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1
         BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO
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 3
     In the Matter of the
    Application of Ohio Power:
 4
     Company and Columbus
     Southern Power Company
 5
     for Authority to Merge and: Case No. 10-2376-EL-UNC
    Related Approvals.
 6
     In the Matter of the
 7
    Application of Columbus
    Southern Power Company
 8
    and Ohio Power Company
     for Authority to Establish:
     a Standard Service Offer : Case No. 11-346-EL-SSO
 9
    Pursuant to §4928.143, : Case No. 11-348-EL-SSO
10
    Ohio Rev. Code, in the
     Form of an Electric
11
    Security Plan.
12
     In the Matter of the
    Application of Columbus
13
    Southern Power Company
                              : Case No. 11-349-EL-AAM
                              : Case No. 11-350-EL-AAM
     and Ohio Power Company
14
     for Approval of Certain
    Accounting Authority.
15
     In the Matter of the
16
    Application of Columbus
     Southern Power Company to : Case No. 10-343-EL-ATA
17
    Amend its Emergency
    Curtailment Service
    Riders.
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19
     In the Matter of the
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                           : Case No. 10-344-EL-ATA
    Emergency Curtailment
     Service Riders.
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22
     In the Matter of the
     Commission Review of the
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     Capacity Charges of Ohio : Case No. 10-2929-EL-UNC
     Power Company and Columbus:
     Southern Power Company.
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1
     In the Matter of the
    Application of Columbus
2
    Southern Power Company for:
    Approval of a Mechanism to: Case No. 11-4920-EL-RDR
3
    Recover Deferred Fuel
    Costs Ordered Under Ohio
4
    Revised Code 4928.144.
5
    In the Matter of the
    Application of Ohio Power:
6
    Company for Approval of a :
    Mechanism to Recover : Case No. 11-4921-EL-RDR
7
    Deferred Fuel Costs
    Ordered Under Ohio Revised:
    Code 4928.144.
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                          PROCEEDINGS
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    before Ms. Greta See and Mr. Jonathan Tauber,
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    Attorney Examiners, at the Public Utilities
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    Commission of Ohio, 180 East Broad Street, Room 11-A,
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    Columbus, Ohio, called at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday,
    October 20, 2011.
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                           VOLUME XI
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1 Thursday Morning Session, October 20, 2011. 2 3 4 EXAMINER SEE: Let's go on the record. 5 Let's take brief appearances of the counsel here for 6 the various parties. Start with the company and go 7 around the table. 8 MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor. On 9 behalf of AEP, Ohio Power Company, and Columbus 10 Southern Power Company, Steven T. Nourse and Matthew 11 J. Satterwhite, Daniel R. Conway. Thank you. 12 MR. ETTER: Good morning, your Honors. 13 On behalf of the residential utility customers, the 14 Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel, Terry L. 15 Etter, Assistant Consumers' Counsel, Maureen R. 16 Grady, Assistant Consumers' Counsel. 17 EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Etter, you're going to 18 have to speak up. 19 MR. ETTER: Hopefully I won't have to 20 talk much today. 21 MR. HAYDEN: Good morning, your Honors. 2.2 On behalf of FES, Mark Hayden and David Kutik. 23 MR. HOWARD: Good morning, your Honors. 24 On behalf of Constellation NewEnergy, Constellation 25 Energy Commodities Group, Exelon Energy Group, Retail

Energy Supply Association, Compete Coalition, and PJM Power Providers Group, Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, by M. Howard Petricoff, Lija Kaleps-Clark, and Steven M. Howard. Thank you.

2.2

MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, on behalf of the Industrial Energy Users of Ohio I'd like to enter the appearance of Mr. Frank Darr, Mr. Joseph Oliker, and reentering an appearance for myself, Sam Randazzo, as reflected previously in the record.

MS. HAND: Good morning, your Honor.

Emma Hand and Douglas G. Bonner for Ormet Primary

Aluminum Corporation.

MR. YURICK: Good morning, your Honors.

On behalf of the Kroger Company, law firm of Chester,

Willcox & Saxbe, John Bentine, Mark Yurick, Zach

Kravitz. Thank you.

MR. KURTZ: For the Ohio Energy Group, Mike Kurtz and Kurt Boehm.

MS. McALISTER: On behalf of the OMA Energy Group, Lisa McAlister and Matt Warnock.

MR. MARGARD: On behalf of the Commission, Assistant Attorneys General Warner Margard, John Jones, Steven Beeler, and Thomas McNamee.

MR. MONTGOMERY: Good morning, your

Honor. On behalf of Paulding Wind Farm, LLC, Chris

Montgomery and Terrence O'Donnell. Thank you.

EXAMINER SEE: We'll resume with Mr. Murray.

2.2

MS. McALISTER: Your Honor.

EXAMINER SEE: Yes, Ms. McAlister.

MS. McALISTER: Before Mr. Murray goes on the stand I'd like to state for the record that the OMA Energy Group does not have any questions for Mr. Murray and neither does anybody else represented by attorneys at Bricker, and with your permission I'd like to make a brief statement for the record.

EXAMINER SEE: Okay.

MS. McALISTER: To the extent that my cross-examination questions of Mr. Bowser may have been perceived by any person in any way as an explicit or implicit questioning of IEU-Ohio's motives for not supporting the stipulation, I and Bricker had and have no substantial basis to question IEU-Ohio's motives for not signing the stipulation and to challenge the analytical quality of the work reflected in the testimony of Mr. Bowser and Mr. Murray.

EXAMINER SEE: Thank you.

