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3.7 Inadvertent Interchange.

Inadvertent Interchange will be reconciled each hour by a charge allocation (positive or negative) applied to Network Service Users in proportion to their deliveries to load in the PJM Region, which shall be the product of the positive or negative Inadvertent Interchange amount times the PJM load weighted average Locational Marginal Price for that hour.

4. [Reserved For Future Use]

5. CALCULATION OF CHARGES AND CREDITS FOR TRANSMISSION CONGESTION AND LOSSES

5.1 Transmission Congestion Charge Calculation.

5.1.1 Calculation by Office of the Interconnection.

When the transmission system is operating under constrained conditions, or as necessary to provide third-party transmission provider losses , the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Transmission Congestion Charges for each Network Service User, Market Participants in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, and each Transmission Customer.

5.1.2 General.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Congestion Prices in the form of Day-ahead Congestion Prices and Real-time Congestion Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.

5.1.3 Network Service User Calculation.

(a) Each Network Service User shall be charged for the increased cost of energy incurred by it during each constrained hour to deliver the output of its firm Generation Capacity Resources or other owned or contracted for resources, its firm bilateral purchases, and its non-firm bilateral purchases as to which it has elected to pay Transmission Congestion Charges.

(b) Market Buyers shall be charged for transmission congestion resulting from all load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) scheduled to be served from the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Congestion Prices applicable to each relevant load bus.

(c) Generating Market Buyers shall be reimbursed for transmission congestion resulting from all energy scheduled to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Congestion Prices applicable to each relevant generation bus.

(d) Market Sellers shall be reimbursed for transmission congestion resulting from all energy scheduled to be delivered in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Congestion Prices applicable to each relevant generation bus.

(e) (i) The hourly net amount of energy delivered at each generation bus is determined by revenue meter data if available, or by the State Estimator, if revenue meter data is not available. The total load actually served at each load bus is initially determined by the State Estimator. For each Electric Distributor that reports hourly net energy flows from metered Tie Lines and for which all generators within the Electric Distributor's territory report revenue quality, hourly net energy delivered, the total revenue meter load within the Electric Distributor's territory is calculated as the sum of all net import energy flows reported by their tie revenue meters and all net generation reported via generator revenue meters. The amount of load at each of such Electric Distributor's load buses calculated by the State Estimator is then adjusted, in proportion to its share of the total load of that Electric Distributor, in order that the total amount of load across all of the Electric Distributor's load buses matches its total revenue meter calculated load.

(ii) To determine the amount of load served by each LSE in an Electric Distributor's territory, PJMSettlement utilizes the information submitted into PJM's internal energy scheduling tool by LSEs and Electric Distributors for their respective load settlements ("load contract"), including the names of the LSE responsible for serving the load and the Electric Distributor in whose territory the load is located, the number of megawatts of load assigned to the LSE for each hour, the Energy Settlement Area at which load is to be priced, and the start and end dates for the load contract. During the settlements process, load assigned to an LSE at a specified Energy Settlement Area is further assigned to individual load buses included in the Energy Settlement Area, based on the definition for the Energy Settlement Area as defined in Section 31.7 of the PJM Tariff, which specifies the percentage of the Energy Settlement Area that each bus represents, to identify the LSE's hourly megawatts of load at each bus. All megawatts of load assigned to LSEs in an Electric Distributor's territory as described herein are subtracted from the total megawatts of load for which the Electric Distributor is responsible as determined in subsection (e)(i) above.

(iii) Electric Distributors that hold Provider of Last Resort ("POLR") auctions or similar load auctions may direct PJM to automatically assign megawatt hours for which the Electric Distributor is responsible, as determined in subsection (e)(ii) above, to the LSEs whose bids were accepted in the auction ("POLR Suppliers") based on the tranches the POLR Suppliers won in the auction, as a billing service, based on their contracts associated with the POLR load programs. In such case, the POLR Supplier's share of load shall be determined by multiplying the megawatt hours at each bus that were not specifically assigned under load contracts by the percentage of load won by the POLR Supplier in proportion to its share of the total POLR load of the Electric Distributor. This billing service may also apply to Electric Distributors and LSEs that mutually agree upon a transfer of load from the EDC to the LSE based upon a specified percentage of the megawatt hours at each bus that were not specifically assigned under load contracts.

(f) At the end of each hour during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the Transmission Congestion Charges at each Market Buyer's load bus to be charged for congestion at Real-time Congestion Prices determined by the product of the hourly Real-time Congestion Price at the relevant bus times the Market Buyer's megawatts of load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) at the bus in that hour in excess of the load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) scheduled to be served at that bus in the hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market. To the extent that the load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) actually served at a load bus is less than the load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) scheduled to be served at that bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Market Buyer shall be paid for the difference at the Real-time Congestion Price for the load bus at the time of the shortfall. The megawatts of load at each load bus shall be the sum of the megawatts of load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not less than zero) for that bus of that Market Buyer plus any megawatts of that Market Buyer's bilateral sales attributable to that bus. The total load charge for each Market Buyer shall be the sum, for each of a Market Buyer's load buses, of the charges at Day-ahead Congestion Prices determined in accordance with the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in Section

1.10.1a plus the charges at Real-time Congestion Prices determined as specified herein, net of any payments specified herein for each of the Market Buyer's load buses.

(g) At the end of each hour during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the transmission congestion payments at each Generating Market Buyer's generation bus to be paid at Real-time Congestion Prices, determined by the product of the hourly Real-time Congestion Price at the relevant bus times the Generating Market Buyer's megawatts of generation at such generation bus in the hour in excess of the energy scheduled to be injected at that bus in that hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market. To the extent that the energy actually injected at the generation bus is less than the energy scheduled to be injected at that bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Generating Market Buyer shall be debited for the difference at the Real-time Congestion Price for the generation bus at the time of the shortfall. The megawatts of generation at each generation bus shall be the sum of the megawatts of generation for that bus of that Generating Market Buyer plus any megawatts of bilateral purchases of that Generating Market Buyer attributable to that bus. The total generation revenue for each Generating Market Buyer shall be the sum, for each of the Generating Market Buyer's generation buses, of the revenues at Day-ahead Congestion Prices determined in accordance with the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in Section 1.10.1A plus the revenues at Real-time Congestion Prices determined as specified herein, net of any debits specified herein for each of the Market Buyer's generation buses.

(h) A Market Seller shall be paid for transmission congestion that results from the Real-time sales of energy to the extent of its hourly net deliveries to the PJM Region of energy in excess of amounts scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market from the Market Seller's resources. For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the hourly amounts delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region. The total real-time generation revenues for each Market Seller shall be the sum of its credits determined by the product of (i) the hourly net amount of energy delivered to the PJM Region at the applicable generation or interface bus in excess of the amount scheduled to be delivered in that hour at that bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market from each of the Market Seller's resources, times (ii) the hourly Real-time Congestion Price at that bus. To the extent that the energy actually injected at a generation or interface bus in any hour is less than the energy scheduled to be injected at that bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Market Seller shall be debited for the difference at the Real-time Congestion Price for the applicable bus at the time of the shortfall times the amount of the shortfall. The total generation revenue for each Market Seller shall be the sum, for each of the Market Seller's generation buses or Interface Pricing Points, of the revenues at Day-ahead Congestion Prices determined in accordance with the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in Section 1.10.1A plus the revenues at Real-time Congestion Prices determined as specified herein, net of any debits specified herein for each of the Market Seller's generation or interface buses.

5.1.4 Transmission Customer Calculation.

Each Transmission Customer using Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service (as defined in the PJM Tariff), each Network Customer, and each Transmission Customer using Non-Firm

Point-to-Point Transmission Service (as defined in the PJM Tariff) that has elected to pay Transmission Congestion Charges, shall be charged for the increased cost of energy during constrained hours for the delivery of energy using such Transmission Service. Except as specified in this subsection, a Transmission Congestion Charge shall be assessed for transmission use scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, calculated as the amount to be delivered multiplied by the difference between the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the delivery point or the delivery Interface Pricing Point at the boundary of the PJM Region and the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the source point or the source Interface Pricing Point at the boundary of the PJM Region. Transmission Congestion Charges shall be assessed for real-time transmission use in excess of the amounts scheduled for each hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market, calculated as the excess amount multiplied by the difference between the Real-time Congestion Price at the delivery point or the delivery Interface Pricing Point at the boundary of the PJM Region, and the Real-time Congestion Price at the source point or the source Interface Pricing Point at the boundary of the PJM Region. A Transmission Customer shall be paid for Transmission Congestion Charges for real-time transmission use falling below the amounts scheduled for each hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market, calculated as the shortfall amount multiplied by the difference between the Real-time Congestion Price at the delivery point or the delivery Interface Pricing Point at the boundary of the PJM Region, and the Real-time Congestion Price at the source point or the source Interface Pricing Point at the boundary of the PJM Region.

5.1.4A Transaction Calculation

Each Market Participant entering into transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Markets shall be charged for the increased cost of energy during constrained hours for the delivery of energy on the scheduled path. Except as specified in this subsection, a Transmission Congestion Charge shall be assessed for cleared MWh in the Day-ahead Energy Market, calculated as the amount to be delivered multiplied by the difference between the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the sink point and the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the source point. Transmission Congestion Charges shall be assessed for real-time cleared MWh in excess of the amounts scheduled for each hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market, calculated as the excess amount multiplied by the difference between the Real-time Congestion Price at the sink point and the Real-time Congestion Price at the source point. Such Market Participant shall be paid for Transmission Congestion Charges for real-time cleared MWh falling below the amounts scheduled for each hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market, calculated as the shortfall amount multiplied by the difference between the Real-time Congestion Price at the sink point and the Real-time Congestion Price at the source point.

5.1.5 Operating Margin Customer Calculation.

Each Control Area purchasing Operating Margin shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges for any increase in the cost of energy resulting from the provision of Operating Margin. The Transmission Congestion Charge shall be the amount of Operating Margin purchased in an hour multiplied by the difference in the Locational Marginal Price at what would be the delivery Interface Pricing Point and the Locational Marginal Price at what would be the source Interface Pricing Point, if the operating contingency that was the basis for the purchase of Operating

Margin had occurred in that hour. Operating Margin may be allocated among multiple source and delivery Interface Pricing Points in accordance with an applicable load flow study.

5.1.6 Transmission Loading Relief Customer Calculation.

(a) Each Transmission Loading Relief Customer shall be assessed Transmission Congestion Charges for any increase in the cost of energy in the PJM Region resulting from its energy schedules over contract paths outside the PJM Region during Transmission Loading Relief.

(b) The Transmission Congestion Charge shall be the total amount of energy specified in such energy schedules multiplied by the difference between a Locational Marginal Price calculated by the Office of the Interconnection for the energy schedule source location specified in the NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator and a Locational Marginal Price calculated by the Office of the Interconnection for the energy schedule sink location specified in the NERC Interchange Distribution Calculator. Transmission Congestion Charges that are less than zero shall be set equal to zero for Transmission Loading Relief Customers.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection will determine the Locational Marginal Prices at the energy schedule source and sink locations external to PJM with reference to and based solely on the prices of energy in the PJM Region and at the Interface Pricing Points between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region and the system conditions and actual power flow distributions as described by the PJM State Estimator program. The Office of the Interconnection will determine the Locational Marginal Prices at the external energy schedule source and sink locations and the resulting Congestion Charge based on the portion of the energy schedule that flows through the PJM Region as reflected by the flow distributions from the PJM State Estimator program.

5.1.7 Total Transmission Congestion Charges.

The total Transmission Congestion Charges collected by PJMSettlement each hour will be the aggregate net amounts determined as specified in the PJM Manuals. PJMSettlement shall collect Transmission Congestion Charges for each hour the transmission system operates under constrained conditions.

5.2 Transmission Congestion Credit Calculation.

5.2.1 Eligibility.

(a) Except as provided in Section 5.2.1(b), each FTR Holder shall receive as a Transmission Congestion Credit a proportional share of the total Transmission Congestion Charges collected for each constrained hour.

(b) If an Effective FTR Holder between specified delivery and receipt buses acquired the Financial Transmission Right in a Financial Transmission Rights auction (the procedures for which are set forth in Part 7 of this Schedule 1) and (i) had an Increment Offer and/or Decrement Bid that was accepted by the Office of the Interconnection for an applicable hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market for delivery or receipt at or near delivery or receipt buses of the Financial Transmission Right or had an Up-to Congestion Transaction that was accepted by the Office of the Interconnection for an applicable hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market for a path at or near the path of the Financial Transmission Right; and (ii) the result of the acceptance of such Increment Offer, Decrement Bid or Up-to Congestion Transaction is that the difference in Locational Marginal Prices in the Day-ahead Energy Market between such delivery and receipt buses is greater than the difference in Locational Marginal Prices between such delivery and receipt buses in the Real-time Energy Market, then the Market Participant shall not receive any Transmission Congestion Credit, associated with such Financial Transmission Right in such hour, in excess of one divided by the number of hours in the applicable month multiplied by the amount that the Market Participant paid for the Financial Transmission Right in the Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(c) For purposes of Section 5.2.1(b) a bus shall be considered at or near the Financial Transmission Right delivery or receipt bus if seventy-five percent or more of the energy injected or withdrawn at that bus and which is withdrawn or injected at any other bus is reflected in the constrained path between the subject Financial Transmission Right delivery and receipt buses that were acquired in the Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(d) The Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate Transmission Congestion Credits pursuant to this section and section VI of Attachment M – Appendix. Nothing in this section shall preclude the Market Monitoring Unit from action to recover inappropriate benefits from the subject activity if the amount forfeited is less than the benefit derived by the Effective FTR Holder. If the Office of the Interconnection agrees with such calculation, then it shall impose the forfeiture of the Transmission Congestion Credit accordingly. If the Office of the Interconnection does not agree with the calculation, then it shall impose a forfeiture of Transmission Congestion Credit consistent with its determination. If the Market Monitoring Unit disagrees with the Office of the Interconnection's determination, it may exercise its powers to inform the Commission staff of its concerns and may request an adjustment. This provision is duplicated in section VI of Attachment M – Appendix. An Effective FTR Holder objecting to the application of this rule shall have recourse to the Commission for review of the application of the FTR forfeiture rule to its trading activity.

5.2.2 Financial Transmission Rights.

(a) Transmission Congestion Credits will be calculated based upon the Financial Transmission Rights held at the time of the constrained hour. Except as provided in subsection (e) below, Financial Transmission Rights shall be auctioned as set forth in Section 7.

(b) The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is based on the Financial Transmission Right MW reservation and the difference between the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery and the point of receipt of the Financial Transmission Right. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is positive (a benefit to the FTR Holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Obligation is negative (a liability to the FTR Holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery.

(c) The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is based on the Financial Transmission Right MW reservation and the difference between the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery and the point of receipt of the Financial Transmission Right when that difference is positive. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is positive (a benefit to the FTR Holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt. The hourly economic value of a Financial Transmission Right Option is zero (neither a benefit nor a liability to the FTR Holder) when the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of receipt is higher than the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the point of delivery.

(d) In addition to transactions with PJMSettlement in the Financial Transmission Rights auctions administered by the Office of the Interconnection, a Financial Transmission Right, for its entire tenure or for a specified period, may be sold or otherwise transferred to a third party by bilateral agreement, subject to compliance with such procedures as may be established by the Office of the Interconnection for verification of the rights of the purchaser or transferee.

(i) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer to a third party a Financial Transmission Right, for its entire tenure or for a specified period. Such bilateral transactions shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its eFTR tools.

(ii) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transactions for the transfer of Financial Transmission Rights, the rights and obligations pertaining to the Financial Transmission Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transaction shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. Such bilateral transactions shall not modify the location or reconfigure the Financial Transmission Rights. In no event shall the purchase and sale of a Financial Transmission Right pursuant to a bilateral transaction constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.

(iii) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any Financial Transmission Right Obligation. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations, including meeting applicable creditworthiness requirements, transferred in the bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Financial Transmission Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the FTR Holder shall continue to receive all Transmission Congestion Credits attributable to the Financial Transmission Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Financial Transmission Rights.

(iv) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the transferred Financial Transmission Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transaction.

(v) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.

(vi) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

(e) Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks, sources in, or is transmitted through new PJM zones, at their election, may receive a direct allocation of Financial Transmission Rights instead of an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers may make this election for the succeeding two annual FTR auctions after the integration of the new zone into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. Such election shall be made prior to the commencement of each annual FTR auction. For purposes of this election, the Allegheny Power Zone shall be considered a new zone with respect to the annual Financial Transmission Right auction in 2003 and 2004. Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers in new PJM zones that elect not to receive direct allocations of Financial Transmission Rights shall receive allocations of Auction Revenue Rights. During the annual allocation process, the Financial Transmission Right allocation for new PJM zones shall be performed simultaneously with the Auction Revenue Rights allocations in existing and new PJM zones. Prior to the effective date of the initial allocation of FTRs in a new PJM Zone, PJM shall file with FERC, under section 205 of the Federal Power Act, the FTRs and ARRs allocated in accordance with sections 5 and 7 of this Schedule 1.

(f) For Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks in, sources in, or is transmitted through new PJM zones, that elect to receive direct allocations of Financial Transmission Rights, Financial Transmission Rights shall be allocated using the same allocation methodology as is specified for the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights in Section 7.4.2 and in accordance with the following:

(i) Subject to subsection (ii) of this section, all Financial Transmission Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Financial Transmission Right requests made when Financial Transmission Rights are allocated for the new zone are not feasible then Financial Transmission Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the MW level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.

(ii) If any Financial Transmission Right requests that are equal to or less than a Network Service User's Zonal Base Load for the Zone or fifty percent of its transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load, or fifty percent of megawatts of firm service between the receipt and delivery points of Firm Transmission Customers, are not feasible in the annual allocation and auction processes due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Financial Transmission Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Financial Transmission Rights without their being infeasible for all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes, provided that this subsection (ii) shall not apply if the infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Additionally, such increased limits shall be included in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions; unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (ii) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (ii), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an unanticipated event outside the control of PJM that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Financial Transmission Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates Financial Transmission Rights as a result of this subsection (ii) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Financial Transmission Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Financial Transmission Rights.

(iii) In the event that Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another after an initial or annual allocation of Financial Transmission Rights in a new zone, Financial Transmission Rights will be reassigned on a proportional basis from the Network Service User losing the load to the Network Service User that is gaining the Network Load.

(g) At least one month prior to the integration of a new zone into the PJM Interchange Energy Market, Network Service Users and Firm Transmission Customers that take service that sinks in, sources in, or is transmitted through the new zone, shall receive an initial allocation of Financial Transmission Rights that will be in effect from the date of the integration of the new zone until the next annual allocation of Financial Transmission Rights and Auction Revenue Rights. Such allocation of Financial Transmission Rights shall be made in accordance with Section 5.2.2(f) of this Schedule.

(h) Reserved.

5.2.3 Target Allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits.

A Target Allocation of Transmission Congestion Credits for each FTR Holder shall be determined for each Financial Transmission Right. Each Financial Transmission Right shall be multiplied by the Day-ahead Congestion Price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Financial Transmission Right, calculated as the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the delivery point(s) minus the Day-ahead Congestion Price at the receipt point(s). For the purposes of calculating Transmission Congestion Credits, the Day-ahead Congestion Price of a Zone is calculated as the sum of the Day-ahead Congestion Price of each bus that comprises the Zone multiplied by the percent of annual peak load assigned to each node in the Zone. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, for the purposes of calculating Transmission Congestion Credits, the Day-ahead Congestion Price of a Residual Metered Load aggregate is calculated as the sum of the Day-ahead Congestion Price of each bus that comprises the Residual Metered Load aggregate multiplied by the percent of the annual peak residual load assigned to each bus that comprises the Residual Metered Load aggregate. When the FTR Target Allocation is positive, the FTR Target Allocation is a credit to the FTR Holder. When the FTR Target Allocation is negative, the FTR Target Allocation is a debit to the FTR Holder if the FTR is a Financial Transmission Right Obligation. When the FTR Target Allocation is negative, the FTR Target Allocation is set to zero if the FTR is a Financial Transmission Right Option. The total Target Allocation for Network Service Users and Transmission Customers for each hour shall be the sum of the Target Allocations associated with all of the Network Service Users' or Transmission Customers' Financial Transmission Rights.

5.2.4 [Reserved.]

5.2.5 Calculation of Transmission Congestion Credits.

(a) The total of all the positive Target Allocations determined as specified above shall be compared to the total Transmission Congestion Charges in each hour resulting from both the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market. If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total of the Transmission Congestion Charges, the Transmission Congestion Credit for each entity holding an FTR shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining Transmission Congestion Charges shall be distributed as described below in Section 5.2.6 "Distribution of Excess Congestion Charges."

(b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total Transmission Congestion Charges for the hour resulting from both the Day-ahead Energy Market and the Real-time Energy Market, each FTR Holder shall be assigned a share of the total Transmission Congestion Charges in proportion to its Target Allocations for Financial Transmission Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Financial Transmission Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Transmission Congestion Credit.

(c) At the end of a Planning Period if all FTR Holders did not receive Transmission Congestion Credits equal to their Target Allocations, the Office of the Interconnection shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Transmission Congestion Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient FTRs and the actual Transmission Congestion Credits allocated to those FTR Holders. A charge assessed pursuant to this section shall also include any aggregate charge assessed pursuant to section 7.4.4(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and shall be allocated to all FTR Holders on a pro-rata basis according to the total Target Allocations for all FTRs held at any time during the relevant Planning Period. The charge shall be calculated and allocated in accordance with the following methodology:

1. The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total amount of uplift required as {[sum of the total monthly deficiencies in FTR Target Allocations for the Planning Period + the sum of the ARR Target Allocation deficiencies determined pursuant to section 7.4.4(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement] – [sum of the total monthly excess ARR revenues and congestion charges for the Planning Period]}.

2. For each Market Participant that held an FTR during the Planning Period, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total Target Allocation associated with all FTRs held by the Market Participant during the Planning Period, provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, if the total Target Allocation for an individual Market Participant calculated pursuant to this section is negative the Office of Interconnection shall set the value to zero.

3. The Office of the Interconnection shall then allocate an uplift charge to each Market Participant that held an FTR at any time during the Planning Period in accordance with the following formula: {[total uplift] * [total Target Allocation for all FTRs held by the Market Participant at any time during the Planning

Period] / [total Target Allocations for all FTRs held by all PJM Market Participants at any time during the Planning Period]}.

5.2.6 Distribution of Excess Congestion Charges.

(a) Excess Transmission Congestion Charges accumulated in a month shall be distributed to each FTR Holder in proportion to, but not more than, any deficiency in the share of Transmission Congestion Charges received by the FTR Holder during that month as compared to its total Target Allocations for the month.

(b) After the excess Transmission Congestion Charge distribution described in Section 5.2.6(a) is performed, any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining at the end of a month shall be distributed to each FTR Holder in proportion to, but not more than, any deficiency in the share of Transmission Congestion Charges received by the FTR Holder during the current Planning Period, including previously distributed excess Transmission Congestion Charges, as compared to its total Target Allocation for the Planning Period.

(c) Any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining at the end of a Planning Period shall be distributed to each holder of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, any Auction Revenue Right deficiencies for that Planning Period.

(d) Any excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining after a distribution pursuant to subsection (c) of this section shall be distributed to all FTR Holders on a pro-rata basis according to the total Target Allocations for all FTRs held at any time during the relevant Planning Period. Any allocation pursuant to this subsection (d) shall be conducted in accordance with the following methodology:

1. For each Market Participant that held an FTR during the Planning Period, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the total Target Allocation associated with all FTRs held by the Market Participant during the Planning Period, provided that, the foregoing notwithstanding, if the total Target Allocation for an individual Market Participant calculated pursuant to this section is negative the Office of the Interconnection shall set the value to zero.

2. The Office of the Interconnection shall then allocate an excess Transmission Congestion Charge credit to each Market Participant that held an FTR at any time during the Planning Period in accordance with the following formula: {[total excess Transmission Congestion Charges remaining after distributions pursuant to subsection (a)-(c) of this section] * [total Target Allocation for all FTRs held by the Market Participant at any time during the Planning Period] / [total Target Allocations for all FTRs held by all PJM Market Participants at any time during the Planning Period]}.

5.3 Unscheduled Transmission Service (Loop Flow).

(a) When there are agreements between the LLC and others for compensation to be paid or received for unscheduled transmission service (loop flow) into or out of the PJM Region, the net compensation received shall be included in the total Transmission Congestion Charges that are distributed in accordance with Section 5.2.

(b) With respect to payments by the Office of the Interconnection to the New York Power Pool for the installation and operation of phase angle regulating facilities at Ramapo to control or limit unscheduled transmission service (loop flow), each of the following Transmission Owners with revenue requirements under the PJM Tariff shall pay a share of the charges on a transmission revenue requirements ratio share basis: Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc., Atlantic City Electric Company, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Delmarva Power & Light Company, Jersey Central Power & Light Company, Mid-Atlantic Interstate Transmission, LLC (but only with respect to transmission revenue requirements associated with the Metropolitan Edison Company Zone), PECO Energy Company, Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, Potomac Electric Power Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Rockland Electric Company, and UGI Utilities, Inc.

5.4 Transmission Loss Charge Calculation.

5.4.1 Calculation by Office of the Interconnection.

The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Transmission Loss Charges for each Network Service User, Market Participant in the PJM Interchange Energy Market, and each Transmission Customer.

5.4.2 General.

(a) The basis for the Transmission Loss Charges shall be the differences in the Locational Marginal Prices, defined as the Loss Price at a bus, between points of delivery and points of receipt, as determined in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule. (b) The Office of the Interconnection shall calculate Loss Prices in the form of Day-ahead Loss Prices and Real-time Loss Prices for the PJM Region, in accordance with Section 2 of this Schedule.

5.4.3 Network Service User Calculation.

(a) Each Network Service User shall be charged for the increased cost of transmission losses to deliver the output of its firm Capacity Resources or other owned or contracted for resources, its firm bilateral purchases, and its non-firm bilateral purchases.

(b) Market Buyers shall be charged for transmission losses resulting from all load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) scheduled to be served from the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Loss Price applicable to each relevant load bus.

(c) Generating Market Buyers shall be reimbursed for transmission losses resulting from all energy scheduled to be delivered to the PJM Interchange Energy Market in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Loss Price applicable to each relevant generation bus.

(d) Market Sellers shall be reimbursed for transmission losses resulting from all energy scheduled to be delivered in the Day-ahead Energy Market at the Day-ahead Loss Prices applicable to each relevant generation bus.

(e) (i) The hourly net amount of energy delivered at each generation bus is determined by revenue meter data, if available, or by the State Estimator, if revenue meter data is not available. The total load actually served at each load bus is initially determined by the State Estimator. For each Electric Distributor that reports hourly net energy flows from metered Tie Lines and for which all generators within the Electric Distributor's territory report revenue quality, hourly net energy delivered, the total revenue meter load within the Electric Distributor's territory is calculated as the sum of all net import energy flows reported by their tie revenue meters and all net generation reported via generator revenue meters. The amount of load at each of such Electric Distributor's load buses calculated by the State Estimator is then adjusted, in proportion to its share of the total load of that Electric Distributor, in order that the total amount of load across all of the Electric Distributor's load buses matches its total revenue meter calculated load.

(ii) To determine the amount of load served by each LSE in an Electric Distributor's territory, PJMSettlement utilizes the information submitted into PJM's internal energy scheduling tool by LSEs and Electric Distributors for their respective load contracts, including the names of the LSE responsible for serving the load and the Electric Distributor in whose territory the load is located, the number of megawatts of load assigned to the LSE for each hour, the Energy Settlement Area at which load is to be priced, and the start and end dates for the load contract. During the settlements process, load assigned to an LSE at a specified Energy Settlement Area is further assigned to individual load buses included in the Energy Settlement Area, based on the definition for the Energy Settlement Area as defined in Section 31.7 of the PJM Tariff, which specifies the percentage of the Energy Settlement Area that each bus represents, to identify the LSE's hourly megawatts of load at each bus. All megawatts of load assigned to LSEs in an Electric Distributor's territory as described herein are subtracted from the total megawatts of load for which the Electric Distributor is responsible as determined in subsection (e)(i) above.

(iii) Electric Distributors that hold POLR auctions or similar load auctions may direct PJM to automatically assign megawatt hours for which the Electric Distributor is responsible, as determined in subsection (e)(ii) above, to the POLR Suppliers based on the tranches the POLR Suppliers won in the auction, as a billing service, based on their contracts associated with the POLR load programs. In such case, the POLR Supplier's share of load shall be determined by multiplying the megawatt hours at each bus that were not specifically assigned under load contracts by the percentage of load won by the POLR Supplier in proportion to its share of the total POLR load of the Electric Distributor. This billing service may also apply to Electric Distributors and LSEs that mutually agree upon a transfer of load from the EDC to the LSE based upon a specified percentage of the megawatt hours at each bus that were not specifically assigned under load contracts.

(f) At the end of each hour during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the Transmission Loss Charges at each Market Buyer's load bus to be charged for losses at Real-time Loss Prices determined by the product of the hourly Real-time Loss Prices at the relevant bus times the Market Buyer's megawatts of load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) at the bus in that hour in excess of the load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) scheduled to be served at that bus in the hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market. To the extent that the load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) actually served at a load bus is less than the load (net of Behind The Meter Generation expected to be operating, but not to be less than zero) scheduled to be served at that bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Market Buyer shall be paid for the difference at the Real-time Loss Price for the load bus at the time of the shortfall. The megawatts of load at each load bus shall be the sum of the megawatts of load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not less than zero) for that bus of that Market Buyer plus any megawatts of that Market Buyer's bilateral sales attributable to that bus. The total load charge for each Market Buyer shall be the sum, for each of a Market Buyer's load buses, of the charges at Day-ahead Loss Price determined in accordance with the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in Section 1.10.1a plus the charges at Real-time Loss Prices determined as specified herein, net of any payments specified herein for each of the Market Buyer's load buses.

(g) At the end of each hour during an Operating Day, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate the transmission loss payments at each Generating Market Buyer's generation bus to be paid at Real-time Loss Prices, determined by the product of the hourly Real-time Loss Price at the relevant bus times the Generating Market Buyer's megawatts of generation at such generation bus in the hour in excess of the energy scheduled to be injected at that bus in that hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market. To the extent that the energy actually injected at the generation bus is less than the energy scheduled to be injected at that bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Generating Market Buyer shall be debited for the difference at the Real-time Loss Price for the generation bus at the time of the shortfall. The megawatts of generation at each generation bus shall be the sum of the megawatts of generation for that bus of that Generating Market Buyer plus any megawatts of bilateral purchases of that Generating Market Buyer attributable to that bus. The total generation revenue for each Generating Market Buyer shall be the sum, for each of the Generating Market Buyer's generation buses, of the revenues at Day-ahead Loss Price determined in accordance with the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in Section 1.10.1A plus the revenues at Real-time Loss Prices determined as specified herein, net of any debits specified herein for each of the Market Buyer's generation buses.

(h) A Market Seller shall be paid for transmission losses that results from the Real-time sales of Spot Market Energy to the extent of its hourly net deliveries to the PJM Region of energy in excess of amounts scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market from the Market Seller's resources. For pool External Resources, the Office of the Interconnection shall model, based on an appropriate flow analysis, the hourly amounts delivered from each such resource to the corresponding Interface Pricing Point between adjacent Control Areas and the PJM Region. The total real-time generation revenues for each Market Seller shall be the sum of its credits determined by the product of (i) the hourly net amount of energy delivered to the PJM Region at the applicable generation or interface bus in excess of the amount scheduled to be delivered in that hour at that bus in the Day-ahead Energy Market from each of the Market Seller's resources, times (ii) the hourly Real-time Loss Price at that bus. To the extent that the energy actually injected at a generation bus or Interface Pricing Point in any hour is less than the energy scheduled to be injected at that bus or point in the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Market Seller shall be debited for the difference at the Real-time Loss Price for the applicable bus or point at the time of the shortfall times the amount of the shortfall. The total generation revenue for each Market Seller shall be the sum, for each of the Market Seller's generation buses or Interface Pricing Points, of the revenues at Day-ahead Loss Prices determined in accordance with the Day-ahead Energy Market as specified in Section 1.10.1A plus the revenues at Real-time Loss Prices determined as specified herein, net of any debits specified herein for each of the Market Seller's generation buses or Interface Pricing Points.

5.4.4 Transmission Customer Calculation.

Each Transmission Customer using Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service (as defined in the PJM Tariff), each Network Customer, and each Transmission Customer using Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service (as defined in the PJM Tariff), shall be charged for the increased cost of transmission losses for the delivery of energy using such Transmission Service. Except as specified in this subsection, a Transmission Loss Charge shall be assessed for transmission use scheduled in the Day-ahead Energy Market, calculated as the amount to be delivered multiplied by the difference between the Day-ahead Loss Price at the delivery point or the delivery interface at the boundary of the PJM Region and the Day-ahead Loss Price at the source point or the source interface at the boundary of the PJM Region. Transmission Loss Charges shall be assessed for real-time transmission use in excess of the amounts scheduled for each hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market, calculated as the excess amount multiplied by the difference between the Real-time Loss Price at the delivery point or the delivery interface at the boundary of the PJM Region, and the Real-time Loss Price at the source point or the source interface at the boundary of the PJM Region. A Transmission Customer shall be paid for Transmission Loss Charges for real-time transmission use falling below the amounts scheduled for each hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market, calculated as the shortfall amount multiplied by the difference between the Real-time Loss Price at the delivery point or the delivery interface at the boundary of the PJM Region, and the Real-time Loss Price at the source point or the source interface at the boundary of the PJM Region or the source Interface Pricing Point at the boundary of the PJM Region.

5.4.4A Transaction Calculation.

Each Market Participant entering into transactions in the PJM Interchange Energy Market shall be charged for the increased cost of transmission losses on the scheduled path. Except as specified in this subsection, a Transmission Loss Charge shall be assessed for cleared MWh in the Day-ahead Energy Market, calculated as the amount to be delivered multiplied by the difference between the Day-ahead Loss Price at the sink point and the Day-ahead Loss Price at the source point. Transmission Loss Charges shall be assessed for real-time cleared MWh in excess of the amounts scheduled for each hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market, calculated as the excess amount multiplied by the difference between the Real-time Loss Price at the sink point and the real-time Loss Price at the source point. Such Market Participant shall be paid for Transmission Loss Charges for real-time cleared MWh falling below the amounts scheduled for each hour in the Day-ahead Energy Market, calculated as the shortfall amount multiplied by the difference between the Real-time Loss Price at the sink point and the Real-time Loss Price at the source point.

5.4.5 Total Transmission Loss Charges.

The total Transmission Loss Charges collected by PJMSettlement each hour will be the aggregate net amounts determined as specified in this Schedule.

5.5 Distribution of Total Transmission Loss Charges.

The total Transmission Loss Charges accumulated by PJMSettlement in any hour shall be distributed pro-rata to each Network Service User and Transmission Customer in proportion to its ratio shares of the total MWhs of energy delivered to load (net of operating Behind The Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) in the PJM Region, or the total exports of MWh of energy from the PJM Region (that paid for transmission service during such hour). Exports of energy for which Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service was utilized and for which the Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service rate was paid will receive an allocation of the total Transmission Loss Charges based on a percentage of the MWh of energy exported on such service, determined by the ratio of Non-Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service rate to Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service rate.

6. "MUST-RUN" FOR RELIABILITY GENERATION

6.1 Introduction.

The following procedures shall apply to any generation resource subject to the dispatch of the Office of the Interconnection that, as a result of transmission constraints, the Office of the Interconnection determines, in the exercise of Good Utility Practice, must be run in order to maintain the reliability of service in the PJM Region. The provisions of this Schedule shall otherwise apply to the scheduling, dispatch, operation and accounting treatment of such resources, to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section 6.

6.2 Identification of Facility Outages.

Not later than one hour prior to the deadline specified in Section 1.10.1 of this Schedule, the Office of the Interconnection shall identify on the PJM Open Access Same-Time Information System any facility outage or other system condition which it has determined may give rise to a transmission constraint that may require, in order to maintain system reliability, the dispatch of one or more generation resources that otherwise would not be dispatched based on the merits of their offers to the PJM Interchange Energy Market.

