BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the :
Application of Duke Energy:
Ohio for Authority to :
Establish a Standard :
Service Offer Pursuant to :

Section 4928.143, Revised : Case No. 14-841-EL-SSO

Code, in the Form of an : Electric Security Plan, : Accounting Modifications : and Tariffs for Generation: Service. :

In the Matter of the : Application of Duke Energy:

Ohio for Authority to : Case No. 14-842-EL-ATA

Amend its Certified : Supplier Tariff, P.U.C.O. : No. 20.

PROCEEDINGS

before Ms. Christine M.T. Pirik and Mr. Nick Walstra, Attorney Examiners, at the Public Utilities

Commission of Ohio, 180 East Broad Street, Room 11-A, Columbus, Ohio, called at 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, November 20, 2014.

VOLUME XVI - REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

- - -

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	418	7
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22		
23		
24		
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		4190
1	INDEX	
2		
3	WITNESSES	PAGE
4	Roger A. Morin	
5	Direct Examination by Ms. Watts Cross-Examination by Mr. Serio	4194 4204
6	Kenneth J. Jennings	4244
7	Direct Examination by Ms. Kingery Cross-Examination by Mr. Oliker	4244
8	Cross-Examination by Mr. Darr Cross-Examination by Ms. Hussey	4287 4290
	Cross-Examination by Ms. Bojko	4295
9	Redirect Examination by Mr. Berger Recross-Examination by Mr. Petricoff	4333 4344
10		
11		
12	COMPANY EXHIBITS IDENTIFIED A	ADMITTED
13	40 Rebuttal Testimony of 4194 Roger A. Morin	4242
14	41 Rebuttal Testimony of 4243 Kenneth J. Jennings	4373
15		
16		
17	OCC EXHIBITS IDENTIFIED F	4DMT.I.I.F.D
18	49 AUS Utility Report 4224	4243
	50 OCC-INT-13-349 4232	4243
19		
20	IGS EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED A	
21		
22	14 PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity 4254 Market; Revision 25: Effective Date: October 30,	4374
23	2014	
24		
25		

				4191
1		INDEX (Continued	d)	
2				
3	OM 7\	EXHIBITS	IDENTIFIED	y DM t dide D
4				
5	14	PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, Effective Date: 09/10/2014	4318	4374
6	15	Letter from A. Spiller to	4330	
7	15	B. McNeal, dated November 12, 2014,	4330	
8		Re: Case No. 13-2385-EL-SSO		
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
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Thursday Afternoon Session, 1 2 November 20, 2014.

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EXAMINER WALSTRA: We'll go on the record then.

I believe everyone has received a copy of the proposed redactions for Volume XV. Duke, if you would like to speak, I guess, generally. They seem to be pretty consistent and the same things, but if you want to speak generally about those proposed redactions.

MS. KINGERY: Yes, thank you, your Honor. I'll go page by page since I have to do that anyway as I flip through. So on page 4135 are the first redactions and those are showing direction -directional changes and sort of generally the amount of changes on forced outages.

The next page, 4136, is directional changes on certain assumptions.

And same thing on the next page, again, it's directional words. And again on 4138. So it's either outages or assumptions, so forecasts and assumptions to create them.

> EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you.

Any responses?

4193 MR. BERGER: Your Honor, on page 4136, I 1 2 do not think there is any need for the first two 3 words in that line to be redacted. Other than that, I'm fine. 4 5 EXAMINER WALSTRA: What line are you in reference to? 6 MR. BERGER: Line 14. 7 8 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Anyone else? 9 MS. BOJKO: We would concur with that. 10 MS. KINGERY: And I don't have any problem with that either. It looks like I left those 11 12 two words out on line 5 of the following page. 13 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Okay. Okay. After 14 hearing both sides, we will open up the first two 15 words on page 4136 on line 14, and all the other 16 proposed redactions, we will grant them. 17 MS. KINGERY: Thank you very much, your 18 Honor. 19 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Would you like to call 2.0 your first witness. 2.1 MS. WATTS: Yes, thank you, your Honor. 22 Duke Energy Ohio calls Dr. Roger A. Morin. 23 (Witness sworn.) 24 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you. You may be 25 seated.

4194 MS. WATTS: May we have Dr. Morin's 1 2 testimony marked as Duke Energy Ohio Exhibit 40. 3 And, your Honors, I placed extra copies on the Bench 4 and I have given one to the court reporter. 5 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Got those. Thank you. The exhibit will be so marked. 6 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 7 8 MS. WATTS: Thank you. 9 ROGER A. MORIN 10 being first duly sworn, as prescribed by law, was 11 12 examined and testified as follows: 1.3 DIRECT EXAMINATION 14 By Ms. Watts: Mr. Morin, do you have before you what 15 Q. 16 has been marked Duke Energy Exhibit 40? 17 Α. I do. 18 And is that the testimony you caused to 19 be filed in this proceeding? 2.0 Α. Yes, it is. 2.1 0. And do you have any corrections to that 22 testimony? 23 Α. No.

contained therein, would your answers be the same?

And if I were to ask you the guestions

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A. They would be, yes.

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- Q. Would you state your name, your address, and your title, please?
- A. My name is Roger Morin. My business address is Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, University Plaza, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, and my title is Emeritus Professor of Finance and Distinguished Professor of Finance for Regulated Industry at the Center for the Study of Regulated Industry also located at the Robinson College.
- MS. WATTS: Dr. Morin is available for cross-examination.
- 13 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you.
- MR. SERIO: Your Honor, before we do
 that, I had a motion to strike.
- 16 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Okay.
- MR. SERIO: And in order to make this a little easier for you I have -- can I approach?
- 19 EXAMINER WALSTRA: You may.
- MR. SERIO: I have a copy of Dr. Morin's testimony that was filed on behalf of Duke in the recent Duke electric rate case, 12-1682-EL-AIR on July 20, 2012.
- MS. WATTS: Mr. Serio, do you have a copy
 for the witness?

MR. SERIO: It is really for the examiners for the purposes of the motion to strike.

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Rebuttal testimony is supposed to rebut, your Honor, but if you look at Dr. Morin's direct testimony in the rate case and you compare it to his alleged rebuttal testimony in this proceeding, you'll find that the vast majority of it is the identical testimony that was given in the rate case.

For example, if you start on page 10 of Exhibit 40, and you compare that to page 7 of the testimony from the rate case, the section "Regulatory Framework and Rate of Return" is identical to the extent that even questions and answers, page by page, are identical.

If you go to Exhibit 40, page 18, and the direct testimony, page 14, the same is true for cost of common equity capital estimates. Again, questions and answers are virtually identical.

If you go to Exhibit 40 at page 22, and the direct testimony at page 17, the DCF estimates again are identical.

On page 35 of Exhibit 40 and page 30 of the direct testimony, the CAPM estimates are identical.

On page 54 of Exhibit 40 and page 47 of

the direct testimony, the historic premium estimates are identical.

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On page 57 of the Exhibit 40 and page 49 of the direct testimony, the allowed risk premium discussion is identical.

And then on page 60 of the Exhibit 40 and page 52 of the direct testimony, the need -- the need for floatation cost adjustment is identical.

Finally, on page 66 of Exhibit 40 and page 57 of direct testimony, the summary cost of equity results is identical.

Rebuttal testimony is supposed to rebut. It is not supposed to be something that could have or should have been done in the direct case. The PUCO, in Case No. 98-1398-TP-AMT, I should say the Attorney Examiner in that case, rejected an attempt by the company to submit documents that could have been done as direct testimony in an entry dated July 16, 1999.

In Case No. 96-922-TP-UNC, in an entry dated January 29, 2001, again, the Examiner in that case granted a motion to strike rebuttal testimony that the CLECs tried to get in that proceeding noting that even a cursory review of the testimony revealed that the witnesses weren't rebutting new evidence, but they were simply representing what should have or

could have been done as direct evidence.

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In addition to those two proceedings by the PUCO, we have the case of Weimer versus Anzevino, it's W-e-i-m-e-r versus A-n-z-e-v-i-n-o. It's the Seventh District Court of Appeals in Ohio, Mahoning County, at 122 Ohio Appellate 3d. 720, where the court recognized that rebutting evidence is that which is given to explain, repeal, counteract, or disprove facts given in evidence by the adverse party. It is that evidence which has become relevant or important only as an effect of some evidence introduced by the other side.

That finding was also held by the Ninth Court -- the Ninth Circuit -- the Ninth Appellate

District in Ohio in the Nickey versus Brown,

N-i-c-k-e-y versus Brown, at 7 Ohio Appellate 3d. 32,

on July 14, 1992, quoting the same language, your

Honor. And to help the Bench out, I do have copies

of those orders.

MS. WATTS: Again, Mr. Serio, do you have copies for counsel and the witness? Apparently not.

MR. SERIO: Your Honor, the point is when you do the point-by-point comparison of the alleged rebuttal testimony and direct testimony, it's obvious it doesn't rebut anything.

Supposedly the testimony rebuts the direct testimony of Matthew Kahal which was OCC Exhibit No. 32. Mr. Kahal addressed rate of return in the proposed rider DCI at pages 8 through 10 of his testimony. At no point in his testimony does he discuss regulatory framework and rate of return, cost of common equity capital estimates, DCF estimates, CAPM estimates, historic risk premium estimates, allowed risk premium, a need for a floatation cost adjustment or summary cost of equity results. So they are not rebutting anything that's in Mr. Kahal's testimony.

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The company could have easily filed direct testimony on rate of return in this proceeding had they chosen to. The company chose not to. That meant the parties had no opportunity to review that testimony, to do discovery on that testimony, and to present responsive testimony had they chosen to do so.

Instead, the company came in at the 12th hour, presented direct testimony with the cover page calling it "Rebuttal" and gave the parties two and a half days to prepare for it. Obviously, there's no way we could prepare and present testimony to respond to this in the time given. So it's inappropriate

testimony and it should be stricken.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you.

Response from the company?

MS. WATTS: Yes, thank you, your Honor.

5 First of all, Revised Code 4928.143 has no

requirement for an ROE -- element of ROE in a case.

ROE is not relevant in an ESP case. The company

8 | provided information relevant to ROE in this case

9 because of the additional rider requests that are

10 pertinent. And so, in -- and we relied upon ROEs

11 from previous cases because we thought that was

12 relatively reasonable. They were -- those were ROE

values that came from other ESP proceedings and the

14 company's earlier distribution rate case which the

15 | Commission had ruled upon only just a year ago.

16 So it seemed to us to be a reasonable

17 | value. The range that the company proposed is at --

18 | was, in fact, agreed upon by the parties in that case

and was the low end of the range that the company

20 requested.

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The intervenors have challenged ROE in a

22 number of respects in the record in this proceeding.

23 In fact, in addition to the direct testimony of

24 Mr. Kahal, there was cross-examination of Duke Energy

Ohio Witness Wathen by Ms. Bojko and by Ms. Hussey in

Volume II of the transcript, and I have specific pages references, if that's helpful.

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There was cross-examination of Duke Energy Ohio Witness Laub by Ms. Bojko and by Mr. Serio. There was cross-examination of Duke Energy Ohio Witness Ziolkowski by Mr. Serio.

There was Duke -- there was cross-examination of Staff Witness Turkenton by Mr. Stinson, and there was cross-examination of Staff Witness McCarter by Mr. Serio.

The issue of ROE was raised far more frequently than the company could have anticipated and it's only reasonable to allow us to rebut what was raised in the record in that regard.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you.

MR. SERIO: If I can respond, OCC asked questions about whether the DCI rider would reduce risk. We didn't ask questions about fundamental rate of return principles which make up the vast bulk of the Exhibit 40, as I indicated previously, from regulatory framework through the floatation costs.

All the questions that we asked had to do with did this reduce the risk to the company. We never asked about CAPM or DCF or any of that. So that's not rebutting anything that was in Mr. Kahal's

testimony or anything in any of the questions. It's new testimony.

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And the company's correct, there is no requirement to file rate of return testimony, but had they wanted to, they had the option to do so.

Instead, the company is relying on the rate of return from the -- from the rate case which was based on a stipulation even though the stipulation said that the ROE agreed to in this stipulation shall not be used as precedent in any future electric proceeding except for the purpose of determining the revenue requirements for collection from customers and proceedings addressing the company's SmartGRID rider, rider DR-IM.

So not only did they file improper testimony, but now they are piggybacking that by relying on a rate of return that they are not supposed to use for that purpose. It's inappropriate testimony. It should be stricken.

MS. BOJKO: Your Honor, if I may have the opportunity since my name was just brought into this discussion. I would just like to clarify the record as well that that was a misrepresentation by Ms. Watts of what the questions were.

We also, like OCC, did not get into the

details of rate of return or anything about that. We asked about the risk to customers and it was nothing more than that. Thank you.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Are there any other motions to strike outside of Mr. Serio's requests?

Hearing both arguments, all arguments, we are going to overrule the motion. We think that it is a proper rebuttal witness. I think obviously it's an extensive testimony but it goes into a lot of the background how he made his decisions which makes it more relevant. So we will overrule and allow the testimony to come in.

MS. WATTS: Thank you, your Honor.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Mr. Darr.

MR. DARR: No questions, your Honor.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Mr. O'Brien.

MR. O'BRIEN: No questions, your Honor.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Ms. Hussey.

MS. HUSSEY: No questions, your Honor.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Ms. Bojko.

MS. BOJKO: No questions, your Honor.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Mr. Serio.

MR. SERIO: Thank you, your Honor.

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1	CROSS-EXAMINATION		
2	By Mr. Serio:		
3	Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Morin.		
4	A. Good afternoon.		
5	Q. Can you tell me when did you begin your		
6	preparation on your rebuttal testimony?		
7	MS. WATTS: Objection, your Honor.		
8	Attorney-client privileged and attorney work product		
9	privileged.		
10	MR. SERIO: Your Honor, I am entitled to		
11	know when. I am not asking what anything counsel		
12	told him; simply when he began preparing for it. I		
13	think if I want to make an argument to the Commission		
14	that it was inappropriate, I should be able to point		
15	out to the Commission when the testimony was prepared		
16	in support of that argument. It's a factual		
17	question. It has nothing to do with attorney-client		
18	privilege.		
19	EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.		
20	A. Approximately mid-October.		
21	O Do vou recall when you signed a contract		

- Do you recall when you signed a contract to do the rebuttal testimony? 22
 - I never signed a contract.

24 Now, can you tell me what specific documents you reviewed in preparation for your 25

testimony?

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- A. Yes. The Value Line Investment Survey which is the software version of Value Line. No. 2, the Yahoo Finance website where one can derive growth rates. The Morningstar Valuation Yearbook 2013 Edition and that's it.
- Q. So that's everything that you reviewed in preparation for your testimony, correct?
- A. I also believe I read the credit rating reports as well.
- Q. Now, I'm correct that Duke filed the testimony of various witnesses as part of its application in this case, correct?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. To your knowledge, did Duke sponsor any cost of equity testimony as part of its application?
 - A. No, sir.
- Q. Do you know if Duke sponsored any testimony or evidence showing that the 9.84 return on equity is reasonable for use in the DCI rider?
- A. They did not provide such testimony. Hence, my contribution.
- Q. Do you know why Duke did not file any rate of return testimony as part of its application?
 - A. No. You would have to ask the company

witnesses.

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- Q. Are you aware of anything as in a rule or statute that would precluded Duke from filing rate of return testimony as part of its application?
 - A. I am not, sir.
- Q. Are you aware if there was any type of stay out that precluded Duke from filing rate of return testimony as part of its application?
 - A. I am not aware of that, sir.
- Q. Now, you've testified in numerous rate proceedings before the Ohio Commission, correct?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And would you agree with me that generally when rate of return testimony is filed by a utility, staff and intervenors are given an opportunity to conduct extensive discovery on that testimony?
- A. That's usually the case, but many attorneys are reluctant to cross-examine me, I find.
- Q. I'm sorry. I was referring to discovery first.
 - A. Oh, discovery, same response, yes.
- Q. And staff and intervenors also have the opportunity to file testimony in response to company rate of return testimony when it's filed in a rate

case as part of an application, correct?

- A. Unless they accept the previous decision that was made by the Commission, in this case the 9.84 percent ROE.
- Q. Now, you were in the room when I compared your rebuttal testimony in this proceeding to your direct testimony in the Duke 12-1682-EL-AIR proceeding, correct?
 - A. Yes, sir.

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- Q. And you recall your testimony you filed in that proceeding?
 - A. Very well.
- Q. And was I correct in pointing out there are large sections of your rebuttal testimony that are virtually identical to the direct testimony that you filed in the rate case?
- A. Yes, sir, the hallmark of a good witness is consistency and you testified to that.
- Q. And that consistency went as far as identical questions and identical answers, correct?
- A. Yes, sir, except towards the end there is a section on the effect of rider mechanisms which was not in the 2012 testimony.
- Q. So if I compared your two testimonies, your Exhibit 40, actually the only part that

addresses the DCI rider is your testimony beginning on page 68, Section V, at line 5, correct, through the end of your testimony?

- A. There's a section which begins on page 67 which basically points the Commission to other ROE benchmarks that the Commission should take into account to assess the reasonableness of the 9.4, so I talk about that on page 67 and 68. And also Section V on page 68 is -- discusses the impact of rider mechanisms on ROE, if any. So that's a new section. All the way up to the page -- to the end basically.
- Q. Okay. Now, your testimony in the Duke rate case, 12-1682, you recommended a return on equity of 10.6 percent, correct?
- A. Correct.

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- Q. And the stipulation in that proceeding was 9.84 percent, correct?
 - A. Correct.
- Q. And the Commission adopted that stipulation without any modification, correct?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Now, it's your understanding that in the rate case, Duke had the burden of proving that its rate of return was reasonable, correct?

A. Correct.

2.1

- Q. Is it your understanding that Duke has the same burden in this proceeding?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Now, I think you were also in the room when I pointed out that the 9.84 percent came from the Duke stipulation in the rate case, correct?
 - A. Yes, sir.
 - Q. And did you read that stipulation?
 - A. A long time ago.
- Q. And did you read the language that I read this morning in my motion to strike, pointing out that the rate of return in the stipulation was not to be used in any future proceedings?
 - A. I heard you read it.
- Q. But you recall that when you read it yourself.
 - A. Yeah, I do.
- Q. Now, even though the stipulation specifically said it was not to be used for that purpose, your testimony said that you were starting with that as a starting point, correct?
- A. My starting point was simply to determine if the 9.84 percent, which was stipulated in that case, is still a reasonable number, and I concluded

that it was. That's what my testimony is all about is the 9.84 still reasonable today in 2014 and the answer is yes.

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- Q. On page 4 of your rebuttal testimony at line 7 and 8, you indicate that your testimony is in response to cross-examination of the three company witnesses. Is there anything in their direct testimony that you're responding to or it was only their cross-examination?
- A. The cross-examination mainly and the general idea that emerged from these witnesses that the rider has a risk reduction impact on ROE.
 - Q. Did you read the entire transcripts?
- A. No, only the pages that were relevant to the ROE issue.
- Q. How did you determine which pages were relevant?
 - A. The attorneys pointed that to me in order to reduce the time of reading thousands of pages of transcripts.
 - Q. So you only read pages of the transcript that counsel for Duke pointed out to you as being relevant?
- A. That's right, that dealt with the ROE issue and the risk reduction issue.

Q. So you don't know if there is any other pages in the thousands of pages of transcript that might be pertinent to the rate of return or return on equity issue that counsel for Duke did not point out to you, correct?

A. No, I do not.

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- Q. On page 6 of your rebuttal testimony, at the top of the page you point out that empirical evidence supports the company having a higher rate -- return on equity than the 9.84 percent, correct?
 - A. What lines are you on?
 - Q. Lines 2 through 4.
 - A. Yes, correct.
- Q. And if Duke felt that the 9.48 that they are earning right now was insufficient, Duke could have filed a rate case proceeding, correct?
 - A. It could have.
- Q. But Duke has chosen not to do so, correct?
- A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. On page 8 of your testimony at the top of the page, you indicate that "Adopting a lower ROE would increase costs for ratepayers."
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Over what period of time would it take

before ratepayers experienced higher costs as a result of a lower ROE?

