorical conclusion on that. 2.2 Ο. So in that circumstance there would be a 23 lot of things that you'd want to take a look at 24 before concluding that an embedded cost capacity 25 charge exit fee should be imposed either on the

1 departing retail customer or the municipality. You 2 would need to look at a lot more things, right? 3 Α. Sure. I wouldn't presume it's per se 4 unreasonable or inequitable to do so but there may be 5 other considerations that have already precluded 6 that. 7 0. And those other considerations may cause 8 it to be unreasonable in that circumstance. 9 Or infeasible. Whether it's unreasonable Α. 10 or not. 11 Right. But there are other circumstances 0. 12 that may cause it to be unreasonable. You answered "infeasible." I asked "unreasonable." 13 14 I could conceive of circumstances where Α. 15 it would be. For instance, if there had already been 16 prepayment for some sort of indemnification against 17 some kinds of changes in cost and there was already 18 agreement that customer migration of that kind could 19 occur and was compensated through some a priori 20 mechanism, then switching to a new embedded cost 21 basis might be unreasonable. 2.2 Ο. So if AEP received stranded cost 23 compensation prior to this retail customer moving 24 from AEP to the municipal utility, that might affect 25 your judgment as to whether or not it was appropriate

to impose an embedded cost exit fee on the departing 1 2 customer or the municipality, right? Yes, that's an example of a possible 3 Α. 4 condition that would override the equivalent pricing. 5 And if AEP Ohio had committed that it Ο. 6 would not charge shopping customers a lost revenue exit fee of the type that I've described, that would 7 8 be another consideration that might override your 9 judgment about the justness and reasonableness of 10 using an embedded cost capacity charge, right? 11 Yes, I guess that's fair enough. It Α. 12 would depend on context and it's conceivable that, 13 you know, prior contractual arrangements had already 14 addressed that concern and made arrangements and then 15 changing that would be unreasonable. But it depends 16 on how the contract was entered, whether it was arm's 17 length, whether it was a settlement or a mandate or 18 what determined it. 19 Now, as you understand what AEP Ohio is Q. 20 proposing in this case -- let me back up. 21 Do you have your testimony in front of 2.2 you? 23 Α. Yes. 24 Do you know what a case caption is? Ο. 25 Α. Not really.

920 1 Okay. You see on your testimony below Ο. 2 the front page where it says "Before the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio," and then it's got some 3 4 words on the left and then a case number on the 5 right? 6 Sure. Α. 7 Q. All right. Is it your understanding that 8 this case is to review the capacity charges of Ohio 9 Power Company and Columbus Southern Power Company? 10 Α. Yes. 11 And do you use -- do you mention Columbus Ο. 12 Southern at all in your testimony? 13 You know, I don't appear to, but I think Α. 14 it's just an oversight, except on what must be the 15 case caption here. 16 Ο. That's all right. It wasn't a trick. 17 Now, do you agree that despite likely 18 coal plant retirements over the next few years due to 19 low gas prices and environmental retrofit 20 obligations, it does not appear that there is any 21 reason to fear a supply adequacy problem? Yes, I think that's generally true. 2.2 Α. 23 And do you agree that PJM has more than Ο. 24 target reserves at present and likely retirements are 25 partly offset by announced new entry of generating

1 resources?

2	A. Sure.
3	Q. And, furthermore, that the RPM auctions
4	occur far enough in advance that even if a pending
5	shortfall appeared likely, there would be sufficient
6	time for new resources to be deployed.
7	A. Yes, I agree with that.
8	Q. Okay. And would you accept, subject to
9	check, that I am reading from the testimony that you
10	filed in the ESP 2 as modified case on March 30th,
11	2012, at the top of page 3, that testimony was filed
12	seven days after the testimony you filed in this
13	case? Would you agree that I was reading from that
14	testimony, subject to check.
15	A. It certainly sounds familiar.
16	Q. All right. Now, what was the scope of
17	your responsibility as you were selected by, and I'll
18	just call them AEP Ohio for purposes of preparing
19	your testimony in this case?
20	A. I think it's pretty well described in my
21	report. I was asked to comment on the reasonableness
22	of using embedded cost prices versus RPM prices.
23	Q. Did you look at any alternatives? Beyond
24	the way you framed the analysis, did you look at
25	alternatives beyond RPM or embedded costs as part of

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1 your assignment? 2 Α. No, other than being generally aware of 3 AEP's consideration of a transition out of the FRR 4 process to future RPM-based supply plan. 5 So you constrained your analysis to Q. 6 either embedded cost as you accepted AEP's rendition of it or RPM, right? 7 8 Α. I guess so. That was the scope of my 9 requested services. 10 Right. And from the credentials in your Q. 11 testimony I understand that you've done a fair amount 12 of modeling to address trade-offs and optimize 13 benefits associated with difficult issues; is that 14 fair? 15 Sure, I guess so. I'm often involved in Α. 16 planning studies and regulatory approvals for 17 utilities in which there's complex trade-offs and 18 risk analysis pricing controversies, that sort of 19 thing. 20 Did AEP ask you to limit your analysis to Q. 21 either embedded costs or RPM? 2.2 Α. It wasn't posed explicitly as a hard 23 constraint, but that was the effective nature of the 24 request, that I address the trade-offs between those 25 two and they were -- and that I not take

923 responsibility for any other strategy development for 1 them or any validation of their other -- their 2 estimation of those parameters. 3 Okay. So the binary structure was a 4 Ο. 5 given as you proceeded to render your opinions; is 6 that correct? 7 Α. I think that's fair. 8 Ο. All right. Now, by the way, going 9 through your credentials, lengthy credentials 10 attached to your testimony, do the words "embedded 11 cost" appear anywhere? Will you accept, subject to 12 check, that they do not? 13 I would be happy to accept that. Α. 14 Ο. Do the words "marginal cost analysis" 15 appear frequently in your credentials? 16 Α. Probably. 17 Ο. What's the difference between "marginal cost" and "embedded cost"? 18 19 Well, marginal cost is a short run or Α. 20 long run avoidable cost of future service. Embedded 21 cost is the average cost of the -- recovering the investment and operating costs of historically 2.2 23 acquired assets. 24 Have you ever constructed a model that 0. 25 relies exclusively on embedded costs for purposes of

trying to identify an economic efficient result? 1 Not exclusively, but I've certainly used 2 Α. embedded cost analyses in analyses of what would be 3 4 efficient. 5 But you would not design a model of the Q. 6 type that I described earlier only to consider embedded costs, right? If you were trying -- if you 7 8 were trying to reach economic efficiency. Is that 9 correct? 10 Well, efficiency is a broad topic, Α. 11 there's short-run efficiency and long-run efficiency, 12 there's question about dynamic efficiency and 13 fairness, and the longer term ones do require 14 consideration of embedded costs and continuity of 15 rulemaking and so on. So they enter into it but 16 they're not sufficient by themselves to resolve that question. 17 18 Right. So I appreciate the length of Ο. 19 your answer and the qualifications, but am I correct, 20 sir, that you would not believe it would be 21 reasonable to rely upon an economic model that 2.2 utilized exclusively embedded costs to identify an 23 economically efficient outcome? Is that correct? 24 Α. I certainly have not done so and I would

say that generally I would not expect to.

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925 And based upon your experience it would 1 Ο. be unreasonable to do so; would it not? 2 3 Α. Sure, if efficiency is your only 4 consideration, then you can't solve that by just 5 looking at embedded costs. 6 Is The Brattle Group engaged by AEP or 0. 7 any subsidiary of AEP for purposes other than your 8 testimony? 9 I believe we have been from time to time. Α. 10 And can you describe the range of Q. 11 services that you provide to AEP through The Brattle 12 Group. 13 Α. I don't know that I can give you a 14 comprehensive list. It's not very extensive, but I 15 believe we've been involved in some assisting in some 16 assessments of the design of their advance meter infrastructure and demand response programs, I think 17 18 we may have reviewed some of their efficiency 19 programs, I think we're involved in some transmission 20 line risk analysis and investment analysis. 21 Ο. Okay. 2.2 Α. I am not involved in those, but our firm 23 is. 24 Ο. And one of the main aspects of your 25 training and experience involves finance; is that

926 1 correct? 2 Α. Yes, it certainly does. 3 Ο. Can you help me to understand your view 4 of what falls under the heading of "finance"? What 5 is the discipline of finance about? Well, at a very broad level finance is 6 Α. 7 about --8 Ο. Please. 9 -- intertemporal economics of how markets Α. 10 equilibrate over time as opposed to 11 cross-sectionally. Conventional microeconomics is about cross-sectional behavior, pricing, and 12 13 competitive activity, and finance is about how payoffs to decisions that occur over time are priced 14 15 and how markets that provide intertemporal allocation 16 and capital reallocation work. 17 Ο. Okay. And when you say "intertemporal," you're talking about things that occur in different 18 19 time periods, correct? 20 Yes. Α. 21 Okay. So in finance looking at the Ο. 2.2 present value of various options would be part of --23 routine part of financial analysis, correct? 24 Α. Yes, that's an important component. 25 Q. Right. And things like, tools like

1 discounted cash flow would be another way to come to 2 a present value observation about different 3 opportunities, correct? 4 Yes, that's one of the tools. There are Α. 5 others, but of course that's an important one. 6 And I also gather from your experience Ο. 7 that you have been involved in the issuance of 8 securities; is that correct? 9 Not directly. Not as an issuer or as a Α. 10 dealer, but I've been involved in assessing what the 11 value of securities might be and whether they were 12 fairly disclosed, priced, that sort of thing. 13 Right. And from your credentials I also Ο. 14 gather that you've also been an expert witness in 15 litigation in circumstances where there have been 16 allegations that misrepresentations or fraud had 17 occurred in conjunction with the issuance of 18 securities, correct? 19 Yes. Generally less so with regard to Α. 20 issuance of securities than with regard to management 21 representation about the going-forward value of their 2.2 companies, but --23 Q. All right. -- but I've been involved in securities 24 Α. 25 litigation several times.

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1	Q. And how, in the process of issuing
2	securities, you mentioned management representations,
3	is it your understanding that prior to the issuance
4	of securities that the management of a firm is
5	required to provide information to potential
6	investors that fully and completely disclose the
7	nature of the business and the risks associated with
8	that business so the investor can make an informed
9	choice about whether or not to purchase securities?
10	Is that your understanding of the structure we have
11	in this country?
12	A. It's generally true. There are different
13	degrees of disclosure requirements for different
14	kinds of securities and it depends on whether the
15	investors will be public or private and what sorts of
16	responsibilities they bear for their decisions to
17	invest, but generally public disclosure of some kind
18	about the future risks and opportunities is required.
19	Q. And do you understand that AEP is a
20	publicly traded company?
21	A. Yes.
22	Q. And is it also correct that Ohio Power
23	and Columbus & Southern are not publicly traded
24	companies?
25	A. That's my understanding. They're

1 subsidiaries. Q. And AEP is the sole shareholder or sole 2 3 owner of the stock of Ohio Power and Columbus 4 Southern; is that correct? 5 I haven't reviewed that, but I have no Α. 6 reason to doubt it. 7 Okay. So if there was common equity Q. 8 issued in the case of Ohio Power or Columbus & 9 Southern, that wouldn't happen, right? In the structure that we call AEP. 10 11 It would be privately held equity inside Α. 12 of AEP. 13 Right. So the common equity issuer in Ο. the AEP system would be AEP, American Electric Power 14 15 Company, Inc., right? 16 That is my understanding. Α. 17 Q. And that's true with holding company structures often, correct? 18 19 That often is. There can be minority Α. 20 interests that are public, but generally that's not 21 the case. 2.2 And as a publicly traded company, prior Ο. 23 to issuing securities, AEP electric -- American 24 Electric Power Company, Inc. would be obligated to 25 issue a prospectus, correct?

1 Again, depending on the nature of the Α. 2 security, that could be required. Certain types of debt instruments don't require the same disclosure. 3 4 It depends on who is the lender. 5 And so we're clear, if we were talking Q. 6 about the issuance of common equity by American Electric Power Company, Inc., a publicly traded 7 8 company, your understanding is that there would be a 9 prospectus that would be required to be issued to 10 identify the lines of business and the risks and 11 other things that investors would want to know before 12 they invest in American Electric Power Company, Inc. 13 Α. Yes. 14 Ο. Right? 15 That's true for public offerings. Α. 16 And if there was a misleading or false Ο. 17 statement in that prospectus, the people that were 18 responsible for issuing the prospectus would be 19 subject to criminal and civil punishment, right? 20 Well, subject to a much richer test of Α. 21 why it was misleading, but in principle that could 2.2 happen. 23 Are you aware that American Electric Ο. 24 Power Company, Inc. issued common equity in 2002? 25 Α. I was not.

931 1 MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honor, I would ask 2 that the document I've just distributed be marked as TEU Exhibit No. 113. 3 4 EXAMINER PARROT: So marked. 5 We need another copy, Mr. Randazzo. 6 MR. RANDAZZO: I'm sorry. Now, I believe it was Mr. Kutik and 7 Q. 8 yourself --9 EXAMINER PARROT: Just a moment, 10 Mr. Randazzo. 11 MR. RANDAZZO: Yes. I stand corrected. 12 I believe it's 112. 13 EXAMINER PARROT: Yes, it is. 14 MR. RANDAZZO: Thank you. I'm sorry. 15 EXAMINER PARROT: The exhibit is marked 16 as IEU Exhibit 112. 17 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 18 Ο. (By Mr. Randazzo) Now, a prospectus 19 issued by a publicly traded company in conjunction 20 with a proposed issuance of common equity would be a 21 source of information about the business plans of the 2.2 entity issuing common equity, the lines of business, 23 regulated and unregulated, that that company may be 24 in, as well as their expectations about the value 25 opportunities that are presented to potential

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1	investors, correct?				
2	A. Broadly that's correct.				
3	Q. Do you have before you, sir, what has				
4	been marked as IEU Exhibit 112?				
5	A. I do.				
6	Q. Would you accept, subject to check, that				
7	that's the prospectus supplement that was issued by				
8	American Electric Power Company, Inc. in conjunction				
9	with a 9.25 percent equity units?				
10	A. Yes, it seems to be.				
11	Q. And in the lower left-hand corner you see				
12	June 5, 2002; is that correct?				
13	A. Yes.				
14	Q. Would you accept, subject to check, that				
15	this was issued after the completion of the				
16	implementation of Ohio's electric restructuring?				
17	A. I believe that was completed by				
18	June 2002.				
19	Q. Okay. Now, would you turn to page S-3				
20	near the front of the document.				
21	A. Okay, I have it.				
22	Q. Now, do you see the descriptions of				
23	"regulated operations" and "unregulated operations"				
24	there?				
25	A. Yes, the first and second bold sections				

1 of that page.

2	Q. Do you see anywhere on that page a
3	reference to the sale of capacity? How about the
4	fourth bullet point under "Unregulated Operations."
5	A. Okay. Thank you. Yes, it describes the
6	unregulated operations as possibly participating in
7	long-term transactions to buy or sell capacity,
8	energy, and ancillary services of electric generating
9	facilities.
10	Q. Do you see the word "possibly" in that
11	statement at all? You added it.
12	A. No, I'm saying that I view this list as a
13	list of things they could do.
14	Q. Do you see at the top first of all,
15	we're dealing with a description of unregulated
16	operations; is that correct?
17	A. Yes, and that section is on unregulated
18	operations.
19	Q. Yeah. Would you read the first two lines
20	under that heading before the colon.
21	A. Okay. "Our unregulated business
22	operations focus on value-driven asset optimization
23	at each link of the energy chain through the
24	following activities:"
25	Q. Now

MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, at this point I'm just going to interject an objection to the relevance of this line of questioning, its appropriateness in any event from pursuing the meaning of the company's securities filings with Mr. Graves who is an outside consultant. It's just not appropriate.

MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, this witness 8 9 has testified about what AEP expected as a basis for 10 concluding that the use of embedded cost would be 11 reasonable and has agreed that the prospectus issued 12 in conjunction with common equity by American 13 Electric Power, Inc. would be a place from which we 14 could obtain information about what those 15 expectations were, and I would like the opportunity 16 to talk to this witness about his view on the 17 expectations as they were stated by AEP Ohio in a 18 document which must fully and fairly disclose those 19 expectations to potential purchasers of securities. 20 MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, I believe the

21 witness declined to be a witness that would testify 22 as to what AEP's expectations are. He said he could 23 derive from publicly available information views 24 about their position, but I think he declined to say 25 that he was the witness who could speak about AEP

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1 Ohio's expectations. That's the first point. 2 The second point is that this document is 3 from 2002, it was issued with regard to securities 4 that were themselves issued well before there was a 5 PJM capacity market, and so its relevance to the 6 issues that we have before us today is nonexistent. 7 There's no connection. And it's 8 inappropriate to take up this amount of time pursuing 9 this goose chase. And it's inappropriate to do it 10 with the witness Mr. Graves. We could just as well 11 have an empty chair up there and have Mr. Randazzo 12 ask his questions to the wall and we'd have just as 13 much -- it would have just as much relevance and 14 propriety as using Mr. Graves. 15 MR. RANDAZZO: Mr. Graves, so it's clear, 16 I don't think you're a wall. 17 EXAMINER PARROT: Anything else, 18 Mr. Randazzo? 19 MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, as Mr. Conway 20 indicated, Mr. Graves has also already indicated it 21 would be appropriate to look at publicly available 2.2 documents as to identify what AEP Ohio and AEP in 23 general expected. This is a publicly available 24 document. 25 Mr. Conway is not suggesting that it's

not an authority on the subject of my inquiry or that 1 2 there's anything misstated in this document, so I will -- I believe the cross-examination is 3 4 appropriate. 5 EXAMINER PARROT: And as to the time 6 period? What's the relevance? 7 MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honor, we have --8 your Honors, we have had testimony throughout this 9 proceeding dealing with things like the opportunity 10 that was available to AEP to recover stranded costs. 11 We have had testimony throughout this 12 proceeding saying that AEP viewed itself as a bundled 13 entity, vertically integrated entity, as a predicate 14 for a claim that somehow it was entitled to embedded 15 cost recovery. 16 I believe, if allowed, I will show that 17 is false based upon the statements made in this 18 prospectus. 19 EXAMINER PARROT: All right. The 20 objection is overruled. 21 (By Mr. Randazzo) Now, will you turn to Ο. 2.2 page S-28 and S-29. 23 Okay, I have it. Α. 24 And do you see on the bottom of S-280. 25 there is a organizational chart that shows the

937 1 corporate structure that existed at the time this 2 prospectus was issued and the proposed post 3 restructuring corporate structure on the following 4 page? 5 Yes. Α. 6 And underneath the "Regulated Holdco" 0. 7 column on S-29 do you see boxes that are for Ohio 8 Power wires and Columbus Southern Power Company 9 wires? Yes. On the left set of branches of the 10 Α. 11 corporate organizational tree there's a Regulated 12 Holdco which includes some wires companies. 13 And underneath the AEP Enterprises column Ο. on S-29, you will see OPCo Genco and Columbus 14 15 Southern Power Genco, correct? 16 Α. Yes. 17 Ο. Do you know at the time of implementing 18 Senate Bill 3 what the corporate separation plan was 19 that was submitted by Columbus Southern and Ohio 20 Power? 21 No. Α. 2.2 Ο. Did you review that for purposes of 23 forming your opinions in this case? 24 Α. No, I did not. 25 Q. All right.

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1	MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, I would ask				
2	that a document titled Direct Testimony of William R.				
3	Forrester on behalf of Columbus Southern Power				
4	Company and Ohio Power Company be marked as IEU				
5	Exhibit No. 113.				
6	(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)				
7	Q. Sir, do you have before you what has been				
8	marked as IEU Exhibit No. 113?				
9	A. Yes.				
10	Q. Will you accept, subject to check, that				
11	this is testimony that AEP well, I should say				
12	Columbus Southern and Ohio Power filed in the				
13	electric transition plan proceeding to implement				
14	Ohio's electric restructuring legislation?				
15	A. I suspect this is part of that. I can't				
16	imagine it's the whole plan.				
17	Q. No.				
18	A. It would be the world's most concise				
19	plan, but				
20	Q. Right. Thank you for that.				
21	I pulled several pages out of the				
22	testimony and I'd like you to look at the back page.				
23	A. The graph or the table? The figure I				
24	guess.				
25	Q. Yeah, the figure. And also then turn to				
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939 1 page 21 of the text that's in IEU Exhibit 113. 2 Α. Okay. 3 Ο. Now, do you see at line 9 on page 21 the sentence that begins with "The two new subsidiaries"? 4 5 It's on line 10 in mine, but that's fine, Α. 6 yes. 7 Q. Yes. I'm sorry. Yes, it is, I'm sorry. 8 And does that sentence indicate to you 9 that Columbus Southern and Ohio Power were proposing 10 to form two new subsidiaries to own and operate 11 transmission and distribution assets? 12 Α. It says that, yes. 13 Ο. And the sentence above that that begins 14 on line 9 contemplated that the existing Columbus 15 Southern and Ohio Power would own the generating 16 assets, right? 17 Α. Yes. 18 All right. Do you know if this was Q. 19 approved, this proposed corporate separation plan was 20 approved by the Commission? 21 I don't know. Α. 2.2 Ο. Well, if it was approved by the PUCO, by 23 the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, would the 24 organizational chart on page S-29 of the prospectus 25 underneath the corporate structure post restructuring

1 be consistent with the description in Mr. Forrester's 2 testimony to which I referred you to? 3 MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, I object, again on relevance and also the propriety of using this 4 5 witness for whatever purpose, relevant or not, that 6 Mr. Randazzo is pursuing. 7 This is a document from the original ETP 8 case from 1999 and Mr. Forrester -- an excerpt of 9 Mr. Forrester's testimony. The witness has already 10 explained that he's not familiar with the corporate 11 separation plan that was approved then or proposed then and whether or not it was approved, and since 12 13 that time there's been a lot of water over the dam, 14 and to use this witness as a pretext for injecting 15 into the record this information I think is 16 inappropriate. 17 We had Mr. Munczinski who actually 18 testified in this case who was a witness in this 19 proceeding earlier during the hearing and none of 20 these questions were asked of him, which even if not 21 relevant would have been an appropriate subject to 2.2 address them to. 23 And now we have Mr. Randazzo going 24 through this, at this point ancient history with a 25 witness who is not familiar with it and not a part of

1 that case, I think it's irrelevant and inappropriate. 2 EXAMINER PARROT: Response. 3 MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, I have a 4 couple more questions, foundational questions, as a 5 predicate for moving to more current documents that 6 explain how AEP itself implemented the plan that was 7 described in Mr. Forrester's testimony and is 8 described in the prospectus. 9 And, your Honor, my MR. CONWAY: 10 objections will continue and it will be the same 11 basis. First, relevance, but even beyond that, what 12 this witness has to do with the purpose of the 13 examination, particularly in light of when we had a 14 witness from the company who's familiar with the 15 history who was here before and none of these 16 questions were asked of him. It makes no sense and 17 it's inappropriate to bear upon this witness with 18 this material. 19 EXAMINER PARROT: Anything else? 20 MR. RANDAZZO: No. 21 EXAMINER PARROT: The objection is 2.2 overruled. 23 THE WITNESS: Can I hear the question 24 again? 25 Q. (By Mr. Randazzo) Let me restate it.

A. Okay.

1

Q. Is the description in Mr. Forrester's testimony as well as the diagram on the back of the testimony to which I referred you to consistent with the diagram that's on the page S-29 dealing with the corporate structure post restructuring?

A. Well, they're obviously not the same, but
there are some areas of apparent consistency. The
broad distinguishing of wires companies from
generation and wholesale from retail is constant.
There's a service company that's identified in each
case.

You know, the precise allocation of functions and the number of entities that would be providing those aren't comparable on the two charts, but they may not be inconsistent.

Q. All right. But based on the prospective places where I've directed you to this point, do you think it would be fair to conclude that, with regard to the generation function, the prospectus identified that that would be part of the unregulated activities of American Electric Power? Right?

A. I'm sorry, with regard to the prospectusor with regard to the separation plan?

- 25
- Q. With regard to the prospectus.

Generation is identified and the sale of capacity is identified as part of the unregulated business, correct?

4 MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, I just continue 5 to object to subjecting this witness to giving 6 opinions about what the prospectus from 2002 was 7 intended to show or to provide in the way of 8 information. There's no basis in this witness's 9 experience to do that. There's no basis that's any 10 superior in this witness's experience than anyone 11 around the table in this room could provide.

The witness who might have been able to provide or shed some light on it has been on and is now off, and so I find it troubling that the vessel through which Mr. Randazzo seeks to inject his view, his world view of what happened in 2002 is this witness, the person who may be the most uniquely unqualified to carry that job, so I object.

EXAMINER PARROT: And your continuingobjection is noted and, again, overruled.

21 Mr. Graves, you may answer the question22 to the best of your knowledge.

A. Okay. Well, I'm only interpreting what I
say on the page here providing no other additional
contextual knowledge, but I think you perhaps

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1 overstated the degree of exclusion of generation from 2 regulated operations based on S-29. The first bullet has five dashed 3 4 subtopics underneath it and the fourth one says, 5 under Regulated Operations, "Optimize generation 6 assets to enhance availability of off-system sales." 7 So there's some continuing linkage 8 between generation and regulated operations. 9 Okay. Let's move to another -- are you Ο. 10 familiar with FERC, what we call the FERC Form 1? 11 Sure, generally. Α. 12 Ο. And is that another document that 13 utilities subject to the Federal Energy Regulatory 14 Commission's jurisdiction are obligated to use to 15 provide accurate and complete information to 16 regulatory authorities? 17 Α. There are some standard information 18 requirements, I don't know whether they're complete 19 in the sense that they cover everything you could 20 possibly want to know about a utility, but subject to 21 those guidelines, yes, the utilities are obligated to 2.2 file Form 1s annually with the Commission. 23 And do you know whether or not the FERC 0. 24 Form 1 also constitutes the annual report that's 25 submitted to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,

945 1 if you know? 2 Α. I don't, but I wouldn't be surprised if 3 it's used. 4 MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honor, I have 5 distributed a document that has name of the 6 respondent in the upper left-hand corner, Columbus Southern Power, in the right-hand corner it has 7 8 December 31, 2001, and at the bottom of the page it 9 has FERC Form 1, page 123. I would like it to be marked as IEU Exhibit 114. 10 11 EXAMINER PARROT: So marked. 12 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 13 You accept, subject to check -- do you Q. 14 have what's been marked as IEU Exhibit No. 114? 15 Α. Yes. 16 You accept, subject to check, that this 0. 17 is a excerpt from the FERC Form 1 filed by Columbus & 18 Southern for the year 2001? 19 Yes, it certainly looks like it. Α. 20 All right. And as part of the FERC Form Q. 21 1 and the 10-K filed with the Securities & Exchange 2.2 Commission and other documents issued by public 23 companies, publicly traded companies, they are 24 required to identify significant regulatory changes 25 and changes in accounting practices, right?

946 THE WITNESS: Could I hear that again? 1 2 (Record read.) 3 I suppose that's generally true. Α. The 4 disclosure requirements are somewhat different for 5 the 10-K and the Form 1 because they don't use 6 identical accounting traditions, but they do 7 generally seek disclosures of changes in regulatory 8 accounting and policy. 9 Okay. And with regard to the FERC Form Ο. 1, it would be your understanding that utilities are 10 11 obligated to provide accurate and complete 12 information, correct? 13 Sure, subject to the guidelines of the Α. 14 standard system of accounts that's used. 15 Right. Now, would you turn to page 123.5 Q. 16 which is the second page in IEU Exhibit 114. 17 Α. I'm sorry, 123.5? 18 Ο. Yes. 19 Okay, I have it. Α. 20 And do you see there the description of Q. 21 "Customer Choice and Industry Restructuring"? 2.2 Α. I do, at the bottom of the page. 23 Do you have any reason to disagree with Ο. 24 Columbus & Southern's description of the electric 25 restructuring that was passed in Ohio?

