PUCO EXHIBIT FILING

Date of Hearing:	·
Case No. 14-1693-EL-RDR 14-1694-EL-AAM	-
PUCO Case Caption: In the Matter of the application Seeks	~
approval of Ohio Power Companys Proposal to	a .
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Inclusion in the Power Puchase agreement Rides.	Tills
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Reporter's Signature:	
Date Submitted:	

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BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the Application Seeking Approval of Ohio Power

Approval of Ohio Power :
Company's Proposal to : Case No. 14-1693-EL-RDR
Enter into an Affiliate :

Enter into an Affiliate : Power Purchase Agreement : for Inclusion in the Power: Purchase Agreement Rider. :

In the Matter of the : Application of Ohio Power :

Company for Approval of : Case No. 14-1694-EL-AAM

Certain Accounting : Authority. :

PROCEEDINGS

before Ms. Greta See and Ms. Sarah Parrot, Attorney Examiners, at the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 180 East Broad Street, Room 11-D, Columbus, Ohio, called at 9 a.m. on Tuesday, October 6, 2015.

VOLUME VII

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
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BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the Application of)	
Ohio Power Company for Authority to)	Case No. 13-2385-EL-SSO
Establish a Standard Service Offer)	
Pursuant to §4928.143, Revised Code.)	
in the Form of an Electric Security Plan)	
In the Matter of the Application of)	
Ohio Power Company for Approval of)	Case No. 13-2386-EL-AAM
Certain Accounting Authority)	

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM A. ALLEN IN SUPPORT OF AEP OHIO'S ELECTRIC SECURITY PLAN

Filed: June 20, 2014



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Storm Damage Recovery Rider	10
Carrying Costs on Regulatory Assets	13

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM A. ALLEN ON BEHALF OF OHIO POWER COMPANY

1 PERSONAL DATA

- 2 O. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
- 3 A. My name is William A. Allen, and my business address is 1 Riverside Plaza, Columbus,
- 4 Ohio 43215.
- 5 Q. DID YOU PRESENT DIRECT TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?
- 6 A. Yes.

7 PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY

- 8 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?
- 9 A. The purpose of my testimony is to rebut certain claims made by various parties in this
- case related to the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) rider, the Storm Damage Recovery
- Rider (SDRR), and carrying costs on regulatory assets. Specifically, I will show that 1)
- the most appropriate estimate of the PPA rider shows a net customer benefit of \$8 million
- over the ESP term; 2) the PPA rider provides a price stabilizing tool for all customers that
- is not available through other mechanisms; 3) the proposed modifications to the
- 15 Company's SDRR are inappropriate and inconsistent with historical rate making
- treatment and 4) the weighted average cost of capital is the most appropriate carrying cost
- to apply to regulatory assets that have deferrals longer than a year.

18 Q. WHAT EXHIBITS ARE YOU SPONSORING?

19 A. I am sponsoring the following exhibits:

1		Exhibit WAA-R1 Impact of Staggered and Laddered SSO Auctions
2		Exhibit WAA-R2 PPA Rider Mitigation of Market Price Changes
3		Exhibit WAA-R3 Summary of CRES Offer Terms
4		Exhibit WAA-R4 Summary of CRES Offer Price Changes
5		Exhibit WAA-R5 Upper Arlington Governmental Aggregation Price Changes
6		Exhibit WAA-R6 Response to Staff Data Request 6-010
7		Exhibit WAA-R7 Response to Staff Data Request 6-008
8	POW	ER PURCHASE AGREEMENT RIDER
9	Q.	STAFF WITNESS DR. CHOUEIKI STATES ON PAGE 10, LINE 16, THROUGH
10		PAGE 11, LINE 3, THAT MARKET PRICE VOLATILITY CAN BE
11		MITIGATED BY STAGGERING AUCTIONS FOR SSO PROCUREMENTS AND
12		LADDERING MULTIPLE AUCTION PRODUCTS FOR SSO PROCUREMENTS
13		MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN THE PPA RIDER. HE ALSO MAINTAINED
14		THE POSITION DURING CROSS EXAMINATION THAT THESE TWO TOOLS
15		ALONE ADEQUATELY MANAGE MARKET PRICE VOLATILITY (TR. XII
16		AT 2924, 2933-34, 2936). DO YOU AGREE WITH THESE CONCLUSIONS?
17	A.	No. First, it is important to recognize that staggering and laddering only impacts the SSO
18		price and does not impact the price paid by shopping customers. Second, staggering and
19		laddering only smooth the impact of price changes for SSO customers and cannot
20		mitigate fundamental changes in market prices. I do agree that staggering auctions for
21		SSO procurements can address some of the risk of market volatility resulting from short

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term changes in forward market prices for a comparable product. Exhibit WAA-R1, page

1, shows that for the FirstEnergy SSO auctions the blending of October 2013 auctions

with January 2014 auctions mitigated half of the auction price increase of \$4.92/MWh and \$8.32/MWh that occurred in January of 2014 for the two products procured in those auctions. Laddering auction products has the effect of mitigating short-term changes in market prices for SSO customers. But as AEP Ohio witness Dr. McDermott testifies in his testimony, the SSO laddering only addresses short-term volatility and has no mitigating impacts on long-term volatility. In addition, the use of this auction design method can also have unintended consequences that should be carefully considered. As an example, laddering auction products essentially averages capacity clearing prices across multiple planning years. If a this laddering averages a high near term capacity price with lower future capacity prices, CRES providers may not be able to offer competitive one year products that include that high capacity price. Because the SSO determines the price to compare that drives shopping decisions by retail customers, this kind of price impact could affect CRES providers' ability to compete with the SSO during a particular period. Finally, to the extent there are some benefits of staggering and laddering, that strategy should not be used to the exclusion of further efforts that can provide an additional rate stabilization impact for all customers.

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By contrast, the PPA rider is fundamentally different and unique from the staggering and laddering options that Staff witness Dr. Choueiki supports. The PPA rider by design moves in a manner counter to market prices. Exhibit WAA-R2 provides an example of how the PPA rider can mitigate the impact of market price changes for both SSO and shopping customers. This exhibit demonstrates that a PPA rider, including only the OVEC entitlement, would mitigate \$0.35/MWh of a \$5/MWh change in market prices or 7% of that change. In addition, this exhibit demonstrates that an expanded PPA rider

including 3,000 MW of generating capacity would mitigate \$2.39/MWh of a \$5/MWh change in market prices or 48% of that change. Moreover, because the PPA rider would not affect the price to compare, it would not adversely affect the competitive retail market.

Q.

Α.

Staff witness Dr. Choueiki states that there are two tools that the Commission currently can use to mitigate price volatility and that these tools should be used exclusively (Tr. XII at 2924). The PPA rider is another tool that the Commission should recognize as beneficial to providing added price stability for customers. Given the importance of rate stability to retail customers there is no good reason to exclude such effective tools from the Commissions regulatory tool box.

EXELON WITNESS CAMPBELL STATES AT PAGE 15 LINE 23 THROUGH
PAGE 16 LINE 2 OF HIS DIRECT TESTIMONY "IN CONTRAST, ABSENT
THE RIDER PPA CHARGE, A COMPETITIVE SUPPLIER CAN OFFER A
CUSTOMER A STABLE, LONG TERM, FIXED PRICE AT A MUCH LOWER
RATE THAT IS REFLECTIVE OF MARKET PRICES." DO YOU AGREE?

No. While it is theoretically possible that a competitive supplier could offer long term stable offers, the fact is that they do not currently do so. I have used data from the Commission's Apples-to-Apples web page to review the current Competitive Retail Electric Service (CRES) offerings to residential customers across all six Ohio Electric Distribution Utilities (EDUs). This data demonstrates that CRES providers are not offering long term stable offers. In fact, the vast majority of offers (72.4%) are for terms of 12 months or less and there are no offers in the AEP Ohio service territory exceeding 36 months. I have included a summary of this data in Exhibit WAA-R3. The short-term

nature of these contracts results in customers needing to sign new contracts on a regular basis which creates volatility for customers as they transition from one contract to another. Based upon a review of CRES offerings of comparable terms one can see that this transition can result in significant volatility in the form of generation rate changes of at least 9.7% and up to 48.4% over the most recent 12-month period. I have included a summary of this data in Exhibit WAA-R4. The same phenomenon can occur for customers served by CRES providers through governmental aggregation. As shown in Exhibit WAA-R5, the CRES pricing for customers served under the Upper Arlington governmental aggregation program will see their price increase from 5.545 ¢/kWh to 7.84 ¢/kWh, or just over 41%, this year.

The risk of shopping customers seeing significant price volatility is exacerbated by the fact that many CRES contracts for residential customers include a rollover provision that automatically enrolls the customer in a new market based variable rate plan or a fixed rate plan unless the customer the customer takes action. Unless the customer takes proactive action, a new and potentially higher rate unilaterally charged by the CRES provider will automatically apply.

- 17 Q. DOES THE APPROACH RECOMMENDED BY STAFF WITNESS DR.
 18 CHOUEIKI ADDRESS MARKET VOLATILITY ASSOCIATED WITH CRES
 19 OFFERS OR GOVERNMENTAL AGGREGATION?
- 20 A. No. The exclusive use of SSO auction laddering/staggering recommended by Staff does nothing to address this market volatility.
- Q. OCC WITNESS WILSON TESTIFIED THAT THE COST OF THE PPA RIDER
 WOULD BE \$116 MILLION (DIRECT TESTIMONY PAGE 9, LINE 5) OVER

1		THE THREE YEAR TERM OF THE ESP. IEU WITNESS MURRAY INDICATES
2		IN HIS DIRECT TESTIMONY (IEU EX. 1A AT 12) THAT HE BELIEVES THE
3		PPA RIDER IMPACT DURING THE ESP TERM WILL BE \$82 MILLION.
4		HAVE YOU REVIEWED THE ANALYSIS THAT OCC WITNESS WILSON
5		USED TO COME TO THIS CONCLUSION?
6	A.	Yes. In reviewing OCC witness Wilson's analysis that was provided in response to a
7		discovery request I determined that his analysis was fundamentally flawed in a number of
8		ways that make his results unreliable.
9	Q.	CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE FLAWS THAT YOU IDENTIFIED?
10	A.	Yes, OCC witness Wilson's analysis included the following flaws:
11		1. It failed to use the most current forecast data for the OVEC costs;
12		2. It failed to redispatch the units based upon the updated market prices included in
13		his analysis;
14		3. The market prices used in the analysis are not shaped by hour during the day and
15		instead use a single price for all on-peak hours and a single price for all off-peak
16		hours and inappropriately combines this with the company's dispatch that
17		included shaped prices; and
18		4. It arbitrarily reduced the projected output of the units based upon an overly
19		selective set of historical data.
20	Q.	EXPLAIN HOW OCC WITNESS WILSON FAILED TO USE THE MOST
21		CURRENT COST ESTIMATE.
22		The failure to use the most current OVEC cost estimate results in a significantly
23		overstated and incorrect estimate of the PPA rider over the term of the ESP. On page 6,

line 18, through page 7, line 1, of OCC witness Wilson's testimony he states that he "revised the projected Demand Charges to use the actual forecasts provided by OVEC." He also states on page 12, lines 8 through 10, that \$10 million in annual demand charge savings estimated by the Company does not appear to be sufficiently supported. He fails to recognize that the current forecast of OVEC costs (provided by OVEC) which was provided to the parties, including OCC, in response to OEG INT-2-004 (IEU Exhibit 8) demonstrated that expected demand charge savings exceeded those estimated by the Company. Recognition of data available to OCC at the time of the preparation of their testimony demonstrates that the \$30.4 million adjustment included on Table 3 of his testimony is inappropriate. IEU witness Murray also fails to account for the updated OVEC cost data in his estimate of the PPA rider.

A.

Q. EXPLAIN HOW OCC WITNESS WILSON FAILED TO REDISPATCH THE UNITS BASED ON THE UPDATED MARKET PRICES.

The failure to redispatch the units based upon the updated market prices included in his analysis results in revenues that do not align with the market prices that create the revenues. As an example, in the first month of his forecast there are hours where the market price in his forecast exceeds the variable cost of production for the OVEC units by approximately \$15/MWh and yet his model recognizes no revenue for that hour. See AEP Ohio Exhibit 22 (hours 1 through 7; hour 24). Based on a margin of \$15/MWh and a maximum output of 437MW, for every hour that his model fails to reflect appropriate dispatch revenues are understated by over \$6,500. In the first month of his forecast this occurred 61 times which understated revenues by approximately \$400,000. Similarly, in the second month of his forecast there are 37 hours where the market price in his forecast

exceeds the variable cost of production for the OVEC units by approximately \$28/MWh and yet his model recognizes no revenue for that hour resulting in an understatement of revenues of over \$450,000. In January of 2016, his analysis has a similar problem but in this case both the on and off-peak prices exceed the variable cost of the OVEC units by a considerable amount and there are 102 of 744 hours in the month where the units should be economically dispatched and his model fails to do so. These same errors persist throughout his analysis, over 10% of the total hours in the three year forecast period, to such a degree as to make the analysis unreliable and unusable.

A.

Q EXPLAIN HOW OCC WITNESS WILSON FAILED TO USE SHAPED HOURLY MARKET PRICES USED IN HIS ANALYSIS.