6.3 Dispatch for Local Reliability.

6.3.1 Request and Dispatch.

In addition to the dispatch of generation by the Office of the Interconnection to maintain reliability on transmission facilities monitored by it, a Member that owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership local Transmission Facilities, as defined in this Agreement and the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement and that operates a local control center in accordance with Section 11.3.3 of this Agreement or a Market Operations Center in accordance with Section 1.7.5 of this Schedule may request the Office of the Interconnection to dispatch generation in order to maintain reliability on any such local Transmission Facilities that are not then monitored by the Office of the Interconnection, subject to the rules and procedures in Section 6.3.2 and the PJM Manuals. The Office of the Interconnection shall dispatch generation to maintain reliability on such local Transmission Facilities by incorporating the facilities in the State Estimator program described in Section 2.3 as set forth below, unless the Office of the Interconnection determines that such dispatch would adversely affect reliability in the PJM Region or would otherwise not be in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

6.3.2 Designation of Local Transmission Facilities.

The following rules and procedures shall apply to a Member request that the Office of the Interconnection dispatch generation on one or more local Transmission Facilities that are not then directly monitored by the Office of the Interconnection.

(a) The local Transmission Facilities that are the subject of the request for monitoring and dispatch control must be among the facilities that comprise the Transmission System under the PJM Tariff and must meet the PJM Reliability Planning Criteria set forth in the PJM Manuals;

(b) The Member shall provide modeling information for such local Transmission Facilities and provide sufficient telemetry to the Office of the Interconnection such that power flows are observable by the State Estimator program described in Section 2.3;

(c) The request for monitoring and dispatch control of local Transmission Facilities shall constitute a request that such local Transmission Facilities become and remain monitored by the Office of the Interconnection and subject to its dispatch control for a period of not less than one year;

(d) Requests under this Section for monitoring and dispatch control of local Transmission Facilities may be made only annually pursuant to the procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals;

(e) The Office of the Interconnection shall post all requests for monitoring and dispatch control of local Transmission Facilities made under this Section on the PJM Internet site; and

(f) The Member shall comply with all other operating procedures established by the Office of the Interconnection regarding dispatch for local reliability as set forth in the PJM Manuals.

6.3.3 Transition Procedures for Local Transmission Facilities under the Monitoring Responsibility and Dispatch Control of the Office of the Interconnection as of June 1, 2002.

The Office of the Interconnection shall determine whether local Transmission Facilities under its monitoring responsibility and dispatch control as of June 1, 2002 meet the PJM Reliability and Planning Criteria. Members with such local Transmission Facilities that do not meet the PJM Reliability Planning Criteria must either (1) remove the local Transmission Facilities from the dispatch control and monitoring responsibility of the Office of the Interconnection within 60 days of notification by the Office of the Interconnection of its determination that the local Transmission Facilities do not meet the PJM Reliability and Planning Criteria; or (2) commit, at their own cost and by a completion date agreed to by the Office of the Interconnection and the Member, to reinforce the local Transmission Facilities to enable the local Transmission Facilities to meet the PJM Reliability and Planning Criteria. This commitment to reinforce the local Transmission Facilities is subject to the requirements of applicable law, government regulations and approvals, including, without limitation, requirements to obtain any necessary state or local siting, construction and operating permits, to the ability to acquire necessary right-of-way, and to the right to recover, pursuant to appropriate financial arrangements and tariffs or contracts, all reasonably incurred costs, plus a reasonable return on investment, provided that, in the event that a Member cannot reinforce the local Transmission Facilities due to the unavailability of required financing, the local Transmission Facilities must be removed from the monitoring responsibility and dispatch control of the Office of the Interconnection within 60 days of the determination that required financing is unavailable. The local Transmission Facilities will remain under the monitoring and dispatch control of the Office of the Interconnection during the construction of the reinforcements.

6.4 Offer Price Caps.

6.4.1 Applicability.

(a) If, at any time, it is determined by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with Sections 1.10.8 or 6.1 of this Schedule that any generation resource may be dispatched out of economic merit order to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability, the offer prices for energy from such resource shall be capped at the levels specified below. If the Office of the Interconnection is able to do so, such offer prices shall be capped only during each hour when the transmission limit affects the schedule of the affected resource, and otherwise shall be capped for the entire Operating Day. The energy offer prices as capped shall be used to determine any Locational Marginal Price affected by the offer price of such resource and as further limited as described in Sections 2.2 and 2.4 of this Schedule.

(b) The energy offer price by any generation resource requested to be dispatched in accordance with Section 6.3 of this Schedule shall be capped at the levels specified below. If the Office of the Interconnection is able to do so, such offer prices shall be capped only during each hour when the affected resource is so scheduled, and otherwise shall be capped for the entire Operating Day. The energy offer prices as capped shall be used to determine any Locational Marginal Price affected by the price of such resource.

(c) Generation resources subject to an offer price cap shall be paid for energy at the applicable Locational Marginal Price.

(d) [Reserved for Future Use]

(e) Offer price caps under section 6.4 of this Schedule shall be suspended for a generation resource with respect to transmission limit(s) for any hour in which (1) there are not three or fewer generation suppliers available for redispatch under subsection (a) that are jointly pivotal with respect to such transmission limit(s), and (2) the generation resource's owner, when combined with the two largest other generation suppliers, is not pivotal ("three pivotal supplier test").

(f) For the purposes of conducting the three pivotal supplier test in subsection (e), the following applies:

(i) All megawatts of available incremental supply for which the power distribution factor ("dfax") has an absolute value equal to or greater than the dfax used by the Office of the Interconnection's system operators when evaluating the impact of generation with respect to the constraint ("effective megawatts") will be included in the available supply analysis at costs equal to the cost-based offers of the available incremental supply adjusted for dfax ("effective costs"). The Office of the Interconnection will post on the PJM website the dfax value used by operators with respect to a constraint when it varies from three percent.

(ii) The three pivotal supplier test will include in the definition of the relevant market incremental supply up to and including all such supply available at an effective cost equal to 150% of the cost-based clearing price calculated using effective costs and effective megawatts and the need for megawatts to solve the constraint.

(iii) Offer price caps will apply on a generation supplier basis (i.e. not a generating unit by generating unit basis) and only the generation suppliers that fail the three pivotal supplier test will have their units that are dispatched with respect to the constraint offer capped. A generation supplier for the purposes of this section includes corporate affiliates. Supply controlled by a generation supplier or its affiliates by contract with unaffiliated third parties or otherwise will be included as supply of that generation supplier; supply owned by a generation supplier but controlled by an unaffiliated third party by contract or otherwise will be included as supply of that third party.

A generation supplier's units are offer capped if, when combined with the two largest other generation suppliers, the generation supplier is pivotal.

(iv) In the Day-ahead Energy Market, the Office of the Interconnection shall include price sensitive demand, Increment Offers and Decrement Bids as demand or supply, as applicable, in the relevant market.

6.4.2 Level.

(a) The offer price cap shall be one of the amounts specified below, as specified in advance by the Market Seller for the affected unit:

(i) The weighted average Locational Marginal Price at the generation bus at which energy from the capped resource was delivered during a specified number of hours during which the resource was dispatched for energy in economic merit order, the specified number of hours to be determined by the Office of the Interconnection and to be a number of hours sufficient to result in an offer price cap that reflects reasonably contemporaneous competitive market conditions for that unit;

(ii) For offers of $2,000/MWh or less, the incremental operating cost of the generation resource as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals ("incremental cost"), plus up to 10% of such costs, the sum of which shall not exceed $2,000/MWh; and, for offers greater than $2,000/MWh, the incremental cost of the generation resource;

(iii) For units that are frequently offer capped ("Frequently Mitigated Unit" or "FMU"), and for which the unit's price based offer was greater than its cost based offer, the following shall apply:

(a) For units that are offer capped for 60% or more of their run hours, but less than 70% of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental cost plus 10% or (ii) incremental cost plus $20 per megawatt-hour;

(b) For units that are offer capped for 70% or more of their run hours, but less than 80% of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental cost plus 10%, or (ii) incremental cost plus $30 per megawatt-hour;

(c) For units that are offer capped for 80% or more of their run hours, the offer price cap will be the greater of either (i) incremental costs plus 10%; or (ii) incremental cost plus $40 per megawatt-hour.

(b) For purposes of section 6.4.2(a)(iii), a generating unit shall qualify for the specified offer cap upon issuance of written notice from the Market Monitoring Unit, pursuant to Section II.A of the Attachment M-Appendix, that it is a "Frequently Mitigated Unit" because it meets all of the following criteria:

(i) The unit was offer capped for the applicable percentage of its run hours, determined on a rolling 12-month basis, effective with a one month lag.

(ii) The unit's Projected PJM Market Revenues plus the unit's PJM capacity market revenues on a rolling 12-month basis, divided by the unit's MW of installed capacity (in $/MW-year) are less than its accepted unit specific Avoidable Cost Rate (in $/MW-year) (excluding APIR and ARPIR), or its default Avoidable Cost Rate (in $/MW-year) if no unit-specific Avoidable Cost Rate is accepted for the BRAs for the Delivery Years included in the rolling 12-month period, determined pursuant to Sections 6.7 and 6.8 of Attachment DD of the Tariff. (The relevant Avoidable Cost Rate is the weighted average of the Avoidable Cost Rates for each Delivery Year included in the rolling 12-month period, weighted by month.)

(iii) No portion of the unit is included in a FRR Capacity Plan or receiving compensation under Part V of the Tariff.

(iv) The unit is internal to the PJM Region and subject only to PJM dispatch.

(c) Any generating unit, without regard to ownership, located at the same site as a Frequently Mitigated Unit qualifying under Sections 6.4.2(a)(iii) shall become an "Associated Unit" upon issuance of written notice from the Market Monitoring Unit pursuant to Section II.A of Attachment M-Appendix, that it meets all of the following criteria:

1. The unit has the identical electric impact on the transmission system as the FMU;

2. The unit (i) belongs to the same design class (where a design class includes generation that is the same size and utilizes the same technology, without regard to manufacturer) and uses the identical primary fuel as the FMU or (ii) is regularly dispatched by PJM as a substitute for the FMU based on differences in cost that result from the currently applicable FMU adder;

3. The unit (i) has an average daily cost-based offer, as measured over the preceding 12-month period, that is less than or equal to the FMU's average daily cost-based offer adjusted to include the currently applicable FMU adder or (ii) is regularly dispatched by PJM as a substitute for the FMU based on differences in cost that result from the currently applicable FMU adder.

The offer cap for an associated unit shall be equal to the incremental operating cost of such unit, as determined in accordance with Schedule 2 of the Operating Agreement and the PJM Manuals, plus the applicable percentage adder or dollar per megawatt-hour adder as specified in Section 6.4.2(a)(iii)(a), (b), or (c) for the unit with which it is associated.

(d) Market Participants shall have exclusive responsibility for preparing and submitting their offers on the basis of accurate information and in compliance with the FERC Market Rules, inclusive of the level of any applicable offer cap, and in no event shall PJM be held liable for the consequences of or make any retroactive adjustment to any clearing price on the basis of any offer submitted on the basis of inaccurate or non-compliant information.

6.5 [Reserved for Future Use]

6.6 Minimum Generator Operating Parameters – Parameter Limited Schedules.

(a) Market Sellers submitting Offer Data for Generation Capacity Resources shall submit and be subject to pre-determined limits on cost-based offers, which are always parameter limited. Market Sellers submitting Offer Data for Generation Capacity Resources shall submit and be subject to pre-determined limits on market-based offers conforming to parameter limitations ("parameter limited schedules") under the following circumstances:

(i) The Market Seller fails the three pivotal supplier test. When this subsection applies, the parameter limited schedule shall be the less limiting, i.e. more flexible, of the defined parameter limited schedules or the submitted offer parameters.

(ii) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency or a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(iii) For Capacity Performance Resources, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency; (ii) issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, Hot Weather Alert, Cold Weather Alert; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Maximum Generation Emergency, Maximum Generation Emergency Alert, Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(iv) For Base Capacity Resources, the Office of the Interconnection: (i) declares a Maximum Generation Emergency during hot weather operations; (ii) issues a Maximum Generation Emergency Alert or Hot Weather Alert during hot weather operations; or (iii) schedules units based on the anticipation of a Hot Weather Alert, or a Maximum Generation Emergency or Maximum Generation Emergency Alert during hot weather operations, for all, or any part, of an Operating Day.

(b) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery *Years for Generation Capacity Resources other than Capacity Performance Resources, and the 2016/2017 through 2019/2020 Delivery Years for Generation Capacity Resources identified and committed in an FRR Capacity Plan*, parameter limited schedules shall be defined for the following parameters:

(i) Turn Down Ratio;

(ii) Minimum Down Time;

(iii) Minimum Run Time;

(iv) Maximum Daily Starts;

(v) Maximum Weekly Starts.

For the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years for Base Capacity Resources during Hot Weather Alerts, Emergency Actions during hot weather operations, and when the unit is offer capped to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability per Section 6.4 hereof, and for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years for Capacity Performance Resources during Hot Weather Alerts, Cold Weather Alerts, Emergency Actions, and when the unit is offer capped to maintain system reliability as a result of limits on transmission capability per Section 6.4 hereof, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the unit-specific achievable operating parameters for each individual unit on the basis of its operating design characteristics and other constraints, recognizing that remedial and ongoing investment and maintenance may be required to perform on the basis of those characteristics, for the following parameters:

(i) Turn Down Ratio;

(ii) Minimum Down Time;

(iii) Minimum Run Time;

(iv) Maximum Daily Starts;

(v) Maximum Weekly Starts;

(vi) Maximum Run Time;

(vii) Start-up Time; and

(viii) Notification Time.

These unit-specific values shall apply for the generating unit unless it is operating pursuant to an exception from those values under subsection (h) hereof due to operational limitations that prevent the unit from meeting the minimum parameters. Throughout the analysis process, the Office of the Interconnection shall consult with the Market Monitoring Unit, and consider any input received from the Market Monitoring Unit, in its determination of a unit's unit-specific parameter limited schedule values.

In order to make its determination of the unit-specific parameter limited schedule values for a unit, the Office of the Interconnection may request that the Capacity Market Seller provide to it and the Market Monitoring Unit certain data and documentation as further detailed in the PJM Manuals. Once the Office of the Interconnection has made a determination of the unit-specific parameter limited schedule values for a unit, those values will remain applicable to the unit until such time as the Office of the Interconnection determines that a change is needed based on changed operational capabilities of the unit.

A Capacity Market Seller that does not believe its generating unit can meet the unit-specific values determined by the Office of the Interconnection due to actual operating constraints, and who desires to establish adjusted unit-specific parameters for those units may request adjusted unit-specific parameter limitations. Any such request must be submitted to the Office of the Interconnection by no later than the February 28 immediately preceding the first Delivery Year for which the adjusted unit-specific parameters are requested to commence. Capacity Market Sellers shall supply, for each generating unit, technical information about the operational limits to support the requested parameters, as further detailed in the PJM Manuals. The Office of the Interconnection shall consult with the Market Monitoring Unit, and consider any input received from the Market Monitoring Unit, in its determination of a unit's request for adjusted unit-specific parameter limited schedule values. After it has completed its evaluation of the request, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the Capacity Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, whether the request is approved or denied, by no later than April 15. The effective date of the request, if approved by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be no earlier than June 1.

The operational limitations referenced in this section 6.6 shall be (a) physical operational limitations based on the operating design characteristics of the unit, or (b) other actual physical constraints, including those based on contractual limits, that are not based on the characteristics of the unit. *In order for a contractual or other actual constraint to be deemed a physical constraint that can be reflected in its unit-specific parameter limits for a Generation Capacity Resource, the Capacity Market Seller must demonstrate that contractual or other actual constraint is not simply an economic decision but a physical restriction that could not be rectified among any commercial alternatives actually available to it.*

(c) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the following table specifies default parameter limited schedule values, by technology type, for generating units, no portion of which is committed as a Capacity Performance Resource:

Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix

Parameter	Minimum Down Time (Hrs)	Minimum Run Time (Hrs)	Maximum Daily Starts	Maximum Weekly Starts	Turn Down Ratio = Economic Maximum MW / Economic Minimum MW
Small Frame CT and Aero CT Units - Up to 29 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	2.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium Frame CT and Aero CT Units - 30 MW to 65 MW ICAP	2.0 or Less	3.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Medium-Large Frame CT Units - 65 MW to 135 MW ICAP	3.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Large Frame CT Units - 135 MW to 180 MW ICAP	4.0 or Less	5.0 or Less	2 or More	14 or More	1.0 or More
Combined Cycle Units	4.0 or Less	6.0 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	1.5 or More
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Pre-1985	7.0 or Less	8.0 or Less	1 or More	7 or More	3.0 or More
Petroleum and Natural Gas Steam Units - Post-1985	3.5 or Less	5.5 or Less	2 or More	11 or More	2.0 or More
Sub-Critical Coal Units	9.0 or Less	15.0 or Less	1 or More	5 or More	2.0 or More
Super-Critical Coal Units	84.0	24.0 or Less	1 or More	2 or More	1.5 or More

(d) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, upon receipt of proposed revised parameter limited schedule values from the Market Monitoring Unit, prepared in accordance with the procedures for periodic review included in section II.B.1 of Attachment M - Appendix, the Office of the Interconnection shall file to revise the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix in section 6.6(c) above accordingly. In the event that the Office of the Interconnection disagrees with the values proposed for revising the matrix, the Office of the Interconnection shall file the values that it determines are appropriate.

(e) For the 2014/2015 through 2017/2018 Delivery Years, the Market Monitoring Unit shall calculate and provide to Market Sellers default values in accordance with section II.B of Attachment M - Appendix. The default values set forth in the table in subsection (c) above shall apply for the referenced technology types unless a generating unit is operating pursuant to an exception from the default values under subsection (h) due to physical operational limitations that prevent the unit from meeting the minimum parameters, or any megawatts of the unit are committed as a Capacity Performance Resource in which case the unit-specific or adjusted unit-specific values for the generating unit determined by the Office of the Interconnection shall apply to all megawatts of the generating unit offered into the PJM energy markets. For generating units having the ability to operate on multiple fuels, Market Sellers may submit a parameter limited schedule associated with each fuel type.

(f) For the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years, the following additional parameter limits shall apply for Capacity Performance Resources, other than Capacity Storage Resources, submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market or rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market for the following Operating Day, and for the Real-time Energy Market for the same Operating Day, unless the Capacity Market Seller has requested for its Capacity Performance Resource, and the Office of the Interconnection has granted, an adjusted unit-specific start-up and/or notification time due to actual operating constraints pursuant to the process described in subsection (b) above:

(i) The combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 24 hours, except when a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued;

(ii) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 14 hours;

(iii) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, notification time shall not exceed one hour; and,

(iv) When a Hot Weather Alert or Cold Weather Alert has been issued, parameters shall be based on the actual operational limitations of the Capacity Performance Resource for both its market-based schedules and cost-based schedules.

Capacity Storage Resources that clear in a Reliability Pricing Model Auction shall, unless the Capacity Market Seller has requested for its Capacity Storage Resource, and the Office of the Interconnection has granted, an adjusted unit-specific start-up and notification time, and/or minimum down time, due to actual operating constraints pursuant to the process described in subsection (b) above:

(i) Have combined start-up and notification times that shall not exceed one hour; and,

(ii) Have a minimum down time that shall not exceed one hour.

(g) For the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, the following additional parameter limits for Base Capacity Resources submitted in the Day-ahead Energy Market or rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market for the following Operating Day, and for the Real-time Energy Market for the same Operating Day, unless the Capacity Market Seller has requested for its Base Capacity Resource, and the Office of the Interconnection has granted, an adjusted unit-specific start-up and/or notification time due to actual operating constraints pursuant to the process described in subsection (b) above:

(i) Combined start-up and notification times shall not exceed 48 hours;

(ii) When a Hot Weather Alert has been issued, notification time shall not exceed one hour; and,

(iii) When a Hot Weather Alert has been issued, parameters shall be based on the actual operational limitations of the Base Capacity Resource for both its market-based schedules and cost-based schedules.

(h) If a generating unit is or will become unable to achieve the default or unit-specific values determined by the Office of the Interconnection due to actual operating constraints affecting the unit, the Capacity Market Seller of that unit may submit a written request for an exception to the application of those values. Exceptions to the parameter limited schedule default or unit-specific values shall be categorized as either a one-time temporary exception, lasting 30 days or less; a period exception, lasting at least 31 days and no more than one year; or a persistent exception, lasting for at least one year.

(i) *Temporary Exceptions*. A temporary exception shall be deemed accepted without prior review by the Market Monitoring Unit or the Office of the Interconnection upon submission by the Market Seller of the generating unit of written notification to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection, at least one business day prior to the commencement of the exception, and shall automatically commence and terminate on the dates specified in such notification, which must be for a period of time lasting 30 days or less, unless the termination date is extended pending a request for a period exception or shortened due to a change in the physical conditions of the unit such that the temporary exception is no longer required. Such Market Seller shall provide to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three days following the commencement of the temporary exception its documentation explaining in detail the reasons for the temporary exception, and shall also respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three business days after such request. Failure to provide a timely response to such request for additional information shall cause the temporary exception to terminate the following day. The Market Seller shall notify the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Monitoring Unit in writing of an early termination of a temporary exception due to changed physical conditions by no later than one business day prior to the early termination date. A temporary exception may only be requested one-time for the same physical or actual constraint since an operational constraint that may occur more than once should be the subject of a period exception request rather than multiple temporary exception requests.

In addition, if a Market Seller is unaware of the need for a period exception prior to the February 28 deadline for submitting such requests, the Market Seller may utilize the temporary exception process and seek to modify that exception pursuant to the process described below.

Modification of Temporary Exceptions. If, prior to the scheduled termination date the Market Seller determines that the temporary exception must persist for more than 30 days and the Market Seller wants to extend the period for which the exception applies, or if a Market Seller is unaware of the need for a period or persistent exception prior to the February 28 deadline for submitting such requests and the Market Seller has submitted a temporary exception request, it must submit to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection a written request to modify the temporary exception to become a period exception or a persistent exception, and provide detailed documentation explaining the reasons for the requested modification of the temporary exception. Market Sellers shall supply for each generating unit the required historical unit operating data in support of the period or persistent exception request, and if the exception requested is based on new physical operating limits for the unit for which some or all historical operating data is unavailable, the Market Seller may also submit technical information about the physical operational limits of the unit to support the requested parameters. Such Market Seller shall respond to additional requests for information from the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection within three business days after such request. Such request shall be reviewed by the Market Monitoring Unit and must be evaluated by the Office of the Interconnection using the same standard utilized to evaluate period exception and persistent exception requests. Per Section II.B of Attachment M-Appendix, the Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate the modification request and provide its determination of whether the request raises market power concerns, and, if so, any modifications that would alleviate those concerns, to the Market Seller, with a copy to Office of the Interconnection, by no later than 15 business days from the date of the modification request. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide its determination whether the request complies with the Tariff and Manuals by no later than 20 business days from the date of the modification request. A temporary exception shall be extended and shall not terminate until the date on which the Office of the Interconnection issues its determination of the modification request.

(ii) *Period Exceptions and Persistent Exceptions*. Market Sellers must submit period exception and persistent exception requests to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection by no later than the February 28 immediately preceding the twelve month period from June 1 to May 31 during which the exception is requested to commence. Market Sellers shall supply for each generating unit the required historical unit operating data in support of the period exception or persistent exception request, and if the exception requested is based on new physical operational limits for the unit for which some or all historical operating data is unavailable, the generating unit may also submit technical information about the physical operational limits for exceptions of the unit to support the requested parameters. The Market Monitoring Unit shall evaluate such request in accordance with the process set forth in Section II.B of Attachment M - Appendix. A Market Seller (i) must submit a parameter limited schedule value consistent with an agreement with the Market Monitoring Unit under such process or (ii) if it has not agreed with the Market Monitoring Unit on the parameter limited schedule value, may submit its own value to the Office of the Interconnection and to the Market Monitoring Unit, by no later than April 8. Each exception request must indicate the expected duration of the requested exception including the termination date thereof. The proposed parameter limited schedule value submitted by the Market Seller is subject to approval of the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to the requirements of the Tariff and the PJM Manuals. The Office of the Interconnection may engage the services of a consultant with technical expertise to evaluate the exception request. After it has completed its evaluation of the exception request, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, whether the exception request is approved or denied, by no later than April 15. The effective date of the exception, if approved by the Office of the Interconnection, shall be no earlier than June 1 of the applicable Delivery Year. The Office of the Interconnection's determination for an exception shall continue for the period requested and, if requested, for such longer period as the Office of the Interconnection may determine is supported by the data.

The Market Seller shall provide written notification to the Market Monitoring Unit and the Office of the Interconnection of a material change to the facts relied upon by the Market Monitoring Unit and/or the Office of the Interconnection in their evaluations of the Market Seller's request for a period or persistent exception. The Market Monitoring Unit shall provide written notification to the Office of the Interconnection and the Market Seller of any change to its determination regarding the exception request, based on the material change in facts, by no later than 15 business days after receipt of such notice. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, of any change to its determination regarding the exception request, based on the material change in facts, by no later than 20 business days after receipt of the Market Seller's notice. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the exception no longer complies with the Tariff or Manuals, the following parameter values shall apply to all megawatts of the generating unit offered into the PJM energy markets:

(1) for generating units for which no megawatts of the unit are commited as Capacity Performance Resources the default values specified in the Parameter Limited Schedule Matrix shall apply for the 2016/2017 through 2017/2018 Delivery years,

(2) for generating units for which any megawatts of the unit are committed as a Base Capacity Resource and no megawatts are committed as a Capacity Performance Resource, and for which no adjusted unit-specific values have been approved by PJM, the Base Capacity Resource unit-specific values determined by PJM shall apply for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years,

(3) for generating units for which any megawatts of the unit are committed as a Capacity Performance Resource, but for which no adjusted unit-specific values have been approved by PJM, the Capacity Performance Resource unit-specific values determined by PJM shall apply for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years,

(4) for generating units for which any megawatts of the unit are committed as a Base Capacity Resource and no megawatts are committed as a Capacity Performance Resource, and for which adjusted unit-specific values have been approved by PJM, the Base Capacity Resource adjusted unit-specific values shall apply for the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 Delivery Years, and

(5) for generating units for which any megawatts of the unit are committed as a Capacity Performance Resource and for which adjusted unit-specific values have been approved by PJM, the Capacity Performance Resource adjusted unit-specific values shall apply for the 2016/2017 Delivery Year and subsequent Delivery Years.

(i) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions of this Section 6.6 shall only pertain to the Offer Data a Market Seller must submit to the Office of the Interconnection for its offers into the Day-ahead Energy Market, rebidding period that occurs after the clearing of the Day-ahead Energy Market and Real-time Energy Market, and do not affect or change in any way a Generation Owner's obligation under NERC Reliability Standards to notify the Office of the Interconnection of its actual or expected actual physical operating conditions during the Operating Day.

(j) Notwithstanding anything contrary herein, the unit-specific parameters, adjusted unit-specific parameters or exception to parameter limited schedule values determined by the Office of the Interconnection for a generating unit shall be applicable to that generating unit regardless whether there is a change in the owner, operator or Market Seller of the unit because the parameter limited schedule values for the unit are determined based on the physical limitations of the unit, which should not change merely based on a change in owners, operator or Market Seller. Because parameter limited schedule values attach to the generating unit and are not owned by a Market Seller of the unit, when there are multiple owners or Market Sellers for a generating unit, all owners and Market Sellers shall be bound by the unit-specific parameters, adjusted unit-specific parameters or exception to parameter limited schedule values determined by the Office of the Interconnection for the unit.

(k) The provisions of this section 6.6 only apply to Generation Capacity Resources, and not to Energy Resources.

6A [Reserved For Future Use]

6A.1 [Reserved For Future Use]

6A.2 [Reserved For Future Use]

6A.3 [Reserved For Future Use]

7. FINANCIAL TRANSMISSION RIGHTS AUCTIONS

7.1 Auctions of Financial Transmission Rights.

Annual, periodic and long-term auctions to allow Market Participants to acquire or sell Financial Transmission Rights shall be conducted by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the provisions of this Section. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Financial Transmission Rights arising from such auctions; provided however, that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to any subsequent bilateral transfer of Financial Transmission Rights between Market Participants. The conversion of an Auction Revenue Right to a Financial Transmission Right pursuant to this section 7 shall not constitute a purchase or sale transaction to which PJMSettlement is a contracting party.

7.1.1 Auction Period and Scope of Auctions.

(a) The periods covered by auctions shall be: (1) the one-year period beginning the month after the final round of an annual auction; (2) any single calendar month period remaining in the Planning Period that is within the three, or less, month period immediately following the month that the monthly auction is conducted; (3) any Planning Period Quarter remaining in the Planning Period following the month that the monthly auction is conducted; and (4) the Planning Period Balance. In addition to the period defined in (2) of this subsection, only one of the periods defined in (3) or (4) of this subsection will be included in the monthly auction clearing until the Office of the Interconnection determines that both of the periods defined in (3) and (4) can be solved simultaneously in the same monthly auction process within the timeframe specified in Section 7.3.7. With the exception of FTRs allocated pursuant to Section 5.2.2 (e) of this Schedule and the Financial Transmission Rights awarded as a result of the exercise of the conversion option pursuant to Section 7.1.1(b) of this Schedule, in the annual auction, the Office of the Interconnection, on behalf of PJMSettlement, shall offer for sale the entire Financial Transmission Rights capability for the year in four rounds with 25 percent of the capability offered in each round. In the monthly auction, the Office of the Interconnection, on behalf of PJMSettlement, shall offer for sale in the auction any remaining Financial Transmission Rights capability for the months remaining in the Planning Period after taking into account all of the Financial Transmission Rights already outstanding at the time of the auction. In addition, any holder of a Financial Transmission Right for the period covered by an auction may offer such Financial Transmission Right for sale in such auction. On-Peak, off-peak and 24-hour FTRs will be offered in the annual and monthly auctions. FTRs will be offered as Financial Transmission Right Obligations and Financial Transmission Right Options, provided that such Financial Transmission Right Obligations and Financial Transmission Right Options shall be awarded based only on the residual system capability that remains after the allocation of Financial Transmission Rights pursuant to Section 5.2.2(e) and the award of Financial Transmission Rights pursuant to Section 7.1.1(b) of this Schedule. Market Participants may bid for and acquire any number of Financial Transmission Rights, provided that all Financial Transmission Rights awarded are simultaneously feasible with each other and with all Financial Transmission Rights outstanding at the time of the auction and not sold into the auction. An ARR holder may self-schedule an FTR on the same path in the Annual FTR auction according to the rules described in the PJM Manuals.

(b) An Auction Revenue Rights holder may convert Auction Revenue Rights to Financial Transmission Rights, and such conversion shall not be considered a purchase or sale of Financial Transmission Rights in the auction. Such Financial Transmission Rights must (i) have the same source and sink points as the Auction Revenue Rights; (ii) be a 24-hour product; and (iii) be Financial Transmission Right Obligations. The Auction Revenue Rights holder must inform the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the procedures established by the Office of the Interconnection that it intends to exercise the conversion option prior to close of round one of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction. Once the conversion option is exercised, it will remain in effect for the entire Financial Transmission Rights auction. The Office of the Interconnection will designate twenty-five percent of the megawatt amount of the Auction Revenue Rights to be converted as price-taker bids in each of the four rounds of the Financial Transmission Rights auction. An Auction Revenue Rights holder that converts its Auction Revenue Rights may not designate a price bid for its converted Financial Transmission Rights and will receive a price equal to the clearing price set by other bids in the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. To the extent a market participant seeks to obtain FTRs in the annual auction through such conversion, the FTRs sought will not be included in the calculation of such market participant's credit requirement for such annual FTR auction.

7.1.2 Frequency and Time of Auctions.

Subject to Section 7.1.1 of this Schedule, annual Financial Transmission Rights auctions shall offer the entire FTR capability of the PJM system in four rounds with 25 percent of the capability offered in each round. All four rounds of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction shall occur within the two-month period (April – May) preceding the start of the PJM Planning Period. Each round shall occur over five business days and shall be conducted sequentially. Each round shall begin with the bid and offer period. The bid and offer period for annual Financial Transmission Rights auctions shall be open for three consecutive business days, opening the first day at 12:00 midnight (Eastern Prevailing Time) and closing the third day at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Prevailing Time). Monthly Financial Transmission Rights auctions shall be held each month. The bid and offer period for monthly Financial Transmission Rights auctions shall be open for three consecutive business days in the month preceding the first month for which Financial Transmission Rights are being auctioned, opening the first day at 12:00 midnight (Eastern Prevailing Time) and closing the third day at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Prevailing Time).

7.1.3 Duration of Financial Transmission Rights.

Each Financial Transmission Right acquired in a Financial Transmission Rights auction shall entitle the holder to credits of Transmission Congestion Charges for the period that was specified in the corresponding auction.

Each Financial Transmission Right acquired in a Financial Transmission Rights auction shall entitle the holder to credits of Transmission Congestion Charges for the period that was specified in the corresponding auction.

7.1A Long-Term Financial Transmission Rights Auctions.

7.1A.1 Auctions.

(i) Subsequent to each annual Financial Transmission Rights auction conducted pursuant to Section 7.1 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a long-term Financial Transmission Rights auction for the three consecutive Planning Periods immediately subsequent to the Planning Period during which the long-term Financial Transmission Rights auction is conducted. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Financial Transmission Rights arising from such long-term FTR auctions, provided however, that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to any subsequent bilateral transfers of Financial Transmission Rights between Market Participants. The conversion of an Auction Revenue Right to a Financial Transmission Right pursuant to this section 7 shall not constitute a purchase or sale transaction to which PJMSettlement is a contracting party.

(ii) The capacity offered for sale in long-term Financial Transmission Rights auctions shall be the residual system capability after the Annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations and the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction. In determining the residual capability the Office of the Interconnection shall assume that all Auction Revenue Rights allocated in the immediately prior annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation process are self-scheduled into Financial Transmission Rights, which shall be modeled as fixed injections and withdrawals in the long-term Financial Transmission Rights auction.

7.1A.2 Frequency and Timing.

The long-term Financial Transmission Rights auction process shall consist of three rounds. The first round shall be conducted by the Office of the Interconnection approximately 11 months prior to the start of the three Planning Period term covered by the relevant long-term Financial Transmission Rights auction. The second round shall be conducted approximately 3 months after the first round, and the third round shall be conducted approximately 3 months after the second round. In each round 1/3 of total capacity available in the long-term Financial Transmission Rights auction shall be offered for sale. Eligible entities may submit bids to purchase and offers to sell Financial Transmission Rights at the start of the bidding period in each round. The bidding period shall be three business days ending at 5:00 p.m. on the last day. PJM performs the Financial Transmission Rights auction clearing analysis for each round and posts the auction results on the market user interface within five business days after the close of the bidding period for each round unless circumstances beyond PJM's control prevent PJM from meeting the applicable deadline. Under such circumstances, PJM will post the auction results at the earliest possible opportunity. If the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the results posted for a long-term Financial Transmission Rights auction, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the business day immediately following the initial publication of the results for that auction. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines it is necessary to post modified auction results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day following the initial publication of prices for that auction. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post the corrected prices by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication of prices in the auction. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced auction results are under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

7.1A.3 Products.

(i) The periods covered by long-term Financial Transmission Rights auctions shall be: (1) any single Planning Period within the three Planning Period term covered by the relevant auction; and (2) the three Planning Period term covered by the relevant auction.

(ii) On-Peak, off-peak and 24-hour Financial Transmission Rights obligations, as defined in Section 7.3.4 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, shall be offered in long-term Financial Transmission Rights auctions; Financial Transmission Rights options shall not be offered.

7.1A.4 Participation Eligibility.

(i) To participate in long-term Financial Transmission Rights auctions an entity shall be a PJM Member or a PJM Transmission Customer. Eligible entities may submit bids or offers in long-term Financial Transmission Rights auctions, provided they own Financial Transmission Rights offered for sale.

7.1A.5 Specified Receipt and Delivery Points.

The Office of the Interconnection will post a list of available receipt and delivery points for each long-term Financial Transmission Rights Auction. Eligible receipt and delivery points in long-term Financial Transmission Rights Auctions shall be limited to the posted available hubs, Zones, aggregates, generators, and Interface Pricing Points.