- A. Until such a time that the bond rating agencies would react to having a lower ROE than the peer companies and this would probably launch a credit watch and the company's bond could be put on negative credit watch and then eventually downgraded if that's the case.
- Q. How long would that take? Six months? A year? Two years?
- A. It's hard to say. Bond rating agencies conduct their reviews on a quarterly basis usually for operating companies. So I would say next couple of quarters.
- Q. And if that were to happen, the company would always have the option of filing another rate proceeding, correct?
 - A. Oh, yes, they do.
- Q. And if they were to file a rate proceeding, that would probably preclude the bond agencies from taking any action until the resulting return from that proceeding were determined, correct?
- A. Yeah. It would depend on the outcome of this case as well.
 - Q. Now --

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- A. Rating agencies take a variety of factors into account including what you suggest.
- Q. Now, you indicated that it could result in their bonds being downgraded, et cetera. Now, if the Commission was to reduce the return on equity from 9.84 to let's say 9.50, did you do any analysis to quantify the impact that would have?
 - A. The impact on what?

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- Q. On Duke's earnings.
- A. No, not really, but it certainly would impact the risk in the last -- there has not been a reduction in ROE due to decoupling and riders since 2011. In the 70 to 75 cases that I'm aware of where riders were discussed, 80 percent of them had zero reduction in ROE, and a few had a 10 basis point reduction in ROE, but all those cases were prior to 2011.

And what's happened since 2011 is, of course, the risks faced by the industry have intensified, and I am talking about renewable standards and I am talking about conservation, I'm talking about the slower economy. And the response of regulators has been extremely supportive and they have come up with risk mitigators like the rider that we are discussing here in this case. And that's why

there is no impact on ROE due to the presence of a rider because it's an offset to other risks that have emerged.

- Q. On page 10 of your testimony, line 15, you talk about the traditional regulatory process. That's the process where the company files a rate case similar to what happened in the 12-1682 proceeding, correct?
 - A. Yes, sir.

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- Q. And in a proceeding like that, regulatory -- you're familiar with the concept of regulatory lag, correct?
 - A. Very much so, yes.
- Q. And regulatory lag is built into the traditional regulatory process, correct?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. So if you remove regulatory lag by allowing cost recovery through a rider, you're eliminating one of the components that's built into a traditional regulatory process, correct?
- A. That's correct. But that's usually done again in response to other policy responses to other risks that have suddenly emerged like the ones I mentioned a few minutes ago.
- Q. Now, you talk about a utility's financial

integrity being compromised by lower return on equity. At what -- how -- what would you have to quantify in return on equity drop in order to -- for it to be an impact on the utility's financial integrity? How much -- how much reduction?

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A. Well, the bond rating agencies will engage in the same process I looked at on page 67.

Additional benchmarks, they will certainly scrutinize the allowed returns for the peer companies which is somewhere in the 10.2 percent right now.

They will also examine recent ROE decisions which have averaged about 10 percent, and if you are out of line, they will take actions, possibly put you on negative credit watch and possible down grade.

So they will look at a variety of benchmarks. They will look at how supportive the regulator is to all these new risks that have suddenly appeared, the ones that I mentioned earlier. We have riders, we have appreciation trackers, we have DCI in this case, we have revenue decouplings, we have straight fixed variable rate design. We have a whole host of tools that regulators have come up with to support the -- and offset the rising risks in the industry. So they would look at a variety of

factors.

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- Q. The companies that you list on pages 67 and 68, Exhibit 40, those have a range anywhere from 8.72 up to, it looks like 11.48, correct?
 - A. Yeah, the average is 10.2.
- Q. So if the Commission were to reduce the 9.84 and stay above the 8.72, they would still fall within that range, wouldn't they?
- A. The range page 68, yeah, that's correct. These are the currently-allowed returns in my peer group which average 10.22.
- Q. Well, let's take a look at your peer review group there. Do you know what year each of those companies had that return on equity established?
- A. They vary. Some are recent. Some date back. It depends on the last rate case for these subsidiaries of these operating -- of these parent companies. You can always say, well, if these companies are not earning their ROE, they can always file for a rate case. If they are earning too much, the regulators will say, hey, show cause, come in here and tell us why your rates are not too high. So that's a valid benchmark, one of many.
 - Q. But you don't list anywhere in your

testimony when those companies had that return set, so we don't know if it was last year or five years or ten years ago, correct?

- A. No, we don't know, nor do we care because there is always the luxury that the regulator has to have a show cause order if they are deemed to be too high, or if they are too low, the company can come in and ask for a rate case.
- Q. How often is it your experience that PUCs have show cause orders, ordering companies to come in to reduce rates?
- A. I don't know the frequency of that. It does happen. I have been in a lot of cases like that.
 - Q. Have you ever experienced that in Ohio?
 - A. No.

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- Q. Do you know if any of the companies listed on page 67 or 68 had a show cause order by their Commission, asking them to come in to reduce their rate -- their return on equity?
- A. No, I did not investigate that. I didn't think it was relevant.
- Q. Now, you indicate that these numbers come from the current issue of AUS Utility Reports.
 - A. That's the paragraph on page 68, line 1

through 4.

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- Q. Actually, I was looking at page 67, lines

 10 through 12.
 - A. Okay. Yes, correct, yes, I follow you.
 - Q. Now, would that -- would that report list the years --
 - A. Yes, it does.
 - Q. It does for all those companies?
 - A. Yes, it does. I will be glad to supply you with that document.
- MR. SERIO: Can I approach, your Honor?

 EXAMINER WALSTRA: You may.
- MR. SERIO: I wasn't planning on making this an exhibit, your Honor.
 - Q. The document I just handed you, it's titled, on the right-hand side, "AUS Utility Report, the investor's edge," is that the document you are talking about?
 - A. Yes, it is. Which month do you have here? Which date? Which edition?
- Q. I am looking to see if it's on here.
- A. It's not on here.
- Q. I thought it was the most current one available at the time.
- 25 A. Okay. I think mine was August but

anyway, go ahead.

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- Q. If you go to page 10 of that document, is that the page where you got the companies that you list in the peer group?
- A. Yes, it is in the last column -- the last two columns refer to allowed return and order date.
- Q. And if I look at the last column, the order date, the only three companies that have an order date are MGE Energy --

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Mr. Serio, what is this document?

MR. SERIO: The AUS Utility Report.

MS. WATTS: And, your Honor, I would like to enter an objection because I don't have a copy

16 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Nor does the Bench.

MS. WATTS: It also appears that
Mr. Serio is using a version that is not necessarily
the same as the one the witness had in his testimony.

- Q. Dr. Morin, are you familiar with this particular copy of the AUS report?
- A. I am familiar with the document. I use it fairly regularly.
- Q. Are the allowed ROEs listed on the second-to-last column identical to those ROEs listed

in your testimony on page 67 and 68?

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- A. Yes, they are. So we must be using the same edition.
- Q. Okay. And other than those three that have a date listed, is there any way from this --

MS. WATTS: Your Honor, again, I am going to object because I am not even able to look at what the witness is looking at.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Do you have a copy?

MR. SERIO: No, I don't, your Honor. The witness didn't attach it to his testimony. I had to dig it up myself.

MS. WATTS: The witness stated that it was not relevant to his testimony.

EXAMINER PIRIK: Mr. Serio, the Bench doesn't have copies of the document you are referring to, so you can't proceed with something that you are not going to provide the Bench with copies.

THE WITNESS: I'll be glad to donate mine because I know the document pretty well.

EXAMINER PIRIK: You can't proceed with something that the record isn't going to understand because it is not marked as a document. You are referring to page numbers and there's no document for us to substantiate on the record.

MR. SERIO: Your Honor, thus far, he has substantiated in general terms --

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EXAMINER PIRIK: You are referring to a document and you are referring to page numbers in a document that's not been marked as an exhibit.

There's no website that you are referring to that we can even look at the document on the Bench. I mean, I understand that you all --

MR. SERIO: I can provide a website, your Honor.

EXAMINER PIRIK: Mr. Serio, I understand you understand what it is, but we don't have anything to look at. We need to have something to look at if you are going to refer to it. I mean, if you have one copy for the counsel and one copy for the Bench, that would be sufficient as long as we have something we can look at.

MR. SERIO: Your Honor, my concern with copying it was I did not have authorization to copy it and there's a copyright warning on the document. So I didn't want to make numerous copies and put it into the record because I hadn't had an opportunity to contact the company itself to see if I could use it as a document. You know, that's the only reason I didn't make copies. I didn't want to violate the

warning on the second page of this.

EXAMINER PIRIK: Is it on a website?

MR. SERIO: Yes, it is, your Honor. It's

www.ausinc.com. Ausinc.com.

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MS. WATTS: Mr. Serio, is it proprietary such that one must pay for the document?

MR. SERIO: It says "This publication covers all companies which have common stock available for public trading with the exception of a few companies which are omitted because of the small percentage in the hands of the public or the small size of the company."

"The material set forth here has been compiled from sources believed by the publisher to be reliable, but the accuracy is not guaranteed. It contains condensed, therefore incomplete, data which are intended for record and for reference only and not as representation. No portion of this Report may be copied or duplicated without the express written consent of the publisher." And it is something you have to pay to get. So that's why I didn't make copies, your Honor.

MR. BERGER: We are seeing if we can pull it up on the computer so we can provide you with a copy.

1 MR. SERIO: May I approach, your Honor? 2 EXAMINER WALSTRA: You may. 3 MR. SERIO: Your Honor, I can give you my copy and I will point out on page 10 there are 4 5 highlights. It is my highlights. It did not come this way, so not to indicate they are there for any 6 7 reason other than my highlighting. If I get 8 authorization from the publisher, I would be happy to 9 mark it as an exhibit, but I have to do it and I didn't have the time to do it in the time I had 10 allotted. So I guess I'll reserve a number for it 11 12 and if the publisher allows me to do it, I can submit 13 it as a document tomorrow after the hearing is over. 14 EXAMINER WALSTRA: That sounds 15 reasonable. If we are going to be referencing it, 16 our record needs to be clear what we are referring 17 to. 18 MS. WATTS: So that solves the problem 19 for the Bench. It doesn't solve my problem. 2.0 EXAMINER PIRIK: Can you pull it up on 2.1 your computer? 22 MS. SPILLER: What's the website? 23 MS. WATTS: Your Honor, may I approach 24 the witness? 25 EXAMINER WALSTRA: You may.

4224 1 MS. WATTS: If it's okay, I'll just stand next to the witness if that's --2 3 EXAMINER WALSTRA: That's fine. MS. BOJKO: Joe, she needs the website. 4 5 MR. SERIO: It's ausinc.com, I believe. It's on the front of the -- I don't have my copy now. 6 7 EXAMINER WALSTRA: I believe that's the 8 correct address. 9 0. (By Mr. Serio) Okay. Dr. Morin. Yes, sir. 10 Α. 11 Ο. Just so that we are on the same page, you 12 indicated that the ROE listed on what would be --1.3 MR. SERIO: I am going to reserve No. 49 to identify that as OCC Exhibit No. 49. 14 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 15 16 On page 10, the ROE listed on the 17 second-to-last column, those are the same ROEs that 18 are listed on page 67 and 68 of your rebuttal 19 testimony, correct? 2.0 Α. Yes, sir. 2.1 And the only three companies that have a 22 date listed for when their return was set are MGE 23 Energy, PG&E Corp. and UIL Holdings, correct? 24 That is correct, and I suspect that the Α.

reason why they are -- they do not show dates for the

other companies is because these are parent holding companies that have multiple subsidiaries in multiple states and they can't pinpoint one single date for one particular case since there is a variety of cases for many of these operating companies.

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But, again, that's not relevant. If the ROEs are deemed to be too high, there will be show cause orders; if they are too low, the companies will seek redemption.

- Q. Now, of the companies listed on page 67 and 68 of your testimony, do you know how many of them have a rider similar to the DCI rider?
- A. I looked at that and all of them have a variety of risk mitigators. Some of them have CAPEX riders, some of them have revenue decouplings, some of them have straight fixed variable rate design, some of them have formula ratemaking. They all have a variety of similar mechanisms that essentially do the same thing to reduce risk.
- Q. But the amount of risk that each of those mechanisms reduces, differs from company to company, correct?
- A. It probably does as some are a little different than others, but all of them have riders.

 And that's why I keep saying in my testimony that the

impact of riders is already embedded in the stock prices. It's already embedded in the bond ratings. And if you go ahead and further reduce the ROE, you are double counting the effects of these allowed ROEs.

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- Q. If the companies that were used as a proxy group when the company had its rate case a year and a half ago had riders and Duke did not, and Duke had its return set based on the proxy group, if you reduce the risk now, by having a rider come in after the fact, doesn't that give Duke an additional benefit?
- A. No, it doesn't, because the peer group already has a variety of risk mitigators, and if you are going to reduce the ROE on the grounds that the DCI rider reduces risk, you are going to be double counting the impact of such riders.
- Q. Is there any evidence from the rate case that Duke's return on equity was reduced because of riders that other companies have?
- A. No, no. There isn't, but there is a variety of empirical evidence from an industry point of view that shows that the impact of revenue decoupling on ROE is zero. And that's because of the reasons that I've delineated, that is, that riders

tend to offset other risks that have arisen.

- Q. There's different kinds of riders, correct, you identified?
- A. Yes. There's placement for gas companies, in this case distribution infrastructure assets, there's trackers for environmentally-related capital expenditures. There's a whole variety, a whole panoply of different attempts to mitigate risks.
- Q. Fuel riders are different than nonfuel riders, correct?
- A. Yes. Every company in my group has a fuel clause, so.
 - Q. Would you agree with me that some of the riders that some of those companies have have true-ups and others do not?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. And Duke did not propose a true-up with the DCI rider, correct?
 - A. That's correct. That's very low on the radar screen of investors.
 - Q. And some of -- some of the riders are based on projected costs and others are based on actual costs, correct?
- 25 A. That's true.

- Q. And Duke's DCI rider is based on projected costs, correct?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. And some of the riders include O&M cost savings credit, correct?
 - A. Some of them do.
- Q. And Duke did not propose an O&M cost savings credit, correct?
 - A. That's correct.
 - Q. So --

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- 11 A. There is a whole variety of riders, I
 12 agree with you there.
 - Q. So if I was to ask you to specifically list which of the proxy companies have a DCI-type rider similar to Duke's, you can't identify those for me, can you?
 - A. Well, I can list all the riders or risk mitigators they have. I already have that. I can certainly do that.
 - Q. Is there anywhere in your testimony that identifies which of the 25 or 26 companies have a DCI-type rider?
 - A. Yeah, quite a few have similar, to mitigate risk. Some of them have CAPEX riders, some of them have renewable type of investment riders.

There is a whole variety of risk mitigators out there.

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- Q. But there is nothing in your testimony that identify which ones have a DCI-type rider, correct?
- A. No. But I could provide that if you want.
 - Q. And you don't know when the riders for those other utilities might have been implemented or what the terms of the riders were, correct?
- A. Some of them date back five, six, seven years, but since 2011, there's been roughly 50 cases with riders or risk mitigators I should say. And in all of those cases since 2011, the reduction in ROE was zero because, again, you are trying to offset other risks with these riders.
- Q. On page 71 of your testimony, line 20, you indicate that risk-mitigating mechanisms, such as the DCI rider, reduces risk on an absolute basis, correct?
- A. Yes, but not on the relative basis. It's the same idea as a fuel clause. A fuel clause reduces risk on an absolute basis, but relative to other utilities it does not because they all have it. So you don't want to double count.

- Q. With regard to riders, especially the DCI rider that Duke proposed, is it your understanding that there's any kind of prudence review associated with the cost of the rider?
 - A. I'm not familiar with that.
- Q. Do you know if companies that have similar riders to the Duke DCI rider have had prudence disallowances from costs included in their riders?
 - A. I am not aware of that.
- 11 Q. Would you turn to page 73 of your 12 testimony.
 - A. I have it.

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- Q. On line 5, you indicate a low authorized ROE increases the likelihood a utility would have to rely increasingly on debt financing. Do you see that?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. When you identify a "low authorized ROE," what would be a low authorized ROE that would cause Duke to have to rely increasingly on debt financing?
 - A. Something less than 9.84.
 - Q. So you know for a fact --
- A. Something that's outside a reasonable range.

Q. So there could be a number below 9.84 where the company still would not have to use debt financing for capital needs, correct?

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- A. There could be, but it would be more expensive for the customers, if they can get access to their money at all.
- Q. And have you done any analysis to determine what that number would be where Duke would begin to get higher costs for its financing?
- A. Oh, I think if you set a low rate of return, the 9.8 is sort of near the bottom of my range. My range is 9.6 to about 11, the same as FERC's recent electric VCF models, the same range. I think if you are out of that range, I think there would be cause for concern.
- Q. Do you know what the debt financing is in Duke's current 9.84?
- A. The company has approximately a debt ratio of 50 percent.
- Q. Do you know what the equity ratio is in the DCI rider?
 - A. No, I do not.
- MR. SERIO: Can I approach, your Honor?
- EXAMINER WALSTRA: You may.
- MR. SERIO: I would like to mark for

4232 purposes of identification OCC Exhibit 50. 1 2 EXAMINER WALSTRA: So marked. 3 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 4 It's a two-page document indicating Q. 5 OCC-INT-13-349. Do you have that, Dr. Morin? Yes, sir. 6 Α. 7 Q. And at the bottom it says "Person 8 Responsible: Peggy Laub." Do you know who Peggy Laub is? 9 10 Α. Yes. And if you look at the second page of OCC 11 12 Exhibit No. 50, I believe under "Percent of Total" 13 for common equity, it says 53.3 percent. 14 Α. Yes, I see that. And that would be the debt equity ratio, 15 Q. 16 correct? 17 That would be the common equity ratio. Α. 18 Or common equity ratio. And is that 0. 19 considered a low common equity ratio? 2.0 Α. It's considered reasonable. The industry 2.1 average is around 50, 51 percent, so I consider that 22 okay.

- I'm sorry. You said the average was 50 23 Q. 24 to 51 percent?
- 25 Α. Somewhere in that area, yeah, depending

if you include short-term debt or exclude short-term debt.

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- Q. Now on page 73 of your testimony, on line 14, it says "As the company relies more on debt financing...." What constitutes "more"?
- A. Well, obviously, if it has to deviate from the 53 percent and resort to debt, that -- the company obviously becomes riskier. The shareholders bear more financial risk if the company relies more and more on debt.
- Q. So if they had to rely 1 percent more on debt, would that make the company riskier?
- A. Oh, probably not. Investors -- the investment community doesn't react to decimal point changes, but if the company sees a trend -- if the investment community sees a trend towards increasing the debt ratio over subsequent debt issues, it will get very concerned, but I wouldn't worry too, too much if it went from 53 to 51 or 52.
- Q. What would constitute a trend? How many offers before you had a trend?
- A. Well, it depends on the size of the offering.
- Q. So a single offering wouldn't constitute a trend under any circumstances, correct?

- A. No. Again, it depends on the size of the offering and how much would it increase or decrease the equity ratio. How much financial risk does the company have to bear as a result of this new debt issue.
- Q. On line 15, on page 73, you talk about decreasing the operating income available. Have you quantified what level of decrease it would take before there was an impact on the company's ability to finance?
 - A. This was a generic statement.
- Q. On line 17, you talk about greater uncertainty. Can you quantify the greater uncertainty?
- A. It would be an increase in beta which is a very important measure of risk in financial circles.
 - Q. How great an increase in beta?
- A. .1.

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- Q. Then you talk about the risk of default on the company's bonds. Has Duke ever defaulted on any of its company bonds?
- 23 A. No.
- Q. Has any Ohio EDU defaulted on company bonds that you are aware of?