The market prices used in the analysis are not shaped¹ by hour during the day and instead use a single price for all on-peak hours and a single price for all off-peak hours and inappropriately combines this with the company's dispatch that included shaped prices. To the extent that his forecast shows the OVEC units not dispatching at the beginning of a peak period in a given day, his analysis understates the revenues associated with the generation during the higher priced peak hours that a shaped price would produce. An example of this flaw in his analysis shows up in the 0700, 0800 and 2200 hours of June 1, 2015 – the first day in his analysis – and persists throughout. While I've observed that this is a flaw in his analysis I have not attempted to quantify the magnitude of the impact. This provides another example of the substantive flaws underlying OCC witness Wilson's testimony provided to the Commission.

¹ Forward prices typically include a single price for the on-peak period and a single price for the off-peak period for each month. The shaping of prices by hour recognizes that prices change in a gradual manner throughout the hours of the day and do not make a step change at the dividing line between on-peak and off-peak. As an example, while 10 AM and 4 PM on a weekday are both peak hours, the projected price using shaped prices would show a lower price for 10 AM and a higher price for 4 PM.

1	Q.	EXPLAIN HO	ow occ	WITN	VESS	WILSON	ARBIT	RA	RILY	REDUC	CED 1	THE
2		PROJECTED	OUTPUT	OF	THE	UNITS	USING	A	SELE	CTIVE	SET	OF
3		HISTORICAL	DATA.									

Q.

A.

OCC witness Wilson's analysis reduced the projected output of the units based upon an overly selective set of historical data. His reduction in the output of the units by approximately 25% relies on only two years' worth of data - 2012 and 2013. His analysis assumes a projected capacity factor of approximately 50%. Other than in 2012 and 2013 when the OVEC units had environmental tie in outages and dispatched in a more limited fashion due to extremely low market prices the OVEC units have historically had capacity factors of approximately 75%. The use of capacity factors that are well below those that would be expected for these units based upon projected market prices results in a significantly overstated cost of the PPA rider. As such, the Commission should not rely upon the quantification of the "Impact of updated generation quantities" provided in Table 3 of OCC witness Wilson's testimony.

Lastly, OCC witness Wilson provides as estimate of the "Impact of Updated AD Hub prices" in Table 3 of his testimony. While I am not disputing (or agreeing with) the accuracy of the AD Hub prices that are included in the analysis, the impact of his updated prices was calculated using the same flawed approach that I have previously described and as such cannot be relied upon.

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD RELY ON THE ANALSYSIS REGARDING THE QUANTITATIVE IMPACT OF THE PPA RIDER PRESENTED BY IEU WITNESS MURRAY OR OCC WITNESS WILSON?

A. No. I've previously discussed the flaws in each of their analysis which renders each unreliable for use by the Commission. The most appropriate estimate of the PPA rider over the ESP period is the estimate provided as AEP Exhibit 8A which showed a net credit of \$8 million over the three year period.

STORM DAMAGE RECOVERY RIDER

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- 6 Q. IN STAFF EXHIBIT 12 AND DURING CROSS-EXAMINATION, STAFF 7 WITNESS LIPTHRATT RECOMMENDED CONSIDERATION OF EXPENSES 8 AND REVENUES ASSOCIATED WITH MUTUAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES 9 BEING PROVIDED TO OTHER UTILITIES AS AN OFFSET TO THE 10 PROPOSED STORM RIDER RECOVERY. HOWEVER, STAFF WITNESS 11 LIPTHRATT INDICATED HE WAS UNAWARE IF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE 12 COSTS AND EXPENSES WERE ALREADY INCLUDED RATES, WILL YOU 13 PLEASE EXPLAIN?
- 14 A. Yes, Staff witness Lipthratt's assumptions about Ohio Power's rates are incorrect.

 Revenues and expenses associated with mutual assistance provided to other utilities are

 not included in rates or in the storm threshold baseline established by the Commission, as

 proposed by Staff in prior cases.

First and foremost the expenses and revenues associated with providing mutual assistance to peer utilities in emergencies are not included in base rates. Staff witness Lipthratt had that information available to him in this case in the response to Staff Data Request 6-010, where the Company indicated that these mutual assistance expenses and revenues are included in Account 186. (See Exhibit WAA-R6) Account 186 is not included in base rates. Staff witness Lipthratt's recommendation is based entirely on a

	taise premise that costs associated with providing inditial assistance for peer duffiles,
	such as food, travel, lodging, etc., are included in base rates. The costs associated with
	providing mutual assistance to peer utilities are not included in base rates and as such it
	would be improper to credit the revenues that offset the cost of providing mutual
	assistance in the SDRR.
Q.	STAFF WITNESS LIPTHRATT STATES ON PAGE 5, LINES 1 THROUGH 3,
	"THE FIRST 40 HOURS THAT THE EMPLOYEE WORKS IN A WEEK IS
	CONSIDERED TO BE IN BASE RATES AND SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN
	THE SDRR REVENUE REQUIREMENT." DO YOU AGREE WITH HIS
	RECOMMENDATION?
A.	No. Staff witness Lipthratt's recommendation is based upon the false premise that the
	first 40 hours that an employee works in a week is included in base rates. When Staff
	witness Hecker recommended the \$5 million baseline for major storm expenses, his
	analysis was based upon the Company's policy to categorize incremental storm cost.
	Staff witness Lipthratt supports his recommendation with the following statement on
	page 5, lines 9 through 13, of his testimony:
	"When rates are calculated in a base rate case, Staff determines the number of employees that typically work in a week and multiplies it by 40 hours and the wage rates to arrive to an amount of labor to be included in base rates. Therefore, theoretically, the pay for the first 40 hours in a week for management and union employees is included in base rates."
	This statement does not reflect how base rates were determined in the Company's most

recent base rate case, Case No 11-351-EL-AIR, et al. The Staff analysis that was the

basis of the revenue requirement determined in that case used actual expenses for the test

year and did not include a projected level of labor as indicated by Staff witness Lipthratt.

Q. WHAT WAS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN CASE NO. 11-351-EL-AIR, ET AL?

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- A. At the time, my position was Director of Regulatory Case Management and my group
 was responsible for the preparation of that case as well as the review of the Staff Report
 that was filed in that case. I personally reviewed or directed the review of the
 recommendations included in the Staff Report. I also participated in the settlement
 discussions that lead to resolution of the proceeding.
- STAFF WITNESS LIPTHRATT INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT REVIEW 7 Q. 8 ANY COMPANY UNION CONTRACTS OR EXEMPT EMPLOYEE POLICIES 9 (TR. VOLUME VII AT 1699 AND 1702) TO DETERMINE THE RIGHTS AND 10 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMPANY IN PAYMENT OF EMPLOYEES 11 FOR MAJOR **STORM** RESTORATION **EFFORTS** FOR HIS 12 RECOMMENDATION PROPOSED IN STAFF EXHIBIT 11. DOES HIS 13 RECOMMENDATION ON OVERTIME PAYMENT PROPERLY REFLECT THE EXISTING CONTRACTS OF OHIO POWER? 14
 - No, Staff witness Lipthratt again ignored the information available to him in Staff DR 6-008 (see Exhibit WAA-R7) that discussed the incremental nature of labor and overtime and where to look for more information. Staff DR 6-008 discussed the unique accounting codes for major storms and the accounting of storms consistent with the Staff witness Hecker's approach in Case Nos. 11-346-EL-SSO and Company Mitchell's Exhibit TEM-2 in Case No. 12-3255-EL-RDR (the 2012 storm case Staff witness Lipthratt relies upon exclusively in cross examination). As indicated in the response provided Staff witness Lipthratt, all applicable incremental major storm O&M expenses including Company overtime are paid in accordance with its policies and contract labor are included in the

monthly determination of the over/under deferral calculation compared to the \$5 million major storm threshold.

However, Staff witness Lipthratt failed to review those contracts and policies of Ohio Power in making his recommendation that the Commission simply start storm damage recovery for labor at the forty-first hour of every employee. Storm restoration response is different than the normal work day. Major storm restoration personnel work 16 hour days, sometimes in extreme conditions, to restore power as quickly and safely as possible. Employees can be reassigned away from home to other parts of the state to assist in the effort and the Company labor contracts all recognize the heightened nature of major storm restoration response and adjust the overtime in a non-discretionary manner in reaction to the major storm. Staff witness Lipthratt's broad recommendation ignores the realities and intricacies of the Ohio Power contracts and policies while minimizing the restoration efforts of our dedicated staff and field workers.

In addition, the historical \$5 million average has been approved by the PUCO and it included all Company personnel overtime. If Staff now recommends in this proceeding, converting incurred Company paid overtime to straight time, it must recommend a comparable decrease in the \$5 million threshold.

CARRYING COSTS ON REGULATORY ASSETS

Q. STAFF WITNESS LIPTHRATT STATES AT PAGE 3 LINES 18 THROUGH 21

"STAFF BELIEVES A CARRYING CHARGE BASED ON THE LATEST

APPROVED COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT SHOULD BE APPLIED TO ANY

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TOTAL MAJOR STORM COST AND THE \$5

MILLION BASELINE AT THE END OF THE PREVIOS CALENDAR YEAR."

1	DO	YOU	BELIEVE	THAT	$\mathbf{I}\mathbf{T}$	IS	APPROPRIATE	TO	USE	A	LONG-TERM

2 DEBT RATE TO CALCULATE CARRYING COSTS ON REGULATORY

ASSETS LIKE THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SDRR IF RECOVERY IS


EXTENDED BEYOND ONE YEAR?

No. The Company's assets are financed with a combination of debt and equity. To the extent that the company carries additional assets, a regulatory asset in this case, for a period of greater than one year it is appropriate that the carrying costs reflect the Company's weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The WACC reflects the cost of financing the entire Company, including regulatory assets. To assign a long-term debt rate to a regulatory asset fails to recognize that the debt component of the Company's capital structure has already been used to fund other investments. Staff witness Lipthratt's proposal would effectively use the same dollar of debt to finance two investments simultaneously which is a financial impossibility. If the Commission were to adopt the Staff proposal, it would be necessary to remove the value of all regulatory assets that accrue a carrying cost based upon a long-term debt rate from the long-term debt component of the WACC which would have the impact of increasing the WACC for all other investments.

18 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

19 A. Yes.

A.



		FirstEn	FirstEnergy Same Delivery Period Auction Results Comparison	/ Period A	uction Resu	lts Compar	ison		
Auction	Construction To	Control L		Tranche	Tranches	Range	Winning	+/ (-) same	,
Date	service Type		Delivery Period	Target	Procured	Starting Price	(\$/MWH)	prior auction	Average
1/28/2014	Full Requirements	12	6/1/14-5/31/15	16	16	\$80-\$105	\$55.83	\$\$ 000 \$\$	## 639
10/1/2013	Full Requirements	12	6/1/14-5/31/15	16	16	\$80-\$105	\$50.91	34×34	75.500
1/28/2014	Full Requirements	24	6/1/14-5/31/16	17	17	\$80-\$105	\$68,31	¢6 33	3000
10/1/2013	Full Requirements	24	6/1/14-5/31/16	17	17	\$80-\$105	\$59.99	20.00	504.L3
1/1/2013	Full Requirements	36	6/1/13-5/31/16		17	\$85-\$105	\$59.17	(6.3 7.3)	¢60 00
10/1/2012	Full Requirements	36	91/13-2/31/16	4	17	\$80-\$105	\$60.89	132.66	\$0.00
			,						
1/1/2012	Full Requirements	24	6/1/12-5/31/14	(\$\)	17	\$65-\$85	\$44.76	(60 03)	Ç40 00
10/1/2011	Full Requirements	24	6/1/12-5/31/14	41	17	\$75-\$90	\$52.83	(20.07)	340.00
1/1/2011	Full Requirements	12	6/1/11-5/31/12	(Levy	11	\$65-07\$	\$56.13	¢4 F0	7 7 H L W
10/1/2010	Full Requirements	12	21/11-2/31/15	11	17	06\$-59\$	\$54.55	21.30	*****
1/1/2011	Full Requirements	24	6/1/11-5/31/13	(I.e.	17	\$6\$-07\$	\$54.92	¢0 03	4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
10/1/2010	Full Requirements	24	6/1/11-5/31/13	L T	11	06\$-59\$	\$54.10	40.0¢	40.4C
1/1/2011	Full Requirements	36	6/1/11-5/31/14	16	16	\$70-\$95	\$57.47	08 U\$	¢E7 03
10/1/2010	Full Requirements	36	6/1/11-5/31/14	91	91	\$65-590	\$56.58		همد الدياء و الم الجيد الميد