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1	A. No, I have no reason to disagree with it.
2	Q. All right. And at the top of the next
3	page, 123.6, do you see the statement "All customers
4	continue to be served by CSP for transmission and
5	distribution services"?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. And several places in your testimony you
8	use the words "franchise service territory," right?
9	A. I think I mention that, yes.
10	Q. What's your understanding of the
11	franchise service territory of Ohio Power and
12	Columbus & Southern?
13	A. I don't know the chapter and verse of
14	what cities and
15	Q. Well, let me let me shorten this up I
16	think.
17	A. Okay.
18	Q. Is it your understanding that they have
19	franchised service territory for generation service?
20	A. No. They have a, right now they have a
21	transmission and distribution franchise but they have
22	a standard service offer for customers within that
23	zone who don't go shopping.
24	Q. Right. And are there any other
25	opportunities that you're aware of for strike

948 1 that. 2 Let me ask you this question: Do you know what an electric distribution utility is? 3 4 I think so. Α. 5 That would be an entity that just uses --Ο. 6 just operates the distribution segment of the business, correct? 7 8 Α. Yes, that sounds right. 9 For purposes of your testimony did you Ο. assume that Columbus Southern and Ohio Power are 10 11 something other than an electric distribution 12 utility? 13 It wasn't a distinction I was trying to Α. 14 draw. My focus is on the fulfillment of their FRR 15 obligations and the pricing that's appropriate to 16 capacity in that, so I didn't review their 17 distribution operations. 18 Continuing on IEU Exhibit 114, page Ο. 19 123.6, the first full paragraph on that page that 20 begins with the Ohio Act. 21 Yes, I see it. Α. 2.2 Ο. Do you have any reason to disagree that 23 the Ohio legislation provided for a five-year 24 transition period to move from cost-based rates to 25 market pricing for electric generation supply

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1	service	es?		
2		A.	I see that, and I agree with that.	
3		Q.	And I'd like you to turn to page 123.7.	
4		A.	Okay.	
5		Q.	Do you see the italics there?	
6		A.	In the middle of the page?	
7		Q.	Yes.	
8		A.	Yes.	
9		Q.	The italics says "Discontinuance of the	
10	Applica	ition	of SFAS 71 Regulatory Accounting in	
11	Ohio,"	right	z?	
12		A.	Yes.	
13		Q.	What's regulatory accounting?	
14		A.	Regulatory accounting is the mechanism	
15	whereby	v the	value of assets and costs incurred are	
16	recorde	ed for	r regulatory purposes.	
17		Q.	Okay. And if you discontinue regulatory	
18	account	ing,	how is the value of assets recorded?	
19		A.	Well, I haven't reviewed FAS 71 for some	
20	time.			
21		Q.	Which they discontinued.	
22		A.	Right. It doesn't describe every asset	
23	that a	util	ity holds. It has to do with, as I	
24	recall,	regu	latory assets that are being amortized	
25	over ti	.me ar	nd whether they have to be recorded at	

950 book value or market value. 1 2 Ο. I'm not asking you about 71. First of 3 all, if I was not regulated, I would not be eligible 4 for regulatory accounting, correct? 5 Correct. Α. 6 Okay. So -- and a lot of people think I Ο. need to be regulated, so we'll get to that later. 7 8 And for nonregulated lines of business 9 that maintain a balance sheet that have assets on the 10 left side and liabilities on the right side, right? 11 Α. Yes, as do utilities. 12 Ο. As do utilities. But for nonregulated 13 lines of business the opportunity to maintain a value on the asset side is subject to what is referred to 14 15 as an impairment test, right? 16 Α. Generally that's true. What's an impairment test? 17 Ο. 18 An impairment test is used for things Α. 19 like goodwill and assets that have been recorded at a 20 value that could change over time and you want to see 21 if it still reflects the fair value of the asset. 2.2 And for purposes of -- well, let's do Q. 23 this by the numbers. In the event that the value 24 shown on the books for an asset no longer reflects 25 fair value, what is required at that point?

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1	A. Well, it only applies to certain assets.
2	Most assets that are tangible assets are held for
3	on a book accounting basis quite similarly to the way
4	utilities do it, but certain kinds of intangible
5	assets, as I mentioned such as goodwill, are revalued
6	annually to see if the accounting value that they had
7	when they were first acquired still reflects their
8	value and, if not, there's an adjustment up or
9	down
10	Q. Okay.
11	A to market value.
12	Q. So based on your understanding of
13	regulatory accounting and the text at page 123.7, is
14	it clear to you that after the Ohio electric
15	restructuring that Columbus Southern elected to
16	discontinue regulatory accounting for the generation
17	portion of their business?
18	A. Yes, that's correct.
19	Q. All right.
20	A. At least under FAS 71.
21	Q. Okay. Is there any other regulatory
22	accounting?
23	A. A broad question. I guess for generation
24	do you mean or for asset valuation outside of I
25	mean, yes, there's tomes of material on regulatory

952 1 accounting. 2 Q. Okay. 3 Α. It's a big topic. 4 All right. Now, would you look at the Q. 5 next paragraph on page 123.7. 6 Α. Okav. 7 It begins "The discontinuance...."? Q. 8 Α. Yes, I have it. 9 Does that paragraph contain your Q. 10 understanding of the significance of discontinuing 11 regular inventory accounting? 12 Α. Yes. 13 Okay. Are you aware of whether or not Ο. 14 Columbus Southern or Ohio Power has continued to not 15 follow regulatory accounting for the generation portion of their business? 16 17 Α. I don't know specifically but I would 18 assume that's the case. 19 MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honor, I would like 20 to have marked for identification purposes a one-page 21 document that has Ohio Power Company in the left-hand 2.2 corner and in the right-hand corner under the box 23 Year Period of Report you'll see 2011 Q4. 24 EXAMINER PARROT: The exhibit will be 25 marked as IEU Exhibit 115.

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1	(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)	
2	Q. Now, sir, do you have before you what's	
3	been marked as IEU Exhibit No. 115?	
4	A. I do.	
5	Q. Would you accept, subject to check, that	
6	this is the most recent FERC Form 1 that had been	
7	filed by Ohio Power or Columbus Southern?	
8	A. Yes.	
9	Q. And will you accept, subject to check,	
10	that for purposes of this FERC Form 1 Ohio Power and	
11	Columbus & Southern have been combined?	
12	A. Okay. I'll accept that.	
13	Q. All right. Now, do you see at the top of	
14	the page "Accounting for the Effects of Cost-Based	
15	Regulation"?	
16	A. Yes.	
17	Q. And the last sentence of that paragraph.	
18	A. I see it, yes.	
19	Q. And would I be correct there that that	
20	sentence indicates that Ohio Power, now referring to	
21	both Columbus Southern and Ohio Power,	
22	"discontinued the application of 'Regulated	
23	Operations' accounting treatment for the generation	
24	portion of its business"?	
25	A. Yes, it says that.	

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1	Q. And then it goes on to, in the next
2	paragraph, explain the significance of that; am I
3	correct?
4	A. Yes. That's closely related.
5	Q. Okay. And am I correct that in that
6	paragraph that once you discontinue rate regulated
7	operations that the accounting rules require the
8	recognition of an impairment of stranded net
9	regulatory assets and stranded plant costs if they
10	are not recoverable in regulated rates?
11	A. That's my understanding and that's also
12	what it says.
13	Q. Okay. What rates are currently in
14	effect? Strike that.
15	Would you agree with me that the proposed
16	capacity charge of AEP Ohio in this case is not
17	presently in effect?
18	A. Sure. That's true.
19	Q. Do you know what capacity charge is in
20	effect?
21	A. Yes. The RPM rate.
22	Q. It's your understanding that the RPM rate
23	is in effect; is that correct?
24	A. Yes.
25	Q. All right. Do you know whether or not

1 Columbus Southern and Ohio Power has done an 2 impairment analysis? 3 Α. I don't know. 4 Q. Well, if there was some cost not 5 recoverable at the RPM rate which you understand is 6 presently in effect, would you expect that the accounting rules would trigger the need for an 7 8 impairment analysis? 9 MR. CONWAY: Objection. The predicates 10 haven't been established and the opinion is well 11 beyond anything that this witness has covered in his 12 testimony, and it calls for speculation. It's 13 outside the scope of his testimony and it calls for 14 speculation. 15 EXAMINER PARROT: Overruled. 16 Α. I don't know that by itself that would be 17 a sufficient condition to require an impairment 18 analysis. Impairment is a measure of present value 19 of the asset in relation to book value, not a 20 question of whether in any given short-run period the 21 asset is recovering its accounting costs. So that 2.2 would contribute to the likelihood that it would need 23 an impairment analysis, but it doesn't by itself 24 require one. 25 Ο. Okay. Very helpful answer. So for

1 purposes of doing an impairment analysis to determine 2 whether there is stranded plant costs you would not 3 look to a short-term period, correct? 4 Α. That's my understanding. 5 Yeah. And it would be unreasonable to Ο. 6 look exclusively at a short-term period for purposes 7 of determining whether or not there would be stranded 8 plant costs, right? 9 Sure, and it would also be unreasonable Α. 10 to look just at the RPM component or the capacity 11 price component of revenues for those assets. 12 Q. Precisely. What other revenue streams would you be looking at? 13 14 Well, there's other market revenues that Α. 15 might be available over a long period of time to 16 those assets that could contribute to their value. 17 Energy, ancillary services. 18 Energy sales? Ο. 19 Α. Sure. 20 The words "ancillary services" get thrown Q. 21 around a lot. What are ancillary services? Ancillary services are payments from the 2.2 Α. 23 RTO to the generators for providing various kinds of 24 grid support adjustments to their operations, voltage 25 support, load following, regulation, black start,

1 things like that.

2 Q. Okay. And are there options under PJM's 3 market model for entities that can supply ancillary 4 services to be compensated on a cost-based 5 methodology? 6 There may be for some components, voltage Α. support and black start may fall into that category. 7 8 Ο. Are there opportunities for suppliers of 9 ancillary services to receive more than their 10 embedded cost in the way of compensation? 11 Well, ancillary services as a rule are Α. 12 fairly low in value relative to the embedded cost of 13 the generation that provides them, but relative to 14 the components of the generation that are diverted to 15 supply ancillary services it's certainly possible you 16 could recover all of your embedded costs on a portion 17 of your generation that's providing those services. 18 Is it also possible to recover more than Ο. 19 the allocable embedded costs associated with 20 providing those services? 21 Conceivably, sure, if it's a market-based Α. 2.2 ancillary price. 23 So we have ancillary services and my Ο. 24 recollection is there may be seven or so of them. 25 That's about right. Α.

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1	Q. If Ohio Power and Columbus & Southern
2	were being compensated on an embedded cost
3	methodology for capacity, would it be consistent with
4	your notion of just and reasonable if they received
5	more than embedded costs for other products that are
6	produced by the generator? Like energy and ancillary
7	services.
8	THE WITNESS: Can I hear the question
9	again?
10	(Record read.)
11	A. So can you be a little more specific
12	here, do you mean on average? For shopping
13	customers? For nonshopping customers?
14	Q. Sure. Do you think it would be
15	appropriate for a generator to opportunistically use
16	an embedded cost methodology for one product provided
17	by a generator, say capacity, and then use
18	market-based pricing or above cost-based pricing for
19	the other products produced by the generator?
20	A. It would not necessarily be
21	opportunistic, no.
22	Q. But for impairment purposes, if we were
23	looking to see if a generating plant or a series of
24	plants were impaired in the sense that some of the
25	costs would be stranded, it would be your view that

959 1 it would be necessary to look at all the potential revenue streams available from the use of those 2 3 plants over a lengthy period of time. 4 Yes, that's my understanding of the Α. 5 impairment test as a general concept. 6 Have you assisted companies in doing an 0. 7 impairment test? 8 Α. Not as a formal matter for accounting 9 purposes. I've certainly looked at the value of assets in relation to their booked costs. 10 11 Okay. And for purposes of looking at the Ο. 12 value of assets in relationship to their booked 13 costs, how would you go about determining the value 14 of the assets? 15 Α. The market value? 16 Ο. You said "value." I asked you "value." 17 Would you use the market value? 18 Well, it's part of the -- for an Α. 19 impairment test it's part of the test but it's not 20 the whole test. 21 Okay. So if the market value is above Ο. 2.2 the book or embedded cost value, then there wouldn't 23 be an impairment, right? 24 Α. Correct. 25 All right. So for purposes of estimating Q.

1 the market value would you also look at all the 2 potential revenue streams available from that utilization of that asset? 3 4 Α. Generally, yes, you look at all the sources of value. 5 6 And so, again, we would look at capacity, 0. 7 energy, ancillary services, revenues in the case of 8 an electric generating plant, right? 9 That is correct. Α. Yes. 10 And the valuation, market-based valuation Q. 11 of the assets would also be done over a long period 12 of time, correct? 13 Typically that's the case, yes. Α. 14 And you would look for things like the Ο. 15 potential for life extension for generating assets, 16 for example. 17 Α. This is getting a little close to the 18 edge of my knowledge, but my belief is that 19 contingent value is not generally recognized in 20 impairment tests, that it's a little too speculative 21 to incorporate. Although there may be such value, 2.2 they're more likely to reflect contingent loss 23 potential than contingent gain potential. 24 Ο. All right. Now, based on the FERC Form 1 25 documents that I've given you that have been marked

1 as IEU Exhibit No. 114 and 115, it's clear to you that beginning in 2001 at least AEP Ohio discontinued 2 a regulatory accounting for the generation portion of 3 4 its business and that discontinuance continues 5 through today. 6 That appears to be the case. Α. 7 Q. And based upon IEU Exhibit 115 and the 8 second paragraph that I gave you, once that type of 9 accounting is discontinued, the value that can be 10 held on the books for generating plants is subject to 11 an impairment test, correct? 12 Α. Yes, we've agreed on that. 13 Based upon what you know from the Ο. accounting rules, is AEP Ohio obligated to 14 15 periodically conduct an impairment test? 16 You know, I don't recall the standards, Α. but I suspect they require regular or periodic review 17 18 of that. 19 So if one were trying to figure out if Q. 20 RPM pricing would result in stranding embedded costs 21 associated with generating plants of AEP Ohio, we 2.2 might ask AEP Ohio to provide the impairment test, 23 right? The results of the test. 24 Α. If you were trying to do a stranded cost 25 analysis for all time, yes, that would be helpful.

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1	Q. Okay. Did you ask AEP Ohio for whether
2	it conducts an impairment test, and if so, whether
3	they would provide you with the results of the
4	impairment test?
5	A. No. It was not part of my testimony.
6	Q. So this, again, we're back to the
7	framework of your testimony which really involved the
8	binary analysis, should it be embedded costs or RPM
9	for a relatively short period of time, right?
10	A. Yes, that's right, for the next three
11	years.
12	Q. You are a witness in what us Ohio folks
13	call the ESP 2 as a modified case for AEP Ohio,
14	correct?
15	A. Correct.
16	Q. And as part of that responsibility you've
17	been subjected to our wonderful discovery process?
18	A. Yes.
19	Q. Okay. And is it true that you, in the
20	discovery process as you understand it, parties to a
21	proceeding have the opportunity to present what we
22	call interrogatories to elicit information or
23	requests for production of documents?
24	A. Of course.
25	Q. And you are aware, are you not, that

963 1 there have been a series of interrogatories put to 2 AEP Ohio in the ESP 2 modified proceeding, correct? 3 Α. Yes. 4 Have you been reviewing some of that Ο. 5 discovery? 6 Really not much. One or two questions Α. were directed at me and I reviewed those of course. 7 8 MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honor, I've just 9 handed out a document, on the top of it it has Ohio 10 Power Company's Responses to the Office of the Ohio 11 Consumers' Counsel's Discovery Requests, PUCO Case 12 11-346-EL-SSO and 11-348-EL-SSO Modified ESP First 13 Set, and I would ask that it be marked as IEU Exhibit 14 116. 15 EXAMINER PARROT: So marked. 16 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 17 Ο. Sir, do you have what has been marked as TEU Exhibit 116? 18 19 Α. I do. 20 Would you turn to interrogatory 1-010? Q. 21 I'm sorry the pages are not numbered, so -- for some 2.2 reason we're not smart enough to do that. 23 I have it. 110? Oh, 1-010. Α. 24 Ο. Yes, that's correct, I'm sorry. 25 Α. Yes, I have it.

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1	Q. And do you see there that there's a
2	question from the Office of Consumers' Counsel
3	related to stranded costs?
4	A. Correct.
5	Q. Because of the cessation of cost-based
6	regulation for generation in Ohio. Right?
7	A. Yes, this is referring to whether the
8	company previously sought stranded costs.
9	Q. And am I correct that in the company's
10	response it refers to the same cases, at least two of
11	the same cases that were on the front of
12	Mr. Forrester's testimony that we discussed earlier?
13	A. Yes, the first bullet refers to cases
14	1729 and 1730-EL-ETP and those are the cases in
15	Mr. Forrester's testimony.
16	Q. And I would like you to go to
17	interrogatory 1-012, please.
18	A. Okay. I have it.
19	MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, at this point
20	I'd just interpose an additional objection. These
21	interrogatories are from a different case. The
22	witness has not indicated that he had any role in the
23	preparation of the responses. In fact, the
24	interrogatory responses themselves indicate in each
25	case that those responsible are persons other than

1 this witness, and so I think it's inappropriate to 2 question him about the interrogatories themselves. If Mr. Randazzo wants to ask us whether 3 4 these are statements made by the company in the other 5 case, we'd agree -- we'd agree to that. They appear 6 to be authentic. Their relevance may be a separate matter, but using this witness to read portions of 7 8 the interrogatories into the record is not 9 appropriate. 10 MR. RANDAZZO: Well, if counsel will 11 stipulate that in response to OCC's question or 12 interrogatory that has the company's written down the 13 value, i.e., taken an accounting loss due to an 14 impairment of value, of any of the assets which it 15 plans to transfer to its new generating affiliate, 16 that the company responded after the objection "In 17 the third quarter 2011, the OPCo generation assets 18 were tested for recoverability in accordance with 19 Accounting Standard Codification 360, Property, Plant 20 and Equipment. The test indicated that the 21 undiscounted cash flows exceeded the carrying value 2.2 and impairment was not applicable." 23 If you'll stipulate to that, I'll 24 withdraw the question. 25 MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, this has nothing

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966 1 to do -- these responses have nothing to do with this 2 witness's testimony in this case; I object on that basis. It's inappropriate to be questioning him 3 4 about these matters. 5 EXAMINER PARROT: The objection is 6 overruled. 7 THE WITNESS: So is there a question 8 pending? 9 EXAMINER PARROT: I believe so. 10 MR. RANDAZZO: Rather than go back to the 11 question I can -- as long as we can proceed without further objections to the line of questioning. Let 12 13 me see if I can restate it. 14 (By Mr. Randazzo) Do you have before you Q. 15 the interrogatory 1-012? 16 Α. I do. 17 Ο. And am I correct that in that 18 interrogatory the company, Ohio Power, which now at 19 this point includes Columbus Southern and Ohio Power, 20 was asked the question about write-downs related to 21 assets which the companies plan to transfer to its 2.2 new generating affiliate? 23 Yes, that's the question. Α. 24 Ο. And am I correct that in the answer Ohio 25 Power, which now includes Columbus Southern and Ohio

Power, after objecting indicated that there was an impairment analysis conducted in accordance with the Accounting Standard Codification identified in the answer and the test indicated that the undiscounted cash flows exceeded the carrying value and impairment was not applicable.

A. I see that. It doesn't tell us what the undiscounted cash flows were so we don't know what was assumed as to what the pricing of capacity would be, for instance, in the test, but it certainly passed whatever test they did.

Q. Right. Now, I'd like you to help me understand the significance, the accounting significance of an impaired asset. Let's say that I had an asset on the books recorded at a hundred dollars. I'm a publicly traded company, so let's make it a billion.

18 I've got an asset on my books, a billion 19 dollars. I do an impairment test and I discover that 20 the value that I have on my books is overstated by 21 half. It's only worth 500 million. Are you with me? 2.2 Α. Yes. 23 That's the left-hand side of the balance Ο. 24 sheet, right? Correct.

A. The asset is, yes.

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1	Q. Okay. So what happens once I do my
2	impairment analysis and discover that the billion
3	dollars is overstated by half, what happens on the
4	left-hand side of the balance sheet? What
5	adjustments do I need to make?
6	A. Well, if it's an asset that requires
7	being marked to market, then it has to be marked down
8	to a lower value.
9	Q. Okay. That was my understanding. Now,
10	it's called a "balance sheet" for a reason, right?
11	A. Yes.
12	Q. And the reason it's called a balance
13	sheet is that when you have an impaired asset on the
14	left-hand side like the one we just talked about
15	where the value has been reduced by half, there's a
16	corresponding adjustment on right side of the balance
17	sheet, correct?
18	A. Yes.
19	Q. So what would the adjustment where
20	would you make the adjustment on the right side of
21	the balance sheet?
22	A. Well, my recollection is you would take
23	an extraordinary loss which would reduce your net
24	income which would reduce your retained earnings
25	which would reduce your equity and that would balance

1 the balance sheet. 2 Ο. Right. So the extraordinary loss that 3 you just described actually shows up on the income 4 statement, right? 5 Starts out there, right. Α. 6 0. And then because the extraordinary loss produces or may produce negative net income, the 7 8 consequence on the balance sheet is a reduction in 9 common equity, correct? 10 Α. Yes. 11 Ο. All right. 12 Α. The income statement is folded into the 13 balance sheet. 14 And the reason that there's a reduction Q. 15 in common equity is because it's the shareholders of 16 the firm that are the owners of the residual value of the firm, right? The common shareholders. 17 18 Α. Right. 19 So in this case, in the case of AEP Ohio Ο. 20 the adjustment to the retained earnings or common 21 equity balance that we just discussed resulting from 2.2 an impairment of an asset that caused that asset's 23 value to drop in half from a billion to 500 million 24 would reduce the value of the parent's equity 25 ownership interest in Ohio Power, correct?

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1	A. If AEP Ohio was the company that had the
2	impaired asset, their income would fall and that
3	would be folded up to the consolidated parent, but of
4	course they didn't find they had an impairment.
5	Subject to your premise that's the way it would work.
6	Q. Okay. Now, is there a separate
7	impairment analysis required at the parent?
8	A. No. That would be you've already
9	captured all the value in the first analysis, you
10	don't want to do it twice.
11	Q. Okay. All right. Let's talk about the
12	balance sheet of the parent and the same hypothetical
13	that I gave you. If the asset value of Ohio Power
14	drops in half from a billion to 500 million and that
15	is reflected on the right-hand side of the balance
16	sheet by a corresponding reduction in equity, the
17	dollar amount of equity, how does that flow through
18	to the parent corporation?
19	A. Well, it depends on the nature of the
20	organization of the company and how it does its
21	consolidation, but as a rough rule, when companies
22	are wholly owned, they are aggregated up to the
23	parent company's accounts, that is the parent company
24	reports them as a sum of the subsidiary balance
25	sheets, netting out cross-corporate assets that are

1 offsetting.

2 So it's basically just adding up the 3 pieces and not double counting anything. 4 Ο. All right. But in the case of Ohio 5 Power, if there was an impaired asset, if generating 6 plants, the book value of generating plants was worth less in the market than stated on the books, based 7 8 upon your understanding of the discontinuation of 9 regulatory accounting, it would be necessary to do an 10 impairment analysis at that point; is that right? 11 Well, you assumed in your conclusion that Α. 12 they're worth less than the books in the first place. 13 You do an impairment analysis to find that out. 14 Ο. Okay. 15 And that depends on what you assume to be Α. 16 the character of the revenues and market 17 opportunities and so on that prevail in the future, 18 so it's not just a function of current conditions or 19 market prices, it's really a function of all the 20 contracts they have, the cost structures, the whole 21 works. 2.2 Ο. The whole works. All right. Okay. 23 Would risk management strategies that have been 24 undertaken come into play for purposes of the 25 impairment analysis? In other words in --

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1	A. Generally I would say no, but I'm not
2	positive that's there are some gray areas as to
3	when a risk management arrangement is tied to the
4	assets as opposed to being tied to a risk management
5	subsidiary operation.
6	Q. Do you know what "hedging" is?
7	A. Sure.
8	Q. Do you know what hedging is in the
9	wholesale electricity market context?
10	A. Of course.
11	Q. What is hedging in the wholesale electric
12	utility context?
13	A. Hedging is locking down a future price
14	for a revenue item or a cost item so that it is known
15	before the fact of being incurred.
16	Q. And how far out can you hedge your
17	position in the wholesale electric market?
18	A. Depends on what you want to hedge.
19	Q. Well, let's say I want to lock in a
20	revenue stream associated with the energy production
21	I have in my generating plants. How far out can I
22	lock in a is it possible to do bilateral contracts
23	for 20 years? Ten years?
24	A. In principle it's extremely unlikely you
25	would find a counterparty interested in that, but

973 there's nothing that per se would prevent it. 1 2 Q. Are you aware of whether or not AEP Service Corporation on behalf of the AEP Operating 3 4 Companies has entered into long-term 10- to 20-year 5 full requirements contracts with other utilities? 6 I don't know. They may have. Α. 7 0. But if we were doing an impairment 8 analysis of the type that you described, we would 9 look at the revenue streams available from those 10 long-term contracts in addition to the revenue 11 streams that might be more obvious from participation 12 in things like PJM's market, right? 13 My general understanding is that there Α. 14 are circumstances when that would be true and some 15 when it might not be true. The question of whether a 16 hedge is tied to the assets that are being evaluated 17 is a fairly technical one and one of some judgment 18 and occasional controversy. 19 You can certainly enter hedges that are 20 independent of specific assets and, in fact, that's 21 more common than not because most companies that 2.2 hedge their generation fleet do it at a portfolio 23 level and include lots of nongeneration assets, lots 24 of physical assets in their asset mix. 25 Q. Right.

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1	A. So it's not easy to isolate, but under
2	certain conditions if a forward position is deemed to
3	be tied to specific assets, then it would be
4	incorporated in the impairment analysis I believe.
5	Q. Okay.
6	A. This is way beyond you should really
7	be asking an accountant or a CPA about this.
8	Q. Okay. I appreciate that. We have one
9	testifying shortly.
10	A. Okay. There's your guy.
11	Q. In the PJM structure, whether I'm an FRR
12	entity or not, I have if I'm a load-serving
13	entity, I have a capacity obligation, correct?
14	A. If I'm a load-serving entity?
15	Q. Right.
16	A. You have an obligation to buy capacity.
17	You don't have an obligation to supply capacity.
18	Q. So that's interesting. If I'm in the
19	RPM market, do I have to offer, and I'm not an FRR,
20	do I have to offer my generating capacity into the
21	RPM market?
22	A. If you have generation assets that you
23	want to place in the PJM energy markets, yes, you
24	must.
25	Q. Yeah. So if you're an RPM entity, you
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don't have the choice of not offering your generating 1 2 assets into the capacity auction; is that correct? 3 Α. Well, if you're an RPM entity, you 4 already have offered them in, right, that's what it 5 means to be an RPM entity. 6 Right. And if you're an FRR entity you 0. do not have to offer your generating assets into the 7 8 RPM auction. 9 That is my understanding. Α. 10 If you know, do you have to be an FRR Q. 11 entity or, excuse me, strike that. 12 If you know, do you have to own 13 generation to be an FRR entity? 14 I don't believe you have to literally own Α. 15 the iron in the ground as the person who accounts for 16 it as the equity holder on their books, but you have 17 to have the rights to the capacity benefit of sufficient assets to serve your FRR obligation. 18 19 And do you know who the FRR entity is in Q. 20 the case of the AEP Operating Companies? 21 I haven't reviewed their specific Α. 2.2 contract, but I believe it's the five companies 23 combined in the past, and it will be four companies in the future. 24 25 Q. So you're not aware of anything that

suggests that AEP Ohio specifically as a stand-alone 1 2 entity has selected the FRR option; is that correct? I'm not the best witness for this, but 3 Α. 4 that's my general understanding, that the FRR 5 obligation is to the group of operating companies, not just Ohio. 6 Now, in the PJM structure what types of 7 Ο. 8 resources can qualify as capacity? 9 Well, pretty much anything that's firmly Α. 10 deliverable to the area or reliably available to 11 displace firm delivery needs. 12 Ο. So the last part of your statement would 13 include things like energy efficiency? 14 Yes, certain kinds. Α. 15 And customers who are willing to Q. 16 discontinue their use of electricity in response to a 17 request by PJM otherwise known as the demand response 18 part of capacity resources. 19 Yes, controllable or curtailable loads Α. 20 can be capacity resources if they choose to 21 participate. 2.2 Ο. Well, if I am a customer and I have an 23 ability to reduce using electricity in response to a 24 request by PJM, and I have selected -- I have been 25 selected in the RPM process as a capacity resource,

977 1 what price do I receive? Do I receive the RPM price? 2 Do I receive some embedded price? What price do I 3 receive? 4 Α. You are paid at the RPM price. You're 5 part of the capacity mix. 6 And that would be true even if I'm a 0. customer of Columbus Southern or Ohio Power, right? 7 8 A retail customer. 9 As far as I know. I haven't studied Α. 10 specific customers in AEP's territory but I believe 11 that's correct. 12 Ο. Okay. And in that circumstance -- strike 13 that. 14 Where a customer with a demand response 15 capability is being compensated based on RPM, do you 16 believe that the capacity resource associated with the demand response is receiving just and reasonable 17 18 compensation? 19 It's not really a concept that applies to Α. 20 a customer willingly entering into a contract of its 21 own volition to do so. They must deem it adequate, 2.2 but it's very rare for people to think of it as just 23 and reasonable when they're voluntarily doing 24 something. 25 Well, AEP Ohio, as you understand it, Ο.

