**BEFORE**

**THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO**

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| In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company for Authority to Establish a Standard Service Offer Pursuant to R.C. 4928.143 in the Form of an Electric Security Plan.In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company for Approval of Certain Accounting Authority. | )))))))) | Case No. 23-23-EL-SSOCase No. 23-24-EL-AAM |

**APPLICATION FOR REHEARING**

**BY**

**OFFICE OF THE OHIO CONSUMERS’ COUNSEL**

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May 3, 2024 (willing to accept service by e-mail)

**BEFORE**

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**APPLICATION FOR REHEARING**

**BY**

**OFFICE OF THE OHIO CONSUMERS’ COUNSEL**

The Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (“OCC”) files this application for rehearing[[1]](#footnote-2) to protect the 1.2 million residential consumers of the Ohio Power Company (“AEP”) from being charged more than $1 billion in increased rates under its unlawful and unreasonable Electric Security Plan (“ESP”). OCC was one of the few holdouts in that case as parties lined up to support the utility’s plan in exchange for their pet projects.

 The PUCO approved the nearly unanimous settlement with its $1 billion of charges to consumers over the next four years. At the same time the PUCO brushed aside the very real and compelling issue before it: the alarming rate at which AEP is disconnecting its consumers. With this latest increase we fear that AEP’s already outrageous number of disconnections could skyrocket, especially for AEP’s at-risk consumers.

The PUCO’s order adopting the settlement is premised on the notion that AEP needs an enormous cash infusion from its current consumers to continue to provide reliable service. But neither AEP’s filings, nor the PUCO’s Opinion and Order, set forth any factual basis to support that notion. In fact, the evidence in the record shows the opposite—with much lower spending during the past few years, AEP has met or exceeded the PUCO’s reliability standards. So, charging consumers an additional $1 billion over the next four years to maintain or improve reliability is not only excessive, but it lacks evidentiary support, violating R.C. 4903.09.

It should not be lost on the PUCO or the public that the *real* motivation for AEP’s money-grab from consumers may be about paving the way to serve large, commercial/industrial customers (such as data centers). Indeed, AEP witness Mayhan testified that the first purported “benefit” of the increased spending is “better position[ing] the Company to react to the ever-increasing new customer growth in the AEP Ohio service territory . . . .”[[2]](#footnote-3)

Adding to that PUCO error, is the fact that AEP failed to show that its plan is more favorable in the aggregate than a market rate offer for consumers. Approving it violates R.C. 4928.143(C)(1). And, AEP’s excessive distribution charges, all in the name of improving reliability, violate R.C. 4928.02(A)’s requirement of reasonably priced electric service. The PUCO’s April 3, 2024 Opinion and Order approving the Stipulation and Recommendation (“Settlement”) is unlawful and unreasonable.

 The PUCO’s April 3, 2024 Order is unreasonable and unlawful for the following reasons:

**ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1:** The PUCO’s Order is unreasonable and unlawful because it approved substantially increased charges to consumers for distribution reliability without record evidence, in violation of R.C. 4903.09. The PUCO’s Order conflicts with the PUCO findings that AEP repeatedly met or exceeded its reliability standards and consumer reliability expectations under dramatically lower spending levels.

**ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 2:** The PUCO’s Order is unreasonable and unlawful under R.C. 4928.143(C)(1) because AEP’s ESP is not more favorable in the aggregate than a market rate offer.

**ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 3:** The PUCO’s Order is unreasonable and unlawful because it fails to ensure the availability to consumers of reasonably priced retail electric service, in violation of R.C. 4928.02.

The reasons in support of this Application for rehearing are set forth in the accompanying memorandum in support. The PUCO should grant rehearing and modify its Order.

