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DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION

November 15, 2006

Docketing Division Public Utilities Commission of Ohio 180 East Broad Street Columbus, OH 43215

Re: Case No. 05-725-EL-UNC, et al.

Dear Docketing Division:

Enclosed please find an original and eighteen copies of the Redacted Version of the Supplemental Testimony of Charles R. Whitlock. Please stamp file and return to me the extra three copies of the filing. Also enclosed you will find an original and eighteen copies of a Motion for Protective Order and the Confidential Version of the Supplemental Testimony of Charles R. Whitlock. Please stamp file and return to me in the envelope provided the extra copies of the motion.


Should you have any questions please do not hesitate to call me at 513-287-3842.

Very truly yours,

mita M. Schafer

Anita M. Schafer Senior Paralegal

Enclosure



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2006 NOV 16 AM 10: 46 BEFORE

$P \bigcup C$ () THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the Application of The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company to Modify its Quarterly Fuel and Purchase Power Component of its Market Based Standard Service Offer.))))	Case No. 05-725-EL-UNC
In the Matter of the Application of The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company to Adjust and Set its System Reliability Tracker Market Price)))	Case No. 05-724-EL-UNC
In the Matter of the Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. to Modify its Quarterly Fuel and Purchase Power Component of its Market Based Standard Service Offer))))	Case No. 06-1068-EL-UNC
In the Matter of the Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. to Adjust and Set its System Reliability Tracker)))	Case No. 06-1069-EL-UNC

SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECT TESTIMONY OF

CHARLES R. WHITLOCK

ON BEHALF OF

DUKE ENERGY OHIO

DATE: November 16, 2006

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ATTACHMENTS

Attachment CRW-1

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I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

1	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.			
2	A.	My name is Charles R. Whitlock and my business address is 139 East Fourth			
3		Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202.			
4	Q.	BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?			
5	A.	I am employed by Duke Energy Americas, an affiliate of Duke Energy, as			
6		President, Commercial Asset Management ("CAM").			
7	Q.	ARE YOU THE SAME CHARLES R. WHITLOCK WHO PREVIOUSLY			
8		FILED TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?			
9	A.	Yes.			
	II. <u>PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY</u>				
10	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS			
11		PROCEEDING?			
12	A.	The purpose of my supplemental testimony is to respond to certain Management			
13		Audit Recommendations contained in pages 1-9 through 1-10 of the Report of the			
14		Financial And Management/Performance Audit of the Fuel and Purchased Power			
15		Rider of Duke Energy Ohio. Specifically, I address the Auditor's			
16		recommendations with respect to: 1.) Treatment of margins realized from the			
17		2.) DE-Ohio's active management of the coal,			
18		emission allowance, and forward power purchases portfolio; 3.) Requiring coal			
19		suppliers to permit the resale of coal; and 4.) The purchase of reserve capacity			
20		from the Midwest generating assets, previously owned by DENA (DENA Assets).			

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CHARLES R. WHITLOCK SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECT

III. <u>DISCUSSION</u>

1	Q.	HAVE YOU REVIEWED THE AUDITOR'S REPORT OF THE
2		FINANCIAL AND MANAGEMENT/PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE
3		FUEL AND PURCHASED POWER RIDER OF DUKE ENERGY OHIO?
4	A.	Yes.
5	Q.	DOES THE AUDITOR MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS
6		REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF NET MARGINS DERIVED FROM
7		?
8	А.	Yes. The Auditor recommends that DE-Ohio pass through the entire margin
9		related to the second second second and concludes that the total margin from the
10		re-sale of this coal during the audit period was \$
11	Q.	DOES DE-OHIO AGREE WITH THE AUDITOR'S RECOMMENDATION?
12	Α.	No. DE-Ohio believes that the recommendation is too broad. A portion, but not
13		all, of the benefits realized under the standard standard should should flow through
14		to non-residential Rider FPP consumers.
15	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN THE
16	A.	In March and April 2002, DE-Ohio entered into two contracts with
17		for the delivery of specific amounts and types of coal during 2002, 2003, 2004
18		and 2005. In August 2003, Sector and a sector of the sector and a sector of the secto
19		deliver as contractually obligated. After extensive negotiation,
20		DE-Ohio and DE-Ohio and reached a financial settlement
21		(Example 1999) regarding the default on the prior contracts.
22		agreed to deliver a specific quantity of NYMEX quality coal going