A. No.

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- Q. Now, you list 26 companies in your proxy group, correct, on pages 67 and 68, of Exhibit 40?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. And you use a screen to eliminate companies that have excessive nonutility operations, correct?
 - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. But your proxy group does include some nonutility operations, correct?
- A. Yes, some. I think the average was approximately 80 percent of revenues are from regulated operations, gas and electric, so I felt pretty confident this was a good peer group.
- Q. Would you agree that most of your proxy group consists of vertically-integrated utilities?
- A. Well, they have to because you don't have stock prices for operating subsidiaries, so you have to rely on parent company data.
- Q. And would you agree with me that generation is riskier than distribution?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And would you agree that the majority of your proxy group has at least some regulated generation?

- A. They have some, yes.
- Q. Now, of the utilities listed in your rebuttal testimony, did you look at other utilities that have received an ROE since January 1 of 2013?
- A. No. If you read right below the table at page 68, on line 1 through 4, the current issue of Regulatory Research's quarterly review reports ROE so far in 2014 and the average allowed ROE is 10 percent. That's the most recent that I could find.
- Q. Are you familiar with the company Cross
 Texas Transmission?
- 12 A. No.

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- Q. Are you familiar with Wind Energy
 Transmission Texas?
- 15 A. No.
 - Q. Do you know if Wind Energy Transmission

 Texas got a 9.6 return on equity on January 16, 2013?
 - A. No, I didn't know that, but.
- Q. Are you familiar with Baltimore Gas and Electric?
- MS. WATTS: Objection, your Honor. The lawyer is testifying into the record right now.
- MR. SERIO: Those are questions, your
- 24 Honor.
- 25 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

- Are you familiar with Baltimore Gas and 1 Ο. 2 Electric? 3
 - Yes, I am. Α.
 - Did you know that Baltimore Gas and 0. Electric got 9.75 percent ROE on February 22, 2013?
 - No, I do not. Α.
 - Q. Are you familiar with Niagara Mohawk Power?
- 9 I know the company. I have testified for them. 10
- Did you know that Niagara Mohawk got an 11 Ο. 12 ROE of 9.30 on March 14, 2013?
- 13 Α. No, I do not, but I know that the average allowed returned in 2014 is 10 percent. 14
 - I'm sorry. 2013. It wasn't 2014. Are Ο. you familiar with Atlantic City Electric?
- 17 Α. Yes.

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- 18 Did you know that Atlantic City Electric 0. got an ROE of 9.75 percent on June 21, 2013? 19
 - Yes, but I'm sure there are as many Α. companies that have received rates of return above the average of 10 percent.
- 23 Ο. Are you familiar with Potomac Electric 24 Power Company?
- 25 Α. Yes.

4238 Did you know that Potomac Electric got an 1 Ο. 2 ROE of 9.36 on July 12, 2013? 3 T do now. Α. 4 Are you familiar with United 0. 5 Illuminating? Α. 6 7 MS. WATTS: Your Honor, I object. 8 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Mr. Serio, do you 9 have --10 MR. SERIO: I don't know what she is objecting about. She just said she objected. 11 12 MS. WATTS: Mr. Serio is just raising a 13 litany of companies that have no connection to 14 anything the witness is testifying to. 15 MR. SERIO: Well, your Honor, they are 16 companies, most of which he is familiar with, some of 17 which he has testified for, and they are companies 18 that have a return lower than his average. Just asking if he is familiar with those. I'm entitled to 19 2.0 do that. 2.1 EXAMINER WALSTRA: I'll overrule. 22 Q. I think the last one I asked you about 23 was United Illuminating. 24 Α. Yes.

Do you know that United Illuminating got

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Q.

a return of 9.15 on August 14, 2013?

- A. No, I did not, but, again, respectfully, the nature of an average is you have some estimates above the average and some below. Hopefully, you will give me the ones that are above too.
 - Q. Are you familiar with Ameren Illinois?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. Did you know that they got an 8.72 return on equity on December 9, 2013?
 - A. No, I am not familiar with that.
- Q. I'm sorry?
- A. I'm not familiar with that case.
- MS. WATTS: Again, I object. A number of these companies that Mr. Serio has raised are not companies that the witness is even familiar with.
- MR. SERIO: And a large number of

 companies that he is familiar with and at least on

 two of them he actually testified on their behalf.
- MS. WATTS: So why don't we explore those then, Mr. Serio.
- MR. SERIO: Your Honor --
- EXAMINER WALSTRA: At this point you are basically reading stuff in and he hasn't expressed familiarity. He has expressed some familiarity with some companies, but he hasn't expressed any

familiarity with these numbers, and we aren't aware where these numbers are coming from or their accuracy.

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- Q. (By Mr. Serio) Dr. Morin, do you know why none of these cases that I've asked you about were included in your proxy group?
- A. Yes, it's very simple. The proxy group consists of parent holding companies and the companies that you've enumerated are subsidiaries of these parent companies. That's the reason.
- Q. And those subsidiaries would be -- would be comparable to Duke Energy Ohio, correct?
- A. I did not make that determination. I don't know that.
- Q. Well, they are subsidiaries similar to how Duke Energy Ohio is a subsidiary, correct?
 - A. There are some similarities, yes.
- Q. And the return for those companies like the return for Duke Energy Ohio are set by their individual state PUCs, correct?
 - A. That's correct.
- MS. WATTS: Objection again, because the return that Mr. Serio has put in the record has no foundation.
- 25 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

Is it your understanding that by the end 1 Ο. 2 of this year, that Duke Energy Ohio will no longer 3 own any generation capacity? I'm not familiar with that. Ask the 4 5 company witness. If that is the case and they no longer 6 7 owned any generation facilities, would that reduce 8 the risk that the company faces? 9 No, not really. The amount of generation 10 is Lilliputian compared to the amount of distribution assets and revenues. 11 12 MR. SERIO: Thank you, Dr. Morin. 13 That's all I have, your Honor. 14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. EXAMINER WALSTRA: Mr. Kurtz. 15 16 MR. KURTZ: No questions. 17 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Mr. Oliker. 18 MR. OLIKER: No, thank you. EXAMINER WALSTRA: Mr. Petricoff. 19 2.0 MR. PETRICOFF: No questions, your Honor. 2.1 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Staff. 22 MR. BEELER: No questions, thank you. EXAMINER WALSTRA: Any redirect? 23 24 MS. WATTS: May we have a moment, your 25 Honor?

4242 1 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Sure. 2 (Discussion off the record.) 3 EXAMINER WALSTRA: We'll go back on the record. 4 5 And, Ms. Watts, any redirect? MS. WATTS: Thank you, your Honor. No 6 7 redirect. 8 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you. 9 Thank you, Dr. Morin. 10 THE WITNESS: Pleasure to appear before 11 you, your Honors. 12 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Would you like to move 13 your exhibit? MS. WATTS: We'd move Duke Energy Exhibit 14 15 40, please. 16 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Any objections? 17 MR. SERIO: Other than the one I made 18 initially, no, your Honor. 19 EXAMINER WALSTRA: The exhibit will be 2.0 admitted. 2.1 (EXHIBITS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 22 MR. SERIO: Your Honor, I would move 23 admission of Exhibit 50, which everyone got a copy of 24 and also OCC Exhibit No. 49, which hopefully tomorrow 25 I will be able to provide to the parties, the court

4243 1 reporter, and to the Bench. 2 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Any objections? 3 MS. WATTS: No, your Honor. 4 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you. OCC exhibits will be admitted. 5 (EXHIBITS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 6 7 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Would you like to call 8 your next witness? 9 MS. KINGERY: Thank you, your Honor. Duke Energy Ohio would call Kenneth J. Jennings to 10 the stand. And may I approach? 11 12 EXAMINER WALSTRA: You may. 13 (Witness sworn.) MS. KINGERY: Your Honor, I would ask 14 this be marked as Duke Energy Ohio Exhibit 41 and 15 16 it's the direct testimony of Mr. Jennings. Do you 17 need copies? 18 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Yeah, at this point. 19 MS. KINGERY: I took it from DIS so it 2.0 should be good. 2.1 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 22 (Witness sworn.) 23 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you, you may be 24 seated. 25

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1	KENNETH J. JENNINGS
2	being first duly sworn, as prescribed by law, was
3	examined and testified as follows:
4	DIRECT EXAMINATION
5	By Ms. Kingery:
6	Q. Would you please state your name and
7	business address and title for the record.
8	A. My name is Kenneth Jennings. I work for
9	Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. My address is 411
10	Fayetteville Street, Raleigh, North Carolina 27601,
11	and my title is Renewable Strategy and Policy
12	Director.
13	Q. And did you have a different title until
14	very recently?
15	A. I did.
16	Q. And what was that?
17	A. Director of Market Policy and RTO
18	Services.
19	Q. And in that capacity, were you also
20	working for Duke Energy Carolinas?
21	A. Indirectly as a shared service resource.
22	Q. So you were working for which you were
23	actually employed by which company?
24	A. Duke Energy Commercial Enterprises which
25	is a service organization.

Q. Thank you.

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And do you have before you what has just been marked as Duke Energy Ohio Exhibit 41?

- A. I do.
- Q. And is this your rebuttal testimony filed in this case on November 17, 2014?
- A. It is.
 - Q. And did you prepare this testimony or have it -- cause it to be prepared under your direct supervision?
- 11 A. I did.
- 12 Q. And do you have any changes or
 13 modifications to make to this testimony today?
- 14 A. I do.
- Q. For the first page, what page would that change be on?
- 17 A. Page 4.
- 18 Q. What line, sir?
- A. Line 12. It says "for the first time in the 2007/2008 delivery year." Change "in" to "for."
- 21 Q. For, f-o-r?
- 22 A. Yes.
- Q. Thank you.
- And do you have any other changes?
- A. Yes. On page 9, line 8, the last word

4246 says "PRA." It should say "BRA." 1 "BRA." Okay. Thank you. 2 Ο. 3 Do you have any other changes? 4 Α. I do not. And if I were to ask you all of these 5 Ο. 6 questions today, would your answers be the same? 7 Α. Yes. 8 MS. KINGERY: Thank you very much. 9 The witness is available for cross-examination. 10 11 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you. 12 Any motions before we move forward? 13 Mr. O'Brien. 14 MR. O'BRIEN: No questions, your Honor. 15 Mr. Darr. 16 MR. DARR: Several of us had discussions 17 earlier today and I believe Mr. Oliker was going to proceed first. Is that still his intention or not? 18 19 MR. OLIKER: Yeah. Do you have any 2.0 cross, Mike, before I go? Do you have any cross? 2.1 I'm just curious. 22 MR. KURTZ: Do you have any cross? MR. OLIKER: For this witness. 23 24 MR. KURTZ: I'm not the witness. 25 MR. OLIKER: Do you have any cross for

4247 the witness. 1 2 MR. KURTZ: I don't have any cross, but I 3 don't know why you are asking me that, Joe. 4 MR. OLIKER: I'm just curious. If that's 5 the case. MR. KURTZ: Your Honor, no objection to 6 7 Mr. Oliker going first, and I probably don't have any 8 cross for this witness for whatever that's worth. 9 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you. Any 10 objections? MS. KINGERY: No, your Honor. 11 12 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Go ahead. 13 MR. OLIKER: Thank you, your Honor. 14 15 CROSS-EXAMINATION 16 By Mr. Oliker: 17 Good afternoon, Mr. Jennings. Q. 18 Α. Good afternoon. 19 My name is Joe Oliker and I represent IGS 2.0 Energy. Just a few questions for you today. You 2.1 mentioned your new position, it's Renewable Strategy 22 and Policy Director. 23 Α. Yes, it is. 24 Now, just so we can understand that, are

you working now exclusively with Duke Carolina?

A. Not yet.

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- Q. Besides what you are doing here today, are you doing work exclusively with Duke Carolina?
- A. No. There are transitional responsibilities that I still retain associated with PJM and the divestiture of the Ohio assets.
- Q. Okay. Let's -- let's talk a little about that in a second maybe. Can you tell me what the Renewable Strategy and Policy Director -- what are your responsibilities under that new title?
- A. Well, I'll tell you what I told the people in Charlotte yesterday was that I'm kind of deciding what that is because I have been doing it for 30 days.

But right now, it is working with -- with strategy folks in Raleigh that are in the state regulatory arena and other folks in Charlotte, around what are our renewable strategy is. So I don't think that's completely defined yet, but I'm working on that and attending meetings, and meeting with a variety of stakeholders that have interests in renewables in the Carolinas.

Q. And -- okay. And I think you answered this, so you are going to be working -- the goal is to have you working in the regulated state of North

Carolina, South Carolina, doing renewable strategy.

- A. I think -- I think once the assets are divested and the sale has closed, that I'll be pretty much dedicated to North Carolina.
- Q. Okay. Just -- and if you don't mind me asking, why -- why the shift to renewable strategy?
- A. I like working for Duke Energy. I wouldn't have had a job otherwise.
- Q. I appreciate your candor. And Duke sees renewables as an important tool for the future?
- A. Yeah --

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- MS. KINGERY: I am going to object at this point. This is totally irrelevant to this witness's testimony.
- MR. OLIKER: It's just additional voir dire of the witness's background, your Honor.
 - EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.
- 18 A. I think that's true.
- Q. Okay. And you said that you were involved in Duke Energy's divestiture and you still are of its -- the resources that are currently held by Duke Energy Corp. that would be transferred to Dynegy?
- A. Yes. So as the PJM expert, there's a lot of PJM administrative stuff around transferring the

assets to a new owner and that's my major contribution as associated with PJM-related issues.

Q. Okay.

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MS. KINGERY: And, your Honor, if I could, I would like to just clarify the record. I believe Mr. Oliker asked about assets that are owned by Duke Energy Corp. that are being transferred to Dynegy. I don't know that that's what you really meant.

MR. OLIKER: Can the witness clarify for the record who the assets are owned by that are going to be transferred to Dynegy?

- A. So the current owner is Duke Energy Commercial Asset Management, LLC.
 - Q. Okay. Thank you.

And shifting to your testimony, you mention, on page 13, that pseudo-tied resources calculates LMPs at the resource generator organization buss just like internal resources, correct?

- A. Yes.
- Q. But you agree that all of the generation units at Clifty Creek and Kyger Creek will have their LMP calculated at one interface.
 - A. So I don't know that for sure. And the

reason I say that is because there are multiple LMPs at every station and typically they are always the same. But so -- and some -- in some ways you're right and some ways you're wrong because there may actually be one for every unit, but they may all be the same price.

- Q. But that's the difference between a pseudo-tied unit and internal unit. Say we take East Bend, if we look at East Bend, we are going to see probably, I think, four prices and there is going to be slight differentials between them on a megawatt-hour basis for the four different units. They will be similar, but they'll be -- they'll be different.
- A. I'm not sure. I think they can be, but I don't know that they are.
- Q. But it's true for a pseudo-tied unit you are only going to see one price for all of the units.
- A. I disagree. I disagree because my experience with pseudo-ties is probably more relative to the joint-owned units that were in MISO and so, for example, Zimmer was actually in MISO but pseudo-tied to PJM. I think the joint owners had multiple LMPs at that unit.
 - Q. Isn't there only one interface for OVEC

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for both units?

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- A. Once -- once the pseudo-tie is final and completed, which is in the process of being done, it's not required until the planning year 20 -- it's not required until June 1 of 2017, but it probably will be done before the end of the year. Once the pseudo-tie is complete, I think -- it won't be an interface. It will be treated like an internal unit.
- Q. And that's just your belief. You don't know exactly, correct?
- A. That's the way that -- so that's my understanding of PJM's filing and PJM's rules around pseudo-ties as -- as filed in ER 14-503, and then they've produced working papers associated with that and that's kind of how they've described it, it will be treated just like an internal unit, and then I am going back to looking at the way they treated pseudo-tied units that were -- that were jointly operated by co-owners in Ohio and Duke Energy Ohio.
- Q. I think we'll come back to that. What is your -- do you know what network external designated transmission service is?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. Could you give a definition, please.
 - A. It is the -- it is the allocation of

transmission costs that -- that are allocated to load provided by the transmission owners in RTO.

- Q. There are limitations on the amount of network external designated transmission service, correct?
 - A. External? That's correct.
 - Q. Okay.
- A. That's the reason for the -- the capacity import limit filing that was made in November of last year, ER 14-503.
 - Q. Okay. And let's talk about that.
- A. Okay.

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- Q. There is an exception for pseudo-tied units. There's three -- there's three parts to the exception, correct?
 - A. Correct.
- Q. But there's also another part which is the total megawatt quantity of exceptions granted for delivery year in the external source zone plus the capacity import limit for the external source zone may not exceed the total megawatt quantity of confirmed network external designated transmission service on such interface, correct?
- A. No, that's not correct, because if you've already got the firm transmission service which --

which is the first -- the first requirement is you have firm transmission service, what happens is that if that's part of the capacity import limit, then it's removed from the capacity import limit.

If you look at the -- if you look at the planning parameters from the 2017-18 auction, what you'll see is many of the import zones were actually at zero and that was because the CIL was pulled to zero because all of the firm transmission had consumed the CIL. And that's -- that's the interpretation. You are just interpreting it differently, I think. Firm transmission subtracts from CIL, but CIL cannot take from firm transmission.

MR. OLIKER: Your Honor, may I please approach the witness?

EXAMINER WALSTRA: You may.

- Q. I will give you the whole copy.
- A. Okay.

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MR. OLIKER: Your Honor, I would like to mark as IGS Exhibit 14, I believe, the PJM Manual 18.

I have given the entire document to the witness, but I have only marked an excerpt.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: So marked.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

Q. Mr. Jennings --

A. Yep.

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- Q. -- do you recognize this document that's been marked as IGS 14?
- A. I probably haven't looked at it since it's been updated on October 30, but go ahead. I'm familiar with the document. I haven't looked at it since this has been updated, but go ahead.
- Q. So when was the last PJM manual you did look at?
- A. Probably would have been before I started my new job which was October 16.
- Q. So going back to a question I asked you a little while ago. Could you turn to page 14, and would you agree that the document states, at the bottom paragraph, "The total megawatt quantity of exceptions granted for a Delivery Year in an external source zone, plus the Capacity Import Limit for the external source zone may not exceed the total megawatt quantity of confirmed Network External Designated Transmission service on such interface."
- A. Tell me where that's at again in this document?
- Q. Bottom -- very bottom paragraph on page 14. It's the first sentence, four lines from the bottom.

A. So I'm reading that, yes.

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- Q. Okay. Thank you. And you would agree this manual controls --
 - A. I will not agree that -- I would not agree that that has anything to do with what you asked me though.
- Q. That's fine. I will let the document speak for itself.
 - A. It doesn't have anything to do with the CIL limits.
 - Q. I don't believe there is a question.
- A. It says that the CIL limits are -- are additional to the -- are added to the exception amount.
- MR. DARR: Move to strike, your Honor.
- A. That's what you asked me.
 - MR. OLIKER: Your Honor, there's no question pending. I would move to strike.
- 19 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Sustained.
- MR. OLIKER: Thank you.
 - Q. (By Mr. Oliker) Mr. Jennings, you agree that this document controls the rules of the PJM capacity market, correct?
- A. No, it doesn't. The tariff -- the tariff
 controls everything. The tariff overrides this

document. As a matter of fact, this document is not always consistent with the tariff.

- Q. But you would agree this document is used to interpret the tariff and the rules for bidding as a capacity resource?
- A. Not necessarily. It is an interpretation of the tariff, but not the final interpretation of the tariff.
 - Q. Thank you.

You would agree that there are rules that prevent a transmission owner from discriminating against the use of its transmission assets against other generation resources, correct? It's called FERC Order 88.

- A. That sounds familiar.
- Q. Okay. Moving to a different subject.

 Your testimony indicates that the PSR does not require the Commission to regulate wholesale power prices, correct?
- 20 MS. KINGERY: Would we have a page number, please?
- MR. OLIKER: I think it's littered throughout, but.
- Q. I think it's on page 3, but it's also elsewhere.

- A. Three of what?
- 2 Q. Just in general --
 - A. Three of my testimony or.
 - Q. Your rebuttal testimony.
 - A. Okay.