FirstEnergy Auction Results

	detion results				
Delivery Period	Auction Date	Term	Delivery Period	Tranches Procured	Winning Price (\$/MWH)
	1/1/2011	_12	6/1/11-5/31/12	17	\$56.13
	10/1/2010	12	6/1/11-5/31/12	17	\$54.55
	1/1/2011	24	6/1/11-5/31/13	17	\$54.92
6/1/11-5/31/12	10/1/2010	24	6/1/11-5/31/13	17	\$54.10
	1/1/2011	36	6/1/11-5/31/14	16	\$57.47
	10/1/2010	36	6/1/11-5/31/14	16	\$56.58
	Total			100	\$55.60
	1/1/2011	24	6/1/11-5/31/13	17	\$54.92
	10/1/2010	24	6/1/11-5/31/13	17	\$54.10
	1/1/2011	36	6/1/11-5/31/14	16	\$57.47
6/1/12-5/31/13	10/1/2010	36	6/1/11-5/31/14	16	\$56.58
	1/1/2012	24	6/1/12-5/31/14	17	\$44.76
	10/1/2011	24	6/1/12-5/31/14	17	\$52.83
	Total	s		100	\$53.37
	1/1/2011	36	6/1/11-5/31/14	16	\$57.47
	10/1/2010	36	6/1/11-5/31/14	16	\$56.58
	1/1/2012	24	6/1/12-5/31/14	17	\$44.76
6/1/13-5/31/14	10/1/2011	24	6/1/12-5/31/14	17	\$52.83
	1/1/2013	36	6/1/13-5/31/16	17	\$59.17
,	10/1/2012	36	6/1/13-5/31/16	17	\$60.89
	Total			100	\$55.25
	1/1/2013	36	6/1/13-5/31/16	17	\$59.17
	10/1/2012	36	6/1/13-5/31/16	17	\$60.89
	1/28/2014	24	6/1/14-5/31/16	17	\$68.31
6/1/14-5/31/15	10/1/2013	24	6/1/14-5/31/16	17	\$59.99
	1/28/2014	12	6/1/14-5/31/15	16	\$55.83
	10/1/2013	12	6/1/14-5/31/15	16	\$50.91
	Total			100	\$59.30
	1/1/2013	36	6/1/13-5/31/16	17	\$59.17
	10/1/2012	36	6/1/13-5/31/16	17	\$60.89
6/1/15-5/31/16	1/28/2014	24	6/1/14-5/31/16	17	\$68.31
	10/1/2013	24	6/1/14-5/31/16	17	\$59.99
	Total			68	\$62.09

EXHIBIT WAA-R2

		OVEC	Expanded PPA
(1)	Capacity (MW)	437	3,000
(2)	Capacity Factor (%)	75%	75%
(3)	Hours/year	8,760	8,760
(1)*(2)*(3)=(4)	MWh Production	2,871,090	19,710,000
(5)	Change in Market Price (\$/MWh)	5.00	5.00
(4)*(5)=(6)	Change in PPA Rider (\$)	14,355,450	98,550,000
(7)	AEP Ohio Load (MWh)	41,250,000	41,250,000
(6)/(7)=(8)	Change in PPA Rider (\$/MWh)	(0.35)	(2.39)

EXHIBIT WAA-R3

Residential CRES Offer Terms as of June 13, 2014

			EDU Servic	EDU Service Territory			State Totals	Totals
Contract Term	AEP Ohio	DP&L	Duke	30	130	31	Number	Percent
Up to 12 months	35	32	49	97	76	26	194	72.4%
Greater than 12 months and up to 24 months	12	8	12	8	8	8	56	20.9%
Greater than 24 months and up to 36 months	4	3	4	Ţ	T	₩.	14	5.2%
Greater than 36 months	0	0		I	1	T.	77	1.5%
Total Offers	51	43	99	36	36	36	268	100.0%

Source: PUCO Apples to Apples Comparison Charts dated June 13, 2014

EXHIBIT WAA-R4

Residential CRES Offers by Date

				Rate Offered	
CRES	EDU	Term	June 10, 2013	June 13, 2014	Increase
AD Can and Clauthin	A ED Obio	12 months	\$ 0.0749 /kWh		
Ar Gas and Decuir	ALT OILO	12 months		\$ 0.0849 /kWh	13.4%
DSS Enormy	ACD Object	29 months	\$ 0.0679 /kWh		
טר אור בן ופּרְפּאָ	AET OHIO	24 months		\$ 0.0819 /kWh	20.6%
	250 Obj.	12 months	\$ 0.0625 /kWh		
	AET OILIO	12 months		\$ 0.0779 /kwh	24.6%
A ST COMMAND C	AED Obj.	12 months	\$ 0.0644 /kWh		
miregiys fileigy seivices inc	AET OILO	12 months		\$ 0.0824 /kWh.	28.0%
	0,40 aak	24 months	\$ 0.0744 /kWh		
megrys chergy services inc	AET OHO	24 months		\$ 0.0824 /kwh	10.8%
A D Car and Elements		12 months	\$ 0.0610 /kWh		
אר ספא מווט ביפרונות	Olio Edisoli	12 months		\$ 0.0849 /kWh	39.2%
Control of the contro	Ohio Edicon	12 months	\$ 0.0565 /kWh		
ninali kalialianing	O II O E CAISO	12 months		\$ 0.0689 /kWh	21.9%
1000	Ohio Edicon	12 months	\$ 0.0579 /kWh		
Dral Eller By	חווס בתופסוו	12 months		\$ 0.0859 /kWh	48.4%
Date 2 links Date at a color	Object a	12 months	\$ 0.0599 /kWh		
Ouke Elleigy hetali sales	Ollo Edisoli	11 months		\$ 0.0779 /kWh	30.1%
	() () () () () () () () () ()	12 months	\$ 0.0555 /kWh		
FIISTENET BY SOIULIOUS	במונס במונס	14 months		\$ 0.0609 /kWh	9.7%

Source: PUCO Apples to Apples Comparison Charts dated June 10, 2013 and June 13, 2014

EXHIBIT WAA-R5

Phone: 614-583-5000 • Fax: 614-457-6620 • TOD: 614-442-3216

Electrical Aggregation Program with FirstEnergy Solutions Fact Sheet & FAO

Updated June 10, 2014

Updates

• It was originally publicized that the letters would be mailed early June and that the opt out deadline would be Friday, June 27. However, there was a delay in the mailing pushing the mail out date to the week of June 16 and the new opt out date to Monday, July 7. The City apologizes for any confusion this may have caused.

Program Overview

- The City's 24-month Electric Aggregation contract with AEP Retail Energy will be ending this summer
- After seeking proposals from electricity providers, the City has selected FirstEnergy Solutions to provide a new Electric Aggregation Program for eligible households and small businesses for a period of nine months. The term of the contract begins with the July/August 2014 billing cycle.
- The price secured by the City for this program is 7.84 cents per kWh.
- The electricity generation market is currently in a state of fluctuation as electricity providers transition to new competitive regulation. As a result, the rates and term lengths currently offered by electricity providers are not as favorable as they were in 2012 when the City first embarked on an electric aggregation program.
- The week of June 16, eligible households and small businesses in Upper Arlington will be sent a
 joint letter from the City of Upper Arlington and FirstEnergy Solutions that outlines the pricing
 and contract details for a nine-month period. To be automatically included on the eligibility list,
 one of the following criteria must be met:
 - The household or business is participating in the City's 2012-2014 electric aggregation program;
 - The household or business does not have a contract with an electrical provider and is receiving its supply directly from the AEP Ohio utility.
- This is an "opt-out" program therefore, if residents and businesses do nothing, they will automatically be enrolled. They must take action by Monday July 7, 2014 (not the previously publicized Friday, June 27, 2014) to be excluded from the program.
- The "opt-out" approach, which Upper Arlington voters approved, enables FirstEnergy Solutions to offer a lower group rate based on the community's size and estimated pool of program participants.
- There are no early termination penalties for participants who choose to leave the program within the nine-month contract period.

- The City has the ability to terminate the contract under certain circumstances, including if
 FirstEnergy Solutions proposes a price increase during the program that is unacceptable to the
 City.
- Once enrolled in the program, participants will continue to receive their local electric bill from AEP Ohio, which will include FirstEnergy Solutions' charges as a separate line item.
- Program participants should also continue to contact AEP Ohio for all service-related issues, such as outages, meter readings and billing questions.
- When the FirstEnergy Solutions contract draws to a close next spring, the City may choose to seek bids from other electricity providers in order to negotiate a new contract on behalf of eligible households and businesses.
- If the program has not produced an appropriate level of savings for participating customers, the
 City can choose to end the program, at which time participants would be notified of their options
 for continuing in another program with FirstEnergy Solutions, switching to another provider, or
 reverting back to AEP Ohio, the local utility.
- To determine if participating in the City's program is right for you, we encourage you to look at
 the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio's (PUCO) "Apples to Apples" chart for electricity
 providers, which can be accessed at www.puco.ohio.gov
- The number to call at FirstEnergy Solutions for customer service is 866-686-3749, Monday to Friday, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.
- For questions and concerns that cannot be addressed by this Fact Sheet, forward residents to the attention of Megan Hoffman, 583-5027 (mhoffman@uaoh.net), Bob Lamb, 583-5046 (rlamb@uaoh.net) or Emma Speight, 583-5045 (espeight@uaoh.net).

Answers to Frequently Asked Questions

What is the City Electric Aggregation Program?

Under the City of Upper Arlington Electric Aggregation Program, the City has acted on behalf of certain of its electricity consumers to select an electricity provider who, through the power of volume buying, is able to secure electricity at competitive prices. The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio ("PUCO") has taken steps to ensure that Ohio's competitive electricity environment is consumer-friendly. Voters approved the City's ability to establish an electric aggregation program in 2000, and the City Council passed an ordinance adopting an Operation and Governance Plan for Electric Aggregation in 2001.

What is aggregation?

Under governmental aggregation, local officials bring citizens together to gain group buying power for the purchase of competitively priced electricity from a retail electric generation supplier certified by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.

How is my community able to choose a certified electric generation supplier on my behalf? Residents voted in 2000 to allow the community to contract for an electric generation supplier on their behalf.

How will I know if I can save money under the electric governmental aggregation program? You'll know you are saving money as long as your fixed price with FirstEnergy Solutions is lower than your Price to Compare.

What do I need to do if I want to be included in this governmental aggregation?

You do not need to do anything to receive the fixed price offered under this program. You may choose to remain in the aggregation group and begin receiving your discount by simply not returning the opt-out form.

If I join my community's governmental aggregation program, who will deliver my power, read my meter and respond to emergencies, such as power outages?

Your electric utility will be responsible for the delivery of power to your home or business. Since your electric utility still owns the wires and poles that deliver power to you, it will continue to read your meter and restore power after an outage.

Is your price for residential power fixed, or does it vary?

In this program, the price you will receive each month does not change – it is a fixed price.

What is my price?

The City of Upper Arlington has ensured that you will receive an electricity generation and transmission price of 7.84 cents per kWh for your electricity services beginning with the September 2014 billing cycle, for a period of nine (9) months.

How do I estimate my savings?

You can compare the price per kilowatt-hour (kWh) through this program with your local utility price by finding your 'Price to Compare' on your electricity bill. This is the price you currently pay for electric generation service from the utility. Take your Price to Compare and subtract the offer price. This equates to your savings per kWh. Multiply your savings per kWh by your monthly usage (kWh) to determine your savings per month.

What does "opt out" mean?

"Opt out" means that you can decide not to participate in your community's electric governmental aggregation program. By returning the opt-out form, which is included in this mailing, by the opt out deadline you will not be enrolled as an electric generation customer with FirstEnergy Solutions, your community's competitive electric generation supplier, and you will not receive the discount.

What happens if I do not send in the opt-out form?

If you do not return the opt-out form postmarked by the opt out deadline, you will be included in your community's governmental aggregation program and will receive competitively priced electricity from FirstEnergy Solutions.

Can I opt out over the phone?

No, if you want to opt out, you must mail in your completed opt-out form and it must be postmarked by the opt out deadline.

Can I opt out of the program at a later date?

Yes, you may cancel without penalty and switch to another provider or revert back to AEP Ohio, the local utility. Should you cancel your service with FirstEnergy Solutions and return to standard offer service with your local utility, you may not be served under the same rates, terms, and conditions that apply to other utility customers. In other words, the standard service offer available at the time you revert back to AEP Ohio would apply and may be at a different price to the standard service offer currently available to existing customers of AEP Ohio.

What are my energy supply choices if I decide to opt out?

You can stay with your current electric utility, which will continue to supply your electric generation as it always has, or you can shop for an alternative generation supplier. A list of competitive electric suppliers certified by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio and their current prices are available by calling 1-800-686-PUCO (1-800-686-7826).

If I join the aggregation, can I stay on budget billing?

Yes, you can remain on budget billing. By joining the aggregation program, your supplier charges will automatically be budgeted along with your utility charges.

Can I still have my payment automatically deducted from my checking account as I do now? Yes. How you pay your electric bill will not change.

Where do I send payment?

You will continue to receive one bill each month from your local utility. The amount that you owe to FirstEnergy Solutions will be stated separately on your bill and you will continue to send payments to your local utility only.

Who is FirstEnergy Solutions?

FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., a subsidiary of FirstEnergy Corp., offers a wide range of energy and related products and services, including the generation and sale of electricity and energy planning and procurement. FirstEnergy Solutions is a leading competitive supplier of energy to residential and commercial and industrial customers in Ohio. Pennsylvania. New Jersey; Maryland, Illinois and Michigan.

What happens at the end of the nine-month period?

As the program draws to a close, the City can choose to seek bids from electricity providers in order to negotiate a new contract on behalf of eligible households and businesses. If at that time, the program has not produced the savings originally anticipated for customers, the City can also choose to end the program, which time participants would be notified of their options for continuing in a different program with AEP Retail Energy, switching to another provider, or reverting back to AEP Ohio.