1 voluntarily elected FRR, right? 2 Α. Yes. 3 Ο. So would you differentiate your 4 determination as to what a just and reasonable 5 outcome is based upon the extent to which the entity 6 volunteered for the outcome? 7 Α. No. I'm saying just and reasonableness 8 is a regulatory concept that has to do with 9 comparative rates and continuity of rates, and all 10 sorts of political and other kind of economic 11 considerations and willingness to enter a contract to 12 consume something privately is just done on whether 13 or not you think you would enjoy doing so for the 14 money involved, and you may be extremely glad to do 15 it or barely willing to do it. So there's extreme 16 differences in benefit to the participants and just 17 and reasonable is not normally one of the 18 considerations. 19 MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, if I might 20 inquire, we've been going with this witness for 21 approaching three and a quarter hours, it's almost 12:30 now. At what point might it be a good idea to 2.2 23 take a break for everyone's interests? 24 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Randazzo, are you 25 close to concluding at this point?

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1	MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, I hope so.
2	But I could it probably is going to take me a
3	while to go through my testimony not my testimony,
4	just to clean up the stuff and make sure I'm not
5	duplicating anything that's been done already. I can
6	proceed, I don't think I've got more than 20 minutes,
7	maybe a half an hour left.
8	EXAMINER PARROT: All right. In light of
9	that, let's take a ten-minute break.
10	(Recess taken.)
11	EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the
12	record.
13	Mr. Randazzo.
14	MR. RANDAZZO: Thank you, your Honors.
15	Q. (By Mr. Randazzo) Mr. Graves, in the case
16	of an FRR entity, that entity in the resource
17	adequacy context for PJM would be required to
18	identify the generating units that are part of its
19	plan to satisfy its resource adequacy obligation,
20	correct?
21	A. I think that's generally true, yes.
22	Q. And if one of those generating resources
23	happens to not be available for some reason, the FRR
24	entity has the opportunity to substitute capacity,
25	correct?

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1	A. I think that's right. Assuming it has
2	other available capacity.
3	Q. Or it can buy capacity in the market,
4	correct?
5	A. Yes.
6	Q. And, again, the capacity resources that
7	an FRR entity can pledge to satisfy its resource
8	adequacy obligation do not have to be generating
9	assets that are owned by the FRR entity, correct?
10	A. That's my understanding.
11	Q. Right. So in the event that the FRR
12	entity has generating resources committed as part of
13	the capacity plan that's submitted to PJM and the
14	resources don't show up for work at the time when PJM
15	calls upon them, am I correct that the FRR entity
16	would pay a penalty that is equal to 1.2 times the
17	RPM determined price?
18	A. I understand that to be PJM's general
19	policy for nonperformance in the RPM market. I'm not
20	sure if it's identical for FRR but I wouldn't be
21	surprised.
22	Q. Okay. So at least with regard to the FRR
23	entity and the non-FRR entity, the structure for the
24	penalties, based on your understanding, would be the
25	same.

I have no firsthand knowledge but I'll 1 Α. 2 accept that. 3 Now, in your testimony you talk about Ο. 4 harm to AEP Ohio associated with using an RPM-based 5 capacity price. Where you have that discussion in 6 your testimony are you talking about financial harm? 7 Α. Sure. 8 Ο. Okay. And for purposes of determining 9 financial harm would you look at things like whether the value that's been recorded on the books has been 10 11 impaired? 12 Α. Not necessarily because the impairment 13 analysis on the books wouldn't, I think, generally 14 assume or might not assume that the pricing that the 15 assets were going to experience was the RPM price. 16 So I think this is a contingency that would not be 17 the one that is used in the impairment analysis. 18 Okay. Are you aware that in Ohio there's Ο. 19 an opportunity for utilities to seek rate relief in 20 circumstances where they're exposed to financial 21 harm? 2.2 Α. I'm not aware of that. 23 Okay. Fair enough. Q. 24 I'd like to turn to page 112 or, excuse 25 me, IEU Exhibit 112, again, which was the prospectus.

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1	A. Okay. I have it.	
2	Q. Page S-2. The second full paragraph on	
3	that page.	
4	A. Okay.	
5	Q. At least for purposes of this prospectus	
6	at the time what AEP American Electric Power	
7	Company, Inc. was telling prospective investors is	
8	the regulated holding company will own integrated	
9	utilities and Ohio and Texas transmission and	
10	distribution assets, right?	
11	A. I see that.	
12	Q. And then the unregulated holding company	
13	would own the Ohio and Texas generation assets, among	
14	other things, correct?	
15	A. Correct.	
16	Q. So from those two sentences, again, is it	
17	consistent with your understanding about the	
18	organizational charts that we talked about	
19	previously, that the distribution assets would be	
20	placed into and transmission assets would be	
21	placed into a separate company?	
22	A. Well, they would be separate from the	
23	unregulated holding company according to this.	
24	Q. Right.	
25	A. But there is also integrated utilities.	

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1	Q. Are you aware of any restrictions in Ohio
2	on the ability of an electric utility to transfer
3	distribution assets?
4	A. Not specifically. Generally regulatory
5	review is involved in changing ownership and title of
6	regulated assets but I don't know the Ohio rules.
7	Q. All right. Let's assume that the
8	structure that's described in the prospectus is the
9	one that we are dealing with, in other words, that
10	AEP Ohio is actually a wires company.
11	A. You mean assume that today or
12	Q. Yes.
13	A. Okay.
14	Q. Assume that. In that case back up.
15	Are you familiar with corporate
16	separation requirements? Codes of conduct that apply
17	to electric utilities?
18	A. Generally, sure.
19	Q. Have you reviewed the corporate
20	separation requirements here in Ohio or the corporate
21	separation plan that was approved for AEP?
22	A. No, sir.
23	Q. Have you reviewed AEP corporate's
24	structure from the standpoint of the business
25	segments that are under the AEP umbrella, and by

984 1 "business segments" I mean generation, transmission, 2 distribution business segments? 3 MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, at this point 4 I'll interpose another objection. The topic that 5 corporate separation, what was proposed back in 6 2001 --MR. RANDAZZO: I'll withdraw the 7 8 question. 9 MR. CONWAY: -- and what is currently 10 being proposed is beyond the scope of his testimony. 11 MR. RANDAZZO: I'll withdraw the 12 question. 13 Now, if I'm an FRR entity and I submit a Ο. capacity plan to PJM that's accepted by PJM, when the 14 15 generating unit is not called upon by PJM to provide 16 capacity, I can use it for other things, right? I 17 can sell energy from the unit. 18 Well, the energy use of the unit is a Α. 19 little distinct from the capacity use of the unit in 20 general. The units are dispatched into the PJM 21 market which determines their energy production and 2.2 their capacity value is inherent in their reliability 23 and their being earmarked for particular customers' 24 support. That doesn't govern the energy usage of the 25 asset.

985 1 Ο. Okay. Are you familiar with ledger 2 accounting? 3 Α. Sure. 4 Q. What is your understanding of ledger 5 accounting? That's the typical process whereby 6 Α. 7 accounting entries for debits and credits are 8 recognized over the course of time in a year to 9 ultimately create the income and balance sheet 10 statements. 11 And within a holding company structure Ο. 12 would there be ledger accounting to reflect 13 transactions between various business segments within 14 the holding company, based on your experience? 15 It's not something I've reviewed but it Α. 16 wouldn't be -- to the extent there are intercompany 17 transactions there would be ledger recognition of 18 those. 19 MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, I'm handing 20 out a document, its case caption is application of 21 Ohio Power Company and Columbus Southern Power 2.2 Company for certain findings under 15 United States 23 Code Section 729 and 17CFR Section 250.53. And I 24 would ask that it be marked for identification 25 purposes as IEU Exhibit 117.

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1	EXAMINER PARROT: So marked.
2	(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
3	Q. Sir, do you have what has been marked for
4	identification purposes as IEU Exhibit 117 before
5	you?
6	A. I do.
7	Q. Are you familiar with the term "exempt
8	wholesale generators"?
9	A. Broadly.
10	Q. Will you accept, subject to check, that
11	this is an application that Ohio Power and Columbus $\&$
12	Southern made to this Commission in Case No.
13	01-3289-EL-UNC?
14	MR. CONWAY: And once again, your Honor,
15	I object to a line of questions relating to this 2001
16	corporate separation proceeding component to a
17	corporate separation proceeding. There is no
18	relevance that I can see to this proceeding. This is
19	the moribund proceeding from 2001 and the witness has
20	already indicated that he's not familiar with Ohio
21	Power Company's or the Columbus Southern Power
22	Company's or combined company's corporate separation
23	status let alone the history of it. So I think it's
24	inappropriate.
25	EXAMINER PARROT: The objection is

1 overruled. 2 Ο. Will you accept that this is the application that I described earlier that was 3 4 submitted by Ohio Power and Columbus Southern in the 5 case I referenced earlier, the case number's on the 6 front page? 7 Α. It does appear to be a request to 8 redesignate or designate certain assets of EWG 9 assets. 10 And an exempt wholesale generator was an Q. 11 entity that could be formed under the Public Utility 12 Holding Company Act; is that correct? 13 I don't know the legal auspices under Α. 14 which it was authorized. 15 Would you turn to page 5, please. Q. 16 Α. Okay. 17 Ο. At the bottom of page 5 the paragraph that is numbered 11, where it begins with the word 18 19 "The" right before you turn to page 6. 20 Okay, I have it. Α. 21 Do you see that Columbus & Southern and Ο. 2.2 Ohio Power there are saying that the purpose of this 23 application is to satisfy the requirements of Senate 24 Bill 3 to separate control of the generating plants 25 from the regulated wires business?

988 1 Yes, that's the text, or a paraphrasing Α. 2 of the text. 3 And they, Columbus & Southern there Ο. 4 describes in the next sentence the purpose of the 5 corporate separation request, right? 6 Well, it's a purpose. It doesn't say it Α. 7 is the purpose. 8 Ο. Okay. Now, attached to the document that 9 I've handed to you is a Form U-1 which is described 10 on page 8, correct? 11 There's a reference to Form U-1 in the Α. 12 top of paragraph 16 on page 8. 13 And the Form U-1 that is referenced there Ο. 14 is attached to the back of the document that I handed 15 you, it's about maybe a quarter of the way in. 16 Yes, about five or six pages later Α. 17 there's an amendment to No. 2 to Form U-1 and that appears to be a significant part of the remainder of 18 19 the document. 20 All right. And before we get to the U-1, 0. 21 after the text of the application that ends at page 9 2.2 there is an Exhibit 1 that lists the generating 23 facilities that are the subject of the application; is that correct? 24 25 Α. Yes, that's what they appear to be.

	989
1	Q. All right. And on the first page is CPL.
2	A. Correct.
3	Q. And that would be a $$ is that the Texas
4	operating company?
5	A. I think that's right.
6	Q. Okay.
7	A. Certainly the plants are that are beside
8	it.
9	Q. And the next page would be for Columbus $\&$
10	Southern listing the generating assets to be
11	transferred to the EWG, right?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. And then the Ohio Power generating
14	facilities.
15	A. Correct.
16	Q. Okay. Now, if we would go to the U-1 and
17	the glossary of terms.
18	A. All right. I'm in it.
19	Q. First page. Do you see CSP EDC?
20	A. Yes.
21	Q. And there would it be correct to say that
22	the CSP EDC is defined as a to-be formed entity to
23	hold the transmission and distribution assets of
24	Columbus Southern Power? Right?
25	A. Yes. A to-be formed EDC, or energy

990 1 delivery company. 2 Q. Right. And if we turn to the next page, 3 we'll see a similar definition for Ohio Power EDC. 4 Α. Correct. And we also see a definition of Ohio 5 Q. 6 Power PGC which is what Ohio Power would be after the 7 transfer of the distribution and transmission assets, 8 correct? 9 That's the power generating company, yes. Α. 10 Q. That's correct. 11 Right? 12 Α. Yes. Correct. And on item 1 of the U-1 after the 13 Ο. 14 glossary of terms --15 Α. "Description of the Proposed Transaction"? 16 17 Q. Right. 18 A. Okay. 19 See the paragraph that has the two Q. 20 bulleted items? 21 Yes. I'm sorry, I do see that. Α. 2.2 Q. There again, do you see the plan to have 23 the generation activities in the power generation 24 company and the transmission and distribution 25 activities in the distribution utilities, right? Or

991 1 distribution companies. 2 Α. I see that. 3 Ο. Turn to page 6 of the U-1. Now we have a 4 number at the bottom of the page. 5 Α. Okay. 6 Do you see there that Columbus Southern Ο. Power and -- the U-1 is describing that Columbus 7 8 Southern Power and Ohio Power are going to make 9 transfers to comply with the Ohio statute that 10 provides for competitive retail electric service 11 commonly referred to as Senate Bill 3? 12 Α. I see that. 13 Right? And it goes on to state that "The Ο. 14 statute directs vertically integrated electric utilities that offer retail electric service in Ohio 15 16 to separate their generating and other competitive operations (such as aggregation, marketing, and 17 18 brokering) and related assets from their transmission 19 and distribution operations and assets." Do you see 20 that? 21 I do. Α. 2.2 Ο. And then the next line, the next sentence 23 says that on September 28th, 2000, the PUCO 24 approved corporate separation plans that were filed 25 to explain how they will comply with Senate Bill 3.

	992
1	Correct?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. All right. Will you accept, subject to
4	check, that this application was approved by the
5	Public Utilities Commission of Ohio?
6	A. Sure. But I have no firsthand knowledge,
7	so just taking your word for it.
8	Q. Subject to check.
9	A. Okay.
10	MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, I would like
11	a document that has the same case caption as the
12	prior exhibit but is titled "Columbus Southern Power
13	Company's and Ohio Power Company's Memorandum Contra
14	Ohio Consumers' Counsel's Motion to Deny Application
15	For EWG Status," and the remainder of the language
16	there.
17	EXAMINER PARROT: So marked.
18	(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
19	Q. Sir, do you have before you what has been
20	marked as IEU Exhibit 118?
21	A. Okay.
22	Q. Would you accept, subject to check, that
23	this is a memorandum that Columbus & Southern and
24	Ohio Power filed in response to the efforts by our
25	residential consumer advocate to participate in the

	993
1	EWG proceeding that was initiated by the application
2	that is IEU Exhibit 117?
3	MR. CONWAY: Your Honors, I again
4	interpose an objection to the line of questions
5	asking this witness about a document that obviously
6	he's never seen before and then proceeding to ask him
7	questions about whether or not certain sections of
8	the exhibit say what is in the exhibit.
9	MR. RANDAZZO: I have one question, your
10	Honor.
11	EXAMINER PARROT: Please proceed,
12	Mr. Randazzo.
13	Q. Will you accept that, subject to check?
14	MR. RANDAZZO: One question after the
15	subject to check.
16	A. Okay.
17	Q. Turn to page 6 and the first full
18	paragraph on that page.
19	A. "OCC seems to believe"?
20	Q. Yes.
21	A. Okay.
22	Q. Would you read that?
23	A. Okay. Not
24	Q. To yourself.
25	A. All right.

	994
1	Okay, I've read it.
2	Q. All right. Do you see there that
3	Columbus Southern and Ohio Power were referring to
4	requirements in the Ohio Revised Code, namely Section
5	4928.38?
6	A. Yes, I see that.
7	Q. And asserting that, as a result of
8	statutory law of Ohio, that consumers do not continue
9	to have a hold on generating plants owned by
10	companies?
11	A. Yes, they are citing the excerpt from the
12	Ohio Revised Code to counter what they described as
13	the OCC's position.
14	Q. For purposes of your testimony, sir, were
15	you aware that Ohio Revised Code Section 4928.38
16	states, as Columbus and Ohio Power state here, that
17	an electric utility that receives transition revenues
18	shall be wholly responsible for how to use those
19	revenues and wholly responsible for whether it is in
20	a competitive position after the market development
21	period? Were you aware of that provision in Ohio
22	law?
23	A. I have not reviewed the code or the
24	transition revenues that AEP did or did not receive.
25	Q. Okay. So you weren't aware of this

995 1 specific provision in Ohio law, you answered it more 2 generally. 3 Α. Correct, I was not aware. 4 Q. Turn to page 7. 5 I have it. Α. 6 First full paragraph. 0. 7 Α. Okay. 8 Ο. Am I correct there that in that first 9 full paragraph the plain language indicates that 10 Columbus Southern and Ohio Power are responding to 11 the Consumers' Counsel's claim that Senate Bill 3 12 only deals with retail electric service? 13 Yes, that's the essence of the paragraph. Α. 14 And it goes on to explain why Columbus Ο. 15 Southern and Ohio Power believe OCC is wrong. 16 Α. Yes. 17 Ο. And then goes on to discuss the 18 separation that was approved by the Commission of the 19 company's noncompetitive wires business from the 20 competitive generation business, right? 21 I'm sorry, I didn't -- can you restate Α. 2.2 the question? I only heard the premise, I didn't 23 hear the question part. 24 Yes. I'm sorry. The paragraph goes on Ο. to discussion the Commission's approved separation of 25

996 1 the noncompetitive wires business from the 2 competitive generation business, right? 3 Α. The last sentence is about that, yes. 4 Ο. Now, the next paragraph on that page --5 I thought we were just going MR. CONWAY: 6 to have one question back when I made my objection. 7 MR. RANDAZZO: Fair enough. Fair enough. 8 Ο. Are you aware of any commitments that 9 Columbus & Southern and Ohio Power made in 10 conjunction with the Commission's approval of the 11 application that is IEU Exhibit 117? I'm pretty sure the answer is no, but can 12 Α. 13 you remind me of which one is IEU 117? 14 Yeah, that would be the application in Ο. Case No. 01-3289-EL-UNC. 15 16 That's the EWG application? Α. 17 Ο. Yes. Yes, sir. 18 No, I have not -- I was not a party to Α. 19 that process nor have I reviewed its history or 20 documentation. 21 All right. But you indicated earlier Ο. 2.2 that contracts or commitments may affect your 23 conclusion about just and reasonable results, 24 correct? 25 That's a pretty imprecise paraphrasing of Α.

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1	my previous comments, but	
2	Q. Okay.	
3	A. Let's just say context matters.	
4	Q. Okay.	
5	MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, I would ask	
6	that a document that is a copy of a letter that was	
7	submitted in Case No. 01-3289 with AEP's logo on it	
8	be marked for identification purposes as IEU Exhibit	
9	119.	
10	EXAMINER PARROT: So marked.	
11	(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)	
12	Q. Sir, do you have before you what's been	
13	marked as IEU Exhibit 119?	
14	A. I do.	
15	MR. CONWAY: And, your Honors, again, I	
16	object to the line of questions on the same basis as	
17	before.	
18	EXAMINER PARROT: And your objection is	
19	noted and, again, overruled, Mr. Conway.	
20	Q. Would you turn to the last page of that	
21	document. By the way, do you know who Henry Fayne	
22	is?	
23	A. I don't.	
24	Q. F-a-y-n-e.	
25	A. I'm not familiar.	

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1	Q. Okay. Will you accept, subject to check,
2	that this is a letter that AEP filed in the case that
3	we've been discussing, the EWG case, on October the
4	8th, 2002?
5	A. Certainly it's stamped that date.
6	Q. Right. And there's another stamp on
7	there that indicates it was received by the Chairman
8	of the Commission on September the 23rd, 2002,
9	correct?
10	A. Correct.
11	Q. And the Chairman of the Commission is the
12	individual to whom the letter is addressed, right?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. Would you turn to the third page.
15	A. Okay.
16	Q. First full paragraph.
17	A. I see it.
18	Q. The last or the second sentence, also the
19	last sentence in that paragraph.
20	A. I see it.
21	Q. And there would you agree that American
22	Electric Power, Columbus Southern Power, and Ohio
23	Power are committing to not seek recovery through
24	higher rates to any consumers to compensate AEP,
25	Columbus Southern, and Ohio Power for any possible

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1	losses that may be sustained on the investments or
2	for an inadequate return on such investments?
3	MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, I would object
4	to asking this witness to opine about what AEP or
5	AEP Ohio was committing to do in 2002. He has no
6	basis for providing an opinion as to what the
7	commitment was
8	MR. RANDAZZO: Well, let me withdraw the
9	question.
10	MR. CONWAY: in 2002.
11	MR. RANDAZZO: See if we can speed this
12	up.
13	Q. Do you read the plain language there as
14	indicating that AEP, Columbus Southern, and Ohio
15	Power are making a commitment?
16	MR. CONWAY: Same objection.
17	EXAMINER PARROT: Overruled.
18	A. Yes. It's a conditional one not quite as
19	broad as the passage you read. As I read it it says
20	that under the condition that the cost of capital is
21	affected by this transaction they will not seek
22	adjustments for any shortfalls in the difference
23	between the requirements and their returns due to the
24	change in the cost of capital.
25	Q. Right.

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1	A. I don't know that it's broader than that.
2	Q. Okay. Would you turn to the first page
3	of the letter.
4	A. Of the letter?
5	Q. Yes.
6	A. Okay, I have it.
7	Q. Would you read the first paragraph to
8	yourself.
9	A. The numbered one under "Financial
10	arrangements"?
11	Q. No, the first paragraph of the letter
12	under "Dear Chairman Schriber."
13	A. Sure, I've read it.
14	Q. Does the plain language there indicate to
15	you that the letter is being written to confirm that
16	Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power and AEP's
17	intention is to require that the wires business
18	adhere to the financial arrangements portion of the
19	Commission's corporate separation? Do you see that?
20	A. Yes, I see that.
21	Q. Do you see the "Financial arrangements"
22	section?
23	A. I do.
24	Q. And I take it that American Electric
25	Power or Columbus Southern or Ohio Power did not

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bring this letter to your attention for purposes of 1 2 you preparing your testimony. I have not seen it before you gave it to 3 Α. 4 me now. 5 Just a couple more questions, I believe. Q. 6 If one were going to use an embedded cost methodology to establish rates, there are a variety of ways to 7 8 translate an embedded cost methodology into rates, 9 correct? 10 There are different patterns of cost Α. 11 recovery that are consistent with embedded cost 12 rates, if that's what you mean. 13 Right. And by "different patterns of Ο. cost recovery," you are referring to, are you not, 14 15 the differences between traditional cost-based 16 ratemaking which tended to front-end load the revenue requirement compared to a levelized approach, for 17 18 example? 19 Yes, that's a good example. Α. 20 And in the front-end loaded example Q. 21 option for implementing an embedded cost ratemaking 2.2 methodology, it tended to impose the greatest 23 responsibility on customers at the commencement of 24 the rates, right? 25 Α. That's true for a new asset. For an old

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1	asset it imposes the least responsibility, so it's a
2	blend over time.
3	Q. Right. Now, is the methodology, if you
4	know, is the methodology that you understand that
5	Ohio Power has used in this proceeding a levelized
6	front-end loaded or some other version of the
7	embedded cost methodology?
8	A. Are you referring to their ESP 2 or,
9	I'm sorry, to the basis for the 355?
10	Q. Yes, sir.
11	A. Well, I have not reviewed it closely, but
12	my understanding is that the calculations by
13	Dr. Pearce are based on the current net book value of
14	the assets as reported on a Form 1 which would be
15	generally a mid-life approach using front-end loaded
16	annualized carrying charges.
17	Q. Okay. So, in other words, the difference
18	between a front-end loaded approach and a levelized
19	approach deals with the effect of depreciation
20	principally, correct?
21	A. That's a big factor, yes.
22	Q. And in the levelized approach
23	depreciation is assumed to take place more evenly
24	during the life of the asset, correct?
25	A. Actually, no. Under conventional

1 approach the depreciation is even and under a 2 levelized approach the depreciation is back-end 3 loaded. 4 Back-end loaded, okay. And have you --Q. 5 you have made presentations to organizations like 6 NARUC, correct? 7 Α. Yes. 8 Ο. And am I correct that in the course of 9 making those presentations you have identified alternatives to traditional additional embedded cost 10 11 methodologies that produce different patterns? 12 Α. Yes, of the kind we just described. Right. And would I be correct that in 13 Ο. 14 the course of those presentations you have said that 15 front-end loading may be inefficient and inequitable 16 under some circumstances, noting that in competitive 17 markets assets more typically grow in value with 18 inflation, less obsolescence, economic depreciation, 19 generally back-end loaded? 20 Yes, I made that statement, I agree with Α. 21 it. It is circumstantial as to whether it is the 2.2 case or not but it can be true. 23 Yes. And when you say it's Ο. 24 circumstantial, one would need to look at the facts, 25 correct?

1004 1 Yes, that's right. Α. 2 MR. RANDAZZO: Thank you, you are a very 3 kind witness. I appreciate it. 4 At this point, your Honor, I'm done with 5 my cross-examination of the witness. 6 Thank you very much for your patience as 7 well. 8 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Kurtz. 9 MR. KURTZ: Thank you, your Honor. 10 MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, just a moment, 11 please, Mr. Kurtz. Your Honor it's now 1:30, we've 12 been going since a little after 9:00 o'clock. The 13 witness has been cooperative, I think it would be 14 appropriate to take a break to get lunch. 15 EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go off the 16 record. 17 (Discussion off the record.) 18 EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the 19 record. 20 21 CROSS-EXAMINATION 2.2 By Mr. Kurtz: 23 Good afternoon, Mr. Graves. The thrust Ο. 24 of your testimony, the purpose of it was to determine 25 whether or not the RPM or fully embedded cost was the

1 appropriate compensation to AEP for providing 2 capacity to CRES suppliers; is that correct? The purpose of my testimony is to 3 Α. Sure. 4 explain the reasons why embedded cost pricing is 5 reasonable. I understand that not to be the entirety 6 of the proposal that AEP is pursuing and is willing 7 to live with, but -- nor is that the case now, but my 8 primary purpose is to contrast the two. 9 Okay. And you, as you just stated, your Q. 10 conclusion was that embedded cost is more reasonable, 11 more appropriate, more economically efficient, however you characterized it. 12 13 Α. I didn't say it was more efficient. 14 Okav. Ο. 15 I do say it's more reasonable than all Α. 16 RPM pricing. 17 Ο. And in your testimony you state you did 18 not review the \$355 calculation by Dr. Pearce? 19 Only in a very general level. I'm aware Α. 20 of the structure of the calculation but I haven't 21 validated the inputs or the assumption. 2.2 Now, are you aware that the staff Ο. 23 presented the testimony of two witnesses that 24 concluded that the embedded cost of AEP's capacity 25 was \$144 a megawatt-day, not \$355?

A. I've heard that's the case. I have not reviewed it and I don't have a response to whether that's a valid analysis.

Q. Would your testimony continue to be that embedded cost is more appropriate than RPM if the Commission concluded that AEP's embedded cost was \$144?

8 Α. It's a big hypothetical because I think 9 it's guite a long ways from what the company 10 perceives its embedded costs to be, but I'm not 11 testifying about the correct value for the embedded 12 costs, so through review of those calculations its 13 determined it's some number other than 355 and that 14 fairly compensates embedded costs, then that's what 15 I'm worried about. I'm not specifically sponsoring 16 the validity of the 355.

Q. So if the Commission determined that 144 was the correct embedded cost number, nothing in your testimony, none of your conclusions, would change; isn't that true?

21

A. Yes, I guess that's fair.

Q. And that would be true even if the \$144 a megawatt-day for compensation is higher than RPM in the first two planning years at issue here; isn't that correct?