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- Q. You agree that's one of the themes you discuss in your testimony, just from a high level.
 - A. Which is what again?
 - Q. That the P -- approval of the PSR would not require the Commission to regulate wholesale energy and capacity prices.
- 12 A. I agree.
- Q. You are not an attorney, correct?
- 14 A. Correct.
- Q. You do not know the standard for field preemption, correct?
- 17 A. Nope.
- 18 Q. You don't know the standard for conflict preemption.
- A. Nope.
- Q. You would agree that the PSR does allow
 Duke Energy Ohio to receive a different level of
 compensation than it would otherwise receive as a
 market participant.
- MS. KINGERY: I am going to object. Even

1 | I don't understand that question.

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MR. OLIKER: If he doesn't understand it -- I think it's pretty clear.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

- A. I think -- I think that, yeah, I would think that the revenue stream would be different than if they were a -- if they were only excluded to receiving market-based revenues. That's the purpose of the transaction on both sides typically, right? The buyer doesn't want to be exposed to the market price in the future and the seller wants to lock in the revenues for the future.
- Q. Okay. And your testimony does indicate you are familiar with the PSR, and I think that you are from what you just said.
 - A. At a high level, yes.
- Q. Okay. Now in its current form, the PSR relates to only the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation and Clifty Creek, Kyger Creek, correct?
 - A. That's my understanding.
- Q. But Duke Energy Ohio has proposed that it could potentially include additional generation resources in the future, correct?
 - A. I wasn't aware of that.
 - Q. Okay. So -- thank you. That's helpful.

When we are reading your testimony, we should only look at it through the lens as you are looking at this transaction with OVEC, correct?

- A. That's the way I was looking at it.
- Q. Okay. Thank you.

So could you assume for a second -- assume for a second that the Commission decided not to approve the PSR, and in that instance then Duke Energy Ohio would have to bid the OVEC entitlement into PJM energy and capacity markets.

Now, assume Duke makes a decision that these assets aren't profitable. Now, in that case, it could transfer the assets to a third party or an affiliate, correct?

MS. KINGERY: I am going to object. This witness is not here to interpret the terms of the arrangement between Duke and the other co-owners and, in addition, the hypothetical is assuming facts not in the record.

MR. OLIKER: Your Honor, I'm assuming those things are possible. I am not going to get into the details of the transfer. I am just talking about what their options would be and what the impact would be in the market.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

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A. So I'm not sure because the -- the joint operating agreement of OVEC is very complicated, so I don't know that we have the right to transfer it to anyone. I don't know that for sure. I can't answer it either way.

Q. Okay. Now, just assume for me for a second that Duke could transfer it. Would you agree that if Duke decided that its OVEC entitlement wasn't really profitable, that would be an option available to Duke, maybe even a prudent business decision.

MS. KINGERY: I am going to renew my objection. Again, Mr. Oliker is assuming facts that are not in the record.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

- A. I'm trying to understand why it would be a better decision to transfer a losing proposition to an affiliate because it's still going to be a drag on earnings for Duke Energy Corp.
- Q. Okay. That's a fair enough assessment.

 You could still transfer to a third party, correct?

 MS. KINGERY: I'll object again. This

witness has just said he does not know whether a transfer could be made to a third party or not.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Objection is noted.

25 Overruled.

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A. So I have to go back to your -- I would have to ask you to repeat your -- your scenario, how you worded the scenario question at the beginning again.

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- Q. Okay. Let's assume Duke Energy Ohio decides that on a long-term basis that the OVEC entitlement is not going to be profitable, and along with any other asset, Duke could determine it might make sense to transfer that entitlement to a third party, correct?
 - A. Only if they were allowed to do so, yes.
- Q. Okay. And in the case of OVEC, isn't it possible that third party could be located outside of PJM, maybe MISO?
 - A. I suppose. Could be anywhere, right?
- Q. Right. And if it did transfer it to somebody in MISO, would you agree there is a possibility they might not bid the entitlement into PJM into the capacity market?
- A. So -- so I'm assuming that your -- your scenario includes that the PSR has already been approved?
- Q. No. I am assuming it's not. Duke's on -- Duke's on its own. These are the choices that Duke has to make in the competitive market and --

A. Okay. So I can probably answer that question. The answer would be the same no matter what, because regardless of whether PSR is approved or not, Duke is already committed to the pseudo-tie and committed to selling capacity into PJM. So we're going to be -- that capacity is committed to PJM right now until May 31, 2018, and if it gets committed again in May, it will be committed through '19-'20. There are current provisions to buy out of that, although those -- those can still change.

But the only way that they can be committed to another control area or MISO would be by the approval of the market monitor first.

Q. Okay. Thank you.

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So I guess what you're saying is you could transfer to somebody in MISO but you would be limited to using it in the MISO capacity market while -- well, let's not call MISO capacity market that, but you would -- scratch that.

Assuming that they transferred it to a party that was outside of PJM, then they could do whatever they liked with the asset after 2019 unless they get permission from the PJM market monitor and buy out of their commitment.

A. I think that's true.

Q. Okay.

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- A. And I think that would be the case with any internal unit as well.
 - Q. Thank you.

And you would agree if you take capacity out of the PJM capacity market, all else being equal, you can impact the price.

- A. I think that quantity is an important factor in that -- in that assumption. I mean, I suppose -- even a little bit could move things a little bit, I suppose. It depends on -- it depends on what the cost of the resource is that you are removing as well, right? And if whether or not you're a price taker in the market or a cost-based supplier.
 - Q. Thank you.

And you're aware that OVEC has several other Ohio utilities and utility -- and Ohio-based affiliates that are also owners, correct?

- A. That's correct.
- Q. And the number is about 40 percent.
- A. For what?
- Q. Of the ownership ratio.
- A. For who?
- 25 Q. The Ohio-based utilities and their

affiliates.

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- A. I don't know that. I believe you.
- Q. This might help our conversation.

4 MR. OLIKER: Do you mind if I approach

5 | the witness to refresh his recollection, your Honor?

6 EXAMINER WALSTRA: You may.

MR. OLIKER: And this is IEU Exhibit 5 that I would show the witness.

- A. I'm not familiar with it.
- Q. Take your time, Mr. Jennings. I don't mean to rush you.
- 12 A. So I'm coming up with a different number.
- 13 Q. Is it close to 40 percent?
- A. I came up with 70, but maybe I'm not looking at it correctly.
- Q. Could you look at the footnote and see if
 part of that interest is involving some of AEP's Ohio
 non-Ohio affiliates? I think that will help you.
- 19 A. Okay.
- MS. KINGERY: What page are you looking
- 21 at, Mr. Oliker?
- MR. OLIKER: It's the power
- 23 participation. I think you are on the right page,
- 24 Jeanne.
- 25 | MS. KINGERY: I'm not seeing a footnote.

- A. I'm not either.
- Q. Well, would you accept, subject to check.
- A. I will.

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- Q. 40 percent is close?
- A. Yeah, I'll accept, subject to check.
- Q. Okay. Now, assuming each of those other utilities have proposed similar mechanisms to PSR involving OVEC, and those requests are all rejected, would you agree that that could have a strong impact on the dynamic of order of discussions at OVEC?
 - A. What discussions?
- Q. Discussions regarding the future of the units.
 - A. I suppose it could.
 - Q. So, for example, going back to the questions we asked earlier, you would agree that if those companies, that being AEP, Duke, FirstEnergy, and DP&L, they all determined that the OVEC entitlement was not profitable, they could all make the decision to transfer their entitlement to a third party.
 - MS. KINGERY: Objection. Once again this witness has already said that he doesn't know the terms of this agreement.
- 25 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

A. I really don't know what would happen to be quite honest with you. I don't understand how that corporation is formed and what the obligations of the owners are to maintain its funding or anything like that. But if there's a scenario that allows it, it could happen, I suppose.

Q. Thank you. Thank you.

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And like we established before, the third party could be located anywhere; it could be MISO.

MS. KINGERY: Now, we are just supposing hypotheticals, your Honors. There is no foundation whatsoever for any of these questions.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

- A. Well, like I said before, any resource that's currently committed to RPM could relocate itself to another RTO.
- Q. Okay. And we talked about impacts on capacity prices. Now, in this instance, we're looking at, what, 40 percent of something over 2,000 megawatts, right?
 - A. Just for Ohio?
- Q. For OVEC is over 2,000 megawatts for the two plants, correct?
 - A. Yeah, I think that's correct.
 - Q. And if -- if we transferred 40 percent of

that interest to a third party outside of PJM, we could influence the capacity price, couldn't we?

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MS. KINGERY: Objection. There is no "we" here to transfer 40 percent. There's no showing whatsoever that 40 percent of OVEC interests are owned by any entity that would work together as a unit.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

MR. OLIKER: Thank you, your Honor.

- A. I actually think there is a lot more than 40 percent of it in PJM. I think it's more like 90 -- over 90 percent of those resources are dedicated to PJM, and you have currently -- you've just kind of related it to Ohio utilities, but my understanding is almost all of it's completely dedicated to PJM, other than the 5 and a half percent from Louisville and a little bit for City Co.
- Q. Right. But it's a possibility that the third party could be outside of PJM. I think you've testified to that earlier, correct?
- A. Yeah. I agree, but I mean, they could -they could just as easily buy Zimmer and move it out
 of PJM as well.
- Q. Right. But the one thing we do know is if the PSR is approved, then they will bid the asset

into PJM, right?

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- A. I think that's the commitment that we made in the PSR.
- Q. And the point is if the PSR is not approved, it's very possible that the units could be bid someplace else and the capacity price could be different.
- A. Yeah, I suppose. Where else would they go? That's what I am trying to figure out.
- Q. And, again, the other thing we know is if the PSR is not approved, then the owner of OVEC, Duke Energy Ohio, needs to make decisions just like all the other market participants.
- MS. KINGERY: Objection. Duke is not the sole owner of OVEC.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

- A. So the problem is that decisions are made by committee and each company doesn't get to make their own decision in a vacuum, and only -- and one owner can actually veto the decision of the committee even if everyone else is unanimously in agreement.
- Q. Okay. Let's talk about that too.

 Assume -- assume with me for a second -- assume the

 Commission approves the PSR. Let's forget about the

 other Ohio utilities. Just the PSR for Duke Energy

Ohio. And are you familiar with the carbon rules that have been proposed by the EPA?

- A. I don't know that anyone is familiar with them yet, but.
- Q. Okay. Assume for me for a second that the carbon rules that have been proposed, they are approved next summer.
 - A. Okay.

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Q. And then Duke Energy Ohio does an analysis of the projected revenues that it will get in the market, and it makes a determination, starting in 2020, going through 2030, it's going to lose \$25 million a year because the cash flows will be \$25 million less than the cost it has to pay OVEC.

Assume that the other owners of OVEC have made similar -- similar determinations that the plant is just not going to be profitable. In that instance, those other owners might want to retire the plant, but Duke would have a PSR, guaranteed cost recovery, and it could veto that retirement, correct?

MS. KINGERY: And I am going to object.

Once again, this witness has stated he is not

familiar with the terms of the operating agreement.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled. He can answer if he knows.

A. I suppose that's possible.

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- Q. And you would agree that the decision to retire or not retire OVEC could have an influence on capacity prices in PJM.
- A. I think that's true. I think that's one of the motivators that should be on the buyer side to have it in there, right? So it doesn't retire.
- Q. Okay. Let's -- make sure I get the right page. You reference in your testimony part of the transcript where Don Wathen says that Duke, if the PSR is approved, will bid in OVEC into the day-ahead market when the variable cost is lower than the clearing price, correct?
- A. So I think what Don said was that -- that OVEC will be bid in the day-ahead market every day because they have a -- they will have a must-offer obligation and they will offer at their variable cost and when the -- when the clearing price is higher than the OVEC variable costs, then the OVEC unit will clear and receive the clearing price.
 - O. Have --
- A. So we are going to offer it in all the time. Offering is not subject to the variable costs; clearing is subject to the variable costs.
 - Q. Have you ever bid generation into PJM?

- A. In what market?
- Q. In PJM.

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- A. In energy or capacity markets?
- Q. Energy markets.
 - A. No, I have not.
- Q. Are you familiar with different bidding strategies?
 - A. I am not.
 - Q. So do you -- are you familiar with the term a "decrement bid"?
- 11 A. Yes.
- Q. So one option is a generator can bid -who normally bids in the day-ahead market, they could
 make a decision that, you know, they think realtime
 price is going to be higher, so they could submit a
 decrement bid equal to their day-ahead bid and then
 take the realtime price, correct?
 - A. Yes, I think that's true.
 - Q. And that's not what Duke's proposing to do here, correct?
 - A. I don't think so.
- Q. Okay. And are you familiar with
- 23 Intercontinental Exchange?
- 24 A. No.
- Q. You know that there are trading hubs for

forward energy contracts.

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- A. You're referring to ICE?
- Q. Yes.
- A. Yes, I'm familiar with ICE.
- Q. And isn't it true that if futures contracts were at a price that is above what Duke believed its variable cost to be at that time, they could enter into a contract in the futures market and lock in a price that might be higher than the day-ahead price is in that year.
- A. I don't know how you would know what the day-ahead price is for a year.
- Q. Are you familiar with the term "contango"?
 - A. No.
- Q. Isn't it true that somebody who is a market participant could make the decision that they believe future prices now for futures contract is actually higher than those prices will be in the future?
 - A. Yes, you could do that.
- Q. So a market participant could make the decision that they are going to enter a futures contract instead of waiting and bidding in the day-ahead market.

A. Yes, you can do that. You still have to do both.

Q. Yes.

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- A. You still have to do both.
- Q. But it's a financial product, correct?
- A. Yes. So you end up -- the offsets end up you getting the future price and the person you bought the option from is getting -- or, the product from is getting your realtime revenues.
- 10 Q. Okay. Now, also you talked about bidding
 11 in variable costs -- strike that.

You talked about Duke bidding OVEC into the day-ahead market and having it run when variable cost is lower than the clearing price, correct?

MS. KINGERY: Would we have a page reference, please?

MR. OLIKER: I believe he is citing Don Wathen's testimony. But I think we also discussed it previously. It's -- I think it's on page 4. Yes. It's on page 4, line 1 through 3.

- A. Can you start the question over again? I'm sorry.
- Q. Sure. So -- and this part of your testimony you are talking about OVEC being offered in the day-ahead market and being dispatched when the

variable cost is lower than clearing price, correct?

A. Yes.

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- Q. Isn't it true that a generating unit doesn't have to offer in at variable cost. You can offer in at variable cost plus margin.
- A. So there are two different -- there is two different ways that you can offer. There is a market-based offer and a cost-based offer.

 Cost-based offers are limited to costs defined by the market monitor. Market-based offers are -- are -- are based on what the generation owner decides he wants to offer at. So I guess there are two different ways of offering.
 - Q. And Mr. Wathen is --
- A. One thing about this is these decisions are made twice a year. You have to make a commitment whether you are going to be a market-based offer or a cost-based offer twice a year and you are stuck with that decision for six full months. If you are a market-based offer, you still have to submit a cost-based offer. And under any circumstances when the market monitor mitigates the market which is when -- when the market fails the three-prong test, he then mitigates you to your cost-based offer.
 - Q. I guess my point is here in your

- testimony you are talking about submitting a cost-based offer, correct?
 - A. That's my understanding. I am only quoting Don Wathen's testimony though.
 - Q. Okay. Thank you for that clarification.

 Now, you're familiar with the reliability pricing model, correct?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. And I think you mentioned that you followed it since the beginning, back in 2006.
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. You agree the purpose of the reliability pricing model is to provide resource adequacy.
 - A. I am.
- Q. And the purpose of uniform locational price signals is to provide transparent market signals to support infrastructure investment.
- A. You are going to have to repeat that a little bit for me there. You said something about locational price signals.
 - Q. I'll take it slowly.
- A. Okay.
- 23 Q. The purpose of uniform locational price 24 signals is to provide transparent market signals to 25 support infrastructure investment.

- A. Locational investment, yes.
- Q. The goal of RPM is to align pricing with system reliability requirements and to provide transparent information to all market participants far enough in advance for actionable response to information.
- A. It sounds like something you may have read from the PJM website, but yes.
 - Q. Probably the PJM manual, too, right?
 - A. Yeah.

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- Q. Okay. And I think we've already established this, but you would agree that the reliability pricing model uses a uniform clearing price for all resources in a locational delivery area?
 - A. That's right.
- Q. And the reason that RPM uses a uniform clearing price is because in a competitive market prices do not differ for new and old plants or for efficient -- inefficient plants, and commodity markets clear prices based on location and timing of delivery, not the vintage of the production plants used to produce the commodity.
- A. There's a lot of questions in that question, but I would agree with your -- your usage

of the term "vintage," but there are ways of normalizing compensation for generators.

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For example, the UCAP values for wind and solar are -- are prorated for their contribution to supplying the peak load. And, similarly, older units have their UCAP adjusted for EFOR for forced outage rates if they are not well maintained. If they are well maintained, then the vintage may be irrelevant.

I think -- I think that PJM is searching for ways to pay on performance, which I think will change -- change that outcome a little bit more so even. So I think there's a normalization.

You are exactly right, though. I don't think -- I think they are indifferent to the plant that provides the energy, but, at the same time, they're -- they're intent on compensating for performance.

- Q. Okay. And thank you for that. And staying on the single clearing price, a competitive market with a single market clearing price creates incentives for sellers to minimize their costs because cost reduction increases the seller's profit.
- A. Yeah, that might be what's wrong with the PJM market, but. So I think it's relative, right, because -- I would agree with you, but the problem is

the performance component of the market.

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So if you -- if you don't invest in the plant and take care of the plant and it doesn't run, then you can lose -- in the first year you could lose 25 percent of your revenues from -- from peak hour penalties. The second year you could lose 50 percent of your revenues in the peak hour penalties. The third year, you could lose all of your capacity revenues in peak hour penalties.

And the current -- the current plan is to escalate the penalty structure such that you could lose all of your money in the first couple of months. So there's reform going on with regard to performance. But you're exactly right on the basic fundamentals of the market, but the problem is you are ignoring the performance component.

- Q. And, Mr. Jennings, I'm just focusing on the uniform clearing price.
 - A. I get it.
- Q. And with the uniform clearing price, you would have an efficient seller that at times receives revenues that are above its average total costs, and the revenues to an inefficient seller may be below its average total costs and it may be driven out of business.

A. Can you repeat it again? I'm sorry.

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- Q. With uniform clearing price, you have an efficient seller that, at times, may receive revenues that are above its average total costs, whereas the revenues to an inefficient seller may be below its average total costs and that person would be driven out of business.
- A. I think that's true. I think what the market has shown in this market is because the investment is so great that it takes a long time for someone to give up. They keep waiting for the market to turn around. I guess that's what I'm suggesting.
- Q. And you agree that in a competitive market, capacity resources participating in the RPM auction should all be paid the same price.
 - A. Do I agree with that?
- Q. Do you agree that that's the purpose of RPM?
- A. I think that's the purpose of RPM. I don't necessarily agree with it, but.

MR. OLIKER: And, your Honor, since we have been talking about, if you would prefer, we could take administrative notice of the order establishing the reliability pricing model, unless I am free to just cite it in my brief because it's

4281 1 approved by FERC. 2 EXAMINER WALSTRA: We can take notice of 3 it. 4 MR. OLIKER: It's ER-05-1410-001, et al. And it's issued -- this is the order issued 5 December 22, 2006. 6 7 EXAMINER WALSTRA: ER-05-1410? 8 MR. OLIKER: Yes. ER 05-1410-001, which 9 is the Order Denying Rehearing and Approving 10 Settlement Subject to Conditions. 11 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you. The Bench 12 will take notice. 13 MR. OLIKER: Thank you. And if I could 14 have just a minute or two to look through my 15 questions, I may be done. 16 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Go ahead. 17 Mr. Jennings, I think it was either -- I 18 think it might have been in your subpoena testimony, 19 you indicated you have a lot of respect for 2.0 Dr. Joseph Bowring, correct? 2.1 Α. T do. 22 And you believe he is a capable and able market monitor? 23 24 Α. I do. 25 Q. And if he were to intervene in an Ohio

Commission proceeding and recommend that a proposal was anti-competitive, would you agree with that?