Why did the City select FirstEnergy Solutions as its provider?

The City selected FirstEnergy Solutions as its provider following a competitive bidding process. FirstEnergy Solutions was able to propose a program that represented the best overall value for eligible households and businesses.

What happens if my family moves to another home or I move my business location?

If you move to another home or business location within Upper Arlington, you will be able to continue participating in the program. If you leave the City of Upper Arlington, you will no longer be eligible to participate.





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PUCO

Andrew C. Emerson aemerson@porterwright.com

Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP 41 South High Street Suites 2800-3200 Columbus, Ohio 43215-6194

> Direct: 614-227-2104 Fax: 614-227-2100 Toll free: 800-533-2794

> > www.porterwright.com

porter wright

Cincinnati Cleveland Collimbus Dayton Naples Washington. DC June 26, 2012

Ms. Barcy F. McNeaf, Secretary Public Utilities Commission of Ohio 180 East Broad Street Columbus, Ohio 43215

RE: Case No. 02-105-EL-GAG

Dear Ms. McNeal:

On May 30, 2012, I filed a corrected opt-out notice for use in the City of Upper Arlington/AEP Retail Energy government aggregation program. Due to an issue with the printer, that notice was not mailed. Accordingly, please find attached a copy of the opt-out notice that was mailed to all eligible customers today. The notice is identical to the corrected notice filed in this docket, except for a change in the relevant opt-out notice dates. The twenty-one day opt-out period will expire on July 17, 2012.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerety.

Andrew C. Emerson

ACE

cc: Bill Adams

This is to certify that the images appearing are an accurate and complete reproduction of a case file document delivered in the regular course of business.

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«Date»

- <First> <Lust>
- <Mailing address>
- <Mailing City>, <Mailing State> <Mailing Zip>



Your Experts in Electricity Savings.®

IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM

The City of Upper Arkington and AEP Rotali Energy regarding your electricity service at S Address

Dear <First> <Last>:

The City of Upper Arlington secures an electric price of 5.545 cents per kWh for a savings of up to 26% off the AEP Ohio utility rate.

We are pleased to autounce that the City of Upper Arlington is providing you with an opportunity to save money on your electricity bill. Under this arrangement, AEP Retail Energy has been sciented as your city's preferred electricity provider. This special offer is exclusive for eligible residents and businesses of the City of Upper Arlington because officials acted on behalf of their community to select an electricity provider who, through the power of volume buying, is able to secure electricity at competitive prices. AEP Retail Energy is an Ohio-based company and a subsidiary of American Electric Power.

Through your new City Electric Aggregation Program, eligible residents and businesses will receive the price of 5.545 cents per kWh for a period of twenty-four (24) months2, starting with the July or August, 2012 billing cycle, depending on your meter-read date.

You will be automatically enrolled in the program unless you choose NOT to participate by "opting-out" by July 17, 2012. If you do NOT wish to participate in this program, you must follow the "opt-out" instructions.

The City Electric Aggregation Program is a Smart Choice:

- It's Easy to Participate. You don't have to do anything to earoll. All eligible residents and businesses will be automatically enrolled in the program unless you choose to "opt-out."
- Save Maney with a Low Price. The City of Upper Arlington has ensured that you will receive a price of 5.545 cents per kWh for a period of twenty-four (24) months, for your electricity service beginning with the July or August 2012 billing cycle, depending on your materread date. There is no cost to enroll in this exclusive program.
- Continue to Receive One Bill. Your local utility will continue to send you one monthly electric bill. You can continue to remit one payment to your local utility for AEP Retail Energy charges. Also, your local utility will continue to provide service for any emergency
- · Sign up for a Budget Billing Plan. Simply call the number below to sign up for AEP Retail Energy's Budget Billing Plan.

If you do not wish to participate in this program, you must "opt-out" by calling the AEP Retail Energy Customer Care Team at 1-877-726-0214, Monday - Friday from 8:00 am to 7:00 pm EST and Saturday from 9:00 am to 1:00 pm EST or completing the Electric Aggregation "Opt-Out" Election Form below, Your "Opt-Out" Election Form must be returned by July 17, 2012.

Learn more about the City of Upper Artington Electric Aggregation Program by contacting the AEP Retail Energy Customer Care Team at 1-877-726-0214. If you have questions about the City's role as an aggregator, visit www.uach.net or call 614-583-5040 to speak with a City representative.

Thank you.

Upper Arlington City Manager The City of Upper Arlington

Managing Director, Residential Business

AEP Retail Energy

ALC RETAIL ENERGY

The City of Upper Arlington Electric Aggregation Opt-Out Election Form

Account Number: <account Number>

<Service City>, <Service State> <Service Zip>

Account Holder's Name: (Print) Account Holder's Signature:

This form must be postmarked no later than July 17, 2012 for your "not-out" to be effective.

Terms & Conditions Version: AEP12.05 18.Agg UA AEP12.06.15-DM.Agg.UA

Aggregation Program with AEP Retail Energy. <Pre><Pre>rems Code>

SMORTARY BUTCH by returning this signed form, I effirmation, elect NOT to participate in the DNy Electric Appropriation Program. By whether in the participate in the DNy Electric Appropriation Program. By whether in the participate is not accomplishing in the participate in the program. Lond consider that the books to have not of the DNy Electric Appropriation Program. Lond consider that from all matic is, after them (deep or on AP) Head French et 1-977-765-0274, to "quictor" to their days from Electric on AP) Head French and the Old Program and the PNY Electric from 21 days from the continués date on the large of the Old Program.

Complete form and mail to: AEP Retail Energy After City Electric Appragation Program
PO Box 1415 Columbus, OH 43216

Frequently Asked Questions

hat is the City Electric Aggregation Program?

ider the City of Upper Artington Electric Aggregation Program, a City acted on behalf of certain of its electricity consumers to lect an electricity provider who, through the power of volume ying, is able to secure electricity at competitive prices. The ablic Utilities Commission of Ohio ("PUCO") has taken steps ensure that Ohio's competitive electricity environment is insumer-friendly, Voters in the City approved this aggregation ogram and the City Council passed an ordinance adopting this actic Aggregation Program.

re City has selected AEP Retail Energy as its preterred ectricity provider to serve eligible households and businesses aginning with the July or August 2012 billing cycle, depending n your meter-read date, for a period of twenty-four (24) months.

the is AEP Retail Energy?

EP Retail Energy is a certified competitive retail electric service rovider and a subsidiary of American Electric Power AEP Retail nergy is headquartered in Columbus, Ohio and sells electricity o customers at market-based prices rather than regulated rates ffered by your local utility.

low do 1 enroli?

ou don't have to do anything to enroll. All eligible customers o'il be automatically included in the program unless you choose o "opt-out," If you "opt-out," you will continue to be served by our local electric utility's standard service offer, until you choose in alternative electric service provider. However, if you do not aspond to this letter, the utility will complete the enrollment process. Once the utility completes your enrollment, you will be mailed an enrollment confirmation notice that your electric service will be provided by AEP Retail Energy. No deposits are equired to enroll.

When will this program start?

The City Electric Aggregation Program will begin as early as the July or August 2012 billing cycle, depending on your meter-read

What is my price? The City of Upper Arlington has ensured that you will receive an electricity generation and transmission price of 5.545 cents per KVIn for your electricity services beginning with the July or August 2012 billing cycle, depending on your meter-read date, for a period of twenty-four (24) months.

How do I estimate my savings?

You can compare the price per kilowati-hour (kWh) through this program with your local utility rate by finding your 'Price to Compare' on your electricity bill. This is the price you currently pay for electric generation service from the utility. Take your Price to Compare and subtract the offer price. This equates to your savings per kWn. Multiply your savings per kWh by your monthly usage (kWh) to determine your savings per month.

Where do I send payment?

You will continue to receive one bill each month from your local utility. The amount that you owe to AEP Retail Energy will be stated separately on your bill and you will continue to send payments to your local utility only.

Is Sudget Billing available?

A Budget Billing Plan is now available for AEP Retail Energy's charges (generation and transmission charges). The Budget Billing Plan levels your monthly payments to even out the seasonal highs and lows of your monthly bills. You will have more cer-tainty and can better manage your electricity expenses. Please visit www.aepretailenergy.com/bbplan for more information.

Can I cancel at any time?

Yes, you may cancel without penalty and switch to another provider or revert back to AEP Ohio, the local utility. Should you cancel your service with AEP Retail Energy and return to standard offer service with your local utility, you may not be served under the same rates, terms, and conditions that apply to other

How does the City have the right to aggregate? In 2008, the City received voter approval to become an electric aggregator on its citizens' behalf.

Why is this an "opt-out" program? It enables AEP Retail Energy to offer a lower group rate based on the community's size.

Why did the City select AEP Retail Energy as its provider? The City selected AEP Retail Energy as its provider following a competitive bidding process. AEP Retail Energy was able to propose a program that represented the best overall value for eligible households and businesses.

What happens at the end of the 24-month program? As the program draws to a close, the City can choose to seek bids from electricity providers in order to negotiate a new contract on behalf of eligible households and businesses, if at that time, the program has not produced the savings originally an-ticipated for customers, the City can also choose to end the program, at which time participants would be notified of their options for continuing in a different program with AEP Retail Energy, switching to another provider, or reverting back to AEP Ohio, the local utility,

What happens if changes in the electricity utility market im-

pact the program?
The City has the ability to terminate the contract under certain circumstances, including if AEP Retail Energy proposes a price increase that is unacceptable to the City, or the AEP Ohio tariff rate "price to compare" drops below the City's contract rate. Should this occur, all participating customers will be notified relative to their options moving forward, including continuing in a different program with AEP Retail Energy, switching to another provider, or reverting back to AEP Ohio, the local utility.

If I opt-out initially, can I choose to join the program at a inter date?

if you opt-out initially, unfortunately, you will not be able to join the program at a later date.

What happens if my family moves to another home or I move my business location?

If you move to another home or business location within Upper Arlington, you will be able to continue participating in the program. If you leave the City of Upper Arlington, you will no longer be eligible to participate.

Usiess you siftenemently "opened" by July 17, 2012, you will be sufferentiably emplied if you a) have an elegible residence or business located in the specified city movings cleanly extract from AEP Onto AEP Result Energy and b) we not sentiled in the FIPP program. Personation in the program is subject to the Terms & Conditions of the Agreement between the City and AEP Result Energy. Existing and personally one received and the results of some received and are the based open. AEP of the Agreement between the City and AEP Result Energy. Project of your city four including the based open. AEP of the Section of 74 of cents per Vilva as of May 2012 compared to give a 5-545 cents per Vilva. AEP Result Energy is price excludes talky distribution charges and other talky charges and form the personal of your electron bill. Sected between conscious and manufacture of your electron bill. Sected between conscious and provided to intell an interval mater depending on your demand if applicable. For more information, call 1-877-726-7214, write to: AEP Result Energy, PO Box 1415, Colorabos, CH 4016, or vast approximation provided to intell an interval mater depending on your demand if applicable. For more information, call 1-877-726-7214, write to: AEP Result

ASP Retail Energy is a competitive retail identic service provider. While it is no assistance (ASP Ohio, ASP Retail Energy is not embriding on behalf of and is not an appeal for ASP Chio, ASP Ohio customers do not mead to prochest any competitive retail obtains a service from ASP Chica.

If you have any additional questions, please contact the AEP Retail Energy Customer Care team at 1-877-726-0214, Monday - Friday from 8:00 am to 7:00 pm EST and Saturday from 9:00 am to 1:00 pm EST.



RESIDENTIAL AND SMALL COMMERCIAL **AGGREGATION TERMS & CONDITIONS** ("AGREEMENT")

TERM	Generation service charges	CANCELLATION FEE	CONTRACT RENEWAL
Econthly Silling Cycles erm").	5.545 cents per kVth for Generation and Transmission Services. Price excludes utility Distribution Service Charges and other non-trypasseble utility changes and tees.	You may caused within the 7-day rescrission pencic without pensity. If you terminate other the rescrission period there is no fee. See Section 6 for details.	N/A-Your Agreement will terminate after the term.
		1	

MOTTHOMAS. These Terms and Cleadeness (this "Agreshment") are you agreeness for George Service and agreeing service service (the terms of the terms of terms of the terms of the terms of terms of the terms of terms of terms of terms o

FIGURE "Comprision Retail Electric Strong Provider" or "CFES" provider mann, as calculad by Chapter 171-21 of the Substitution Rules applicable to electric service provider, as entity this sits electric service providers as Crisco "Security" Concentration Services ("Longon recommender of Exployed of described "Prochaptematic substitution services services services providers proposed to the production of the production programment of the product of the services of the production of the production

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
Carrotorer Centrent and Reformatives Relative Authoritanton. By accepting this offer from AEP Resid Frampy, you understand and septer to the learn spit conduction of the Approvement of AEP Resid Energy to construct increases from the EDIO in including, on the relative to administration of expected description and the section of the including on the relation of the including and appropriate plant of the including on the relation of the including on the including on the including on the including and appropriate plant of the including on the including and appropriate plant of the including and including an including and appropriate plant of the including and including an including an

PLEASE KEEP A COPY FOR YOUR RECORDS.