Respectfully submitted,

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*/s/ William J. Michael*

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**MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT**

# INTRODUCTION

Electric Security Plans (“ESPs”) are an alternative form of Standard Service Offer (“SSO”) that favor utilities over consumers. They are only permitted under Ohio law where the utility can make a showing that the ESP is “more favorable in the aggregate [to consumers] as compared to the expected results that would otherwise apply” in a Market Rate Offer (“MRO”) under section 4928.142 of the Revised Code.[[3]](#footnote-4) Reviewing the Settlement, and considering only those charges that have a specific dollar value attached to them, consumers will be subjected to an astronomical $1.337 billion in charges over the course of AEP’s ESP V.[[4]](#footnote-5)

Over $1 billion of charges ultimately authorized by the PUCO’s Order are additional charges purportedly for service reliability and infrastructure.[[5]](#footnote-6) Adding insult to consumers’ injury, that number does not include the Advanced Distribution Management System (“ADMS”)[[6]](#footnote-7) and heat map charges (which the Settlement authorizes but does not quantify),[[7]](#footnote-8) the Customer Information System (“CIS”) charges that the Settlement allows AEP to recoup in a later case (plus 5% annual interest),[[8]](#footnote-9) or the potential for an additional $8-16 million in Cost In Aid Of Construction (“CIAC”) expenditures.[[9]](#footnote-10)

Throughout ESP IV, specifically from 2020 through 2022, the PUCO found that AEP routinely met its reliability standards and its consumers were satisfied with the reliability of electric services AEP provided.[[10]](#footnote-11) Yet the Settlement allows AEP to charge consumers nearly three times more for ESP V than what was approved for ESP IV – nearly $1 billion in additional charges to consumers.[[11]](#footnote-12) In light of AEP’s past reliability performance, the enormous increased charges purportedly for reliability raises the question of whether the *real* motivation for AEP’s money-grab from consumers is about paving the way to serve large, commercial/industrial customers (such as data centers).[[12]](#footnote-13)

The PUCO relies on service reliability as the main justification for these additional charges.[[13]](#footnote-14) But the record in this matter is wholly devoid of evidentiary support for increased reliability spending. Therefore, the Order is unreasonable, unlawfully violates the PUCO’s statutory obligations under R.C. 4928.02 and 4928.06, and should be modified to comply with Ohio regulatory principles and practices.

# ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

## ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1: The PUCO’s Order is unreasonable and unlawful because it approved substantially increased charges to consumers for distribution reliability without record evidence, in violation of R.C. 4903.09. The PUCO’s Order conflicts with the PUCO findings that AEP repeatedly met or exceeded its reliability standards and consumer reliability expectations under dramatically lower spending levels.[[14]](#footnote-15)

In the past, the PUCO has approved charging consumers for significant spending by AEP to support and improve service reliability.[[15]](#footnote-16) But the PUCO’s Order unreasonably, unlawfully, and dramatically increases AEP’s charges to consumers under the DIR, ESSR, and gridSMART riders, based nearly exclusively on service reliability. This contradicts the PUCO’s own findings regarding AEP’s reliability and consumer satisfaction. For these reasons, the PUCO should modify its Order to reduce the amount of distribution charges approved under the settlement as recommended by OCC. As OCC witness Williams testified, for example, “[t]he ESP V annual DIR revenue caps should be maintained at levels that are relatively close to the currently approved DIR revenue caps for 2021 through May 2024.”[[16]](#footnote-17)

As part of its Order approving the Settlement, the PUCO approves multiple provisions regarding distribution infrastructure and modernization incentives, primarily the DIR, ESSR, and gridSMART charges. R.C. 4928.143 governs application for, and approval of, ESPs. When reviewing AEP’s ESP distribution service terms, including distribution infrastructure and modernization incentives such as the DIR, ESRR, and gridSMART charges, the PUCO is required to “examine the reliability of [AEP’s] distribution system and ensure that customers’ and [AEP’s] expectations are aligned and that [AEP] is placing sufficient emphasis on and dedicating sufficient resources to the reliability of its distribution system.”[[17]](#footnote-18)