7.2 Financial Transmission Rights Characteristics.

7.2.1 Reconfiguration of Financial Transmission Rights.

Through an appropriate linear programming model, the Office of the Interconnection shall reconfigure the Financial Transmission Rights offered or otherwise available for sale in any auction to maximize the value to the bidders of the Financial Transmission Rights sold, provided that any Financial Transmission Rights acquired at auction shall be simultaneously feasible in combination with those Financial Transmission Rights outstanding at the time of the auction and not sold in the auction. The linear programming model shall, while respecting transmission constraints and the maximum MW quantities of the bids and offers, select the set of simultaneously feasible Financial Transmission Rights with the highest net total auction value as determined by the bids of buyers and taking into account the reservation prices of the sellers.

7.2.2 Specified Receipt and Delivery Points.

The Office of the Interconnection will post the list of available receipt and delivery points for each Financial Transmission Rights Auction before the start of the bidding window. Auction bids for annual Financial Transmission Rights Obligations may specify as receipt and delivery points any combination of available hubs, Zones, aggregates, generators, and Interface Pricing Points. Auction bids for annual Financial Transmission Rights Options may specify as receipt and delivery points such combination of available hubs, Zones, aggregates, generators, and Interface Pricing Points as the Office of the Interconnection shall allow from time to time as set forth in PJM Manual 06: Financial Transmission Rights. Auction bids for Financial Transmission Rights submitted in the monthly auctions may specify as receipt and delivery points any combination of available hubs, Zones, aggregates, generators, and Interface Pricing Points for bids that cover any month beyond the next month, including bids that cover Planning Period Quarters or the Planning Period Balance. Auction bids for Financial Transmission Rights submitted in the monthly auctions that cover the single calendar month period immediately following the month in which the monthly auction is conducted may specify any combination of available receipt and delivery buses represented in the State Estimator model for which the Office of the Interconnection calculates and posts Locational Marginal Prices. Auction bids may specify available receipt and delivery points from locations outside of the PJM Region to locations inside such region, from locations within the PJM Region to locations outside such region, or to and from locations within the PJM Region.

7.2.3 Transmission Congestion Charges.

Financial Transmission Rights shall entitle holders thereof to credits only for Transmission Congestion Charges, and shall not confer a right to credits for payments arising from or relating to transmission congestion made to any entity other than PJMSettlement.

7.3 Auction Procedures.

7.3.1 Role of the Office of the Interconnection.

Financial Transmission Rights auctions shall be conducted by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with standards and procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals, such standards and procedures to be consistent with the requirements of this Schedule. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty to the purchases and sales of Financial Transmission Rights arising from such auctions, provided however, that PJMSettlement shall not be a contracting party to any subsequent bilateral transfers of Financial Transmission Rights between Market Participants. The conversion of an Auction Revenue Right to a Financial Transmission Right pursuant to this section 7 shall not constitute a purchase or sale transaction to which PJMSettlement is a contracting party. Financial Transmission Rights auctions conducted to liquidate a defaulting Members' Financial Transmission Rights portfolio shall be conducted by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Section 7.3.9 herein and with the standards and procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals.

7.3.2 Notice of Offer.

A holder of a Financial Transmission Right wishing to offer the Financial Transmission Right for sale shall notify the Office of the Interconnection of any Financial Transmission Rights to be offered. Each Financial Transmission Right sold in an auction shall, at the end of the period for which the Financial Transmission Rights were auctioned, revert to the offering holder or the entity to which the offering holder has transferred such Financial Transmission Right, subject to the term of the Financial Transmission Right itself and to the right of such holder or transferee to offer the Financial Transmission Right in the next or any subsequent auction during the term of the Financial Transmission Right.

7.3.3 Pending Applications for Firm Service.

(a) [Reserved.]

(b) Financial Transmission Rights may be assigned to entities requesting Network Transmission Service or Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service pursuant to Section 5.2.2 (e), only if such Financial Transmission Rights are simultaneously feasible with all outstanding Financial Transmission Rights, including Financial Transmission Rights effective for the then-current auction period. If an assignment of Financial Transmission Rights pursuant to a pending application for Network Transmission Service or Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service cannot be completed prior to an auction, Financial Transmission Rights attributable to such transmission service shall not be assigned for the then-current auction period. If a Financial Transmission Right cannot be assigned for this reason, the applicant may withdraw its application, or request that the Financial Transmission Right be assigned effective with the start of the next auction period.

7.3.4 On-Peak, Off-Peak and 24-Hour Periods.

On-peak, off-peak and 24-hour FTRs will be offered in the annual and monthly auction. On-Peak Financial Transmission Rights shall cover the periods from 7:00 a.m. up to the hour ending at 11:00 p.m. on Mondays through Fridays, except holidays as defined in the PJM Manuals. Off-Peak Financial Transmission Rights shall cover the periods from 11:00 p.m. up to the hour ending 7:00 a.m. on Mondays through Fridays and all hours on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays as defined in the PJM Manuals. The 24-hour period shall cover the period from hour ending 1:00 a.m. to the hour ending 12:00 midnight on all days. Each bid shall specify whether it is for an on-peak, off-peak, or 24-hour period.

7.3.5 Offers and Bids.

(a) Offers to sell and bids to purchase Financial Transmission Rights shall be submitted during the period set forth in Section 7.1.2, and shall be in the form specified by the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with the requirements set forth below.

(b) Offers to sell shall identify the specific Financial Transmission Right, by term, megawatt quantity and receipt and delivery points, offered for sale. An offer to sell a specified megawatt quantity of Financial Transmission Rights shall constitute an offer to sell a quantity of Financial Transmission Rights equal to or less than the specified quantity. An offer to sell may not specify a minimum quantity being offered. Each offer may specify a reservation price, below which the offeror does not wish to sell the Financial Transmission Right. Offers submitted by entities holding rights to Financial Transmission Rights shall be subject to such reasonable standards for the verification of the rights of the offeror as may be established by the Office of the Interconnection. Offers shall be subject to such reasonable standards for the creditworthiness of the offer or for the posting of security for performance as the Office of the Interconnection shall establish.

(c) Bids to purchase shall specify the term, megawatt quantity, price per megawatt, and receipt and delivery points of the Financial Transmission Right that the bidder wishes to purchase. A bid to purchase a specified megawatt quantity of Financial Transmission Rights shall constitute a bid to purchase a quantity of Financial Transmission Rights equal to or less than the specified quantity. A bid to purchase may not specify a minimum quantity that the bidder wishes to purchase. A bid may specify receipt and delivery points in accordance with Section 7.2.2 and may include Financial Transmission Rights for which the associated Transmission Congestion Credits may have negative values. Bids shall be subject to such reasonable standards for the creditworthiness of the bidder or for the posting of security for performance as the Office of the Interconnection shall establish.

(d) Bids and offers shall be specified to the nearest tenth of a megawatt and shall be greater than zero. The Office of the Interconnection may require that a market participant shall not submit in excess of 5000 bids and offers for any single monthly auction, or for any single round of the annual auction, when the Office of the Interconnection determines that such limit is required to avoid or mitigate significant system performance problems related to bid/offer volume. Notice of the need to impose such limit shall be provided prior to the start of the bidding period if possible. Where such notice is provided after the start of the bidding period, market participants shall be required within one day to reduce their bids and offers for such auction below 5000, and the bidding period in such cases shall be extended by one day.

7.3.6 Determination of Winning Bids and Clearing Price.

(a) At the close of each bidding period, the Office of the Interconnection will create a base Financial Transmission Rights power flow model that includes all outstanding Financial Transmission Rights that have been approved and confirmed for any portion of the month for which the auction was conducted and that were not offered for sale in the auction. The base Financial Transmission Rights model also will include estimated uncompensated parallel flows into each interface point of the PJM Region and estimated scheduled transmission outages.

(b) In accordance with the requirements of Section 7.5 of this Schedule and subject to all applicable transmission constraints and reliability requirements, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the simultaneous feasibility of all outstanding Financial Transmission Rights not offered for sale in the auction and of all Financial Transmission Rights that could be awarded in the auction for which bids were submitted. The winning bids shall be determined from an appropriate linear programming model that, while respecting transmission constraints and the maximum MW quantities of the bids and offers, selects the set of simultaneously feasible Financial Transmission Rights with the highest net total auction value as determined by the bids of buyers and taking into account the reservation prices of the sellers. In the event that there are two or more identical bids for the selected Financial Transmission Rights and there are insufficient Financial Transmission Rights to accommodate all of the identical bids, then each such bidder will receive a pro rata share of the Financial Transmission Rights that can be awarded.

(c) Financial Transmission Rights shall be sold at the market-clearing price for Financial Transmission Rights between specified pairs of receipt and delivery points, as determined by the bid value of the marginal Financial Transmission Right that could not be awarded because it would not be simultaneously feasible. The linear programming model shall determine the clearing prices of all Financial Transmission Rights paths based on the bid value of the marginal Financial Transmission Rights, which are those Financial Transmission Rights with the highest bid values that could not be awarded fully because they were not simultaneously feasible, and based on the flow sensitivities of each Financial Transmission Rights path relative to the marginal Financial Transmission Rights paths flow sensitivities on the binding transmission constraints. Financial Transmission Rights with a zero clearing price will only be awarded if there is a minimum of one binding constraint in the auction period for which the Financial Transmission Rights path sensitivity is non-zero.

7.3.7 Announcement of Winners and Prices.

Within two (2) business days after the close of the bid and offer period for an annual Financial Transmission Rights auction round, and within five (5) business days after the close of the bid and offer period for a monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction, the Office of the Interconnection shall post the winning bidders, the megawatt quantity, the term and the receipt and delivery points for each Financial Transmission Right awarded in the auction and the price at which each Financial Transmission Right was awarded unless circumstances beyond PJM's control prevent PJM from meeting the applicable deadline. Under such circumstances, PJM will post the auction results at the earliest possible opportunity. The Office of the Interconnection shall not disclose the price specified in any bid to purchase or the reservation price specified in any offer to sell. If the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the results posted for a Financial Transmission Rights auction (or a given round of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction), the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the business day following the initial publication of the results of the auction or round of the annual auction. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day following the initial publication of the results of that auction or round of the annual auction. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication of the results of the auction or round of the annual auction. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced auction results are under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

7.3.8 Auction Settlements.

All buyers and sellers of Financial Transmission Rights between the same points of receipt and delivery shall pay PJMSettlement or be paid by PJMSettlement the market-clearing price, as determined in the auction, for such Financial Transmission Rights.

7.3.9 Liquidation of Financial Transmission Rights in the Event of Member Default.

In the event a Member fails to meet creditworthiness requirements or make timely payments when due pursuant to the PJM Operating Agreement or PJM Tariff, the Office of the Interconnection shall, as soon as practicable after such default is declared, initiate the following procedures to close out and liquidate the Financial Transmission Rights of a Member:

a) The Office of the Interconnection shall close out the defaulting Member's positions as of the date of its default, by unilaterally accelerating and terminating all forward Financial Transmission Rights positions.

b) The Office of the Interconnection shall post on its website all salient information relating to the closed out portfolio of Financial Transmission Rights.

c) All current planning period Financial Transmission Right positions within the defaulting Members' Financial Transmission Right portfolio will be offered for sale in the next available monthly balance of planning period Financial Transmission Rights auction at an offer price designed to maximize the likelihood of liquidation of those positions.

d) Financial Transmission Rights positions that do not settle until the next or subsequent planning period will be offered into the next available Financial Transmission Rights auction (taking into account timing constraints and the need for an orderly liquidation) where, based on the Office of Interconnection's commercially reasonable expectation, such positions would be expected to clear. In the event that the next scheduled Financial Transmission Rights auction is more than two (2) months subsequent to the date that the Office of the Interconnection declares a Member in default, a specially scheduled Financial Transmission Rights auction may be conducted by the Office of the Interconnection. The entire portfolio of the defaulting Member's Financial Transmission Rights will be offered for sale at an offer price designed to maximize the likelihood of liquidation of those positions.

e) The Financial Transmission Right positions comprising the defaulting Member's portfolio that are liquidated in a Financial Transmission Rights auction should avoid setting the price in the auction at the bid prices with which they were initially submitted. In the event that any of the closed out Financial Transmission Rights would set price based on the auction's preliminary solution, then only one-half of each Financial Transmission Rights position will be offered for sale and the auction will be re-executed. In the event that any Financial Transmission Rights position that has been closed out once again sets price, then all Financial Transmission Rights scheduled to be liquidated will be removed from the affected auction and the auction will be re-executed excluding the closed out Financial Transmission Right positions. Financial Transmission Right positions that are not liquidated will then be offered in the next available auction or specially scheduled auction, as appropriate.

f) The liquidation of the defaulting Members' Financial Transmission Rights portfolio pursuant to the foregoing procedures shall result in a final liquidated settlement amount. The final liquidated settlement amount will be included in calculating a Default Allocation Assessment as described in Section 15.1.2A(I) of the PJM Operating Agreement. If the Office of the Interconnection is unable to close out and liquidate a Financial Transmission Rights position under the foregoing procedures, the close out shall be deemed void and the defaulting Member shall remain liable for the full final value of its default, such full final value being realized at the normal time for performance of the Financial Transmission Rights position.

In all other respects, Financial Transmission Rights terminated pursuant to this section shall be liquidated pursuant to the appropriate provisions and procedures set forth in the PJM Manuals.

7.4 Allocation of Auction Revenues.

7.4.1 Eligibility.

(a) Annual auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated among holders of Auction Revenue Rights in proportion to, but not more than, the Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Rights Credits for the holder.

(b) Auction Revenue Rights Credits will be calculated based upon the clearing price results of the applicable Annual Financial Transmission Rights auction.

(c) Monthly and Balance of Planning Period FTR auction revenues, net of payments to entities selling Financial Transmission Rights into the auction, shall be allocated according to the following priority schedule:

> (i) To stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights holders in accordance with section 7.4.4 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(ii) of this section;
>
> (ii) To the Residual Auction Revenue Rights holders in proportion to, but not more than their Target Allocation as determined pursuant to section 7.4.3(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If there are excess revenues remaining after a distribution made pursuant to this subsection, such revenues shall be distributed in accordance with subsection (c)(iii) of this section;
>
> (iii) To FTR Holders in accordance with section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(d) Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover individual Planning Periods shall be distributed in the Planning Period for which the FTR is effective. Long-term FTR auction revenues associated with FTRs that cover multiple Planning Years shall be distributed equally across each Planning Period in the effective term of the FTR. Long-term FTR auction revenue distributions within a Planning Period shall be in accordance with the following provisions:

> (i) Long-term FTR Auction revenues shall be distributed to Auction Revenue Rights holders in the effective Planning Period for the FTR. The distribution shall be in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately. The distribution shall not exceed, when added to the distribution of revenues from the prompt-year annual FTR auction itself, the economic value of the ARRs when compared to the annual FTR auction clearing prices from each round proportionately.

(ii) Long-term FTR auction revenues remaining after distributions made pursuant to Section 7.4.1(d)(ii) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be distributed pursuant to Section 5.2.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

7.4.2 Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) Prior to the end of each PJM Planning Period an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights for the next PJM Planning Period shall be performed using a two stage allocation process. Stage 1 shall consist of stages 1A and 1B, which shall allocate ten year and annual Auction Revenue Rights, respectively, and stage 2 shall allocate annual Auction Revenue Rights. The Auction Revenue Rights allocation process shall be performed in accordance with Sections 7.4 and 7.5 hereof and the PJM Manuals.

With respect to the allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, if the Office of the Interconnection discovers an error in the allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify Market Participants of the error as soon as possible after it is found, but in no event later than 5:00 p.m. of the business day following the initial publication of allocation results. After this initial notification, if the Office of the Interconnection determines that it is necessary to post modified allocation results, it shall provide notification of its intent to do so, together with all available supporting documentation, by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the second business day following the publication of the initial allocation. Thereafter, the Office of the Interconnection must post any corrected allocation results by no later than 5:00 p.m. of the fourth calendar day following the initial publication. Should any of the above deadlines pass without the associated action on the part of the Office of the Interconnection, the originally posted results will be considered final. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the deadlines set forth above shall not apply if the referenced allocation is under publicly noticed review by the FERC.

(b) In stage 1A of the allocation process, each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights for a term covering ten consecutive PJM Planning Periods beginning with the immediately ensuing PJM Planning Period from a subset of the historical generation resources that were designated to be delivered to load based on the historical reference year for the Zone, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer (as defined in subsection (f) of this section) may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. The historical reference year for all Zones shall be 1998, except that the historical reference year shall be: 2002 for the Allegheny Power and Rockland Electric Zones; 2004 for the AEP East, The Dayton Power & Light Company and Commonwealth Edison Company Zones; 2005 for the Virginia Electric and Power Company and Duquesne Light Company Zones; 2011 for the ATSI Zone; 2012 for the DEOK Zone; 2013 for the EKPC Zone; and the Office of the Interconnection shall specify a historical reference year for a new PJM zone corresponding to the year that the zone is integrated into the PJM Interchange Energy Market. For stage 1, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine a set of eligible historical generation resources for each Zone based on the historical reference year and assign a pro rata amount of megawatt capability from each historical generation resource to each Network Service User in the Zone based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated to each Network Service User in a Zone from each historical generation resource in a number of megawatts equal to or less than the amount of the historical generation resource that has been assigned to the Network Service User. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right allocated to a Network Service User shall be to the Energy Settlement Area of such Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights allocated at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. In stage 1A of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocated Auction Revenue Rights for a Zone must be equal to or less than the Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load for that Zone. Each Network Service User's pro-rata share of the Zonal Base Load shall be based on its proportion of peak load in the Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined under Section 34.1 of the Tariff. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than fifty percent (50%) of the megawatts of firm service provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer had Point-to-Point Transmission Service during the historical reference year. If stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights are adversely affected by any new or revised statute, regulation or rule issued by an entity with jurisdiction over the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall, to the greatest extent practicable, and consistent with any such statute, regulation or rule change, preserve the priority of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for a minimum period covering the ten (10) consecutive PJM Planning Periods ("Stage 1A Transition Period") immediately following the implementation of any such changes, provided that the terms of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in effect at the time the Office of the Interconnection implements the Stage 1A Transition Period shall be reduced by one PJM Planning Period during each annual stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocation performed during the Stage 1A Transition Period so that all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights that were effective at the start of the Stage 1A Transition Period expire at the end of that period.

(c) In stage 1B of the allocation process each Network Service User may request Auction Revenue Rights from the subset of the historical generation resources determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process, and each Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights based on the megawatts of firm service determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) that were not allocated in stage 1A of the allocation process. In stage 1B of the allocation process, the sum of each Network Service User's allocation Auction Revenue Rights request for a Zone must be equal to or less than the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 34.1 of the Tariff and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for Non-Zone Network Load must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the Network Service User's transmission responsibility for Non-Zone Network Load as determined pursuant to Section

7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone. The sum of each Qualifying Transmission Customer's Auction Revenue Rights must be equal to or less than the difference between one hundred percent (100%) of the megawatts of firm service as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Rights Allocation from stage 1A of the allocation process for that Zone.

(d) In stage 2 of the allocation process, the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct an iterative allocation process that consists of three rounds with up to one third of the remaining system Auction Revenue Rights capability allocated in each round. Each round of this allocation process will be conducted sequentially with Network Service Users and Transmission Customers being given the opportunity to view results of each allocation round prior to submission of Auction Revenue Right requests into the subsequent round. In each round, each Network Service User shall designate a subset of buses from which Auction Revenue Rights will be sourced. Valid Auction Revenue Rights source buses include only Zones, generators, hubs and external Interface Pricing Points. The Network Service User shall specify the amount of Auction Revenue Rights requested from each source bus. Prior to the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff. Commencing with the 2015/2016 Planning Period, each Auction Revenue Right shall sink to the Energy Settlement Area of the Network Service User as described in Section 31.7 of Part III of the Tariff, unless the Network Service User's Energy Settlement Area represents the Residual Metered Load of an electric distribution company's fully metered franchise area(s) or service territory(ies) and the Network Service User elects to have its Auction Revenue Rights sink at the aggregate load buses in a Zone. The sum of each Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights requests in each stage 2 allocation round for each Zone must be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the Network Service User's peak load for that Zone as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) and the sum of its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stages 1A and 1B of the allocation process for that Zone. The stage 2 allocation to Transmission Customers shall be as set forth in subsection (f).

(e) On a daily basis within the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction period, a proportionate share of Network Service User's Auction Revenue Rights for each Zone are reallocated as Network Load changes from one Network Service User to another within that Zone.

(f) A Qualifying Transmission Customer shall be any customer with an agreement for Long-Term Point-to-Point Transmission Service, as defined in the PJM Tariff, used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located either outside or within the PJM Region, and that was confirmed and in effect during the historical reference year for the Zone in which the resource is located. Such an agreement shall allow the Qualifying Transmission Customer to participate in the first stage of the allocation, but only if such agreement has remained in effect continuously following the historical reference year and is to continue in effect for the period addressed by the allocation, either by its term or by renewal or rollover. The megawatts of Auction Revenue Rights the Qualifying Transmission Customer may request in the first stage of the allocation may not exceed the lesser of: (i) the megawatts of firm service between the designated Network Resource and the load delivery point (or applicable point at the border of the PJM Region for load located outside such region) under contract during the historical reference year; and (ii) the megawatts of firm service presently under contract between such historical reference year receipt and delivery points. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in either or both of stage 1 or 2 of the allocation without regard to whether such customer is subject to a charge for Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service under Section 1 of Schedule 7 of the PJM Tariff ("Base Transmission Charge"). A Transmission Customer that is not a Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in stage 2 of the allocation process, but only if it is subject to a Base Transmission Charge. The Auction Revenue Rights that such a Transmission Customer may request in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process must be equal to or less than one third of the number of megawatts equal to the megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service. The source point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated source point that is specified in the Transmission Service request and the sink point of the Auction Revenue Rights must be the designated sink point that is specified in the Transmission Service request. A Qualifying Transmission Customer may request Auction Revenue Rights in each round of stage 2 of the allocation process in a number of megawatts equal to or less than one third of the difference between the number of megawatts of firm service being provided between the receipt and delivery points as to which the Transmission Customer currently has Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service and its Auction Revenue Right Allocation from stage 1 of the allocation process.

(g) PJM Transmission Customers that serve load in the Midwest ISO may participate in stage 1 of the allocation to the extent permitted by, and in accordance with, this Section 7.4.2 and other applicable provisions of this Schedule 1. For service from non-historic sources, these customers may participate in stage 2, but in no event can they receive an allocation of ARRs/FTRs from PJM greater than their firm service to loads in MISO.

(h) Subject to subsection (i) of this section, all Auction Revenue Rights must be simultaneously feasible. If all Auction Revenue Right requests made during the annual allocation process are not feasible then Auction Revenue Rights are prorated and allocated in proportion to the megawatt level requested and in inverse proportion to the effect on the binding constraints.

(i) If any Auction Revenue Right requests made during stage 1A of the annual allocation process are not feasible due to system conditions, then PJM shall increase the capability limits of the binding constraints that would have rendered the Auction Revenue Rights infeasible to the extent necessary in order to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights without their being infeasible unless such infeasibility is caused by extraordinary circumstances. Such increased limits shall be included in all rounds of the annual allocation and auction processes and in subsequent modeling during the Planning Year to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission Rights auctions unless and to the extent those system conditions that contributed to infeasibility in the annual process are not extant for the time period subject to the subsequent modeling, such as would be the case, for example, if transmission facilities are returned to service during the Planning Year. In these cases, any increase in the capability limits taken under this subsection (i) during the annual process will be removed from subsequent modeling to support any incremental allocations of Auction Revenue Rights and monthly and balance of the Planning Period Financial Transmission

Rights auctions. In addition, PJM may remove or lower the increased capability limits, if feasible, during subsequent FTR Auctions if the removal or lowering of the increased capability limits does not impact Auction Revenue Rights funding and net auction revenues are positive.

For the purposes of this subsection (i), extraordinary circumstances shall mean an unanticipated event outside the control of PJM that reduces the capability of existing or planned transmission facilities and such reduction in capability is the cause of the infeasibility of such Auction Revenue Rights. Extraordinary circumstances do not include those system conditions and assumptions modeled in simultaneous feasibility analyses conducted pursuant to section 7.5 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. If PJM allocates stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights as a result of this subsection (i) that would not otherwise have been feasible, then PJM shall notify Members and post on its web site (a) the aggregate megawatt quantities, by sources and sinks, of such Auction Revenue Rights and (b) any increases in capability limits used to allocate such Auction Revenue Rights.

(j) Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service customers that are not Qualifying Transmission Customers and Network Service Users serving Non-Zone Network Load may participate in stage 1 of the annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to Section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, subject to the following conditions:

i. The relevant Transmission Service shall be used to deliver energy from a designated Network Resource located either outside or within the PJM Region to load located outside the PJM Region.

ii. To be eligible to participate in stage 1A of the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation: 1) the relevant Transmission Service shall remain in effect for the stage 1A period addressed by the allocation; and 2) the control area in which the external load is located has similar rules for load external to the relevant control area.

iii. Source points for stage 1 requests authorized pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be limited to: 1) generation resources owned by the LSE serving the load located outside the PJM Region; or 2) generation resources subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contract executed by the LSE to meet its load obligations, provided that such contract remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years from the first effective Planning Period that follows the initial stage 1 request.

iv. For Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) , the generation resource(s) designated as source points may include any portion of the generating capacity of such resource(s) that is not, at the time of the request, already identified as a Capacity Resource.

v. For Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j), at the time of the request, the generation resource(s) designated as source points must either be committed into PJM's RPM market or be designated as part of the entity's FRR Capacity Plan for the purpose of serving the capacity requirement of the external load.

vi. All stage 1 source point requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the relevant annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and shall not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions in the simultaneous feasibility test prescribed in subsection (vii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).

vii. To ensure the conditions of subsection (vi) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) are met, a simultaneous feasibility test shall be conducted: 1) based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs; and 2) based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.

viii. Requests for stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) that are received by PJM by November 1st of a Planning Period shall be processed for the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. Requests received after November 1st shall not be considered for the upcoming annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.

ix. Requests for new or alternate stage 1 resources made by Network Service Users and external LSEs that are received by November 1st shall be evaluated at the same time. If all requests are not simultaneously feasible then requests will be awarded on a pro-rata basis.

x. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points that qualify pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be eligible as stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights source points in subsequent annual Auction Revenue Rights allocations.

xi. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Customers requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Transmission service contract megawatt amount; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

xii. Network Service Users requesting stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) may request Auction Revenue Rights megawatts up to the lesser of: 1) the customer's network service peak load; or 2) the customer's Firm Transmission Withdrawal Rights.

xiii. Stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed 50% of the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j).

xiv. Stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall not exceed the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by subsections (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatts granted in stage 1A.

xv. In each round of Stage 2 of an annual allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, megawatt requests made pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) shall be equal to or less than one third of the difference between the maximum allowed megawatts authorized by paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount allocated in stage 1.

xvi. Stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights sources established pursuant to this subsection 7.4.2(j) and the associated Auction Revenue Rights megawatt amount may be replaced with an alternate resource pursuant to the process established in Section 7.7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

7.4.2a Bilateral Transfers of Auction Revenue Rights

(a) Market Participants may enter into bilateral agreements to transfer Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights to a third party. Such bilateral transfers shall be reported to the Office of the Interconnection in accordance with this Schedule and pursuant to the LLC's rules related to its eFTR tools.

(b) For purposes of clarity, with respect to all bilateral transfers of Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights, the rights and obligations to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights that are the subject of such a bilateral transfer shall pass to the buyer under the bilateral contract subject to the provisions of this Schedule. In no event, shall the purchase and sale of an Auction Revenue Right or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to a bilateral transfer constitute a transaction with PJMSettlement or a transaction in any auction under this Schedule.

(c) Consent of the Office of the Interconnection shall be required for a seller to transfer to a buyer any obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. Such consent shall be based upon the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the buyer's ability to perform the obligations transferred in the bilateral contract. If consent for a transfer is not provided by the Office of the Interconnection, the title to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall not transfer to the third party and the holder of the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights shall continue to receive all rights attributable to the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights and remain subject to all credit requirements and obligations associated with the Auction Revenue Rights or the right to receive an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights.

(d) A seller under such a bilateral contract shall guarantee and indemnify the Office of the Interconnection, PJMSettlement, and the Members for the buyer's obligation to pay any charges associated with the Auction Revenue Right and for which payment is not made to PJMSettlement by the buyer under such a bilateral transfer.

(e) All payments and related charges associated with such a bilateral contract shall be arranged between the parties to such bilateral contract and shall not be billed or settled by PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection. The LLC, PJMSettlement, and the Members will not assume financial responsibility for the failure of a party to perform obligations owed to the other party under such a bilateral contract reported to the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule.

(f) All claims regarding a default of a buyer to a seller under such a bilateral contract shall be resolved solely between the buyer and the seller.

7.4.3 Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

(a) A Target Allocation of Auction Revenue Right Credits for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be determined for each Auction Revenue Right. After each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction, each Auction Revenue Right shall be divided by four and multiplied by the price differences for the receipt and delivery points associated with the Auction Revenue Right, calculated as the Locational Marginal Price at the delivery points(s) minus the Locational Marginal Price at the receipt point(s), where the price for the receipt and delivery point is determined by the clearing prices of each round of the annual Financial Transmission Right auction. The daily total Target Allocation for an entity holding the Auction Revenue Rights shall be the sum of the daily Target Allocations associated with all of the entity's Auction Revenue Rights.

(b) A Target Allocation of residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits for each entity allocated Residual Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.9 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be determined on a monthly basis for each month in a Planning Period beginning with the month the Residual Auction Revenue Right(s) becomes effective through the end of the relevant Planning Period. The Target Allocation for Residual Auction Revenue Rights Credits shall be equal to megawatt amount of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights multiplied by the LMP differential between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding FTR obligation in each prompt-month FTR auction that occurs from the effective date of the Residual Auction Revenue Rights through the end of the relevant Planning Period.

7.4.4 Calculation of Auction Revenue Right Credits.

(a) Each day, the total of all the daily Target Allocations determined as specified above in Section 7.4.3 plus any additional Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations applicable for that day shall be compared to the total revenues of all applicable monthly Financial Transmission Rights auction(s) (divided by the number of days in the month) plus the total revenues of the annual Financial Transmission Rights auction (divided by the number of days in the Planning Period). If the total of the Target Allocations is less than the total auction revenues, the Auction Revenue Right Credit for each entity holding an Auction Revenue Right shall be equal to its Target Allocation. All remaining funds shall be distributed as Excess Congestion Charges pursuant to Section 5.2.5.

(b) If the total of the Target Allocations is greater than the total auction revenues, each holder of Auction Revenue Rights shall be assigned a share of the total auction revenues in proportion to its Auction Revenue Rights Target Allocations for Auction Revenue Rights which have a positive Target Allocation value. Auction Revenue Rights which have a negative Target Allocation value are assigned the full Target Allocation value as a negative Auction Revenue Right Credit.

(c) At the end of a Planning Period, if all Auction Revenue Right holders did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocations, PJMSettlement shall assess a charge equal to the difference between the Auction Revenue Right Credit Target Allocations for all revenue deficient Auction Revenue Rights and the actual Auction Revenue Right Credits allocated to those Auction Revenue Right holders. The aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to this section, if any, shall be added to the aggregate charge for a Planning Period assessed pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and collected pursuant to section 5.2.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and distributed to the Auction Revenue Right holders that did not receive Auction Revenue Right Credits equal to their Target Allocation.

7.5 Simultaneous Feasibility.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall make the simultaneous feasibility determinations specified herein using appropriate powerflow models of contingency-constrained dispatch. Such determinations shall take into account outages of both individual generation units and transmission facilities and shall be based on reasonable assumptions about the configuration and availability of transmission capability during the period covered by the auction that are not inconsistent with the determination of the deliverability of Generation Capacity Resources under the Reliability Assurance Agreement. The goal of the simultaneous feasibility determination shall be to ensure that there are sufficient revenues from Transmission Congestion Charges to satisfy all Financial Transmission Rights Obligations for the auction period under expected conditions and to ensure that there are sufficient revenues from the annual Financial Transmission Right Auction to satisfy all Auction Revenue Rights obligations.

(b) On an annual basis the Office of the Interconnection shall conduct a simultaneous feasibility test for stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights, which shall assess the simultaneous feasibility for each year remaining in the term of the right(s). This test shall be based on the Auction Revenue Rights required to meet Zonal Base Load requirements. The Office of the Interconnection shall apply a zonal load growth rate to the simultaneous feasibility test for the ten year term of the stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights to reflect load growth as estimated by the Office of the Interconnection.

(c) Simultaneous feasibility tests for new stage 1 resource requests made pursuant to Section 7.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall ensure that the request for a new base resource does not increase the megawatt flow on facilities binding in the current Auction Revenue Rights allocation or in future stage 1A allocations and does not cause megawatt flow to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities in either set of conditions. The most limiting set of conditions will be used as the limiting condition in these evaluations. A simultaneous feasibility test conducted pursuant to this section by the Office of the Interconnection shall assess the simultaneous feasibility under the following conditions:

- Based on next allocation year with all existing stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights modeled as fixed injection-withdrawal pairs.

- Based on 10 year allocation model with all eligible stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights for each year including base load growth for each year.

(d) Simultaneous feasibility tests conducted pursuant to this section shall be subject to Incremental Auction Revenue Rights granted pursuant to Section 7.8 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and Section 231 of the PJM Tariff.

7.6 New Stage 1 Resources.

A Network Service User may request the addition of new stage 1 resources to the stage 1 resource list if the capacity of the historical generation resources for a Zone determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) is less than the Zonal Base Load. Requests made pursuant to this section shall be subject to Section 7.5(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement and shall be limited to generation resources either owned by the requesting party or those subject to a bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contracts where such contract is executed by the requesting party to meet load obligations for which it is eligible to receive stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights and remains in force and effect for a minimum term of ten (10) years.

7.7 Alternate Stage 1 Resources.

A Network Service User may replace one or more of its existing stage 1 resources and its associated megawatt amount of Auction Revenue Rights determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) with an alternate resource. It the Network Service User making such request accepts the megawatt amount of Auction Revenue Rights associated with the alternate resource as established by the Office of the Interconnection, the alternate resource shall replace the relevant existing stage 1 resource prospectively beginning with the next annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation. If the Network Service User making such request rejects the megawatt amount of Auction Revenue Rights established by the Office of the Interconnection for the alternate resource, the Auction Revenue Rights associated with the original stage 1 resource shall remain in effect for the Network Service User. Requests made pursuant to this section shall be subject to the following:

- Requests made pursuant to this section shall be subject to Section 7.5(c);

- Eligible alternate resources shall be limited to generation resources owned by the requesting party or bona fide firm energy and capacity supply contracts that meet the requirements set forth in Section 7.6 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement;

- Alternate resources shall be of an electrically equivalent megawatt amount, which means that relative to the existing resource, the alternate resource cannot consume a greater amount of transmission capability on facilities binding in the current Auction Revenue Rights allocation or future stage 1A allocations, and cannot allow megawatt flow(s) to exceed applicable ratings on any other facilities;

- The total amount of requested alternate stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights cannot exceed the original awarded stage 1 megawatt amounts of Auction Revenue Rights associated with the original historical resource as determined pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b).

7.8 Elective Upgrade Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) In addition to any Incremental Auction Revenue Rights (as defined in the PJM Tariff) established under the PJM Tariff, any party may elect to fully fund Network Upgrades (as defined in the PJM Tariff) to obtain Incremental Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this section, provided that Incremental Auction Revenue Rights granted pursuant to this section shall be simultaneously feasible with outstanding Auction Revenue Rights, which shall include stage 1 and stage 2 Auction Revenue Rights, and against stage 1A Auction Revenue Right capability for the future 10 year period, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 7.8(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. A request made pursuant to this section shall specify a source, sink and megawatt amount.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall assess the simultaneous feasibility of the requested Incremental Auction Revenue Rights and the outstanding Auction Revenue Rights against the existing base system Auction Revenue Right capability and stage 1A Auction Revenue Right capability for the future 10 year period and based on this preliminary assessment it shall conduct studies to determine the upgrades required to accommodate the requested Incremental Auction Revenue Rights and ensure all outstanding Auction Revenue Rights are simultaneously feasible.

(c) If a party elects to fund upgrades to obtain Incremental Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this section, no less than forty-five (45) days prior to the in-service date of the relevant upgrades, as determined by the Office of the Interconnection, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the party of the actual amount of Incremental Auction Revenue Rights that will be granted to the party based on the allocation process established pursuant to Section 231 of Part VI of the Tariff.