Environmental Disclosure - Quarterly Comparison AEP Retail Energy

Projected Data for the Calendar Year 2012
Actual Data for the Period 01/01/12 to 03/31/12.*



With in-depth analysis, the environmental characteristics of any form of electric generation will reveal benefits as well as costs. For further information, visit us online at AEPRetailEnergy.com or contact AEP Retail Energy at 1-866-823-6738.

/ersion: 12.05.220H_ED

"Environmental Dischique lebel is based on the most accurate data available to AEP Refeil Energy as of May 1, 2012.

EXHIBIT WAA-R6

OHIO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO'S DATA REQUEST PUCO CASE NO. 13-2385-EL-SSO et al. STAFF LIPTHRAT SET (6)

DATA REQUEST

DR-6-010 Hov

How does the Company propose to address revenues associated with mutual assistance provided to other utilities regarding storm restoration?

RESPONSE

The Company is not proposing any changes to mutual assistance provided to other utilities, which is not included in the storm damage mechanism/rider. Expenses and revenues associated with mutual assistance provided to other utilities are included in account 186.

Prepared By: Andrea E. Moore

EXHIBIT WAA-R7

OHIO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO'S DATA REQUEST PUCO CASE NO. 13-2385-EL-SSO et al. STAFF LIPTHRAT SET (6)

DATA REQUEST

DR-6-008

How would the Company ensure the storm expenses reported within the true-up rider be incremental, both for company and contract labor (straight-time and over-time) and non-labor?

RESPONSE

The Company assigns unique accounting codes for each major storm. These unique accounting codes ensure all applicable major storm costs are properly assigned and can be attributed to a specific major storm. With respect to the monthly determination of whether major storm expenses are above or below the annual \$5 million major storm O&M threshold for deferral (provided in base distribution rates), the Company analyzes the cost components within the identified major storm O&M expenses and excludes non-incremental expenses from consideration consistent with Staff witness Hecker's approach in Case Nos. 11-346/348-EL-SSO. Also see Company witness Mitchell's Exhibit TEM-2 in Case No. 12-3255-EL-RDR which lists examples of the non-incremental cost components which are excluded from incremental major storm expenses.

All applicable incremental major storm O&M expenses including Company overtime paid in accordance with its policies and contract labor are included in the monthly determination of the over/under deferral calculation which records a regulatory liability or regulatory asset as appropriate in comparison to the annual \$5 million major storm O&M threshold.

The Company will file in April of each year, a true-up rider based on the incremental storm expense incurred in the previous calendar year including the design for the SDRR to collect or refund this regulatory asset or liability recorded at year-end.

Prepared by: Thomas E. Mitchell

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the Rebuttal Testimony of William A. Allen was served by electronic mail upon the individuals listed below this 20th day of June, 2014.

> /s// Steven T. Nourse Steven T. Nourse

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6/20/2014 4:03:23 PM

in

Case No(s). 13-2385-EL-SSO, 13-2386-EL-AAM

Summary: Testimony (Rebuttal) of William A. Allen electronically filed by Mr. Steven T Nourse on behalf of Ohio Power Company

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:


AN EXAMINATION OF THE APPLICATION OF)	
THE FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE OF)	CASE NO.
KENTUCKY POWER COMPANY FROM)	2014-00225
NOVEMBER 1, 2013 THROUGH APRIL 30, 2014)	

ORDER

Pursuant to 807 KAR 5:056, the Commission established this case on August 13, 2014, to review and evaluate the operation of the Fuel Adjustment Clause ("FAC") of Kentucky Power Company ("Kentucky Power") for the six-month period that ended on April 30, 2014. The Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by and through his Office of Rate Intervention, ("AG") and Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc. ("KIUC") were granted intervention in this matter. The Commission established a procedural schedule that provided for discovery, intervenor testimony, and rebuttal testimony. Commission Staff ("Staff") and KIUC submitted requests for information to Kentucky Power. After KIUC and the AG filed joint testimony, Kentucky Power filed rebuttal testimony. The Commission held a public hearing on this matter on November 12, 2014. Kentucky Power filed a post-hearing brief, and KIUC and the AG filed a joint post-hearing brief. All information requested at the hearing has been filed, and the case now stands submitted for a decision.

Power Purchases

Staff questioned Kentucky Power about the recovery of power purchases through the FAC. Specifically, Kentucky Power was asked whether it was limiting cost recovery,



through the FAC, of power purchased under either of the following circumstances: 1) when experiencing a planned outage, or 2) when not experiencing an outage, but making power purchases to meet its load. Kentucky Power responded that it was not limiting recovery of these purchases through the FAC in either scenario.¹

In FAC review proceedings in 2002, the Commission set forth the definition of "economy energy purchases" and "non-economy energy purchases" and the recoverability of each through the FAC. In Case No. 2002-00495-8 involving the sixmonth FAC review of Kentucky Power (formerly known as American Electric Power Company), the Commission discussed the recoverability of "economy energy purchases" via the FAC.

We view "economy energy purchases" that are recoverable through an electric utility's FAC as purchases that an electric utility makes to serve native load, that displace its higher cost of generation, and that have an energy cost less than the avoided variable generation cost of the utility's highest cost generating unit available to serve native load during that FAC expense month.²

In that same case, the Commission also discussed the recoverability of "non-economy energy purchases" via the FAC.

We interpret Administrative Regulation 807 KAR 5:056 as permitting an electric utility to recover through its FAC only the lower of the actual energy cost of the non-economy purchased energy or the fuel cost of its highest cost generating unit available to be dispatched to serve native load during the reporting expense month. Costs for non-economy energy purchases that are not recoverable through an electric utility's FAC are considered "non-FAC expenses"

¹ Response to Items 26 and 27 of the Commission's First Request for Information ("Commission's First Request"), attached as the Appendix to the Commission's August 13, 2014 Order.

² Case No. 2000-00495-B, An Examination of the Application of the Fuel Adjustment Clause of American Electric Power Company from May 1, 2001 to October 31, 2001 (Ky. PSC May 2, 2002) at 4.

and, if reasonably incurred, are otherwise eligible for recovery through base rates.³

Because Kentucky Power was unique in that it did not own a combustion turbine in 2002, it sought and was granted rehearing in Case No. 2000-00495-B. By Order dated October 3, 2002, Kentucky Power was granted authority to use the "Peaking Unit Equivalent" approach to calculate the level of non-economy purchase power costs to recover through the FAC.⁴

In a March 21, 2005 Order in Case No. 2004-00430⁵ involving East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc. ("East Kentucky"), the Commission clarified its definition of "non-economy energy purchases," stating, "A more accurate definition of non-economy energy purchases recognizes that the energy costs thereof may be greater or less than the variable cost of the highest cost generating unit available to serve native load." The Commission, however, did not modify the limitation set forth in Case No. 2002-00495-B that a utility could recover through the FAC "only the lower of the actual energy cost of the non-economy purchased energy or the fuel cost of its highest cost generating unit available to be dispatched to serve native load during the reporting expense month."

³ Id. at 5.

⁴ The Peaking Unit Equivalent was based on the operating characteristics of a General Electric simple-cycle gas turbine.

⁵ Case No. 2004-00430, East Kentucky Power Cooperative's Request for a Declaratory Ruling on the Application of Administrative Regulation 807 KAR 5:056 to its Proposed Treatment of Non-Economy Energy Purchases (Ky. PSC Mar. 21, 2005).

⁶ Id. at 6.

⁷ Case No. 2000-00495-B, An Examination of the Application of the Fuel Adjustment Clause of American Electric Power Company from May 1, 2001 to October 31, 2001 (Ky. PSC May 2, 2002) at 5. (Emphasis added).

Kentucky Power initially stated in this proceeding that it was not limiting recovery of the non-economy purchases because it had interpreted the Commission's March 21, 2005 Order in Case No. 2004-00430 to require that actual fuel costs of non-economy purchases, rather than a proxy, be used in accounting for and reporting fuel costs. However, upon additional questioning, Kentucky Power stated, "Upon review and analysis, the Company recognizes its earlier interpretation of the EKPC Orders was erroneous." During questioning at the hearing, Kentucky Power stated that \$83,720.76 in power purchases in excess of the "Peaking Unit Equivalent" should be disallowed for the review period. 10

Methodology of Allocating Fuel Costs Between Native Load and Off-System Sales

When allocating fuel costs between native load customers and off-system sales, Kentucky Power allocates "no load costs" to native load customers each hour. "No load costs" are defined by Kentucky Power as the fixed fuel and consumable costs incurred when a unit is in operation that are not dependent on the output level of the unit. In addition, Kentucky Power allocates other incremental costs to run the generating units at the minimum level of operation each hour to native load customers to the extent that there is native load to which to allocate the costs. If there is not enough native load in that hour to allocate the other incremental costs, Kentucky Power allocates the costs to

⁸ Response to Item 1.b.(1) of Commission Staff's Second Request for Information ("Staff's Second Request").

⁹ Response to Item 1.a. of Commission Staff's Third Request for Information ("Staff's Third Request.")

¹⁰ November 12, 2014 Hearing at 15:11:13.

¹¹ Response to Item 29 of the Commission's First Request.

off-system sales.¹² For costs above the unit minimums, Kentucky Power stacks the costs on a \$/MWh basis, and for each hour, for each unit, the unit with the most expensive \$/MWh cost of the last megawatt hour ("MWh") produced is assigned to off-system sales.¹³ Kentucky Power states that allocating "no load costs" and other incremental costs to run the generating units at the minimum level to native load customers is a historical practice that has been in place for at least 30 years.¹⁴

Kentucky Power asserts that its fuel allocation methodology is reasonable because: 1) customers have "first call" on its generating assets and, because of this "first call," its customers received net benefits of \$9.9 million during the period between January 1, 2014, through April 2014; 15 and 2) its fuel allocation methodology is consistent with historic practice, the methodology used by Louisville Gas and Electric Company and Kentucky Utilities Company, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission guidance, and the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement ("Settlement Agreement") in Case No. 2012-00578 ("Mitchell Case"). 16 17 Kentucky Power notes that the Settlement Agreement states that "[c]ustomers shall at all times be entitled to the least-cost energy

¹² Response to Item 4.b.(1) of Staff's Second Request.

¹³ Response to Item 29.b. of Commission's First Request.

¹⁴ Id.

¹⁵ Rebuttal Testimony of Kelly D. Pearce at pages 8 and 20.

¹⁶ Kentucky Power Post-Hearing Brief at pages 10-16.

¹⁷ Case No. 2012-00578, Application of Kentucky Power Company for (1) a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity Authorizing the Transfer to the Company of an Undivided Fifty Percent Interest in the Mitchell Generating Assets; (2) Approval of the Assumption by Kentucky Power Company of Certain Liabilities in Connection with the Transfer of the Mitchell Generating Station; (3) Declaratory Rulings; (4) Deferral of Costs Incurred in Connection with the Company's Efforts to Meet Federal Clean Air Act and Related Requirements; and (5) All Other Required Approvals and Relief (Ky. PSC Oct. 7, 2013).

produced by generation owned, leased or purchased by the Company consistent with economic dispatch principles" and that its allocation of the highest incremental fuel costs to off-system sales follows from the economic dispatch of its units. Kentucky Power claims that it acted in good faith in making its representations regarding a \$16.75 million fuel savings reported in the Mitchell Case, and that had a net energy cost analysis been performed in that proceeding, it would have demonstrated the significant net fuel cost benefits to its native load customers as a result of the Mitchell Generating Station ("Mitchell Station") transfer. Kentucky Power claims that any change to its fuel allocation methodology can be made only prospectively and only at a time when base rates are modified.

KIUC and the AG object to Kentucky Power's methodology, arguing that: 1) it caused native load customers to pay a disproportionate amount of fuel costs during the review period, as evidenced by a difference in \$/MWh of fuel costs allocated to native load compared to the \$/MWh allocated to off-system sales; 18 2) "no load costs" for all Kentucky Power generating units were unfairly allocated to native load customers each hour even when the units were not necessary to serve native load; 3) Kentucky Power claimed \$16.75 million in annual fuel savings if it acquired a 50 percent undivided interest in the Mitchell Station, but failed to disclose the impact its fuel allocation methodology would have on native load customers upon acquisition of the Mitchell Station; 4) "no load costs" are similar to fixed environmental costs which are allocated to off-system sales; and 5) Kentucky Power's calculation of \$9.9 million of savings from January 1, 2014, through April 30, 2014, related to the transfer of the Mitchell Station

¹⁸ Direct Testimony of Lane Kollen, Exhibit_(LK-3), shows that, for the four months of the review period that fall in the overlap period, the average fuel cost allocated to native load customers was \$31.67/MWh, while \$24.13/MWh was allocated to off-system sales.

was flawed in that it used unrealistic and incorrect assumptions. KIUC and the AG recalculated Kentucky Power's fuel costs using the methodology used by East Kentucky and recommend that \$12.648 million in fuel costs be disallowed, plus an additional \$.864 million in interest. ¹⁹ In addition, KIUC and the AG recommend that Kentucky Power be required to adopt the fuel-cost allocation of East Kentucky and Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc. hereafter. ²¹

DISCUSSION

Settlement Agreement which authorized Kentucky Power to acquire a 50 percent undivided interest in the Mitchell Station. Because of that approval, during the period January 1, 2014, through May 31, 2015 ("the Overlap Period"), Kentucky Power will own and operate both the 800-megawatt ("MW") Big Sandy Unit 2 and its 50 percent undivided interest in the Mitchell Station, or 780 MW. During the 17-month Overlap Period, Kentucky Power will be operating with an unusually large reserve margin, estimated at 57 percent for 2014.²² Given that most utilities operate with much smaller

¹⁹ Direct Testimony of Lane Kollen at page 6.