An electric security plan can only be approved if the PUCO finds that the plan is more favorable in the aggregate as compared to the expected results that would otherwise apply under a market rate offer.[[18]](#footnote-19) The burden of proving that an ESP is more favorable than a Market Rate Offer (“MRO”) under R.C. 4928.142 falls upon the utility.[[19]](#footnote-20) Additionally, the PUCO is statutorily obligated to “[e]nsure the availability to consumers of adequate, reliable, safe, efficient, nondiscriminatory, and reasonably priced retail electric service.”[[20]](#footnote-21) Ultimately, the PUCO’s Order must support its decision with “findings of fact and written opinions setting forth the reasons prompting the decisions arrived at, based upon said findings of fact”[[21]](#footnote-22) and provide sufficient details to enable a court to determine how the PUCO reached that decision.[[22]](#footnote-23)

Many went along with AEP’s plan. This should come as no surprise, as many obtained pet projects in return. The Citizens Utility Board, Ohio Environmental Council, and the Environmental Law & Policy Center got so-called energy efficiency programs (such as smart thermostats) paid for by residential consumers.[[23]](#footnote-24) The Ohio Energy Leadership Council and Ohio Energy Group got their interruptible rate programs, funded by other customers, including the residential consumers OCC represents.[[24]](#footnote-25) And competitive retail electric service providers got smart thermostat demand response programs, functionality in AEP’s Customer Information System, and a working group to discuss time-of-use rates paid for with consumer dollars.[[25]](#footnote-26) But pet projects, that look a lot like cash payments (or their equivalent), are not enough to approve the Settlement or protect consumers.

In this matter, AEP has failed to produce, and the PUCO has failed to cite in its Order, any evidence supporting the need to so significantly inflate AEP’s spending relating to service reliability. Indeed, it appears that AEP’s real motivation to increase spending is paving the way for large commercial/industrial customers – not residential consumers.[[26]](#footnote-27) As a result, to comply with Ohio law and this state’s regulatory principles and practices, the PUCO’s Order must be modified to reduce the recovery caps for these charges as recommended by OCC.

The PUCO’s Order dramatically and unreasonably increases the charges AEP may impose on consumers and collect through charges, citing only continued service reliability and related benefits as justification for these charges.[[27]](#footnote-28) During AEP’s previous ESP, consumers were charged approximately $315 million under the utility’s Distribution Investment Rider (“DIR”).[[28]](#footnote-29) And under AEP’s last plan consumers were charged approximately $45 million annually (or approximately $153.75 million over the term of the ESP) under AEP’s Electric Service Reliability Rider (“ESRR”).[[29]](#footnote-30)Excluding unquantified charges under the Settlement, the Settlement would allow AEP to charge consumers nearly three times more for this ESP than what was approved for the previous ESP – nearly $1 billion in additional charges to consumers.

AEP has not produced, nor has the PUCO cited in the Order, any record evidence to support an additional $1 billion dollars in charges to consumers.In fact, the only benefits to consumers that the PUCO cites as justification for the approved increased charge caps are related to service reliability.[[30]](#footnote-31) But as the Order clearly finds, AEP has met or exceeded its reliability standards for 2020 through 2022, and met its consumers’ expectations with regard to reliability, under the significantly lower charges to consumers from AEP’s previous ESP.[[31]](#footnote-32) In light of AEP’s reliability performance, there is no record evidence to support increasing charges to consumers. Increasing charges on consumers would violate R.C. 4903.09. It would also be unreasonable, as there is simply no justification for the PUCO’s approval of such dramatically increased charge caps and the exorbitant charges AEP’s consumers will pay under them.

## ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 2: The PUCO’s Order is unreasonable and unlawful under R.C. 4928.143(C)(1) because AEP’s ESP is not more favorable in the aggregate than a market rate offer.

Even if the approved increase in spending could somehow dramatically increase AEP’s reliability (which is not needed) AEP’s ESP does not provide sufficient benefits to consumers to outweigh the excessive burden of an additional $1 billion in utility service charges. The Order fails to provide a more favorable result than consumers would receive under an MRO.[[32]](#footnote-33) The additional $1 billion in costs over the course of AEP’s ESP V far exceeds the value of any benefits it might provide consumers in the form of additional reliability.[[33]](#footnote-34)AEP met or exceeded its reliability standards for the last three years under the ESP IV charge caps,[[34]](#footnote-35) and met its consumers’ expectations for reliability by spending at that those levels.[[35]](#footnote-36) Neither AEP nor any of its settlement partners provided any evidence to support the requested dramatic increases in collection under its charges. The PUCO’s Order approving dramatic increases in those charge spending caps is therefore wholly unsupported by the record in this matter.