(d) Incremental Auction Revenue Rights established pursuant to this section shall be *effective for the lesser of thirty (30) years, or the life of the project, from the in-service date of* the Network Upgrade(s). At any time during this thirty-year period (or the life of the Network Upgrade whichever is less), in lieu of continuing this thirty-year Auction Revenue Right, the owner of the right shall have a one-time choice to switch to an optional mechanism, whereby, on an annual basis, it will have the choice to request an Auction Revenue Right during the annual Auction Revenue Rights allocation process between the same source and sink, provided the Auction Revenue Right is simultaneously feasible. A party that is granted Incremental Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to this section may return such rights at any time, provided that the Office of the Interconnection determines that it can simultaneously accommodate all remaining outstanding Auction Revenue Rights following the return of such Auction Revenue Rights. In the event a party returns Incremental Auction Revenue Rights, it shall retain no further rights regarding such Incremental Auction Revenue Rights.

(e) No Incremental Auction Revenue Rights shall be granted pursuant to this section if the costs associated with funding the associated Network Upgrades are included in the rate base of a public utility and on which a regulated return is earned.

7.9 Residual Auction Revenue Rights.

(a) As necessary in each Planning Period PJM shall calculate Residual Auction Revenue Rights for Auction Revenue Rights pathways that were prorated pursuant to section 7.4.2(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. Residual Auction Revenue Rights calculated pursuant to this section shall be determined prior to the increase in transmission capability, including the return to service of existing transmission capability, that creates the Residual Auction Revenue Rights.

(b) Network Service Users and Qualifying Transmission Customers allocated stage 1 Auction Revenue Rights pursuant to section 7.4.2(a)-(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement that were subject to proration pursuant to section 7.4.2(h) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be eligible to receive Residual Auction Revenue Rights. Residual Auction Revenue Rights shall be allocated pursuant to the following schedule:

(i) The initial allocation of Residual Auction Revenue Rights shall be to holders of prorated stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights in an amount equal to the difference between the allocated stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights and the requested stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights.

(ii) Residual Auction Revenue Rights remaining after an allocation made pursuant to section 7.9(b)(i) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall be allocated to holders of prorated stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights in an amount equal to the difference between the allocated stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights and the requested stage 1B Auction Revenue Rights.

(iii) Residual Auction Revenue Rights remaining after allocations made pursuant to section 7.9(b)(i) and (ii) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement shall not be allocated to any entity and shall not be considered by the Office of the Interconnection in its administration of Section 7 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(c) The sum of a Network Service User's and Qualifying Transmission Customer's Residual Auction Revenue Rights awarded pursuant to this section and its stage 1 and 2 Auction Revenue Rights awarded in an annual allocation shall not exceed the entity's peak load.

(d) Residual Auction Revenue Rights awarded pursuant to this section shall be effective on the first day of the month in a Planning Period the increase in transmission capability creating the Residual Auction Revenue Rights is included in the administration of section 7.1.1(a) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(e) Residual Auction Revenue Rights awarded pursuant to this section shall be subject to section 7.4.2(e) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(f) The value of Residual Auction Revenue Rights awarded pursuant to this section, determined as specified in section 7.4.3(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, shall be positive. Negatively valued Residual Auction Revenue Rights will not be awarded.

7.10 Financial Settlement

Financial credits and charges for Auction Revenue Rights and Financial Transmission Rights, including associated auction charges, shall be calculated and accrued on a daily basis, and included in PJMSettlement's regular invoice to each participant for the relevant period of such invoice.

7.11 PJMSettlement as Counterparty

(a) Auction Revenue Rights and Financial Transmission Rights provide certain contractual rights and obligations for the holders of such rights set forth in this Schedule 1, the Agreement, and the PJM Tariff. PJMSettlement shall be the Counterparty with respect to the contractual rights and obligations of the holders of Auction Revenue Rights, and Financial Transmission Rights.

(b) As specified in sections 5.2.2(d) and 7 of this Schedule 1, Market Participants may trade Financial Transmission Rights and Auction Revenue Rights and under certain circumstances they may convert Auction Revenue Rights to Financial Transmission Rights. PJMSettlement shall not be the counterparty with respect to bilateral transfers of Financial Transmission Rights or Auction Revenue Rights between Market Participants or the conversion of Auction Revenue Rights to Financial Transmission Rights.

8. EMERGENCY AND PRE-EMERGENCY LOAD RESPONSE PROGRAM

8.1 Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program Options

The Emergency Load Response Program and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program are designed to provide a method by which end-use customers may be compensated by PJM for reducing load immediately prior to an anticipated emergency event ("pre-emergency event") or during an emergency event. As used in the Emergency Load Response Program and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program, the term "end-use customer" refers to an individual location or aggregation of locations that consume electricity as identified by a unique electric distribution company account number. There are two options for participation in the Emergency Load Response Program and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program:

- Full Program Option

  Participants in the Full Program Option receive, pursuant to Attachment DD of the Tariff and as applicable, (i) an energy payment for load reductions during a pre-emergency or emergency event, and (ii) a capacity payment for load reductions during a pre-emergency event or emergency event measured as set forth in the Reporting and Compliance provisions below.

- Energy Only Option

  Participants in the Energy Only Option receive only an energy payment for load reductions during an emergency event.

8.2 Participant Qualifications

Two primary types of distributed resources are candidates to participate in the PJM Emergency Load Response Program and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program:

On Site Generators

These generators (including Behind The Meter Generation) can be either synchronized or non-synchronized to the grid. Capacity Resources are not eligible for compensation under this program. Injections into the grid by local generators also will not be eligible for compensation under this program.

Load Reductions

A participant that has the ability to reduce a measurable and verifiable portion of its load, as metered on an EDC account basis.

Only Members or Special Members may participate in the Emergency Load Response Program and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program by complying with all of the requirements of the applicable Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority and all other applicable federal, state and local regulatory entities together with the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program provisions herein, including, but not limited to, the Registration section. Special membership provisions have been established for program participants in the Energy Only Option, as described below. The special membership provisions shall not apply to program participants in the Full Program Option. Any existing PJM Member or Special Member may participate in the Emergency Load Response Program and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program on behalf of non-members as the Curtailment Service Provider. All payments are made to the PJM Member or Special Member in such case. Curtailment Service Providers must become signatories to the PJM Operating Agreement, as described in the ***PJM Manual for Administrative Services for the Operating Agreement of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*** However, for Special Members the $5,000 annual member fee, the $1,500 application fee, and liability for Member defaults are waived, along with the following other modifications.

Special Members are limited to be PJM Market Sellers;
Voting privileges and sector designation are waived;
Thirty day notice for waiting period is waived;
Requirement for 24/7 control center coverage is waived;
No PJM-supported user group capability is permitted.

To participate in the Emergency Load Response Program and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program, the Demand Resource must:

Be capable of reducing at least 100 kW of load;
Be capable of receiving notification of a Load Management Event.

8.3 Metering Requirements

The Curtailment Service Provider is responsible to ensure that the Emergency Load Response Program and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program Participants have metering equipment that provides integrated hourly kWh values on an electric distribution company account basis. Non-interval metered residential customers that have Direct Load Control may use current statistical sampling of interval metering equipment on an electric distribution company account basis in accordance with the PJM Manuals and subject to PJM approval. The metering equipment shall either meet the electric distribution company requirements for accuracy or have a maximum error of two percent over the full range of the metering equipment (including Potential Transformers and Current Transformers) and the metering equipment and associated data shall meet the requirements set forth herein and in the PJM Manuals. The Emergency Load Response Program and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program participants must meter reductions in demand by using either of the following two methods:

(a) Using metering equipment that is capable of recording integrated hourly values for generation running to serve local load (net of that used by the generator); or

(b) Using metering equipment that provides actual load change by measuring actual load before and after the reduction request, such that there is a valid integrated hourly value for the hour prior to the event and each hour during the event. This value cannot be estimated nor can it be averaged over some historical period. This load will be metered on an electric distribution company account basis, or metered on a representative sample of Electric Distribution Company accounts for non-interval metered residential Direct Load Control in accordance with the PJM Manuals.

Metered load reductions will be adjusted up to consider transmission and distribution losses as submitted by the Curtailment Service Provider and verified by PJM with the electric distribution company.

The installed metering equipment must be one of the following:

(a) Metering equipment used for retail electric service;

(b) Customer-owned metering equipment or metering equipment acquired by the Curtailment Service Provider, approved by PJM, that is read electronically by PJM in accordance with the requirements herein and in the PJM Manuals; or

(c) Customer-owned metering equipment or metering equipment acquired by the Curtailment Service Provider, approved by PJM, that is read by the customer (or the Curtailment Service Provider), and such readings are then forwarded to PJM, in accordance with the requirements set forth herein and in the PJM Manuals.

Nothing herein changes the existence of one recognized meter by the state commissions as the official billing meter for recording consumption.

8.4 Registration

1. Curtailment Service Providers must complete the applicable PJM Load Response Program Registration Form ("Registration Form") that is posted on the PJM website (www.pjm.com) for each end-use customer, or aggregation of end-use customers, pursuant to the requirements set forth in the PJM Manuals. Because of the required electric distribution company ten business day review period, as described herein, Curtailment Service Providers should submit completed Registration Forms to the Office of the Interconnection no later than one day before the tenth business day preceding the relevant Delivery Year. All registrations that have not been approved on or before May 31st preceding the relevant Delivery Year shall be rejected by the Office of the Interconnection. To the extent that a completed Registration Form is submitted to the Office of the Interconnection prior to one day before the tenth business day preceding the relevant Delivery Year and such registration is rejected by the electric distribution company or the Office of the Interconnection because of incorrect data on the Registration Form, such registration may be resubmitted by the Curtailment Service Provider before May 31st preceding the relevant Delivery Year, but such registration will be rejected by the Office of the Interconnection unless the electric distribution company has verified the registration on or before May 31st preceding the relevant Delivery Year. Incomplete Registration Forms will be rejected by the Office of the Interconnection; Curtailment Service Providers may not resubmit registrations that were rejected for being incomplete unless they are able to do so no later than one day before the tenth business day preceding the relevant Delivery Year. The following general steps will be followed:

2. For end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed more than 4 million MWh in the previous fiscal year:

a. The Curtailment Service Provider completes the Registration Form located on the PJM website. PJM reviews the application and ensures that the qualifications are met, including verifying that the appropriate metering exists. After confirming that an entity has met all of the qualifications to be an Emergency Load Response or Pre-Emergency Load Response Program participant, PJM shall notify the appropriate electric distribution company of an Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program participant's registration and request verification as to whether the load that may be reduced is subject to laws or regulations of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority that prohibit or condition the end-use customer's participation in PJM's Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Programs pursuant to the process described below. The electric distribution company has ten business days to respond. An electric distribution company which seeks to assert that the laws or regulations of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority prohibit or condition (which condition the electric distribution company asserts has not been satisfied) an end-use customer's participation in PJM's Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response program shall provide to PJM, within the referenced ten business day review period, either: (a) an order, resolution or ordinance of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority prohibiting or conditioning the end-use customer's participation, (b) an opinion of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority's legal counsel attesting to the existence of a regulation or law prohibiting or conditioning the end-use customer's participation, or (c) an opinion of the state Attorney General, on behalf of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, attesting to the existence of a regulation or law prohibiting or conditioning the end-use customer's participation.

i. If evidence provided by an electric distribution company to the Office of the Interconnection indicates that a Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority law or regulation prohibits or conditions (which condition the electric distribution company asserts has not been satisfied) the end-use customer's participation and is received by the Office of the Interconnection on or after May 31st preceding the applicable Delivery Year, then the existing end-use customer's registration for Demand Resource (as defined in the Reliability Assurance Agreement) will remain in effect for the applicable Delivery Year. If evidence provided by an electric distribution company to the Office of the Interconnection indicates that a Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority law or regulation prohibits or conditions (which condition the electric distribution company asserts has not been satisfied) the end-use customer's participation and is received by the Office of the Interconnection before May 31st preceding the applicable Delivery Year and the Curtailment Service Provider does not provide supporting documentation to the Office of the Interconnection on or before May 31st preceding the applicable Delivery Year demonstrating that the Curtailment Service Provider had an executed contract with the end-use customer for Demand Resource participation *before the date the Demand Resource cleared the applicable Reliability Pricing* Model Auction, and that the date that the Demand Resource cleared the applicable Reliability Pricing Model Auction was prior to the effective date of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority law or regulation prohibiting or conditioning the end-use customer's participation, then, unless the below exception applies, the existing end-use customer's registration for Demand Resource participation shall be deemed to be terminated for the applicable Delivery Year, and the Curtailment Service Provider will be subject to the Reliability Pricing Model provisions, as specified in Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff.

b. In the absence of a response from the electric distribution company within the referenced ten business day review period, the Office of the Interconnection shall assume that the load to be reduced is not subject to laws or regulations of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority that prohibit or condition the end-use customer's participation in PJM's Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Programs, and the Office of the Interconnection shall accept the registration, provided it meets all other Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program requirements.

c. For those registrations terminated pursuant to this section, all Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participant activity incurred prior to the termination date of the registration shall be settled by PJM in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the PJM Tariff, PJM Operating Agreement and PJM Manuals.

3. For end-use customers of an electric distribution company that distributed 4 million MWh or less in the previous fiscal year:

a. The Curtailment Service Provider completes the Emergency Registration Form located on the PJM website. PJM reviews the application and ensures that the qualifications are met, including verifying that the appropriate metering exists. After confirming that an entity has met all of the qualifications to be an Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participant, PJM shall notify the appropriate electric distribution company of an Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participant's registration and request verification as to whether the load that may be reduced is permitted to participate by the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority pursuant to the process described below. The electric distribution company has ten business days to respond. If the electric distribution company verifies that the load that may be reduced is permitted or conditionally permitted (which condition the electric distribution company asserts has been satisfied) to participate in the Emergency Load Response Program and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program, then the electric distribution company must provide to the Office of the Interconnection within the referenced ten business day review period either: (a) an order, resolution or ordinance of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer's participation, (b) an opinion of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority's legal counsel attesting to the existence of a regulation or law permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer's participation, or (c) an opinion of the state Attorney General, on behalf of the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, attesting to the existence of a regulation or law permitting or conditionally permitting the end-use customer's participation.

i. If the electric distribution company denies the end-use customer's Demand Resource (as defined in the Reliability Assurance Agreement) registration on or before May 31st preceding the applicable Delivery Year and the Curtailment Service Provider does not provide the above referenced Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority evidence to the Office of the Interconnection on or before May 31st preceding the applicable Delivery Year demonstrating that the Curtailment Service Provider had Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority permission or conditional permission (which condition the electric distribution company asserts has been satisfied) for the end-use customer's participation and an executed contract with the end-use customer Demand Resource before the date the Demand Resource cleared the applicable Reliability Pricing Model Auction then, unless the below exception applies, the existing end-use customer's registration for Demand Resource participation shall be deemed to be terminated for the applicable Delivery Year and the Curtailment Service Provider will be subject to the Reliability Pricing Model provisions, as specified in Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff.

b. In the absence of a response from the electric distribution company within the referenced ten business day review period, the Office of the Interconnection shall reject the registration. If it is able to do so in compliance with all of the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program requirements, including the registration section, the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participant may submit a new registration to the Office of the Interconnection for consideration if a prior registration has been rejected pursuant to the terms of the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program provisions.

c. For those registrations terminated pursuant to this section, all Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response participant activity incurred prior to the termination date of the registration shall be settled by PJMSettlement in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the PJM Tariff, PJM Operating Agreement and PJM Manuals.

4. PJM will inform the requesting Curtailment Service Provider of acceptance into the Emergency Load Response Program and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program and notify the appropriate electric distribution company of the requesting Curtailment Service Provider's acceptance into the program or notifies the requesting Curtailment Service Provider and appropriate electric distribution company of PJM's rejection of the requesting participant's registration.

5. Any end-use customer intending to run distributed generating units in support of local load for the purpose of participating in this program must represent in writing to PJM that it holds all applicable environmental and use permits for running those generators. Continuing participation in this program will be deemed as a continuing representation by the owner that each time its distributed generating unit is run in accordance with this program, it is being run in compliance with all applicable permits, including any emissions, run-time limit or other constraint on plant operations that may be imposed by such permits.

8.5 Pre-Emergency Operations

All participants in the Pre-Emergency Load Response Program shall be subject to the operation procedures herein, unless the participant can demonstrate its Demand Resource: (1) relies on Behind the Meter generation to fulfill its load reduction obligations; (2) the Demand Resource has environmental restrictions imposed on it by Applicable Laws and Regulations that limit the Demand Resource's ability to operate only in emergency conditions; and (3) such limitation exists for any period of time. For the purposes of Section 8, emergency conditions shall be defined either by the express terms of the Applicable Law or Regulation, or if not set forth therein shall be deemed to exist if PJM has declared a NERC Energy Emergency Alert Level 2, as defined in the applicable NERC Standards. If these criteria are met, the participant shall be subject to the emergency operation procedures contained in Section 8.6. In such case, the Curtailment Service Provider shall submit a request for the relevant Demand Resource(s) to be an emergency (versus pre-emergency) Demand Resource to the Office of the Interconnection, at the time the Registration Form is submitted in accordance with this Agreement. A Curtailment Service Provider shall not submit a request for an exception unless it has done its due diligence to confirm that the Demand Resource meets the requirements referenced herein and has obtained from the end-use customer documentation supporting the exception request. The Curtailment Service Provider shall provide the Office of the Interconnection with a copy of such supporting documentation within three (3) business days of a request therefor. Failure to provide such supporting documentation by the deadline shall result in the Demand Resource being subject to the pre-emergency procedures herein.

PJM will initiate a pre-emergency event prior to the declaration of a Maximum Generation Emergency or an emergency event when practicable. A pre-emergency event is implemented when economic resources are not adequate to serve load and maintain reserves or maintain system reliability, and prior to proceeding into emergency procedures. Understanding the primary responsibility of the Office of the Interconnection to maintain system security, the Office of the Interconnection will strive to exhaust, but it is not obligated to exhaust, all economic resources prior to initiating a pre-emergency event. PJM will initiate an electronic message to Curtailment Service Providers notifying them of the pre-emergency event; Curtailment Service Providers are required to have the capability to retrieve this electronic message as described in the PJM Manuals. Additionally, PJM will post the pre-emergency event information on the PJM website and issue a separate All-Call message.

Following PJM's request to reduce load, (i) participants in the Energy Only Option voluntarily may reduce load; and (ii) participants in the Full Program Option are required to reduce load unless they already have reduced load pursuant to the Economic Load Response Program. PJM will dispatch the resources of all Emergency Load Response Program participants (not already dispatched under the Economic Load Response Program) based on the availability, location, minimum notification time, dispatch price and/or quantity of load reduction needed, subject to transmission constraints in the PJM Region. To give PJM dispatchers the flexibility to address reliability concerns in the most effective and timely manner and invoke the resources that offer the most assurance of effective relief of emergency conditions, the dispatch of Demand Resources may not be based solely on the least-cost resources since such dispatch shall be based not only on price, but also on availability, location, minimum notification time and/or quantity of megawatts of load or load reduction needed.

The dispatch price of Full Program Option resources and Energy Only Option resources in the Pre-Emergency Load Response Program are eligible to set the real time Locational Marginal Prices ("LMP") when the Office of the Interconnection has implemented pre-emergency procedures and such resources are required to reduce demand in the PJM Region and as described in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of the PJM Operating Agreement and the parallel provisions of Attachment K-Appendix of the PJM Tariff. Energy Only Option resources must also satisfy PJM's telemetry requirements.

Curtailment Service Providers with resources registered to participate in the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Programs must provide real-time operational data regarding the availability and status of their resources to PJM, and comply with operational procedures, as described in detail in the PJM Manuals.

8.6 Emergency Operations

PJM will initiate the notification of a Load Management Event coincident with the declaration of Maximum Generation emergency. (Implementation of the Emergency Load Response Program can be used for regional emergencies.) A Load Management Event is implemented whenever economic generating capacity is not adequate to serve load and maintain reserves or maintain system reliability. PJM will initiate an electronic message to Curtailment Service Providers notifying them of the Load Management Event; Curtailment Service Providers are required to have the capability to retrieve this electronic message as described in the PJM Manuals. Additionally, PJM will post the Load Management Event information on the PJM website and issue a separate All-Call message.

Following PJM's request to reduce load, (i) participants in the Energy Only Option voluntarily may reduce load; and (ii) participants in the Full Program Option are required to reduce load unless they already have reduced load pursuant to the Economic Load Response Program. PJM will dispatch the resources of all Emergency Load Response Program participants (not already dispatched under the Economic Load Response Program) based on the availability, location, minimum notification time, dispatch price and/or quantity of load reduction needed, subject to transmission constraints in the PJM Region. To give PJM dispatchers the flexibility to address reliability concerns in the most effective and timely manner and invoke the resources that offer the most assurance of effective relief of emergency conditions, the dispatch of Demand Resources may not be based solely on the least-cost resources since such dispatch shall be based not only on price, but also on availability, location, minimum notification time and/or quantity of megawatts of load or load reduction needed.

The dispatch price of Full Program Option resources and Energy Only Option resources in the Emergency Load Response Program are eligible to set the real time LMP when the Office of the Interconnection has implemented Emergency procedures and such resources are required to reduce demand in the PJM Region and as described in Section 2 of Schedule 1 of the PJM Operating Agreement and the parallel provisions of Attachment K-Appendix of the PJM Tariff. Energy Only Option resources must also satisfy PJM's telemetry requirements.

Curtailment Service Providers with resources registered to participate in the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Programs must provide real-time operational data regarding the availability and status of their resources to PJM, as described in detail in the PJM Manuals. Operational procedures are described in detail in the ***PJM Manual for Emergency Operations***.

8.7 Verification

PJM requires that the load reduction meter data be submitted to PJM within 60 days of the Load Management Event. If the data are not received within 60 days, no payment for participation shall be provided. Meter data must be provided for all hours during the day of the Load Management Event or the Load Management performance test, and for all hours during any other days as required by the Office of the Interconnection to calculate the load reduction.

These data files are to be communicated to PJM either via the Load Response Program web site or email. Files that are emailed must be in the PJM-approved file format. Meter data will be forwarded to the electric distribution company upon receipt, and these parties will then have ten (10) business days to provide feedback to PJM.

8.8 Market Settlements

Payment for reducing load is based on the actual kWh relief provided plus the adjustment for losses, subject to the Reporting and Compliance provisions below. The minimum duration of a load reduction request is one hour. The magnitude of capacity relief provided by Full Program Option participants shall be the amount determined in accordance with the Reporting and Compliance provisions below. The magnitude of relief provided by Energy Only Option participants, and the magnitude of energy relief provided by Full Program Option participants, may be less than, equal to, or greater than the kW amount declared on the Emergency Registration Form. Compensation will be provided for reductions in energy consumption during emergency events by Full Program Option participants and Energy Only Option participants regardless of whether the participant's load during the event exceeds its peak load contribution for the applicable Delivery Year.

PJMSettlement pays the applicable LMP to the PJM Member that nominates the load. Payment will be equal to the measured energy load reduction adjusted for losses times the applicable LMP. The measured energy load reduction for locations with approved Economic Load Response registrations prior to a Load Management Event that have an economic CBL different than the maximum base load as defined in the PJM Manuals will use the associated economic CBL to determine the energy load reduction unless the locations on the Emergency Load Response registration are not the same locations as those included on the Economic Load Response registration. If, at the time that a Load Management Event or emergency event is initiated by PJM, an end-use customer is already responding economically (i.e., pursuant to the Economic Load Response rules) and economic CBL is based on Symmetric Additive Adjustment, then the CBL calculated based on the Symmetric Additive Adjustment period prior to the economic event will be used. Locations that do not have an approved Economic Load Response registration prior to a Load Management Event will use the Customer Baseline Load as defined in section 3.3A.2 and associated Symmetric Additive Adjustment as defined in section 3.3A.2 of this schedule unless an alternative CBL is approved pursuant to section 3.3A.2.01 of this schedule as the CBL to determine the energy load reduction.

If, however, the sum of the hourly energy payments to a Curtailment Service Provider with a Demand Resource dispatched by PJM for actual, achieved reductions is not greater than or equal to the offer value (i.e. Minimum Dispatch Price and shut down costs) then the Curtailment Service Provider will be made whole up to the offer value for its actual, achieved reductions for the Demand Resource.

Locations on Economic Load Response registrations dispatched in the Real-time Energy Market or cleared in the Day-ahead Energy Market that are also included on an Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response registration as Full Program Option, and that have also been dispatched as part of an emergency event for the same hour (i.e., have an "overlapping dispatch hour") will be compensated for energy based on emergency energy settlement and cost allocation rules as set forth in this section and in the PJM Manuals. Overlapping dispatch hours will use shutdown costs based on what was considered for the economic event, and no balancing Operating Reserve charges will be assessed for deviations from real-time dispatch amounts or from cleared day-ahead commitments. To avoid duplicative energy payments, overlapping dispatch hours for an aggregate registration (i.e., multiple locations on the same registration) or dispatch groups where locations on the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response registration are not the same locations as those on the Economic Load Response registration will have hourly economic energy load reduction and/or hourly emergency energy load reduction prorated based on load reduction capability provided by the Curtailment Service Provider for the locations.

The Curtailment Service Provider will only submit energy settlements for Load Management Events that occur outside of the specific availability period defined in the Reliability Assurance Agreement for each Demand Resource type if the Curtailment Service Provider has confirmed that the customers on the registration did take action to reduce load or the registration reflects the entire group of mass market customers for which an energy settlement will either be submitted for all or none of the mass market customers, as approved by PJM. The Curtailment Service Provider will only submit energy settlements for each registration for Load Management Events that occur during the product specific availability period as defined for each product in the Reliability Assurance Agreement if the Curtailment Service Provider also provides associated load data for each registration in order to calculate that registration's capacity compliance.

Full Program Option participants that fail to provide a load reduction (as measured as set forth in the Reporting and Compliance provisions below) when dispatched by PJM shall be assessed penalties and/or charges as specified in Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff and the Reliability Assurance Agreement, as applicable.

During emergency conditions, costs for emergency purchases in excess of LMP are allocated among PJM Market Buyers in proportion to their increase in net purchases minus real-time dispatch reduction megawatts from the PJM energy market during the hour in the Real-time Energy Market compared to the Day-ahead Energy Market. Consistent with this pricing methodology, all charges under the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Programs are allocated to purchasers of energy, in proportion to their increase in net purchases minus real-time dispatch reduction megawatts from the PJM energy market during the hour from day-ahead to real-time.

Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program charges and credits will appear on the PJM Members monthly bill, as described in the ***PJM Manual for Operating Agreement Accounting*** and the ***PJM Manual for Billing***.

8.9 Reporting and Compliance

Actual load reductions of Energy Only Option emergency resources will be added back for the purpose of peak load calculations for capacity for the following Delivery Year.

Actual Emergency Load Response, Pre-Emergency Load Response and Economic Load Response load reductions for Load Management resources registered as Emergency Load Response or Pre-Emergency Load Response Full Program Option or Capacity Only resources which occur from June 1 through September 30, will be added back for the purpose of calculating peak load for capacity for the following Delivery Year, as set forth in the PJM Manuals and consistent with the load response recognized for capacity compliance as set forth in the Reporting and Compliance provisions below. Capacity Only resources are Full Program Option resources that do not receive an energy payment for load reductions during a pre-emergency or emergency event.

Actual load reductions of Load Management resources registered as Emergency Load Response or Pre-Emergency Load Response Full Program Option or Capacity Only resources used to determine Load Management Event and test capacity compliance for Firm Service Level and Guaranteed Load Drop end-use customers shall be equal to the load reduction provided to the electric distribution company as follows and in accordance with the PJM Manuals:

i) For Guaranteed Load Drop end-use customers, the lesser of (a) comparison load used to best represent what the load would have been if the Office of the Interconnection did not declare a Load Management Event or the CSP did not initiate a test as outlined in the PJM Manuals, minus the metered load ("Load") and then multiplied by the loss factor ("LF") or (b) the current Delivery Year peak load contribution ("PLC") minus the metered load multiplied by the loss factor ("LF"). A load reduction will only be recognized for capacity compliance if the metered load multiplied by the loss factor is less than the current Delivery Year peak load contribution. The calculation is represented by:

   Minimum of {(comparison load – Load) * LF, PLC – (Load * LF)}

   Methodologies for establishing comparison load for Guaranteed Load Drop end-use customers include the following:

   - Comparable Day
   - Same Day
   - Customer Baseline
   - Regression Analysis
   - Generation

   Each of these methodologies is described in greater detail in Manual M-19, ***PJM Manual for Load Forecasting and Analysis***, at Attachment A: Load Drop Estimate Guidelines.

ii) For Firm Service Level end-use customers the current Delivery Year PLC minus the Load multiplied by the LF. The calculation is represented by:

PLC – (Load * LF)

The capacity compliance of Load Management resources that are registered as Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Full Program Option, as determined in accordance with these Reporting and Compliance provisions, shall not affect energy payments to such resources for load reductions during an emergency event, as provided in the Market Settlements provisions above and Attachment DD of the Tariff.

PJM will submit any required reports to FERC on behalf of the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program participants. PJM will also post this document, as well as any other program-related documentation on the PJM website.

PJM will post on its website a report of demand response activity, and will provide a summary thereof to the PJM Markets and Reliability Committee on an annual basis.

As PJM receives evidence from the electric distribution companies pursuant to section 1.5A.3 of PJM's Economic Load Response Program, PJM will post on its website a list of those Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authorities that the electric distribution companies assert prohibit or condition retail participation in PJM's Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Program together with a corresponding reference to the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority evidence that is provided to PJM by the electric distribution companies.

8.10 Non-Hourly Metered Customer Pilot

Non-hourly metered customers may participate in the Emergency Load Response Program on a pilot basis under the following circumstances. The Curtailment Service Provider must propose an alternate method for measuring hourly demand reductions. The Office of the Interconnection shall approve alternate measurement mechanisms on a case-by-case basis for a time period specified by the Office of the Interconnection ("Pilot Period"). Demand reductions by non-hourly metered customers using alternate measurement mechanisms on a pilot basis shall be limited to a combined total of 500 MW of reductions in both the Emergency Load Response Program and the PJM Interchange Energy Market. With the sole exception of the requirement for hourly metering, non-hourly metered customers shall be subject to the rules and procedures for participation in the Emergency Load Response Program. Following completion of a Pilot Period, the alternate method shall be evaluated by the Office of the Interconnection to determine whether such alternate method should be included in the PJM Manuals as an accepted measurement mechanism for demand reductions in the Emergency Load Response Program.

8.11 Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Participant Aggregation.

The purpose for aggregation is to allow the participation of End-Use Customers in the Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Programs that can provide less than 100 kW of demand response on an individual basis. Emergency Load Response and Pre-Emergency Load Response Participant aggregations shall be subject to the following requirements:

i. All End-Use Customers in an aggregation shall be specifically identified;

ii. All End-Use Customers in an aggregation shall be served by the same electric distribution company ;

iii. All End-Use Customers in an aggregation that settle at Transmission Zone, existing load aggregate, or node prices shall be located in the same Transmission Zone, existing load aggregate or at the same node, respectively;

iv. Energy settlement will be based on each individual customer's load reductions, or a current statistical sample of end-use customers' load reductions for non-interval metered residential Direct Load Control customers as set forth in the PJM Manuals, pursuant to section 3.3A of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region and the PJM Manuals. Capacity compliance will be based on each individual customers' load reductions, or a current statisitical sample of end-use customers' load reductions, and then aggregated pursuant to section 3.3A of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, the PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region and the PJM Manuals; and

v. Each End-Use Customer site must meet the requirements for market participation by a Demand Resource.

SCHEDULE 2 -
COMPONENTS OF COST

1. GENERAL COST PROVISIONS

1.1 Permissible Components of Cost-based Offers.

(a) Each Market Participant obligated to sell energy on the PJM Interchange Energy Market at cost-based rates may include the following components or their equivalent in the determination of costs for energy supplied to or from the PJM Region:

For generating units powered by boilers
Firing-up cost
Peak-prepared-for maintenance cost

For generating units powered by machines
Starting cost from cold to synchronized operation

For all generating units
Incremental fuel cost
Incremental maintenance cost
No-load cost during period of operation
Incremental labor cost
Emission allowances/adders
Maintenance Adders
Ten percent adder
Other incremental operating costs

For a generating unit that is subject to operational limitations due to energy or environmental limitations imposed on the generating unit by Applicable Laws and Regulations (as defined in the PJM Tariff), the Market Participant may include in the calculation of its "other incremental operating costs" an amount reflecting the unit-specific Energy Market Opportunity Costs expected to be incurred. Such unit-specific Energy Market Opportunity Costs are calculated by forecasting Locational Marginal Prices based on future contract prices for electricity using PJM Western Hub forward prices, taking into account historical variability and basis differentials for the bus at which the generating unit is located for the prior three year period immediately preceding the relevant compliance period, and subtract therefrom the forecasted costs to generate energy at the bus at which the generating unit is located, as specified in more detail in PJM Manual 15. If the difference between the forecasted Locational Marginal Prices and forecasted costs to generate energy is negative, the resulting Energy Market Opportunity Cost shall be zero. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a Market Participant may submit a request to PJM for consideration and approval of an alternative method of calculating its Energy Market Opportunity Cost if the standard methodology described herein does not accurately represent the Market Participant's Energy Market Opportunity Cost.

For a generating unit that is subject to operational limitations because it only has a limited number of starts or available run hours resulting from (i) the physical equipment limitations of the unit, for up to one year, due to original equipment manufacturer recommendations or insurance carrier restrictions, or (ii) a fuel supply limitation, for up to one year, resulting from an event of Catastrophic Force Majeure, the Market Participant may include in the calculation of its "other incremental operating costs" an amount reflecting the unit-specific Non-Regulatory Opportunity Costs expected to be incurred. Such unit-specific Non-Regulatory Opportunity Costs are calculated by forecasting Locational Marginal Prices based on future contract prices for electricity using PJM Western Hub forward prices, taking into account historical variability and basis differentials for the bus at which the generating unit is located for the prior three year period immediately preceding the period of time in which the unit is bound by the referenced restrictions, and subtract therefrom the forecasted costs to generate energy at the bus at which the generating unit is located, as specified in more detail in PJM Manual 15. If the difference between the forecasted Locational Marginal Prices and forecasted costs to generate energy is negative, the resulting Non-Regulatory Opportunity Cost shall be zero.

(b) All fuel costs shall employ the marginal fuel price experienced by the Member.

1.2 Method of Determining Cost Components.

The PJM Board, upon consideration of the advice and recommendations of the Members Committee, shall from time to time define in detail the method of determining the costs entering into the said components, and the Members shall adhere to such definitions in the preparation of incremental costs used on the Interconnection.

2. FUEL COST POLICY

2.1 Approved Fuel Cost Policy Requirement for Non-Zero Cost-based Offer.

A Market Seller may only submit a non-zero cost-based offer into the PJM Interchange Energy Market for a generation resource if it has a PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy consistent with each fuel type for such generation resource.

2.2 Fuel Cost Policy Approval Process.

(a) A Market Seller shall provide a Fuel Cost Policy to PJM and the Market Monitoring Unit for each generation resource that it intends to offer into the PJM Interchange Energy Market, for each fuel type utilized by the resource. The Market Seller shall submit its initial Fuel Cost Policy for a generation resource to PJM and the Market Monitoring Unit for review by no later than 45 days prior to the Market Seller's expected initial submittal of a cost-based offer for the resource and shall update existing Fuel Cost Policies consistent with the annual update requirements set forth below in section 2.6. For each new generation resource for which the Market Seller does not have commercial operating data, the Market Seller shall submit a provisional Fuel Cost Policy, which describes the Market Seller's methodology to procure and price fuel and includes all available operating data, to PJM and the Market Monitoring Unit for review and approval by no later than forty five (45) calendar days prior to the Market Seller's expected initial submittal of a cost-based offer for the resource. Within ninety (90) calendar days of the commercial operation date of the generation resource, the Market Seller shall submit to PJM and the Market Monitoring Unit for review an updated Fuel Cost Policy reflecting actual commercial operating data of the resource. The basis for the Market Monitoring Unit's review is described in the PJM Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix. PJM shall consult with the Market Monitoring Unit, and consider any input and advice timely received from the Market Monitoring Unit, in its determination of whether to approve a Market Seller's Fuel Cost Policy. After it has completed its evaluation of the submitted Fuel Cost Policy, PJM shall notify the Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, whether the Fuel Cost Policy is approved or rejected. If PJM rejects a Market Seller's Fuel Cost Policy, PJM shall include an explanation for why the Fuel Cost Policy was rejected in its written notification.