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1	A. Yes, 144 is above the 20 to 30 dollars
2	that prevail in the next two RPM years.
3	Q. And \$144 is less than RPM in the third
4	planning year, correct?
5	A. A little bit, as I recall. Yes.
6	Q. A little bit. And you would still
7	continue to believe that embedded cost is appropriate
8	even if it were less than RPM in the last planning
9	year.
10	A. Yes. Subject to the understanding that
11	embedded cost is a way of providing reasonable
12	recovery for the investments that AEP has made, if
13	that number is, in fact, 144, that's fine, but it's
14	not a question of whether it's higher or lower than
15	one year's RPM price.
16	MR. KURTZ: Thank you, your Honors.
17	EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Yurick?
18	MR. YURICK: No questions, thank you,
19	your Honor.
20	EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Sugarman?
21	MR. SUGARMAN: Thank you.
22	
23	CROSS-EXAMINATION
24	By Mr. Sugarman:
25	Q. Good afternoon. If you can't hear me,

1008 1 please let me know. 2 Α. I'm fine. Thanks for checking. 3 Ο. Would you agree that the scope of your 4 assignment for your testimony in this proceeding was 5 fairy narrow? 6 Α. I guess compared to what would be the question. 7 8 Ο. Okay. Compared to the primary purpose 9 that you stated was to comment upon the embedded cost 10 whether it's just and reasonable, correct? 11 That's the core purpose of my testimony, Α. right, and I guess in that sense it's a fairly 12 13 specific scope. 14 Instead of narrow, it's specific in Ο. 15 scope. 16 How long did it take you to perform the assignment necessary to present your direct testimony 17 18 that has been marked and that's in front of you 19 today? 20 MR. CONWAY: Objection. Relevance. 21 EXAMINER PARROT: Overruled. 2.2 Α. As a matter of elapsed calendar time I 23 think I was engaged about a month before the original 24 filing in the fall and I spent on the order of a week 25 and a half of preparatory time in reviewing materials

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1	and writing it and then there were some updates for
2	the amendment filing, that couple of days worth of
3	time.
4	Q. Are you able to quantify for the
5	Commission how long hour-wise you spent on your
6	assignment?
7	MR. CONWAY: Objection. Again,
8	relevance.
9	EXAMINER PARROT: Overruled.
10	A. I can certainly do it. Roughly estimated
11	I would say on the order of 80 hours to prepare the
12	written report and then, of course, some preparatory
13	time for this hearing and reviewing other
14	testimonies, depositions and so on. Excluding all
15	the transactional aspects of this case, about 80
16	hours of analytic preparation and report writing.
17	Q. Thank you.
18	Now, looking at Appendix A which do
19	you have that in front of you? It's attached to your
20	testimony, just in case we need to refer to it.
21	A. Yes.
22	Q. At least by my count, and subject to
23	check, it appears that at least in the last ten years
24	you've provided 43 testimonies and written
25	presented or published 34 papers.

1010 1 That sounds about right. Α. 2 Q. All right. And in those 43 testimonies 3 have you generally presented your opinion on the 4 matters that have been the subject of those testimonies? 5 6 I'm sorry, can I hear that again? Α. 7 Ο. Sure. In the matters in which you've 8 presented testimony, the 43 in the last ten years --9 Α. Okay. 10 -- have you generally presented your Q. 11 testimony in the form of opinions on the matters that 12 have been the subject of your testimony? 13 There are opinion aspects certainly in Α. 14 that they involve interpreting economic situations. 15 Oftentimes there's a fair amount of analytic evidence as well which is less opinion and more public fact or 16 17 objective record. 18 Okay. And in the matters in which you've Ο. 19 offered opinions, have those been offered by you as 20 an expert? 21 I think without exception that's the Α. 2.2 case. I've never been -- virtually never been a fact 23 witness. 24 It may have happened but nothing comes to Ο. 25 mind at the present time.

A. Right.

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Q. All right. Now, your opinion in those matters on which you testified and you mentioned that in your educational background the relevant expertise in your prefiled testimony, have those opinions been offered by you based upon a reasonable degree of certainty within the field or the subject matter of the testimony offered in those proceedings?

A. Well, I've always been accepted as an
expert in my offered testimony, so I would say to
that standard, yes.

12 Ο. Okay. Now, in this particular case 13 you've testified both in your prefiled testimony and 14 again -- well, especially in your prefiled testimony 15 that you are commenting on the policy question of 16 whether it would be just and reasonable for AEP Ohio 17 to use embedded cost pricing for capacity; is that correct? And if you will, I'm referring to the 18 19 prefiled testimony and your response to the third 20 question and I'm looking at the last sentence. 21 MR. CONWAY: Can we have a page 2.2 reference, Mr. Sugarman? 23 MR. SUGARMAN: It should be on page 3, 24 Mr. Conway.

Q. Do you have the reference?

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1	A. I do. And that is the statement I make
2	at the bottom of page 2, wrapping over to the top of
3	page 3.
4	Q. Okay. That you're commenting on this
5	policy question here, correct?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. And where did you derive the policy
8	question upon which you then proceed to comment?
9	A. Well, that was posed to me as the issue
10	under debate for which I could contribute some
11	viewpoint by AEP when they contacted me to assist.
12	Q. So that was the specific scope of your
13	assignment given to you by AEP for this proceeding
14	and for your testimony. Do I understand that
15	correctly?
16	A. Sure. Subject to the rest of the
17	description in my report, but I've agreed that's the
18	basic purpose of my appearance here.
19	Q. All right. And on the last page of your
20	testimony where you are asked to summarize your
21	conclusions, sir, do you see where you state that you
22	conclude that the proposed use of embedded costs for
23	AEP Ohio's capacity rate is just and reasonable and
24	would have no adverse impacts on efficient retail
25	competition? Did I read that correctly?

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1	A. You did.
2	Q. That's your conclusion, right?
3	A. Yes, sir.
4	Q. And the comments and the conclusions that
5	we've just reviewed are not opinions, are they, that
6	you're offering for consideration by this Commission,
7	are they?
8	A. I guess I don't know formally what you're
9	trying to circumscribe as an opinion versus some
10	other kind of conclusion. They are the result of my
11	review of the market circumstances and the situation
12	that situation and obligations AEP faces.
13	Q. If you look at the summary of your
14	conclusions and opinions in your prefiled testimony,
15	which is should be on page 3 and 4. Do you have
16	that part of your testimony, sir?
17	A. Okay.
18	Q. And the opinions you offer the Commission
19	in response to that question as to "Please summarize
20	your conclusions and opinions," you do not restate
21	the comments or the conclusions as to whether or not
22	the proposed use of embedded costs are just and
23	reasonable, do you?
24	A. I guess in that section I don't
25	explicitly say that embedded costs are just and

1 reasonable, but it's not for want of disagreeing with 2 myself at the beginning of the report and changing my 3 mind at the end. I just didn't include it in both 4 places.

Q. It's not explicitly stated as an opinion by you in any aspect of your prefiled testimony, is that correct, that you are opining as to the specific subject matter of whether embedded costs are just and reasonable to AEP Ohio; is that correct?

10 A. Well, didn't we just read on page 18 that11 I do conclude they're just and reasonable?

12 Q. You conclude, but you do not say that you 13 opine, do you?

A. No, I don't describe that as my opinion,I described it as my conclusion.

Q. Is the conclusion or comment that it would be unjust or unreasonable for AEP Ohio to use something other than embedded cost pricing for capacity based upon any reasonable degree of scientific or other certainty within your areas of expertise?

A. That actually is not my conclusion.
You've paraphrased it in a way that's not accurate.
I didn't say nothing else could be just and
reasonable. I said embedded costs could be just and

1 reasonable and RPM would not be. There are other 2 possible arrangements that would be just and 3 reasonable. I have not studied all of those, but I 4 did not conclude that nothing else could be just and 5 reasonable.

Q. And if you heard that as my question,7 then I need to restate it.

8 In your testimony in the comments that it 9 would be just and reasonable to AEP Ohio to use 10 embedded cost pricing for capacity, is that based 11 upon any reasonable degree of scientific or other 12 certainty within the area of your expertise?

13 The notion of being just and reasonable I Α. 14 don't think is normally captured as a scientific 15 conclusion. It's a judgment about the economic 16 reasonableness of something in light of fairness considerations, impacts on markets, continuity of 17 prior arrangements, relationship to the cost 18 19 structure of the parties involved, and I consider 20 several aspects of that including how it could affect 21 markets and the circumstances facing AEP.

I don't look at all of those. Some of them I'm relying on other parties to explain and support.

25

Q. But to the specific question -- I

1 understand the qualification. The specific question 2 being that your conclusions and comments are not based upon any reasonable degree of scientific or 3 4 other certainty within your areas of expertise, you 5 would agree with that statement, correct? 6 MR. CONWAY: Objection, your Honor. That 7 just mischaracterized the witness's answer. 8 MR. SUGARMAN: I'm not characterizing, 9 I'm asking the witness a guestion. 10 MR. CONWAY: He answered it and you 11 mischaracterized it. 12 Α. Well I would say no, I offered my opinion 13 inside the boundaries of what economic analysis and 14 policy traditions are, as I understand them, and I 15 have a great deal of experience in that space so I 16 feel I'm squarely in the mainstream of legitimate 17 economic conclusions. 18 Well, within that mainstream of your Ο. 19 economic conclusions you're not telling this 20 Commission, are you, that it would be either unjust 21 or unreasonable were AEP Ohio to use something other than embedded cost pricing for capacity, are you? 2.2 23 I agree with that. Α. 24 Ο. Okay. 25 MR. SUGARMAN: That's all the questions I

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1	have.
2	EXAMINER PARROT: Ms. Kern?
3	MS. KERN: No questions, your Honor,
4	thank you.
5	EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Jones.
6	MR. JONES: Thank you, your Honor.
7	
8	CROSS-EXAMINATION
9	By Mr. Jones:
10	Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Graves, I have a few
11	questions for you. As to what AEP Ohio is proposing
12	for a rate to charge CRES providers, what's your
13	understanding of how long this rate would be in
14	effect if it was approved by the Commission?
15	A. Under the proposed ESP 2 amendment or
16	I need a little more clarification as to what
17	circumstances you're assuming prevail.
18	Q. Assuming that the Commission approves the
19	company's proposal to charge 352.72 for the capacity
20	rate to CRES providers, and that was a decision by
21	the Commission, they approved that rate, how long is
22	your understanding would that rate be in effect?
23	A. It's my understanding it would change
24	every year as the Form 1 is released and the
25	underlying cost elements shift. So I guess it would

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1018 be a year at a time and revised with the next Form 1. 1 2 Ο. The rate would not -- would the rate go 3 past June 1st, 2015? 4 Not to my knowledge, but I'm not Α. 5 sponsoring their implementation plan so you might 6 direct that to other witnesses better. 7 Q. So you don't know; is that your answer? 8 Α. Well, let me provide backup just a tiny 9 bit. As I said, the rate will change, as I 10 understand it, annually, so the 352 would certainly 11 not prevail in June of 2015 simply because prices 12 would have changed by then. 13 At that point, as I understand it, they 14 will be going to RPM-based supply and pricing and it 15 would -- whatever its value was at the time would 16 end. But that's just my understanding, there are 17 probably company witnesses who can explain the 18 transition better than me. 19 And I'm asking the question what is your Q. 20 understanding as to when it would end? 21 The 352 would be in effect for one year, Α. 2.2 I believe, and then would change. 23 Aside from the adjustments that you're 0. 24 referring to based on each year's adjustment, I mean 25 how long --

1019 1 So you mean when would embedded cost Α. 2 price change. 3 Ο. That's correct. 4 If it was entirely embedded cost pricing Α. 5 I think it would last through the FRR transition 6 period and then stop, that's my understanding. 7 Q. So to June 1st, 2015. 8 Α. That's my understanding. 9 And, Mr. Graves, you would agree with me Ο. 10 that there is, between now and that time and such 11 time as the company would no longer be an FRR entity, 12 that there is no need to develop new capacity in the 13 AEP Ohio territory to maintain adequate reliability? 14 That appears to be the case. Α. 15 And would you agree with me that demand Q. 16 for capacity has been low and will continue to be low 17 for some time? 18 Well, we've certainly been in a recession Α. 19 that knocked down a lot of growth and rates of 20 recovery don't look extremely rapid, so that's part 21 of my conclusion that there is likely to be adequate 2.2 supply through 2015. 23 And if you would refer to your testimony Ο. 24 on page 8, lines 13 to 15, let me know when you're 25 there.

	1020
1	A. Okay.
2	Q. And would you read that, please, those
3	lines?
4	A. The question at line 13?
5	Q. Lines 13 to 15, your answer. On page 8.
6	MR. CONWAY: Excuse me. Mr. Jones, on my
7	copy there's a question that starts at line 13 and
8	continues on through line 15. Is that
9	MR. JONES: I'm sorry, I'm actually
10	reading from the one that has the edits there, that's
11	why my pages are off. I apologize.
12	Q. Let's see, Mr. Graves, it would be the
13	last sentence of your answer to right before the
14	question of why does AEP Ohio need to recover its
15	embedded capacity costs from CRES providers. Do you
16	see that?
17	A. The last full sentence is what you want
18	me to read?
19	Q. Yes, please.
20	A. Okay. "It is more likely that if market
21	prices increase materially, CRES providers will turn
22	their former AEP Ohio customers back to AEP Ohio as
23	the default service provider."
24	Q. Okay. And, Mr. Graves, you already know
25	what the market prices are going to be for capacity

between now and June 1st, 2015; do you not? 1 2 Α. The RPM prices, yes. And that there will not be a 3 Ο. Yes. 4 material increase in those prices during that period 5 from today's price; is that correct? Certainly the capacity prices are fixed, 6 Α. energy price could change, I don't think it's 7 8 terribly likely, but this is not a forecast, it's an observation about what could happen. 9 10 But you're saying that there would not be Q. 11 a material increase in capacity prices during that 12 period of time from today's capacity prices; is that 13 correct? 14 To the contrary, the capacity prices will Α. 15 be continually declining. And, Mr. Graves, I want to refer you to 16 Ο. 17 another piece of your testimony. I'm going to be off, again, I apologize, I have on page 10, it's 18 19 either going to be on page 10 or 11 of your 20 testimony, it's on the economic issues and CRES 21 capacity pricing and it's the first answer to the 2.2 first question underneath that topic. 23 That begins "Absent the recovery"? Or is Α. 24 it to the question before that? 25 Q. That would be line 13, page 10.

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1	A. Okay.
2	Q. And there you have as part of your answer
3	in parentheses you have "(potentially reallocating
4	those shortfalls to the non-shopping AEP Ohio
5	customers)." Do you see that?
6	A. I do.
7	Q. And how would AEP Ohio potentially
8	reallocate those alleged shortfalls to nonshopping
9	AEP Ohio customers?
10	A. I don't have a specific mechanism in mind
11	nor do I even know for sure that that has regulatory
12	feasibility. What I'm getting at here is that to the
13	extent there's a cost recovery shortfall it either
14	falls on shareholders or it has to be transferred to
15	someone else and the only place to transfer it would
16	be to nonshopping customers.
17	Q. So that would be in a separate
18	proceeding?
19	A. Presumptively. I don't know the
20	procedural mechanism whereby it could occur. And it
21	might not. It could just be a loss to shareholders.
22	Q. Mr. Graves, my next question starts at
23	the bottom of page 10 and moves over to page 11 with
24	the answer, and you talk about the capacity cost
25	that's collected from nonshopping customers. Do you

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1	see that part of your answer to that question?
2	A. I believe so.
3	Q. Okay. Your understanding of where that
4	information comes from is what where did AEP Ohio
5	get that rate approved; do you know? Where they
6	would collect that charge?
7	A. The non what is "that rate" that you're
8	talking about?
9	Q. The rate that nonshopping customers are
10	paying for capacity currently.
11	A. That's part of their ESP which has been
12	set periodically over time.
13	Q. And is that the SSO rate that's been in
14	effect since 2009, do you know?
15	A. I don't know when it was last updated.
16	Q. And are you saying in your testimony that
17	the company, AEP Ohio, has in their bundled
18	generation rate they're charging a capacity rate of
19	355.72 to their customers? Is that your testimony?
20	A. No, not explicitly. What I'm saying is
21	it's collecting the company witnesses believe they
22	are collecting roughly the 355 number from the G
23	component of their SSO service. I don't know that
24	it's an explicit charge or that it's exact, but
25	they're comfortable that it's pretty close.

1 You're just taking the word of another Ο. 2 AEP Ohio witness, is that correct, for your 3 understanding of that? 4 As I explained, I'm not sponsoring their Α. 5 cost-of-service analysis. I'm addressing the question of the circumstances under which embedded 6 7 cost pricing is reasonable in relation to RPM. 8 Ο. And that's my point. You haven't done 9 any analysis, correct? So you wouldn't know other 10 than what you've been told; is that correct? 11 Yes; I'm relying on other AEP witnesses Α. 12 in that regard. 13 Ο. Okay. Mr. Graves, I have another 14 question that pertains to page 12 of your testimony, 15 the question concerning the energy credits. 16 Α. Okav. 17 Ο. And the second sentence you have there, you say "The concern is that energy operating margins 18 19 could become occasionally so high that if fully 20 deducted, the net capacity costs would become 21 negative." Do you see that? 2.2 Α. Yes, I see it. 23 Fully deducted from what? From what rate Ο. 24 are you thinking about there when you make that 25 statement?

1025 1 From the CRES embedded cost charge of Α. 355. 2 3 Q. From the 355 --4 Α. Yes. 5 -- .72 rate. Ο. Mr. Graves, you used the term 6 7 "free-riders" here multiple times in your testimony I 8 think on page 13, 14, 15, a couple pages there. Is 9 that your term or did you get that from somewhere else? 10 11 Free-rider, it's a standard term in Α. 12 economic literature. Widely used. 13 Does that mean somebody's getting Ο. something for nothing? 14 15 Well, if they were fully free-riders, Α. 16 yes, they would be getting something for nothing, or 17 avoiding some responsibility that they should be paying for. 18 19 So the context you're using it here is Q. 20 that they're fully not paying anything? 21 I don't mean they're not paying anything. Α. 2.2 But the point is to the extent they're not paying 23 their commensurate share of costs, it's much like if 24 pollution, for instance, is not priced and a firm can emit pollution and not incur a cost for that, they 25

1 are free-riding on their ability to impose an externality on society, it doesn't mean they're not 2 incurring other costs but to that extent they're 3 4 doing it for free. 5 But that is not the case in this case, if Ο. 6 they were to pay RPM price, they would not be free; 7 is that correct? 8 Α. It would not be free but RPM pricing 9 would be considerably below the price that is 10 being -- at which that capacity is being carried by 11 AEP and it would create a situation where CRES 12 providers can take the existing nonshopping customers 13 and swap them over to a new service where they simply 14 don't pay as much as the exact capacity as they were 15 paying and AEP simply eats the loss. 16 But my point is they're not free, right? Ο. 17 The charge is not free, correct? 18 It's not the charge that's the basis for Α. 19 the free-rider part, it's the difference between the 20 charges that's the free.

Q.Okay.Now, Mr. Graves, I want you referyou to your testimony on page 14, line 20.

A. Sorry, what line?

24 Q. Line 20.

23

25

A. Okay.

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1	Q. Page 14. And there, if you would, would
2	you read that sentence for me where it begins there?
3	A. Beginning with "If CRES providers?
4	Q. Yes.
5	A. Sure. "If CRES providers gained access
6	to AEP Ohio's capacity with the RPM-based rates, they
7	would have little or no incentive to contract forward
8	for FRR capacity in the future, in a manner that
9	would actually signal their need and willingness to
10	pay for it to potential developers."
11	Q. Now, when you say "in the future," do you
12	mean post June 1st, 2015, or what do you mean by
13	"future" when you're using it in that context? When
14	is the future?
15	A. Here I'm describing a general principle
16	and impact of changing price structures. The point
17	is not that's a problem in the future that has to be
18	solved in 2015. We happen to be in a situation where
19	we could make this change and there probably would be
20	no adverse impacts on capacity.
21	But as a matter of the way these kinds of
22	changes alter the attractiveness of developing
23	utility infrastructure, simply transferring existing
24	assets to someone else at a price below their cost
25	doesn't create any efficiency benefits or any

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1	incentives or any signal about the need for or
2	benefit from new resources. So that's true in
3	general. It happens we don't have a likely problem
4	by 2015 that needs to be cured, but it doesn't make
5	it more fair to ignore that.
6	Q. So you're talking post June 1st, 2015,
7	is your answer, correct?
8	A. In all likelihood that would be the next
9	time we would need capacity.
10	Q. Mr. Graves, I want to refer to the same
11	page, line 11.
12	A. Okay.
13	Q. There you say "This tends to create an
14	incentive to let others solve the capacity
15	development problem/obligation." What capacity
16	development problem are you referring to there?
17	A. I'm explaining there what a free-rider is
18	in system reliability management.
19	Q. Well, you're characterizing it as there's
20	a capacity development problem that would need to be
21	addressed. Isn't that what your testimony says
22	there?
23	A. Yes.
24	Q. Well, I'm asking you what problem are you
25	identifying?

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1	A. I'm describing the reason why we have
2	obligations for everyone to support reliability in a
3	pool because it is a public good on a network system
4	so if the system is made more reliable because one
5	person is more nervous about it than others, all the
6	others can relax and not participate, which creates
7	perverse incentives for free-riders to wait and
8	eventually that discourages those who would develop
9	it from actually being willing to invest.
10	So to prevent that you have to enforce
11	equitable sharing of the obligation, otherwise you
12	don't get the right amount of social development of
13	those resources. It's a standard problem in
14	economics and I'm describing it in general terms
15	here.
16	Again, I'm not saying there's a forecast
17	that we are facing a crisis of that time by 2015, I'm
18	just saying that's appropriate of reasonable utility
19	pricing that it addresses this shared responsibility
20	problem.
21	Q. Mr. Graves, you would agree with me that
22	there is no problem with reliability in the pool
23	between now and June 1st, 2015, correct?
24	MR. CONWAY: Objection, he's already
25	answered that question, your Honor, at least two or

1 three times.

2	MR. JONES: Your Honor, he used that as
3	an answer to my last question suggesting there would
4	be a problem with, you know, with their contributing
5	to their share for reliability of the pool.
6	MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, he specifically,
7	well, his testimony and the transcript will say what
8	it says, but that's a mischaracterization of his
9	testimony. And it's also a question that he's
10	addressed at least two or three times now in the last
11	ten minutes.
12	MR. JONES: I'm addressing his answer,
13	your Honor.
14	EXAMINER PARROT: The objection is
15	overruled. You may answer, Mr. Graves.
16	A. Okay, I had previously answered that and
17	my answer was that I do not foresee a problem by
18	2015.
19	Q. (By Mr. Jones) For pool reliability.
20	Reliability in the pool.
21	A. Yes, that's correct.
22	Q. Thank you.
23	Mr. Graves, I want to refer you to your
24	testimony on page 16, line 15.
25	A. Okay, I have it.

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1	Q. There you say, I'll start at the
2	beginning of the sentence, "RPM-based capacity prices
3	would provide a more efficient short term signal"
4	How would you define "short-term" there?
5	A. I'd say for a year or less.
6	Q. I just have one last question here, it's
7	in your testimony on page 18, line 14, and you say
8	that "In contrast, requiring the RPM-based rate
9	without other financial compensation adjustments
10	would simply entail AEP Ohio being forced to
11	subsidize its own bypass."
12	What are you referring to there when you
13	say "without other financial compensation
14	adjustments"? What's that refer to?
15	A. The problem with going to a hundred
16	percent RPM is the financial shortfall and the large
17	wealth transfer for some operational gains that would
18	occur by simply shifting customers from AEP to CRES
19	providers. So that creates financial harm that could
20	be mitigated in other ways.
21	One way is to use the embedded cost
22	pricing, another way is to set up some kind of rate
23	stabilization plan, or in principle if it were still
24	feasible as a regulatory matter some sort of lost
25	revenue correction. There's a variety of things that

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1	can be done to mitigate financial risk.
2	There could be an earnings catch-up
3	process that was alluded to this morning as actually
4	being in place in Ohio, but those have to be reliable
5	enough to work, but more than one way could be used
6	to plug a leak.
7	Q. So that's not limited to embedded costs
8	then, is that your testimony?
9	A. That's correct.
10	MR. JONES: That's all I have. Thank
11	you.
12	EXAMINER PARROT: All right. Very good.
13	Let's take a break for lunch, we will reconvene at
14	3:15.
15	Thank you, Mr. Graves.
16	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
17	(Luncheon recess taken.)
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19	
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1033 1 Monday Afternoon Session, April 23, 2012. 2 3 4 EXAMINER PARROT: Let's go back on the 5 record. 6 Any redirect, Mr. Conway? 7 MR. CONWAY: Thank you, your Honor. 8 9 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 10 By Mr. Conway: 11 Mr. Graves, this morning when you were in 0. 12 discussions with Mr. Kutik, do you recall several 13 questions regarding the August 2011 Brattle Group 14 report? 15 A. On capacity markets, on PJM's capacity 16 markets? 17 Ο. Yes. 18 A. Yes, I do recall that. 19 Do you believe there's any inconsistency Q. 20 between The Brattle Group's August 2011 report and 21 your testimony in this proceeding? 2.2 Α. No, I think they're consistent. 23 And do you recall an exchange with Ο. Mr. Kutik in which the discussion focused on the 24 25 energy and ancillary service credit or offset

against, I think it was the, it may have been the 1 2 gross CONE amount? Do you recall that? 3 Α. Yes, we discussed how net CONE is 4 converted from gross CONE. 5 And I believe there was a reference to a Ο. 6 three-year look-back for information data regarding 7 the energy and ancillary services credit that is then 8 used in connection with that conversion. Do you 9 recall that? 10 Α. I do. 11 Could you explain the lag between the Ο. 12 three years of data used for the EM - AES offset and the base residual auction and the subsequent delivery 13 14 year? 15 Yes. As I understand it, the gross CONE Α. 16 is converted to net CONE by taking out the energy and 17 ancillary services that that type of unit would have 18 had in the three years prior to the base residual 19 auction under the LMP prices that prevailed in PJM, 20 so it uses three years before the BRA and then the 21 BRA itself sets a price for three years later, so the gap between the two is potentially as much as six 2.2 23 years. 24 And what impact does that gap or that lag 0.

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have on the use of the three-year look-back of data

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1035 1 as a proxy for the offset? 2 Α. It raises the chance that the energy 3 offset won't be descriptive of what the actual realized energy and ancillary service offsets would 4 5 turn out to be. 6 And do you recall a line of questions, I Ο. 7 believe it was during the discussions you had with 8 Mr. Randazzo regarding the capacity pricing that's currently in effect for AEP Ohio? 9 10 Α. I believe so. 11 And I believe you mentioned the RPM rate, Ο. 12 the current RPM rate, the \$145 rate being in effect. 13 Do you recall that? 14 Yes. Α. 15 What's your understanding of the capacity Q. 16 pricing that is currently in effect for AEP Ohio? 17 Α. I think my previous description of it as being based on RPM was oversimplified. I understand 18 19 there's a two-tier structure where the first portion 20 of available capacity to CRES providers is at the RPM 21 rate and then it goes to 255 a megawatt-day I 2.2 believe, or something approximately like that, for 23 the second tier. 24 And also in the course of your 0. 25 examination by Mr. Randazzo I believe there was some

1 discussion of impairments. Do you recall that? Yes. 2 Α. And specifically there was one discussion 3 Ο. 4 you had which was I believe related to one of the 5 documents he showed you that focused on the 6 impairment reporting or decision that related to the 7 third quarter of 2011 and AEP Ohio's generation 8 assets. Do you recall that? 9 Α. Yes. 10 And I believe in the course of the 0. 11 discussion you indicated that whether an asset is 12 impaired depends on all of the revenue flows related 13 to the asset. Do you recall that? 14 Yes, that's generally what I said. Α. 15 Could you describe, in addition to the Q. 16 capacity revenues that CRES providers serving 17 nonshoppers would pay to the company, what other 18 revenue streams there might be related to the 19 generation assets that would be relevant to any 20 impairment analysis? 21 I have not specifically reviewed that Α. 2.2 impairment analysis but I can speak to what I expect 23 would be the relevant types of revenues to include, 24 and that would include things like the capacity 25 contributions or fixed cost contributions earned from

payments from nonshopping customers under the
standard service offer rate; payments from pool
members for their share of capacity that's
transferred or priced at cost internally; there may
be long-term contracts for some capacity with certain
parties that are rates with considerable returns; and
there's energy and off-system and ancillary sales in
the off-system markets as well which can produce a
margin. So all of those would have to be considered
to know there's an impairment.
Q. Mr. Graves, do you have with you still on
the stand the exhibits, the various exhibits that
Mr. Randazzo showed to you and then discussed in some
respects with you?
A. Yes, I have quite a few.
Q. I'd like to just quickly have you again
take a look at each of them. Just so that the record
is clear I'm referring to IEU Exhibit 112, the
prospectus supplement from 2002 for AEP, Exhibit
IEU Exhibit No. 113 which is an excerpt from
Mr. Forrester's direct testimony in the original ETP
case, 99-1729 back in 2000, and then the excerpt from
the Columbus Southern Power Company FERC Form No. 1
marked as IEU Exhibit 114.