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MS. KINGERY: I am going to object here. This is not the time for cross-examining with regard to testimony that occurred last week or the week before. There's nothing about this issue in his rebuttal testimony.

MR. OLIKER: It's related to the PSR, your Honor.

MS. KINGERY: His testimony is not just in general about the PSR.

MR. OLIKER: It's about whether it influences wholesale capacity and energy prices which is what the market monitor is supposed to look into.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: I'll overrule.

A. So I have the utmost respect for

Dr. Bowring and I will agree that he is very much a

capable market monitor, but I will also say that he

and I don't always agree. We don't agree on

everything. We've had our differences at times and I

would disagree that if -- I did not see his testimony

in this docket, but if he claims that this -- this is

anti-competitive, I would disagree with him.

- Q. So I will ask you one last question.
- A. Okay.

Q. Earlier you mentioned that Duke Energy
Ohio -- that you're unaware that Duke had potentially
offered to include additional resources in the PSR.
Do you remember that?

- A. I did say that.
- Q. Now, assume that Duke -- the PSR is approved and Duke wants to add 3,000 additional megawatts to the PSR and it tells the Commission either approve these 3,000 megawatts or we are going to retire them and not offer them in future base residual auctions. You would agree that the Commission is going to be making a decision there that is likely to affect the capacity price?

MS. KINGERY: Objection. The question is based on suppositions that are contrary to fact. We all -- we have just heard that Duke Energy Ohio is not going to own generation assets after the end of the year. Indeed, other than the Beckjord units, it does not currently own any generation assets.

So Mr. Oliker's question supposing that Duke Energy Ohio is going to offer in 3,000 megawatts and threaten that they would retire them if they weren't allowed to be -- included in the PSR is contrary to fact.

MR. OLIKER: Jeanne, are you withdrawing

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your proposal to potentially have a supplemental PSR?

MS. KINGERY: You are talking about -
Mr. Oliker is talking about Duke Energy Ohio

threatening to retire assets, but it doesn't own any

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Can you clarify?

MR. OLIKER: I can change the hypothetical.

- Q. (By Mr. Oliker) You are familiar with the deal with Dynegy, correct?
 - A. Tam.

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assets.

Q. Assume the deal falls through, and assume the Commission approves the PSR, and assume that those generating assets total about 3,000 megawatts, and Duke indicates that unless it approves a PSR that includes the assets owned by DECAM of 3,000 megawatts, it will retire those units. Would you agree that in that circumstance, Duke would be asking the Commission to make a decision that will have an impact on the capacity price?

MS. KINGERY: Objection. Once again, we are talking about a hypothetical that is contrary to fact. As Mr. Oliker is well aware, corporate separation rules in Ohio would prohibit Duke Energy Ohio from controlling the retirement of assets that

1 are owned by an affiliate, DECAM.

MR. OLIKER: It's a hypothetical, your

3 Honor.

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EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

MS. BOJKO: Your Honor, at this point I am going to move to strike counsel's testimony regarding corporate separation and she is not the witness. Nothing was asked about corporate separation and she is gratuitously testifying now.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

MS. KINGERY: Your Honor, I would also object on the grounds that this is a collateral attack on FirstEnergy and AEP cases as this is not an issue in this case.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ OLIKER: I can ask the question again for clarity of the record.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you.

- Q. (By Mr. Oliker) Maybe I can make it really simple.
- A. It has to be simpler than that, I think, before I can answer.
 - Q. Okay. Assume that the Commission has a proposal before it with the PSR to add 3,000 additional megawatts of capacity to the PSR. And the

Commission is aware in the proposal that those 3,000 megawatts will either be included in the PSR or they will be retired and no longer bid into PJM's capacity auctions. You would agree that the Commission will be making a determination that would influence the capacity price.

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A. I don't know that it would impact the capacity price because I think that -- I think that at that level the response from new generation is going to be pretty rapid and there could be an offset at that point, but because it's such a large quantity I think -- I don't know what that impact would be.

Certainly if -- it seems like such a crazy scenario, first of all. It seems like you are implying that utility would be blackmailing the Commission and threatening them through some -- some subversive type of activity which we wouldn't -- we would call it -- we wouldn't think that the people could kind of do that, but.

If you were to change the scenario that if 3,000 -- so 3,000 megawatts has retired in the past and it did have an impact on price. I will agree with that.

Q. Okay. Let's just make it really simple.

All else being equal, if you take 3,000 megawatts out

of the auction, you could likely influence the capacity price.

A. If it's low-priced capacity, it would change the price.

MR. OLIKER: Okay. And besides asking if you would be willing to testify in the FirstEnergy case, that's all I have, your Honor.

MS. KINGERY: Move to strike that comment.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Sustained.

11 Mr. Darr.

MR. DARR: Thank you, your Honor.

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14 CROSS-EXAMINATION

15 By Mr. Darr:

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- Q. Just to follow-up on a couple of things Mr. Oliker just asked you. You are aware there's about 20,000 megawatts that's proposed to retire by 2019, correct?
 - A. Yeah, I think that's right.
- Q. And based on your testimony a minute ago, you would expect that new generation would step up to -- because of the -- because of those retirements?
 - A. It will if they get the price right and they get the performance -- and the performance

metrics right it will. I think -- I think that there are -- there are things that could cause it to not show up, but I think it will eventually.

Q. Are you familiar with the current construction queue that is published by PJM?

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- A. I don't know all the details in it, but I do look at it, under different occasions and circumstances.
- Q. And would you agree that that construction queue would give us some idea of what the response has been to the fact that there is 20,000 megawatts of generation that's scheduled to retire?
- A. There's more than that in the queue, but I don't know how -- how well it's correlated to the retirement queue.
 - Q. Fair enough.

Now, with regard to your testimony at page 8, beginning at line 8 -- excuse me, beginning at line 7, you indicate that Duke Energy only owns 9 percent of the OVEC resources, and as a result of that, you cannot decide to unilaterally retire the units. Am I summarizing this correctly?

- A. I think that's right.
- Q. And from that you conclude that there is

no way that Duke Energy Ohio is unable to avoid the going-forward costs because it cannot unilaterally retire the units. Am I also summarizing that correctly?

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- A. As I define "going-forward cost," that's right.
- Q. Now, in response to a question that Mr. Oliker asked you, you previously indicated you were not familiar with the provisions with regard to assignment that are currently in the operating agreement between OVEC and the sponsoring companies; is that correct?
- A. That's right. I don't know all the details of it. I'm not on the operating committee.
- Q. So is it fair to say for purposes of the statement that you make on page 8, line 7 through 8, you do not consider the effect of the operating agreement on whether or not the company could avoid the going-forward costs in future years?
- A. I know for a fact we can't avoid the going-forward costs.
- Q. That wasn't my question. Did you consider in your testimony whether or not the operating agreement would have any effect on the ability of Duke Energy Ohio to avoid the operating

4290 cost -- the going-forward operating cost? 1 I don't know. I feel like I answered the 2 Α. 3 question already. 4 MR. DARR: I have nothing further. Thank 5 you. EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you. 6 7 Ms. Hussey? 8 MS. HUSSEY: Thank you, your Honor. 9 CROSS-EXAMINATION 10 11 By Ms. Hussey: 12 Q. Could you turn to page 8, line 7 of your 13 testimony. Here you refer to Duke's percent interest and specifically to OVEC resources at the end of that 14 line. Could you clarify what you mean by 15 16 "resources"? 17 Α. I'm referring to the Kyger Creek and 18 the -- the other ones. 19 Clifty perhaps? Q. 2.0 Clifty, correct. Α. 2.1 Q. Okay. And the generation from those? 22 Α. Yes. 23 Q. Okay. 24 I am referring to the assets themselves, Α. 25 the generators.

Q. Okay. Thank you.

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- A. PJM refers to capacity resources as "resources" rather than, so it's just a habit that I call them "resources."
- Q. Okay. When you're -- basically by saying "resources" you are referring to the generators then?
- A. Yeah. I think PJM tried to transfer the term "capacity resources" because they considered there would be a variety of types of resources that could provide capacity besides generators.
- Q. Okay. And at line 9, you testify that if the units don't clear in the RPM auctions, Duke Energy Ohio remains obligated for the fixed costs associated with the assets without receiving any capacity revenues; is that correct?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. If rider PSR is approved as proposed by the Commission, wouldn't Duke Energy Ohio customers be the parties that are obligated for the fixed costs associated with the OVEC assets?
- A. Yeah, that's right, but that's not exactly the intent of the comment. The intent of the comment was that -- that the impact on the market wouldn't be changed because -- because Duke cannot avoid the fixed costs, they are already offering the

resources at zero. So if they are offering at zero today and they offer them at zero after the approval of the PSR, nothing changes because the behavior doesn't change.

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- Q. Okay. But it remains that if the rider is approved by the Commission, as it has been proposed, it would be customers, rather than Duke, that would be on the hook for those fixed costs.
- A. So the customers would be on the hook for the fixed price, but they would also be getting all the revenues from the capacity market.
- Q. Okay. And you state without any way -line 11, you state without any way of avoiding future
 fixed costs that Duke Energy Ohio typically has and
 will likely continue to offer the OVEC units at zero;
 is that correct?
 - A. Yeah. That's what I said.
- Q. Okay. And to your knowledge has Duke formally committed to this procedure?
- A. That's what I believe that everyone has testified to so far.
- Q. That Duke will offer the OVEC units at zero?
- A. That was my understanding. I think that's what I read in Don Wathen's testimony.

Q. Okay. Line 17 and 18, on page 9, you indicate that "Duke Energy Ohio's objective is to maximize revenues subject to Rider PSR," correct?

A. That's right.

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- Q. Okay. And if rider PSR is approved as designed, will Duke's interest in OVEC be revenue neutral?
 - A. I think that's -- that's true.
- Q. Okay. Would it be more accurate then to state that Duke Energy Ohio's main objective would be to cover the costs to which it's subject pursuant to its OVEC interest?
- A. Well, I think when we say "maximize," what we're saying is that we'll offer them into the energy market economically. "Economically" meaning at cost so we can clear as much generation as possible, which generation margins will be offsets or credits in the rider. And, similarly, we will offer the capacity into RPM at zero and -- and the margins from that will be then credited to the PSR as well.

So I think the term optimizing means that we are going to -- we are going to optimize the amount of energy that's sold into the market, we are going to optimize the amount of capacity that's sold into the market, and we are going to pass all those

revenues back through the rider.

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And those -- those -- those could be -- so, it depends on the costs, that could be positive or negative and, in my opinion, it very well could be positive credits going forward in the future.

- Q. Okay. And I'm sorry. Did you use the word "optimize"? Is there somewhere in your testimony that you use that word that I missed?
 - A. I thought you used it in the question.
- Q. No, I'm sorry. I used the word "objective." And so, from what I read from your testimony, I believe that you indicate that Duke's objective is to maximize revenues subject to rider PSR.
- A. Okay. So I was interpreting -- I was -- objective of maximizing revenues, I was translating that into optimization, but I think that, in my mind, it's the same thing.
- Q. But as an objective of rider PSR, wouldn't you agree that Duke has a different objective for the outcome for rider PSR for it as a company?
- A. I don't think so. You think that -- I think that there is still an incentive to create a credit.

- Q. Okay. But as approved -- excuse me, if it's approved as it's proposed, you do agree that its interest in OVEC would end up being revenue neutral?
- A. It will be from the -- in the end it will be.
- 6 MS. HUSSEY: Okay. Thank you. No further questions.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you.

Ms. Bojko?

MS. BOJKO: Thank you, your Honor.

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12 CROSS-EXAMINATION

13 By Ms. Bojko:

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- Q. Good afternoon. Could I go -- so as I understood your testimony earlier today, you are no longer employed by the shared services company; is that correct?
- A. That's correct. They don't -- they don't send my check anymore.
- Q. Okay. And today, though, you are testifying on behalf of Duke Energy Ohio; is that right?
- A. As part of my transitional responsibilities, I am.
- Q. Okay. And so the duties that you list on

page 2, line 6 to 16 of your testimony, those are duties from your prior position; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

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- Q. And you no longer have those duties or at least you only have those for a transitional period; is that right?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. And that transitional period, is that until just the assets are sold to Dynegy or are you going to retain these responsibilities throughout the ownership of the OVEC entitlement in the generation output of OVEC?
- A. It's my hope those will end at the -- after the closure of the divestiture.
 - Q. Of the assets that are going to Dynegy?
 - A. Correct.
- Q. So to answer my question, no, you won't still have responsibility for the OVEC generating units or you don't believe you will anyway.
 - A. I do not believe I will.
- Q. And, today, do you have responsibility for the OVEC units?
- MS. KINGERY: Objection. Could counsel clarify the meaning of "responsibility for the OVEC units"?

- Q. I'm sorry. I am going to withdraw that question. I didn't ask that correctly. Let me try again.
 - A. Okay.

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- Q. Prior to your new position, did you have responsibility over control of the OVEC generating output or anything to do with the entitlement-owned by Duke?
- A. So my role -- my role until October 16
 was -- was policy adviser, market -- PJM market
 adviser. So I was the PJM interface on behalf of
 those assets, but I didn't interact with the board or
 the operating committee or offer the resources or do
 any of that.
- Q. Okay. So you didn't actually bid them into the energy -- or, the output into the energy or capacity markets.
- A. I probably worked on the capacity side of it at times.
 - Q. But --
 - A. But not the energy side.
- Q. Okay. And when you testified previously before us, you testified as an OCC witness; is that correct?
- A. That's correct.

Q. And you were not part of Duke's direct case at that time; is that accurate?

- A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. And were you deposed prior to giving that testimony before the Commission?
 - A. I was.

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- Q. And it was my understanding that prior to that deposition you were not familiar with Duke's electric security plan application and filing; is that correct?
- 11 A. I wasn't -- I wasn't intimate with it at 12 all.
 - Q. Okay. And it's also true that then you didn't work on Duke's ESP application prior to it being filed; is that correct?
 - A. That's right.
 - Q. And so you testified in front of the Commission that after you were deposed, you did some independent research on the issues you were deposed on, and that included looking at the source of the UCAP number and reviewing discovery responses provided by Mr. Dougherty; is that correct?
 - A. That was mainly correct because my understanding was that the OCC staff needed a response and so I helped to find that response.

Q. Okay. So -- but my question was is that after your deposition is the time period, and before your testimony, when you did some independent research to look at the UCAP number and looked at some discovery responses.

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MS. KINGERY: Your Honor, I'll object to this line of questioning. I don't understand what it has to do with his rebuttal testimony. It might have had something to do with the testimony that he provided under the subpoena issued by OCC, but nothing to do with the rebuttal testimony that we're here for today.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

- A. So what was your question again?
- Q. My question was is it true that after you were deposed, you began researching the issues in this case and reviewed some discovery responses?
- A. So there were discovery responses that I worked on before that I was deposed. And then there were -- and then you're correct, after the deposition, then I looked for things to be responsive to the requests from the OCC staff.
- Q. So you are disputing your testimony that you provided here at the Commission that you did not review any of the discovery or look into the source

of the UCAP until after the deposition?

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- A. No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying there were questions that I answered and I said that in my testimony the last time that I answered questions that were in discovery.
- Q. You actually answered discovery? Your name is on discovery.
- A. There was one response, I think, that my
 -- answer -- my name was on. And then -- and then at
 the request of OCC staff, then I helped resolve
 questions that he had afterwards, after the
 deposition.
- MS. BOJKO: Your Honor, may I approach the witness? I'm sorry I didn't bring copies. I'm referring to the transcript that was taken and filed in the docket in this proceeding where the witness answered differently than he is answering today, so I would like to have that read into the record.
- MS. KINGERY: Are you talking about the transcript from the hearing or the transcript of the deposition?
- MS. BOJKO: From the hearing.
- 23 EXAMINER WALSTRA: You may approach.
- MS. KINGERY: Ms. Bojko, can you give us a page reference?

MS. BOJKO: Sure. It's several parts in here. It starts on 1680 and -81, -82, -83.

MS. BOJKO: VI.

Q. (By Ms. Bojko) Sir, the question starting on line --

MS. WATTS: Which volume is that?

MS. KINGERY: I just want to interrupt here. I just want the record to reflect I don't have a copy. I have no way of following along to see whether or not this is being read in correctly, so subject to that.

MS. BOJKO: Well, your Honor, it was a publicly-filed document in the record. It's a transcript. And just as we weren't provided deposition transcripts, I'm not obligated to provide a transcript of proceedings in this case.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Okay.

MS. BOJKO: I mean, it's online. You can go online and look.

Q. (By Ms. Bojko) Sir, on line 5, do you see the answer -- actually, it starts on -- that's not very good. So line 12, says "So the answer to my question, yes, after the deposition --"

"Yes, in that regard, I did."

MS. KINGERY: Could we have the question,

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first, rather than just his answers?

- Q. That was the question.
- A. What line?

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- Q. And did I read that correctly, sir?
- A. I can't even see where you're at.
 - Q. I was on the question starting on line 12, page 1681.
- A. Line 12. You say "So to my answer question" -- this is you speaking, I assume.
- Q. Question would be me, yes.
- 11 A. "So to answer my question, yes, after the deposition --"
 - Q. And your response was "Yes, in that regard, I did." Is that correct?
 - A. I am going to look at the question before that because that's -- I don't know what heck -- the words are like five words. The question says "after the deposition." I have no clue when you're talking about.
- Q. Okay. We can start and we can read the whole thing into the transcript. That's fine with me.
- A. That's fine.
- Q. Let's start on line 2 and my question was
 "Okay. And subsequent to you being deposed, you then

did independent research on the issues you were deposed upon; is that correct?"

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Then the answer: "So I looked up the source of the UCAP number mainly because there wasn't really a source and the request was there had to be a source. The OCC was looking for a witness. And so when I looked in the PJM system, I found that number and realized that that was the source. The source had just been lost over time, but I found the source."

Question: "So to answer my question, yes, after the deposition --"

Answer: "Yes, in that regard, I did."

And then it goes on to talk about the discovery responses. "And apparently you also went back and reviewed some discovery responses from Mr. Dougherty; is that also true?"

Your answer: "I looked at the document that I had provided him, yes."

And then if we turn to page 1682.

- A. Okay.
- Q. Then question beginning on line 7, I asked you "Had you responded to that discovery response, you would have responded differently; is that correct?" And it was talking about the

Dougherty discovery response.

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And your answer was: "I may have struggled with it as well initially. I'm not sure because I wasn't involved in the beginning." Is that what it -- is that what it states?

A. Yeah, that's right, but that discovery response is not the one that I worked on. There were a number of discovery requests and there was one that I worked on and it was very inconsequential and I can't even remember what it is right now.

MS. KINGERY: Your Honor, at this point I would object to this use of the transcript. It's improper use of the transcript. It doesn't impeach anything that he said here today.

MS. BOJKO: It most certainly does, your Honor, and it's not an improper use of the transcript.

May I approach the witness?

EXAMINER WALSTRA: You may.

- A. You just want it back?
- Q. Yes. So it's my understanding from your testimony on line -- on page 2, line 19, you're stating that you are now familiar with Duke's application; is that correct?
- A. I'm familiar with the things that I have

been asked about, yes.