CHARLES R. WHITLOCK SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECT

1		forward in 2006, 2007 and 2008 at a
2		
3	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY DE-OHIO BELIEVES ONLY A PORTION OF
4		THE MARGINS DERIVED FROM THE
5		SHOULD FLOW THROUGH TO NON-RESIDENTIAL RIDER FPP
6		CONSUMERS.
7	A.	As I previously mentioned, the two original contracts with
8		delivery of coal during 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. Rider FPP was effective
9		beginning January 1, 2005 for non-residential consumers and January 1, 2006 for
10		residential consumers. Prior to January 1, 2005, DE-Ohio's market price included
11		fuel prices frozen at the level approved by the Commission in Case No. 99-1658-
12		EL-ETP. In other words, prior to January 1, 2005, neither the
13		were passed through to
14		consumers. Accordingly, the portion of the
15		corresponds to the coal that was to be delivered prior to January 1, 2005, is
16		remuneration for damages sustained by DE-Ohio, not retail consumers. This
17		portion of the state of the should not flow through Rider FPP.
18		However, a portion of the second second second second does replace coal
19		deliveries that were to have occurred in 2005. Consequently, some of the costs
20		incurred during 2005 were partially borne by non-residential Rider FPP
21		consumers. Therefore, the affected Rider FPP consumers should share in the
22		respective margins on based upon based upon
23		the portion of the original contract delivery for 2005.

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1	A.	The calculation of the allocation is set forth in Attachment CRW-1 to my				
2		supplemental testimony. As I previously mentioned, the				
3		is for, replacing				
4		deliveries that did not occur in 2003, 2004 and 2005. The 2005 deliveries, had				
5		they occurred, amounted to 40.57 % of the total quantity of coal under the				
6		defaulted contracts. Of the 40.57% of coal, that would have been delivered,				
7		approximately 47.6 % of that would have been allocated to non-residential Rider				
8		FPP consumers. Therefore, DE-Ohio is proposing to flow through the margins on				
9		19.3% of the coal to be delivered under the				
10		residential FPP consumers (40.57% times 47.6%).				
11	Q.	DOES THE AUDITOR MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS				
12		REGARDING DE-OHIO'S ACTIVE MANAGEMENT OF FUEL, POWER				
13		AND EMISSION ALLOWANCES?				
14	A.	Yes. The Auditor recommends that DE-Ohio adopt "traditional utility				
15		procurement strategies related to the procurement of coal, power, and emission				
16		allowances and cease its 'active management' through the balance of the RSP				
17		period."				
18	Q.	DOES DE-OHIO AGREE WITH THE AUDITOR'S				
19		RECOMMENDATION?				
20	A.	No. The Auditor's recommendation contradicts the stipulation and Commission's				
21		Opinion and Order in Case No. 05-806-EL-UNC. The active management of the				
22		emission allowance, fuel and forward power purchases portfolio is a "best				
23		practice" management technique that was specifically agreed to in the December				
	CHARLES R. WHITLOCK SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECT					

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2005 Stipulation and approved by the Commission in its February 2006 Opinion
 and Order.

The Auditor made a similar recommendation, regarding "regulated utility 3 4 industry practice," in the previous Rider FPP audit report and it was not adopted 5 by this Commission. As DE-Ohio explained in its supplemental testimony in its 6 last Rider FPP case, an actively managed portfolio allows gross margins to be 7 continuously locked-in based on market signals. In turn, DE-Ohio is able to 8 maximize the value of its generating asset portfolio while managing these 9 inherent risks in the most cost effective manner relative to daily changes in the 10 market.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY THE AUDITOR'S PROPOSED PERIODIC MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE IS IMPRUDENT.

A. The Auditor recommends that DE-Ohio no longer seek to flatten its position on a
daily basis, but rather "adjust its SO₂ position on no more than a quarterly basis
unless specific events dictate otherwise." The Auditor offers no opinion on what
constitutes "specific events" which would warrant adjusting the position on a
more frequent basis.