(b) PJM and the Market Monitoring Unit will have an initial thirty (30) Business Days for review of a submitted policy. Market Sellers shall have five (5) Business Days or an alternative deadline agreed to by PJM, to provide additional documentation or information on any request from PJM or the Market Monitoring Unit. If the Market Seller does not believe it can provide the information within five (5) Business Days, it can request an alternative deadline for submission of the data from PJM no later than one (1) Business Day before the due date of the request for additional data, and if PJM consents to extend the deadline, PJM will advise the Market Seller and the Market Monitoring Unit of the new deadline. If the Market Monitoring Unit makes a request directly to the Market Seller, the Market Monitoring Unit shall, within one (1) Business Day, inform PJM of such request at the time it is made. Failure to meet a data request deadline may result in PJM's rejection of the policy. If additional documentation or information has been requested by PJM or the Market Monitoring Unit, PJM has five (5) Business Days after the deadline for the Market Seller's submittal of such additional information or documentation to notify the Market Seller and Market Monitoring Unit of its approval or rejection of the Fuel Cost Policy.

2.3 Standard of Review.

(a) PJM shall review and approve a Fuel Cost Policy if it meets the requirements set forth in subsections 2.3(a)(i) through (v) below. PJM shall reject Fuel Cost Policies that fail to meet such requirements and that do not accurately reflect the applicable costs, such as the fuel source, transportation cost, procurement process used, applicable adders, commodity cost, or provide sufficient information for PJM to verify the Market Seller's fuel cost at the time of the Market Seller's cost-based offer. If PJM rejects a Market Seller's Fuel Cost Policy, PJM shall include an explanation for why the Fuel Cost Policy was rejected in its written notification. A Fuel Cost Policy must:

(i) Provide information sufficient for the verification of the Market Seller's fuel procurement practices, as further described below and in PJM Manual 15, and how those practices are utilized to determine cost-based offers the Market Seller submits into the PJM Interchange Energy Market;

(ii) Reflect the Market Seller's applicable commodity and/or transportation contracts (to the extent it holds such contracts) and the Market Seller's method of calculating delivered fossil fuel cost, limited to inventoried cost, replacement cost or a combination thereof, that reflect the way fuel is purchased or scheduled for purchase, and set forth all applicable indices as a measure that PJM can use to verify how anticipated spot market purchases are utilized in determining fuel costs;

(iii) Provide a detailed explanation of the basis for and reasonableness of any applicable adders included in determining fuel costs in accordance with PJM Manual 15;

(iv) Account for situations where applicable indices or other objective market measures are not sufficiently liquid by documenting the alternative means actually utilized by the Market Seller to price the applicable fuel used in the determination of its cost-based offers, such as documented quotes for the procurement of natural gas; and

(v) Adhere to all requirements of PJM Manual 15 applicable to the generation resource.

(b) To the extent a Market Seller proposes alternative measures to document its fuel costs in its Fuel Cost Policy for a generation resource, the Market Seller shall explain how such alternative measures are consistent with or superior to the standard specified in section 2.3(a) above, accounting for the unique circumstances associated with procurement of fuel to supply the generation resource.

(c) If PJM determines that a Fuel Cost Policy submitted for review does not contain adequate support for PJM to make a determination as to the acceptability of any portion of the proposed policy consistent with the standards set forth above, PJM shall reject the Fuel Cost Policy. If PJM rejects the Fuel Cost Policy, the Market Seller's previously PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy shall apply to all of the Market Seller's cost-based offers until such time as, subject to the review process set forth below in section 2.6, PJM approves a new Fuel Cost Policy for the Market Seller.

2.4 Revocation of Approved Fuel Cost Policies.

If, after having approved a Fuel Cost Policy, PJM determines, with input and advice timely received from the Market Monitoring Unit, that the Market Seller's procurement practices or the method for determining other components of cost-based offers is no longer consistent with the approved Fuel Cost Policy, this Schedule or PJM Manual 15, PJM may revoke its approval of the Fuel Cost Policy, and Market Seller shall be required to submit a new Fuel Cost Policy for approval pursuant to the process and deadlines set forth in PJM Manual 15. If PJM revokes a Market Seller's previously approved Fuel Cost Policy, PJM shall notify the Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, and include an explanation for the revocation. Upon revocation of a Fuel Cost Policy, the penalty referenced in section 5(a) below shall apply beginning on the day after PJM issues the written notification of revocation to the Market Seller, with no additional requirement for PJM to provide any further notice to the Market Seller.

2.5 Information Required To Be Included In Fuel Cost Policies.

(a) Each Market Seller shall include in its Fuel Cost Policy the following information, as further described in the applicable provisions of PJM Manual 15:

(i) For all Fuel Cost Policies, regardless of fuel type, the Market Seller shall provide a detailed explanation of the Market Seller's established method of calculating fuel costs, indicating whether fuel purchases are subject to a contract price and/or spot pricing, and specifying how it is determined which of the contract prices and/or spot market prices to use. The Market Seller shall include its method for determining commodity, handling and transportation costs.

(ii) For Fuel Cost Policies applicable to generation resources using a fuel source other than natural gas, the Market Seller shall adhere to the following guidelines:

1. Fuel costs for solar, Energy Storage Resources and run-of-river hydro resources shall be zero.

2. Fuel costs for nuclear resources shall not include in-service interest charges whether related to fuel that is leased or capitalized.

3. For Pumped Storage Hydro resources, fuel cost shall be determined based on the amount of energy necessary to pump from the lower reservoir to the upper reservoir.

4. For wind resources, the Market Seller shall identify how it accounts for renewable energy credits and production tax credits.

5. For solid waste, bio-mass and landfill gas resources, the Market Seller shall include the costs of such fuels even when the cost is negative.

(iii) Market Sellers shall report, for all of the generation resource's operating modes, fuels, and at various operating temperatures, the incremental, no load and start heat requirements, the method of developing heat inputs, and the frequency of updating heat inputs.

(iv) A Fuel Cost Policy shall include any applicable unit specific performance factors, and the method used to determine them, which may be modified seasonally to reflect ambient conditions.

(v) A Fuel Cost Policy shall include the cost-based Start Cost calculation for the generation resource, and identify for each temperature state the starting fuel (MMBtu), station service (MWh), start Maintenance Adder, and any Start Additional Labor Cost.

(vi) A Fuel Cost Policy shall also include any other incremental operating costs included in a Market Seller's cost-based offer for a resource, including but not limited to the consumables used for operation and the marginal value of costs in terms of dollars per MWh or dollars per unit of fuel, along with all applicable descriptions, calculation methodologies associated with such costs, and frequency of updating such costs.

2.6 Periodic Update and Review of Fuel Cost Policies.

On an annual basis, all Market Sellers will be required to either submit to PJM and the Market Monitoring Unit an updated Fuel Cost Policy that complies with this Schedule 2 and PJM Manual 15, or confirm that their currently effective and approved Fuel Cost Policy remains compliant, pursuant to the procedures and deadlines specified in PJM Manual 15. Market Sellers must submit such information by no later than June 15 of each year. PJM shall consult with the Market Monitoring Unit, and consider any input timely received from the Market Monitoring Unit, in its determination of whether to approve a Market Seller's updated Fuel Cost Policy. After it has completed its evaluation of the request, PJM shall notify the Market Seller in writing, with a copy to the Market Monitoring Unit, of its determination whether the updated Fuel Cost Policy is approved or rejected by no later than November 1. If PJM rejects a Market Seller's updated Fuel Cost Policy, in its written notification, PJM shall provide an explanation for why the Fuel Cost Policy was rejected. If a Market Seller desires to update its Fuel Cost Policy, or PJM determines either on its own or based on input received from the Market Monitoring Unit, that the Market Seller must update its Fuel Cost Policy outside of the annual review process, the Market Seller shall follow the applicable processes and deadlines specified in this Schedule 2 and the PJM Manual 15.

2.7 Market Monitoring Unit Review For Market Power Concerns.

Nothing in this Schedule 2 is intended to abrogate or in any way alter the responsibility of the Market Monitoring Unit to make determinations about market power pursuant to PJM Tariff, Attachment M and Attachment M-Appendix.

3. EMISSION ALLOWANCES/ADDERS

3.1 Review of Emissions Allowances/Adders.

(a) For emissions costs, Market Sellers shall report the emissions rate of each generation resource, the method for determining the emissions allowance cost, and the frequency of updating emission rates. Such adders must be submitted and reviewed at least annually by PJM and be changed if they are no longer accurate.

(b) Market Sellers may submit emissions cost information to PJM and the Market Monitoring Unit as part of the information it submits during the annual Fuel Cost Policy review process, described in section 2.6 of this Schedule. The basis for the Market Monitoring Unit's review is described in PJM Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.A.2. PJM shall consult with the Market Monitoring Unit, and consider any input and advice timely received from the Market Monitoring Unit, in its determination of whether to approve emissions costs.

4. MAINTENANCE ADDERS

4.1 Review of Maintenance Adders.

(a) Maintenance Adders must be submitted and reviewed at least annually by PJM and be changed if they are no longer accurate. Maintenance Adders cannot include any costs that are included in the generation resource's Avoidable Cost Rate.

(b) Market Sellers may submit Maintenance Adder information to PJM and the Market Monitoring Unit as part of the information it submits during the annual Fuel Cost Policy review process, described in section 2.6 of this Schedule. The basis for the Market Monitoring Unit's review is described in PJM Tariff, Attachment M-Appendix, section II.A.2. PJM shall consult with the Market Monitoring Unit, and consider any input and advice timely received from the Market Monitoring Unit, in its determination of whether to approve emissions costs.

5. PENALTY PROVISIONS

5.1 Penalties.

(a) If upon review of a Market Seller's cost-based offer, PJM determines that the offer is not in compliance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy or this Schedule 2 and the Market Monitoring Unit agrees with that determination, or the Market Monitoring Unit determines that the offer is not in compliance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy and PJM agrees with the Market Monitoring Unit's determination, or the Market Seller does not have a PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, or PJM determines that any portion of the cost-based offer is not in compliance with this Schedule 2, the Market Seller shall be subject to the following penalty summed for each hour that the offer applied:

$$\sum \text{Penalty}_{dh} = \frac{\min(d, 15)}{20} \times \text{LMP}_h \times \text{MW}_h$$

where:

d is the greater of one and the number of days since PJM first notified the Market Seller of PJM's and the Market Monitoring Unit's agreement regarding applicability of the penalty

h is the applicable hour of the day for which the offer applies

LMP_h is the real-time LMP at the applicable pricing location for the resource for the hour

MW_h is the available capacity of the resource for the hour

All charges collected pursuant to this provision shall be allocated to Market Participants based on each Market Participant's real-time load ratio share for each applicable hour, as determined based on the Market Participant's total hourly load (net of operating Behind The

Meter Generation, but not to be less than zero) to the total hourly load of all Market Participants in the PJM Region.

(b) Market Sellers that are assessed a penalty for non-compliance with an approved Fuel Cost Policy or the cost-based offer is not in compliance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy or this Schedule 2 shall be assessed penalties until the day after PJM determines that the Market Seller's cost-based offers are in compliance with the Market Seller's approved Fuel Cost Policy or in compliance with this Schedule 2. Such penalties will be assessed for no less than one (1) Operating Day.

(c) Market Sellers that are assessed a penalty for not having an approved Fuel Cost Policy shall be assessed penalties until the day after PJM approves the Market Seller's submitted Fuel Cost Policy. Such penalties will be assessed for no less than one (1) Operating Day.

(d) If upon review of a Market Seller's cost-based offer PJM and the Market Monitoring Unit disagree about whether the offer is in compliance with the Market Seller's PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, PJM and/or the Market Monitoring Unit may confidentially refer the matter to FERC Office of Enforcement for resolution and determination whether the applicable penalties should be assessed.

5.2 Rebuttal Period To Challenge Revocation of Fuel Cost Policy.

Market Sellers who have a Fuel Cost Policy revoked by PJM will be provided a three (3) Business Day rebuttal period, starting from the date of revocation, to submit supporting documentation to PJM demonstrating that the revoked Fuel Cost Policy accurately reflects the fuel source, transportation cost, procurement process used, applicable adders, or commodity cost for such generation resource such that the Fuel Cost Policy accurately reflects the Market Seller's fuel procurement practices and methodology for pricing fuel. During the rebuttal period, if the Market Seller does not have a PJM-approved Fuel Cost Policy, it may not submit a non-zero cost-based offer. The penalty will still apply during the rebuttal period. However, if, upon review of the Market Seller's supporting documentation, PJM determines that the revoked policy accurately reflects the Market Seller's actual methodology used to develop the cost-based offer that was submitted at the time of revocation and that the Market Seller has not violated its Fuel Cost Policy, then PJM will refund to the Market Seller the penalty payments and make whole the Market Seller via uplift payments for the time period for which the applicable Fuel Cost Policy had been revoked and the generation resource was mitigated to its cost-based offer.

SCHEDULE 2 - EXHIBIT A - EXPLANATION OF THE TREATMENT OF THE COSTS OF EMISSION ALLOWANCES

The cost of emission allowances is included in "Other Incremental Operating Costs" pursuant to Schedule 2. The replacement cost of emission allowances will be used to recover the cost of emission allowances consumed as a result of producing energy for the PJM Region.

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Consistent with definitions promulgated by the PJM Board upon consideration of the advice and recommendations of the Members Committee under Schedule 2, each Member subject to Schedule 2 will determine and provide to the Interconnection its replacement cost of emission allowances, such cost to be an amount not exceeding the market price index published by Cantor-Fitzgerald Environmental Brokerage Services ("EBS"), or a PJM Board approved index in the event that EBS should cease publication of such index. As with all other components of cost required for accounting under this Agreement, each Member subject to Schedule 2 will use the same replacement cost of emissions allowances, so determined, as it uses for coordinating operation of its generating facilities hereunder.

For each Member subject to Schedule 2, the cost of emissions allowances is included in the cost of energy supplied to or received from the PJM Region.

Payment

The Members subject to Schedule 2 waive the right of payment-in-kind for emission allowances for transactions wholly between the parties. Cash payments for emission allowances consumed in providing energy for the PJM Region shall be incorporated into and conducted pursuant to the billing procedures for energy prescribed by this Agreement.

Calculation of Emission Allowance Amount and Cost

Pursuant to the letter from the PJM Interconnection to FERC dated June 26, 1995, the calculation of an annual average for the cost of emission allowances, described below, is required due to the profile of the PJM physical system and PJM Energy Management software system. An average emission allowance cost based on a standard production cost study case will be used to calculate the average cost of emission allowances for each pool megawatt produced.

The Emission Allowances (Tons of SO2) associated with a transaction will be calculated by multiplying the magnitude of a transaction (MWhr) by an Emissions per MWHr Factor (Tons of SO2 per MWhr):

Emission Allowances Used (Tons of S02)	=	Transaction Magnitude (MWhr)	x	Emissions per MWhr Factor (Tons of S02 per MWhr)

The Emissions per MWHr Factor will be calculated by dividing the forecast annual emissions from all Phase I units (Tons of SO2) by the Forecast Annual Total PJM Energy Production (MWhr):

$$\text{Emissions per MWhr Factor (Tons of SO2 per MWhr)} = \frac{\text{Forecast Annual Phase I Unit Emissions (Tons of SO2)}}{\text{Forecast Annual Total PJM Energy Production (MWhr)}}$$

Likewise, the cost (Dollars) of the Emission Allowances for a transaction will be calculated by multiplying the transaction magnitude (MWhr) by a Charge per MWhr Factor (Dollars per MWHr).

$$\text{Cost of Emission Allowances Used (Dollars)} = \text{Transaction Magnitude (MWhr)} \times \text{Charge per MWhr Factor (Dollars per MWhr)}$$

The Charge per MWhr Factor will be calculated by multiplying, for each Member subject to Schedule 2, its Forecast Annual Emissions (Tons of SO2)by its respective Emissions Allowance Replacement Cost (Dollars per Ton of SO2) to yield each the forecasted annual cost of emissions (Dollars). Then, the total of forecasted annual cost of emissions for each Member subject to Schedule 2 is divided by the Forecast Annual Total PJM Energy Production (MWhr) to determine the Charge per MWHr Factor (Dollars per MWHr).

$$\text{Charge per MWhr Factor} = \frac{\Sigma(A \times B)}{C}, \text{ where:}$$

A = Member's Forecasted Annual Emissions, (Tons of SO2)
B = Emission Allowance Replacement Cost, (Dollars per Ton of SO2, per company)
C = Forecast Annual PJM Energy Production, (MWhr)

SCHEDULE 3 - ALLOCATION OF THE COST AND EXPENSES OF THE OFFICE OF THE INTERCONNECTION

(a) Each group of Affiliates, each group of Related Parties, and each Member that is not in such a group shall pay an annual membership fee, the proceeds of which shall be used to defray the costs and expenses of the LLC, including the Office of the Interconnection. The amount of the annual fee as of the Effective Date shall be $5,000. The annual membership fee shall be charged on a calendar year basis. In the year that a new membership commences, the annual membership fee may be reduced, at the election of the entity joining, by 1/12th for each full month that has passed prior to membership commencing. If the entity seeking to join elects to pay a prorated annual membership fee as provided here, it shall not be permitted to vote at meetings until the first day following the date that its entry as a new Member is announced at a Members Committee meeting, provided that if an entity's membership is terminated and it seeks to rejoin within twelve months, it will be subject to the full $5,000 annual membership fee. Annual membership fees shall not be refunded, in whole or in part, upon termination of membership. Each group of Affiliates, each group of Related Parties, and each Member that does not timely pay its annual membership fee by January 1 shall be deemed to have given notice of its intent to withdrawal from PJM Membership in accordance with Section 18.18.2 of this Agreement. PJM shall provide the affected group of Affiliates, group of Related Parties and/or Member with notification (electronic or otherwise) of its intent to apply this provision and the affected group of Affiliates, group of Related Parties and/or Member shall have 90 days therefrom to make payment of its annual membership fee before its withdrawal from PJM Membership becomes effective.

(b) Each group of State Offices of Consumer Advocates from the same state or the District of Columbia and each State Consumer Advocate that nominates its representative to vote on the Members Committee but is not in such a group shall pay an annual fee, the proceeds of which shall be used to defray the costs and expenses of the LLC, including the Office of the Interconnection. The amount of the annual fee shall be $500. The annual membership fee shall be charged on a calendar year basis and shall not be subject to proration for memberships commencing during a calendar year.

(c) The amount of the annual fees provided for herein shall be adjusted from time to time by the PJM Board to keep pace with inflation.

(d) All remaining costs of the operation of the LLC and the Office of the Interconnection and the expenses, including, without limitation, the costs of any insurance and any claims not covered by insurance, associated therewith as provided in this Agreement shall be costs of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. Administrative Services and shall be recovered as set forth in Schedule 9 to the PJM Tariff. Such costs may include costs associated with debt service, including the costs of funding reserve accounts or meeting coverage or similar requirements that financing covenants may necessitate.

(e) An entity accepted for membership in the LLC shall pay all costs and expenses associated with additions and modifications to its own metering, communication, computer, and other appropriate facilities and procedures needed to effect the inclusion of the entity in the operation of the Interconnection, and for additional services requested by Members from the LLC, PJMSettlement or the Office of the Interconnection that are not required for the operation of the LLC or the Office of the Interconnection.

SCHEDULE 4 -
STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE LLC

Any entity which wishes to become a Member of the LLC shall, pursuant to Section 11.6 of this Agreement, tender to the President an application, upon the acceptance of which it shall execute a supplement to this Agreement in the following form:

Additional Member Agreement

1. This Additional Member Agreement (the "Supplemental Agreement"), dated as of ________________, is entered into among ____________ and the President of the LLC acting on behalf of its Members.

2. ____________ has demonstrated that it meets all of the qualifications required of a Member to the Operating Agreement. If expansion of the PJM Region is required to integrate __________________'s facilities, a copy of Attachment J from the PJM Tariff marked to show changes in the PJM Region boundaries is attached hereto. __________________ agrees to pay for all required metering, telemetering and hardware and software appropriate for it to become a member.

3. ____________________ agrees to be bound by and accepts all the terms of the Operating Agreement as of the above date.

4. ____________________ hereby gives notice that the name and address of its initial representative to the Members Committee under the Operating Agreement shall be:

____

5. The President of the LLC is authorized under the Operating Agreement to execute this Supplemental Agreement on behalf of the Members.

6. The Operating Agreement is hereby amended to include __________ as a Member of the LLC thereto, effective as of __________________, _____, the date the President of the LLC countersigned this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, ____________________ and the Members of the LLC have caused this Supplemental Agreement to be executed by their duly authorized representatives.

Members of the LLC

By: ____________________________
Name: ____________________________
Title: President

By: ____________________________
Name: ____________________________
Title: ____________________________

SCHEDULE 5 - PJM DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES

References to section numbers in this Schedule 5 refer to sections of this Schedule 5, unless otherwise specified.

1. DEFINITIONS

1.1 Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator.

"Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator" shall mean the individual designated by the Office of the Interconnection.

1.2 Related PJM Agreements.

"Related PJM Agreements" shall mean this Agreement, the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement and the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

2. PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES

2.1 Common and Uniform Procedures.

The PJM Dispute Resolution Procedures are intended to establish common and uniform procedures for resolving disputes arising under the Related PJM Agreements. To the extent any of the foregoing agreements or the PJM Tariff contains dispute resolution provisions expressly applicable to disputes arising thereunder, however, this Agreement shall not supplant such provisions, which shall apply according to their terms.

2.2 Interpretation.

To the extent permitted by applicable law, the PJM Dispute Resolution Procedures are to be interpreted to effectuate the objectives set forth in Section 2.1. To the extent permitted by these PJM Dispute Resolution Procedures, the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator shall coordinate with the established dispute resolution committee of an Applicable Regional Entity, where appropriate, in order to conserve administrative resources and to avoid duplication of dispute resolution staffing.

3. NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION

3.1 When Required.

The parties to a dispute shall undertake good-faith negotiations to resolve any dispute as to a matter governed by one of the Related PJM Agreements. Each party to a dispute shall designate an executive with authority to resolve the matter in dispute to participate in such negotiations. Any dispute as to a matter governed by one of the Related PJM Agreements that has not been resolved through good-faith negotiation shall be subject to non-binding mediation prior to the initiation of arbitral, regulatory, judicial, or other dispute resolution proceedings as may be appropriate as provided by these PJM Dispute Resolution Procedures.

3.2 Procedures.

3.2.1 Initiation.

If a dispute that is subject to the mediation procedures specified herein has not been resolved through good-faith negotiation, a party to the dispute shall notify the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator in writing of the existence and nature of the dispute prior to commencing any other form of proceeding for resolution of the dispute. The Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator shall have ten calendar days from the date it first receives notification of the existence of a dispute from any of the parties to the dispute in which to distribute to the parties a list of mediators.

3.2.2 Selection of Mediator.

The Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator shall distribute to the parties by facsimile or other electronic means a list containing the names of seven mediators with mediation experience, or with technical or business experience in the electric power industry, or both, as it shall deem appropriate to the dispute. The Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator may draw from the lists of mediators maintained by the established dispute resolution committee of an Applicable Regional Entity, as the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator shall deem appropriate. In the event the Office of the Interconnection is one of the parties to the dispute, the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator shall distribute the names of all qualified mediators on the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator's list. The persons on the proposed list of mediators shall have no official, financial, or personal conflict of interest with respect to the issues in controversy, unless the interest is fully disclosed in writing to all participants in the mediation process and all such participants waive in writing any objection to the interest. The parties shall then alternate in striking names from the list with the last name on the list becoming the mediator. The determination of which party shall have the first strike off the list shall be determined by lot. The parties shall have ten calendar days to complete the mediator selection process, unless the time is extended by mutual agreement.

3.2.3 Advisory Mediator.

If the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator deems it appropriate, it shall distribute two lists, one containing the names of seven mediators with mediation experience (or a list containing the names of all current mediators in the event of a dispute involving the Office of the Interconnection), and one containing the names of seven mediators with technical or business experience in the electric power industry. In connection with circulating the foregoing lists, the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator shall specify one of the lists as containing the proposed mediators, and the other as a list of proposed advisors to assist the mediator in resolving the dispute. The parties shall then utilize the alternative strike procedure set forth above until one name remains on each list, with the last named persons serving as the mediator and advisor.

3.2.4 Mediation Process.

The disputing parties shall attempt in good faith to resolve their dispute in accordance with procedures and a timetable established by the mediator. In furtherance of the mediation efforts, the mediator may:

(a) Require the parties to meet for face-to-face discussions, with or without the mediator;

(b) Act as an intermediary between the disputing parties;

(c) Require the disputing parties to submit written statements of issues and positions;

(d) If requested by the disputing parties at any time in the mediation process, provide a written recommendation on resolution of the dispute including, if requested, the assessment by the mediator of the merits of the principal positions being advanced by each of the disputing parties; and

(e) Adopt, when appropriate, the Center for Public Resources Model ADR Procedures for the Meditation of Business Disputes (as revised from time to time) to the extent such Procedures are not inconsistent with any rule, standard, or procedure adopted by the Office of the Interconnection or with any provision of this Agreement.

3.2.5 Mediator's Assessment.

(a) If a resolution of the dispute is not reached by the thirtieth day after the appointment of the mediator or such later date as may be agreed to by the parties, if not previously requested to do so the mediator shall promptly provide the disputing parties with a written, confidential, non-binding recommendation on resolution of the dispute, including the assessment by the mediator of the merits of the principal positions being advanced by each of the disputing parties. The recommendation may incorporate or append, if and as the mediator may deem appropriate, any recommendations or any assessment of the positions of the parties by the advisor, if any. Upon request, the mediator shall provide any additional recommendations or assessments the mediator shall deem appropriate.

(b) At a time and place specified by the mediator after delivery of the foregoing recommendation, the disputing parties shall meet in a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute in light of the recommendation of the mediator. Each disputing party shall be represented at the meeting by a person with authority to settle the dispute, along with such other persons as each disputing party shall deem appropriate. If the disputing parties are unable to resolve the dispute at or in connection with this meeting, then: (i) any disputing party may commence such arbitral, judicial, regulatory or other proceedings as may be appropriate as provided in the PJM Dispute Resolution Procedures; and (ii) the recommendation of the mediator, and any statements made by any party in the mediation process, shall have no further force or effect, and shall not be admissible for any purpose, in any subsequent arbitral, administrative, judicial, or other proceeding.

3.3 Costs.

Except as specified in Section 4.13, the costs of the time, expenses, and other charges of the mediator and any advisor, and of the mediation process, shall be borne by the parties to the dispute, with each side in a mediated matter bearing one-half of such costs, and each party bearing its own costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection with the mediation.

4. ARBITRATION

4.1 When Required.

Any dispute as to a matter: (i) governed by one of the Related PJM Agreements that has not been resolved through the mediation procedures specified herein, (ii) involving a claim that one or more of the parties owes or is owed a sum of money, and (iii) the amount in controversy is less than $1,000,000.00, shall be subject to binding arbitration in accordance with the procedures specified herein. If the parties so agree, any other disputes as to a matter governed by a Related PJM Agreement may be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the procedures specified herein.

4.2 Binding Decision.

Except as specified in Section 4.1, the resolution by arbitration of any dispute under this Agreement shall not be binding.

4.3 Initiation.

A party or parties to a dispute which is subject to the arbitration procedures specified herein shall send a written demand for arbitration to the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator with a copy to the other party or parties to the dispute. The demand for arbitration shall state each claim for which arbitration is being demanded, the relief being sought, a brief summary of the grounds for such relief and the basis for the claim, and shall identify all other parties to the dispute.

4.4 Selection of Arbitrator(s).

The parties to a dispute for which arbitration has been demanded may agree on any person to serve as a single arbitrator, or shall endeavor in good faith to agree on a single arbitrator from a list of arbitrators prepared for the dispute by the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator and delivered to the parties by facsimile or other electronic means promptly after receipt by the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator of a demand for arbitration. The Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator may draw from the lists of arbitrators maintained by the established dispute resolution committee of an Applicable Regional Entity, as the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator deems appropriate. In the event the Office of the Interconnection is one of the parties to the dispute, the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator shall distribute the names of all qualified arbitrators on the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator's list. If the parties are unable to agree on a single arbitrator by the fourteenth day following delivery of the foregoing list of arbitrators or such other date as agreed to by the parties, then not later than the end of the seventh business day thereafter the party or parties demanding arbitration on the one hand, and the party or parties responding to the demand for arbitration on the other, shall each designate an arbitrator from a list for the dispute prepared by the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator. The arbitrators so chosen shall then choose a third arbitrator.

4.5 Procedures.

The Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator shall compile and make available to the arbitrator(s) and the parties standard procedures for the arbitration of disputes, which procedures (i) shall include provision, upon good cause shown, for intervention or other participation in the proceeding by any party whose interests may be affected by its outcome, (ii) shall conform to the requirements specified in these PJM Dispute Resolution Procedures, and (iii) may be modified or adopted for use in a particular proceeding as the arbitrator(s) deem appropriate. To the extent deemed appropriate by the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator, the procedures shall be based on the American Arbitration Association Rules, to the extent such Rules are not inconsistent with any rule, standard or procedure adopted by the Office of the Interconnection, or with any provision of these PJM Dispute Resolution Procedures. Upon selection of the arbitrator(s), arbitration shall go forward in accordance with applicable procedures.

4.6 Summary Disposition and Interim Measures.

4.6.1 Lack of Good Faith Basis.

The procedures for arbitration of a dispute shall provide a means for summary disposition of a demand for arbitration, or a response to a demand for arbitration, that in the reasoned opinion of the arbitrator(s) does not have a good faith basis in either law or fact. If the arbitrator(s) determine(s) that a demand for arbitration or response to a demand for arbitration does not have a good faith basis in either law or fact, the arbitrator(s) shall have discretion to award the costs of the time, expenses, and other charges of the arbitrator(s) to the prevailing party.

4.6.2 Discovery Limits.

The procedures for the arbitration of a dispute shall provide a means for summary disposition without discovery of facts if there is no dispute as to any material fact, or with such limited discovery as the arbitrator(s) shall determine is reasonably likely to lead to the prompt resolution of any disputed issue of material fact.

4.6.3 Interim Decision.

The procedures for the arbitration of a dispute shall permit any party to a dispute to request the arbitrator(s) to render a written interim decision requiring that any action or decision that is the subject of a dispute not be put into effect, or imposing such other interim measures as the arbitrator(s) deem necessary or appropriate, to preserve the rights and obligations secured by any of the Related PJM Agreements during the pendency of the arbitration proceeding. The parties shall be bound by such written decision pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding.

4.7 Discovery of Facts.

4.7.1 Discovery Procedures.

The procedures for the arbitration of a dispute shall include adequate provision for the discovery of relevant facts, including the taking of testimony under oath, production of documents and other things, and inspection of land and tangible items. The nature and extent of such discovery shall be determined as provided herein and shall take into account (i) the complexity of the dispute, (ii) the extent to which facts are disputed, and (iii) the amount in controversy. The forms and methods for taking such discovery shall be as described in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except as modified by the procedures established by the arbitrator(s) or agreement of the parties.

4.7.2 Procedures Arbitrator.

The sole arbitrator, or the arbitrator selected by the arbitrators chosen by the parties, as the case may be (such arbitrator being hereafter referred to as the "Procedures Arbitrator"), shall be responsible for establishing the timing, amount, and means of discovery, and for resolving discovery and other pre-hearing disagreement. If a dispute involves contested issues of fact, promptly after the selection of the arbitrator(s) the Procedures Arbitrator shall convene a meeting of the parties for the purpose of establishing a schedule and plan of discovery and other pre-hearing actions.

4.8 Evidentiary Hearing.

The procedures for the arbitration of a dispute shall provide for an evidentiary hearing, with provision for the cross-examination of witnesses, unless all parties consent to the resolution of the matter on the basis of a written record. The forms and methods for taking evidence shall be as described in the Federal Rules of Evidence, except as modified by the procedures established by the arbitrator(s) or agreement of the parties. The arbitrator(s) may require such written or other submissions from the parties as shall be deemed appropriate, including submission of the direct testimony of witnesses in written form. The arbitrator(s) may exclude any evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, unduly repetitious or prejudicial, or privileged. Any party or parties may arrange for the preparation of a record of the hearing, and shall pay the costs thereof. Such party or parties shall have no obligation to provide or agree to the provision of a copy of the record of the hearing to any party that does not pay an equal share of the cost of the record. At the request of any party, the arbitrator(s) shall determine a fair and equitable allocation of the costs of the preparation of a record between or among the parties to the proceeding willing to share such costs.

4.9 Confidentiality.

4.9.1 Designation.

Any document or other information obtained in the course of an arbitral proceeding and not otherwise available to the receiving party, including any such information contained in documents or other means of recording information created during the course of the proceeding, may be designated "Confidential" by the producing party. The party producing documents or other information marked "Confidential" shall have twenty days from the production of such material to submit a request to the Procedures Arbitrator to establish such requirements for the protection of such documents or other information designated as "Confidential" as may be reasonable and necessary to protect the confidentiality and commercial value of such information and the rights of the parties, which requirements shall be binding on all parties to the dispute. Prior to the decision of the Procedures Arbitrator on a request for confidential treatment, documents or other information designated as "Confidential" shall not be used by the receiving party or parties, or the arbitrator(s), or anyone working for or on behalf of any of the foregoing, for any purpose other than the arbitration proceeding, and shall not be disclosed in any form to any person not involved in the arbitration proceeding without the prior written consent of the party producing the information or as permitted by the Procedures Arbitrator.

4.9.2 Compulsory Disclosure.

Any party receiving a request or demand for disclosure, whether by compulsory process, discovery request, or otherwise, of documents or information obtained in the course of an arbitration proceeding that have been designated "Confidential" and that are subject to a non-disclosure requirement under these PJM Dispute Resolution Procedures or a decision of the Procedures Arbitrator, shall immediately inform the party from which the information was obtained, and shall take all reasonable steps, short of incurring sanctions or other penalties, to afford the person or entity from which the information was obtained an opportunity to protect the information from disclosure. Any party disclosing information in violation of these PJM Dispute Resolution Procedures or requirements established by the Procedures Arbitrator shall thereby waive any right to introduce or otherwise use such information in any judicial, regulatory, or other legal or dispute resolution proceeding, including the proceeding in which the information was obtained.

4.9.3 Public Information.

Nothing in the Related PJM Agreements shall preclude the use of documents or information properly obtained outside of an arbitral proceeding, or otherwise public, for any legitimate purpose, notwithstanding that the information was also obtained in the course of the arbitral proceeding.

4.10 Timetable.

Promptly after the selection of the arbitrator(s), the arbitrator(s) shall set a date for the issuance of the arbitral decision, which shall be not later than eight months (or such earlier date as may be agreed to by the parties to the dispute) from the date of the selection of the arbitrator(s), with other dates, including the dates for an evidentiary hearing or other final submissions of evidence, set in light of this date. The date for the evidentiary hearing or other final submission of evidence shall not be changed absent extraordinary circumstances. The arbitrator(s) shall have the power to impose sanctions, including dismissal of the proceeding for dilatory tactics or undue delay in completing the arbitral proceedings.

4.11 Advisory Interpretations.

Except as to matters subject to decision in the arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator(s) may request as may be appropriate from any committee or subcommittee established under a Related PJM Agreement or by the Office of the Interconnection, an interpretation of any Related PJM Agreements, or of any standard, requirement, procedure, tariff, Schedule, principle, plan or other criterion or policy established by any committee or subcommittee. Except to the extent that the Office of the Interconnection is itself a party to a dispute, the arbitrator(s) may request the advice of the Office of the Interconnection with respect to any matter relating to a responsibility of the Office of the Interconnection under the Agreement or with respect to any of the Related PJM Agreements, or to the PJM Manuals. Any such interpretation or advice shall not relieve the arbitrator(s) of responsibility for resolving the dispute or deciding the arbitration proceeding in accordance with the standards specified herein.