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- Q. Okay. So you're familiar with the PSR proposal contained in Duke's application.
- A. My understanding of the PSR is with regards to OVEC and its inclusion in the PSR.
 - Q. Okay. Have you read Duke's application?
 - A. I have not.
- Q. So, as you referenced Mr. Oliker, you are not aware that the company has requested the OVEC to be included in the PSR, but then the company also proposes rider PSR as a rider in which additional contractual arrangements would be included to increase the benefits available to customers.
- MS. KINGERY: Objection. It's misstating the application.
- 16 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.
- 17 A. Yeah, I have no clue what you just said, but.
 - Q. Well, sir, page 13 of the application says the company further proposes rider PSR as a rider in which additional contractual arrangements could be included to increase the benefits available to customers.
 - A. I was not aware of that.
 - Q. And let's turn to page 3 of your

testimony, please, sir. Page 3, line 13, this goes to a discussion about what you are summarizing for Mr. Wathen. I still don't quite understand what you said to Mr. Oliker. At the bottom of page 3 you state that Duke has only committed to offering the output from the OVEC generating units that it's entitled to into the PJM market if it's economic to do so; is that correct?

- So my understanding of our commitment is to offer our entitlement every day at cost. And it will clear if it's -- if it is economic, it will clear.
- 0. Okay. And then, so turn to the next page, 4, you explain the basis of economic, and that's what you just said here, that when the market price exceeds the variable costs of generation for that share, Duke will offer it; is that what vou're --
- No, that's not what I meant. We'll offer Α. it no matter what. It will clear if the variable costs are less than the clearing price. So if I --I'm not reading it, but if that's what it says, then I probably have another correction.
 - Ο. Okay.

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MS. KINGERY: Could we have the actual

words from his testimony considered? Could you direct the witness to exactly where you are reading from so he can see whether those are the words said?

MS. BOJKO: I did. I said at the top of page 4, the continuing sentence.

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- A. Just tell me what line. Line?
- Q. Well, since it continues the sentence from the bottom of page 13 onto page 14, it's line 1.
- A. You mean page 3? You said 4. So 13.

 Oh, line 13. So it starts at line 13? So can I read
 the answer?
- Q. I don't have a question pending. You answered my response.
 - A. What did I answer? I didn't hear it.
 - Q. Look at line 2. You use the word "energy markets" on line 2. Page 4, line 2. Page 4. Still on page 4.
 - A. I am looking at it.
 - Q. Okay. So here, "energy markets," do you use energy only or are you talking about energy and capacity, because on line 4 you go to capacity and energy, and line 8 you --
 - A. I would never put energy and capacity together in the same sentence because they are completely different markets. So I don't think -- I

don't see where you are saying that I said that the -- that we would offer it if it was economic. I said that we will offer it, and if it's economic, it will clear, and "economic" meaning that when the variable costs are less than the clearing price.

- Q. I'm just asking you questions, sir.
- A. Show me where I said that.
- Q. You can clarify.
- A. I got the impression that -- that you were impeaching something I said in my testimony, and so if it -- if I didn't say it the way that I just said it, then we should probably fix it.
- Q. You -- I asked you if -- what "economic" meant and you clarified that for me, so thank you.
 - A. Okay.

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- Q. But looking at the bottom -- I'm a little confused now about your comment you wouldn't put energy and capacity in the same sentence, because that's what I am trying to figure out what you mean on line 2, page 4, because on page 3, line 16, you do put energy and capacity markets in the same sentence. And then on line --
- A. Could I say something like I would -- you would get the benefits of energy and capacity. But they are clearly different products.

Q. Okay. So look on -- that's -- I am just trying to ask you what you mean by your testimony "energy markets" on line 2, because you continue and then you talk about sales of capacity and energy on line 4, and then, on line 8, you talk about energy and capacity. So my question for you is when you say "energy" markets on line 2 in that sentence, are you only referring to energy only markets? That's my -- that's my only question.

- A. I am only referring to energy markets on that line.
- Q. Okay. And this was what you were talking about with Mr. Oliker that in this sentence is what you were referring to that it would be a cost-based offer in the day-ahead market.
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. And so when you talk about "market price" on line 2, do you see that?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. Okay. What is the market price? You're talking about the energy market, market price in that sentence?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. And so who would determine -- when would the determination be made about whether Duke

will sell its share of OVEC into PJM when the market price exceeds the variable cost? Who makes that decision?

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- A. So there is no decision. It's offered every day, all of it, and then -- and then PJM clears the market and PJM decides how much they are going to take from the offer.
- Q. Okay. So you're saying that you will always offer it and whether it clears or not is the determining factor.
- A. That's PJM's decision whether it clears or not.
- Q. Okay. So the market price would be the clearing price in this sentence.
 - A. It's also known as LMP.
- Q. Okay. And also, it's your understanding that regardless of whether it clears PJM or not, the customers will still be responsible for the cost of those OVEC units; is that your understanding?
- A. So they won't be responsible for the variable O&M because there will be no favorable O&M if they don't clear.
- Q. But there will be other fixed O&M; isn't that true?
 - A. That's where I don't -- that's where I

keep energy and capacity separate because the fixed costs are associated with capacity. And they will get the revenues from the capacity market to offset their fixed costs.

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- Q. Well, if you bid into PJM, but it doesn't clear, there still may be some costs associated with that process, would there not be?
- A. That's why we suggested we would offer the capacity at zero which ensures an offset to the fixed costs.
- Q. So the answer to my question is yes, there still may be costs associated with that.
- A. I don't know. I don't know how you relate that to my answer, but.
- Q. Well, it sounded like to me you were saying there would be an offset, so there must be costs in order to offset.
- A. There will be no variable costs associated with the energy that doesn't clear. There will be fixed costs associated with the capacity that does. And the capacity revenues are offsets to the fixed costs associated with that, so you're --
 - O. And there --
- A. -- as long as you keep them separate, I think I'm clear with you.

- Q. And there could be fixed costs associated with operating the generating units, could there not be?
 - A. That's why you have a capacity market.
- Q. So you're saying that if it doesn't ever -- if it's not running, that it will never have costs associated with it?
 - A. Not variable costs, no.
 - Q. I didn't say variable costs.
- A. Well, when I talk about energy, I only refer to capacity. When I talk about capacity, then I talk about fixed costs. So which market are we talking about?
- Q. Well, my question is would there be costs associated with the generating units if it was on an outage?
- A. Yeah, and that's what's covered by the capacity market in the RPM revenues, that's the -- that's the -- that's what the -- that's what the buyer gets in exchange for those fixed costs is the RPM revenues.
- Q. But there may not be any revenues.
- 23 That's -- that's the point.

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- A. Why wouldn't there be revenues?
- Q. Well, if it doesn't -- if it's --

- A. Capacity revenues come 365 days a year even if you are not running capacity revenues.
 - Q. Well --

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- A. There's no doubt about that. As long as the capacity market clears at something greater than zero, you get paid every day.
- Q. Okay. And that's clarification. As long as it clears above zero.
 - A. That's right.
- Q. So there may be a time when there is no revenues if it doesn't clear above zero.
 - A. I wouldn't take that bet.
- Q. That's true, though, a true statement, correct?
 - A. It's -- it's possible, I suppose. If everybody offered at zero, then it could clear at zero.
 - Q. All right. Let's go back to your testimony. Let's look at --
 - A. Well, actually, I will clarify that. If everyone offered at zero and there was more capacity than load then it could clear at zero. But if everybody offers at zero, but there's still not enough capacity in the market, it could still clear at over \$500 a megawatt-day.

- Q. Okay. Let's turn to page 3 of your testimony, line 8. You explain one of the reasons you're here today or the reason you are here today, one, excuse me, is to confirm that rider PSR cannot affect the wholesale markets; is that right?
- A. In this unique situation, I think that's true.
- Q. Okay. And the unique situation you are referencing OVEC; is that right?
 - A. Correct.

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- Q. Okay. And it's the concept of having customers pay for the cost of those OVEC generating units and having the output sold into the wholesale energy markets, is that right, and also sold in the capacity markets?
- A. So you are going to have to ask your question again. I am not sure I get that.
- Q. You are saying in this unique situation, and that unique situation is having a rider where it will collect the costs from customers to pay for those OVEC generating units and having the output generating units sold into the PJM markets.
- A. It has nothing to do with the PSR. What I said was is that -- is that the PSR would not have any impact on the markets because it doesn't change

the behavior of the market participant. If -- if -- if Duke were to -- were offering it at cost, because they could avoid their fixed costs or going-forward costs, before the PSR was approved, and therefore, was setting price in the market and then they suddenly changed to offering at zero, then that would change the market.

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But if they are offering zero before because they can't avoid their fixed costs and they offer zero after the PSR is approved, there is no change in behavior and therefore there is no impact on the capacity market.

- Q. Okay. So you are now talking about offering at zero for capacity markets. We were talking about energy markets.
- A. We never said we would offer zero in the energy markets. We said we would offer our variable costs.
- Q. No, I am saying your response was to the capacity market. You are talking about bidding the share of OVEC into the BRA at zero; is that correct?
 - A. That's what I said.
 - Q. Okay. So --
- A. I am not sure what we're talking about, but that's what I said. I thought we were talking

about can we affect the market. I thought that was the subject of the question.

- Q. Right. And you -- on page 3, line 8, you are saying that you're here to confirm that rider PSR, so you are talking about rider PSR, cannot affect the wholesale market, right? You're the one that was talking about rider PSR.
 - A. I agree with that.

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- Q. And so then I asked you the concept that you are talking about with regard to rider PSR is having customers pay for the cost of the generating plants and then having the output of those generating plants sold into the wholesale energy and capacity markets and then offsetting any revenues that may or may not be received through that output being sold into the capacity and energy markets.
- A. If you are asking me if that's my definition of this part of the PSR, I think that's right.
- Q. Okay. So now you brought up the bidding into the BRA at zero. So my question for you is you keep talking about this bidding behavior of bidding into BRA, but there's no requirement that Duke currently bids in at zero, is there?
 - A. I don't know. I thought there was. I

- thought -- I thought we testified that we would. I think I have, if no one else has.
- Q. And I'm asking you today, without the PSR, is Duke somehow required to bid in the BRA at zero?
- A. We're not required to, but it's only rational to do so.
- Q. Okay. And in your testimony and then you also, in response to some questions, you've referred to the independent market monitor in PJM; is that correct?
 - A. Correct.

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- Q. And is it your understanding, sir, that the market monitor and the department was created by PJM's Open Access Transmission Tariff?
- A. I would say that it was created originally that way. I would say that FERC has something to do with the way that it's independent. I think that the market monitor was created as a part of PJM, and then I forget what year it was but there was FERC proceedings and a settlement that made it independent.
- Q. Okay. Well, I thought you said earlier to Mr. Oliker that PJM spoke through its tariffs; is that right?

4318 1 Α. Yes. 2 MS. BOJKO: Okay. Your Honor --3 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Why don't we take a 4 break here. You can approach after the break. Take a 15-minute break. 5 (Recess taken.) 6 7 EXAMINER WALSTRA: All right. We'll go 8 back on the record. 9 Ms. Bojko. 10 MS. BOJKO: May I approach, your Honor? 11 EXAMINER WALSTRA: You may. 12 MS. BOJKO: Your Honor, at this time I 13 would like to have marked as OMA Exhibit 14, it's a 14 portion of the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff. 15 I did not print out the whole entire tariff. I only 16 printed out Attachment M, but I did provide, at the 17 top of this document, the website link. 18 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Okay. 19 (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 2.0 0. (By Ms. Bojko) Sir, before the break we 2.1 were talking about the market monitor being created 22 pursuant to the Open Access Transmission Tariff. Do 23 you recall that? 2.4 Α. Yes. 25 Q. And you believe there was probably a FERC

order that went along with that, but I think you agreed that the PJM Open Access Tariff would -- did create the market monitor.

- A. It defines his role, yes.
- Q. Okay. And if you look at, it would be Attachment M which is titled "PJM Market Monitoring Plan," that's what you have before you that's been marked as OMA Exhibit 14?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. And, sir, to your knowledge, this Open Access Tariff has been approved by FERC; is that correct?
- A. I would -- yeah, I know that it has been.
 I assume that what you're showing me is -- it says
 2012, so yes.
- Q. Well, you said 2012. If you look at the effective date on the front page, it says September 10, 2014. I believe some portions were amended in 2014, and the other one has an effective date of 2010, and there's a docket number at the bottom of the page. Is that what you are referencing, sir?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. So it appears that -- that this is a tariff that has different effective periods based on maybe the attachments; is that your understanding of

how they revise the PJM OATT?

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- A. That sounds right.
- Q. And going back to Attachment M, the market monitoring unit has the exclusive authority to perform the functions set forth in this Attachment M; is that your understanding, sir?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And you understand that the purpose in creating the market monitor was, in part, to establish an objective expert to assist federal and state agencies in identifying instances of market power and ensuring compliance with market rules to promote a robust electricity market?

MS. KINGERY: Your Honor, I object.

Perhaps if Ms. Bojko is reading from some particular place in this exhibit, we could have a reference.

MS. BOJKO: I wasn't reading.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Okay.

MS. BOJKO: The reference, I guess, would be Attachment M, Sections IV.A. through IV.B. and IV.4. Talks about the market monitor's role and the purpose of creating the market monitoring unit.

- Q. Is that your understanding, sir?
- A. Yeah. I guess -- I think I agree with you that that's his role. It's supposed to be his

4321 role. He doesn't necessarily get to change the 1 2 tariff. He doesn't have -- he doesn't administer the 3 tariff. PJM administers the tariff. So a lot of 4 times he says things that he thinks that don't 5 actually come to fruition. On a number of occasions, for the last several years, he's -- he's said that 6 7 demand response should be removed from the market 8 completely. It still hasn't been removed, but. 9 MS. BOJKO: Your Honor, I move to strike 10 his response as being nonresponsive to my question. I asked if that was the purpose of creating the 11 12 market monitor --13 MS. KINGERY: And, your Honor --14 MS. BOJKO: -- not about his opinions. MS. KINGERY: -- he's explaining his 15 16 answer. 17 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled. 18 Okay. Let's turn to Section IV then. Q. 19 Let's read from the document as your counsel 2.0 suggested. Does it --2.1 Α. What page of Section IV? 22 Q. 1999. 23 Α. All right. 24 Do you see here where it says the market Ο.

monitoring unit shall objectively monitor the

competitive -- competitiveness of PJM markets, investigate violations of FERC or PJM market rules, recommend changes, which is one I think you just suggested, and prepare reports; is that what A. says?

A. Yes. That's what A. says.

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- Q. Now, let's turn to B. And Section B. is talking about what the market monitoring unit is actually responsible for and it talks about it's responsible for the compliance with the PJM market rules, design flaws in the market rules, structural problems that may inhibit a robust and competitive market. And also, No. 4, the potential for a market participant to exercise market power or violate any of the PJM or FERC market rules or the actual exercise of market power or violation of those rules, right?
- A. That's his role, but, like I said before, not all of his recommendations are adopted.
- Q. Right. Because he's independent; isn't that right?
- A. That has nothing to do with it. The fact is he doesn't get to set policy at FERC. He can make recommendations to FERC, but FERC doesn't always listen to him. He can make recommendations to PJM.

 PJM doesn't always listen to him.

Q. Okay. So in this section this is the tariff that we're talking about that sets forth the creation of the market -- market monitoring unit and states what it's responsible for; is that correct?

- A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. That's all I am talking about right now. It says the market monitoring unit is responsible for the things that I listed; is that correct?
- A. Yeah, but it feels like you're overexerting his authority, and he has very little, if any.
- Q. Sir, I'm asking you if the PJM tariff says that the market monitoring unit shall, and it's mandatory, be responsible for certain items; is that correct?
- A. I agree that you are reading from the tariff. The way that it's applied, I disagree with.
- Q. Okay. And if you turn to section -- we will get back to that.

It's your understanding, sir, that the market monitor or the market monitoring unit is involved in state proceedings that raise market power or competitive issues?

A. I think he injects himself, from time to

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time, but I don't think he has a place there.

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Q. Okay. Well, let's read -- turn to

Section H. which is on page 2002. Doesn't this

specifically authorize his participation in those

state proceedings? Doesn't this say "If during the

ordinary course of its activities the Market

Monitoring Unit discovers evidence of wrongdoing

(other than minor misconduct) that the Market Monitor

reasonably believes to be within a State Commission's

jurisdiction, the Market Monitoring Unit shall report

such information to the State Commission(s)"?

MS. KINGERY: I am going to object here. I don't understand how this can possibly be relevant to Mr. Jennings's testimony or this case at all.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Ms. Bojko.

MS. BOJKO: Oh, it's relevant, your Honor. He references the market monitoring. He is talking about the wholesale market. He's talking about his opinion in the wholesale market. So I'm going to ask him some questions about other people's opinion of the wholesale market.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

- A. It says that he can make referrals to the State Commission. I am not sure that it mandates it.
 - Q. Well, doesn't it say that if he finds

- wrongdoing, he has to report? It's a requirement

 "shall report...to the State Commission(s)"?
 - A. I think that's true if he identifies wrongdoings. To me, wrongdoing is equivalent to market manipulation.
- Q. Okay.

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- 7 A. And so, yeah, I would say that's the 8 case.
 - Q. And he has to report that.
- 10 A. He should.
- 11 Q. Okay. Well, he has to. It's required.
- 12 It's a "shall," right?
- A. Right.

he shouldn't.

- Q. Okay. And is it your understanding that the --
- A. That's not the only time he injects

 himself. He does inject himself when it's not market

 manipulation. He injects himself into mergers,

 acquisitions, divestitures, all kinds of things that
- Q. That's your opinion, right? He
 interjects -- he is required to interject himself if
 he believes that there is wrongdoing; isn't that
 true?
- A. He should. And he should limit his

activity to that, but he goes beyond that on many occasions.

- Q. Okay. And it's your understanding that he has -- the market monitor has intervened in cases similar to Duke, such as regarding the PSR?
- A. So I don't know about that. I know that he intervened into Constellation-Exelon's merger. He's currently involved in the Exelon-PHI acquisition. He's willing to get into anything that he can get into.
- Q. Okay. And he has intervened in front of the Ohio Commission in two cases presently pending before the Commission regarding a purchase power agreement of OVEC generating units; is that true?
 - A. I don't know that.
- Q. Okay. Do you know whether Duke has intervened in another company's application for recovery of costs for similar OVEC-type costs through a PSR or a rider similar to that?
- 20 MS. KINGERY: Object. Totally irrelevant.
- 22 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.
- 23 A. I don't recall.
- Q. Sir, do you recall the independent market monitoring -- or market monitor -- I'm sorry, you

don't recall if Duke has intervened. Was that your response?

- A. I do not. I don't recall that.
- Q. Okay. Did you answer my question of whether you know whether the market monitor has intervened in other cases?
 - A. I'm not aware of that either.
 - Q. Okay.

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- A. I said that I'm aware of him intervening in a variety of cases. I'm not aware of him intervening in PSR-like cases.
- Q. Okay. And are you aware that the market monitor has stated that subsidies should not be permitted to interfere with the competitiveness of PJM markets and PJM's competition-based market design?
 - A. I've heard him say that.
- Q. Are you -- are you aware, sir, that other PJM generators and suppliers have intervened in cases similar to Duke's proposed ESP with a PSR-type rider?
 - A. I'm not aware of that.
- Q. And have you -- are you aware of economists and other entities, financial institutions, speaking about the proposals and potential subsidies of an item such as the PSR that

Duke's proposing?

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- A. I've heard lots of economists speak.

 I've never heard them talk about any kind of specific case like this before.
- Q. Would you be surprised if there is -- are those people out there talking about this?
 - A. No, I'm not surprised.
- Q. Sir, are you aware that Duke has participated by filing documents in -- in proceedings that contain a PSR-type filing, stating that they believe that their application is similar to that of the other utility companies in Ohio?

MS. KINGERY: Objection. It's totally irrelevant to this case whether or not Duke Energy Ohio has filed to intervene or participate in other cases or has made statements in those other cases. It has nothing to do with this case.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

- A. I'm not aware of that.
- Q. Do you know that other utilities have filed similar proposals to collect costs from customers for the OVEC generating assets as well as other purchase power arrangements?
- A. Specific with OVEC, I'm not aware that OVEC is a part of it, but I've read articles about

other utilities doing something similar to PSR.

Q. So you're not aware that AEP has a current proposal pending that involves OVEC generating assets?

MS. KINGERY: Objection. Asked and answered.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

- A. I saw the headline recently.
- Q. For AEP?
- A. Yeah.