1 Ohio Power Company FERC Form No. 1 for 2011 marked as 2 IEU Exhibit 115, and then the packet of discovery 3 responses in the modified ESP proceeding that is 4 currently pending involving AEP Ohio, Case No. 11-346 5 and 348 which was marked as IEU Exhibit 116. 6 And then IEU Exhibit No. 117, which is the OPCo's -- Ohio Power's and Columbus Southern 7 Power's application in a PUCO case No. 01-3289 back 8 9 in 2001-2002, Exhibit 118 for IEU which is the Ohio 10 Power and Columbus Southern Power memo contra an OCC 11 motion in that case, that case being the 01-3289 case back in 2002, and then finally IEU Exhibit 119 which 12 is the letter from Mr. Fayne to Chairman Schriber of 13 the PUCO in that same case, 01-3289. 14 15 Do you have all those before you? 16 Yes, I do. Α. 17 Had you ever seen any of these documents Ο. before Mr. Randazzo began examining you concerning 18 19 them? 20 Α. No, I had not. 21 And did you -- I take it, then, that they 0. played no role in your preparation of your testimony 2.2 23 for this case; is that correct? 24 Α. That's correct, I did not rely on them in 25 any way.

1039 1 And you did have some opportunity at Ο. 2 Mr. Randazzo's request to at least skim through each of those documents, correct? 3 4 Α. Yes. 5 And having done that do you have any Ο. 6 personal knowledge about the regulatory context that might have applied at the time each of the documents 7 8 was created or filed? 9 No, there's none for which I was involved Α. 10 or have firsthand knowledge of how they were 11 developed or used. 12 Ο. And do you have any familiarity with the 13 particular facts and circumstances that would have 14 underlaid each of the documents when each was 15 prepared or filed? 16 Α. I do not. 17 MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, that's all I have on redirect. 18 19 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Kutik? 20 MR. KUTIK: Thank you, your Honor. 21 2.2 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 23 By Mr. Kutik: 24 Mr. Graves, with respect to the energy Ο. 25 and ancillary services offset that you discussed with

1 Mr. Conway, the establishment of net CONE for the 2 planning year 2015 and 2016 would look back at the 3 years 2009 through 2012 for the energy and ancillary 4 offset; is that right? 5 Planning years through 2012, yes, so the Α. 6 one ending this year. And would it be fair to say that energy 7 Q. 8 prices during that period of time were fairly low? 9 Yes, that's correct. Α. 10 So when AEP Ohio joins the RPM process in Q. 11 2015-2016, as part of that planning year, they will be able to get, for lack of a better term, the 12 13 benefit of those low prices in the establishment of a 14 net CONE price, correct? 15 Unless energy prices stay comparably low Α. 16 that they would at least be getting a small -- a 17 smaller offset than if energy prices were higher. 18 Now, the formula for the establishment of Ο. 19 net CONE included the energy and ancillary services 20 offset as set forth in the reliability assurance 21 agreement, correct? I believe so. 2.2 Α. 23 And that was an agreement that was Ο. 24 entered into by numerous stakeholders holding a 25 variety of points of view.

1041 I'm sure that's true. I don't know what 1 Α. 2 their points of view were, but it would be 3 astonishing if they were in complete agreement. 4 Ο. So they are representing a fair result as 5 far as all those folks were concerned, correct? 6 I don't know how many of them, how Α. 7 unanimously it was supported, but at least it was 8 supported enough to be deemed acceptable to a 9 deciding majority. 10 And so a deciding majority of Q. 11 stakeholders from a variety of points of view 12 believed that the final result of the RAA was fair, 13 it was a fair result, correct? 14 MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, at this point 15 I'll object. This has gone now well beyond the scope 16 of my redirect. 17 EXAMINER PARROT: Response. 18 MR. KUTIK: Your Honor, this all has to 19 do with he believes that the offset is perhaps 20 inappropriate or somehow unbalanced, and I'm 21 establishing that a whole bunch of other people 2.2 didn't agree. 23 MR. CONWAY: That's not -- that was not 24 the scope of my redirect. This is plowing new ground 25 entirely.

1042 1 MR. KUTIK: This is my -- I have two more 2 questions left. 3 EXAMINER PARROT: The objection is 4 overruled. 5 Please continue, Mr. Kutik. 6 Do you need the question reread? 7 THE WITNESS: I think I have it. 8 I guess I don't feel comfortable 9 concluding that it was deemed fair by the parties. 10 It was probably deemed acceptable under the 11 conditions, and conditions have changed since then, 12 some of those parties may no longer feel like it's a 13 good metric, and it's the kind of thing which is 14 subject to review and potential revision in the RPM 15 process. And I don't know where people stand now as 16 to whether they like it, but at least at the time, as 17 I agreed, there was enough support to condone it and 18 approve it. 19 And deem it acceptable. Q. 20 Implicitly we can say that because it was Α. 21 approved. And the RAA was accepted by the Federal 2.2 Ο. 23 Energy Regulatory Commission, correct? 24 Yes, that's my understanding. Α. 25 Ο. And so we can assume from that that the

1043 Commission felt that the RAA provisions were just and 1 2 reasonable, correct? 3 Α. I don't know that that's the way it was 4 described in the approval but it's probable that they 5 would have taken that standard. 6 MR. KUTIK: Can I have one minute, your 7 Honor. 8 Ο. Now, we talked earlier about the Brattle 9 studies of the PJM process, correct? 10 Α. Yes. 11 And isn't it a fact that the stakeholders Ο. 12 as a result of that report reaffirmed various 13 portions of the RAA? 14 You know, I don't know to what extent all Α. 15 of it has been put against stakeholder support, there 16 are revisions under consideration of several terms 17 and some are being implemented so I don't know what the status of its overall re-approval is. 18 19 Q. Okay. Fair enough. 20 MR. KUTIK: I have no further questions, 21 thank you. 2.2 EXAMINER PARROT: Ms. Kaleps-Clark? 23 MS. KALEPS-CLARK: No questions, your 24 Honor, thank you. 25 EXAMINER PARROT: Ms. Kingery?

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1	MS. KINGERY: No questions, your Honor.
2	EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Randazzo?
3	MR. RANDAZZO: Just a couple, I think.
4	
5	RECROSS-EXAMINATION
6	By Mr. Randazzo:
7	Q. You were asked a question about your
8	understanding regarding the RPM rate for the charge
9	for capacity that's currently in place. Do you
10	recall that?
11	A. I do.
12	Q. Yeah. What was your understanding at the
13	time that you prepared your testimony?
14	A. As to what that rate was?
15	Q. Yeah.
16	A. I understood there to be a two-tier
17	structure in place as I described, I simply
18	misdescribed it in response to your question earlier.
19	Q. Okay. That's fine.
20	And how is community aggregation treated
21	in that two-tier structure?
22	A. That gets a bit into the details that I'm
23	not as comfortable with. I believe there's an extra
24	portion of tier-1 rights that are set aside for
25	community aggregation such that a bit more than

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1	21 percent is the tier 1 target but I think it can be
2	larger if there's some community aggregation, but
3	it's not unlimited as far as I know.
4	Q. What is not unlimited?
5	A. The amount of tier 1 capacity available
6	to community aggregation. But I'm not an expert in
7	that. I know there's a special provision for some
8	allowance for it.
9	Q. Okay. You were asked some questions
10	about the things or you were asked a question about
11	the scope of the considerations to do an impairment
12	analysis. Do you recall that question?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. Would dividend policy be one of the
15	things you would look at?
16	A. I would not normally think so as it's not
17	a feature of the asset value, that's a financial
18	transfer.
19	Q. Do you know what the would you accept,
20	subject to check, that for 2011 the net income
21	reported on the combined Columbus Southern and Ohio
22	Power FERC Form 1 was \$464,992,339?
23	MR. CONWAY: Could I have that question
24	read back, please?
25	(Record read.)

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1	MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, at this point
2	I'll interpose another objection. I think this is
3	beyond the scope of my questions which simply asked
4	the witness to describe the revenue flows that might
5	support the relevance to an impairment analysis. I
6	didn't ask him about the net income, combined net
7	income of Columbus Southern and Ohio Power on the
8	FERC Form 1.
9	EXAMINER PARROT: Response?
10	MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honor, your Honors,
11	it's a foundation question and if I don't connect in
12	the next question, I will withdraw both questions.
13	EXAMINER PARROT: All right. Please
14	proceed.
15	Q. (By Mr. Randazzo) Will you accept that,
16	subject to check, that net income reported on line 2
17	at page 120 of the 2011 FERC Form 1 for the combined
18	Ohio Power and Columbus & Southern shows a net income
19	of \$464,992,339?
20	A. Sure, I'm happy to accept that.
21	Q. Would you accept, subject to check, that
22	the dividend for that same period on common stock
23	paid from the combined Columbus Southern and Ohio
24	Power to the parent was \$650 million?
25	MR. CONWAY: Objection. The basis is my
	ARMSTRONG & OKEY, INC., Columbus, Ohio (614) 224-9481

1 previous basis. It's beyond the scope. 2 MR. RANDAZZO: It's the other foundation 3 question, your Honor. 4 EXAMINER PARROT: So there's two 5 foundation questions. 6 MR. RANDAZZO: I'm sorry, I thought I 7 indicated there was one more foundation. 8 EXAMINER PARROT: I didn't interpret it 9 that way, you maybe said that but, okay, let's --10 Sure, I'm happy to accept that as well. Α. 11 Okay. So when a company pays more in Ο. 12 dividends than it receives in net income, are you 13 saying that you would not consider that for purposes 14 of an impairment analysis? 15 Sure, I am saying that. An impairment Α. 16 analysis is about the value of the assets, not the cash balances of the parties that are holding them 17 18 and whether they need that cash for internal purposes 19 or not, that's a financial transfer that doesn't 20 reveal anything about the value of the assets. 21 All right. When you pay dividends out Ο. that are greater than net income, does it affect your 2.2 23 capitalization ratio? 24 MR. CONWAY: Objection. Same basis. 25 EXAMINER PARROT: Overruled.

1 Compared to not paying dividends, sure, Α. 2 it affects your balance sheet, but it may not affect 3 it adversely, it just changes it. 4 And when you -- well, let's back up. You Ο. 5 said compared to not paying them. And my question 6 asked you to accept a situation, subject to check, a situation where Ohio Power and Columbus & Southern is 7 8 actually paying dividends to the parent greater than 9 net income. Did you understand my earlier questions 10 that way? 11 I did. Α. 12 Ο. Yeah. 13 MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, I asked the man 14 what revenue streams were relevant to the impairment 15 analysis and it was a follow-up to a 16 cross-examination question in the same vein. Ι 17 didn't ask him to get into the area of balance sheet effects of subject to check dividend payments made 18 19 upstream from AEP Ohio. It's beyond the scope of my 20 redirect examination. 21 EXAMINER PARROT: The objection is overruled. 2.2 23 Did you understand previously --Ο. 24 Α. So I believe I understood your question, 25 and my -- I think my answer is the same. If you pay

1049 out a large dividend, it changes your equity, it may 1 2 not change your capitalization structure depending on 3 what else you also had cash available for, perhaps 4 you retired comparable amounts of debt in parallel. 5 There's no per se impact and it is not a 6 per se indication of high value or low value of the 7 underlying assets. It's a property of the cash needs 8 of the parties, not of the asset values. 9 And for purposes of doing an impairment Q. 10 analysis you would not look at such things as 11 dividend policy as I understood your prior answer; is 12 that correct? 13 Α. Yes, that's the same answer. 14 Ο. Okay. 15 MR. RANDAZZO: That's all I have. Thank 16 you very much. 17 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Royer? 18 MR. ROYER: No questions. 19 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Kurtz? 20 MR. KURTZ: No questions. 21 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Yurick? 2.2 MR. YURICK: No questions, your Honor, thank you. 23 24 EXAMINER PARROT: Ms. Kern? 25 MS. KERN: No questions, thank you.

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1	EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Jones?
2	MR. JONES: No questions, your Honor.
3	EXAMINER PARROT: Thank you very much,
4	Mr. Graves.
5	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
6	EXAMINER PARROT: You are excused.
7	Mr. Conway.
8	MR. CONWAY: Thank you, your Honor, at
9	this time AEP Ohio moves for the admission of
10	Mr. Graves' testimony which I believe is Exhibit 105.
11	EXAMINER PARROT: Are there any
12	objections to the admission of AEP Exhibit 105?
13	Hearing none, Exhibit AEP Exhibit 105
14	is admitted into the record.
15	(EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.)
16	EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Kutik.
17	MR. KUTIK: Your Honor, FES moves for the
18	admission of FES Exhibit 118. We are not moving for
19	the admission of Exhibit 119.
20	EXAMINER PARROT: Are there any
21	objections to the admission of FES Exhibit 118?
22	MR. CONWAY: Just one moment, your Honor.
23	This is the order denying rehearing?
24	MR. KUTIK: Yes.
25	MR. CONWAY: No objection, your Honor.

1051 1 EXAMINER PARROT: FES Exhibit 118 is 2 admitted. 3 (EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 4 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Randazzo. 5 MR. RANDAZZO: I would move the admission 6 of what have been marked as IEU Exhibits 112 through 7 118. 8 EXAMINER PARROT: I'm sorry, did I hear you correctly, through 118? You're not moving 119? 9 10 MR. RANDAZZO: Yes, 119, that too, thank 11 you. 12 EXAMINER PARROT: Are there any --13 MR. RANDAZZO: 119 being the letter to 14 Dr. Schriber I believe. 15 EXAMINER PARROT: Are there any 16 objections to the admission of IEU Exhibits 112 17 through 119? 18 MR. CONWAY: Yes, your Honor. The 19 witness exhibited no familiarity with the documents, 20 was not familiar with the regulatory or factual 21 context in which the documents were prepared or 2.2 filed, and all that we have on the record is 23 Mr. Randazzo's request that he accept, subject to 24 check, that they are what they purported to be and so 25 I don't think that they get into the record based on

1 the witness's testimony. 2 EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Randazzo. 3 MR. RANDAZZO: Yes, your Honors. There 4 has been no suggestion that the documents are not 5 authentic. Some of the documents are AEP business 6 records. Some of the documents are required to be 7 filed from a regulatory perspective. 8 This witness, as others, have told a 9 story about why it is they believe that embedded cost 10 pricing is appropriate, and told a story that 11 includes the notion that somehow we are still dealing 12 with a bundled vertically integrated entity, they 13 have told a story that implies that somehow the 14 accounting that is peculiar to regulated entities is 15 still relevant, and I believe the documents that we 16 have tried to bring forward so that the Commission 17 can see what AEP actually said itself about such 18 things are perhaps some of the most relevant 19 documents that have been made available in this 20 record. 21 AEP has brought forward witnesses that 2.2 have selective knowledge and select memories about 23 what happened, and from our perspective, unless the 24 Commission is willing to actually dig into these 25 kinds of records, we're going to continue to engage

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1	in this fantasy that has been concocted by AEP with
2	no information to support it, this fantasy about
3	financial harm without doing an impairment analysis
4	to determine what the impact would be, discovery
5	responses that suggest that the impairment analysis
6	that has been done reveals that there is no problem.
7	So with that explanation, your Honor, I
8	would ask that you overrule the objection and let
9	some of this information finally get to a place where
10	the people that have not lived through this situation
11	over the last ten or so years have an opportunity to
12	better understand what has transpired.
13	MR. CONWAY: Your Honor, if I might make
14	a few reply comments.
15	EXAMINER PARROT: Sure, Mr. Conway.
16	MR. CONWAY: Thank you. I think the
17	proper place and time to argue about which positions
18	are fantastic is in the post-hearing briefs which
19	or post-hearing arguments which all parties have an
20	opportunity to engage in.
21	The question here is, is this witness a
22	proper conduit for Mr. Randazzo's effort to introduce
23	these documents, and the answer is clearly no.
24	Mr. Randazzo has a witness who is about to take the
25	stand who he could have tried to use as a conduit for

1	these documents but, for whatever reason, decided not
2	to. That's not the company's decision, that was
3	Mr. Randazzo's decision.
4	Mr. Randazzo could have talked about
5	talked with witnesses of the company such as
6	Mr. Munczinski or Mr. Allen about these documents,
7	none of which none of which he did. And perhaps
8	he could have found a conduit through one of the two
9	of them to do it.
10	The point that I'm making is that there
11	is no basis for getting these documents in through
12	Mr. Graves. And, frankly, I disagree with
13	Mr. Randazzo's portrayal of these documents as
14	telling partially, let alone all of the story, about
15	the topics covered in them, and so I disagree.
16	I don't disagree with Mr. Randazzo's
17	right to present his case as he sees fit, but I do
18	disagree with the manner in which he's trying to do
19	it through this witness. Thank you.
20	EXAMINER PARROT: Mr. Randazzo, before we
21	issue a ruling I'd like to ask you about IEU Exhibit
22	113 and that's an excerpt of the Forrester testimony.
23	MR. RANDAZZO: Yes.
24	EXAMINER PARROT: In reviewing your IEU
25	Exhibit 106 it looks like that testimony has already

1055 been admitted into the record; is that correct? 1 2 MR. RANDAZZO: That is correct, your 3 That is my error. Yes. Honor. 4 EXAMINER PARROT: So it's not really 5 necessary for us at this point, I don't believe, to 6 also admit IEU Exhibit 113. Is there any reason that 7 you see for us that we should do that? 8 MR. RANDAZZO: As long as the record is 9 clear it's the same thing as the prior exhibit. 10 EXAMINER PARROT: I just want to be sure 11 it is. It looks to me like it is. 12 MR. RANDAZZO: That's my understanding. 13 EXAMINER PARROT: Well, in light of that 14 we are going to not admit IEU Exhibit 113 because, 15 again, that testimony that's already been admitted 16 the record as IEU Exhibit 106. 17 Thank you both for your patience. At this point we are going to admit IEU Exhibits 112 as 18 19 well as 114 through 119. 20 (EXHIBITS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 21 EXAMINER PARROT: I believe IEU has our 2.2 next witness. 23 MR. RANDAZZO: We do, your Honor, but if 24 the company has rested its direct case I have a 25 motion that I would like to make. It will be short.

1	EXAMINER SEE: Go ahead, Mr. Randazzo.
2	MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, the
3	companies, as I understand it, have rested their
4	direct case, and the Commission set this proceeding
5	to allow the companies to present information on
6	appropriate capacity charges.
7	There are three ways in which the
8	Commission can set prices: One applies to
9	noncompetitive services; the companies have not put
10	forward the evidence that is required to prosecute an
11	application based upon a request to increase prices
12	for noncompetitive services, there's been no
13	identification of rate base, no identification of the
14	property that's used and useful for providing
15	service, none of the requirements that are embedded
16	in traditional ratemaking as applied to Ohio law, the
17	inventory that's required by 4909.05, none of the
18	procedures required by 4908-18 and 19 have been
19	followed. None. No attempt to follow them.
20	The Commission has emergency ratemaking
21	authority, and the Commission's criteria for using
22	that authority which deal with imperiled financial
23	circumstances require that there be a demonstration
24	of an emergency prior to the grant of temporary
25	relief.

1 The evidence is reviewed with strict 2 scrutiny and subject to a clear and convincing 3 demonstration of the presence of extraordinary 4 circumstances. Emergency relief can not be granted 5 if the emergency request is filed merely to 6 circumvent some other option. 7 And, finally, the Commission will not 8 grant temporary relief due to financial peril more 9 than the minimum level necessary to avert and relieve 10 the emergency. 11 None of the information the applicants 12 have provided is directed at the criteria that the 13 Commission has long used to evaluate when to 14 intervene to address a financial problem. 15 We then come to the pricing mechanisms 16 that are available for competitive services. Now, 17 throughout this process repeatedly, in the discovery 18 fight as well, is a legal view that somehow the 19 electric distribution utility, AEP Ohio, which 20 includes both Columbus Southern and Ohio Power, is a 21 competitor, that somehow it is competing with 2.2 competitive retail electric service suppliers 23 including governmental aggregation entities for the 24 love and affection of retail customers and, more 25 importantly the money I guess.

That is a legal impossibility under Ohio 1 2 law. The electric distribution company cannot be a competitor. The only supply opportunity that it has 3 4 is as a default supplier, period. End of story. 5 The service at question here, some people 6 may say it's competitive, some people may say it's 7 noncompetitive, the important point is the rule of 8 law dictates the kind of information that you have to 9 provide and when you can obtain an increase in 10 None of that has been provided in this case. prices. 11 None. 12 The Commission's criteria and standards 13 precedents also say that any intervention by the 14 Commission due to financial harm shall not be longer 15 than the demonstration of the emergency, longer than 16 the period for which an emergency is demonstrated. Hasn't been any demonstrated. 17 18 The Commission did AEP a great favor by 19 intervening and restoring capacity charges in the ESP 20 2 settlement based upon an allegation that not doing 21 so would impose financial harm. There's been no 2.2 proof whatsoever of any financial harm. None. 23 And as a consequence of the Commission's 24 effort to make an opportunity for AEP Ohio, AEP Ohio 25 has not stepped forward to carry the burden of proof,

1 which is the burden of first coming forward with 2 enough information to satisfy the statutory criteria, 3 or the burden of persuading anybody that its theory 4 has merit based upon the law and circumstances.

5 We move to dismiss and I would ask the 6 Commission to terminate the restoration of the two-tier capacity charges because the only reason the 7 8 Commission restored the two-tiered capacity charges 9 was based on an allegation of financial harm, which 10 when given the opportunity to do so, AEP Ohio has 11 failed to demonstrate, according to the Commission's 12 long-standing criteria that are used to measure financial harm. 13

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, briefly respond. Regarding the motion to dismiss, as the Bench is aware, the same arguments have been raised in a written motion to dismiss, the company's responded, other parties have responded. I think the Bench has already indicated they're going to issue -- defer a ruling and issue the entry or opinion and order.

I won't repeat those responses, I'll just add a couple things regarding Mr. Randazzo's additional comments.

24 First, with respect to the discovery 25 dispute which he's not part of and has already been

1 ruled upon, I think the statement mischaracterizes 2 AEP Ohio's arguments as portraying itself as a competitor to CRES providers, that doesn't -- it's 3 4 not accurate and doesn't reflect positions we put in 5 the written discovery disputes. 6 Second, regarding the interim relief that was granted in a March 7th entry and Mr. Randazzo 7 8 is challenging that and seeking to terminate it, I 9 would submit that's an untimely challenge to that 10 March 7th order; it should not be entertained. 11 I would also submit that it's speculative 12 when he attributes particular purposes and intentions 13 to the Commission's entry in that regard. 14 Finally, your Honor, I would note that 15 the statements about the burden of proof are 16 presumptuous as this proceeding, I would submit, is 17 a, more akin to a Commission-ordered investigation and don't necessarily agree that the company has the 18 19 burden of proof, and I obviously disagree with the 20 characterization that the company has not met a 21 burden of persuasion or otherwise met its duty to 2.2 present evidence in accordance with the Commission's 23 entries in this case. 24 Thank you, your Honor. 25 EXAMINER SEE: Thank you.

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1	MR. RANDAZZO: If I may just for the
2	record, we did file an application for rehearing with
3	regard to the March 7th order. It was granted by
4	the Commission. So I just wanted to point that out
5	to make sure everybody's aware of that.
6	EXAMINER SEE: The Bench is aware of it.
7	And just so we're all clear, the
8	applications for rehearing as to the
9	March 7th entry were granted to allow the
10	Commission some additional time to consider the
11	issues raised in those applications and will be
12	addressed on the merit at a later date.
13	In regard to the oral motion that
14	Mr. Randazzo made here today, we'll take those issues
15	up at a later date as we indicated earlier and we
16	will address the arguments in the written motion to
17	dismiss as well as the issues raised here today.
18	MR. RANDAZZO: Thank you.
19	EXAMINER SEE: With that, let's move on
20	to the next witness.
21	Mr. Randazzo.
22	MR. RANDAZZO: Yes, your Honors, at this
23	time I would ask that Mr. Edward Hess, J. Edward
24	Hess, I believe, be called as a witness and sworn to
25	give testimony.

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1	EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Hess, if you would
2	raise your right hand.
3	(Witness sworn.)
4	EXAMINER SEE: Thank you. Have a seat.
5	Mr. Randazzo.
6	
7	J. EDWARD HESS
8	being first duly sworn, as prescribed by law, was
9	examined and testified as follows.
10	DIRECT EXAMINATION
11	By Mr. Randazzo:
12	Q. Mr. Hess, would you state your name and
13	your business address, please.
14	A. My name is J. Edward Hess, my business
15	address is 21 East State Street, Columbus, Ohio,
16	43215.
17	Q. For purposes of this proceeding,
18	Mr. Hess, did you cause to be prepared direct
19	testimony?
20	A. Yes, I did.
21	MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honor, I believe
22	everyone should have a copy of Mr. Hess's direct
23	testimony at this point. If anybody needs a copy, I
24	have a few extras. I would ask that that prefiled
25	direct testimony of J. Edward Hess be marked as IEU

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1063 Exhibit 120. 1 2 EXAMINER SEE: I think you reserved, did 3 you reserve IEU --4 MR. RANDAZZO: I'm sorry, Mr. Darr did. 5 That's correct, thank you. EXAMINER SEE: The exhibit is so marked 6 7 as IEU Exhibit 101. 8 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 9 Mr. Hess, do you have what's been marked Ο. 10 for identification purposes as IEU Exhibit 101? 11 Yes, I do. Α. 12 Ο. Do you have any changes or corrections 13 that you would like to make in that testimony? 14 I have three corrections. Page 2, the Α. 15 third line up after "Dr. Edward P. Kahn," I would like to insert "William R. Forrester," 16 17 F-o-r-r-e-s-t-e-r, comma. 18 Page 3, line 4, after the word -- after 19 the name "Graves," comma, William A. K-l-u-n. 20 And then page 9, line 6, a new sentence 21 would read -- should read "Dr. Landon updated his 2.2 schedules on April 19th, 2000, in the same ETP 23 case." 24 Could you read that sentence again? 0. 25 Α. Yes, sir. "Dr. Landon updated his

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1	schedules on April 19th, 2000, in the same ETP
2	case."
3	Q. Okay. Mr. Hess, at page 15 you discuss
4	or describe your understanding of what we have come
5	to call in this proceeding RPM; is that correct?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. And is that understanding based upon
8	are you relying on Mr. Kevin Murray for that
9	understanding?
10	A. Yes, I am. At line 21 through 22 I'm
11	pretty clear that according to IEU Witness Kevin
12	Murray.
13	Q. Now, with regard to the bottom of page 2
14	where you're listing the documents you reviewed
15	before your recommendation, to the extent that there
16	are other documents mentioned in your testimony, you
17	would have reviewed those as well, correct?
18	A. I say that on page 3, the first and the
19	second line, first full sentence.
20	Q. Okay. Now, if I were to ask you the
21	questions that are contained in IEU Exhibit 101,
22	would the answers you would give here today be as set
23	forth therein?
24	A. Subject to those corrections, yes.
25	MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, I would move

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1	the admission of IEU Exhibit 101 and make Mr. Hess
2	available for cross-examination.
3	EXAMINER SEE: Ms. Kern?
4	MS. KERN: No questions, your Honor.
5	EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Royer?
6	MR. ROYER: No questions.
7	EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Yurick?
8	MR. YURICK: No questions, thank you,
9	your Honor.
10	EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Kurtz?
11	MR. KURTZ: No questions.
12	EXAMINER SEE: Ms. Kingery?
13	MS. KINGERY: No questions, your Honor.
14	EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Hayden?
15	MR. HAYDEN: No questions.
16	EXAMINER SEE: Ms. Kaleps-Clark?
17	MS. KALEPS-CLARK: No questions, your
18	Honor, thank you.
19	EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Jones?
20	MR. JONES: No questions, your Honor.
21	EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Nourse?
22	MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor.
23	
24	
25	

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1	CROSS-EXAMINATION
2	By Mr. Nourse:
3	Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Hess.
4	A. Good afternoon.
5	Q. So in your testimony you are advancing or
6	supporting an argument made by IEU that the
7	AEP Ohio's and I'll refer to AEP Ohio to include,
8	especially when you refer back to this time period,
9	Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power; do you
10	understand that?
11	A. Understood, yes.
12	Q. So you're advancing the argument that the
13	ETP stipulation operates today to preclude the
14	proposal in this case for a cost-based capacity
15	charge; is that accurate?
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. So, Mr. Hess, are you saying that the
18	same analysis or a comparable analysis was done in
19	the ETP cases as is being advanced in this case by
20	the company?
21	A. No. I am saying it's a more complete
22	analysis that was performed then. This is a short
23	period for an item. The complete analysis was
24	performed in 2000 for the ETP case.
25	MR. RANDAZZO: Mr. Hess, would you speak

1 up, please.