4.12 Decisions.

The arbitrator(s) shall issue a written decision, including findings of fact and the legal basis for the decision. The arbitral decision shall be based on (i) the evidence in the record, (ii) the terms of the Related PJM Agreements, as applicable, (iii) applicable United States federal and state law, including the Federal Power Act and any applicable FERC regulations and decisions, and international treaties or agreements as applicable, and (iv) relevant decisions in previous arbitration proceedings. The arbitrator(s) shall have no authority to revise or alter any provision of the Related PJM Agreements. Any arbitral decision issued pursuant to these PJM Dispute Resolution Procedures that affects matters subject to the jurisdiction of FERC under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act shall be filed with FERC.

4.13 Costs.

Unless the arbitrator(s) shall decide otherwise, the costs of the time, expenses, and other charges of the arbitrator(s) shall be borne by the parties to the dispute, with each side on an arbitrated issue bearing its pro-rata share of such costs, and each party to an arbitral proceeding shall bear its own costs and fees. The arbitrator(s) may award all or a portion of the costs of the time, expenses, and other charges of the arbitrator(s), the costs of arbitration, attorney's fees, and the costs of mediation, if any, to any party that substantially prevails on an issue determined by the arbitrator(s) to have been raised without a substantial basis.

4.14 Enforcement.

If the decision of the arbitrator(s) is binding, the judgment may be entered on such arbitral award by any court having jurisdiction thereof; provided, however, that within one year of the issuance of the arbitral decision any party affected thereby may request FERC or any other federal, state, regulatory or judicial authority having jurisdiction to vacate, modify, or take such other action as may be appropriate with respect to any arbitral decision that is based upon an error of law, or is contrary to the statutes, rules, or regulations administered or applied by such authority. Any party making or responding to, or intervening in proceedings resulting from, any such request, shall request the authority to adopt the resolution, if not clearly erroneous, of any issue of fact expressly or necessarily decided in the arbitral proceeding, whether or not the party participated in the arbitral proceeding.

5. ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION COORDINATOR

5.1 Responsibilities.

The duties of the Alternate Dispute Resolution Coordinator shall include the following:

i) Maintain a list of persons qualified by temperament and experience, and with technical or legal expertise in matters likely to be the subject of disputes, to serve as mediators or arbitrators under these PJM Dispute Resolution Procedures, which lists shall be updated no less than annually and shall include the names of any mediators or arbitrators recommended by any Member; and

ii) Provide to disputing parties lists of mediators, advisors or arbitrators to resolve particular disputes.

SCHEDULE 6 -
REGIONAL TRANSMISSION EXPANSION PLANNING PROTOCOL

References to section numbers in this Schedule 6 refer to sections of this Schedule 6, unless otherwise specified.

1. REGIONAL TRANSMISSION EXPANSION PLANNING PROTOCOL

1.1 Purpose and Objectives.

This Regional Transmission Expansion Planning Protocol shall govern the process by which the Members shall rely upon the Office of the Interconnection to prepare a plan for the enhancement and expansion of the Transmission Facilities in order to meet the demands for firm transmission service, and to support competition, in the PJM Region. The Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (also referred to as "RTEP") to be developed shall enable the transmission needs in the PJM Region to be met on a reliable, economic and environmentally acceptable basis.

1.2 Conformity with NERC *Reliability Standards* and Other Applicable Reliability Criteria.

(a) NERC establishes Reliability Standards to promote the reliability, adequacy and security of the North American bulk power supply as related to the operation and planning of electric systems.

(b) ReliabilityFirst Corporation is responsible for ensuring the reliability, adequacy and security of the bulk electric supply systems in the geographic region described in the applicable agreements between NERC and ReliabilityFirst Corporation, as approved by the FERC, through coordinated operations and planning of generation and transmission facilities. Toward that end, it has adopted the NERC Reliability Standards and has established detailed Reliability Principles and Standards for Planning the Bulk Electric Supply System of the ReliabilityFirst Corporation.

(c) [Reserved]

(c.01) [Reserved]

(c.02) SERC is responsible for ensuring the reliability, adequacy and security of the bulk electric supply systems in the VACAR subregion of SERC. Toward that end, it has adopted the NERC Reliability Standards and has established detailed Reliability Principles and Standards for Planning the Bulk Electric Supply System for SERC.

(d) The Regional Transmission Expansion Plan shall conform at a minimum to the applicable reliability principles, guidelines and standards of NERC, ReliabilityFirst Corporation and SERC, and other Applicable Regional Entities in accordance with the planning and operating criteria and other procedures detailed in the PJM Manuals.

(e) The Regional Transmission Expansion Plan planning criteria shall include, Office of the Interconnection planning procedures, NERC Reliability Standards, Regional Entity reliability principles and standards, and the individual Transmission Owner FERC filed planning criteria as filed in FERC Form No. 715, and posted on the PJM website. FERC Form No. 715 material will be posted to the PJM website, subject to applicable Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII) requirements.

(f) The Office of the Interconnection will also provide access through the PJM website, to the planning criteria and assumptions used by the Transmission Owners for the development of the current Local Plan.

1.3 Establishment of Committees.

(a) The Planning Committee shall be open to participation by (i) all Transmission Customers, as that term is defined in the PJM Tariff, and applicants for transmission service; (ii) any other entity proposing to provide Transmission Facilities to be integrated into the PJM Region; (iii) all Members; (iv) the electric utility regulatory agencies within the States in the PJM Region and the State Consumer Advocates; and (v) any other interested entities or persons and shall provide technical advice and assistance to the Office of the Interconnection in all aspects of its regional planning functions. The Transmission Owners shall supply representatives to the Planning Committee, and other Members may provide representatives as they deem appropriate, to provide the data, information, and support necessary for the Office of the Interconnection to perform studies as required and to develop the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan.

(b) The Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee established by the Office of the Interconnection will meet periodically with representatives of the Office of the Interconnection to provide advice and recommendations to the Office of the Interconnection to aid in the development of the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan. The Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee participants shall be given an opportunity to provide advice and recommendations for consideration by the Office of the Interconnection regarding sensitivity studies, modeling assumption variations, scenario analyses, and Public Policy Objectives in the studies and analyses to be conducted by the Office of the Interconnection. The Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee participants shall be given the opportunity to review and provide advice and recommendations on the projects to be included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan. The Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee meetings shall include discussions addressing interregional planning issues, as required. The Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee shall be open to participation by: (i) all Transmission Customers, as that term is defined in the PJM Tariff, and applicants for transmission service; (ii) any other entity proposing to provide Transmission Facilities to be integrated into the PJM Region; (iii) all Members; (iv) the electric utility regulatory agencies within the States in the PJM Region, the Independent State Agencies Committee, and the State Consumer Advocates; and (v) any other interested entities or persons. The Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee shall be governed by the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee rules and procedures set forth in the PJM Regional Planning Process Manual (PJM Manual M-14 series) and by the rules and procedures applicable to PJM committees.

(c) The Subregional RTEP Committees established by the Office of the Interconnection shall facilitate the development and review of the Subregional RTEP Projects. The Subregional RTEP Committees will be responsible for the initial review of the Subregional RTEP Projects, and to provide recommendations to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee concerning the Subregional RTEP Projects. A Subregional RTEP Committee may of its own accord or at the request of a Subregional RTEP Committee participant, also refer specific Subregional RTEP Projects to the

Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee for further review, advice and recommendations.

(d) The Subregional RTEP Committees shall be responsible for the timely review of the criteria, assumptions and models used to identify reliability criteria violations, economic constraints, or to consider Public Policy Requirements, proposed solutions prior to finalizing the Local Plan, the coordination and integration of the Local Plans into the RTEP, and addressing any stakeholder issues unresolved in the Local Plan process. The Subregional RTEP Committees will be provided sufficient opportunity to review and provide written comments on the criteria, assumptions, and models used in local planning activities prior to finalizing the Local Plan. The Subregional RTEP Committees meetings shall include discussions addressing interregional planning issues, as required. Once finalized, the Subregional RTEP Committees will be provided sufficient opportunity to review and provide written comments on the Local Plans as integrated into the RTEP, prior to the submittal of the final Regional Transmission Expansion Plan to the PJM Board for approval. In addition, the Subregional RTEP Committees will provide sufficient opportunity to review and provide written comments to the Transmission Owners on any Supplemental Projects included in the Local Plan.

(e) The Subregional RTEP Committees shall be open to participation by: (i) all Transmission Customers, as that term is defined in the PJM Tariff, and applicants for transmission service; (ii) any other entity proposing to provide Transmission Facilities to be integrated into the PJM Region; (iii) all Members; (iv) the electric utility regulatory agencies within the States in the PJM Region, the Independent State Agencies Committee, and the State Consumer Advocates and (v) any other interested entities or persons.

(f) Each Subregional RTEP Committee shall schedule and facilitate a minimum of one Subregional RTEP Committee meeting to review the criteria, assumptions and models to identify reliability criteria violations, economic constraints, or to consider Public Policy Requirements. Each Subregional RTEP Committee shall schedule and facilitate an additional Subregional RTEP Committee meeting, per planning cycle, and as required to review the identified criteria violations and potential solutions. The Subregional RTEP Committees may facilitate additional meetings to incorporate more localized areas in the subregional planning process. At the discretion of the Office of the Interconnection, a designated Transmission Owner may facilitate Subregional RTEP Committee meeting(s), or the additional meetings incorporating the more localized areas.

(g) The Subregional RTEP Committees shall be governed by the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee rules and procedures set forth in the PJM Regional Planning Process Manual (Manual M-14 series) and by the rules and procedures applicable to PJM committees.

1.4 Contents of the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan.

(a) The Regional Transmission Expansion Plan shall consolidate the transmission needs of the region into a single plan which is assessed on the bases of (i) maintaining the reliability of the PJM Region in an economic and environmentally acceptable manner, (ii) supporting competition in the PJM Region, (iii) striving to maintain and enhance the market efficiency and operational performance of wholesale electric service markets and (iv) considering federal and state Public Policy Requirements.

(b) The Regional Transmission Expansion Plan shall reflect, consistent with the requirements of this Schedule 6, transmission enhancements and expansions; load forecasts; and capacity forecasts, including expected generation additions and retirements, demand response, and reductions in demand from energy efficiency and price responsive demand for at least the ensuing ten years.

(c) The Regional Transmission Expansion Plan shall, at a minimum, include a designation of the Transmission Owner(s) or other entity(ies) that will construct, own, maintain, operate, and/or finance each transmission enhancement and expansion and how all reasonably incurred costs are to be recovered.

(d) The Regional Transmission Expansion Plan shall (i) avoid unnecessary duplication of facilities; (ii) avoid the imposition of unreasonable costs on any Transmission Owner or any user of Transmission Facilities; (iii) take into account the legal and contractual rights and obligations of the Transmission Owners; (iv) provide, if appropriate, alternative means for meeting transmission needs in the PJM Region; (v) provide for coordination with existing transmission systems and with appropriate interregional and local expansion plans; and (vi) strive for consistency in planning data and assumptions that may relieve transmission congestion across multiple regions.

1.5 Procedure for Development of the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan.

1.5.1 Commencement of the Process.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall initiate the enhancement and expansion study process if: (i) required as a result of a need for transfer capability identified by the Office of the Interconnection in its evaluation of requests for interconnection with the Transmission System or for firm transmission service with a term of one year or more; (ii) required to address a need identified by the Office of the Interconnection in its on-going evaluation of the Transmission System's market efficiency and operational performance; (iii) required as a result of the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the Transmission System's compliance with NERC Reliability Standards, more stringent reliability criteria, if any, or PJM planning and operating criteria; (iv) required to address constraints or available transfer capability shortages, including, but not limited to, available transfer capability shortages that prevent the simultaneous feasibility of stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, constraints or shortages as a result of expected generation retirements, constraints or shortages based on an evaluation of load forecasts, or system reliability needs arising from proposals for the addition of Transmission Facilities in the PJM Region; or (v) expansion of the Transmission System is proposed by one or more Transmission Owners, Interconnection Customers, Network Service Users or Transmission Customers, or any party that funds Network Upgrades pursuant to Section 7.8 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The Office of the Interconnection may initiate the enhancement and expansion study process to address or consider, where appropriate, requirements or needs arising from sensitivity studies, modeling assumption variations, scenario analyses, and Public Policy Objectives.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee participants of, as well as publicly notice, the commencement of an enhancement and expansion study. The Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee participants shall notify the Office of the Interconnection in writing of any additional transmission considerations they would like to have included in the Office of the Interconnection's analyses.

1.5.2 Development of Scope, Assumptions and Procedures.

Once the need for an enhancement and expansion study has been established, the Office of the Interconnection shall consult with the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee and the Subregional RTEP Committees, as appropriate, to prepare the study's scope, assumptions and procedures.

1.5.3 Scope of Studies.

In conducting the enhancement and expansion studies, the Office of the Interconnection shall not limit its analyses to bright line tests to identify and evaluate potential Transmission System limitations, violations of planning criteria, or transmission needs. In addition to the bright line tests, the Office of the Interconnection shall employ sensitivity studies, modeling assumption variations, and scenario analyses, and shall also consider Public Policy Objectives in the studies and analyses, so as to mitigate the possibility that bright line metrics may inappropriately include or exclude transmission projects from the transmission plan. Sensitivity studies, modeling assumption variations, and scenario analyses shall take account of potential changes in expected future system conditions, including, but not limited to, load levels, transfer levels, fuel costs, the level and type of generation, generation patterns (including, but not limited to, the effects of assumptions regarding generation that is at risk for retirement and new generation to satisfy Public Policy Objectives), demand response, and uncertainties arising from estimated times to construct transmission upgrades. The Office of the Interconnection shall use the sensitivity studies, modeling assumption variations and scenario analyses in evaluating and choosing among alternative solutions to reliability, market efficiency and operational performance needs. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide the results of its studies and analyses to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee to consider the impact that sensitivities, assumptions, and scenarios may have on Transmission System needs and the need for transmission enhancements or expansions. Enhancement and expansion studies shall be completed by the Office of the Interconnection in collaboration with the affected Transmission Owners, as required. In general, enhancement and expansion studies shall include:

(a) An identification of existing and projected limitations on the Transmission System's physical, economic and/or operational capability or performance, with accompanying simulations to identify the costs of controlling those limitations. Potential enhancements and expansions will be proposed to mitigate limitations controlled by non-economic means.

(b) Evaluation and analysis of potential enhancements and expansions, including alternatives thereto, needed to mitigate such limitations.

(c) Identification, evaluation and analysis of potential transmission expansions and enhancements, demand response programs, and other alternative technologies as appropriate to maintain system reliability.

(d) Identification, evaluation and analysis of potential enhancements and expansions for the purposes of supporting competition, market efficiency, operational performance, and Public Policy Requirements in the PJM Region.

(e) Identification, evaluation and analysis of upgrades to support Incremental Auction Revenue Rights requested pursuant to Section 7.8 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement.

(f) Identification, evaluation and analysis of upgrades to support all transmission customers, including native load and network service customers.

(g) Engineering studies needed to determine the effectiveness and compliance of recommended enhancements and expansions, with the following PJM criteria: system reliability, operational performance, and market efficiency.

(h) Identification, evaluation and analysis of potential enhancements and expansions designed to ensure that the Transmission System's capability can support the simultaneous feasibility of all stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to Section 7.4.2(b) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement. Enhancements and expansions related to stage 1A Auction

Revenue Rights identified pursuant to this Section shall be recommended for inclusion in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan together with a recommended in-service date based on the results of the ten (10) year stage 1A simultaneous feasibility analysis. Any such recommended enhancement or expansion under this Section 1.5.3(h) shall include, but shall not be limited to, the reason for the upgrade, the cost of the upgrade, the cost allocation identified pursuant to Section 1.5.6(l) of Schedule 6 of this Agreement and an analysis of the benefits of the enhancement or expansion, provided that any such upgrades will not be subject to a market efficiency cost/benefit analysis.

1.5.4 Supply of Data.

(a) The Transmission Owners shall provide to the Office of the Interconnection on an annual or periodic basis as specified by the Office of the Interconnection, any information and data reasonably required by the Office of the Interconnection to perform the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, including but not limited to the following: (i) a description of the total load to be served from each substation; (ii) the amount of any interruptible loads included in the total load (including conditions under which an interruption can be implemented and any limitations on the duration and frequency of interruptions); (iii) a description of all generation resources to be located in the geographic region encompassed by the Transmission Owner's transmission facilities, including unit sizes, VAR capability, operating restrictions, and any must-run unit designations required for system reliability or contract reasons; the (iv) current Local Plan; and (v) all criteria, assumptions and models used in the current Local Plan. The data required under this Section shall be provided in the form and manner specified by the Office of the Interconnection.

(b) In addition to the foregoing, the Transmission Owners, those entities requesting transmission service and any other entities proposing to provide Transmission Facilities to be integrated into the PJM Region shall supply any other information and data reasonably required by the Office of the Interconnection to perform the enhancement and expansion study.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection also shall solicit from the Members, Transmission Customers and other interested parties, including but not limited to electric utility regulatory agencies within the States in the PJM Region, Independent State Agencies Committee, and the State Consumer Advocates, information required by, or anticipated to be useful to, the Office of the Interconnection in its preparation of the enhancement and expansion study, including information regarding potential sensitivity studies, modeling assumption variations, scenario analyses, and Public Policy Objectives that may be considered.

(d) The Office of the Interconnection shall supply to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee and the Subregional RTEP Committees reasonably required information and data utilized to develop the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan. Such information and data shall be provided pursuant to the appropriate protection of confidentiality provisions and Office of the Interconnection's CEII process.

(e) The Office of the Interconnection shall provide access through the PJM website, to the Transmission Owner's Local Plan, including all criteria, assumptions and models used by the

Transmission Owners in developing their respective Local Plan ("Local Plan Information"). Local Plan Information shall be provided consistent with: (1) any applicable confidentiality provisions set forth in Section 18.17 of this Operating Agreement; (2) the Office of the Interconnection's CEII process; and (3) any applicable copyright limitations. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Office of the Interconnection may share with a third party Local Plan Information that has been designated as confidential, pursuant to the provisions for such designation as set forth in Section 18.17 of this Operating Agreement and subject to: (i) agreement by the disclosing Transmission Owner consistent with the process set forth in this Operating Agreement; and (ii) an appropriate non-disclosure agreement to be executed by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., the Transmission Owner and the requesting third party. With the exception of confidential, CEII and copyright protected information, Local Plan Information will be provided for full review by the Planning Committee, the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee, and the Subregional RTEP Committees.

1.5.5 Coordination of the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan.

(a) The Regional Transmission Expansion Plan shall be developed in accordance with the principles of interregional coordination with the Transmission Systems of the surrounding Regional Entities and with the local transmission providers, through the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee and the Subregional RTEP Committee.

(b) The Regional Transmission Expansion Plan shall be developed taking into account the processes for coordinated regional transmission expansion planning established under the following agreements:

- Joint Operating Agreement Between the Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., which is found at http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/agreements/joa-complete.ashx;

- Northeastern ISO/RTO Planning Coordination Protocol, which is described at Schedule 6-B and found at http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/agreements/northeastern-iso-rto-planning-coordination-protocol.ashx;

- Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between New York Independent System Operator Inc., which is found at http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/agreements/nyiso-pjm.ashx;

- Interregional Transmission Coordination Between the SERTP and PJM Regions, which is found at Schedule 6-A of this Agreement;

- Allocation of Costs of Certain Interregional Transmission Projects Located in the PJM and SERTP Regions, which is located at Schedule 12-B of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff;

- Joint Reliability Coordination Agreement Between the Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc.; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. and Progress Energy Carolinas.

(i) Coordinated regional transmission expansion planning shall also incorporate input from parties that may be impacted by the coordination efforts, including but not limited to, the Members, Transmission Customers, electric utility regulatory agencies in the PJM Region, and the State Consumer Advocates, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the applicable regional coordination agreements.

(ii) An entity, including existing Transmission Owners and Nonincumbent Developers, may submit potential Interregional Transmission Projects pursuant to Section 1.5.8 of this Schedule 6.

(c) The Regional Transmission Expansion Plan shall be developed by the Office of the Interconnection in consultation with the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee during the enhancement and expansion study process.

(d) The Regional Transmission Expansion Plan shall be developed taking into account the processes for coordination of the regional and subregional systems.

1.5.6 Development of the Recommended Regional Transmission Expansion Plan.

(a) The Office of the Interconnection shall be responsible for the development of the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan and for conducting the studies, including sensitivity studies and scenario analyses on which the plan is based. The Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, including the Regional RTEP Projects, the Subregional RTEP Projects and the Supplemental Projects shall be developed through an open and collaborative process with opportunity for meaningful participation through the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee and the Subregional RTEP Committees.

(b) The Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee and the Subregional RTEP Committees shall each facilitate a minimum of one initial assumptions meeting to be scheduled at the commencement of the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan process. The purpose of the assumptions meeting shall be to provide an open forum to discuss the following: (i) the assumptions to be used in performing the evaluation and analysis of the potential enhancements and expansions to the Transmission Facilities; (ii) Public Policy Requirements identified by the states for consideration in the Office of the Interconnection's transmission planning analyses; (iii) Public Policy Objectives identified by stakeholders for consideration in the Office of the Interconnection's transmission planning analyses; (iii) the impacts of regulatory actions, projected changes in load growth, demand response resources, energy efficiency programs, price responsive demand, generating additions and retirements, market efficiency and other trends in the industry; and (iv) alternative sensitivity studies, modeling assumptions and scenario analyses proposed by the Committee participants. Prior to the initial assumptions meeting, Committee participants will be afforded the opportunity to provide input and submit suggestions regarding the information identified in items (i) through (iv) of this subsection. Following the assumptions meeting and prior to performing the evaluation and analyses, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the range of assumptions to be used in the studies and scenario analyses, based on the advice and recommendations of the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee and

Subregional RTEP Committees and the validation of Public Policy Requirements and assessment and prioritization of Public Policy Objectives by the states through the Independent State Agencies Committee. The Office of the Interconnection shall document and publicly post its determination for review. Such posting shall include an explanation of those Public Policy Requirements and Public Policy Objectives adopted at the assumptions stage to be used in performing the evaluation and analysis of the potential enhancements and expansions to the Transmission System and an explanation of why other Public Policy Requirements and Public Policy Objectives introduced by stakeholders at the assumptions stage were not adopted.

(c) After the assumptions meeting(s), the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee and the Subregional RTEP Committees shall facilitate additional meetings and shall post all communications required to provide early opportunity for the committee participants (as defined in Sections 1.3(b) and 1.3(c) of this Schedule 6) to review and evaluate the following arising from the studies performed by the Office of the Interconnection, including sensitivity studies and scenario analyses: (i) any identified violations of reliability criteria and analyses of the market efficiency and operational performance of the Transmission System; (ii) potential transmission solutions, including any acceleration, deceleration or modifications of a potential expansion or enhancement based on the results of sensitivities studies and scenario analyses; and (iii) the proposed Regional Transmission Expansion Plan. These meetings will be scheduled as deemed necessary by the Office of the Interconnection or upon the request of the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee or the Subregional RTEP Committees. The Office of the Interconnection will provide updates on the status of the development of the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan at these meetings or at the regularly scheduled meetings of the Planning Committee.

(d) In addition, the Office of the Interconnection shall facilitate periodic meetings with the Independent State Agencies Committee to discuss: (i) the assumptions to be used in performing the evaluation and analysis of the potential enhancements and expansions to the Transmission Facilities; (ii) regulatory initiatives, as appropriate, including state regulatory agency initiated programs, and other Public Policy Objectives, to consider including in the Office of the Interconnection's transmission planning analyses; (iii) the impacts of regulatory actions, projected changes in load growth, demand response resources, energy efficiency programs, generating capacity, market efficiency and other trends in the industry; and (iv) alternative sensitivity studies, modeling assumptions and scenario analyses proposed by Independent State Agencies Committee. At such meetings, the Office of the Interconnection also shall discuss the current status of the enhancement and expansion study process. The Independent State Agencies Committee may request that the Office of Interconnection schedule additional meetings as necessary. The Office of the Interconnection shall inform the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee and the Subregional RTEP Committees, as appropriate, of the input of the Independent State Agencies Committee and shall consider such input in developing the range of assumptions to be used in the studies and scenario analyses described in Section (b), above.

(e) Upon completion of its studies and analysis, including sensitivity studies and scenario analyses the Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website the violations, system conditions, economic constraints, and Public Policy Requirements as detailed in Section 1.5.8(b) of this Schedule 6 to afford entities an opportunity to submit proposed enhancements or expansions to address the posted violations, system conditions, economic constraints and Public Policy Requirements as provided for in Section 1.5.8(c) of this Schedule 6. Following the close of a proposal window, the Office of the Interconnection shall: (i) post all proposals submitted pursuant to Section 1.5.8(c) of this Schedule 6; (ii) consider proposals submitted during the proposal windows consistent with Section 1.5.8(d) of this Schedule 6 and develop a recommended plan. Following review by the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee of proposals, the Office of the Interconnection, based on identified needs and the timing of such needs, and taking into account the sensitivity studies, modeling assumption variations and scenario analyses considered pursuant to Section 1.5.3 of this Schedule 6, shall determine, which more efficient or cost-effective enhancements and expansions shall be included in the recommended plan, including solutions identified as a result of the sensitivity studies, modeling assumption variations, and scenario analyses, that may accelerate, decelerate or modify a potential reliability, market efficiency or operational performance expansion or enhancement identified as a result of the sensitivity studies, modeling assumption variations and scenario analyses, shall be included in the recommended plan. The Office of the Interconnection shall post the proposed recommended plan for review and comment by the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee. The Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee shall facilitate open meetings and communications as necessary to provide opportunity for the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee participants to collaborate on the preparation of the recommended enhancement and expansion plan. The Office of the Interconnection also shall invite interested parties to submit comments on the plan to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee and to the Office of the Interconnection before submitting the recommended plan to the PJM Board for approval.

(f) The recommended plan shall separately identify enhancements and expansions for the three PJM subregions, the PJM Mid-Atlantic Region, the PJM West Region, and the PJM South Region, and shall incorporate recommendations from the Subregional RTEP Committees.

(g) The recommended plan shall separately identify enhancements and expansions that are classified as Supplemental Projects.

(h) The recommended plan shall identify enhancements and expansions that relieve transmission constraints and which, in the judgment of the Office of the Interconnection, are economically justified. Such economic expansions and enhancements shall be developed in accordance with the procedures, criteria and analyses described in Sections 1.5.7 and 1.5.8 of this Schedule 6.

(i) The recommended plan shall identify enhancements and expansions proposed by a state or states pursuant to Section 1.5.9 of this Schedule 6.

(j) The recommended plan shall include proposed Merchant Transmission Facilities within the PJM Region and any other enhancement or expansion of the Transmission System requested by any participant which the Office of the Interconnection finds to be compatible with the Transmission System, though not required pursuant to Section 1.1, provided that (1) the requestor has complied, to the extent applicable, with the procedures and other requirements of Parts IV and VI of the PJM Tariff; (2) the proposed enhancement or expansion is consistent with applicable reliability standards, operating criteria and the purposes and objectives of the regional planning protocol; (3) the requestor shall be responsible for all costs of such enhancement or expansion (including, but not necessarily limited to, costs of siting, designing, financing, constructing, operating and maintaining the pertinent facilities), and (4) except as otherwise provided by Parts IV and VI of the PJM Tariff with respect to Merchant Network Upgrades, the requestor shall accept responsibility for ownership, construction, operation and maintenance of the enhancement or expansion through an undertaking satisfactory to the Office of the Interconnection.

(k) For each enhancement or expansion that is included in the recommended plan, the plan shall consider, based on the planning analysis: other input from participants, including any indications of a willingness to bear cost responsibility for such enhancement or expansion; and, when applicable, relevant projects being undertaken to ensure the simultaneous feasibility of Stage 1A ARRs, to facilitate Incremental ARRs pursuant to the provisions of Section 7.8 of Schedule 1 of this Agreement, or to facilitate upgrades pursuant to Parts II, III, or VI of the PJM Tariff, and designate one or more Transmission Owners or other entities to construct, own and, unless otherwise provided, finance the recommended transmission enhancement or expansion. Any designation under this paragraph of one or more entities to construct, own and/or finance a recommended transmission enhancement or expansion shall also include a designation of partial responsibility among them. Nothing herein shall prevent any Transmission Owner or other entity designated to construct, own and/or finance a recommended transmission enhancement or expansion from agreeing to undertake its responsibilities under such designation jointly with other Transmission Owners or other entities.

(l) Based on the planning analysis and other input from participants, including any indications of a willingness to bear cost responsibility for an enhancement or expansion, the recommended plan shall, for any enhancement or expansion that is included in the plan, designate (1) the Market Participant(s) in one or more Zones, or any other party that has agreed to fully fund upgrades pursuant to this Agreement or the PJM Tariff, that will bear cost responsibility for such enhancement or expansion, as and to the extent provided by any provision of the PJM Tariff or this Agreement, (2) in the event and to the extent that no provision of the PJM Tariff or this Agreement assigns cost responsibility, the Market Participant(s) in one or more Zones from which the cost of such enhancement or expansion shall be recovered through charges established pursuant to Schedule 12 of the Tariff, and (3) in the event and to the extent that the Coordinated System Plan developed under the Joint Operating Agreement Between the Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. assigns cost responsibility, the Market Participant(s) in one or more Zones from which the cost of such enhancement or expansion shall be recovered. Any designation under clause (2) of the preceding sentence (A) shall further be based on the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the contributions to the need for, and benefits expected to be derived from, the pertinent enhancement or expansion by affected Market Participants and, (B) subject to FERC review and approval, shall be incorporated in any amendment to Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff that establishes a Transmission Enhancement Charge Rate in connection with an economic expansion or enhancement developed under Sections 1.5.6(h) and 1.5.7 of this Schedule 6, (C) the costs associated with expansions and enhancements required to ensure the simultaneous feasibility of stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights allocated pursuant to Section 7 of Schedule 1 of this

Agreement shall (1) be allocated across transmission zones based on each zone's stage 1A eligible Auction Revenue Rights flow contribution to the total stage 1A eligible Auction Revenue Rights flow on the facility that limits stage 1A ARR feasibility and (2) within each transmission zone the Network Service Users and Transmission Customers that are eligible to receive stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights shall be the Responsible Customers under Section (b) of Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff for all expansions and enhancements included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan to ensure the simultaneous feasibility of stage 1A Auction Revenue Rights, and (D) the costs associated with expansions and enhancements required to reduce to zero the Locational Price Adder for LDAs as described in Section 15 of Attachment DD of OATT shall (1) be allocated across Zones based on each Zone's pro rata share of load in such LDA and (2) within each Zone, to all LSEs serving load in such LDA pro rata based on such load.

Any designation under clause (3), above, (A) shall further be based on the Office of the Interconnection's assessment of the contributions to the need for, and benefits expected to be derived from, the pertinent enhancement or expansion by affected Market Participants, and (B), subject to FERC review and approval, shall be incorporated in an amendment to a Schedule of the PJM Tariff which establishes a charge in connection with the pertinent enhancement or expansion. Before designating fewer than all customers using Point-to-Point Transmission Service or Network Integration Transmission Service within a Zone as customers from which the costs of a particular enhancement or expansion may be recovered, Transmission Provider shall consult, in a manner and to the extent that it reasonably determines to be appropriate in each such instance, with affected state utility regulatory authorities and stakeholders. When the plan designates more than one responsible Market Participant, it shall also designate the proportional responsibility among them. Notwithstanding the foregoing, with respect to any facilities that the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan designates to be owned by an entity other than a Transmission Owner, the plan shall designate that entity as responsible for the costs of such facilities.

(m) Certain Regional RTEP Project(s) and Subregional RTEP Project(s) may not be required for compliance with the following PJM criteria: system reliability, market efficiency or operational performance, pursuant to a determination by the Office of the Interconnection. These Supplemental Projects shall be separately identified in the RTEP and are not subject to approval by the PJM Board.

1.5.7 Development of Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions.

(a) Each year the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee shall review and comment on the assumptions to be used in performing the market efficiency analysis to identify enhancements or expansions that could relieve transmission constraints that have an economic impact ("economic constraints"). Such assumptions shall include, but not be limited to, the discount rate used to determine the present value of the Total Annual Enhancement Benefit and Total Enhancement Cost, and the annual revenue requirement, including the recovery period, used to determine the Total Enhancement Cost. The discount rate shall be based on the Transmission Owners' most recent after-tax embedded cost of capital weighted by each Transmission Owner's total transmission capitalization. Each year, each Transmission Owner will be requested to provide the Office of the Interconnection with the Transmission Owner's most recent after-tax embedded cost of capital, total transmission capitalization, and levelized carrying charge rate, including the recovery period. The recovery period shall be consistent with recovery periods allowed by the Commission for comparable facilities. Prior to PJM Board consideration of such assumptions, the assumptions shall be presented to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee for review and comment. Following review and comment by the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee, the Office of the Interconnection shall submit the assumptions to be used in performing the market efficiency analysis described in this Section 1.5.7 to the PJM Board for consideration.

(b) Following PJM Board consideration of the assumptions, the Office of the Interconnection shall perform a market efficiency analysis to compare the costs and benefits of: (i) accelerating reliability-based enhancements or expansions already included in the Regional Transmission Plan that if accelerated also could relieve one or more economic constraints; (ii) modifying reliability–based enhancements or expansions already included in the Regional Transmission Plan that as modified would relieve one or more economic constraints; and (iii) adding new enhancements or expansions that could relieve one or more economic constraints, but for which no reliability-based need has been identified. Economic constraints include, but are not limited to, constraints that cause: (1) significant historical gross congestion; (2) pro-ration of Stage 1B ARR requests as described in section 7.4.2(c) of Schedule 1 of this Agreement; or (3) significant simulated congestion as forecasted in the market efficiency analysis. The timeline for the market efficiency analysis and comparison of the costs and benefits for items 1.5.7(b)(i-iii) is described in the PJM Manuals.

(c) The process for conducting the market efficiency analysis described in subsection (b) above shall include the following:

(i) The Office of the Interconnection shall identify and provide to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee a list of economic constraints to be evaluated in the market efficiency analysis.

(ii) The Office of the Interconnection shall identify any planned reliability-based enhancements or expansions already included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, which if accelerated would relieve such constraints, and present any such proposed reliability-based enhancements and expansions to be accelerated to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee for review and comment. The PJM Board, upon consideration of the advice of the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee, thereafter shall consider and vote to approve any accelerations.

(iii) The Office of the Interconnection shall evaluate whether including any additional Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan or modifications of existing Regional Transmission Expansion Plan reliability-based enhancements or expansions would relieve an economic constraint. In addition, pursuant to Section 1.5.8(c) of this Schedule 6, any market participant may submit to the Office of the Interconnection a proposal to construct an additional Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion to relieve an economic constraint. Upon completion of its evaluation, including consideration of any eligible market participant proposed Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions, the Office of the Interconnection shall present to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee a description of new Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions for review and comment. Upon consideration and advice of the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee, the PJM Board shall consider any new Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions for inclusion in the Regional Transmission Plan and for those enhancements and expansions it approves, the PJM Board shall designate (a) the entity or entities that will be responsible for constructing and owning or financing the additional Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions, (b) the estimated costs of such enhancements and expansions, and (c) the market participants that will bear responsibility for the costs of the additional Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions pursuant to Section 1.5.6(l) of this Schedule 6. In the event the entity or entities designated as responsible for construction, owning or financing a designated new Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion declines to construct, own or finance the new Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion, the enhancement or expansion will not be included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan but will be included in the report filed with the FERC in accordance with Sections 1.6 and 1.7 of this Schedule 6. This report also shall include information regarding PJM Board approved accelerations of reliability-based enhancements or expansions that an entity declines to accelerate.

(d) To determine the economic benefits of accelerating or modifying planned reliability-based enhancements or expansions or of constructing additional Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions and whether such Economic-based Enhancements or Expansion are eligible for inclusion in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, the Office of the Interconnection shall perform and compare market simulations with and without the proposed accelerated or modified planned reliability-based enhancements or expansions or the additional Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions as applicable, using the Benefit/Cost Ratio calculation set forth below in this Section 1.5.7(d). An Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion shall be included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan recommended to the PJM Board, if the relative benefits and costs of the Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion meet a Benefit/Cost Ratio Threshold of at least 1.25:1.