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- Q. And are you aware FirstEnergy owns OVEC generating assets and they have requested the same approval to pass those costs on to customers?

 MS. KINGERY: Objection. There's no
- evidence whatsoever that FE's proposal is the same as Duke's.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

- A. I read that there is a -- there is a proceeding associated with FE and AEP at the same time, but I'm not certain that it's identical to the PSR.
- Q. Okay. And just so I understand, because I think that you made a distinction earlier, you're saying that they are not identical because you believe that Duke's proposal is only for the OVEC

generating units and those other cases might include or incorporate future purchase power agreements; is that the distinction you're making?

MS. KINGERY: Objection. Your Honor, the witness just explained that all -- the only knowledge he had about those other proceedings is that he had read some article that vaguely talked about them. So there's no reason to believe that this witness is distinguishing the Duke proposal from the other companies' proposals on any particular --

EXAMINER WALSTRA: He can clarify.

A. So I don't know the details of those -of those plans. I haven't read them. I haven't -- I
haven't talked to anybody about them. So I'm
headline knowledgeable and that's it. And so, I
don't know that it's the same deal.

MS. BOJKO: Your Honor, may I approach?

EXAMINER WALSTRA: You may.

MS. BOJKO: May I have marked, as OMA Exhibit 15, a letter by Duke Energy Ohio issued and filed in Case No. 13-2385-EL-SSO.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

- Q. Sir, do you have in front of you what's been marked as OMA Exhibit 15?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. And does this appear to be a letter from Ms. Spiller or Duke Energy Ohio counsel?
 - A. It appears to be.
- Q. And is it written on behalf of Duke
 Energy Ohio whereas the first line says "Duke Energy
 Ohio supports...."?
 - A. I see that.

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Q. And, sir, in this letter, do you see the sentence, it starts "Furthermore"?

MS. KINGERY: I am going to object.

There is no showing that this witness has ever seen this letter before.

MS. BOJKO: Your Honor, it's a letter written on behalf of Duke Energy Ohio. He's testifying here on behalf of Duke Energy Ohio. He said that he believed that there were other cases pending but he wasn't sure. I am trying to show him a document to refresh his recollection about the positions that he said he thought were similar but wasn't sure.

MS. KINGERY: But it's not his document, your Honor. He didn't author it and there is no showing that he's ever seen it or has had any involvement with it.

MS. BOJKO: Your Honor, it's a party

opponent's document. It is an admission by the company.

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EXAMINER WALSTRA: Are you trying to refresh his memory?

MS. BOJKO: Well, he made some statements and I am trying to clarify on the record of the company's position, which he testified earlier today he is here to represent Duke Energy Ohio, and he is here to represent Duke Energy Ohio about the PSR. He wasn't a direct witness, but he is a rebuttal witness. So he made some statements and I'm trying to ascertain the truth of what he stated and how he came up with that statement.

MS. KINGERY: But there's nothing in that statement from Ms. Bojko that would demonstrate this witness has any knowledge of this document whatsoever and he shouldn't be cross-examined about a document that is not his and he's never seen.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: I am going to sustain the objection.

- Q. (By Ms. Bojko) Mr. Jennings, you stated earlier you are aware of filings by other utility companies. You have stated AEP and FirstEnergy; is that correct?
- A. So I'm not aware of the filings. I read

an article that said that they have made filings. That was all I saw.

- Q. Okay. And your knowledge is that the filings were for a purchase power agreement or a similar type PSR mechanism where customers would be charged -- or, excuse me, the utility companies would assess a rider to customers that would collect the cost of generating units such as OVEC or other future purchase power agreements? I believe you said yes.
- A. The article didn't go into that detail, but it sounded like an -- the article talked about a commitment of resources to their respective load.

 And so, in that way, I guess, it's similar.

MS. BOJKO: Thank you, your Honor. I have no further questions.

16 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you.

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MR. BERGER: Thank you, your Honor.

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20 CROSS-EXAMINATION

21 By Mr. Berger:

- Q. Good evening, Mr. Jennings. Nice to see you again.
- A. Nice to see you.
- Q. Mr. Jennings, on page 6 of your testimony

at line 20, you say that "Generation offers represent the prices at which each supplier is willing to sell energy in the day at various" -- "various levels of output." Do you see that?

- A. Could you refer me to the line?
- Q. Yes. It's page 6, at line 20.
- A. Yes, I see that.

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- Q. You would agree that PJM does not determine what OVEC's marginal or variable operational costs are.
 - A. Yeah, I would agree with that.
- Q. And OVEC or its sponsoring companies inform PJM what -- what its variable or marginal cost of operation in the day-ahead market is; is that right?
- A. So I'm not the dispatch person, but I would think that they would report the cost to -- the variable cost to the representative of Duke and then someone from Duke would then offer that resource to PJM.
- Q. So you think OVEC conveys the information to Duke, Duke or the other sponsoring companies then convey it to PJM for PJM's dispatch purposes.
 - A. Correct.
 - Q. So would you agree with me that to the

extent that OVEC determines what that variable cost is on a day-to-day basis, that it has some control over the -- over whether the units will be dispatched based upon its determination of that cost?

- A. I don't think they have any determination of the dispatch.
- Q. But whether the units will be dispatched depends on how that cost compares to the variable cost of other units in PJM, right?
- A. So cost is well defined in -- in PJM's manuals and monitored, and this is the area that the market monitor does belong. He tracks the cost of -- of what the units are, people are constantly updating their -- their full cost parameters. And so, I don't see how they can control anything other -- unless they were to change their costs or lie about their costs, I don't see how they could change their dispatch.
- Q. Well, OVEC determines what -- what particular coal that it's going to utilize to -- to burn at any particular unit; isn't that right?
 - A. That's a fair point.
- Q. And that different coal has different costs associated with it, right?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. And different coal has different maintenance costs associated with it, doesn't it?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. So, to that extent, you would agree that OVEC does have some control over what the variable costs will be at its -- at its units.
- A. I would think that amount would be very marginal, but yes.
- Q. You haven't looked in particular at the extent to which OVEC may have some control over that.
 - A. I have not.
- Q. It's your understanding that -- I think earlier you talked about the fact that OVEC or its sponsoring companies could determine whether to offer at variable cost or at a market-based price every six months or something of that nature. Do you recall that?
 - A. That's just basic PJM rules, yeah.
- Q. Are you aware of whether OVEC has -- OVEC or the sponsoring companies have ever made the decision to use anything other than variable costs, to use the market-based costs?
- A. I don't know anything about the other sponsoring companies.
 - Q. Do you know whether Duke has used

market-based costs as opposed to the variable costs?

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- A. I don't know. I don't think so, but I don't know for sure.
- Q. Do you know how the market-based cost is determined?
- A. So, again, I am not the dispatch person, but since I did talk about clearing, Duke's typical practice has been that their market-based price was equal to their cost. The only time that it would vary was if there were certain actual costs that didn't -- were not consistent with the -- the cost manuals. So typically cost-based offers are the practice. And typically that's good economic behavior.
 - Q. Would you agree with me that the higher OVEC's variable costs are relative to the market, the less OVEC will dispatch?
 - A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. And would you agree also that to the extent that the OVEC dispatch is lower, OVEC will experience lower maintenance costs associated with its units?
 - A. I'm not sure I agree with that.
 - Q. Well, if dispatch is lower --
- 25 A. If dispatch is lower, the maintenance

costs should be lower, yes.

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- Q. Okay. So you do agree with that.
- A. Yes.
- Q. And in your testimony, do you recall you also talked about the fact that unanimous consent is required to retire the OVEC units. Do you recall that?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Are you -- in making that statement, is that something that you gathered from your review of the Intercompany Power Agreement or is that just something somebody told you? How do you know that?
- A. It's been a topic of discussion in -before, at Duke, that it couldn't unilaterally retire
 the units.
- Q. Are you aware of what provision in the ICPA provides that?
- A. I think it's the contract that commits us to 2040.
- Q. Does -- and -- when you say "the contract," you are talking about the ICPA?
 - A. Yeah, correct.
- Q. And you don't know what -- I understand you're saying that it's the fact that there's an agreement through 2040. Would you agree with me that

4339 there's nothing in the ICPA that says that the 1 2 parties require that it -- that they are required 3 unanimous consent to terminate the contract? 4 MS. KINGERY: I am going to be object. 5 The witness has previously stated in testimony tonight that he is not familiar with the ICPA. 6 7 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled. 8 I don't -- I don't agree. Because I Α. think we would have -- we would have explored that in 9 the past and I don't think we have. 10 You don't know what provision in the 11 12 ICPA --13 Α. I can't point it out. Not today. 14 If I provided you a copy, would you be Q. able to find it? 15 16 I guess if we had more time, yeah, 17 probably. 18 MR. BERGER: Just one minute, your Honor. 19 MR. OLIKER: Mr. Jennings, do you still 2.0 have the IEU Exhibit 5? 2.1 THE WITNESS: Excuse me? 22 MR. OLIKER: Do you still have IEU Exhibit 5 that I gave you? Or did I take it back? 23 24 THE WITNESS: Yep. 25 MR. OLIKER: Okay. He's got it.

Q. (By Mr. Berger) Yeah, so if you could take a few minutes to look at that document and let me know what provision you are referring to.

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MS. KINGERY: Your Honor, I don't believe there's been any showing at this point that the witness has ever reviewed this document.

MR. BERGER: Your Honor, he's testified about the fact that it's from the ICPA that he understands that unanimous consent is required to retire the units.

MS. KINGERY: That isn't actually what he said. He said he learned that from conversations with other people at Duke. He didn't say he had read the document.

MR. BERGER: He said it was his understanding that came from the agreement. So I'm asking him if -- otherwise, I would move to strike his testimony in this respect because otherwise he is just testifying on hearsay and he can't even identify the provision that he is referring to. He said it came from the agreement.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Overruled.

- A. Is this the entire agreement?
- Q. It's not very long. It's not a very long agreement.

A. So if you look at Section 8.03 -- or, 8.04, it says that "Unconditional Obligation to Pay Demand and Other Charges. The obligation of each Sponsoring Company to pay its specified portion of the Demand Charge under Section 5.03, the Transmission Charge under Section 5.04, and all charges under Article 7 for any Month shall not be reduced irrespective of," and it talks about different reasons.

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"Demand Charge. During the period commencing with the Effective Date and for the remainder of the term of this Agreement," which I think means until 2040, "demand charges payable by the Sponsoring Companies to Corporation shall be determined by the Corporation as provided below in Section 5.03. Each Sponsoring Company's share of the aggregate demand charges shall be the percentage of such charges represented by its Power Participation Ratio." So I think that that alone demands that we pay it until the termination of the contract.

Q. Right. But there's nothing in the ICPA that you are aware of that says that the parties can't agree by -- or, have to agree by unanimous consent --

A. So I could decide --

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- Q. -- to terminate the provision of the contract.
- A. I could decide to retire my share, but I am going to continue to pay the charges until 2040 is what I am telling you. And someone else can take my shares, but I am going to still continue to pay the charges.
- Q. Right. But you are not aware of any provision, Mr. Jennings, in the contract that says under what conditions an amendment or termination of the contract may be accomplished.
- MS. KINGERY: And, your Honor, if we are going to ask Mr. Jennings, at this point, whether there is any provision that says that, he needs to be provided with half an hour or so to read the document.
- MR. BERGER: I am asking him whether he is aware of any provision that specifies a certain number -- or, certain requirements for termination or amendment of the contract.
- A. It's an interpretation of this clause that we are committed to make those payments until 2040. All members are. And so, if all members agree that they were going to retire them, then they would

basically be agreeing to terminate the agreement.

But until the termination of the agreement, there's

no retirement of the unit. That's -- that's what I

am trying to say.

- Q. So what I understand you're saying is that because it's a contract, it can't be terminated unless everybody agrees.
 - A. That's correct.

MR. BERGER: Okay. Thank you. That's all I have, your Honor.

11 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Thank you.

12 Mr. Kurtz?

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MR. KURTZ: No questions.

EXAMINER WALSTRA: Mr. Petricoff?

MR. PETRICOFF: Thank you, your Honor.

THE WITNESS: You have got to get that

dog out, remember?

18 (Laughter.)

MR. PETRICOFF: No, no. I have been in this Commission long enough, I already -- at the break I already made arrangements to have the dog walked. Otherwise, he would have to wait too long.

Well, we can see that I'll have no problems with the SPCA.

25 (Laughter.)

THE WITNESS: I might have to go to the bathroom now.

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CROSS-EXAMINATION

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By Mr. Petricoff:

6 Q. Okay

- Q. Okay. Well, on a lighter note, let's take a look -- I have got a couple of things I want -- in your testimony that I want to clean up here for the record. And we'll try to -- it will be somewhat disjointed because you have had a lot of cross-examination now and I will try to avoid.
 - A. They softened me up for you.
 - Q. Yeah. Or dug me into a huge hole.
 - A. Not with you, Howard.
- Q. Let's start from the beginning. If you would turn to page 1 and I want you to look at the answer starting on line 5. I am going to ask you about the players here and let's find out. First, you are saying I'm employed by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, an affiliate of Duke Energy Ohio. Now, Duke Energy Ohio is the utility that serves a service district in southwest Ohio, right?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. What does Duke Energy Carolinas do?
 - A. The same thing in North Carolina.

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- Q. Okay. And -- okay. So basically Duke Energy Carolinas takes -- is devoted to a service area in -- in North Carolina, but it's a subsidiary of -- I'm sorry, it's an affiliate.
 - A. Affiliate, yes.
 - Q. Of Duke Energy.
 - A. Distant cousin.
- Q. Right. So basically there's very little interlap then between Duke Energy Carolina and Duke Energy Ohio, in the normal course of business?
- 12 A. In the normal course of business, that's true.
 - Q. Okay. Now, Duke Energy Commercial Enterprise, that's on line -- line 7, who are they?
 - A. That's a service company that provides consulting and advice to -- to all affiliates.
 - Q. Now, did the legacy generation from Duke Energy Ohio go to Duke Energy Commercial Enterprises?
 - A. No.
 - Q. Okay. Where did the legacy generation go before it went to Dynegy?
- A. It hasn't gone to Dynegy.
- MS. KINGERY: Your Honor, could we get a clarification what exactly you mean by the "legacy

generation."

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- Q. Oh, sure. These would be the nine power plants and -- and OVEC -- oh, thank you -- the nine power plants and the right to the OVEC generation that was -- that's owned by Duke Energy Ohio. That's what I mean by the legacy generation.
- A. So OVEC is still owned by Duke Energy
 Ohio and there was a transfer of some of the legacy
 Ohio assets from Duke Energy Ohio to Duke Energy
 Commercial Asset Management which is a different
 company from Duke Energy Commercial Enterprises.
- Q. Well, what we are trying to do is get all the players down here. And what is the relationship between Duke Energy Assets, Duke Energy Ohio, and Duke Energy Commercial Enterprise?
- A. Duke Energy Commercial Enterprise is a service company that houses certain shared service employees that provide services across different affiliate structures.
- Q. Does Duke Energy assets hold any generation other than the generation that was transferred to it? What we've identified here as the legacy generation?
- MS. KINGERY: Can we get a clarification?

 I'm sorry. When you say "Duke Energy Assets," are

1 you talking about Duke Energy Commercial Asset
2 Management?

MR. PETRICOFF: Yes.

MS. KINGERY: Can you call it "DECAM."

THE WITNESS: DECAM, that's easier to

remember.

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MR. PETRICOFF: We'll use that.

Q. What does DECAM own at the moment?

A. They own the legacy Duke gas assets that are located in PJM which includes Lee, Fayette, Washington, Hanging Rock, and then it also owns the legacy Ohio assets, except for Beckjord right now, which is going to be spun and transferred to DECAM, I believe, on December 1 -- no. It's going to be transferred to an LLC, another LLC.

But DECAM owns Miami Fort, Zimmer -Miami Fort, Zimmer, what -- the Stewart, Killen,
Conesville, I can't think if I am missing anything or
not. Everything except -- everything that was in the
old portfolio except for Beckjord is there right now.
Natural gas assets.

- Q. And Beckjord is going to be closed?
- A. Yes. What is not closed already will be closed.
 - Q. And I think it's just like one unit

that's still running in Beckjord?

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- A. There is four combustion turbines that are still available.
- Q. Okay. And what will DECAM own then after -- after the arrangement with Dynegy closes?
- A. They will still own all of that because Dynegy is buying DECAM, the company.
- Q. Okay. So at that point then DECAM will no longer be affiliated with Duke Energy Ohio.
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. Now, earlier, I know you told Mr. Oliker you personally haven't done any dispatching. Are you aware though of how the OVEC generation is dispatched from the Kyger Creek and Clifty Creek plants?
- A. Not more than what I've said in my testimony already which is basically just fundamental PJM energy market dispatch.
- Q. I want to take you down one -- one level of detail below that. When the units are dispatched, does Duke dispatch its 9 percent, or are the units dispatched as a whole on behalf of OVEC?
- A. So that's kind of a good question given that it's kind of mixed, a little bit of both. Units have to be committed as one unit. I can't

dispatch -- you can't start up 9 percent of the unit, but each of the sponsors offer their own shares separately to PJM. So the assumption is that the unit is started and then -- and then once it's started then it's dispatched off of incremental costs that are provided by each of the sponsors for their 9 percent share. Duke would do 9 percent.

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- Q. So it's possible then that Duke could have a different dispatch instruction and a different set of prices that are sent to PJM than -- than the portion that's owned by AEP or the portion that's owned by Louisville?
- A. That's where it gets complicated. The price would be the same. Although, I don't know how Louisville would be priced because their share is not in PJM. But let's just say another PJM member, the price should be the same. And the dispatch could be different, perhaps, depending on how the other party offers.

So, you know, if the other part is offering on a price-based offer, not necessarily cost-based offer, then -- and it was higher than Duke's offer, then Duke's -- Duke's share could be going up while the co- -- the joint owners' share could be going down at the same time.

Q. Okay. Now, if you will turn to page 10 of your testimony. There is where you -- I will give you a line reference here in a moment.

A. Okay.

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- Q. I want you to look at lines 11 through

 14. This is where you're offering in the alternative

 that -- that Duke would submit to audits and an

 investigation or review and evaluation of its bidding

 strategies. Given what we've just been through,

 aren't they going to have to look at all of them

 for -- for OVEC, not just Duke's 9 percent?
- A. I don't think so. Like I just said, if the joint owner was offering at a price higher than Duke was offering their share at the same time, it can actually dispatch Duke's share up and the co-owner's share down.
- Q. But I thought you told me earlier that -that the -- the smallest granulation on which you
 could dispatch is a unit.
 - A. No. I didn't say that.
- Q. Well, let's ask that. What's the smallest -- if, in fact, we have three different prices for -- for dispatching and everyone just owns a percentage, how does that get -- what are the instructions that go to -- to PJM?

- A. There's two sets of instructions. One is called "unit commitment," and the second one is called "dispatch." And so, we would dispatch individually commit together.
- Q. And when you say "commit," what would you be committing, committing the unit to run?
- A. It's called "start up." Commitment and start up are synonymous.
- Q. Okay. And clarify that for me. What do you mean by start up?
 - A. Putting -- putting coal in the boiler.
 - Q. Okay.

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- A. And lighting the boiler and sending steam to the turbine and generating megawatts pushing to the grid.
- Q. Okay. You will agree with me that a steam plant like Clifty Creek and Kyger can't be turned on and off. They can't be toggled on and off. You need days to warm them up and days to cool them down.
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. That's right. So when you are talking about committing them, you are just -- you would commit them so they would have to be, in other words, in a position where they could be ramped up to

deliver power all the time.

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A. I don't think that's the case. It could be the case, but I don't know that that's the case. So this is common in coal plant operation. It's nothing new. People have to do this all the time. It's difficult to get a coal plant started if your start up is a million dollars, right?