2	Q. Okay. But in the ETP case why don't you
3	give us your understanding in your own words of the
4	analysis that was done to support the calculation of
5	stranded generation investment. That was intended to
6	be a question.
7	A. I'm sorry, I thought I answered that
8	question in my testimony. I'm looking for it.
9	Q. Okay.
10	A. At page 7, question 14, the answer to
11	question 14, actually specifically about line 16.
12	Q. Okay. So this analysis that was done in
13	the ETP case first of all, the company's position
14	in this regard was supported by Dr. Landon and
15	Mr. Kahn, K-a-h-n, is that your understanding?
16	A. I believe it was Dr. Kahn, but, yes.
17	Q. Dr. Kahn, okay. And you reviewed that
18	testimony in preparing your testimony in this case,
19	correct?
20	A. Yes.
21	Q. Okay. So the basic exercise, is it
22	accurate that at that time was to take a long-term
23	view of the energy market and determine whether that
24	on a net-present-value exceeds the exceeds or is
25	less than the net present value of essentially a

1068 1 regulated revenue stream? 2 MR. RANDAZZO: Hold on. Just objection or clarification. When you say "energy market," what 3 4 are you referring to? 5 MR. NOURSE: Well, I'm asking him to 6 describe the exercise and how he would characterize it, so he's referred me to page 7 and I'm trying to 7 8 boil it down a little bit more. 9 I think in some cases in your testimony Q. 10 you refer to the concept of above market, correct? 11 Α. Correct. 12 Ο. Okay. And so it's your position, is it 13 not, that at the time of the ETP case there is an 14 evaluation of whether the net book value of the 15 generation fleet, AEP Ohio, exceeded, was greater 16 than, or was less than a future projection of electricity prices; wholesale and retail? 17 18 I think actually one of the reasons I Α. 19 wanted to include Dr. Landon's JHL-2 on my testimony 20 is to give kind of a clear picture of some of the 21 analysis that we went through. As I mentioned in my testimony, there 2.2 23 were several different ways to do this. As you can 24 see in the analysis, at least from 15, and I'm right 25 now on Exhibit JEH-1, page 1 of 4, the dispatched

1	generation of all the units was multiplied times a
2	projected market rate and then the associated
3	expenses for that generation were excluded from that,
4	and then specific adjustments were made to that
5	further down, and then that value, the net value of
6	that cash flow was discounted back and compared to
7	the net value net book value of the generating
8	plants at 12/31/00.
9	Q. Okay. Well, let me do this, I've got the
10	full testimony I'd like to mark as an exhibit from
11	both Dr. Landon and Dr. Kahn and distribute that and
12	I want to ask you some questions about it. Do you
13	have it with you?
14	A. I could use a copy.
15	MR. NOURSE: Okay. If these weren't so
16	heavy, I'd carry them around at the same time.
17	Let me first mark let me first
18	identify this exhibit, your Honor, it's direct
19	testimony of John H. Landon on behalf of CSP and OPCo
20	in the, okay, I don't have the case number, just a
21	second. I think it's 1729 and 1730.
22	EXAMINER SEE: Yes.
23	MR. NOURSE: 99-1729 and 1730-EL-ETP, as
24	AEP Exhibit
25	EXAMINER SEE: 106 I believe is your next

1070 1 exhibit. 2 MR. NOURSE: Okay. Thank you. 3 Let's go ahead and mark as 107 the 4 testimony of Edward P. Kahn in the same cases. 5 EXAMINER SEE: The exhibits are so 6 marked. 7 (EXHIBITS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 8 Ο. (By Mr. Nourse) Mr. Hess, this is the 9 same testimony you said you reviewed in preparing 10 your testimony? 11 Yes. Just so it's clear, Dr. Landon did Α. 12 supplement his testimony. 13 Yeah, okay. In terms of the numbers that Ο. 14 you use in your JEH-1, however, they would correspond 15 to this version of the testimony, correct? 16 Α. That's correct. 17 Q. Okay. In fact, if you look at Dr. Landon's testimony, I think there's a more 18 19 readable summary of those numbers on page 44. Do you 20 agree? 21 Yeah, they're a little better on this Α. 22 exhibit. 23 And those are the same numbers, the Ο. 24 bottom-line numbers that you've used in your 25 testimony and in your JEH-1 that replicates --

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1	A. Those are the same four pages, yes.
2	Q. Yeah. Okay. So now with respect to
3	Dr. Landon, his analysis of forward pricing, you talk
4	about that a little bit. In your testimony, first of
5	all, page 9, line 7, in Q and A 16 you're talking
6	about the comparison of Landon's methodology to the
7	proposed cost-based formula in this case, correct?
8	A. Page 9?
9	Q. Of your testimony.
10	A. Yes, what was the reference, I'm sorry?
11	Q. Q and A 16.
12	A. Got that.
13	Q. Right. That's where you're comparing
14	Dr. Landon's methodology in the ETP cases to the
15	proposed cost-based formula advanced by the company
16	in this case, correct?
17	A. Yes.
18	Q. Okay. So with respect to Dr. Landon's
19	analysis, his forward projections cover the period
20	2001 to 2030; is that correct?
21	A. That's correct.
22	Q. Okay. And the formula rate in this case
23	covers the 2010 calendar year, correct?
24	A. That's correct.
25	Q. And does Dr. Landon's forward view of

electricity prices cover both wholesale and retail? 1 2 Α. It covers full generation, yes. So that it does cover wholesale and 3 Ο. retail electric sales in the future? 4 5 Yeah, the top line was total gigawatts Α. 6 generated, his price would have been covering both 7 wholesale and retail. 8 Ο. Now, can you turn to page 34 of 9 Dr. Landon's testimony, it would be 106. And this is 10 the section of his testimony that starts on page 33, 11 it covers the forward prices that he recommends, 12 correct? 13 That's correct. Α. 14 Okay. And looking at page 34, can you Q. 15 read the sentence that starts in the middle of line 7 16 and ends in the middle of line 9? "In order to assign value to a generating 17 Α. asset, we would need estimates of future electricity 18 19 spot prices for the entire duration of the remaining 20 useful life of that asset." 21 Okay. So would you agree that based on Ο. 2.2 that statement it was Dr. Landon's view that an 23 appropriate forward analysis of the market price for 24 a particular generating asset should match up with 25 the useful life of asset?

1073 1 THE WITNESS: Could I have the question repeated, please? 2 3 (Record read.) 4 I'm sorry, I don't understand the Α. 5 question. 6 Okay. Well, the sentence you read on 0. page 34 indicates Dr. Landon's opinion, does it not, 7 8 that an appropriate forward estimate would match up 9 with the entire duration of the remaining useful life of that asset, correct? 10 11 MR. RANDAZZO: Can I ask for a 12 clarification? Are you asking him to just focus on 13 that one sentence or the entire answer? 14 MR. NOURSE: He can look at anything else 15 in the testimony he wants to. I was directing his 16 attention to that sentence. 17 MR. RANDAZZO: Thank you. 18 If you're asking me, I mean, the revenue Α. 19 valuation methodology would cover the entire life of 20 the generating plant, the cash associated with the 21 entire life of the generating plant, yes. Well, yeah. And this is the side of the 2.2 Ο. 23 equation in stranded cost valuation that was done 24 that looked at the forward energy price, correct? 25 Α. Correct.

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1	Q. And having read Dr. Landon's testimony in
2	preparation of your own in this case, is it your
3	understanding that Dr. Landon would have accepted a
4	one-year RPM price or a three-year advanced RPM price
5	for a one-year delivery period as an appropriate
6	forward price to use in that comparison?
7	A. I'm sorry, Mr. Nourse, I don't understand
8	the question.
9	Q. Based on this discussion we've had about
10	Dr. Landon's view that if you're going to look
11	forward to the future energy prices and make a
12	judgment as to whether a plant is above market, he's
13	saying that you should look at the entire duration of
14	the remaining useful life of that asset, correct?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. And so would it be appropriate in that
17	context of Dr. Landon's position to use a one-year
18	RPM price such as you're comparing it to in this
19	case?
20	MR. RANDAZZO: I object to the
21	characterization.
22	MR. NOURSE: The witness can explain his
23	position.
24	EXAMINER SEE: Go ahead and answer the
25	question, Mr. Hess.

1075 1 It's a part of my criticism of this Α. 2 request is that the reduced value driven by 2010 was incorporated into his analysis. 2010 was accounted 3 4 for in his calculation. 5 Okay. But in this case aren't you Q. saying, correct me if I'm wrong, that anything above 6 the RPM price is above market and should be rejected 7 8 as untimely stranded cost recovery? 9 I'm saying that that valuation would have Α. 10 been included in this analysis and it was determined 11 at that minute in time that there were no stranded 12 costs. 13 So it's your belief that the RPM price Ο. 14 would have been reflected in Dr. Landon's analysis? 15 RPM prices weren't available at that time Α. 16 but the projected market prices were. 17 Ο. Was Dr. Landon's -- let me back up. 18 Dr. Kahn actually and Dr. Landon worked together in a 19 sense presenting the company's case at that time or 20 the company's valuation for stranded costs in that 21 case; did they not? 2.2 Α. Yes. Dr. Kahn ran the model for 23 Dr. Landon. 24 Ο. Okay. So Dr. Kahn is the source of the 25 forward energy prices, correct?

1076 1 Yeah, I believe his model calculated Α. 2 every third year and Dr. Landon estimated what the 3 prices were in between those periods. 4 Q. Okay. 5 Dr. Kahn's model also dispatched the Α. 6 units based upon certain prices and that's -- he was 7 responsible for the top line, the generation of the 8 output of the plants. 9 MR. RANDAZZO: Mr. Hess, could you speak 10 up, please, or get closer to the microphone. 11 Okay, we'll get back to Dr. Kahn, I just Ο. 12 wanted to make that link and to make sure you agreed 13 with that understanding. 14 All right. So let's go back to what 15 Dr. Landon did, then. So you just indicated a moment 16 ago that the RPM market was not in place in year 2000 17 when this analysis was done, correct? 18 Α. Not to my knowledge; yes. 19 Was there a capacity market, was there Q. 20 any kind of capacity market indicator that was a 21 public pricing indicator available at that time? 2.2 Α. I don't know the answer to that question. 23 Is it fair to -- is it fair to Ο. 24 characterize the analysis that Drs. Kahn and Landon 25 relied on in that ETP case as looking at an

1077 1 energy-only forward price? 2 Α. To my knowledge, it was the projection of what the generating units would realize for the 3 4 generation, the projected prices. 5 Okay. Well, let's look at Dr. Kahn's Q. 6 testimony a little bit and we can tie this together a 7 little bit. That's AEP Exhibit 107, if you could 8 turn your attention to page 16 first. 9 I have that. Α. 10 And this page shows, and he discussed in Q. 11 the text, there's a table showing the input 12 assumptions. Do you see that? 13 Α. Yes. 14 Okay. And does this table, can you Q. 15 review this, does that refresh your recollection that 16 the modeling was done on an energy-only basis? 17 Α. Again, I had assumed it was the No. projected prices for the generating plants. 18 19 MR. RANDAZZO: Mr. Nourse, you might look 20 at the bottom of page 17 where it talks about AEP's 21 capacity. 2.2 MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I object to that 23 kind of whatever he's trying to assist Mr. Hess here. 24 Mr. Hess, let's look at the table I just Ο. 25 directed your attention to. And do you see where it

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1	says "Market Structure"?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. And what does it indicate for the
4	variables that we used for that input?
5	A. That the second column is "ISOs energy
6	only."
7	Q. Now, if you could look at page 18 and
8	direct your attention to the next-to-last sentence on
9	page 18, does that refresh your recollection that the
10	forward prices were an energy-only basis?
11	A. That's what he states here, yes.
12	Q. Okay. Can you turn to Exhibit EPK-5
13	attached to Dr. Kahn's testimony.
14	A. I have that.
15	Q. And does this table not also confirm that
16	the scenarios that Dr. Kahn had developed were
17	reflective of market clearing prices in
18	dollars-per-megawatt-hour calculated down to the
19	totals reflected there?
20	THE WITNESS: Could I have the question
21	reread, please?
22	(Record read.)
23	A. Yes.
24	Q. Now, Mr. Hess, would it be your opinion
25	or understanding that a forward view of energy prices

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1079 1 vintage the year 2000 would be different than a 2 forward view of energy prices as we sit here today in 3 2012? 4 Α. Yes. 5 And would you agree that a forward Q. 6 view -- well, let me back up. 7 Part of Dr. Kahn's analysis reflected 8 essentially two different environmental scenarios; is 9 that your understanding? 10 Α. No. Two different gas prices. 11 Okay. But what's your understanding of, Ο. 12 we're still looking at EPK-5 for the moment, the base 13 environment versus alternative environment? 14 I'm sorry. I don't know what that is. Α. 15 Is it your understanding that Dr. Kahn Q. 16 looked at one scenario of environmental future 17 regulation -- or costs based on regulation? 18 Α. Yes. 19 And you mentioned the two gas -- forward Q. 20 gas price scenarios that are reflected in EPK-5 that 21 is low gas and high gas, right? 2.2 Α. Yes. 23 And that future gas price was essentially Ο. 24 used as a proxy for future energy prices; is that 25 correct? Is that your understanding?

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1	A. No, I think Dr. Landon's more specific
2	about the gas being on the margin. It would have had
3	an impact on the dispatching, generation dispatching.
4	Q. Okay. Well, is it fair to say that the
5	forward gas prices that Dr. Kahn used were a driver
6	for the modeling he did on future energy prices?
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Hess, you, of course,
9	recount in your testimony that you previously worked
10	in this building on a lot of the same cases including
11	the ETP case. You were a member of the staff,
12	correct?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. Okay. And you also worked on AEP's other
15	case, the rate stabilization plan and the ESP 1 case
16	as well on behalf of staff?
17	A. That's correct.
18	Q. And in your testimony in the ESP 1
19	proceeding did you have an opportunity to address
20	staff's view of AEP's stranded cost claim that
21	originated in the ETP case?
22	A. Are you referring to the request for
23	Sporn?
24	Q. Yes, there was a request for closure
25	plant closure costs and that was the context in which

1081 you, I believe, addressed it. Is that your 1 recollection? 2 3 Α. Yes. 4 Okay. And was it your opinion in that Ο. 5 case conveying staff's position that the economic 6 value in the generation fleet of AEP was never 7 specifically addressed by the Commission? 8 Α. I don't remember that in my testimony. 9 Do you remember stating a position on Ο. behalf of staff that it could be assumed that the net 10 11 value of AEP's fleet was not stranded? 12 Α. Yes. 13 And did you state in that case that staff Ο. 14 assumes that the net value of the generating fleet of 15 AEP is still positive? 16 Α. The net value of AEP's fleet is still 17 positive? 18 Ο. Do you recall whether that was your 19 testimony? 20 Α. I don't recall making that statement. 21 I'd like to see it. 2.2 Q. Okay. I can mark this as an exhibit, but 23 I have a couple copies. 24 MR. NOURSE: Counsel, do you have copies 25 of his testimony?

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1	MR. RANDAZZO: No.
2	MR. NOURSE: Okay, I've got one for you.
3	MR. RANDAZZO: Thank you.
4	Q. I'd direct you to page 8, Mr. Hess. Do
5	you see the answer that starts on line 5 and ends on
6	line 17?
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. And there you are talking about the, what
9	you're referring to as the economic value of the
10	generation fleet in the ETP cases, correct?
11	A. Yes.
12	Q. And in the last in the sentence that
13	goes from line 9 to line 11 excuse me, line 9 to
14	line 11, you state, do you not, that the economic
15	value of the fleet was never specifically addressed
16	by the Commission, and you state an assumption that
17	the net value was not stranded, correct?
18	MR. RANDAZZO: I object to the
19	characterization. It's not
20	MR. NOURSE: I asked him if it's correct.
21	He's reading it and he can explain.
22	EXAMINER SEE: The objection is
23	overruled.
24	A. I think what I meant by "never
25	specifically addressed," I don't think the Commission

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1083 1 ever quantified a value for it. 2 Ο. And, therefore, you're saying it could be assumed that the net value was not stranded; isn't 3 4 that your testimony? 5 It could be assumed -- it could be Α. 6 assumed that the company's fleet was not stranded, 7 that's correct. 8 Ο. All right. And did staff have that 9 assumption? 10 Yes, I think we agreed to that, that Α. 11 there were no transition costs associated with the generating fleet and that we agreed with the company 12 13 on that. 14 And you state at lines 16 and 17 that we, Ο. 15 and by that I mean, I take it you refer to the staff, 16 are assuming that net value of the generating fleet 17 is still positive. Do you see that? 18 Α. Yes. 19 So by "still positive" does that suggest Q. 20 that you or staff believed all along that there was 21 never a stranded investment in AEP generation fleet? 2.2 Α. That's correct, it was never a stranded 23 investment in AEP's generating fleet. 24 Ο. Okay. And your statement in the full 25 sentence of line 15 through 17 is saying because the

1084 1 market rates have increased significantly since that 2 time of the ETP cases, the stranded benefit would 3 only be even greater; is that what you're saying 4 there? 5 I don't say "because." I say given that Α. 6 the market rates have increased significantly. 7 MR. RANDAZZO: Mr. Hess, please speak up. EXAMINER SEE: Just a minute, Mr. Nourse. 8 9 I'm sorry. MR. NOURSE: 10 EXAMINER SEE: Let us switch out the 11 microphone, please. 12 Ο. You say "given," you don't say "because." 13 With that correction, do you agree with the rest 14 of --15 There were no stranded investments in Α. 16 2000 and there were no stranded investments in 2009. 17 Now, let's go back to your testimony here Q. in this case. Let me ask you first to go to page 4, 18 19 and in line 17 you make a statement that the period 20 for recovering stranded generation plant costs ended 21 by no later than December 31st, 2005, correct? 2.2 Α. Yes. 23 Ο. Okay. And what was supposed to happen on 24 January 1st, 2006? 25 The market development period ended. Α.

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1	Q. And what happened to SSO rates at that
2	time? What was supposed to happen under Senate
3	Bill 3 to SSO rates?
4	A. As did happen, they continued to stay on
5	market rate.
6	Q. You say continued to stay at market rate.
7	Is it your belief that the SSO rate for nonshopping
8	customers during the market development period
9	reflected a market rate?
10	A. It had to, 4928.14 said that it had to.
11	Q. Okay. And so the unbundled legacy rates
12	were fairly characterized as a market rate with
13	respect to the generation rate?
14	A. As defined by the legislature, yes.
15	Q. Okay. But let's back up, Mr. Hess. I
16	mean, wasn't the notion that, I'll say the unbundled
17	generation rates during the market development
18	period, were those rates constrained in any way?
19	A. They were frozen, yes.
20	Q. Okay. And so what was supposed to happen
21	January 1st, 2006, relative to those constrained
22	A. They were no longer frozen.
23	Q. And was it supposed to be a fully
24	market-based SSO rate at that time?
25	A. As it was, yes.

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1	Q. Your opinion was the rates well, first
2	let me ask you, the actual rate plan that was adopted
3	for 2006 through 2008, those were referred to as rate
4	stabilization plans?
5	A. Yes.
6	Q. Okay. And it's your opinion that the SSO
7	rates that were adopted under the rate stabilization
8	plan for AEP Ohio was a fully market-based rate?
9	A. It had to be, yes, sir.
10	Q. Well, I'm not asking you what the law
11	said. I'm not even referring to the statutes. I'm
12	asking you for your opinion in connection with my
13	point about constraints or free of constraints, was
14	the rate under the ESP excuse me, the RSP in 2006
15	a unconstrained market rate?
16	A. It was a market rate. It was constrained
17	by the company's plan.
18	Q. So the company agreed to not go to
19	<pre>market; isn't that fair?</pre>
20	A. No. The company agreed to provide a
21	market rate.
22	Q. Were market rates higher at that time
23	than the SSO rates, in your opinion?
24	A. Could I ask you too, when you say "the
25	company," what company are you referring to? The

1087 distribution company? The distribution function? 1 2 Ο. I'm talking about SSO rates in our entire 3 discussion. 4 Α. So it was the distribution company would 5 have had to provide market-based rates, yes. 6 Again, I'm not asking you what the Ο. 7 statute said. 8 Α. And I'm not just responding to the 9 statute. It was a market-based rate, yes. 10 So it's your opinion -- let me ask you Q. 11 this: Was it your understanding that the Commission 12 requested AEP Ohio that AEP Ohio file a rate 13 stabilization plan? 14 It requested the distribution function of Α. Columbus & Southern and Ohio Power to file a rate 15 16 stabilization plan, yes. 17 Q. That's what I'm talking about. The EDU, the SSO rates, you understand those acronyms, right? 18 19 Α. Yes. 20 So did the Commission request that the Q. 21 AEP Ohio electric distribution utility file an SSO 2.2 plan that maintains stability and did not go to a 23 true market rate at that time? 24 No, sir. I don't think they said do not Α. 25 go to a true market rate. I think they asked you to

1088 1 provide a rate stabilization plan. 2 Ο. And your opinion is the rate --3 stabilization plan rates that largely continued the 4 prior rates, correct? 5 No. There were percentage increases Α. 6 applied to both of the generation rates that had been in place before. 7 8 Ο. Okay. What were those percentage 9 increases? 10 Α. 3 percent for Columbus & Southern and 11 7 percent for Ohio Power with the potential of an a 12 additional 4 percent for both companies. 13 Okay. And is it your opinion that those Ο. 14 particular percentages matched up with a true market 15 rate at that time? 16 Yes. They had to, Mr. Nourse. Α. 17 Q. Well, okay. 18 Mr. Hess, let me ask you this: Do you 19 understand, is it your opinion that the opportunity 20 for stranded costs under Senate Bill 3 was linked to 21 getting to charge market rates after the market 2.2 development period? 23 Well, first of all, are we referring to Α. transition costs under the statute? 24 25 Yes, and I'm focusing on nonregulatory Q.

asset transition costs or stranded generation like 1 2 the focus of your testimony here. That was linked to going to market rates? 3 Α. 4 I don't know the answer to that. 5 Okay. If I were to read to you a Q. 6 provision in the law 4928.37 that says that the 7 transition cost recovery provides an electric 8 utility, quote, the opportunity to receive transition 9 revenues that may assist it in making the transition 10 to a fully competitive retail electric generation 11 market, period, end quote, does that help make the 12 connection --13 Α. No. 14 -- to refresh your memory? Ο. 15 Could you read it again? I'm sorry. Α. 16 The statute 4928.37 says that Senate Bill 0. 17 3 provides an electric utility, quote, the 18 opportunity to receive transition revenues that may 19 assist it in making the transition to a fully 20 competitive retail electric generation market, 21 period, end quote. 2.2 Α. I'll agree that that's an accurate 23 reading, yes. 24 Okay. So receiving the transition 0. 25 revenues was quid pro quo for going to the fully

1090 1 competitive generation market starting in 2006, 2 correct? I don't think that's what that says. It 3 Α. says that assists the utility company in getting to a 4 5 fully -- to a full market. 6 And were the transition revenues to 0. continue beyond the market development period? 7 8 Α. Transition cost recovery could, if it was 9 associated with the regulatory asset. 10 Again, I'm asking about the nonregulatory Q. 11 asset, the stranded generation that's the topic of 12 your testimony. 13 Okay. No, they could not go beyond Α. 14 12/31/05. 15 Okay. Let me ask you to turn to page 5 Q. 16 of your testimony. The first full sentence on page 17 5, can you read that sentence? I just want to 18 clarify what you mean by that sentence for the 19 record. 20 Have you read it? 21 Α. Yes. 2.2 Are you saying that nonshopping customers Q. 23 were deemed to contribute to stranded cost recovery 24 without paying anything more than their unbundled 25 generation rate?

1091 1 Α. Yes. 2 Q. So the unbundled generation rate was 3 deemed to recover stranded costs without any 4 additional generation transition charge? 5 Α. Yes. 6 So continuation of the same default Ο. 7 supply price on January 1st, 2006, would that have 8 been a form of additional transition revenue after 9 the market development period under your view? 10 Α. No. That would have been just a market 11 rate without continuation of the GTC as it would have 12 been identified as. 13 Okay. And you're familiar with the terms Ο. 14 that were used at the time of big "G" and little "g"? 15 Α. Yes. 16 Ο. What does that mean to you? 17 Α. Big "G" was the amount left over after we 18 unbundled the D and the T from the vertically 19 integrated rate, and little "g" was the difference 20 between big "G" and any stranded cost recovery 21 charge. 2.2 Ο. And was little "g" bypassable for 23 shoppers? 24 Α. Well, are we talking about CSP and Ohio 25 Power here?

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1	Q. Yeah.
2	A. I believe that's correct, yes. It was an
3	avoidable charge model.
4	Q. Okay. So this statement, the sentence at
5	the top of page 5, is that even applicable to
6	AEP Ohio?
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. How so?
9	A. Well, embedded within the default
10	generation supply price during the market development
11	period was a recovery mechanism for stranded costs.
12	Q. Are you saying that AEP Ohio received
13	recovery of stranded generation costs that did not
14	relate to regulatory assets?
15	A. I'm sorry. That's correct. No. You're
16	right. I was confused there. There was no GTC built
17	into the standard service offer for Ohio Power and
18	CSP.
19	Q. Okay. Now, is it your opinion that the
20	ETP stipulation that was entered into covered the
21	period from 2001 to 2005, the end of 2005?
22	A. No. There were provisions in there that
23	went beyond 2005.
24	Q. Such as?
25	A. The regulatory asset recovery mechanism,

1093 a distribution rate freeze. 1 2 Ο. So the first one, the regulatory asset 3 recovery mechanism, that's, again, that's not related 4 to stranded generation investment, or stranded 5 generation costs, correct? Those are other 6 regulatory assets that may relate to the transition, 7 to competition; is that your understanding? 8 Α. They were regulatory assets, yes, as 9 defined by 4928.1(F)(26) I believe. 10 All I'm asking, those regulatory assets Q. 11 did not relate to stranded generation investment, 12 correct? MR. RANDAZZO: Could I have the question 13 14 read back, please. 15 (Record read.) 16 I think for the most part a lot of them Α. 17 were directly related to the generating assets. 18 Okay. But are you saying the regulatory Ο. 19 assets that were recovered through GTC under the 20 stipulation constituted stranded generation costs? 21 As that term is --2.2 Α. Did you mean to say "RTC"? 23 Ο. Yes. 24 Yeah, we were required to break it down Α. 25 between regulatory asset transition costs and other

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1	generation-related transition costs. And the RTC
2	recovery mechanism related to the regulatory asset
3	recovery transition cost recovery mechanism.
4	Q. Okay. Can you turn to page 6. At the
5	top of the page you're listing the four your
6	understanding of the four criteria that qualify
7	receipt of transition revenue, right?
8	A. Yes. Can I correct that?
9	Q. Okay.
10	A. To identify transition costs. These were
11	the four criteria.
12	Q. Okay. Well, all right. But those are
13	the screening criteria to see if something was
14	eligible for collection as a transition charge,
15	correct?
16	A. Screening mechanism, the criteria for
17	determining whether an item was recoverable as
18	transition costs to be recovered by a transition
19	charge, yes.
20	Q. Okay. And with respect to kind of the
21	issue that you're raising now in your testimony
22	today, that really relates to criteria No. 3, right?
23	A. I'm not certain what you're asking me.
24	Q. Okay.
25	A. If we're I don't understand the

1 question.

2	Q. Okay. Your position today is that
3	generation costs, capacity costs that exceed the RPM
4	capacity market price are equal to those costs that
5	are unrecoverable in a competitive market; is that
6	accurate?
7	A. Yeah, my testimony is that the capacity
8	cost formula requested by the company would not
9	qualify as a transition cost. And those costs were
10	accounted for in the original calculation.
11	Q. Those costs, let's focus in on that.
12	Those costs that you referred to, you're saying the
13	costs that would exceed the RPM the current RPM
14	price, right?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. Okay. And your basis for saying the
17	costs that exceed the RPM price today were are
18	unrecoverable in a competitive market is the ETP
19	stipulation and testimony, correct?
20	A. Correct.
21	Q. Okay. On page 6 you also make reference
22	and I believe somewhere in here you might, yeah, you
23	refer to advice of counsel at the bottom of 6
24	carrying over to page 7. Do you see that statement?
25	A. Yes.