Rehearing should be granted, and the Order modified as recommended by OCC.

## ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 3: The PUCO’s Order is unreasonable and unlawful because it fails to ensure the availability to consumers of reasonably priced retail electric service, in violation of R.C. 4928.02.

As discussed above, R.C. 4928.02(A) codifies Ohio’s policy to “[e]nsure the availability to consumers of adequate, reliable, safe, efficient, nondiscriminatory, and reasonably priced retail electric service.” Likewise, R.C. 4928.06(A) requires the PUCO to “ensure that the policy specified in section 4928.02 of the Revised Code is effectuated.” By failing to address AEP’s abysmal disconnection rates, the PUCO’s Order violates its statutory obligations under R.C. 4928.06 and must be modified. This is especially so because the PUCO’s failure occurs at the same time that it is approving more than $1 billion in increased charges to consumers for which AEP has provided no evidentiary support.

OCC witness Tinkham testified that the Settlement does nothing to specifically address the affordability of consumers’ essential electric utility service or the unreasonably large number of AEP service disconnections that occurred in previous years.[[36]](#footnote-37) OCC was not alone in its concern about AEP’s disconnection rates.[[37]](#footnote-38) AEP’s unreasonably high disconnection rates are clear evidence that “adequate, reliable, safe, efficient, nondiscriminatory, and reasonably priced retail electric service” is not available to many of AEP’s consumers. The increased charges authorized by the Order only serve to make that situation worse. The PUCO’s Order failed to hold AEP accountable for its unreasonable disconnection rates.

AEP’s own 2022 to 2023 annual disconnection reports demonstrate that electric service is becoming less affordable for consumers. The total dollar amount of unpaid bills represented by such disconnections tripled from $21,162,801[[38]](#footnote-39) to $63,554,235.65,[[39]](#footnote-40) which results in an increase of $42,391,434.65. Also, the number of final notices increased from 1,673,835[[40]](#footnote-41) in 2022 to 1,789,128[[41]](#footnote-42) in 2023, representing an increase of 115,293 final notices sent to residential consumers. Finally, the total amount of unpaid balances on the final disconnection notices increased from $459,550,106[[42]](#footnote-43) in 2022 to $542,345,458.50[[43]](#footnote-44) in 2023, an increase of $82,795,352.50.

This data shows that service disconnections are increasing at an alarming rate for AEP’s consumers. In fact, if the disconnection numbers provided by AEP over the last five years are examined, we see a steady and significant pattern of increase.[[44]](#footnote-45) Rather than take responsibility for this disturbing trend, or provide any potential solutions, AEP has simply provided excuses, and questioned the validity of other utilities published disconnection rates.[[45]](#footnote-46)

The PUCO Order finds that the Settlement addresses AEP’s disconnection rates by “a modest bill increase for residential customers” and energy efficiency programs (funded primarily by AEP’s consumers) proposing to provide bill payment assistance, weatherization, and lighting/appliance updates with the goal of reducing energy usage and electric bills to improve affordability.[[46]](#footnote-47) The PUCO cites its own rules and programs “to address affordability and the threat of disconnection for residential customers, including the PIPP programs. PIPP Plus and Graduate PIPP Plus are designed to make electric and gas utility services more affordable for low-income customers.”[[47]](#footnote-48) The PUCO also cites “Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-18-05 [which requires AEP], like other electric, gas, and natural gas utilities, to offer any residential customer an extended payment plan to help make payments more affordable and avoid the possibility of disconnection [and the PUCO’s nearly 40 years] of winter reconnection procedures.”[[48]](#footnote-49)

But the PUCO fails to recognize that the programs it cites as addressing disconnections are not new programs. The programs have all been in place throughout the time period when AEP was disconnecting consumers left and right. Further, as the PUCO even points out within its Order,[[49]](#footnote-50) those programs all apply to the other utilities providing electric service to Ohioans. They have posted substantially lower rates of disconnection in the same time periods.[[50]](#footnote-51)

Rehearing should be granted, and the Order modified, to comply with the PUCO’s statutory duties.