Essentially, the Auditor is now recommending that DE-Ohio make a speculative bet every 90 days in the coal, emission allowance, and power markets. DE-Ohio believes that the Auditor's recommended approach poses a significant risk to consumers. For instance, if DE-Ohio locks in a price by purchasing coal on a date certain and the price subsequently falls while power prices escalate, consumers cannot benefit from coal purchases at the lower price. Similarly, if the

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price of coal rises while forward power prices decline, consumers cannot benefit
 from the sale of the coal at the higher price in the market. In either scenario,
 consumers would suffer.

4 Additionally, the Auditor's recommendation fails to recognize that DE-5 Ohio is not a regulated utility for the sale of electricity. It is not permitted to 6 recover generation investments plus a reasonable return through the regulatory process, nor is it permitted to recover increases in many other costs not included 7 8 in Rider FPP. Rider FPP is fully avoidable by all consumers that purchase 9 generation from a competitive retail electric service provider. Traditional 10 regulated utility practice is not appropriate for managing all of the risks inherent 11 in a deregulated environment.

In its previous audit report in Case No. 05-806-EL-UNC, this same Auditor recommended that DE-Ohio true-up the allowance allocations and the auction proceeds on an annual basis. Clearly, with its present recommendation of a 90-day position adjustment, followed by the caveat of "unless specific events dictate otherwise," the Auditor recognizes the benefits of a more frequent position review.

Finally, it is important to note that DE-Ohio manages these variables for
Rider FPP consistent with its management of these variables for all of its sales of
deregulated electricity.

Q. WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF AN ACTIVE MANAGEMENT PROCUREMENT APPROACH OVER "TRADITIONAL UTILITY PROCUREMENT STRATEGIES?"

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1 A. The benefits of active management are that DE-Ohio may make rational 2 economic decisions based on the market price of coal, power and emission allowances, and reduce market price risk on behalf of consumers. DE-Ohio will 3 enter into transactions based on market commodity prices and all of the benefits 4 5 of these transactions are credited to consumers. Just as there are examples where 6 a bet on prices at a date certain will yield lower costs than active management, 7 there are also examples where the same bet will yield higher costs. The risk lies 8 in when to place the bet. Active management limits the market risk and reduces 9 volatility in Rider FPP. In this case, the Auditor agrees, at page 2-14 of the report 10 that DE-Ohio's active management techniques with respect to "quality swaps" 11 have resulted in a substantial savings for Rider FPP consumers. Similarly, the 12 Auditor found that if DE-Ohio had engaged in active management with respect to 13 flattening its emission allowance position beginning on October 1, 2005, and prior 14 to the Commission's Order in February 2006, in the last FPP case, DE-Ohio 15 would have lowered consumer costs by over \$14 million in one short period. It is 16 clear that active management is commercially sound and provides benefits to consumers, relative to "traditional utility procurement strategies." 17

18 Q. DOES THE AUDITOR MAKE ANY FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 19 REGARDING DE-OHIO'S ACTIVE MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY?

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A. Yes, the Auditor also states that DE-Ohio should "develop and implement a
portfolio strategy such that it purchases coal through a variety of short, medium
and long-term agreements with appropriate supply and supplier diversification
with credit worthy counterparties."

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Q. IS DE-OHIO PURCHASING COAL THROUGH A VARIETY OF SHORT, MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM AGREEMENTS WITH APPROPRIATE SUPPLY AND SUPPLIER DIVERSIFICATION WITH CREDIT WORTHY COUNTERPARTIES?

- A. Yes. DE-Ohio does in fact have short, medium and long-term contracts in its
 portfolio with multiple suppliers and requires all suppliers to meet specific credit
 requirements. This recommendation is simply a result of the Auditor's
 misunderstanding of DE-Ohio's portfolio management.
- 9 Q. DOES THE AUDITOR MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS 10 REGARDING THE RESALE OF COAL BY DE-OHIO?
- A. Yes, the Auditor recommends that as long as the Rider FPP is in effect, coal
 suppliers should not be required to allow the resale of their coal.