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1	Q. And you're referring to RC 4928.141 which
2	you say was added after Senate Bill 3, excluded any
3	previously authorized allowances for transition costs
4	with the exclusion becoming effective on and after
5	the date the allowance was scheduled to end under the
6	prior rate plan. That's you're stating your
7	understanding of that provision, right?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. Okay. And I'm going to read you what
10	4928.141 says. Quote, A standard service offer under
11	Section 4928.142 or 4928.143 of the Revised Code
12	shall exclude any previously authorized allowances
13	for transition costs, for such exclusion being
14	effective on and after the date that the allowance is
15	scheduled to end under the utility's rate plan,
16	period, end of quote.
17	Does that refresh your recollection of
18	what that provision does?
19	A. Yes.
20	Q. And is that referring to previously
21	authorized allowances for transition costs?
22	A. I'm sorry, Mr. Nourse, could you read
23	that for me again?
24	Q. Yeah. Let's just look at your testimony.
25	At the top of page 7, line 1, you say "excluded

1097 1 any previously authorized allowances for transition 2 costs...." So that's the scope of that provision, right, it's talking about previously authorized --3 4 MR. RANDAZZO: We'll stipulate to that. 5 We'll stipulate to that. 6 MR. NOURSE: Yeah. 7 Q. So does this provision apply to AEP Ohio 8 that you discuss here? 9 Α. No. Yeah, I see your point now. No, no 10 uneconomic plan, no GTCs had been previously 11 authorized. 12 Ο. Okay. Mr. Hess, do you agree that the 13 capacity charge at issue in this case is a wholesale 14 charge paid from a CRES provider to PJM who in turn 15 pays AEP Ohio? 16 Α. And then later passed on to the retail customer, yes. 17 18 Ο. Passed on to the retail customer by the 19 CRES provider? 20 Α. Yes. 21 Okay. Well, let's talk about that. You Ο. 2.2 assume that in your testimony, page 16. Do you want 23 to jump there? And the first part of answer 24, 24 that's what you're referring to? 25 I'm sorry. What am I referring to? Α.

1098 1 In your prior answer just now you said Ο. 2 the capacity charge paid by CRES providers is passed through to retail customers. 3 4 Α. Yes. 5 And that's what you're referring to here Ο. on page 16 starting in line 9, you say it's common 6 sense that CRES providers will pass through changes 7 8 such as, you go on to say capacity charge. 9 Α. Yes. 10 The decision whether to pass Q. Okay. 11 through such a charge or an increase in a capacity 12 charge like that is the CRES provider's, individual 13 CRES provider's decision, correct? 14 Well, I mean, the decision would be Α. 15 theirs but they wouldn't be an ongoing entity and they wouldn't be able to sustain their business if 16 17 they didn't pass that cost on. 18 Well, when you say pass it on, let's Ο. 19 clarify it. You're just saying the retail rates 20 generally speaking would cover the cost of doing 21 business including capacity charges they pay, right? 2.2 Α. Okay. 23 Well, let me ask it this way: If the Ο. 24 Commission adopts a capacity charge increase from the 25 RPM, the two-tiered system in place right now to

1099 something higher, are you saying that all of the CRES 1 retail customers will experience rate increases in 2 3 direct proportion to the increase that occurs? 4 Some of the terms and conditions that Α. 5 I've seen would do that, yes. 6 Would allow the CRES provider to pass it 0. 7 through if they choose to do so; is that what you're 8 saying? 9 Α. Yes. 10 Okay. So if a CRES provider already had Q. 11 a high margin, they were able to absorb that 12 increase, or some other cost of doing business 13 changed, they wouldn't necessarily pass it on in the 14 form of a retail rate increase, would they? 15 Well, again, Mr. Nourse, I assume here Α. 16 for the regulatory model we have to assume that that 17 cost is passed on or the entity isn't going to 18 survive. 19 What regulatory model are you talking Q. 20 about? 21 The establishment of a retail rate. Α. 2.2 Ο. Does the Commission approve CRES retail 23 rate levels or increases? 24 Α. No. 25 Q. Now, you stated that CRES providers

1100 1 wouldn't be an ongoing concern or business if they 2 didn't pass through their costs to their customers, a 3 moment ago, right? 4 Α. Yes. 5 Would the same be true for AEP Ohio? Q. 6 It would be for AEP Ohio, but I don't Α. 7 think you could look at a short-term -- if you're 8 referring to if you didn't recover these costs in the 9 two-year period, I think it's unfair. It has to be 10 looked at over a longer term period. 11 A CRES provider's contract is only for 12 two or three years, one, two, or three years. 13 So that's your opinion. Q. 14 Α. Yes. 15 Okay. Now, also -- let me go back to Q. 16 where we were before. Actually, I'm going to cover another item while we're on page 16 here. The bottom 17 half of answer 24, you're stating that AEP Witness 18 19 Baker and Witness Thomas have included RPM-based 20 capacity prices as part of the MRO test. Is that 21 accurate? 2.2 Α. No. 23 What are you stating here by --Q. 24 That they have included capacity price as Α. 25 a necessary component of a competitive retail market,

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1	not RPM. I don't think Laura Thomas
2	Q. Okay. So, yeah
3	A. I think her I think the capacity price
4	that she used was the formula method. I think Craig
5	used the RPM; if I remember correctly, Laura used the
6	formula based method.
7	Q. Okay. And, again, is all you're saying
8	here is that the capacity prices paid by a CRES
9	provider are a cost of doing business?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q. Okay.
12	A. As recognized by AEP Ohio.
13	Q. Right. Okay. Now let me ask you just in
14	terms of your sort of overarching argument as I
15	understand it that the ETP stipulation, you know, is
16	a controlling document or has a commitment that
17	controls today whether AEP Ohio can charge a
18	cost-based rate for capacity. That's an accurate
19	summary of your argument, isn't it?
20	A. I think it was a commitment by AEP not to
21	do this into the future, yes. And in fairness that
22	we all agreed there were things that were given up by
23	the other parties who signed that settlement and I
24	think in fairness AEP should be held to that
25	commitment.

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1	Q. Right. So is it fair to say that
2	everyone that signed the ETP stipulation also
3	understood as a premise or a prominent feature of
4	Senate Bill 3 that fully market-based SSO rates would
5	be paid starting in 2006?
6	A. I can't speak for any other parties. I
7	don't know the answer to that. As I stated earlier
8	in my testimony, that is what happened.
9	Q. That is a requirement that was a
10	requirement under Senate Bill 3, was it not?
11	A. What was a requirement under Senate Bill
12	3?
13	Q. Charging fully market-based rates
14	starting January 1st, 2006?
15	A. Yes, it was required under 4928.14.
16	Q. So is there any reason the parties would
17	have contemplated, let alone addressed, any future
18	restrictions under a future regulatory regime that
19	may be different than that?
20	A. Again, I can't answer for any of the
21	other parties.
22	Q. Well, you are stating you just stated
23	two answers ago that you're asserting the rights of
24	parties that signed the stipulation in your fairness
25	argument about the package deal, so I'm asking you is

1103 1 there a reason that parties in that agreement, given the current state of affairs under Senate Bill 3, 2 3 would have addressed any future restrictions that 4 might apply to a future regulatory regime that came 5 into being after Senate Bill 3? 6 MR. RANDAZZO: Could I have the question 7 read back? 8 MR. NOURSE: I would suggest we read the 9 question before. Or let me just rephrase it. 10 So, Mr. Hess, is there any reason the Q. 11 parties to the ETP stipulation would have contemplated, let alone addressed in any future 12 13 restrictions under a future regulatory regime that 14 might be different than the one embodied in Senate Bill 3? 15 16 No, and that is what was applied. Α. 17 Ο. So, Mr. Hess, in your opinion has anything changed about the platforms that were 18 19 enacted with Senate Bill 3 as we sit here today? 20 No. The policy of the state is to Α. 21 continue to go towards retail rates, policy of the 2.2 Commission has been that way. 23 Senate Bill 221 did allow a little bit 24 more discretion by the Commission in establishing a 25 market-based rate, but the general platform has not

1104 1 changed nor has the Commission's position on it. 2 Q. Okay. We'll get to that. 3 So, Mr. Hess, is your argument based 4 on -- is your argument that AEP is currently 5 precluded from charging a cost-based capacity charge 6 based on Senate Bill 3 or is it based on the 7 stipulation that you refer to in your testimony? 8 Α. Well, Senate Bill 3 limited transition 9 cost recovery for uneconomic plant through 10 12/31/05 and the company said that they would not 11 charge customers for uneconomic plant. So a 12 combination of the two. 13 So that period in the market development Ο. period, Senate Bill 3 permitted recovery of 14 15 transition costs subject to certain criteria, and 16 the -- I'm sorry, you were nodding your head, do you 17 agree with that? 18 Α. That's correct, yes. 19 And the stipulation said that AEP was not Q. 20 going to pursue that possible transition cost 21 recovery period; is that right? Well, I'm looking for the language from 2.2 Α. 23 the stipulation. I think I have it somewhere here in 24 my testimony. AEP Ohio committed not to impose any 25 lost revenue charges, generation transition charges,

1105 1 GTCs on any switching customers. 2 Q. All right. And lost revenue charges are defined under Senate Bill 3 -- were they? Were they 3 4 defined under Senate Bill 3? 5 Α. No. 6 Okay. So what is your interpretation of Ο. what that phrase means? 7 8 Α. No GTC, no uneconomic plant. GTC was the assumed acronym for the recovery of uneconomic --9 10 transition charges associated with uneconomic plant. 11 And that allowance or possibility of Ο. 12 recovering GTC was limited to the market development 13 period, was it not? 14 By Senate Bill 3, yes, it was. Α. 15 Q. Okay. 16 And in addition to that, AEP Ohio said Α. that they would never do that. 17 18 Where do you see where they said they Ο. 19 would never do that? 20 Well, I assume it doesn't say "never." Α. 21 It says we will not impose any lost revenue charges, 2.2 generation transition charges, on any switching 23 customers. 24 Okay. So, again, that's your --Ο. 25 There was no time limit on that so I Α.

assumed it was forever. 1 2 Ο. But you stated that the law, Senate Bill 3, restricted the time limit to the five-year window 3 4 of the market development period, did it not? 5 Α. Yes. 6 Okay. Now, Mr. Hess, would your argument Ο. 7 be the same regardless of whether AEP asked for 8 nothing under the transition cost recovery allowance 9 or whether it asked for billions of dollars and 10 recovered billions of dollars, or whether it asked 11 for something and then gave up their claim? Do anv 12 of those scenarios really make a difference as we sit 13 here today? 14 Well, the fact is the company did ask for Α. 15 something and gave up their claim. 16 So that's one of the three scenarios. Ο. 17 Would your argument be the same if AEP never advanced 18 a claim for transition charges? 19 MR. RANDAZZO: Could I have a 20 clarification. You keep using the word "arguments," 21 Mr. Nourse, are you asking about his opinions? 2.2 MR. NOURSE: Well, I think it stands for 23 itself. I'm asking about his testimony, his 24 positions. Obviously, he stated in his testimony 25 he's supporting arguments, Mr. Randazzo, that you're

1 making and so if there's any lack of clarity there, 2 please let me know.

A. My testimony's based on the commitment of the company not to charge GTC rates to shopping customers. The scenario as to whether or not they had requested it, had not requested it, or any of the three scenarios that you had put before me, I don't think would change that opinion based upon that statement.

Q. Right. So your position is really based on what Senate Bill 3 allowed and didn't allow; is that accurate?

A. No. It's based upon the company'scommitment not to do it.

Q. All right. Did the ETP stipulation, in your opinion, govern SSO pricing after the market development period?

18 A. I don't remember a specific provision of19 that. I don't think it did, no.

20 Q. Would you characterize the rate 21 stabilization plan for AEP Ohio as providing an 22 additional transition period beyond the market 23 development period?

A. No. I think it's probably better characterized as just a rate stabilization period.

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1	Q. So in your opinion, Mr. Hess, the rate
2	stabilization plan fully implemented Senate Bill 3's
3	requirements for market-based rates starting in
4	January 2006?
5	A. It had to, Mr. Nourse.
6	Q. Okay. Let me talk to you a little bit
7	more about Senate Bill 221. First of all, did IEU
8	support Senate Bill 3 in proceeding to fully
9	competitive retail shopping in Ohio?
10	A. Did IEU-Ohio support that?
11	Q. Yeah.
12	A. I don't know the answer to that.
13	MR. NOURSE: Okay. Let me mark AEP
14	Exhibit
15	MR. RANDAZZO: We'll stipulate we did.
16	MR. NOURSE: 108.
17	MR. RANDAZZO: If it shortens this up.
18	A. Yeah, I don't know specifically but I
19	would have to assume, knowing Mr. Randazzo, that they
20	did, yes.
21	MR. NOURSE: Well, we don't want to
22	shorten our presentation up, Mr. Randazzo.
23	MR. RANDAZZO: No, we don't want to do
24	that but we'll stipulate that we supported Senate
25	Bill 3 that was passed unanimously except for one

1109 1 vote by the General Assembly. 2 Q. Mr. Hess, do you have Exhibit 108? 3 EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Nourse, you're going to have to mark this as 108, the Exhibit is so 4 5 marked. 6 MR. NOURSE: I believe that's what we're 7 up to, your Honor. 8 EXAMINER SEE: Yes. 9 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) I have that, yes. 10 Α. 11 (By Mr. Nourse) Okay, Mr. Hess, if you 0. 12 could turn to page 4, first of all, this is a motion 13 to intervene by IEU-Ohio in the ETP cases that you've 14 been discussing, correct? 15 Α. Yes. 16 Okay. Could you review the statements 0. 17 made on page 4. 18 Α. I see those, yes. 19 Okay. And is it accurate to say that IEU Q. 20 has been active in state and federal regulatory 21 proceedings to advocate retail competition in Ohio? 2.2 Α. Yes. 23 And is it accurate to state that -- well, Ο. 24 let me just read a sentence that's the last full sentence on the page. "IEU-Ohio's direct interest in 25

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1	these proceedings is also the result of the effect
2	these proceedings will have upon the formation of a
3	dynamically efficient generation market that must be
4	functioning by no later than December 31st, 2005,
5	(as required by Chapter 4928, Revised Code) to
6	promote protect and to promote public interest."
7	Do you see that?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. Is it fair to say that the consensus,
10	view, and expectation around the year 2000 was that,
11	number one, the market rates would remain below
12	standard service offer rates after the market
13	development period?
14	MR. RANDAZZO: Could I have the question
15	read back?
16	MR. NOURSE: Let me rephrase.
17	Q. Mr. Hess, is it your understanding that
18	the advocates of Senate Bill 3 believe that market
19	rates will be more favorable than SSO rates after the
20	market development period?
21	A. Can you explain to me what you mean by
22	"more favorable"?
23	Q. Lower.
24	A. I don't believe that's correct, no.
25	Q. Do you believe they thought market rates

1111 1 would be higher? 2 Α. Than -- particularly whose rates? 3 Q. SSO rates. 4 Α. For what company? 5 AEP Ohio. Q. 6 Yeah, I don't know the answer to that. Α. 7 don't know that there was an assumption in 2000 about 8 where rates would be in 2006; higher or lower. 9 Okay. And as we proceeded through the Ο. 10 market development period and we entered into rate 11 stabilization plans in the Ohio EDUs, did AEP --12 excuse me, did IEU maintain its position that the 13 Commission should proceed to a fully competitive SSO 14 environment? 15 Α. I don't remember that. 16 Ο. Do you recall whether IEU advocated 17 making changes to Senate Bill 3 as the rate 18 stabilization plans were drawing to an end? 19 I don't remember that. Α. 20 Q. Okay. 21 MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I'd like to mark 2.2 AEP Exhibit 109. 23 EXAMINER SEE: The exhibit is so marked. 24 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 25 Q. Mr. Hess, do you see the document

1112 entitled "Electricity Post 2008, A Common Sense 1 Blueprint for Ohio"? 2 3 Α. Yes. 4 Ο. And does this appear to be an IEU-Ohio 5 document? 6 Α. At the top right corner of that page it 7 has the IEU logo on it. 8 Ο. Okay. Looking at the first page, the fourth paragraph, it says "The rate shock clock is 9 10 ticking in Ohio." Do you see that? 11 Α. Yes. 12 Ο. Do you have an understanding of what that 13 means? 14 Α. No. 15 If you look at page 5, in the middle of Q. 16 the page, can you read the paragraph that starts "The 17 PUCO was also somewhat passive.... "? Read it out 18 loud, please. 19 "The PUCO was also somewhat passive Α. 20 during all the rate stabilization proceedings as the 21 utilities threatened to 'go to market' if 2.2 stakeholders and the PUCO did not accept the 23 utility's rate stabilization plan demands. As a 24 result of the PUCO's response to these 'qo-to-market' 25 threats, customer representatives found themselves

1113 with little leverage to achieve outcomes that were 1 materially different than those associated with the 2 3 demands of the utilities." 4 Q. Okay. And does this suggest to you that 5 market rates were equal to the SSO rates? Reflected 6 in the rate stabilization plans? 7 Α. No. I'm not sure what this means. 8 Ο. Well, it uses the word "threatened" --9 "threat" multiple times, so is it fair to assume if 10 someone's threatening to go to market that would 11 result in a rate increase? 12 Α. No, it simply means that it was 13 threatening to go to market. 14 And you don't have any idea, first page, Q. 15 what the statement "the rate shock clock is ticking 16 in Ohio" means? 17 Α. No. 18 Do you know what "rate shock" is? Q. 19 It's a substantial increase in rates. A Α. 20 one-time substantial increase in rates. 21 Okay. Let's look at page 2. There's a Ο. 2.2 box there that has a summary of recommendations. Do 23 you see that? 24 Α. Yes. 25 Q. And could you read No. 2 and state your

1 understanding of what that means? 2 Α. I understand factually that the request to repeal the generation service as a competitive 3 4 service, I'm not sure I understand what it does mean. 5 Okay. Could you turn to page 11 of the Q. 6 document. Can you review the paragraph "Getting back to the 'good old days'.... " And does that help your 7 8 understanding of what No. 2 means? 9 I'm still -- I still don't really Α. understand what it means. 10 11 Okay. On page 11 can you read the Ο. sentence right above the bold, read it aloud, please. 12 13 "We recommend that the General Assembly Α. 14 repeal the statutory --" 15 No, I'm sorry. Above the bold area, the Q. 16 sentence right before that. 17 Α. "If the statutory declaration that 18 generation service is competitive is repealed, 19 generation service would be classified as a 20 noncompetitive service and the market-based pricing 21 standard would not apply until such time as the PUCO 2.2 might determine that generation service met the 23 competitive service criteria." 24 Ο. So doesn't that suggest to you that IEU's position at that time was that generation service was 25

1115 1 not fully competitive? 2 Α. It could suggest that, yes. 3 Ο. Okay. Can you go back to page 2 and 4 review item 3. 5 Α. I see it. 6 Okay. And was it your understanding that Ο. under Senate Bill 3 electric distribution utilities 7 8 could transfer or sell generation units without the 9 PUCO's approval? 10 Α. Yes. 11 And here IEU is recommending that that Ο. 12 provision be repealed such that the -- so the 13 Commission could, quote/unquote, manage the risks 14 presented by claims and schemes like those of 15 Monongahela Power. Do you see that, unquote? 16 Α. It's 4928.17(E). 17 Ο. Is the provision that had previously 18 allowed generation asset to be transferred without 19 approval that's what's being --20 Okay. And your question was? Α. MR. RANDAZZO: If it will move this 21 2.2 along, we will stipulate that we recommended that. 23 Okay. So IEU here was recommending that Ο. 24 the Commission be -- that that provision be repealed; 25 is that your understanding?

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1	A. Yes.
2	Q. And that the Commission be given
3	authority, again, to approve generation transfers; is
4	that your understanding?
5	A. Yes.
6	Q. And IEU's purpose, stated purpose here
7	was to give the Commission authority to, quote,
8	manage the risks presented by claims and schemes like
9	those of Monongahela Power, unquote, correct?
10	A. That's what it reads, yes.
11	Q. And what's your understanding, you were
12	involved with the, I'll call it Mon Power situation
13	because I don't like to say "Monongahela." You were
14	involved in that when you were on staff?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. And what's your understanding of the
17	situation being referred to here?
18	A. I'm not sure what situation is being
19	referred to here. Monongahela Power wanted ended
20	its market development period at the end of '03 and
21	started buying power I believe in the day-ahead
22	market. It was only allowed to charge its rates that
23	were a part of its unbundled that it had unbundled
24	as part of Senate Bill 3 and it deferred the costs
25	between what it was purchasing power for and what it

1 was charging customers. 2 Q. Did Mon Power or Allegheny transfer the assets that were previously owned by Mon Power in the 3 4 EDU to an affiliate? 5 I don't believe Monongahela Power ever Α. 6 owned any generating assets. 7 Q. Okay. But did the -- what Mon Power and 8 Allegheny wanted to do was charge a market price for 9 purchased power, essentially, supporting the SSO offer; is that correct? 10 11 Yes, during '04 and '05. Α. 12 Ο. Okay. So is it your understanding that 13 IEU here in recommendation 3 is saying the Commission 14 should be given authority to block transfers of 15 assets to avoid this situation of having to be faced 16 with paying market rates? I don't know the answer to that. 17 Α. T'm not. 18 even certain what IEU's referring to here when it's 19 referring to those owed Monongahela Power. 20 Is it fair to say there was a big stir-up Ο. 21 in terms of litigation with this issue when Mon Power 2.2 attempted to pass through market rates? 23 Well, again, I responded to you about Α. 24 what I was involved with with Monongahela Power. I'm 25 not sure what's being referred to in the IEU document

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1	when it references Mon Power.
2	Q. My last question was related to
3	A. And yes, there was a big stir-up.
4	Q. Okay. Please turn to page 3 of this
5	document. There's a statement or there's a paragraph
6	that starts "SB 3 assumed that effective
7	competition" Do you see that?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. Can you read aloud the first sentence in
10	that paragraph?
11	A. "SB 3 assumed that effective competition
12	would lower prices relative to 1999 levels and
13	billions of dollars were paid to Ohio electric
14	utilities - all of them - as 'stranded' or
15	'transition' costs based upon estimates of the future
16	electric prices that would be produced by effective
17	competition."
18	Q. Okay. So does this statement, is it
19	consistent with you stated your personal
20	understanding earlier that the move to lower
21	market-based prices would be forthcoming in exchange
22	for paying stranded costs; do you recall your earlier
23	statement on that?
24	A. I don't think I ever said that. I never
25	assumed lower market prices were coming.

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1	Q. Well, I'm asking you if this statement is
2	consistent with what you stated your personal view
3	earlier to be.
4	A. Well, it certainly isn't as far as Senate
5	Bill 3 assumed that the effective competition would
6	lower prices relative to 1999 levels.
7	Q. Next let me ask you about the statement
8	here that says "billions of dollars were paid to
9	Ohio electric utilities - all of them - as 'stranded'
10	or 'transition' costs" Do you see that?
11	A. Yes.
12	Q. Is that statement true as applied to
13	AEP Ohio?
14	A. Yes.
15	Q. And what are the billions of dollars that
16	were paid to AEP Ohio as stranded or transition
17	costs?
18	A. AEP Ohio recovered the regulatory assets.
19	Q. So what AEP Ohio recovered was not
20	stranded generation investment, correct?
21	A. That's correct.
22	Q. Thank you.
23	MR. RANDAZZO: Can I have that question
24	read back, please?
25	(Record read.)

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1	MR. RANDAZZO: I'm sorry, what was the
2	answer?
3	MR. NOURSE: I believe the question was
4	already answered.
5	THE REPORTER: "That's correct."
6	Q. Okay, Mr. Hess, let's return to your
7	testimony, talk a bit more about Senate Bill 221,
8	your understanding as a nonlegal person that's been
9	involved with these issues for a number of years,
10	okay?
11	A. Yes.
12	Q. Now, do you agree that Senate Bill 221
13	let me back up.
14	Is it fair to characterize Senate Bill 3
15	as deregulation of retail?
16	A. No. Restructuring.
17	Q. Okay. Was there supposed to be
18	regulation of generation SSO rates after 2006, price
19	regulation?
20	A. It was to be the Commission had the
21	authority to approve or disapprove.
22	Q. And
23	A. Based upon market rate.
24	Q. Okay. Is it fair, in your opinion, to
25	characterize Senate Bill 221 as exerting an

1121 additional degree of regulation over generation 1 2 standard service pricing? Could you be more specific what you're 3 Α. 4 referring to? 5 Would you characterize Senate Bill 221 as Ο. 6 another stage of restructuring? 7 Α. No. 8 Ο. How would you characterize it? 9 It changed the Commission's ability to Α. value a market-based rate. 10 11 Is the market-based rate language that Ο. 12 you referred to earlier from Senate Bill 3 still in Senate Bill 221? 13 14 I don't know the answer to that. Α. 15 Okay. And there are two options for Q. 16 standard service offer rate plans, correct, a market 17 rate offer and an electric security plan? 18 Α. Yes. 19 Do you believe the market rate offer, or Q. 20 MRO, is a fully competitive market rate? 21 Could you tell me what you mean by "fully Α. 2.2 competitive market rate"? 23 I'm asking your belief of whether a Ο. 24 market rate offer rate plan reflects a fully 25 competitive market rate.

	1122
1	MR. RANDAZZO: I'll object. He can't
2	respond to the question unless the counsel will
3	provide him with an indication of how he's using the
4	terms.
5	Q. I'm not using them in any special way,
6	Mr. Hess. I'm using plain English.
7	A. I don't understand the term and I can't
8	answer the question.
9	Q. You don't understand what "fully
10	competitive market rates" are?
11	A. I'm not sure that I can define the term
12	"market rate."
13	Q. Okay. Do you agree that an MRO plan
14	would involve another transition period of six to ten
15	years before getting to a fully auction-based
16	standard service offer?
17	A. I believe there are requirements about
18	how what the percentages of the standard service
19	offer that can be auctioned.
20	Q. And so the nonmarket part of the pricing
21	blend you referred to goes up from the maximum of
22	10 percent year 1; 20 percent year 2; 30 percent
23	year 3; 40 percent year 4; 50 percent in year 5; is
24	that your understanding?
25	A. Yes.

	1123
1	Q. And so to get to a hundred percent it
2	takes six years, does it not?
3	MR. RANDAZZO: Are you asking
4	Q. At a minimum.
5	MR. RANDAZZO: Are you asking a legal
6	opinion or his understanding?
7	MR. NOURSE: No, I'm asking his
8	understanding. None of my questions are legal.
9	MR. RANDAZZO: Good.
10	A. No, I think at some point in time during
11	that period of time the Commission has discretion to
12	shift to a hundred percent prior to year 5. Or
13	actually to even change the percentage.
14	Q. So it's your opinion, your understanding,
15	that the Commission could go to a hundred percent
16	market under the MRO option in less than five years?
17	A. I believe that's correct, yes.
18	Q. Okay. Did Senate Bill 221 also implement
19	a significantly excessive earnings test?
20	A. Yes.
21	Q. And that applies to ESP plans?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. And is it also your understanding that
24	ESP plans as a whole or in the aggregate have to
25	produce results that are more favorable than a market

1124 rate offer, expected outcome of a market rate offer? 1 2 Α. A market rate offer plan, yes. 3 Ο. Okay. So it's fair to say that the 4 regulatory regime in 221 has changed substantively 5 and materially from what it was under Senate Bill 3; 6 would you agree? 7 Α. I don't think I'm going to agree to the 8 "substantive and materially." But it did change. It 9 gave the Commission additional abilities to establish 10 the market rates. 11 So it's your opinion that the changes Ο. 12 made in Senate Bill 221 were nonsubstantive? 13 I just said they were changes. I don't Α. have an opinion as to whether they're substantive or 14 15 not substantive. 16 Is it your opinion that the changes were Ο. 17 nonmaterial associated with Senate Bill 221? 18 I don't have an opinion as to whether Α. 19 they were material or nonmaterial. 20 Okay, Mr. Hess, let's turn to page 15, Q. 21 and here in question 23 you refer to above-market 2.2 generation costs. Do you see that? 23 Α. Yes. 24 Okay. And by that you mean costs that Ο. 25 are above the RPM capacity rate?