The Benefit/Cost Ratio shall be determined as follows:

Benefit/Cost Ratio = [Present value of the Total Annual Enhancement Benefit for each of the first 15 years of the life of the enhancement or expansion] ÷ [Present value of the Total Enhancement Cost for each of the first 15 years of the life of the enhancement or expansion]

Where

Total Annual Enhancement Benefit = Energy Market Benefit + Reliability Pricing Model Benefit

and

For economic-based enhancements and expansions for which cost responsibility is assigned pursuant to Section (b)(i) of Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff the Energy Market Benefit is as follows:

Energy Market Benefit = [.50] * [Change in Total Energy Production Cost] + [.50] * [Change in Load Energy Payment]

For economic-based enhancements and expansions for which cost responsibility is assigned pursuant to Section (b)(v) of Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff the Energy Market Benefit is as follows:

Energy Market Benefit = [1] * [Change in Load Energy Payment]
and

Change in Total Energy Production Cost = [the estimated total annual fuel costs, variable O&M costs, and emissions costs of the dispatched resources in the PJM Region without the Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion] – [the estimated total annual fuel costs, variable O&M costs, and emissions costs of the dispatched resources in the PJM Region with the Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion]. The change in costs for purchases from outside of the PJM Region and sales to outside the PJM Region will be captured, if appropriate. Purchases will be valued at the Load Weighted LMP and sales will be valued at the Generation Weighted LMP.

and

Change in Load Energy Payment = [the annual sum of (the hourly estimated zonal load megawatts for each Zone) * (the hourly estimated zonal Locational Marginal Price for each Zone without the Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion)] – [the annual sum of (the hourly estimated zonal load megawatts for each Zone) * (the hourly estimated zonal Locational Marginal Price for each Zone with the Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion)] – [the change in value of transmission rights for each Zone with the Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion (as measured using currently allocated Auction Revenue Rights plus additional Auction Revenue Rights made available by the proposed acceleration or modification of the planned reliability-based enhancement or expansion or new Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion)]. The Change in the Load Energy Payment shall be the sum of the Change in the Load Energy Payment only of the Zones that show a decrease in the Load Energy Payment.

And

For economic-based enhancements and expansions for which cost responsibility is assigned pursuant to Section (b)(i) of Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff the Reliability Pricing Benefit is as follows:

Reliability Pricing Benefit = [.50] * [Change in Total System Capacity Cost] + [.50] * [Change in Load Capacity Payment]

and

For economic-based enhancements or expansions for which cost responsibility is assigned pursuant to Section (b)(v) of Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff the Reliability Pricing Benefit is as follows:

Reliability Pricing Benefit = [1] * [Change in Load Capacity Payment]

Change in Total System Capacity Cost = [the sum of (the megawatts that are estimated to be cleared in the Base Residual Auction under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff) * (the prices that are estimated to be contained in the Sell Offers for each such cleared megawatt without the Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion) * (the number of days in the study year)] – [the sum of (the megawatts that are estimated to be cleared in the Base Residual Auction under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff) * (the prices that are estimated to be contained in the Sell Offers for each such cleared megawatt with the Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion) * (the number of days in the study year)]

and

Change in Load Capacity Payment = [the sum of (the estimated zonal load megawatts in each Zone) * (the estimated Final Zonal Capacity Prices under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff without the Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion) * (the number of days in the study year)] – [the sum of (the estimated zonal load megawatts in each Zone) * (the estimated Final Zonal Capacity Prices under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff with the Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion) * (the number of days in the study year)]. The Change in Load Capacity Payment shall take account of the change in value of Capacity Transfer Rights in each Zone, including any additional Capacity Transfer Rights made available by the proposed acceleration or modification of the planned reliability-based enhancement or expansion or new Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion. The Change in the Load Capacity Payment shall be the sum of the change in the Load

Capacity Payment only of the Zones that show a decrease in the Load Capacity Payment.

and

Total Enhancement Cost (except for accelerations of planned reliability-based enhancements or expansions) = the estimated annual revenue requirement for the Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion.

Total Enhancement Cost (for accelerations of planned reliability-based enhancements or expansions) = the estimated change in annual revenue requirement resulting from the acceleration of the planned reliability-based enhancement or expansion, taking account of all of the costs incurred that would not have been incurred but for the acceleration of the planned reliability-based enhancement or expansion.

(e) For informational purposes only, to assist the Office of the Interconnection and the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee in evaluating the economic benefits of accelerating planned reliability-based enhancements or expansions or of constructing a new Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion, the Office of the Interconnection shall calculate and post on the PJM website the change in the following metrics on a zonal and system-wide basis: (i) total energy production costs (fuel costs, variable O&M costs and emissions costs);(ii) total load energy payments (zonal load MW times zonal load Locational Marginal Price); (iii) total generator revenue from energy production (generator MW times generator Locational Marginal Price); (iv) Financial Transmission Right credits (as measured using currently allocated Auction Revenue Rights plus additional Auction Revenue Rights made available by the proposed acceleration or modification of a planned reliability-based enhancement or expansion or new Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion); (v) marginal loss surplus credit; and (vi) total capacity costs and load capacity payments under the Office of the Interconnection's Commission-approved capacity construct.

(f) To assure that new Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan continue to be cost beneficial, the Office of the Interconnection annually shall review the costs and benefits of constructing such enhancements and expansions. In the event that there are changes in these costs and benefits, the Office of the Interconnection shall review the changes in costs and benefits with the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee and recommend to the PJM Board whether the new Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions continue to provide measurable benefits, as determined in accordance with subsection (d), and should remain in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan. The annual review of the costs and benefits of constructing new Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan shall include review of changes in cost estimates of the Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion, and changes in system conditions, including but not limited to, changes in load forecasts, and anticipated Merchant Transmission Facilities, generation, and demand response, consistent with the requirements of Section 1.5.7(i) of this Schedule 6.

(g) For new economic enhancements or expansions with costs in excess of $50 million, an independent review of such costs shall be performed to assure both consistency of estimating practices and that the scope of the new Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions is consistent with the new Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions as recommended in the market efficiency analysis.

(h) At any time, market participants may submit to the Office of the Interconnection requests to interconnect Merchant Transmission Facilities or generation facilities pursuant to Parts IV and VI of the PJM Tariff that could address an economic constraint. In the event the Office of the Interconnection determines that the interconnection of such facilities would relieve an economic constraint, the Office of the Interconnection may designate the project as a "market solution" and, in the event of such designation, Section 216 of the PJM Tariff, as applicable, shall apply to the project.

(i) The assumptions used in the market efficiency analysis described in subsection (b) and any review of costs and benefits pursuant to subsection (f) shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

(i) Timely installation of Qualifying Transmission Upgrades, that are committed to the PJM Region as a result of any Reliability Pricing Model Auction pursuant to Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff or any FRR Capacity Plan pursuant to Schedule 8.1 of the Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load-Serving Entities in the PJM Region ("Reliability Assurance Agreement").

(ii) Availability of Generation Capacity Resources, that are committed to the PJM Region as a result of any Reliability Pricing Model Auction pursuant to Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff or any FRR Capacity Plan pursuant to Schedule 8.1 of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

(iii) Availability of Demand Resources that are committed to the PJM Region as a result of any Reliability Pricing Model Auction pursuant to Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff or any FRR Capacity Plan pursuant to Schedule 8.1 of the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

(iv) Addition of Customer Facilities pursuant to an executed Interconnection Service Agreement, Facility Study Agreement or executed Interim Interconnection Service Agreement for which Interconnection Service Agreement is expected to be executed. Facilities with an executed Facilities Study Agreement may be excluded by the Office of the Interconnection after review with the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee.

(v) Addition of Customer-Funded Upgrades pursuant to an executed Interconnection Construction Service Agreement or an Upgrade Construction Service Agreement.

(vi) Expected level of demand response over at least the ensuing fifteen years based on analyses that consider historic levels of demand response, expected demand response growth trends, impact of capacity prices, current and emerging technologies.

(vii) Expected levels of potential new generation and generation retirements over at least the ensuing fifteen years based on analyses that consider generation trends based on existing generation on the system, generation in the PJM interconnection queues and Capacity Resource Clearing Prices under Attachment DD of the PJM Tariff. If the Office of the Interconnection finds that the PJM reserve requirement is not met in any of its future year market efficiency analyses then it will model adequate future generation based on type and location of generation in existing PJM interconnection queues and, if necessary, add transmission enhancements to address congestion that arises from such modeling.

(viii) Items (i) through (v) will be included in the market efficiency assumptions if qualified for consideration by the PJM Board. In the event that any of the items listed in (i) through (v) above qualify for inclusion in the market efficiency analysis assumptions, however, because of the timing of the qualification the item was not included in the assumptions used in developing the most recent Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, the Office of the Interconnection, to the extent necessary, shall notify any entity constructing an Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion that may be affected by inclusion of such item in the assumptions for the next market efficiency analysis described in subsection (b) and any review of costs and benefits pursuant to subsection (f) that the need for the Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion may be diminished or obviated as a result of the inclusion of the qualified item in the assumptions for the next annual market efficiency analysis or review of costs and benefits.

(j) For informational purposes only, with regard to Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions that are included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan pursuant to subsection (d) of this Section 1.5.7, the Office of the Interconnection shall perform sensitivity analyses consistent with Section 1.5.3 of this Schedule 6 and shall provide the results of such sensitivity analyses to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee.

1.5.8 Development of Long-lead Projects, Short-term Projects, Immediate-need Reliability Projects, and Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions.

(a) **Pre-Qualification Process.**

(a)(1) On September 1 of each year, the Office of the Interconnection shall open a thirty-day pre-qualification window for entities, including existing Transmission Owners and Nonincumbent Developers, to submit to the Office of the Interconnection: (i) applications to pre-qualify as eligible to be a Designated Entity; or (ii) updated information as described in Section 1.5.8(a)(3) of this Schedule 6. Pre-qualification applications shall contain the following information: (i) name and address of the entity; (ii) the technical and engineering qualifications of the entity or its affiliate, partner, or parent company; (iii) the demonstrated experience of the entity or its affiliate, partner, or parent company to develop, construct, maintain, and operate transmission facilities, including a list or other evidence of transmission facilities the entity, its affiliate, partner, or parent company previously developed, constructed, maintained, or operated; (iv) the previous record of the entity or its affiliate, partner, or parent company regarding construction, maintenance, or operation of transmission facilities both inside and outside of the PJM Region; (v) the capability of the entity or its affiliate, partner, or parent company to adhere to standardized construction, maintenance and operating practices; (vi) the financial statements of the entity or its affiliate, partner, or parent company for the most recent fiscal quarter, as well as the most recent three fiscal years, or the period of existence of the entity, if shorter, or such other evidence demonstrating an entity's or its affiliate's, partner's, or parent company's current and expected financial capability acceptable to the Office of the Interconnection; (vii) a commitment by the entity to execute the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, if the entity becomes a Designated Entity; (viii) evidence demonstrating the ability of the entity or its affiliate, partner, or parent company to address and timely remedy failure of facilities; (ix) a description of the experience of the entity or its affiliate, partner, or parent company in acquiring rights of way; and (x) such other supporting information that the Office of Interconnection requires to make the pre-qualification determinations consistent with this Section 1.5.8(a).

(a)(2) No later than October 31, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the entities that submitted pre-qualification applications or updated information during the annual thirty-day pre-qualification window, whether they are, or will continue to be, pre-qualified as eligible to be a Designated Entity. In the event the Office of the Interconnection determines that an entity (i) is not, or no longer will continue to be, pre-qualified as eligible to be a Designated Entity, or (ii) provided insufficient information to determine pre-qualification, the Office of the Interconnection shall inform that the entity it is not pre-qualified and include in the notification the basis for its determination. The entity then may submit additional information, which the Office of the Interconnection shall consider in re-evaluating whether the entity is, or will continue to be, pre-qualified as eligible to be a Designated Entity. If the entity submits additional information by November 30, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the entity of the results of its re-evaluation no later than December 15. If the entity submits additional information after November 30, the Office of the Interconnection shall use reasonable efforts to re-evaluate the application, with the additional information, and notify the entity of its determination as soon as practicable. No later than December 31, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website the list of entities that are pre-qualified as eligible to be Designated Entities. If an entity is notified by the Office of the Interconnection that it does not pre-qualify or will not continue to be pre-qualified as eligible to be a Designated Entity, such entity may request dispute resolution pursuant to Schedule 5 of the Operating Agreement.

(a)(3) If an entity was pre-qualified as eligible to be a Designated Entity in the previous year, such entity is not required to re-submit information to pre-qualify with respect to the upcoming year. In the event the information on which the entity's pre-qualification is based changes with respect to the upcoming year, such entity must submit to the Office of the Interconnection all updated information during the annual thirty-day pre-qualification window and the timeframes for notification in Section 1.5.8(a)(2) of this Schedule 6 shall apply. In the event the information on which the entity's pre-qualification is based changes with respect to the current year, such entity must submit to the Office of the Interconnection all updated information at the time the information changes and the Office of the Interconnection shall use reasonable efforts to evaluate the updated information and notify the entity of its determination as soon as practicable.

(a)(4) As determined by the Office of the Interconnection, an entity may submit a pre-qualification application outside the annual thirty-day pre-qualification window for good cause shown. For a pre-qualification application received outside of the annual thirty-day pre-qualification window, the Office of the Interconnection shall use reasonable efforts to process the application and notify the entity as to whether it pre-qualifies as eligible to be a Designated Entity as soon as practicable.

(a)(5) To be designated as a Designated Entity for any project proposed pursuant to Section 1.5.8 of this Schedule 6, existing Transmission Owners and Nonincumbent Developers must be pre-qualified as eligible to be a Designated Entity pursuant to this Section 1.5.8(a). This Section 1.5.8(a) shall not apply to entities that desire to propose projects for inclusion in the recommended plan but do not intend to be a Designated Entity.

(b) **Posting of Transmission System Needs**. Upon identification of existing and projected limitations on the Transmission System's physical, economic and/or operational capability or performance in the enhancement and expansion analysis process described in this Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals, and after consideration of non-transmission solutions, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website the violations, system conditions, and economic constraints, and Public Policy Requirements, including (i) federal Public Policy Requirements; (ii) state Public Policy Requirements identified or agreed-to by the states in the PJM Region, which could be addressed by potential Short-term Projects, Long-lead Projects or projects determined pursuant to the State Agreement Approach in Section 1.5.9 of this Schedule 6, as applicable. The Office of the Interconnection also shall post an explanation regarding why transmission needs associated with federal or state Public Policy Requirements were identified but were not selected for further evaluation.

(c) **Project Proposal Windows**. The Office of the Interconnection shall provide notice to stakeholders of a 30-day proposal window for Short-term Projects and a 120-day proposal window for Long-lead Projects and Economic-based Enhancements or Expansions. The Office of Interconnection may shorten a proposal window should an identified need require a shorter proposal window to meet the needed in-service date of the proposed enhancements or expansions, or extend a proposal window as needed to accommodate updated information regarding system conditions. The Office of the Interconnection may shorten or lengthen a proposal window that is not yet opened based on one or more of the following criteria: (1) complexity of the violation or system condition; and (2) whether there is sufficient time remaining in the relevant planning cycle to accommodate a standard proposal window and timely address the violation or system condition. The Office of the Interconnection may lengthen a proposal window that already is opened based on or more of the following criteria: (i) changes in assumptions or conditions relating to the underlying need for the project, such as load growth or Reliability Pricing Model auction results; (ii) availability of new or changed information regarding the nature of the violations and the facilities involved; and (iii) time remaining in the relevant proposal window. In the event that the Office of the Interconnection determines to lengthen or shorten a proposal window, it will post on the PJM website the new proposal window period and an explanation as to the reasons for the change in the proposal window period. During these windows, the Office of the Interconnection will accept proposals from existing Transmission Owners and Nonincumbent Developers for potential enhancements or expansions to address the posted violations, system conditions, economic constraints, as well as Public Policy Requirements.

(c)(1) All proposals submitted in the proposal windows must contain: (i) the name and address of the proposing entity; (ii) a statement whether the entity intends to be the Designated Entity for the proposed project; (iii) the location of proposed project, including source and sink, if applicable; (iv) relevant engineering studies, and other relevant information as described in the PJM Manuals pertaining to the proposed project; (v) a proposed initial construction schedule including projected dates on which needed permits are required to be obtained in order to meet the required in-service date; (vi) cost estimates and analyses that provide sufficient detail for the Office of Interconnection to review and analyze the proposed cost of the project; and (vii) with the exception of project proposals with cost estimates submitted with the proposals that are under $20 million, a non-refundable fee must be submitted with each proposal, by each proposing entity who indicates an intention to be the Designated Entity, as follows: a non-refundable fee in the amount of $5,000 for each project with a cost estimate submitted with the proposal that is equal to or greater than $20 million and less than $100 million and a non-refundable fee in the amount of $30,000 for each project with a cost estimate submitted with the proposal that is equal to $100 million or greater.

(c)(2) Proposals from all entities (both existing Transmission Owners and Nonincumbent Developers) that indicate the entity intends to be a Designated Entity, also must contain information to the extent not previously provided pursuant to Section 1.5.8(a) demonstrating: (i) technical and engineering qualifications of the entity, its affiliate, partner, or parent company relevant to construction, operation, and maintenance of the proposed project; (ii) experience of the entity, its affiliate, partner, or parent company in developing, constructing, maintaining, and operating the type of transmission facilities contained in the project proposal; (iii) the emergency response capability of the entity that will be operating and maintaining the proposed project; (iv) evidence of transmission facilities the entity, its affiliate, partner, or parent company previously constructed, maintained, or operated; (v) the ability of the entity or its affiliate, partner, or parent company to obtain adequate financing relative to the proposed project, which may include a letter of intent from a financial institution approved by the Office of the Interconnection or such other evidence of the financial resources available to finance the construction, operation, and maintenance of the proposed project; (vi) the managerial ability of the entity, its affiliate, partner, or parent company to contain costs and adhere to construction schedules for the proposed project, including a description of verifiable past achievement of these goals; (vii) a demonstration of other advantages the entity may have to construct, operate, and maintain the proposed project, including any cost commitment the entity may wish to submit; and (viii) any other information that may assist the Office of the Interconnection in evaluating the proposed project.

(c)(3) The Office of the Interconnection may request additional reports or information from an existing Transmission Owner or Nonincumbent Developers that it determines are reasonably necessary to evaluate its specific project proposal pursuant to the criteria set forth in Sections 1.5.8(e) and 1.5.8(f) of this Schedule 6. If the Office of the Interconnection determines any of the information provided in a proposal is deficient or it requires additional reports or information to analyze the submitted proposal, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the proposing entity of such deficiency or request. Within 10 business days of receipt of the notification of deficiency and/or request for additional reports or information, or other reasonable time period as determined by the Office of the Interconnection, the proposing entity shall provide the necessary information.

(c)(4) The request for additional reports or information by the Office of the Interconnection pursuant to Section 1.5.8(c)(3) of this Schedule 6 may be used only to clarify a proposed project as submitted. In response to the Office of the Information's request for additional reports or information, the proposing entity (whether an existing Transmission Owner or Nonincumbent Developer) may not submit a new project proposal or modifications to a proposed project once the proposal window is closed. In the event that the proposing entity fails to timely cure the deficiency or provide the requested reports or information regarding a proposed project, the proposed project will not be considered for inclusion in the recommended plan.

(c)(5) Within 30 days of the closing of the proposal window, the Office of the Interconnection may notify the proposing entity that additional per project fees are required if the Office of the Interconnection determines the proposing entity's submittal includes multiple project proposals. Within 10 business days of receipt of the notification of insufficient funds by the Office of the Interconnection, the proposing entity shall submit such funds or notify the Office of the Interconnection which of the project proposals the Office of the Interconnection should evaluate based on the fee(s) submitted.

(d) **Posting and Review of Projects**. Following the close of a proposal window, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website all proposals submitted pursuant to Section 1.5.8(c) of this Schedule 6. All proposals addressing state Public Policy Requirements shall be provided to the applicable states in the PJM Region for review and consideration as a Supplemental Project or a state public policy project consistent with Section 1.5.9 of this Schedule 6. The Office of the Interconnection shall review all proposals submitted during a proposal window and determine and present to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee the proposals that merit further consideration for inclusion in the recommended plan. In making this determination, the Office of the Interconnection shall consider the criteria set forth in *Sections 1.5.8(e) and 1.5.8(f) of this Schedule 6. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on* the PJM website and present to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee for review and comment descriptions of the proposed enhancements and expansions, including any proposed Supplemental Projects or state public policy projects identified by a state(s). Based on review and comment by the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee, the Office of the Interconnection may, if necessary conduct further study and evaluation. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website and present to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee the revised enhancements and expansions for review and comment. After consultation with the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine the more efficient or cost-effective transmission enhancements and expansions for inclusion in the recommended plan consistent with this Schedule 6.

(e) **Criteria for Considering Inclusion of a Project in the Recommended Plan.** In determining whether a Short-term Project or Long-lead Project proposed pursuant to Section 1.5.8(c), individually or in combination with other Short-term Projects or Long-lead Projects, is the more efficient or cost-effective solution and therefore should be included in the recommended plan, the Office of the Interconnection, taking into account sensitivity studies and scenario analyses considered pursuant to Section 1.5.3 of this Schedule 6, shall consider the following criteria, to the extent applicable: (i) the extent to which a Short-term Project or Long-lead Project would address and solve the posted violation, system condition, or economic constraint; (ii) the extent to which the relative benefits of the project meets a Benefit/Cost Ratio Threshold of at least 1.25:1 as calculated pursuant to Section 1.5.7(d) of this Schedule 6; (iii) the extent to which the Short-term Project or Long-lead Project would have secondary benefits, such as addressing additional or other system reliability, operational performance, economic efficiency issues or federal Public Policy Requirements or state Public Policy Requirements identified by the states in the PJM Region; and (iv) other factors such as cost-effectiveness, the ability to timely complete the project, and project development feasibility.

(f) **Entity-Specific Criteria Considered in Determining the Designated Entity for a Project.** In determining whether the entity proposing a Short-term Project or a Long-lead Project recommended for inclusion in the plan shall be the Designated Entity, the Office of the Interconnection shall consider: (i) whether in its proposal, the entity indicated its intent to be the Designated Entity; (ii) whether the entity is pre-qualified to be a Designated Entity pursuant to Section 1.5.8(a); (iii) information provided either in the proposing entity's submission pursuant to Section 1.5.8(a) or 1.5.8(c)(2) relative to the specific proposed project that demonstrates: (1) the technical and engineering experience of the entity or its affiliate, partner, or parent company, including its previous record regarding construction, maintenance, and operation of transmission facilities relative to the project proposed; (2) ability of the entity or its affiliate, partner, or parent company to construct, maintain, and operate transmission facilities, as proposed, (3) capability of the entity to adhere to standardized construction, maintenance, and operating practices, including the capability for emergency response and restoration of damaged equipment; (4) experience of the entity in acquiring rights of way; (5) evidence of the ability of the entity, its affiliate, partner, or parent company to secure a financial commitment from an approved financial institution(s) agreeing to finance the construction, operation, and maintenance of the project, if it is accepted into the recommended plan; and (iv) any other factors that may be relevant to the proposed project, including but not limited to whether the proposal includes the entity's previously designated project(s) included in the plan.

(g) **Procedures if No Long-lead Project or Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion Proposal is Determined to be the More Efficient or Cost-Effective Solution.** If the Office of the Interconnection determines that none of the proposed Long-lead Projects received during the Long-lead Project proposal window would be the more efficient or cost-effective solution to resolve a posted violation, or system condition, the Office of the Interconnection may re-evaluate and re-post on the PJM website the unresolved violations, or system conditions pursuant to Section 1.5.8(b), provided such re-evaluation and re-posting would not affect the ability of the Office of the Interconnection to timely address the identified reliability need. In the event that re-posting and conducting such re-evaluation would prevent the Office of the Interconnection from timely addressing the existing and projected limitations on the Transmission System that give rise to the need for an enhancement or expansion, the Office of the Interconnection shall propose a project to solve the posted violation, or system condition for inclusion in the recommended plan and shall present such project to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee for review and comment. The Transmission Owner(s) in the Zone(s) where the project is to be located shall be the Designated Entity(ies) for such project. In determining whether there is insufficient time for re-posting and re-evaluation, the Office of the Interconnection shall develop and post on the PJM website a transmission solution construction timeline for input and review by the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee that will include factors such as, but not limited to: (i) deadlines for obtaining regulatory approvals, (ii) dates by which long lead equipment should be acquired, (iii) the time necessary to complete a proposed solution to meet the required in-service date, and (iv) other time-based factors impacting the feasibility of achieving the required in-service date. Based on input from the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee and the time frames set forth in the construction timeline, the Office of the Interconnection shall determine whether there is sufficient time to conduct a re-evaluation and re-post and timely address the existing and projected limitations on the Transmission System that give rise to the need for an enhancement or expansion. To the extent that an economic constraint remains unaddressed, the economic constraint will be re-evaluated and re-posted.

(h) **Procedures if No Short-term Project Proposal is Determined to be the More Efficient or Cost-Effective Solution.** If the Office of the Interconnection determines that none of the proposed Short-term Projects received during a Short-term Project proposal window would be the more efficient or cost-effective solution to resolve a posted violation or system condition, the Office of the Interconnection shall propose a Short-term Project to solve the posted violation, or system condition for inclusion in the recommended plan and will present such Short-term Project to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee for review and comment. The Transmission Owner(s) in the Zone(s) where the Short-term Project is to be located shall be the Designated Entity(ies) for the Project.

(i) **Notification of Designated Entity.** Within 10 business days of PJM Board approval of the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, the Office of the Interconnection shall notify the entities that have been designated as the Designated Entities for projects included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan of such designations. In such notices, the Office of the Interconnection shall provide: (i) the needed in-service date of the project; and (ii) a date by which all necessary state approvals should be obtained to timely meet the needed in-service date of the project. The Office of the Interconnection shall use these dates as part of its on-going monitoring of the progress of the project to ensure that the project is completed by its needed in-service date.

(j) **Acceptance of Designation.** Within 30 days of receiving notification of its designation as a Designated Entity, the existing Transmission Owner or Nonincumbent Developer shall notify the Office of the Interconnection of its acceptance of such designation and submit to the Office of the Interconnection a development schedule, which shall include, but not be limited to, milestones necessary to develop and construct the project to achieve the required in-service date, including milestone dates for obtaining all necessary authorizations and approvals, including but not limited to, state approvals. For good cause shown, the Office of the Interconnection may extend the deadline for submitting the development schedule. The Office of the Interconnection then shall review the development schedule and within 15 days or other reasonable time as required by the Office of the Interconnection: (i) notify the Designated Entity of any issues regarding the development schedule identified by the Office of the Interconnection that may need to be addressed to ensure that the project meets its needed in-service date; and (ii) tender to the Designated Entity an executable Designated Entity Agreement setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties. To retain its status as a Designated Entity, within 60 days of receiving notification of its designation (or other such period as mutually agreed upon by the Office of the Interconnection and the Designated Entity), the Designated Entity (both existing Transmission Owners and Nonincumbent Developers) shall submit to the Office of the Interconnection a letter of credit as determined by the Office of Interconnection to cover the incremental costs of construction resulting from reassignment of the project, and return to the Office of the Interconnection an executed Designated Entity Agreement containing a mutually agreed upon development schedule. In the alternative, the Designated Entity may request dispute resolution pursuant to Schedule 5 of this Agreement, or request that the Designated Entity Agreement be filed unexecuted with the Commission.

(k) **Failure of Designated Entity to Meet Milestones.** In the event the Designated Entity fails to comply with one or more of the requirements of Section 1.5.8(j); or fails to meet a milestone in the development schedule set forth in the Designated Entity Agreement that causes a delay of the project's in-service date, the Office of the Interconnection shall re-evaluate the need for the Short-term Project or Long-lead Project, and based on that re-evaluation may: (i) retain the Short-term Project or Long-lead Project in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan; (ii) remove the Short-term Project or Long-lead Project from the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan; or (iii) include an alternative solution in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan. If the Office of the Interconnection retains the Short-term or Long-term Project in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, it shall determine whether the delay is beyond the Designated Entity's control and whether to retain the Designated Entity or to designate the Transmission Owner(s) in the Zone(s) where the project is located as Designated Entity(ies) for the Short-term Project or Long-lead Project. If the Designated Entity is the Transmission Owner(s) in the Zone(s) where the project is located, the Office of the Interconnection shall seek recourse through the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement or FERC, as appropriate. Any modifications to the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan pursuant to this section shall be presented to the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee for review and comment and approved by the PJM Board.

(l) **Transmission Owners Required to be the Designated Entity**. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Section 1.5.8, in all events, the Transmission Owner(s) in whose Zone(s) a project proposed pursuant to Section 1.5.8(c) of this Schedule 6 is to be located will be the Designated Entity for the project, when the Short-term Project or Long-lead Project is: (i) a Transmission Owner Upgrade; (ii) located solely within a Transmission Owner's Zone and the costs of the project are allocated solely to the Transmission Owner's Zone; or (iii) located solely within a Transmission Owner's Zone and is not selected in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan for purposes of cost allocation.

(m) **Immediate-need Reliability Projects**:

(m)(1) Pursuant to the expansion planning process set forth in Sections 1.5.1 through 1.5.6 of Schedule 6, the Office of the Interconnection shall identify immediate reliability needs that must be addressed within three years or less. The Office of the Interconnection shall develop Immediate-need Reliability Projects for which a proposal window pursuant to Section 1.5.8(m)(2) is infeasible. The Office of the Interconnection shall consider the following factors in determining the infeasibility of such a proposal window: (i) nature of the reliability criteria violation; (ii) nature and type of potential solution required; and (iii) projected construction time for a potential solution to the type of reliability criteria violation to be addressed. The Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website for review and comment by the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee and other stakeholders descriptions of the Immediate-need Reliability Projects for which a proposal window pursuant to Section 1.5.8(m)(2) is infeasible. The descriptions shall include an explanation of the decision to designate the Transmission Owner as the Designated Entity for the Immediate-need Reliability Project rather than conducting a proposal window pursuant to Section 1.5.8(m)(2), including an explanation of the time-sensitive need for the Immediate-need Reliability Project, other transmission and non-transmission options that were considered but concluded would not sufficiently address the immediate reliability need, the circumstances that generated the immediate reliability need, and why the immediate reliability need was not identified earlier. After the descriptions are posted on the PJM website, stakeholders shall have reasonable opportunity to provide comments to the Office of the Interconnection. All comments received by the Office of the Interconnection shall be publicly available on the PJM website. Based on the comments received from stakeholders and the review by Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee, the Office of the Interconnection shall, if necessary, conduct further study and evaluation and post a revised recommended plan for review and comment by the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee. The PJM Board shall approve the Immediate-need Reliability Projects for inclusion in the recommended plan. In January of each year, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website and file with the Commission for informational purposes a list of the Immediate-need Reliability Projects for which an existing Transmission Owner was designated in the prior year as the Designated Entity in accordance with this Section 1.5.8(m)(1). The list shall include the need-by date of Immediate-need Reliability Project and the date the Transmission Owner actually energized the Immediate-need Reliability Project.

(m)(2) If, in the judgment of the Office of the Interconnection, there is sufficient time for the Office of the Interconnection to accept proposals in a shortened proposal window for Immediate-need Reliability Projects, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website the violations and system conditions that could be addressed by Immediate-need Reliability Project proposals, including an explanation of the time-sensitive need for an Immediate-need Reliability Project and provide notice to stakeholders of a shortened proposal window. Proposals must contain the information required in Section 1.5.8(c) and, if the entity is seeking to be the Designated Entity, such entity must have pre-qualified to be a Designated Entity pursuant to Section 1.5.8(a). In determining the more efficient or cost-effective proposed Immediate-need Reliability Project for inclusion in the recommended plan, the Office of the Interconnection shall consider the extent to which the proposed Immediate-need Reliability Project, individually or in combination with other Immediate-need Reliability Projects, would address and solve the posted violations or system conditions and other factors such as cost-effectiveness, the ability of the entity to timely complete the project, and project development feasibility in light of the required need. After PJM Board approval, the Office of the Interconnection, in accordance with Section 1.5.8(i) of this Schedule 6, shall notify the entities that have been designated as Designated Entities for Immediate-need Projects included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan of such designations. Designated Entities shall accept such designations in accordance with Section 1.5.8(j). In the event that (i) the Office of the Interconnection determines that no proposal resolves a posted violation or system condition; (ii) the proposing entity is not selected to be the Designated Entity; (iii) an entity does not accept the designation as a Designated Entity; or (iv) the Designated Entity fails to meet milestones that would delay the in-service date of the Immediate-need Reliability Project, the Office of the Interconnection shall develop and recommend an Immediate-need Reliability Project to solve the violation or system needs in accordance with Section 1.5.8(m)(1).

(n) ***Reliability Violations on Transmission Facilities Below 200 kV.*** *Pursuant to the expansion planning process set forth in Sections 1.5.1 through 1.5.6 of Schedule 6, the Office of the Interconnection shall identify reliability violations on facilities below 200 kV. The Office of the Interconnection shall not post such a violation pursuant to Section 1.5.8(b) of this Schedule 6 for inclusion in a proposal window pursuant to Section 1.5.8(c) unless the identified violation(s) satisfies one of the following exceptions: (i) the reliability violations are thermal overload violations identified on multiple transmission lines and/or transformers rated below 200 kV that are impacted by a common contingent element, such that multiple reliability violations could be addressed by one or more solutions, including but not limited to a higher voltage solution; or (ii) the reliability violations are thermal overload violations identified on multiple transmission lines and/or transformers rated below 200 kV and the Office of the Interconnection determines that given the location and electrical features of the violations one or more solutions could potentially address or reduce the flow on multiple lower voltage facilities, thereby eliminating the multiple reliability violations. If the reliability violation is identified on multiple facilities rated below 200 kV that are determined by the Office of the Interconnection to meet one of the two exceptions stated above, the Office of the Interconnection shall post on the PJM website the reliability violations to be included in a proposal window consistent with Section 1.5.8(c) of*

Schedule 6. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that the identified reliability violations do not satisfy either of the two exceptions stated above, the Office of the Interconnection shall develop a solution to address the reliability violation on below 200 kV Transmission Facilities that will not be included in a proposal window pursuant to Section 1.5.8(c). The Office of Interconnection *shall post on the PJM website for review and comment by the Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee and other stakeholders descriptions of the below 200 kV reliability violations that will not be included in a proposal window pursuant to Section 1.5.8(c). The descriptions shall include an explanation of the decision to not include the below 200 kV reliability violation(s) in a Section 1.5.8(c) proposal window, a description of the facility on which the violation(s) is found, the Zone in which the facility is located, and notice that such construction responsibility for and ownership of the project that resolves such below 200 kV reliability violation will be designated to the incumbent Transmission Owner. After the descriptions are posted on the PJM website, stakeholders shall have reasonable opportunity to provide comments for consideration by the Office of the Interconnection. With the exception of Immediate-need Reliability Projects under section 1.5.8(m) of this Schedule 6, PJM will not select an above 200 kV solution for inclusion in the recommended plan that would address a reliability violation on a below 200 kV transmission facility without posting the violation for inclusion in a proposal window consistent with Section 1.5.8(c) of Schedule 6. All written comments received by the Office of the Interconnection shall be publicly available on the PJM website.*

1.5.9 State Agreement Approach.

(a) State governmental entities authorized by their respective states, individually or jointly, may agree voluntarily to be responsible for the allocation of all costs of a proposed transmission expansion or enhancement that addresses state Public Policy Requirements identified or accepted by the state(s) in the PJM Region. As determined by the authorized state governmental entities, such transmission enhancements or expansions may be included in the recommended plan, either as a (i) Supplemental Project or (ii) state public policy project, which is a transmission enhancement or expansion, the costs of which will be recovered pursuant to a FERC-accepted cost allocation proposed by agreement of one or more states and voluntarily agreed to by those state(s). All costs related to a state public policy project or Supplemental Project included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan to address state Public Policy Requirements pursuant to this Section shall be recovered from customers in a state(s) in the PJM Region that agrees to be responsible for the projects. No such costs shall be recovered from customers in a state that did not agree to be responsible for such cost allocation. A state public policy project will be included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan for cost allocation purposes only if there is an associated FERC-accepted allocation permitting recovery of the costs of the state public policy project consistent with this Section.