13 Q. DOES DE-OHIO IN FACT REQUIRE THE POTENTIAL TO RESELL

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- 14 COAL AS A CONDITION TO CONSIDER OFFERS FROM SUPPLIERS?
- A. No, it does not. DE-Ohio does include the resale of coal as a condition on its
 RFPs but does not exclude an offer from consideration if the supplier will not
 permit the resale of coal.

18 Q. WHY IS THE ABILITY TO RESELL COAL A BENEFIT TO 19 CONSUMERS?

A. As part of the active management of coal inventories, the ability to resell coal permits DE-Ohio to manage price risk by selling an "expensive" coal, based on the then market price of coal and emission allowances, and burning a comparatively less expensive coal, also based on market prices. Consumers

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benefit from the sale transaction because any resulting margin is credited against the fuel cost in the calculation of the Rider FPP market price, and the exposure to market volatility is greatly reduced. In its report, the Auditor goes so far as to quantify this benefit and recognized that DE-Ohio's active management with respect to quality swaps of coal created a \$14 million credit for Rider FPP consumers.

Q. DOES THE AUDITOR MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING THE PURCHASE OF RESERVE CAPACITY FROM THE
LEGACY DENA ASSETS FOR INCLUSION IN RIDER SRT?

- 10 A. Yes. The Auditor recommends that the legacy DENA Assets should not be
 eligible for inclusion in Rider SRT.
- 12 Q. DOES DE-OHIO AGREE WITH THIS RECOMMENDATION?
- 13 A. No.

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14 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY DE-OHIO BELIEVES THE DENA ASSETS 15 SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR INCLUSION IN CAPACITY 16 PURCHASES AS PART OF THE RIDER SRT?

A. The purpose of the SRT is to ensure adequate capacity to meet DE-Ohio's obligation as provider of last resort (POLR). At present, this obligation requires DE-Ohio to maintain a 15% capacity reserve margin. There are limited assets located in the MISO footprint that meet MISO's designated network resource (DNR) requirements. Consumers should have access to every possible economic option with respect to available generating assets. The risks to its consumers are substantial and increasingly likely if DE-Ohio does not have access to market

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price capacity during a time of need. This is particularly true if a capacity purchase must be made in the spot market where prices are exceptionally volatile. It is in the consumer's best interest if DE-Ohio has the ability to avoid such a risk through a readily available and reasonably priced alternative regardless of the source of supply.

6 Additionally, on a daily operational level, the ability to include the DENA 7 Assets makes sense. MISO requires approximately 4% daily reserve margin from 8 market participants such as DE-Ohio. DE-Ohio should be permitted to satisfy its 9 reserve margin in the most economic manner. Limiting the options through 10 which DE-Ohio may satisfy its capacity obligation by arbitrarily excluding 11 specific generators from consideration can only increase the cost to consumers, if 12 the capacity is available at all.

DE-Oho transacts to meet its capacity requirements in the long-term market. While DE-Ohio cannot predict that reasonably priced capacity will be unavailable in the long-term capacity market, there is no economic justification to deprive consumers of the opportunity to purchase the most reasonably priced capacity available simply because the capacity stems from a DENA Asset.

18 In short, if the DENA Assets provide the most economic option, it does
19 not make sense to exclude them from consideration.

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20 Q. WHAT IS THE AUDITOR'S JUSTIFICATION FOR RECOMMENDING 21 THAT THE DENA ASSETS SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED AS PART OF 22 RIDER SRT CAPACITY PURCHASES?

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A. First, the Auditor does not believe consumers are paying more for capacity in the
 market than if purchased from the DENA Assets. Second, the Auditor believes
 that purchases from affiliates are problematic and reduces competitive bid offers.
 Third, the Auditor believes the auditing of affiliate transactions is burdensome.
 Fourth, the Auditor believes that given the condition of the capacity market, DE Ohio should be able to sell its legacy DENA capacity on the open market.