East Kentucky describes its methodology as follows: "Fuel is allocated between native-load sales and off-system sales on a stacked cost basis. EKPC considers each hour of operation, determines if a sale was made from its system during that hour and then allocates the highest cost resource(s) to that sale for FAC purposes. The process of stacking and assigning the highest cost resources to off-system sales protects EKPC's native load from having no-load cost assigned inappropriately." See Case No. 2014-00226, An Examination of the Application of the Fuel Adjustment Clause of East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc. from November 1, 2013 through April 30, 2014, Response to Commission's Initial Request for Information, attached as the Appendix in the Commission's August 13, 2014 Order, Item 29.a.

Inc. to be the same or similar as both make reference throughout their joint brief of the "EKPC/Duke" methodology.

²² See Case No. Case No. 2013-00475, Integrated Resource Planning Report of Kentucky Power Company to the Kentucky Public Service Commission, page 14, filed Dec. 20, 2013.

reserve margins, Kentucky Power's operations during the temporary Overlap Period cannot be considered "usual" or "normal." For these reasons, the Commission finds that it is inappropriate at this time to determine whether Kentucky Power's methodology for allocating fuel costs between native load and off-system sales is unreasonable under "normal" operating conditions. We will defer consideration of that issue until such time as Kentucky Power is operating under "usual" or "normal" circumstances with respect to the level of reserve margin. The Commission further finds that Kentucky Power's methodology for allocating fuel costs between native load and off-system sales should be evaluated for reasonableness after Kentucky Power has operated for a 12-month period without the effect of the recently terminated American Electric Power Pool Agreement and without the operation of Big Sandy Unit 2. However, the Commission finds that during the Overlap Period, when its reserve margin is unusually large and operating conditions are not "normal," Kentucky Power's fuel allocation methodology is unreasonable because it produces an unreasonable result and that certain fuel costs related to the Mitchell Station should be disallowed as discussed below.

"No Load Costs" Related to the Mitchell Station ("Mitchell 'no load cost")

As discussed *supra*, the Settlement Agreement approved in Case No. 2012-00578 authorized Kentucky Power to acquire a 50 percent interest in the Mitchell Station. Our approval was premised, in no small part, on the stipulation that the Mitchell acquisition would result in significant fuel savings to Kentucky Power's ratepayers, because the Mitchell Station was fully scrubbed and capable of burning a certain amount of higher-sulfur, lower-cost coal. In that proceeding, in response to Item 10 of Staff's Fifth Request, Kentucky Power provided an exhibit which showed, among other

things, that customers would receive a 5.33 percent increase in rates during the Overlap Period as a result of the Mitchell Station acquisition. The relatively small rate impact was a direct function of the then-claimed \$16.75 million in annual fuel savings. However, it was discovered in June 2014²³ that this response failed to reflect the "no load costs" related to the Mitchell Station that would be allocated to native load customers as a result of Kentucky Power's fuel allocation methodology. Kentucky Power was asked to revise the exhibit in the current proceeding to reflect the Mitchell "no load costs." The revised exhibit shows \$38.252 million in annual "no load costs" related to the Mitchell Station and that, instead of an increase of 5.33 percent, customers are actually experiencing a 12.81 percent increase during the Overlap Period.²⁴

Kentucky Power was the only party to the Settlement Agreement aware of and able to disclose the effect that its allocation of Mitchell "no load costs" would have on its customers during the Overlap Period. Kentucky Power did not disclose this information, even though a Kentucky Power witness testified in this proceeding that he had been aware of the allocation of "no load costs" for years, ²⁵ and this same witness participated in the settlement discussions in the Mitchell Case. ²⁶ It is incomprehensible to the Commission how information this significant, resulting in costs of this magnitude, could

the Commission's Meeting Tracking process, and KIUC requested Kentucky Power to explain the reason for an increase in fuel costs for discussion at the meeting.

²⁴ Response to Item 9.c. of Staff's Third Request.

November 12, 2014 Hearing at 19:36:35, Kentucky Power witness William Allen stated he has been involved in fuel costs for eight to ten years and was aware of "no-load" fuel costs.

²⁶ See attendance sheets attached to June 28, 2013 Informal Conference Memo in Case No. 2012-00578, which summarized the May 16, 2013, May 22, 2013, and May 24, 2013 Informal Conferences in which the parties to that case engaged in settlement discussions.

have been overlooked by Kentucky Power in the Mitchell Case. The parties entering into the Settlement Agreement in that case had every right to believe that Kentucky Power had fully disclosed all costs related to the transaction. Instead, the Commission and the intervening parties were informed that there would be \$16.75 million in annual fuel savings, but were not informed of \$38.252 million in annual "no load costs" that would be allocated entirely to native load customers. It is difficult to overstate the importance of the Commission's decision in the Mitchell Case to Kentucky Power's ratepayers, the parties to that proceeding, and the Commission. Transparency is critical, and indeed one of the touchstone principles in the regulatory process. The failure of Kentucky Power to disclose this information in the Mitchell Case is a matter of great concern to the Commission.

DECISION

Administrative Regulation 807 KAR 5:056 requires the Commission, at six-month intervals, to conduct public hearings on a utility's past fuel adjustments. It further requires the Commission to "order a utility to charge off and amortize any adjustments it finds unjustified due to improper calculation or application of the charge or improper fuel procurement practices."

Because the Mitchell "no load costs" and their impact during the Overlap Period were not disclosed by Kentucky Power in Case No. 2012-00578, and because the application of Kentucky Power's fuel cost allocation methodology during the Overlap

Period when its reserve margin is approximately 57 percent produces an unreasonable result.²⁷ the Commission finds the following:

- 1. One hundred percent of Kentucky Power's share of Mitchell "no load costs" incurred during the Overlap Period should be disallowed for recovery. For the entire 17-month Overlap Period, the disallowance will total approximately \$54 million. For the four months of the Overlap Period that fall in the review period, the amount of the disallowance is \$13,155,170.15.29
- 2. Kentucky Power should immediately cease collecting through the FAC "no load costs" related to the Mitchell Station. This cessation should continue through the end of the Overlap Period, May 31, 2015.
- 3. Mitchell "no load costs" that Kentucky Power has recovered through the FAC since the end of the review period should be disallowed in future FAC review proceedings.
- 4. Because the \$13,155,170.15 of Mitchell "no load costs" was collected over a four-month period and the \$83,720.76 of power purchases in excess of the Peaking Unit Equivalent was collected over three months, Kentucky Power should be required to credit through its FAC a total of \$13,238,890.91 over four months in equal amounts of

A percentage increase approximately 2.5 times the increase that Kentucky Power indicated would occur as a result of the Settlement Agreement is patently unreasonable. In addition, the difference between the S/MWh of fuel costs allocated to native load and the S/MWh allocated to off-system sales is unreasonable.

 $^{^{28}}$ \$38.252 million divided by 12, multiplied by 17.

Total of columns Mitchell 1 KP and Mitchell 2 KP of Kentucky Power's response to Item 29 of the Commission's First Request, Attachment 2.

\$3,309,722.73³⁰ beginning with the first FAC monthly filing following the date of this Order.

5. Outside of the power purchases in excess of the Peaking Unit Equivalent and the allocation of Mitchell "no load costs" discussed herein, the Commission finds that there is no evidence of improper calculation or application of Kentucky Power's FAC charges or improper fuel procurement practices.

Although the Commission has found that Kentucky Power's allocation of its "no load costs" in the context of FAC recovery during the Overlap Period is unreasonable, such a finding has no impact on our decision in the Mitchell Case that the Mitchell Station acquisition, over the long term, still represents the lowest reasonable cost alternative with respect to the disposition of Big Sandy Unit 2.

The Commission also finds that, in the next FAC review proceedings covering the two-year period November 1, 2012, through October 31, 2014, it will examine the issue of regional transmission organization ("RTO") billing codes and the appropriateness of their inclusion in the FAC calculation for those utilities that are members of an RTO. The Commission further finds that Kentucky Power should file testimony in the next FAC review proceeding on the specific codes that are included in the FAC calculation and an explanation of why each is appropriate for inclusion.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

 One hundred percent of Kentucky Power's share of Mitchell "no load costs" incurred during the Overlap Period is disallowed for recovery.

³⁰ In order not to exceed the total refund of \$13,238,890.91, the fourth month's credit will be equal to \$3,309,722.72.

- 2. For the four months of the Overlap Period that fall in the review period, January 2014 through April 2014, the amount of the disallowance for Mitchell "no load costs" is \$13,155,170.15.
- 3. Power purchases in the amount of \$83,720.76 that were in excess of the Peaking Unit Equivalent are disallowed for recovery during the review period.
- 4. Beginning with its first FAC filing made subsequent to the date of this Order, or as amended if filed prior to the date of this Order, and continuing for a total of four consecutive months, Kentucky Power shall include a credit of \$3,309,722.73³¹ to refund to customers a total of \$13,238,890.91 for power purchases in excess of the Peaking Equivalent Unit and Mitchell "no load costs" during the period under review as discussed herein.
- 5. Kentucky Power shall cease collecting through the FAC "no load costs" related to the Mitchell Station. This cessation shall continue through the end of the Overlap Period, May 31, 2015.
- 6. Mitchell "no load costs" that Kentucky Power has recovered through the FAC since the end of the review period shall be disallowed in future FAC review proceedings.
- 7. Outside of the power purchases in excess of the Peaking Unit Equivalent and the allocation of Mitchell "no load costs" to native load customers discussed herein, the Commission finds that there is no evidence of improper calculation or application of Kentucky Power's FAC charges or improper fuel procurement practices.

³¹ *Id*.

8. Kentucky Power shall file testimony in the next FAC review proceeding on which codes are included in the FAC calculation and an explanation for why each is appropriate for inclusion.

By the Commission

ENTERED

JAN 22 2015

KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

ATTES:

Executive Director

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Chantale LaCasse

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DELIVERED BY EMAIL

June 3, 2015

Ray Strom
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
Rates & Analysis Department
Siting, Efficiency & Renewables Division

Tamara S. Turkenton Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Rates & Analysis Department Regulatory Services Division

Re: Update to Redactions

Dear Mr. Strom and Ms. Turkenton:


Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 9 of the May 13, 2015 Finding and Order of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio ("PUCO" or "Commission"), please find attached to this letter a redacted version of the report from NERA Economic Consulting ("NERA"), the Auction Manager under AEP Ohio's Competitive Bidding Process ("CBP"). This report was submitted on May 12, 2015 following the conclusion of the auction to procure full requirements supply for 50% of the energy and capacity requirements of AEP Ohio's Standard Service Offer ("SSO") customers using supply periods of twelve months, twenty-four months, and thirty-six months.

Other than an update to the redactions pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Finding and Order cited above, the attached report is the same as the report sent to you on May 12, 2015.

Sincerely yours,

Cantale Ca (GRRe.

Chantale LaCasse, Senior Vice President, NERA



cc: Andre Porter, Chairman, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Thomas Johnson, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Lynn Slaby, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio M. Beth Trombold, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Asim Z. Haque, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio

Jason Rafeld, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Greg Price, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio

Frank Mossburg, Boston Pacific Company

Michael McCulty, AEP Ohio David Weiss, AEP Ohio Steven T. Nourse, AEP Ohio

Final Report of the Auction Manager AEP Ohio CBP

May 12, 2015

(Redacted Version)



Table 1. Summary of Auction Results

		ozpadowanie sie sie s		
	June 1, 2015 to	Delivery Period June 1, 2015 to	June 1, 2015 to	Total
	May 31, 2016	May 31, 2017	May 31, 2018	
Number of Registered Bidders				13
Total initial eligibility of Registered Bidders (# of tranches)				
Total initial eligibility divided by tranche target				
Number of tranches bid in round 1	84	68	43	195
Number of bidders that submitted bids in round 1				
Number of tranches bid in round 1 divided by tranche target/volume	4.94	4.00	2.69	3.90
Number of tranches to procure in auction (tranche target/volume)	17	17	16	50
Number of tranches procured in auction	17	17	16	50
Number of rounds in the auction				18
Number of winning bidders	6	6	6	9
Starting price range (\$/MWh)	70.00 - 95.00	70.00 - 95.00	70.00 - 95.00	
Starting price (\$/MWh)				gere Virile depresión de la
Clearing price (\$/MWh)	55.42	54.70	56.35	ategrafinet occasi Lisengalistikusista

Table 2. Winning Bidders, Tranches Won, and Clearing Prices

	Delivery Period			
	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2016	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2017	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2018	Total
Clearing Price (\$/MWh)	55.42	54.70	56.35	
Winning Bidder	Tranches Won	Tranches Won	Tranches Won	
AEP Energy Partners, Inc.	4	4	2	10
American Electric Power Service Corporation as agent for Appalachian Power Company, Indiana Michigan Power Company and Kentucky Power Company	4		_	4
BP Energy Company		4	3	7
Buckeye Power, Inc.	1	-	_	1
DTE Energy Trading, Inc.	2	3	2	7
Exelon Generation Company, LLC	3	3	4	10
FirstEnergy Solutions Corp.	_	1	3	4
Noble Americas Gas & Power Corp.	-	2	2	4
TransCanada Power Marketing Ltd.	3	guin.	_	3
Total	17	17	16	50

Table 3. Auction Manager's Assessment of the Conduct of the Auction

#	Question	Answer
1	Were the competitive bidding rules violated?	No.
2	Does the Auction Manager believe the auction was open, fair, transparent, and competitive?	Yes.
3	Did bidders have sufficient information to prepare for the auction?	Yes. Bidders received information from the competitive bidding process documents, the CBP Website, FAQs posted to the CBP Website, and a bidder webcast.
4	Was the information generally provided to bidders in accordance with the published timetable? Was the timetable updated appropriately as needed?	Yes. No updates to the timetable were needed.
5	Were there any issues and questions left unresolved prior to the auction that created material uncertainty for bidders?	We do not believe that there were any unresolved issues or questions that created material uncertainty for bidders.
6	Were there any procedural problems or errors with the auction, including the electronic bidding process, the backup bidding process, and communications between bidders and the Auction Manager?	No.
7	Were protocols for communication between bidders and the Auction Manager adhered to?	Yes.