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1	A. Yes, which I believe is to be a
2	market-based generation rate based upon how
3	Mr. Murray's described it.
4	Q. Would there okay, well, first of all,
5	that's the capacity charge that you discussed earlier
6	that is the wholesale charge paid by the CRES
7	provider to PJM, correct?
8	A. That's correct.
9	Q. Now, is it your opinion that ESP rates
10	can never be above market rates? Is that possible or
11	not possible?
12	A. No; they can be above market rates.
13	Q. Okay. In fact, even if you never charged
14	an SSO rate above market, there wouldn't be a whole
15	lot of competition, would there?
16	A. That's correct.
17	Q. Now, is it your opinion that the RPM
18	auction is the only indicator of a true market value
19	for capacity?
20	A. I don't have an opinion on that. That's
21	better asked of Mr. Murray.
22	Q. Okay. Are you aware of any other market
23	price indicators for capacity?
24	A. No.
25	Q. Okay. Have you done a long-term forward

1126 1 view of RPM capacity pricing? 2 Α. No. 3 MR. NOURSE: I think that's all the 4 questions I have, thank you, Mr. Hess. 5 THE WITNESS: Thank you. EXAMINER SEE: Commissioner Porter? 6 7 COMMISSIONER PORTER: Just a few. 8 9 EXAMINATION By Commissioner Porter: 10 11 Mr. Hess, can you hear me? 0. 12 Α. Yes, sir, I can. Okay. We've used this term "stranded 13 Ο. 14 costs" and I just want to clearly understand how you 15 understand this term, what you understand this term 16 to mean. 17 Is stranded costs the same thing as the costs that you mention on page 5 of your -- actually 18 19 at the top of page 6 of your testimony, there are 20 four items at the top of page 6 of your testimony? 21 Yeah, it's been used interchangeably Α. 2.2 throughout this hearing, but the statute did define 23 it as a transition cost. 24 Okay. So these costs at the top of page Ο. 6 are what you refer to as transition costs? 25

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1	A. These, yes, transition costs have to
2	qualify for these four items, yes.
3	Q. Are transition costs and stranded costs
4	the same thing?
5	A. They're used interchangeably.
6	Q. Is there anything within stranded costs
7	that would not be one of these four items at the top
8	of page 6 that you're aware of?
9	A. Not off the top of my head, no.
10	Q. Okay. And so the AEP ETP stipulation
11	that you referred to in your testimony as well
12	allowed for the full recovery or at least what's
13	your understanding of the recovery of transition
14	costs as part of the AEP ETP? Was it all of the
15	transition costs for AEP?
16	A. Were recovered, yes.
17	Q. All were recovered. And what total
18	dollar amount, if you know?
19	A. The regulatory assets were quantified at
20	about \$700 million, that's on I believe one of the
21	last pages of the settlement that's in that case.
22	Q. And if you recall in that settlement,
23	that \$700 million, was it a regulatory recovery? Was
24	it a recovery for all of the AEP Ohio plants in
25	existence at the time?

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1	A. It was for regulatory assets associated
2	with Columbus Southern and Ohio Power, yes. And to
3	the extent there were uneconomic plant transition
4	costs, it would have been recovered through the
5	standard service offer.
6	Q. Okay. And so this \$700 million, I think
7	you either characterized Witness Kahn or Witness
8	Landon as describing the \$700 million as a cost-based
9	figure.
10	A. No, the \$700 million was not a part of
11	their study.
12	Q. Okay.
13	A. It was actually explicitly not included
14	in that. It was a they were the regulatory
15	assets. Utility companies have the unique ability to
16	create regulatory assets on their financial
17	statements.
18	If they can't collect an expense at some
19	point in time, the utility company the utility
20	commission can allow them to defer that expense to be
21	collected later. And it is unique to the utility
22	industry. It's you have to be in compliance with
23	FASB 71 to be able to create an asset like that.
24	Q. Okay. So these regulatory assets that
25	were created, were they regulatory assets for the

1 same timeframe of 2001 through 2030? 2 Α. They were regulatory assets that were existing on the financial statements of the utility 3 4 company at 12/31/00 that had been created prior to 5 that point in time. 6 Okay. And so the cost, this regulatory 0. 7 asset that was created was \$700 million and 8 ratepayers paid the total of \$700 million through a 9 stipulation that was approved which charge has 10 already been fully paid and recovered by the company? 11 Yes, sir. The mechanism to recover it Α. 12 was the RTC rate. 13 Okay. Tell me the difference between Ο. 14 these regulatory assets and what's your understanding 15 of the capacity costs that are being requested here 16 today. 17 Α. Regulatory assets were just unique to the assets themselves. Actually, they were defined by 18 19 the statute Senate Bill 3, 4928.1 I believe was the 20 Definition section, paragraph 26, I think, defined 21 what could be accounted for as a regulatory asset. 2.2 Ο. So the generating capacity that the 23 company has today, you would agree that these are 24 power plants that run -- there's a cost associated 25 with keeping those plants running.

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1	A. Yes.
2	Q. And is the capacity cost the company's
3	requesting the Commission to approve to support the
4	costs of keeping those plants running, the overhead
5	for keeping those plants in operation, separating out
6	the energy components of those plants?
7	MR. RANDAZZO: I object to the question.
8	COMMISSIONER PORTER: I'm not sure you
9	can.
10	MR. RANDAZZO: I'm not sure I can either,
11	and I know it's going to be overruled, but I don't
12	believe that's the basis for the claim here. It's a
13	differential of revenue.
14	Overruled? Sustained?
15	EXAMINER SEE: And the objection is
16	overruled.
17	MR. RANDAZZO: Yes, ma'am, thank you.
18	COMMISSIONER PORTER: If you can just
19	read it back and if you have an answer.
20	If you can answer.
21	THE WITNESS: Please, read it back.
22	(Record read.)
23	A. It's the cost associated with the
24	capacity portion of it, yes. My issue is that they
25	want a cost-based rate recovery mechanism for that

1 and I don't believe the state of Ohio can support a 2 cost-based rate recovery mechanism for that, given that the generation service that's provided by the 3 4 generation function at AEP Ohio is under a 5 market-based paradigm.

6 Okay. So am I correct in understanding 0. 7 your testimony that the Ohio Commission cannot 8 approve the requested rate because the Ohio 9 Commission is limited by state law, rather than your 10 testimony being the Ohio Commission should not 11 approve the rate because it was previously recovered 12 through this regulatory charge?

13 I'm not trying to base my testimony on Α. 14 law. It's based upon fairness. It was already 15 accounted for, transition costs were not to be 16 recovered in the future, and I think this is an 17 unfair request by AEP Ohio.

18 Okay. So in your view -- well, let me Q. 19 ask you this, are you opposed to the RPM payments as 20 well that would be received by the company if the 21 direction from the Commission were that capacity should be at RPM? You're not opposed to that? 2.2 23

No; that's what we support. Α.

24 Okay. Let me just very quickly ask you, Ο. 25 you make several recommendations regarding

exclusions, this is beginning on page 16 of your testimony, such that if there were a cost-based capacity rate approved by the Commission, you suggest that these items on page 16 should be excluded I believe. Let me start with construction work in progress, could you briefly explain why? This is the first item.

A. First of all, I think it's very improper to include a cost-based recovery mechanism for the generating assets, but if you're going to approve a revenue requirement calculation for the generating assets, at a minimum it ought to be in compliance with the state of Ohio's laws on revenue requirement calculations.

Q. Okay. So that CWIP is inconsistent or CWIP, for construction work in progress, is inconsistent with state law.

18 A. That's correct, it has not been shown to19 be 75 percent complete.

20 Q. Okay. And if there, for the second item, 21 if there were a mirroring component, it seems as if 22 your -- is it your testimony it's been unlawfully 23 omitted or just as a matter of fairness there should 24 have been a mirroring component included? 25 A. Well, that's what the state of Ohio

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1 requires, that if you include CWIP in a revenue 2 requirement in a cost-based recovery mechanism, that 3 it must be mirrored back. 4 At what level? Is there a dollar amount Ο. 5 that you'd attach to this mirroring component? 6 It's whatever level was collected. Α. 7 Q. Okay. All right. Briefly explain the 8 impact of the lack of this lead-lag study, the 9 lead-lag study --10 The Commission decided years ago to rely Α. 11 upon a lead-lag study to determine a working capital 12 calculation. Years ago FERC used a formula-based 13 approach and then FERC got away from the formula, 14 said it was not a -- not a reliable calculation to 15 determine working capital and they went to a lead-lag 16 methodology and the state of Ohio followed. 17 No, I take that back. I don't think FERC 18 went to a lead-lag methodology. 19 The state of Ohio followed and insisted 20 on lead-lag studies if an allowance for working 21 capital was going to be requested. 2.2 Okay. And, finally, you mentioned that Q. 23 the fact that the -- that if the cost-based capacity 24 mechanism approved by -- requested by the company is 25 approved, that there would be an impact on CRES

1134 1 suppliers and that there should be some risk. 2 There's some risk of the annual adjustments in the 3 cost inputs to this formula. 4 What level of risk should the Commission account for when considering this rate? Do you 5 6 understand my question? 7 Α. No, not at all. 8 Ο. Okay. Let me go to your testimony, at 9 item No. 8 on page 18, maybe I'm misunderstanding 10 your testimony, but I believe that you're suggesting 11 that there needs to be some accounting for the fact 12 that there's risk to CRES suppliers based upon the 13 fact that there would be periodical adjustments in 14 the formula rate -- in the formula rate that's being 15 requested. Is that your testimony? 16 Α. Yes. 17 Ο. Okay. What should that -- how should the 18 Commission account for that? 19 Well, by reducing the equity return Α. 20 that's included in the formula. 21 Do you have any specific recommendations Ο. 2.2 regarding the amount of that reduction? 23 Well, I think if it's going to be a Α. 24 formula-based rate that, you know, a debt rate would 25 probably, you know, if it's going to be adjusted to

1135 1 annually recover whatever costs they incur without an 2 audit on what the costs are, without a verification, if there's no controls on whatever the costs are and 3 4 they're just allowed to pass them through, I think 5 that a debt rate is probably more than reasonable. 6 Okay, you answering all the questions Ο. today has been very helpful to my future 7 consideration of this. 8 9 COMMISSIONER PORTER: I have no further 10 questions, thank you. 11 EXAMINER SEE: Redirect? MR. RANDAZZO: Just a couple of 12 13 questions. Commissioner Porter, you can object to 14 mine as well. 15 COMMISSIONER PORTER: I won't do that. 16 MR. RANDAZZO: All right. 17 COMMISSIONER PORTER: I wouldn't have the 18 guts to do that. 19 MR. RANDAZZO: I will accept that 20 observation. 21 2.2 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 23 By Mr. Randazzo: 24 What's a lead-lag study, Mr. Hess? 0. 25 Α. It's a study that measures the leads and

1136 1 lags of the revenues and expenses of an entity. How does it relate to the determination 2 Ο. 3 of working capital? 4 The net value of the leads and the lags Α. 5 are added to the rate base as a working capital 6 allowance. 7 Q. Is it possible to have negative working 8 capital? 9 MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I object. I 10 mean, these questions don't relate to 11 cross-examination at all. 12 MR. RANDAZZO: I'll withdraw the 13 question. 14 What's a debt rate? Ο. 15 MR. NOURSE: Same objection, your Honor. 16 EXAMINER SEE: Overruled. A debt rate would be whatever the company 17 Α. could currently borrow long-term debt at. 18 19 Okay. So that would be the interest rate Q. 20 you're referring to on the debt? 21 Α. Yes. 2.2 Q. You mentioned in response to several 23 questions by Mr. Nourse some history, you referred to 24 the ESP 1 increases as being 3 percent, 7 percent, 25 plus 4 percent. Do you recall that question and

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1	answer?
2	A. If I said it was ESP 1, I was incorrect.
3	That should be RSP.
4	Q. Okay. You may have said the RSP, which
5	would be the rate stabilization plan, right?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. Were those annual increases?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. And so that would have been 7 percent a
10	year?
11	A. That's correct.
12	Q. Plus the 4 percent?
13	A. That's correct.
14	Q. Once we got beyond the rate stabilization
15	plan, were there also increases in ESP 1?
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. And, again, were these annual?
18	A. Yes.
19	Q. During that period of time, actually
20	since the beginning of Senate Bill the
21	implementation of Senate Bill 3 do you have a
22	recollection as to the return on common equity that
23	Columbus & Southern earned?
24	A. There was a, the SEET case provided an
25	awful lot of information to the Commission about that

1138 and I believe Columbus & Southern's was determined in 1 2 that case to be excessively -- significantly excessive for the period of 2009. 3 4 And with regard to regulatory transition Ο. 5 charges and costs that you discussed with Mr. Nourse 6 and Commissioner Porter and the 700 million, were 7 those generation-related transition costs? 8 Α. Yes. 9 And were they continuing to recover those Q. costs into 2006 and 2007, and in Columbus & 10 11 Southern's case in 2008? 12 Α. That's correct. 13 O. Now --14 Can I correct my answer earlier. Α. They 15 were regulatory assets associated with providing 16 generation service. 17 Ο. Now, as part of this history you talked about the settlement in the ETP case, was that a 18 19 contested settlement? 20 Yes. Α. 21 Why was it contested? Q. 2.2 Α. Shell Energy believed that the -- that 23 there were stranded benefits and that those stranded 24 benefits should be used to offset the regulatory 25 asset recovery mechanism.

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1	Q. And if Shell's position in that case
2	would have been sustained by the Commission, how
3	would it have impacted the regulatory asset
4	transition costs that the Commission authorized
5	pursuant to the settlement?
6	A. I believe it would have been eliminated.
7	Q. And how did stranded benefits factor into
8	the computation of allowable transition revenues?
9	Looking at the criteria that you have in your
10	testimony, please. Page 6.
11	Let me strike that question.
12	What does the concept of netting for
13	purposes of computing transition revenue allowance
14	mean to you?
15	A. I don't understand the question.
16	Q. All right. Fair enough.
17	Now, Mr. Nourse asked you some questions
18	about the testimony of Dr. Kahn and referred you to
19	pages I think one page actually, 16. Would you
20	turn to page do you have that, what's marked as
21	AEP Exhibit 107?
22	A. I have that.
23	Q. Turn to page 17.
24	A. I have that.
25	Q. Am I correct on page 17 at line 22 it

1140 refers to AEP's likely market for AEP's capacity? 1 2 Α. I see that. 3 Ο. And on page 18 where the description of 4 the simulation occurs at line 16, can you tell me 5 what production costs are? Strike that. 6 Would production costs from an accounting standpoint include both fixed and variable costs? 7 8 Α. Yes. Is it possible to express both fixed and 9 Ο. 10 variable cost recovery through an energy-based rate? 11 In other words, a megawatt-hour based rate or a 12 kilowatt-hour based rate. 13 Is it possible to do that? Yes. Α. 14 Yeah. You were asked some questions by Q. 15 Mr. Nourse regarding the two options that were 16 provided as a result of Senate Bill 221. Do you 17 recall those questions? 18 Α. Yes. 19 Does the Commission have the ability to Q. 20 impose an electric security plan on a electric 21 distribution utility? Your understanding. Can the Commission force a -- no. 2.2 Α. 23 MR. RANDAZZO: I believe that's all I 24 have, your Honors. Thank you very much. 25 EXAMINER SEE: Recross, Ms. Kern?

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1	MS. KERN: No, thank you, your Honor.	
2	EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Yurick?	
3	MR. YURICK: No, thank you, your Honor.	
4	EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Kurtz?	
5	MR. KURTZ: No, your Honor.	
6	EXAMINER SEE: Ms. Kingery?	
7	MS. KINGERY: No questions, your Honor.	
8	EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Hayden?	
9	MR. HAYDEN: No, thank you.	
10	EXAMINER SEE: Ms. Kaleps-Clark?	
11	MS. KALEPS-CLARK: No questions, your	
12	Honor.	
13	EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Jones?	
14	MR. JONES: No questions, your Honor.	
15	EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Nourse?	
16	MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor.	
17		
18	RECROSS-EXAMINATION	
19	By Mr. Nourse:	
20	Q. Mr. Hess, your counsel referred you to	
21	the RSP, again, rate stabilization plan annual	
22	increases and the environmental 4 percent, do you	
23	recall that?	
24	A. Referred me to what? I'm sorry.	
25	Q. The annual increases in the rate	

	1142
1	stabilization plan.
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. 3 and 7 percent, and then he referred to
4	an additional 4 percent and then said something about
5	11 percent. Do you recall that?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. Okay. Was the additional 4 percent under
8	the RSP an annual or an automatic increase or was it
9	a maximum increase for proven incremental
10	environmental costs?
11	A. Yes, the utility company had come in and
12	shown the needed increase.
13	Q. And showed by demonstrating they expended
14	the costs that support the increase, correct?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. Incremental cost is not already reflected
17	in existing rates
18	A. That's correct.
19	Q correct?
20	Okay. And there was another reference by
21	your counsel to the 700 million regulatory assets
22	that were recovered through the ETP stipulation; do
23	you recall that?
24	A. Yes.
25	Q. And you stated they were related to

	1143
1	generation service, correct?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. Just to clarify, again, the 700 million
4	regulatory assets that you're referring to there were
5	not uneconomic or stranded generation investment
6	costs, were they?
7	A. I know the distinction you're making,
8	but, yeah, they were not associated with the plant.
9	They were not plant they were not plant costs.
10	Q. Okay. And they met the four criteria you
11	referred to in your testimony on page 6, did they
12	not?
13	A. The regulatory assets?
14	Q. Yeah.
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. And did staff support the regulatory
17	asset recovery?
18	A. Yes. We signed the settlement.
19	Q. Did IEU support the regulatory asset
20	recovery?
21	MR. RANDAZZO: We'll stipulate we did.
22	MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I'd appreciate
23	not being interrupted during examination by
24	Mr. Randazzo to offer stipulations.
25	Q. A simple answer will do, Mr. Hess.

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1	A. Yeah, Mr. Nourse, I don't remember if
2	they signed the settlement or not.
3	Q. Thank you.
4	Finally, Mr. Hess, your counsel directed
5	you to discuss a couple passages in Dr. Kahn's
6	testimony, pages 17 and 18
7	A. Yes.
8	Q do you recall that? And then he asked
9	you if it's possible to reflect capacity costs to the
10	dollar-per-megawatt-hour future energy projection.
11	Do you recall that?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. And regardless of whether it's possible,
14	is it your understanding that Dr. Kahn and/or
15	Dr. Landon reflected capacity costs in their forward
16	prices?
17	A. Yeah, it was my understanding it was an
18	all-in price, yes.
19	Q. So your understanding was not what we
20	discussed earlier, that it was an energy-only
21	projection.
22	A. Well, it was an energy-only rate.
23	Q. So you're saying
24	A. I'm sorry. It was a rate per
25	kilowatt-hour.

	11
1	Q. You're saying the kilowatt-hour the
2	dollar-per-kilowatt-hour rate did reflect capacity
3	costs?
4	A. As I had stated, it was intended to
5	recover all costs associated with the generation.
6	Q. Well, what's your basis for saying "it
7	was intended to recover capacity costs"?
8	A. Page 18 as pointed out by Mr. Randazzo,
9	it states that "Also included are the production
10	costs of generation for OPCo and CSP, together with
11	the associated emission levels."
12	Q. So does that tell you that the full
13	capacity costs were included in the forward prices?
14	A. The capacity costs would have been a
15	portion of the production costs, yes.
16	Q. So even though we confirmed earlier when
17	we looked at Exhibit EPK-5, you confirmed that it was
18	an energy-only projection, you're changing your
19	testimony based on that reference on line 16 of page
20	18?
21	A. Again, I thought my testimony was that I
22	believed it covered all the production costs.
23	Q. And you don't recall discussing the table
24	on page 16 and concluding that it was an energy-only
25	projection?

1146 1 Α. I remember the discussion. I thought, 2 though, that I made it clear it was all -- it was for 3 all costs associated with the generation. 4 Ο. Did you state earlier that there was not 5 a capacity market in 2000? 6 I don't think I stated that earlier. Α. Ι 7 stated that there was not an RPM capacity market. 8 Q. That there was no capacity pricing 9 differentiated from energy pricing at that time? 10 Α. I don't know the answer to that. 11 MR. NOURSE: Thank you. Your Honor, 12 that's all I have. 13 EXAMINER SEE: Thank you, Mr. Hess. 14 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 15 EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Randazzo. 16 MR. RANDAZZO: No questions. 17 EXAMINER SEE: Do you want to --MR. RANDAZZO: We will move the exhibit, 18 19 however. 20 EXAMINER SEE: IEU Exhibit 101. MR. RANDAZZO: Yes, ma'am, thank you. 21 2.2 EXAMINER SEE: Are there any objections 23 to the admission of the direct testimony of Mr. Hess? 24 Hearing none, IEU Exhibit 101 is admitted 25 into the record.

1147 1 (EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 2 EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Nourse. 3 MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor. AEP 4 moves for admission of Exhibits 106 through 109. 5 EXAMINER SEE: Are there any objections to the admission of AEP Exhibits 106 through 109? 6 7 Hearing none, AEP Exhibit 106, 107, 108, 8 and 109 are admitted into the record. 9 (EXHIBITS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 10 EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Nourse, did you intend 11 to mark and move into the record the prefiled 12 testimony of J. Edward Hess in ESP 1? You discussed 13 it in the record. 14 MR. NOURSE: No, your Honor, I had him 15 read the portion into the record we discussed and I 16 didn't mark it as an exhibit. 17 MR. RANDAZZO: I would ask that the 18 full -- either the full testimony be administratively 19 noticed so that the Commission has the benefit of the 20 complete context or that -- we'll mark it as an 21 exhibit and offer it. 2.2 MR. NOURSE: That's fine, I just didn't 23 bring enough copies. So I would be happy to submit 24 that as Exhibit 110, we'll just put it in the record 25 tomorrow.

1148 1 EXAMINER SEE: Okay, thank you. We'll 2 take that up tomorrow, AEP Exhibit 110. 3 And with that --4 MR. NOURSE: I'm sorry, your Honor. 5 Could we have a discussion off the record before we 6 adjourn? 7 EXAMINER SEE: Sure. Let's go off the 8 record. 9 (Discussion off the record.) 10 EXAMINER SEE: Let's go back on the 11 record briefly, and the representations that the parties made as to the motion to compel and what's 12 13 been provided and what hasn't been provided and when 14 you expect to file your interlocutory appeals, I'd 15 prefer to see that information in the transcript. Do you want to go first, well, Mr. Nourse, did you want 16 17 to make your statement there in the record? 18 MR. NOURSE: Yes, your Honor. I was just 19 inquiring off the record as to what the parties that 20 were ordered to compel discovery responses, when they 21 were going to complete that process, number one; and, 2.2 number two, whether it's accurate to say that 23 anything that's not provided in compliance with the 24 order compelling disclosure will be covered in their 25 interlocutory appeal; and, number three, when were

1	those steps going to be completed.
2	EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Hayden?
3	MR. HAYDEN: Yes, your Honor. As I
4	indicated on Friday of our intent, we plan to file
5	our interlocutory appeal tomorrow with respect to the
6	information that AEP is requesting which requests
7	that FES provide customer-specific information, which
8	is proprietary and trade secret having to do with
9	customer names and pricing, the contracts pursuant to
10	the Bench's order.
11	We have, however, provided thousands of
12	pages of customer contracts to AEP on Friday in
13	redacted form and in addition to that we have
14	supplemented all of our interrogatory responses set 1
15	through 4 to meet the Bench's order in that regard.
16	EXAMINER SEE: Did you indicate that
17	there were some responses that had not been provided?
18	MR. HAYDEN: The only responses, your
19	Honor, at this point that we have not provided,
20	interrogatory 1-7, 1-10, and 4-1 through 4-10, which
21	again seek customer-specific information. In our
22	mind we have complied with the Bench's order with
23	respect to all the noncustomer-specific information.
24	EXAMINER SEE: And as to Exelon,
25	Ms. Kaleps-Clark.

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1	MR. NOURSE: I'm sorry, your Honor, could
2	I inquire, before we go to Exelon, briefly of FES.
3	When you say everything except the
4	customer-specific information that you provided which
5	were customer-specific information redacted, are you
6	including all rate information in that category?
7	MR. HAYDEN: All information that is
8	unique to that specific customer with respect to what
9	FES charges or the FES price to that customer has
10	been redacted.
11	MR. NOURSE: So all pricing has been
12	redacted.
13	MR. HAYDEN: All pricing has been
14	redacted.
15	MR. NOURSE: Okay. Thank you, your
16	Honor.
17	EXAMINER SEE: Ms. Kaleps-Clark.
18	MS. KALEPS-CLARK: Thank you, your Honor,
19	Exelon and Constellation, on behalf of them we intend
20	to serve supplemental responses tomorrow to the
21	motion to compel, in response to the motion to
22	compel, and we also intend to file an interlocutory
23	appeal as to that information which will not be
24	included in the supplemental response, which is
25	within the five-day deadline.

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1	EXAMINER SEE: Any specifics as to which
2	of the discovery requests that Exelon has been
3	presented with that you do not intend to respond to?
4	MS. KALEPS-CLARK: At this point in time
5	I'm not exactly sure. I know that they are working
6	those details out now and they will be finalized and
7	that, we will know tomorrow.
8	EXAMINER SEE: I'm sorry, what was the
9	last part?
10	MS. KALEPS-CLARK: We will know tomorrow.
11	EXAMINER SEE: Okay. And with that
12	information, Mr. Nourse, were you expecting the
13	schedule to be reworked that we have thus far in the
14	proceeding?
15	MR. NOURSE: Well
16	EXAMINER SEE: With FES's witnesses and
17	Exelon's witness.
18	MR. NOURSE: I mean, we just heard new
19	information, your Honor, about the scheduling from
20	FES witnesses but I don't think anything's changed,
21	your Honor, relative to the fact that the motion to
22	compel is done in order to prepare our case and
23	prepare our cross-examination and our arguments in
24	this case.
25	The parties have been ordered to disclose

1 the information and, you know, it hasn't happened 2 yet, and there's going to be an interlocutory appeal 3 process.

4 You know, the alternative that we had in 5 our motion to compel is a motion to strike that 6 affected, among other witnesses, Dr. Lesser, several 7 passages in his testimony, and I believe Mr. Banks as 8 well, and so, you know, since the motion to compel is 9 still in play in the interlocutory appeal process, I 10 think it's also fair to say that an alternative 11 motion to strike is in play, and both the testimony 12 submitted as well as the cross-examination could be affected by both of those things. 13

14 So I'm not sure if you're asking us to 15 decide right now whether we're going forward without 16 seeing that process through and without receiving information at all yet from Exelon, for example. You 17 know, I think for one thing Mr. Satterwhite has 18 19 handled a lot of the discovery, has been reviewing it 20 today as well as over the weekend, and I prefer that 21 he come in and talk about it if we're going to get 2.2 into the details of each request that's outstanding.

But I guess what I would suggest, your Honor, is that we have a -- I believe we have a schedule for tomorrow and that we can proceed with

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1 that and see at the end of the day if we know 2 anything further if anything's changed about these 3 matters at that time. 4 MR. HAYDEN: Your Honor, I would just 5 note, since Mr. Nourse referred to the motion to 6 strike, it was only related to the third set of 7 discovery which we have provided all responses to. 8 MR. NOURSE: And I'm happy to check on 9 that with Mr. Satterwhite. 10 MR. LANG: Sorry, second set. 11 MR. HAYDEN: Second set, I'm sorry. 12 EXAMINER SEE: So the parties should --13 Mr. Nourse, I was not implying that the Bench was 14 going to make a ruling at this time in light of the 15 motion to compel, and being aware of the fact that 16 the parties plan to file an interlocutory appeal, 17 given that we should be able to proceed with all 18 three of the witnesses that are scheduled for 19 tomorrow, we'll take the issue up about reworking, if 20 necessary, the current witness schedule at a later 21 time. 2.2 Is there anything else? 23 MR. JONES: Your Honor, I do want to 24 raise the issue of staff witnesses. Mr. Ryan Harter, 25 we do want to have him testify on Friday. He is

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1	coming from Virginia and he has scheduled flight
2	plans to come here to be done on Friday. Now, there
3	might be some flexibility of Mr. Smith, we're
4	checking into that, but we at least want to have
5	Mr. Harter scheduled for Friday as a date certain.
6	EXAMINER SEE: Okay, Mr. Jones. The
7	Bench will make an effort to do so.
8	MR. JONES: Thank you.
9	EXAMINER SEE: Okay. Hearing is
10	adjourned until tomorrow at 9:00 a.m.
11	(Hearing adjourned at 6:41 p.m.)
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1	CERTIFICATE	
2	I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a	
3	true and correct transcript of the proceedings taken	
4	by me in this matter on Monday, April 23, 2012, and	
5	carefully compared with my original stenographic	
6	notes.	
7		
8	Maria DiPaolo Jones, Registered Diplomate Reporter and CRR and Notary Public in and for the	
9	State of Ohio.	
10	My commission expires June 19, 2016.	
11	(MDJ-3999)	
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Summary: Transcript of Commission Review of the Capacity Charges of Ohio Power Company and Columbus Southern Power Company hearing held on 04/23/12 - Volume V electronically filed by Mrs. Jennifer Duffer on behalf of Armstrong & Okey, Inc. and Jones, Maria DiPaolo Mrs.