7 Q. WHAT IS YOUR RESPONSE TO THESE CRITICISMS?

8 DE-Ohio recognizes the issues of documenting a market price for a transaction, Α. 9 where it owns the capacity purchased. DE-Ohio accepts the burden of 10 demonstrating its purchases at a market price by comparison to other capacity 11 available in the market. DE-Ohio is constantly probing the market and making 12 decisions identifying the best offers for its consumers. If DE-Ohio is permitted to consider DENA Assets for capacity purchases through Rider SRT, DE-Ohio will 13 commit to providing the Commission in future audit proceedings with a written 14 record of the concurrent bids and offers to show that the market price for capacity 15 16 is equal to or greater than the market price associated with a capacity purchase 17 from the DENA Assets.

18 The Auditor's concern about the reduction of competitive bid offers is 19 simply unwarranted. The vast majority of competitive bidders are not aware of 20 the nuances of DE-Ohio's exclusion of DENA Assets. As far as the outside world 21 is concerned, the DENA Assets are part of DE-Ohio's generating assets. DE-22 Ohio is currently receiving and accepting competitive bids. There is no reason to 23 believe that DE-Ohio will not continue to do so. Additionally, there is no reason

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to believe that DE-Ohio's motives are nefarious and that the Company will not continue to act in the best interests of its consumers.

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The Auditor's concerns about the added "burden" regarding the mechanics of auditing DENA transactions should not be a determining factor. DE-Ohio accepts the burden to prove the prudence of its transactions. The Auditor's reluctance to perform additional work is immaterial. DE-Ohio will provide documentation of the concurrent competitive bids during the audit period along with the purchase price for capacity from the DENA Assets. This should demonstrate the prudence of DE-Ohio's management decisions.

Lastly, the Auditor's position with respect to the "size of the market" and 10 11 ability to sell legacy DENA capacity in the market is dubious. If the Commission 12 does not permit DE-Ohio to purchase capacity from its DENA Assets to satisfy its 13 Rider SRT obligations, DE-Ohio will continue to sell the capacity on the open 14 market. However, the Auditor should recognize that it is not in the best interests 15 of DE-Ohio's consumers to deprive them of a viable economic market option 16 simply because of its status as a legacy DENA Asset. There is limited capacity in 17 the MISO footprint that meets MISO's DNR requirement. Consumers should 18 have access to all of it.

19Q.AREANYOFTHEDENAASSETSCURRENTLYBEING20ECONOMICALLY DISPATCHED WITHIN THE MISO FOOTPRINT?

21 A. Yes, the Vermillion generating station is in MISO and is being dispatched.

22 Q. DO ALL OF THE DENA ASSETS MEET MISO'S DNR
23 REQUIREMENTS?

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A. Yes. All the DENA Assets meet MISO's DNR Requirements. As I mentioned
 previously, Vermillion is the only DENA asset actually located in MISO. The
 other assets are located in the PJM market. However, their location should not
 exclude them from consideration for Rider SRT capacity purchases. PJM DENA
 assets could be a more economical solution. I believe that Ohio consumers will
 benefit from having access to DENA Assets.

IV. CONCLUSION

7 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?

8 A. Yes.

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Attachment CRW-1 Case No. 05-725-EL-UNC,et al. November 16, 2006 Page 1 of 2

<u> </u>		Fuel Type		
Line		Midsulfur	Туре	
No.	Description	contract	Compliance	Total
1	Date signed			
2	Contract No.			
	Scheduled Shipments (tons):			
3	2002			
4	2003			
5	2004			
6	2005			
7	Total Scheduled Shipments			
	Actual Shipments (tons):			
8	2002			
9	2003			·
10	Total Actual Shipments			
11	Undelivered Tonnage (line 7 - line 10)			
	ondenvered tonnage (mre 7 - mre 10)			
12	2005 Portion of Undelivered Tonnage (line 6 +)	line 11)		
13	2005 Load Ratio of Non-Residential Rider FPP	Customers (see page 2	of 2)	
14	Net Allocable to Non-Residential Rid	der FPP Customers (line	9 12 * line 13)	
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
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Estimated Benefit to Rider FPP Non-Residential Customers

Attachment CRW-1 Case No. 05-725-EL-UNC,et al. November 16, 2006 Page 2 of 2



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Estimated Non-Residential Share of 2005 Rider FPP Load