**************************************	Question	Answer
8	Were there any hardware or software problems or errors, either with the auction system or with its associated communications systems?	No.
9	Were there any unanticipated delays during the auction?	No.
10	Did unanticipated delays appear to adversely affect bidding in the auction?	No.
11	Were appropriate data backup procedures planned and carried out?	Yes. The database was saved in two locations each round.
12	Were any security breaches observed with the auction process?	No security breaches were observed.
13	Were protocols for communications followed by AEP Ohio, the Auction Manager, the PUCO, and the PUCO's consultant during the auction?	Yes.
14	Were the protocols followed for decisions regarding changes in auction parameters (e.g., volume adjustments and price decrements)?	Yes. There were no volume adjustments. The decrements were set according to the information provided to bidders.
15	Were the calculations (e.g., for price decrements or bidder eligibility) produced by the auction software double-checked or reproduced off-line by the Auction Manager?	Yes.

#	Question	Answer
16	Was there evidence of confusion or misunderstanding on the part of bidders that delayed or impaired the auction?	No. There was no such evidence.
17	Were the communications between the Auction Manager and bidders timely and effective?	Yes. The Auction Manager provided information on the schedule and reminders through the messaging function of the auction system.
18	Was there evidence that bidders felt unduly rushed during the process?	No.
19	Was there any evidence of collusion or improper coordination among bidders?	No.
20	Was there any evidence of anti- competitive behavior in the auction?	No.
21	Was information made public appropriately? Was confidential and sensitive information treated appropriately?	Yes.
22	Were there factors exogenous to the auction (e.g., changes in market environment) that materially affected the auction in unanticipated ways?	No, we are not aware of any factors exogenous to the auction that materially affected the auction in unanticipated ways.

NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING

This foregoing document was electronically filed with the Public Utilities

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in

Case No(s). 15-0792-EL-UNC

Summary: Report - Updated Redacted Version - Final Report of the Auction Manager, AEP Ohio CBP, May 12, 2015 electronically filed by Raymond W. Strom on behalf of PUCO Staff



Chantale LaCasse Senior Vice President

National Economic Research Associates, Inc. 1255 23rd Street NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20037 Office: 202-466-9218, Fax: 202-466-3605 Mobile: +1 919 699 1230 Chantale.LaCasse@nera.com

DELIVERED BY EMAIL

April 28, 2015

Ray Strom
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
Rates & Analysis Department
Siting, Efficiency & Renewables Division

Tamara S. Turkenton Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Rates & Analysis Department Regulatory Services Division

Re: Notification of Auction Results under AEP Ohio's CBP

Dear Mr. Strom and Ms. Turkenton:

Please find attached to this letter the redacted version of the report that NERA Economic Consulting, as Auction Manager under AEP Ohio's Competitive Bidding Process ("CBP"), prepared at the conclusion of the first auction under ESP III. This auction procured full requirements supply for 50% of the energy and capacity requirements of AEP Ohio's Standard Service Offer ("SSO") customers using supply periods of twelve months, twenty-four months, and thirty-six months.

Please let us know whether you require any additional information.

Sincerely yours,


Chantale LaCasse,

Senior Vice President, NERA

wate a Gore.

cc: Andre Porter, Chairman, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Thomas Johnson, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Lynn Slaby, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio





M. Beth Trombold, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Asim Z. Haque, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio

Jason Rafeld, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Greg Price, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio

Frank Mossburg, Boston Pacific Company

Michael McCulty, AEP Ohio David Weiss, AEP Ohio Steven T. Nourse, AEP Ohio

Final Report of the Auction Manager AEP Ohio CBP

April 28, 2015

(Redacted Version)

NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING

Table 1. Summary of Auction Results

	Delivery Period			
	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2016	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2017	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2018	Total
Number of Registered Bidders	The state of the s			13
Total initial eligibility of Registered Bidders (# of tranches)				
Total initial eligibility divided by tranche target				
Number of bidders that submitted bids in round 1				
Number of tranches bid in round 1				
Number of tranches bid in round 1 divided by tranche target/volume				
Number of tranches to procure in auction (tranche target/volume)	17	17	16	50
Number of tranches procured in auction	17	17	16	50
Number of rounds in the auction				18
Number of winning bidders	5	7	5	9
Starting price range (\$/MWh)	70.00 - 95.00	70.00 - 95.00	70.00 - 95.00	
Starting price (\$/MWh)				
Clearing price (\$/MWh)	53.79	53.51	55.58	

Table 2. Winning Bidders, Tranches Won, and Clearing Prices

	Delivery Period			Carlo Paragonia de Carlo
	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2016	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2017	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2018	Total
Clearing Price (\$/MWh)	53.79	53.51	55.58	
Winning Bidder	Tranches Won	Tranches Won	Tranches Won	
Total	17	17	16	50

Table 3. Auction Manager's Assessment of the Conduct of the Auction

#.	Question	Answer (
1	Were the competitive bidding rules violated?	
2	Does the Auction Manager believe the auction was open, fair, transparent, and competitive?	
3	Did bidders have sufficient information to prepare for the auction?	
4	Was the information generally provided to bidders in accordance with the published timetable? Was the timetable updated appropriately as needed?	
5	Were there any issues and questions left unresolved prior to the auction that created material uncertainty for bidders?	
6	Were there any procedural problems or errors with the auction, including the electronic bidding process, the backup bidding process, and communications between bidders and the Auction Manager?	
7	Were protocols for communication between bidders and the Auction Manager adhered to?	

#	Question	Answer	
8	Were there any hardware or software problems or errors, either with the auction system or with its associated communications systems?		
9	Were there any unanticipated delays during the auction?		
10	Did unanticipated delays appear to adversely affect bidding in the auction?		
11	Were appropriate data backup procedures planned and carried out?		
12	Were any security breaches observed with the auction process?		
13	Were protocols for communications followed by AEP Ohio, the Auction Manager, the PUCO, and the PUCO's consultant during the auction?		
14	Were the protocols followed for decisions regarding changes in auction parameters (e.g., volume adjustments and price decrements)?		
15	Were the calculations (e.g., for price decrements or bidder eligibility) produced by the auction software doublechecked or reproduced off-line by the Auction Manager?		

#	Question	Answer
16	Was there evidence of confusion or misunderstanding on the part of bidders that delayed or impaired the auction?	
17	Were the communications between the Auction Manager and bidders timely and effective?	
18	Was there evidence that bidders felt unduly rushed during the process?	
19	Was there any evidence of collusion or improper coordination among bidders?	
20	Was there any evidence of anti- competitive behavior in the auction?	
21	Was information made public appropriately? Was confidential and sensitive information treated appropriately?	
22	Were there factors exogenous to the auction (e.g., changes in market environment) that materially affected the auction in unanticipated ways?	

April 28, 2015 Final Report (Redacted Version)

NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING This foregoing document was electronically filed with the Public Utilities

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in

Case No(s). 15-0792-EL-UNC

Summary: Report - Redacted Version - Final Report of the Auction Manager, AEP Ohio CBP, April 28, 2015 electronically filed by Raymond W. Strom on behalf of PUCO Staff



Chantale LaCasse Senior Vice President

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DELIVERED BY EMAIL

May 12, 2015

Ray Strom
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
Rates & Analysis Department
Siting, Efficiency & Renewables Division

Tamara S. Turkenton
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
Rates & Analysis Department
Regulatory Services Division

Re: Notification of Auction Results under AEP Ohio's CBP

Dear Mr. Strom and Ms. Turkenton:

Please find attached to this letter the redacted version of the report that NERA Economic Consulting, as Auction Manager under AEP Ohio's Competitive Bidding Process ("CBP"), prepared at the conclusion of the second auction under ESP III. This auction procured full requirements supply for 50% of the energy and capacity requirements of AEP Ohio's Standard Service Offer ("SSO") customers using supply periods of twelve months, twenty-four months, and thirty-six months.

Please let us know whether you require any additional information.

Sincerely yours,

Chantale LaCasse,

Senior Vice President, NERA

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cc: Andre Porter, Chairman, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Thomas Johnson, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Lynn Slaby, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio



M. Beth Trombold, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Asim Z. Haque, Commissioner, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio

Jason Rafeld, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Greg Price, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio

Frank Mossburg, Boston Pacific Company

Michael McCulty, AEP Ohio David Weiss, AEP Ohio Steven T. Nourse, AEP Ohio

Final Report of the Auction Manager AEP Ohio CBP

May 12, 2015

(Redacted Version)



Table 1. Summary of Auction Results

Table 11 Califfinally of Auddor	Delivery Period			
	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2016	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2017	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2018	Total
Number of Registered Bidders				13
Total initial eligibility of Registered Bidders (# of tranches)				
Total initial eligibility divided by tranche target				
Number of tranches bid in round 1				
Number of bidders that submitted bids in round 1				
Number of tranches bid in round 1 divided by tranche target/volume				
Number of tranches to procure in auction (tranche target/volume)	17	17	16	50
Number of tranches procured in auction	17	17	16	50
Number of rounds in the auction				18
Number of winning bidders	6	6	6	9
Starting price range (\$/MWh)	70.00 - 95.00	70.00 - 95.00	70.00 - 95.00	
Starting price (\$/MWh)				receive profession Sections for the Character for these
Clearing price (\$/MWh)	55.42	54.70	56.35	

Table 2. Winning Bidders, Tranches Won, and Clearing Prices

	Delivery Period			
	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2016	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2017	June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2018	Total
Clearing Price (\$/MWh)	55.42	54.70	56,35	
Winning Bidder	Tranches Won	Tranches Won	Tranches Won	
-				
Total	17	17	16	50

Table 3. Auction Manager's Assessment of the Conduct of the Auction

	Question	Answer	
1	Were the competitive bidding rules violated?		
2	Does the Auction Manager believe the auction was open, fair, transparent, and competitive?		
3	Did bidders have sufficient information to prepare for the auction?		
4	Was the information generally provided to bidders in accordance with the published timetable? Was the timetable updated appropriately as needed?		
5	Were there any issues and questions left unresolved prior to the auction that created material uncertainty for bidders?		
6	Were there any procedural problems or errors with the auction, including the electronic bidding process, the backup bidding process, and communications between bidders and the Auction Manager?		
7	Were protocols for communication between bidders and the Auction Manager adhered to?		

	Question	Answer
8	Were there any hardware or software problems or errors, either with the auction system or with its associated communications systems?	
9	Were there any unanticipated delays during the auction?	
10	Did unanticipated delays appear to adversely affect bidding in the auction?	
11	Were appropriate data backup procedures planned and carried out?	
12	Were any security breaches observed with the auction process?	
13	Were protocols for communications followed by AEP Ohio, the Auction Manager, the PUCO, and the PUCO's consultant during the auction?	
14	Were the protocols followed for decisions regarding changes in auction parameters (e.g., volume adjustments and price decrements)?	
15	Were the calculations (e.g., for price decrements or bidder eligibility) produced by the auction software doublechecked or reproduced off-line by the Auction Manager?	

***	Question	Answei
16	Was there evidence of confusion or misunderstanding on the part of bidders that delayed or impaired the auction?	
17	Were the communications between the Auction Manager and bidders timely and effective?	
18	Was there evidence that bidders felt unduly rushed during the process?	
19	Was there any evidence of collusion or improper coordination among bidders?	
20	Was there any evidence of anti- competitive behavior in the auction?	
21	Was information made public appropriately? Was confidential and sensitive information treated appropriately?	
22	Were there factors exogenous to the auction (e.g., changes in market environment) that materially affected the auction in unanticipated ways?	