(b) Subject to any designation reserved for Transmission Owners in Section 1.5.8(l) of this Schedule 6, the state(s) responsible for cost allocation for a Supplemental Project or a state public policy project in accordance with Section 1.5.9(a) in this Schedule 6 may submit to the Office of the Interconnection the entity(ies) to construct, own, operate and maintain the state public policy project from a list of entities supplied by the Office of the Interconnection that pre-qualified to be Designated Entities pursuant to Section 1.5.8(a) of this Schedule 6.

1.5.10 Multi-Driver Project.

(a) When a proposal submitted by an existing Transmission Owner or Nonincumbent Developer pursuant to Section 1.5.8(c) meets the definition of a Multi-Driver Project and is designated to be included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan for purposes of cost allocation, the Office of the Interconnection shall designate the Designated Entity for the project as follows: (i) if the Multi-Driver Project does not contain a state Public Policy Requirement component, the Office of the Interconnection shall designate the Designated Entity pursuant to the criteria in Section 1.5.8 of this Schedule 6; or (ii) if the Multi-Driver Project contains a state Public Policy Requirement component, the Office of the Interconnection shall evaluate potential Designated Entity candidates based on the criteria in Section 1.5.8 of this Schedule 6, and provide its evaluation to and elicit feedback from the sponsoring state governmental entities responsible for allocation of all costs of the proposed state Public Policy Requirement component ("state governmental entity(ies)") regarding its evaluation. Based on its evaluation of the Section 1.5.8 criteria and consideration of the feedback from the sponsoring state governmental entity(ies), the Office of the Interconnection shall designate the Designated Entity for the Multi-Driver Project and notify such entity consistent with Section 1.5.8(i) of this Schedule 6. A Multi-Driver Project may be based on proposals that consist of (1) newly proposed transmission enhancements or expansions; (2) additions to, or modifications of, transmission enhancements or expansions already selected for inclusion in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan; and/or (3) one or more transmission enhancements or expansions already selected for inclusion in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan.

(b) A Multi-Driver Project may contain an enhancement or expansion that addresses a state Public Policy Requirement component only if it meets the requirements set forth in section 1.5.9(a) of this Schedule 6 and its cost allocations are established consistent with Section (b)(xii)(B) of Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff.

(c) If a state governmental entity(ies) desires to include a Public Policy Requirement component after an enhancement or expansion has been included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, the Office of the Interconnection may re-evaluate the relevant reliability-based enhancement or expansion, Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion, or Multi-Driver Project to determine whether adding the state-sponsored Public Policy Requirement component would create a more cost effective or efficient solution to system conditions. If the Office of the Interconnection determines that adding the state-sponsored Public Policy Requirement component to an enhancement or expansion already included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan would result in a more cost effective or efficient solution, the state-sponsored Public Policy Requirement component may be included in the relevant enhancement or expansion, provided all of the requirements of Section 1.5.10(b) of this Schedule 6 are met, and cost allocations are established consistent with Section (b)(xii)(B) of Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff.

(d) If, subsequent to the inclusion in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan of a Multi-Driver Project that contains a state Public Policy Requirement component, a state governmental entity(ies) withdraws its support of the Public Policy Requirement component of a

Multi-Driver Project, then: (i) the Office of the Interconnection shall re-evaluate the need for the remaining components of the Multi-Driver Project without the state Public Policy Requirement component, remove the Multi-Driver Project from the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, or replace the Multi-Driver Project with an enhancement or expansion that addresses remaining reliability or economic system needs; (ii) if the Multi-Driver Project is retained in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan without the state Public Policy Requirement component, the costs of the remaining components will be allocated in accordance with Schedule 12 of the Tariff; (iii) if more than one state is responsible for the costs apportioned to the state Public Policy Requirement component of the Multi-Driver Project, the remaining state governmental entity(ies) shall have the option to continue supporting the state Public Policy component of the Multi-Driver Project and if the remaining state governmental entity(ies) choose this option, the apportionment of the state Public Policy Requirement component will remain in place and the remaining state governmental entity(ies) shall agree upon their respective apportionments; (iv) if a Multi-Driver Project must be retained in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan and completed with the State Public Policy component, the state Public Policy Requirement apportionment will remain in place and the withdrawing state governmental entity(ies) shall continue to be responsible for its/their share of the FERC-accepted cost allocations as filed pursuant to Section (b)(xii)(B) of Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff.

(e) The actual costs of a Multi-Driver Project shall be apportioned to the different components (reliability-based enhancement or expansion, Economic-based Enhancement or Expansion and/or Public Policy Requirement) based on the initial estimated costs of the Multi-Driver Project in accordance with the methodology set forth in Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff.

(f) The benefit metric calculation used for evaluating the market efficiency component of a Multi-Driver Project will be based on the final voltage of the Multi-Driver Project using the Benefit/Cost Ratio calculation set forth in Section 1.5.7(d) of Schedule 6 of this Operating Agreement where the Cost component of the calculation is the present value of the estimated cost of the enhancement apportioned to the market efficiency component of the Multi-Driver Project for each of the first 15 years of the life of the enhancement or expansion.

(g) Except as provided to the contrary in this Section 1.5.10, Section 1.5.8 of this Schedule 6 applies to Multi-Driver Projects.

(h) The Office of the Interconnection shall determine whether a proposal(s) meets the definition of a Multi-Driver Project by identifying a more efficient or cost effective solution that uses one of the following methods: (i) combining separate solutions that address reliability, economics and/or public policy into a single transmission enhancement or expansion that incorporates separate drivers into one Multi-Driver Project ("Proportional Multi-Driver Method"); or (ii) expanding or enhancing a proposed single driver solution to include one or more additional component(s) to address a combination of reliability, economic and/or public policy drivers ("Incremental Multi-Driver Method").

(i) In determining whether a Multi-Driver Project may be designated to more than one entity, PJM shall consider whether: (i) the project consists of separable transmission elements, which are physically discrete transmission components, such as, but not limited to, a transformer, static var compensator or definable linear segment of a transmission line, that can be designated individually to a Designated Entity to construct and own and/or finance; and (ii) each entity satisfies the criteria set forth in section 1.5.8(f) of Schedule 6. Separable transmission elements that qualify as Transmission Owner Upgrades shall be designated to the Transmission Owner in the Zone in which the facility will be located.

1.6 Approval of the Final Regional Transmission Expansion Plan.

(a) Based on the studies and analyses performed by the Office of the Interconnection under this Schedule 6, the PJM Board shall approve the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan in accordance with the requirements of this Schedule 6. The PJM Board shall approve the cost allocations for transmission enhancements and expansions consistent with Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff. Supplemental Projects shall be integrated into the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan approved by the PJM Board but shall not be included for cost allocation purposes.

(b) The Office of the Interconnection shall publish the current, approved Regional Transmission Expansion Plan on the PJM Internet site. Within 30 days after each occasion when the PJM Board approves a Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, or an addition to such a plan, that designates one or more Transmission Owner(s) or Designated Entity(ies) to construct such expansion or enhancement, the Office of the Interconnection shall file with FERC a report identifying the expansion or enhancement, its estimated cost, the entity or entities that will be responsible for constructing and owning or financing the project, and the market participants designated under Section 1.5.6(l) above to bear responsibility for the costs of the project.

(c) If a Regional Transmission Expansion Plan is not approved, or if the transmission service requested by any entity is not included in an approved Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, nothing herein shall limit in any way the right of any entity to seek relief pursuant to the provisions of Section 211 of the Federal Power Act.

(d) Following PJM Board approval, the final Regional Transmission Expansion Plan shall be documented, posted publicly and provided to the Applicable Regional Entities.

1.7 Obligation to Build.

(a) Subject to the requirements of applicable law, government regulations and approvals, including, without limitation, requirements to obtain any necessary state or local siting, construction and operating permits, to the availability of required financing, to the ability to acquire necessary right-of-way, and to the right to recover, pursuant to appropriate financial arrangements and tariffs or contracts, all reasonably incurred costs, plus a reasonable return on investment, Transmission Owners or Designated Entities designated as the appropriate entities to construct, own and/or finance enhancements or expansions specified in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan shall construct, own and/or finance such facilities or enter into appropriate contracts to fulfill such obligations. Except as provided in Section 1.5.8(k) of this Schedule 6, nothing herein shall require any Transmission Owner to construct, finance or own any enhancements or expansions specified in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan for which the plan designates an entity other than a Transmission Owner as the appropriate entity to construct, own and/or finance such enhancements or expansions.

(b) Nothing herein shall prohibit any Transmission Owner from seeking to recover the cost of enhancements or expansions on an incremental cost basis or from seeking approval of such rate treatment from any regulatory agency with jurisdiction over such rates.

(c) The Office of the Interconnection shall be obligated to collect on behalf of the Transmission Owner(s) or Designated Entity(ies) all charges established under Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff in connection with facilities which the Office of the Interconnection designates one or more Transmission Owners or Designated Entity(ies) to build pursuant to this Regional Transmission Expansion Planning Protocol. Such charges shall compensate the Transmission Owner(s) or Designated Entity(ies) for all costs related to such RTEP facilities under a FERC-approved rate and will include any FERC-approved incentives.

(d) In the event that a Transmission Owner declines to construct an economic transmission enhancement or expansion developed under Sections 1.5.6(d) and 1.5.7 of this Schedule 6 that such Transmission Owner is designated by the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan to construct (in whole or in part), the Office of the Interconnection shall promptly file with the FERC a report on the results of the pertinent economic planning process in order to permit the FERC to determine what action, if any, it should take.

1.8 Interregional Expansions

(a) PJM shall collect from Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc., for distribution to the applicable Transmission Owners, in accordance with Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff, revenues collected by the Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc. under the Open Access Transmission Tariff of the Midwest Independent System Owner, Inc. with respect to transmission enhancements or expansions for which the Coordinated System Plan developed under the Joint Operating Agreement Between the Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. assigns cost responsibility for transmission enhancements or expansions in the PJM Region to market participants in the region of the Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc.

(b) PJM shall disburse to the Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc., for distribution to applicable transmission owners of the Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc., revenues collected under Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff which establishes a charge in connection with enhancements or expansions in the region of the Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc. the cost responsibility for which has been assigned to market participants in the PJM Region under the Coordinated System Plan developed under the Joint Operating Agreement Between the Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.

(c) Nothing in this Section 1.8 shall affect or limit any Transmission Owners filing rights under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act as set forth in the PJM Tariff and applicable agreements.

1.9 Relationship to the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff.

Nothing herein shall modify the rights and obligations of an Eligible Customer or a Transmission Customer, as those terms are defined in the PJM Tariff, with respect to required studies and completion of necessary enhancements or expansions. An Eligible Customer or Transmission Customer electing to follow the procedures in the PJM Tariff instead of the procedures provided herein, shall also be responsible for the related costs. The enhancement and expansion study process under this Protocol shall be funded as a part of the operating budget of the Office of the Interconnection.

SCHEDULE 6-A
Interregional Transmission Coordination Between the SERTP and PJM Regions

The Office of the Interconnection, through its regional transmission planning process, coordinates with the public utility transmission providers of Southeastern Regional Transmission Planning ("SERTP," and individually, "SERTP Transmission Provider," and collectively, "SERTP Transmission Providers"), as the transmission providers and planners for the SERTP region to address transmission planning coordination issues related to interregional transmission projects. The interregional transmission coordination procedures include a detailed description of the process for coordination between the SERTP Transmission Providers and the Office of the Interconnection, to identify possible interregional transmission projects that could address transmission needs more efficiently or cost-effectively than transmission projects included in the respective regional transmission plans. The interregional transmission coordination procedures are hereby provided in this Schedule 6-A with additional materials provided on the PJM Regional Planning website.

The Office of the Interconnection and each of the SERTP Transmission Providers shall:

(1) Coordinate and share the results of the SERTP Transmission Providers' and the Office of the Interconnection's regional transmission plans to identify possible interregional transmission projects that could address transmission needs more efficiently or cost-effectively than separate regional transmission projects;

(2) Identify and jointly evaluate transmission projects that are proposed to be located in both transmission planning regions;

(3) Exchange, at least annually, planning data and information; and

(4) Maintain a website and e-mail list for the communication of information related to the coordinated planning process.

The SERTP Transmission Providers and the Office of the Interconnection developed a mutually agreeable method for allocating between the two transmission planning regions the costs of new interregional transmission projects that are located within both transmission planning regions. Such cost allocation method satisfies the six interregional cost allocation principles set forth in Order No. 1000 and are included in this Schedule 12-B of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff ("Schedule 12-B").

For purposes of this Schedule 6-A, each of the SERTP Transmission Provider's transmission planning process is the process described in each of the SERTP Transmission Providers' open access transmission tariffs; the Office of the Interconnection's regional transmission planning process is the process described in Schedule 6 of this Agreement. References to the respective transmission planning processes in each of the SERTP Transmission Providers' open access transmission tariffs are intended to identify the activities described in those tariff provisions. References to the respective regional transmission plans in this Schedule 6-A are intended to identify, for the Office of the Interconnection, the PJM Regional

Transmission Expansion Plan ("RTEP"), as defined in applicable PJM documents and, for the each SERTP Transmission Providers, the SERTP regional transmission plan which includes the applicable ten (10) year transmission expansion plan. Unless noted otherwise, Section references in this Schedule 6-A refer to Sections within this Schedule 6-A.

Nothing in this Schedule 6-A is intended to affect the terms of any bilateral planning or operating agreements between transmission owners and/or transmission service providers that exist as of the effective date of this Schedule 6-A or that are executed at some future date.

INTERREGIONAL TRANSMISSION PLANNING PRINCIPLES

Representatives of the SERTP and the Office of the Interconnection will meet no less than once per year to facilitate the interregional coordination procedures described below (as applicable). Representatives of the SERTP and the Office of the Interconnection may meet more frequently during the evaluation of project(s) proposed for purposes of interregional cost allocation between the SERTP and the Office of the Interconnection. For purposes of this Schedule 6-A, an "interregional transmission project" means a facility or set of facilities that would be physically located in both the SERTP and PJM regions and would interconnect to transmission facilities in both the SERTP and PJM regions. The facilities to which the project is proposed to interconnect may be either existing transmission facilities or transmission projects included in the regional transmission plan that are currently under development.

1. **Coordination**

1.1 **Review of Respective Regional Transmission Plans:** Biennially, the Office of the Interconnection and the SERTP Transmission Providers shall review each other's current regional transmission plan(s) and engage in the data exchange and joint evaluation described in Sections 2 and 3.

> 1.1.1 The review of each region's regional transmission plan(s), which plans include the transmission needs and planned upgrades of the transmission providers in each region, shall occur on a mutually agreeable timetable, taking into account each region's transmission planning process timeline.

1.2 **Review of Proposed Interregional Transmission Projects:** The SERTP Transmission Providers and the Office of the Interconnection will also coordinate with regard to the evaluation of interregional transmission projects identified by the SERTP Transmission Providers and the Office of the Interconnection as well as interregional transmission projects proposed for Interregional Cost Allocation Purposes ("Interregional CAP"), pursuant to Sections 3 below and Schedule 12-B of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff. Initial coordination activities regarding new interregional proposals will typically begin during the third calendar quarter. The SERTP Transmission Providers and the Office of the Interconnection will exchange status updates for new interregional transmission project proposals or proposals currently under consideration as needed. These status updates will generally include, if applicable: (i) an update of the region's evaluation of the proposal; (ii) the latest calculation of Regional Benefits (as defined in Schedule 12-B); (iii) the anticipated timeline for future assessments; and (iv) reevaluations related to the proposal.

1.3 **Coordination of Assumptions Used in Joint Evaluation:** The SERTP Transmission Providers and the Office of the Interconnection will coordinate assumptions used in joint evaluations, as necessary, which includes items such as:

1.3.1 Expected timelines/milestones associated with the joint evaluation
1.3.2 Study assumptions
1.3.3 Regional benefit calculations

1.4 **Posting of Materials on Regional Planning Websites:** The SERTP Transmission Providers and the Office of the Interconnection will coordinate with respect to the posting of materials related to the interregional coordination procedures described in this Schedule 6-A on each region's regional planning website.

2. **Data Exchange**

2.1 At least annually, each of the SERTP Transmission Providers and the Office of the Interconnection shall exchange power-flow models and associated data used in the regional transmission planning processes to develop their respective then-current regional transmission plan(s). This exchange will occur when such data is available in each of the transmission planning processes, typically during the first calendar quarter. Additional transmission-based models and data may be exchanged between the SERTP Transmission Providers and the Office of the Interconnection as necessary and if requested. For purposes of the interregional coordination activities outlined in this Schedule 6-A, only data and models used in the development of the SERTP Transmission Provider's and the Office of the Interconnection's then-current regional transmission plans and used in their respective regional transmission planning processes will be exchanged. This data will be posted on the pertinent regional transmission planning process' websites, consistent with the posting requirements of the respective regional transmission planning processes, and is considered CEII. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the SERTP Transmission Providers of such posting.

2.2 The RTEP will be posted on the Office of the Interconnection's Regional Planning website pursuant to the Office of the Interconnection's regional transmission planning process. The Office of the Interconnection shall notify the SERTP Transmission Providers of such posting so that the SERTP Transmission Providers may retrieve these transmission plans. Each of the SERTP Transmission Providers will exchange its then-current regional plan(s) in a similar manner according to its regional transmission planning process.

3. **Joint Evaluation**

3.1 **Identification of Interregional Transmission Projects:** The SERTP Transmission Providers and the Office of the Interconnection shall exchange planning models and data and current regional transmission plans as described in Section 2. Each SERTP Transmission Provider and the Office of the Interconnection will review one another's then-current regional transmission plan(s) in accordance with the coordination procedures described in Section 1 and their respective regional transmission planning processes. If through this review, a SERTP Transmission Provider and the Office of the Interconnection identify a potential interregional transmission project that could be more efficient or cost effective than projects included in the respective regional plans, the SERTP Transmission Provider and the Office of the Interconnection will jointly evaluate the potential project pursuant to Section 3.3.

3.2 **Identification of Interregional Transmission Projects by Stakeholders:** Stakeholders may propose projects that may be more efficient or cost-effective than projects included in the SERTP Transmission Providers' and the Office of the Interconnection's regional transmission plans pursuant to the procedures in each region's regional transmission planning processes. The SERTP Transmission Providers and Office of the Interconnection will evaluate interregional transmission projects proposed by stakeholders pursuant to Section 3.3.

3.3 **Evaluation of Interregional Transmission Projects:** The SERTP Transmission Providers and the Office of the Interconnection shall act through their respective regional transmission planning processes to evaluate potential interregional transmission projects and to determine whether the inclusion of any potential interregional transmission projects in each region's regional transmission plan would be more efficient or cost-effective than projects included in the respective then-current regional transmission plans. Such analysis shall be consistent with accepted planning practices of the respective regions and the methods utilized to produce each region's respective regional transmission plan(s). The Office of the Interconnection will evaluate potential interregional transmission projects consistent with Schedule 6 and the PJM Manuals 14A entitled Generation and Transmission Interconnection Process and 14B entitled PJM Region Transmission Planning Process on the PJM Website at http://www.pjm.com/documents/manuals.aspx. To the extent possible and as needed, assumptions and models will be coordinated between the SERTP Transmission Providers and the Office of the Interconnection, as described in Section 1. Data shall be exchanged to facilitate this evaluation using the procedures described in Section 2.

3.4 **Evaluation of Interregional Transmission Projects Proposed for Interregional Cost Allocation Purposes:** Interregional transmission projects proposed for Interregional CAP must be submitted in both the SERTP and PJM regional transmission planning processes. The project submittals must satisfy the applicable requirements for submittal of interregional transmission projects, including those in Schedule 6 of this Agreement and Schedule 12-B of the PJM Tariff. The submittals in the respective regional transmission planning processes must identify the project proposal as interregional in scope and identify SERTP and PJM as the regions in which the project is proposed to interconnect. The Office of the Interconnection will determine whether the submittal for the proposed interregional transmission project satisfies all applicable requirements. Upon finding that the project submittal satisfies all such applicable requirements, the Office of the Interconnection will notify the SERTP Transmission Provider. Upon both regions so notifying one another that the project is eligible for consideration pursuant to their respective regional transmission planning processes, the SERTP Transmission Provider and the Office of the Interconnection will jointly evaluate the proposed interregional projects.

3.4.1 If an interregional transmission project is proposed in the SERTP and Office of Interconnection for Interregional CAP, the initial evaluation of the project will typically begin during the third calendar quarter, with analysis conducted in the same manner as analysis of interregional projects identified pursuant to Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Further evaluation shall also be performed pursuant to this Section 3.4. Projects proposed for Interregional CAP shall also be subject to the requirements of Schedule 12-B.

3.4.2. Each region, acting through its regional transmission planning process, will evaluate proposals to determine whether the interregional transmission project(s) proposed for Interregional CAP addresses transmission needs that are currently being addressed with projects in its regional transmission plan(s) and, if so, which projects in the regional transmission plan(s) could be displaced by the proposed project(s).

3.4.3. Based upon its evaluation, each region will quantify a Regional Benefit based upon the transmission costs that each region is projected to avoid due to its transmission projects being displaced by the proposed project. For purposes of this Schedule 6-A, "Regional Benefit" means: (i) for the SERTP Transmission Providers, the total avoided costs of projects included in the then-current regional transmission plan that would be displaced if the proposed interregional transmission project was included and (ii) for the Office of the Interconnection, the total avoided costs of projects included in the then-current regional transmission plan that would be displaced if the proposed interregional transmission project was included. The Regional Benefit is not necessarily the same as the benefits used for purposes of regional cost allocation.

3.5 **Inclusion of Interregional Projects Proposed for Interregional CAP in Regional Transmission Plans:** An interregional transmission project proposed for Interregional CAP in the SERTP and Office of the Interconnection will be included in the respective regional plans for purposes of cost allocation only after it has been selected by both the SERTP and Office of the Interconnection regional processes to be included in their respective regional plans for purposes of cost allocation.

3.5.1. To be selected in both the SERTP and Office of the Interconnection regional plans for purposes of cost allocation means that each region has performed all evaluations, as prescribed in its regional transmission planning processes, necessary for a project to be included in its regional transmission plans for purposes of cost allocation.

- For SERTP: All requisite approvals are obtained, as prescribed in the SERTP regional transmission planning process, necessary for a project to be included in the SERTP regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation. This includes any requisite regional benefit to cost ("BTC") ratio calculations performed pursuant to the respective regional transmission planning processes. For purposes of the SERTP, the anticipated allocation of costs of the interregional transmission project for use in the regional BTC ratio calculation shall be based upon the ratio of the SERTP's Regional Benefit to the sum of the Regional Benefits identified for both the SERTP and the Office of the Interconnection; and

- For the Office of Interconnection: All requisite approvals are obtained, as prescribed in the PJM regional transmission planning process, necessary for a project to be included in the RTEP for purposes of cost allocation.

3.6 **Removal from Regional Plans:** An interregional transmission project may be removed from the SERTP's or Office of the Interconnection's regional plan for purposes of cost allocation: (i) if the developer fails to meet developmental milestones; (ii) pursuant to the reevaluation procedures specified in the respective regional transmission planning processes; or (iii) if the project is removed from one of the region's regional transmission plan(s) pursuant to the requirements of its regional transmission planning process.

3.6.1 The Office of the Interconnection, shall notify the SERTP Transmission Provider if an interregional project or a portion thereof is likely to be removed from its regional transmission plan.

4. **Transparency**

4.1 The Office of the Interconnection shall post procedures for coordination and joint evaluation on the Regional Planning website.

4.2 Access to the data utilized will be made available through the Regional Planning website subject to the appropriate clearance, as applicable (such as CEII and confidential non-CEII). Both planning regions will make available, on their respective regional websites, links to where stakeholders can register (if applicable/available) for the stakeholder committees or distribution lists of the other planning region.

4.3 PJM will provide status updates of SERTP interregional activities to the TEAC including:

- Facilities to be evaluated
- Analysis performed
- Determinations/results.

4.4 Stakeholders will have an opportunity to provide input and feedback within the respective regional planning processes of SERTP and the Office of the Interconnection related to interregional facilities identified, analysis performed, and any determination/results. Stakeholders may participate in either or both regions' regional planning processes to provide their input and feedback regarding the interregional coordination between the SERTP and the Office of the Interconnection.

4.5 The Office of the Interconnection will post a list on the Regional Planning Website of interregional transmission projects proposed for purposes of cost allocation in both the SERTP and PJM that are not eligible for consideration because they do not satisfy the regional project threshold criteria of one or both of the regions as well as post an explanation of the thresholds the proposed interregional project failed to satisfy.

SCHEDULE 6-B
Interregional Transmission Coordination Between
PJM, New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and ISO New England Inc.

PJM, its Transmission Owners, and any other interested parties shall coordinate system planning activities with neighboring planning regions, (*i.e.*, New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and ISO New England Inc.) ("ISO/RTO Regions") pursuant to the Northeastern Planning Protocol ("Protocol") identified at section 1.5.5(b) of Schedule 6 herein.

The Interregional Planning Protocol includes a description of the committee structure, processes, and procedures through which system planning activities are openly and transparently coordinated by the ISO/RTO Regions. The objective of the interregional planning process is to contribute to the on-going reliability and the enhanced operational and economic performance of the ISO/RTO Regions through: (i) exchange of relevant data and information; (ii) coordination of procedures to evaluate certain interconnection and transmission service requests; (iii) periodic comprehensive interregional assessments; (iv) identification and evaluation of potential Interregional Transmission Projects that can address regional needs in a manner that may be more efficient or cost-effective than separate regional solutions, in accordance with the requirements of Order No. 1000.

Section 9 of the Protocol indicates that the cost allocation for identified interregional transmission projects between PJM and NYISO shall be conducted in accordance with the Joint Operating Agreement Among and Between New York Independent System Operator, Inc. and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. referenced at section 1.5.5(b) of this Schedule 6

The planning activities of the ISO/RTO Regions shall be conducted consistent with the planning criteria of each ISO/RTO Region. The ISO/RTO Regions shall periodically produce a Northeastern Coordinated System Plan that integrates the system plans of all of the ISO/RTO Regions.

SCHEDULE 7 -
UNDERFREQUENCY RELAY OBLIGATIONS AND CHARGES

1. UNDERFREQUENCY RELAY OBLIGATION

1.1 Application.

The obligations of this Schedule apply to each Member that is an Electric Distributor, whether or not that Member participates in the Electric Distributor sector on the Members Committee or meets the eligibility requirements for any other sector of the Members Committee.

1.1A Counterparty.

PJMSettlement is the Counterparty to obligations and all payments and distributions associated with underfrequency relay obligations and charges pursuant to this Schedule 7.

1.2 Obligations.

(a) Each Electric Distributor in the PJM Mid-Atlantic Region shall install or contractually arrange for underfrequency relays to interrupt at least 30 percent of its peak load with 10 percent of the load interrupted at each of three frequency levels: 59.3 Hz, 58.9 Hz and 58.5 Hz. Upon the request of the Members Committee, each Electric Distributor in the PJM Mid-Atlantic Region shall document that it has complied with the requirement for underfrequency load shedding relays.

(b) Each Electric Distributor in the PJM West Region shall install or contractually arrange for underfrequency relays to interrupt at least 25 percent of its peak load with 5 percent of the load interrupted at each of five frequency levels: 59.5 Hz, 59.3 Hz, 59.1 Hz, 58.9 Hz, and 58.7 Hz; provided, however, that each Electric Distributor in the Commonwealth Edison Company Zone shall install or contractually arrange for underfrequency relays to interrupt at least 30 percent of its peak load with 10 percent of the load interrupted at each of three frequency levels: 59.3 Hz, 59.0 Hz, and 58.7 Hz. Upon the request of the Markets and Reliability Committee established by the Reliability Assurance Agreement, each Electric Distributor in the PJM West Region shall document that it has complied with the requirement for underfrequency load shedding relays.

(c) Each Electric Distributor in the PJM South Region shall install or contractually arrange for underfrequency relays to interrupt at least 30 percent of its peak load with 10 percent of the load interrupted at each of 3 frequency levels: 59.3 Hz, 59.0 Hz, 58.5 Hz. Upon the request of the Markets and Reliability Committee established by the Reliability Assurance Agreement, each Electric Distributor in the PJM South Region shall document that it has complied with the requirement for underfrequency load shedding relays.

2. UNDERFREQUENCY RELAY CHARGES

If an Electric Distributor is determined to not have the required underfrequency relays, it shall pay an underfrequency relay charge of:

Charge = D x R x 365

where

D = the amount, in megawatts, the Electric Distributor is deficient; and

R = the daily rate per megawatt, which shall be based on the annual carrying charges for a new combustion turbine generator, installed and connected to the transmission system, which daily deficiency rate as of the Effective Date shall be $58.400/per kilowatt-year or $160 per megawatt-day.

3. DISTRIBUTION OF UNDERFREQUENCY RELAY CHARGES

3.1 Share of Charges.

Each Electric Distributor that has complied with the requirements for underfrequency relays imposed by this Agreement during a Planning Period, without incurring an underfrequency relay charge, shall share in any underfrequency relay charges paid by any other Electric Distributor that has failed to satisfy said obligation during such Planning Period. Such shares shall be in proportion to the number of megawatts of a Electric Distributor's load in the most recently completed month at the time of the peak for the PJM Region during that month rounded to the next higher whole megawatt, as established initially on the Effective Date and as updated at the beginning of each month thereafter.

3.2 Allocation by the Office of the Interconnection.

In the event all of the Electric Distributors have incurred underfrequency relay charges during a Planning Period, the underfrequency relay charges shall be distributed among the Electric Distributors on an equitable basis as determined by the Office of the Interconnection.

SCHEDULE 8 -
DELEGATION OF PJM REGION RELIABILITY RESPONSIBILITIES

1. DELEGATION

The following responsibilities shall be delegated to the Office of the Interconnection by the parties to the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

2. NEW PARTIES

With regard to the addition, withdrawal or removal of a party to the Reliability Assurance Agreement, the Office of the Interconnection shall:

(a) Receive and evaluate the information submitted by entities that plan to serve loads within the PJM Region, including entities whose participation in the Agreement will expand the boundaries of the PJM Region. Such evaluation shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement; and

(b) Evaluate the effects of the withdrawal or removal of a party from the Reliability Assurance Agreement.

3. IMPLEMENTATION OF RELIABILITY ASSURANCE AGREEMENT

With regard to the implementation of the provisions of the Reliability Assurance Agreement, the Office of the Interconnection shall:

(a) Receive all required data and forecasts from the parties to the Reliability Assurance Agreement and other owners or providers of Capacity Resources;

(b) Perform all calculations and analyses necessary to determine the Forecast Pool Requirement and the capacity obligations imposed under the Reliability Assurance Agreement, including periodic reviews of the capacity benefit margin for consistency with the Reliability Principles and Standards, as the foregoing terms are defined in the Reliability Assurance Agreement;

(c) Monitor the compliance of each party to the Reliability Assurance Agreement with its obligations under the Reliability Assurance Agreement;

(d) Keep cost records, and bill and collect any costs or charges due from the parties to the Reliability Assurance Agreement and distribute those charges in accordance with the terms of the Reliability Assurance Agreement;

(e) Assist with the development of rules and procedures for determining and demonstrating the capability of Capacity Resources;

(f) Establish the capability and deliverability of Generation Capacity Resources consistent with the requirements of the Reliability Assurance Agreement;

(g) Establish standards and procedures for Planned Demand Resources;

(h) Collect and maintain generator availability data;

(i) Perform any other forecasts, studies or analyses required to administer the Reliability Assurance Agreement;

(j) Coordinate maintenance schedules for generation resources operated as part of the PJM Region;

(k) Determine and declare that an Emergency exists or has ceased to exist in all or any part of the PJM Region or announce that an Emergency exists or ceases to exist in a Control Area interconnected with the PJM Region;

(l) Enter into agreements for (i) the transfer of energy in Emergencies in the PJM Region or in a Control Area interconnected with the PJM Region and (ii) mutual support in such Emergencies with other Control Areas interconnected with the PJM Region; and

(m) Coordinate the curtailment or shedding of load, or other measures appropriate to alleviate an Emergency, to preserve reliability in accordance with FERC, NERC or Applicable Regional

Reliability Council principles, guidelines, standards and requirements and the PJM Manuals, and to ensure the operation of the PJM Region in accordance with Good Utility Practice.

SCHEDULE 9

[Reserved for Future Use]

SCHEDULE 10 -
FORM OF NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT

THIS NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is made this ___ day of __________, 20__, by and between ___________________, an Authorized Person, as defined below, and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability company, with offices at 2750 Monroe Blvd., Audubon, PA 19403 ("PJM"). The Authorized Person and PJM shall be referred to herein individually as a "Party," or collectively as the "Parties."

RECITALS

Whereas, PJM serves as the Regional Transmission Organization with reliability and/or functional control responsibilities over transmission systems involving fourteen states including the District of Columbia, and operates and oversees wholesale markets for electricity pursuant to the requirements of the PJM Tariff and the Operating Agreement, as defined below; and

Whereas, the PJM Market Monitor serves as the monitor for PJM's wholesale markets for electricity, and

Whereas, the Operating Agreement requires that PJM and the PJM Market Monitor maintain the confidentiality of Confidential Information; and

Whereas, the Operating Agreement requires PJM and the PJM Market Monitor to disclose Confidential Information to Authorized Persons upon satisfaction of conditions stated in the Operating Agreement, which may include, but are not limited to, the execution of this Agreement by the Authorized Person and the maintenance of the confidentiality of such information pursuant to the terms of this Agreement; and

Whereas, PJM desires to provide Authorized Persons with the broadest possible access to Confidential Information, consistent with PJM's and the PJM Market Monitor's obligations and duties under the PJM Operating Agreement, the PJM Tariff and other applicable FERC directives; and

Whereas, this Agreement is a statement of the conditions and requirements, consistent with the requirements of the Operating Agreement, whereby PJM or the PJM Market Monitor may provide Confidential Information to the Authorized Person.

NOW, THEREFORE, **intending to be legally bound, the Parties hereby agree as follows:**

1. DEFINITIONS.

1.1 Affected Member.

A Member of PJM which as a result of its participation in PJM's markets or its membership in PJM provided Confidential Information to PJM, which Confidential Information is requested by, or is disclosed to an Authorized Person under this Agreement.

1.2 Authorized Commission.

(i) A State (which shall include the District of Columbia) public utility commission that regulates the distribution or supply of electricity to retail customers and is legally charged with monitoring the operation of wholesale or retail markets serving retail suppliers or customers within its State or (ii) an association or organization comprised exclusively of State public utility commissions described in the immediately preceding clause (i).

1.3 Authorized Person.

A person, including the undersigned, which has executed this Agreement and is authorized in writing by an Authorized Commission to receive and discuss Confidential Information. Authorized Persons may include attorneys representing an Authorized Commission or consultants and/or contractors directly employed or retained by an Authorized Commission, provided however that consultants or contractors may not initiate requests for Confidential Information from PJM or the PJM Market Monitor.

1.4 Confidential Information.

Any information that would be considered non-public or confidential under the Operating Agreement.

1.5 FERC.

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

1.6 Information Request.

A written request, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement for disclosure of Confidential Information pursuant to Section 18.17.4 of the Operating Agreement.

1.7 Operating Agreement.

The Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., as it may be further amended or restated from time to time.

1.8 PJM Market Monitor.

The Market Monitoring Unit established under Attachment M to the PJM Tariff.

1.9 PJM Tariff.

The PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, as it may be amended from time to time.

1.10 Third Party Request.

Any request or demand by any entity upon an Authorized Person or an Authorized Commission for release or disclosure of Confidential Information. A Third Party Request shall include, but shall not be limited to, any subpoena, discovery request, or other request for Confidential Information made by any: (i) federal, state, or local governmental subdivision, department, official, agency or court, or (ii) arbitration panel, business, company, entity or individual.

2. Protection of Confidentiality.

2.1 Duty to Not Disclose.

The Authorized Person represents and warrants that he or she: (i) is presently an Authorized Person as defined herein; (ii) is duly authorized to enter into and perform this Agreement; (iii) has adequate procedures to protect against the release of Confidential Information, and (iv) is familiar with, and will comply with, all such applicable Authorized Commission procedures. The Authorized Person hereby covenants and agrees on behalf of himself or herself to deny any Third Party Request and defend against any legal process which seeks the release of Confidential Information in contravention of the terms of this Agreement.