# CONCLUSION

To protect AEP’s 1.2 million residential electric utility consumers from excessive and unjustified charges, and help promote the state policy that consumers have adequate, reliable, safe, and efficient electric service,[[51]](#footnote-52) the PUCO should grant rehearing and modify its Order consistent with OCC’s recommendations.

Respectfully submitted,

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Application for Rehearing was served via electronic transmission upon the parties this 3rd day of May 2024.

 */s/ William J. Michael*

 William J. Michael

 Assistant Consumers’ Counsel

The PUCO’s e-filing system will electronically serve notice of the filing of this document on the following parties:

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1. This application for rehearing is authorized by R.C. 4903.10 and O.A.C. 4901-1-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. AEP Ohio Ex. 2 at 21-22 (Mayhan testimony). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. R.C. 4928.143(C)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. *See* *In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company for Authority to Establish a Standard Service Offer*, Case Nos. 23-23-EL-SSO, et al., Joint Stipulation and Recommendation (Sept. 6, 2023) (“Settlement”) at III.H.25 (DIR charges total $1.022 Billion), III.E.8 (ESRR charges total $244 Million), III.L.37-38 (Energy Efficiency Rider charges total $48 Million), III.I.34 (Smart Thermostat charges total $20 Million), III.K.36 (Customer Experience Rider charges Totaling $1.8 Million), and III.F.10 (Electric Transportation Plan charges totaling $1.2 Million). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. *In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company for Authority to Establish a Standard Service Offer*, Case Nos. 23-23-EL-SSO, et al., Opinion and Order (April 3, 2024) (“Order”) at ¶¶ 100 & 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. *See* *In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company for Authority to Establish a Standard Service Offer*, Case Nos. 23-23-EL-SSO, et al., Direct Testimony of Chris M. Shafer in Support of AEP Ohio’s Electric Security Plan (Jan. 6, 2023) (“Shafer Testimony”) at 15:11-16:9 (stating AEP’s estimate for Ohio Power ADMS costs is $25.554 Million, which AEP intends to collect from consumers through the Customer Experience Rider). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. *See* Settlement at III.F.10-11 and III.I.33. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. *See* Settlement at III.C.6; *See also* Direct Testimony of Stacey D. Gabbard on Behalf of Ohio Power Company (Jan. 6, 2023) at 17:13-8:2 (Stating AEP’s January 2023 estimate of CIS costs to be recouped from consumers total $183.476 Million). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. *See* Settlement at III.F.14-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. Order at ¶¶ 97, 99 & 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Settlement at III.H.25, III.E.8, III.L.37-38, III.I.34, III.K.36 and III.F.10. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. *See* AEP Ohio Ex. 2 at 21-22 (Mayhan Testimony). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Order at ¶¶ 100 & 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Order at ¶¶ 97, 99, 100, and 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Order at ¶ 91. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. OCC Ex. 4 (Testimony Recommending Modification of the Stipulation of James D. Williams on Behalf of the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel) (Sept. 20, 2023) (“Williams Testimony”) at 9:6-14; *see also id.* at 12-15 (PUCO should reject increased tree-trimming expenses). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. R.C. 4928.143(C)(1). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. R.C. 4928.02 and R.C. 4928.06. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. R.C. 4903.09. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. *Allnet Communs. Servs. v. PUC of Ohio*, 70 Ohio St.3d 202, 209, 638 N.E.2d 516 (1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. *See* Initial Post-Hearing Brief by the Citizens’ Utility Board of Ohio at 5-8; Initial Brief of the Ohio Environmental Council at 9-10; Initial Post-Hearing Brief of the Environmental Law & Policy Center at 4-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. *See* Initial Post-Hearing Brief of the Ohio Energy Leadership Council at 5-7; Post-Hearing Brief of the Ohio Energy Group at 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. *See, e.g.,* Initial Brief of Direct Energy at 5-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. *See* AEP Ohio Ex. 2 at 21-22 (Mayhan Testimony). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Order at ¶¶ 100 & 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. OCC Ex. 4 (Testimony Recommending Modification of the Stipulation of James D. Williams on Behalf of the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel) (Sept. 20, 2023) (“Williams Testimony”) at 7:20-9:4. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. *In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company for an Increase in Electric Distribution Rates*, Case No. 20-585-EL-AIR, Opinion and Order (Nov. 17, 2021) at 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. Order at ¶¶ 91, 100 & 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. Order at ¶¶ 97, 99, 100 & 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. OCC Ex. 8 (Testimony Recommending Modification of the Stipulation of Joseph P. Buckley on Behalf of the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel) (Sept. 20, 2023) (“Buckley Testimony”) at 13-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Order at ¶¶ 97 & 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. Order at ¶ 99. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. OCC Ex. 1 (Testimony Recommending Modification of the Stipulation of Andrew R. Tinkham on Behalf of the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel) (Sept. 20, 2023) (“Tinkham Testimony”) at 6:10-9:2. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. Order at ¶ 134. CUB Ohio noted these concerns but that did not keep them from signing onto the settlement. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. *Id.* at 6:10-9:2; Attachment ART-1 pp. 3-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. *Id.* at 6:10-9:2; Attachment ART-2 pp. 3-6*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. *Id.* at 6:10-9:2; Attachment ART-1 pp. 3-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. *Id.* at 6:10-9:2; Attachment ART-2 pp. 3-6*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. *Id.* at 6:10-9:2; Attachment ART-1 pp. 3-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. *Id.* at 6:10-9:2; Attachment ART-2 pp. 3-6*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. *In the Matter of the Annual Report Required by R.C. 4933.123 Regarding Service Disconnections for Nonpayment*, Case No. 23-532-GE-UNC, Report Of Service Disconnections For Nonpayment Of Ohio Power Company (June 30, 2023); *In the Matter of the Annual Report Required by R.C. 4933.123 Regarding Service Disconnections for Nonpayment*, Case No. 23-532-GE-UNC, Report Of Service Disconnections For Nonpayment Of Ohio Power Company (June 30, 2023); *In the Matter of the Annual Report Required by R.C. 4933.123 Regarding Service Disconnections for Nonpayment*, Case No. 22-513-GE-UNC, Report Of Service Disconnections For Nonpayment Of Ohio Power Company (June 30, 2022); *In the Matter of the Annual Report Required by R.C. 4933.123 Regarding Service Disconnections for Nonpayment*, Case No. 21-548-GE-UNC, Report Of Service Disconnections For Nonpayment Of Ohio Power Company (June 11, 2021); *In the Matter of the Annual Report Required by R.C. 4933.123 Regarding Service Disconnections for Nonpayment*, Case No. 20-937-GE-UNC, Report Of Service Disconnections For Nonpayment Of Ohio Power Company (June 16, 2020); *In the Matter of the Annual Report Required by R.C. 4933.123 Regarding Service Disconnections for Nonpayment*, Case No. 19-974-GE-UNC, Report Of Service Disconnections For Nonpayment Of Ohio Power Company (June 11, 2019); *In the Matter of the Annual Report Required by R.C. 4933.123 Regarding Service Disconnections for Nonpayment*, Case No. 18-757-GE-UNC, Report Of Service Disconnections For Nonpayment Of Ohio Power Company (July 5, 2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. Order at ¶ 133; *In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company for Authority to Establish a Standard Service Offer*, Case Nos. 23-23-EL-SSO, et al., Initial Post Hearing Brief in Support of Stipulation and Recommendation (Dec. 1, 2023) at 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. Order at ¶ 135. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. Order at ¶ 136. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. Order at ¶ 136. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. Tinkham Testimony 6:10-9:2. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. R.C. 4928.02(A). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)