May 12, 2015 Final Report (Redacted Version)

NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING This foregoing document was electronically filed with the Public Utilities

Commission of Ohio Docketing Information System on

5/13/2015 11:31:28 AM

in

Case No(s). 15-0792-EL-UNC

Summary: Report - Redacted Version - Final Report of the Auction Manager, AEP Ohio CBP, May 12, 2015 electronically filed by Raymond W. Strom on behalf of PUCO Staff

OHIO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSES TO OHIO ENERGY GROUP'S DISCOVERY REQUESTS PUCO CASE NO. 14-1693-EL-RDR FIRST SET

INTERROGATORY

INT-1-011 Refer to pages 10 and 11 of Mr. Allen's Direct Testimony wherein he describes the "oversight" available to the Commission.

- a. Does the Company plan to seek approval from the FERC for the proposed PPA contract(s) and implement FERC tariff(s) for the seller? If so, please describe this process.
- b. Please provide a copy of the seller's application before the FERC for the proposed PPA contract(s), and the proposed FERC tariff(s).

RESPONSE

a. Company objects to this question because it seeks legal advice and does not seek information likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving any of its rights, Company states as follows. The proposed PPA contract will be entered into under the AEP Generation Resources Inc. (Generation Resources) FERC Electric Tariff for Market-Based Sales (MBR Tariff). In accordance with standard FERC procedures for wholesale power contracts, the PPA contract will be reported in the Electronic Quarterly Reports filed by Generation Resources with FERC to report electric power sales for each calendar quarter.

b. Company objects to providing documents that are in the public record. Without waiving any of its rights, Company states that the current Generation Resources MBR Tariff became effective on March 1, 2014 and is on file in FERC Docket No. ER13-01896-005. A copy of the tariff record is provided as OEG INT-1-011 Attachment 1.

Prepared by: Counsel



Effective

TEU B

AEP Generation Resources Inc. as of 6/9/2015

Electric TCS and MBR

Tariff Database FERC Docket:

FERC Order:

Effective Date:

03/01/2014

ER13-01896-005 314

Delegated Letter Order

Order Date:

Status:

03/24/2014

MBR Tariff, FERC Electric Tariff For Market-Based Sales, 4.0.0

AEP Generation Resources Inc. FERC Electric Tariff For Market-Based Sales

1. Availability. AEP Generation Resources Inc. ("Seller") makes electric energy and capacity available under this Tariff to any purchaser for resale. Seller also makes available to any purchaser, the ancillary services listed below:

a. RTO/ISO Specific

PJM: Seller offers regulation and frequency response service, energy imbalance service, and operating reserve service (which includes spinning, 10-minute, and 30-minute reserves) for sale into the market administered by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("PJM") and, where the PJM Open Access Transmission permits, the self-supply of these services to purchasers for a bilateral sale that is used to satisfy the ancillary services requirements of the PJM Office of Interconnection.

MISO: Seller offers regulation service and operating reserve service (which includes 10-minute spinning reserve and 10-minute supplemental reserve) for sale to the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. ("MISO") and to others that are self-supplying ancillary services to MISO.

SPP: Seller offers regulation and frequency response service, reactive supply and voltage control service, energy and generator imbalance service, operating reserve- spinning and operating reserve-supplemental service.

b. Third Party Provider

Third-party ancillary services: Regulation Service, Energy Imbalance Service, Spinning Reserves, and Supplemental Reserves. Sales will not include the following: (1) sales to an RTO or an ISO, i.e., where that entity has no ability to self-supply ancillary services but instead depends on third parties; and (2) sales to a traditional, franchised public utility affiliated with the third-party supplier, or sales where the underlying transmission service is on the system of the public utility affiliated with the third-party supplier. Sales of operating reserve-spinning and operating reserve-supplemental will not include sales to a public utility that is purchasing ancillary services to satisfy its own open access transmission tariff requirements to offer ancillary services to its own customers, except where the Commission has granted authorization. Sales of regulation and frequency response service and reactive supply and voltage control service will not include sales to

a public utility that is purchasing ancillary services to satisfy its own open access transmission tariff requirements to offer ancillary services to its own customers, except at rates not to exceed the buying public utility transmission provider's OATT rate for the same service or where the Commission has granted authorization.

- 2. Rates. All sales shall be made at rates established by agreement between the purchaser and Seller.
- 3. Other Terms and Conditions. All other terms and conditions shall be established by agreement between Seller and the purchaser.
- 4. Compliance with Commission Regulations. Seller shall comply with the provisions of 18 C.F.R. Part 35, Subpart H, as applicable, and with any conditions the Commission imposes in its orders concerning seller's market-based rate authority, including orders in which the Commission authorizes seller to engage in affiliate sales under this tariff or otherwise restricts or limits the seller's market-based rate authority. Failure to comply with the applicable provisions of 18 C.F.R. Part 35, Subpart H, and with any orders of the Commission concerning seller's market-based rate authority, will constitute a violation of this Tariff.
- 5. Limitations and Exemptions Regarding Market-Based Rate Authority.
 - a. Exemptions: The Commission granted Seller in Docket No. ER13-1896-000 the following waivers and blanket authorization: (a) waiver of Subparts B and C of Part 35 of the Commission's regulations requiring the filing of cost-of-service information, except for sections 35.12(a), 35.13(b), 35.15 and 35.16; (b) waiver of Part 41 and Part 101; (c) waiver of Part 141 of the Commission's regulations concerning accounting and reporting requirements, with the exception of 18 C.F.R. §§ 141.14 and 141.15; and (d) blanket approval as to Section 204 of the FPA and Part 34 of the Commission's regulations for all future issuances of securities and debt and assumption of liabilities.

Waiver of Affiliate Restrictions: The Commission has determined that the Order No. 697 affiliate restrictions codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35.39 do not apply to the relationship between Seller and its public utility affiliate, Ohio Power Company, including the requirement to obtain prior approval for affiliate sales of electric energy or capacity between Seller and Ohio Power Company. Ohio Power Company, Docket No. ER14-594 (Feb. 5, 2014).

In American Electric Power Service Corp., 145 FERC ¶ 61,268 (2013), the Commission granted the request for waiver of the "AEP Operating Companies" (Appalachian Power Company, Indiana Michigan Power Company, Kentucky Power Company, Kingsport Power Company, and Wheeling Power Company) of the following market-based rate affiliate restrictions: (1) the separation of functions requirement in section 35.39(c)(2) to permit certain shared employees to continue to

provide outage planning and resource allocation functions to the AEP Operating Companies and Seller; (2) the asymmetrical pricing rule in section 35.39(e) in order for the AEP Operating Companies and Seller to participate in a capital spare parts and machine shop sharing arrangement; and (3) with respect to the Phillip Sporn Plant: (a) the affiliate restriction in section 35.39(d) to permit the sharing of information related to the operation of the plant; (b) the asymmetrical pricing rule in section 35.39(e) for the operation and maintenance ("O&M") services provided by Appalachian Power Company to Seller; and (c) the separation of functions requirements in section 35.39(c)(2) to permit the sharing of employees engaged in fuel procurement.

In American Electric Power Service Corp., 145 FERC ¶ 61,269 (2013), in connection with the Mitchell Power Generation Facility ("Mitchell Plant"), the Commission granted the waiver of the following market-based rate affiliate restrictions to Kentucky Power Company and Seller: (1) the affiliate restrictions in section 35.39(d) to permit the sharing of information related to the operation of the Mitchell Plant; (2) the asymmetrical pricing rule in section 35.39(e) for the O&M services provided by Kentucky Power Company to Seller, and (3) the separation of functions requirement in section 35.39(c)(2) to permit the sharing of employees engaged in fuel procurement.

- b. Limitations: None.
- 6. Modifications. Seller may unilaterally apply, under Federal Power Act Section 205 and the regulations promulgated thereunder, to the Commission or other regulatory agency having jurisdiction for a modification of this Tariff.
- 7. Seller Category. Seller is a Category 2 seller in the Northeast, and Southwest Power Pool Regions, and a Category 1 Seller in the Central, Southeast, Southwest, and Northwest Regions, as defined in 18 C.F.R. § 35.36(a).

OHIO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSES TO ENVIRNOMENTAL LAW & POLICY CENTER'S DISCOVERY REQUESTS PUCO CASE NO. 14-1693-EL-RDR AND 14-1694-EL-AAM THIRD SET

INTERROGATORY

INT-3-019 Refer to Allen Direct Testimony at 10:19-20. Identify any contract or agreement giving rise to potential "legacy costs" under the PPA Rider.

RESPONSE

See the Company's prior discovery responses including OCC INT 5-131, IEU INT 3-1, IEU INT 4-016, and OEG INT 1-003.

Prepared by: William A. Allen



OHIO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSES TO OHIO CONSUMERS' COUNSEL'S DISCOVERY REQUESTS PUCO CASE NO. 14-1693-EL-RDR FIFTH SET

INTERROGATORY

- INT-5-131 Referring to the "legacy costs" for the Affiliated PPA, referenced at page 10 of the Direct Testimony of AEP Ohio Witness Allen:
 - a. Would legacy costs include costs incurred under long-term (one year or longer) coal contracts entered into prior to the Commission accepting the Affiliated PPA?
 - b. If the response to (a) is affirmative, for each contract:
 - i. What is the identity of each contract for each PPA Unit?
 - ii. Who are the parties who entered into the contract?
 - iii. What are the dates of the contract?
 - iv. What are the coal prices for each time period in the contract?

RESPONSE

- a. Yes.
- b. See the Company's response to IEU INT 4-016.

Prepared by: William A. Allen

OHIO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSES TO INDUSTRIAL ENERGY USERS-OHIO DISCOVERY REQUESTS PUCO CASE NO. 14-1693-EL-RDR THIRD SET

INTERROGATORY

- INT-3-001 At page 10, lines 19-20, of the Direct Testimony of William A. Allen, Mr. Allen states, "Legacy costs to be recovered through the contract would be accepted as part of the up-front prudence review." In regard to that statement:
 - a. What are "legacy costs"?
 - b. If the legacy costs are identifiable for Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") accounts, what are the relevant FERC accounts?
 - c. What is the "up-front prudence review"?

RESPONSE

- a. Legacy costs are costs related to actions that occur prior to the Commission accepting the affiliate contract.
- b. The legacy costs are not limited to specific FERC accounts.
- c. The up-front prudence review is the review of AEP Ohio's decision to enter into the affiliate contract and legacy costs performed by the Commission in this proceeding.

Prepared by: William A. Allen

OHIO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSES TO INDUSTRIAL ENERGY USERS-OHIO DISCOVERY REQUESTS PUCO CASE NO. 14-1693-EL-RDR FOURTH SET

INTERROGATORY

INT-4-016

Identify any long-term (one year or longer) contract(s) for the supply of coal

to any of the units proposed to be included in the PPA Rider.

RESPONSE

Because the response to this question involves materials which are voluminous and highly confidential, the materials will be made available for inspection at the AEP offices, upon request with Counsel, at a mutually agreeable date and time.

As a non-operating co-owner, this information is not available for Stuart or Zimmer.

Prepared by: Toby L. Thomas and Kelly D. Pearce

OHIO POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSES TO OHIO ENERGY GROUP'S DISCOVERY REQUESTS PUCO CASE NO. 14-1693-EL-RDR FIRST SET

INTERROGATORY

INT-1-003 Please confirm that it is the Company's position that the Commission does not need to approve the proposed PPAs

RESPONSE

The Company is not seeking approval by the Commission of either the Affiliated PPA or the OVEC/ICPA contract, as both of those agreements would be subject to economic regulation by FERC as wholesale power contracts. As further described below, the Company is seeking recovery of the costs associated with these wholesale contracts as part of the Company's retail rates in Ohio – through the PPA Rider.

With regard to the proposed Affiliated PPA, the Company requests that the Commission find that it is reasonable and prudent for AEP Ohio to enter into this life-of-unit purchase contract with AEPGR. Consistent with the details reflected in the proposed contract and as further explained in testimony, the Company also requests that the Commission acknowledge that its up-front approval of the Affiliated PPA for retail recovery is a one-time prudence review that will not be revisited later during the term of the contract should economic conditions or cost/price projections change in the future. This situation is similar to the Commission's approval of AEP Ohio's decision to enter into a 20-year renewable energy purchase agreement in ESP II, where the Commission approved as prudent the Company's decision to enter into the Timber Road renewable energy purchase agreement (REPA); the costs recovered through retail rates (i.e., through the PPA Rider) are still subject to ongoing financial audits but not subsequent prudence audits. Legacy costs to be recovered through the contracts would be accepted as part of the upfront prudence review, future costs relating to AEP Ohio's obligations and responsibilities under the Affiliate PPA would be subject to Commission review; whereas, the wholesale rate collected by the Seller would not (though the Commission has the opportunity to pursue such issues before the FERC if it desired to do so).

Regarding the OVEC contract, the Company is requesting inclusion of the contract in the PPA Rider – which is an existing contract that does not expire until 2040. Because OVEC is a legacy contract and the Commission has routinely permitted recovery of OVEC costs as being prudent, there is no need to review the prudence of entering into the OVEC contract or the terms and conditions of the OVEC contract. The contract between AEP Ohio and OVEC is already valid and accepted as a just and reasonable wholesale power contract under the Federal Power Act. The contract is and remains subject to FERC's Federal Power Act jurisdiction under the plain terms of the contract, regardless of the orders that the Ohio Commission issues in this proceeding. AEP Ohio only seeks an order of the Ohio Commission approving retail recovery of the costs it incurs as a result of that valid, FERC-approved contract – through the PPA Rider.

Prepared By: Counsel