So you actually have to have economic view of, you know, what pricing is going to be the next day or the day after or a week. And actually, you have to provide -- you have to provide cost-based offers for, like, I think it's the next seven days so that PJM can actually be looking at what your economics are in the future days.

So it's -- it's not like you are just going to -- you don't have to just self-schedule things to get them started. That's my point. You may actually be self-scheduling, but you are self-scheduling with -- under economic analysis. You're making an economic analysis that it's the right thing to do. You're not just running it.

Q. Well, the reason I am running through this is I am trying to get a feel about how much discretion, how many variables, and how easy an audit is going to be. And your indication to me is that

we -- it would be committed jointly by OVEC, but, after that, we would have to go through each of the 12 owners, look at their percentages, and look at their pricing to get a feel as to whether the policy or the pricing selected by Duke was -- was prudent.

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A. I disagree. I think that you could audit each -- each owner separately or only one owner. I think where it's more complicated is in the start up, but I think that you could actually talk to one owner and be able to audit the start up because I think everyone is going to have the same information on start up.

The part where you run into antitrust issues is when you get into the dispatch and that's where everybody has to keep their offers separate and dispatch separately. And that, you only need to know what we're doing for our share of that. You don't need to know -- as long as we are the only ones that need to be audited.

- Q. Well, you know what you are doing, but you wouldn't know whether the assumptions that you made and the strategies that you were following in pricing were reasonable unless you looked at what others were doing for the same plan.
 - A. I don't understand why you have to know

that. If the costs -- if I'm offering my costs, you can see the costs. Why would you have to see someone else's offer if they are not -- if they are not being audited for the same reason?

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- Q. Isn't it possible that in terms of an audit you would want to know what -- what someone with a like unit, an absolutely like unit was offering in, and if they come to different conclusions on price?
- A. I don't know why you would have to know that. If you are getting the costs from OVEC and you could -- I don't see why you wouldn't be able to audit what -- what we're receiving from OVEC in order to construct our offer. And if you're looking at actual costs, transcending that to the offer, and you see that I'm offering at my cost, why would you want to see if someone else is offering at a higher price if they are not being audited for the same reason?
- Q. Well, let's just bring this discussion to a close. I guess I was thinking of auditing as sort of deconstructing. You're going back to break down the decision --
- A. That's not the way dispatch works.

 Dispatch is more of a construction of bottoms-up rather than top-down.

- Q. I wasn't looking at the direction. Let me put the question to you and then you can -- get your answer. And my question to you is simply this: The offer that you are making on page 10 for an audit by the -- by the staff of the Commission is an audit only of the decisions that were made by Duke and without a pledge or a promise to look at what the co-owners have done at the same time with the same units?
- A. That's correct.
- 11 Q. Okay. Okay. The next, if you would take
 12 a look on page --
- A. Are we still on a 20-minute schedule?

 (Laughter.)
- 15 A. Sorry.

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- Q. No, no. You will notice my preface of my remarks I already made arrangements for the dog to be walked.
- A. I know, but you might have to walk me in a minute.
- Q. Fair enough.
- 22 A. Okay.
- Q. Let's go to page 3 of your testimony,
 lines 14 to 16.
- 25 A. Page 3?

- Q. Yeah. Page 3.
- A. Line?

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- Q. 14 to 16.
- A. Okay.
- Q. And you make the comment there that under -- under the rider PSR, Duke would commit to offering all of the economic value of its contractual entitlement into the day-ahead and capacity markets.
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And my question for you is what's Duke doing right now? Isn't that what Duke is doing right now?
 - A. I think that's true.
 - Q. And you have done it for at least a year?
 - A. Yeah.
- Q. And do you have any feel for whether at the moment, in comparing the revenues from -- the revenues from the capacity and energy sales versus the obligation to pay OVEC, whether this has been a money maker or money loser last year for Duke?
 - A. I don't review the P&Ls.
 - Q. Okay.
- MS. KINGERY: And I do just want to caution that we might get, here, onto the edge of confidential information.

MR. PETRICOFF: I don't think so. If he says he doesn't review it, I'm moving on.

- Q. Okay. Then the -- let's see, the next would be on the page 4, lines 17 to 20, this is where you talk about there are two ways -- I guess, in essence, two kinds of capacity pricing at PJM, FRR and the RPM. Would you agree with me that starting in 2015, it will only be RPM? There will be no FRRs left?
- A. No. I disagree. I think AEP's

 Appalachian and their West Virginia utilities are

 still FRR.
 - Q. There will be no Ohio FRR.
 - A. I don't think there will be an Ohio FRR.
- Q. Okay. Okay. Next, I would like you to turn to page 5 and look at line 16. And there you tell us that the -- that the MOPR, the pricing for new generation, is not applicable to existing generation that has previously cleared an RPM auction.
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. Okay. What if the existing generating unit had a major capital expansion and enlarged its output, would it have to go through MOPR?
 - A. Yes, it could.

Q. And what if the major capital expenditure -- I'm sorry.

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- A. I will clarify. I think it has to be an increase in capability, not -- not just a capital expansion. It's actually -- you have to increase the output, too --
 - Q. Okay. Actually, you --
 - A. -- a certain amount, too, I think.
- Q. You foresaw my next question because I was going to ask if the capital investment was for environmental control equipment, in that case would you have to go through the MOPR as opposed to being cleared if you had previously been in the auction.
- A. No, but you would have the option of including it in your capacity offer through the APIR.
- Q. And you would do -- and you would do that to make sure that you will be able to cover the now higher fixed costs.
- A. That's correct, you could, unless you are already subjected to them anyway and, therefore, you might not include them in there.
- Q. Okay. Now, if you would, turn to page 7 of your testimony on line 20 and 21. And this is where -- I know this is ground that's been treaded before, so I'll keep these questions short and

focused. Because Duke has a contractual entitlement
until 2040 and because -- and let me just stop there.

And that was the discussion you just had with

Ms. Bojko about the obligation under the -- the
intercompany partnership agreement?

- A. I think it was -- I think the discussion was with OCC.
- Q. Oh, I'm sorry. But the -- this was your previous testimony that -- that the 2040 limit comes out of the intercompany partnership agreement?
 - A. Correct.
- Q. Okay. Was that agreement and the extension to 2040 a fairly recent event?
 - A. I don't recall.
 - Q. Okay.

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- A. I guess recent is relative, right?
- Q. Okay. Didn't the original --
 - A. It happened while I was still at Duke, that's -- it happened sometime in the last 15 years, but it happened before -- I think it happened before Jim Rogers retired, so that seems like a while ago now.
 - Q. Well, but relatively speaking, the original partnership agreement expired, and then it was renewed five years ago? Did that get me to

Rogers?

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- A. I don't know if it expired, but it was renewed.
- Q. It was renewed, right, and at that time it was renewed until the year 2040.
 - A. That's right.
- Q. And do you know, did -- did Duke seek

 Commission approval before it extended its obligation
 to 2040?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. If you know, is it Duke's position that the customers have any obligation to pay costs for the OVEC units until 2040?
- A. I don't know that. I don't have an opinion.
- Q. I would like you to focus in on page 8 of your testimony, lines 2 -- 2 and 3. And, actually, I think this may be even more -- I'll point this out to you because there are words in here that are so important. This is where you say to maximize gains and minimize losses under the rider PSR, Duke Energy Ohio will bid its share into the BRA at zero, thereby guaranteeing that it will always receive capacity revenues at the BRA price. Do you see that --

A. Yes.

Q. -- in that testimony? So I want to -- I want to break that -- I want to break that down.

If -- let's see, if Duke -- when Duke bids at zero, you will agree with me that it's not going to get zero for capacity. It's going to get whatever that incremental price was that closed the auction, whatever that last increment, whatever that cost to close the BRA auction, that's what everybody gets.

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- A. Are you saying ignoring the -- the PSR?

 Because I think if the PSR were approved, then

 customers would get that BRA price.
- Q. No, no. Right now we're ignoring it. I am just working on the concept of -- of bidding in at zero.
- A. You're basically building a foundation on the clearing market, right?
- Q. That's where I'm going, but we will get to that later. Your job now is just to answer the question, and the question before you is: When you bid zero in the BRA, isn't it true that you will get whatever the closing price is in the BRA?
 - A. For that location, yes.
- Q. Okay. And the reason that you would bid zero is because if you bid something other than zero, it's possible that the BRA could close at a price

below your bid.

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- A. Yeah, you risk not clearing.
- Q. Right. And what happens to those that don't clear?
 - A. They get zero.
- Q. Now, you still could sell the energy and capacity, correct?
- A. You could still sell the energy and ancillary services and you could still possibly clear in an incremental auction which there -- currently there are three incremental auctions that occur after the BRA. But, historically, the BRA price has been higher than the incremental auction price.
- Q. Okay. So the reason that you say to maximize the gains and minimize the losses, Duke would bid zero in the BRA, is out of fear that your -- otherwise, if you bid more, it may not clear and you may get nothing for the capacity.
- A. So I wouldn't -- I wouldn't characterize it like that.
- Q. Well, I didn't ask how you would characterize it. I want to know if that statement is correct.
 - A. It sounded like you characterized it.
- Q. That's right. I want to know if my

characterization is correct.

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- A. I would disagree with you. I would say no. If you'll let me to clarify, then I might agree, but I don't understand your question the way you are stating it. The reason I say that --
- Q. Let's stop there. If you don't understand my question, I will ask it again.
 - A. Okay. Go ahead.
- Q. You will agree with me that the risk that one has in bidding in a price rather than zero, is that the price you bid may result in not having your bid clear the auction.
- A. So I still disagree with you because the reason -- this is really a concession more than anything. People that enter into capacity contracts with units, specific units, if they are guaranteeing that they are going to pay somebody every month for that capacity, they don't want the risk of it not clearing.

So if you are going to tell me you are going to pay me so much money a month to get the capacity revenues from me, I'll offer it at zero to make sure it clears. Good, rational behavior, if I could actually avoid those costs, would be to offer at something else and then mothballing if it doesn't

clear.

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But, in a contract, I think that -- I think that I would offer it at zero to make sure that you are going to get your revenues, because you are going to pay me no matter what.

- Q. Okay. Well, let's take that a step further.
 - A. Okay.
- Q. What if you -- if you did the calculations and you knew that in order to cover your fixed costs you would need \$100 a megawatt-day and you are pretty sure that the -- that the market price -- that the BRA price was not going to come in above \$70, would you still bid in?
- A. Are we talking about a generic unit, or are we talking about the OVEC units?
- Q. We are talking about a generic unit. We are on a theoretical basis now.
 - A. That's not the -- that's not the scenario that we are talking about here, though.
 - Q. No. But you have to answer my question. That's my question to you.
 - A. Okay. So if I was going to offer a \$100 unit and I thought the price -- I will still offer it in, yeah, I would offer it at my cost if it wasn't --

if it wasn't committed to someone else.

- Q. Even though you knew at that point that if your projection was correct, you would have a \$30 loss.
 - A. Yeah, I would, yeah.
 - Q. Okay.

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- A. I don't know that I would have a \$30 loss, though, because if I offered it at 100 and it clears at 70, I get zero, and I am waiting for the incremental auction, so I have a \$100 loss if that auction clears. But I am going to -- I am going to have to wait until I get to the next auction. That would be rational behavior is to offer at my cost which is 100 and hope that it clears at 100.
- Q. As long as we are talking about rational behavior, it could be that if you foresaw that you were permanently going to be above what you thought the BRA prices were, you would close the unit.
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Now, let's -- let me ask about OVEC.

 Does anything in this discussion that we have just had about how your bid would change, if we are talking about the OVEC units, assuming that we -- well, let me just leave it there. Does anything change if we say instead of a theoretical \$100 unit,

1 it's OVEC at \$100 in what we think is a \$70 BRA
2 market?

- A. Yeah, it changes.
- Q. Okay. What changes?
- A. Well, what changes now is that -- is that because I can't -- I can't avoid the \$100, I am going to offer it at zero and take 70, because then I only lose 30.
- 9 Q. If this Commission does not approve PSR,
 10 that risk of losing 30 is the risk of Duke's
 11 shareholders, correct?
- 12 A. Could be, yeah.

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- Q. I'm sorry, what?
 - A. I said, yeah, it could be.
- Q. Was there any -- any scenario where it wouldn't be?
- 17 A. If we found another counterparty to sell it to.
 - Q. Explain that to me.
- A. If there was someone else -- so let's

 just assume that PJM gets approval of their capacity

 performance and the next auction clears at \$300 a

 megawatt-day, I think finding a counterparty will be

 pretty easy.
- Q. Now, let's -- if, in fact, the -- the

rider PSR was approved by the Commission, at that point then, the risk of bidding in at -- bidding in zero, when your costs are 100, in a \$70 BRA market, that loss would be on the ratepayers.

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- A. Yes. If the auction clears at \$70, in that case it would be on the ratepayers. If it clears at \$300, as I just suggested, then the ratepayer would get \$230.
- Q. Okay. Who knows the most about this -this unit? Duke or the ratepayer? I said "this
 unit," I mean Kyger Creek.
 - A. I think we are on equal ground here.
 - Q. We are on equal ground?
- A. I think we are. I mean, I don't know that much about it. We don't go to the plants very often. I mean, this is this is an agreement that's somewhat of a grandfathered situation. So we know more about electric generation than the ratepayer. I don't know how much more we know about OVEC.
- Q. That being the case that it's somewhat of a blind commitment on both sides as you've described it, shouldn't you at least offer to the -- to the customers, those who want to participate can, those who don't want to participate don't have to? Why

does it have to be mandatory?

- A. I don't know. That's not my part.
- Q. Okay.

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- A. I will say this, that the intimacy with the unit is somewhat irrelevant. It's really more about the financial situation that you're in, on either side, as the buyer or the -- the utility. If you expect -- if you understand the market and you expect that the cost of energy is going to be higher in the future, then this somehow reduces your expectation of costs in the future, then -- then you understand the situation. I think understanding how electric is made is somewhat irrelevant, right?
- Q. Let's go back because I want to make sure. You said the cost of energy. Did you really mean the cost of capacity?
- A. It's both, because -- because if -- if, next January, electric prices go to \$2,700 a megawatt-hour, ratepayers will be paying whatever it is at OVEC. Say it's -- we'll just say it's 50, I don't know what it is, but when it goes to \$2,700 a megawatt-hour, they are going to be paying for \$50 worth of fuel and they are going to be getting 26 -- \$2,700 worth of revenue back against that \$50 investment in fuel.

- Q. Well, let's go back a second. If you are in the capacity market, you don't have to run at all in order to get your capacity payment from PJM, correct?
- A. You do not, but why wouldn't you if you were in the money?
- Q. Well, I am just saying you are going -but that's a fixed sum you are going to get for the
 capacity. In addition, you may get additional
 revenues if you run, assuming that we won't run
 unless we cover our variable price, correct?
 - A. That's right.
 - Q. Okay. So --

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- A. I think you're okay when it's \$2,700 a megawatt-hour, though.
- Q. Well, let's go back because we are here to -- even if it was \$2,700, you would agree with me you wouldn't run the plant if it was -- if the cost was below your variable cost.
- A. No. If you mean if the LMP was lower than your variable cost.
- Q. Right. You would never -- you would not dispatch.
- A. Probably not.
 - Q. Okay. And so, you're saying that you can

make money on energy if, in fact, the LMP price, the price in the zone, happens to be lower than the cost of the generation coming out of the OVEC units, right?

- A. No. It has to be higher than the cost of the generation.
- Q. I'm sorry. That's right. You would agree with me that -- no, the -- the price for energy has to be higher than the -- than the variable cost of generating out of the OVEC units.
 - A. I agree with you now.
- Q. Okay. Good. Because it's late and we got to get this record in a readable form.
 - A. I understand.

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- Q. Okay. Now --
- 16 A. In your readable form, right?

 (Laughter.)
 - Q. Now, with that in mind, should we revisit the question I asked you earlier, then doesn't a real familiarity with what costs it takes to run OVEC become important, the OVEC units?
 - A. I think it only matters if -- what my cost is if you are only interested in how much of my generation is clearing and how much of it is being dispatched. But, regardless, I think my opinion

about that is irrelevant. It really comes down to the joint owners, about whether they want to share that, and maybe they will. But I don't think that -- that an auditor needs it.

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- Q. That's just the information. I am just talking about making the decision on -- on whether this should be a business risk of the shareholders or this being a business risk that the ratepayers take, wouldn't -- in order for them to really gauge whether or not there's going to be a revenue stream coming out of the energy side, you would really have to know what the costs are to produce that -- that energy out of the OVEC plants; isn't that true?
 - A. You would really have to know.
 - Q. You would really have to know.
- A. Yeah, I think we do know. I think everyone knows, right? We know what it costs and we are going to share that information.
- MR. PETRICOFF: Okay. Your Honor, may I just have a minute to see if there is anything else?

 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Sure.
- Q. Mr. Jennings, do you have any feel about what the decommissioning costs -- well, first of all, who would pay the decommissioning costs for the OVEC plants if it did appear that they were no longer

economic to run?

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- A. I don't know that at all. I have no clue. I don't know if it's defined anywhere.
- Q. Do you know if that's covered in IEU Exhibit 5, the agreement, the intercompany partnership agreement?
 - A. It --
- Q. I am not going to ask you to research it if you don't know.
- A. It probably is. I don't know. I don't know.
 - Q. Let's assume that each of the -- each of the partners has their pro rata share of the decommissioning costs. If the Commission approves the rider PRS, would --
- 16 A. PSR.
- Q. PSR, thank you, it didn't sound right.

 If they approve the PSR, would that change -- would
 the customers then become obligated for any of the
 decommissioning costs?
- A. I don't know. I don't know how that's -
 I don't know the arrangement. I am not familiar with

 it.
 - Q. Is that something that the Commission ought to consider before it, in your opinion, before

4373 it approves the rider? 1 I don't have an opinion. 2 Α. 3 MR. PETRICOFF: Okay. I have no further 4 questions. Thank you very much. 5 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Howard. EXAMINER WALSTRA: Staff? 6 7 MR. BEELER: Nothing, your Honor. 8 you. 9 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Redirect? 10 MS. KINGERY: May we have just a moment? 11 (Discussion off the record.) 12 MS. KINGERY: We have no redirect. 13 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Okay. Thank you. You 14 may step down. 15 MS. KINGERY: I would move for the 16 admission of Duke Energy Ohio Exhibit 41. 17 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Any objections? 18 MR. PETRICOFF: No objection. 19 EXAMINER WALSTRA: It will be admitted. 2.0 (EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 2.1 MR. OLIKER: Your Honor, IGS would move 22 for the admission of Exhibit 14. 23 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Any objections? 2.4 MS. KINGERY: No objections. 25 EXAMINER WALSTRA: That will be admitted.

4374 1 (EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 2 MS. HUSSEY: Your Honor, on behalf of 3 Ms. Bojko, I would like to move for the admission of 4 OMA Exhibit 14. 5 EXAMINER WALSTRA: Any objections? MS. KINGERY: No objection, your Honor. 6 7 EXAMINER WALSTRA: It will be admitted as 8 well. 9 (EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) EXAMINER WALSTRA: Since we are wrapping 10 11 up here, we will go over the briefing schedule. As 12 we discussed last time, initial briefs will be due December 15, with replies due on December 29. In 13 regards to confidential information, since we have 14 15 already ruled on everything, there will be no need to 16 file an appeal. Anything else? We are adjourned 17 then. 18 (Thereupon, at 6:39 p.m., the hearing was 19 adjourned.) 2.0 2.1 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATE I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings taken by me in this matter on Thursday, November 20, 2014, and carefully compared with my original stenographic notes. Karen Sue Gibson, Registered Merit Reporter. (KSG-5962)

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in

Case No(s). 14-0841-EL-SSO, 14-0842-EL-ATA

Summary: Transcript in the matter of Duke Energy Ohio hearing held on 11/20/14 - Volume XVI electronically filed by Mr. Ken Spencer on behalf of Armstrong & Okey, Inc. and Gibson, Karen Sue Mrs.