Mr. Murray, I'll remind you that you were

placed under oath before and you continue to be under oath at this time. Have a seat.

Mr. Randazzo.

2.2

MR. RANDAZZO: Yes, your Honor, just refreshing everyone's recollection, if we may, Mr. Murray had previously completed his direct examination to sponsor his testimony, we had dealt with motions to strike.

EXAMINER SEE: Yes.

MR. RANDAZZO: With permission of the parties and to help clarify the record I would like to ask Mr. Murray one additional question since he has now appeared after Mr. Fortney and his testimony was -- direct testimony was presented prior to Mr. Fortney and Mr. Fortney's testimony today is a little bit different than his prefiled testimony.

I would just like to ask Mr. Murray the following question: Mr. Murray, the testimony that you submitted previously and sponsored previously was without the benefit of the oral testimony provided by Mr. Fortney. And to that question I believe Mr. Murray would say "Yes." But -- at least I hope so. But, in any event, in fairness I just think it helps to clarify the record given the sequence of witnesses here.

1787 1 EXAMINER SEE: Okay, Mr. Randazzo. 2 ahead. 3 4 KEVIN M. MURRAY 5 being previously duly sworn, as prescribed by law, 6 was examined and testified further as follows: 7 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) 8 By Mr. Randazzo: 9 Mr. Murray, on page 44 at question 50 you 10 begin to discuss your review of Mr. Fortney's 11 analysis of the MRO versus the ESP test; is that 12 correct? 13 Yes. Α. 14 And the testimony that you sponsored 15 previously was testimony that was based upon the 16 knowledge that you had prior to Mr. Fortney taking 17 the stand and providing oral testimony in this 18 proceeding; is that correct? 19 Α. Yes. 20 MR. RANDAZZO: Thank you. That's all I 21 have, your Honor. 2.2 (Discussion off the record.) 23 EXAMINER SEE: Let's start 24 cross-examination of Mr. Murray. 25 MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I believe the

settling parties agreed that I would go first and cross.

2.2

EXAMINER SEE: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. NOURSE: And I also have an additional motion to strike at this time, your Honor. And this is consistent with the rulings on Friday regarding OCC Witness Duann. Mr. Murray's Exhibit Nos. 5 and 6, I believe, are not consistent with the remand order. KMM-5 reflects a POLR charge, the 2011 POLR charge, as part of the baseline rate in his MRO analysis, I believe line 22. And Exhibit 6 -- that line 22 reference applies to both the Ohio Power and the Columbus Southern portion of KMM-5.

EXAMINER SEE: So you're just asking to strike that line?

MR. NOURSE: Well, the numbers flow from that figure, your Honor. And I think, similar to Dr. Duann, the number presented in the exhibit I believe it's fair to say that it does not reflect the remand order and as the companies were directed to do, and other parties purported to do, reflecting the remand was supposed to be reflected in revisions, so similarly in KMM-6, KMM-6 I believe reflects a reduction for environmental carrying costs in line 20 on both pages, Columbus Southern and Ohio Power. And

consequently the ESP benefit numbers that are presented on KMM-6 also are not consistent with the remand order.

2.2

And in the context of the testimony itself and the text, there's some statements and references that rely on those exhibits I'd like to also point out and move to strike. The first one is on page 41 starting on line 21 which references A48 should be Q48, but that carries through to the entirety of page 42 and ends on line 13 of page 43.

EXAMINER SEE: I'm sorry, what was that reference again starting on page 41, Mr. Nourse?

MR. NOURSE: 41 starting on line 21 with question 48, and then the question and answer continues through to line 13 on page 43 and that discussion relates to the numbers presented in Exhibits 5 and 6.

The next one is on page 45, in the answer 53, after the word "yes" there's a sentence, again references the analysis in Exhibits 5 and 6 and I would move to strike the sentence "There are additional costs" beginning on line 14 and ending with "KMM-6" on line 16.

And the final passage, your Honor, is on page 46 beginning on line 17 with the phrase "for

example" and it continues on the remainder of page 46 onto the end of line 6 on page 47.

2.2

All of these statements present numbers from those two exhibits that reflect analysis that does not comport with the remand order so I move that they be stricken in accordance with your rulings Friday afternoon with respect to Dr. Duann.

EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Randazzo, did you want to respond?

MR. RANDAZZO: If I may, your Honors.

Mr. Murray's schedules show individual line items and the math, he describes the math that he followed in his testimony. In this case to the extent that the Commission believes that any of the lines are inappropriate in his analysis, it is simple math to reflect the consequences in the bottom-line numbers.

So I don't want to quarrel with the prior rulings, your Honor, but it seems to me that the companies themselves have put in alternative scenarios showing their version of what the Commission's remand order means and, at your direction, an alternative version.

We have folks that are talking about conditional benefits, nonquantitative, out in the future, for purposes of trying to justify why it is

that they think that the ESP stipulation is better than the MRO. So the scenario that is illustrated here is explicit, the math is explicit, the Commission can remove the numbers, the math is described, the derivative consequences in the math will lead to a bottom-line number, and I think the company is wrong in attempting to strike the testimony and the various exhibits for that reason.

2.2

But if you're going to strike anything, it would be the lines that you think are offensive relative to your prior rulings with the math being followed to produce, of course, a different bottom-line number. It doesn't change the conclusion offered by the witness as you can see from the bottom line in each of those exhibits.

But, your Honor, I think it's helpful to have the testimony in to illustrate the math that was followed by Mr. Murray, he explains it in complete detail, and to the extent that any of the numbers of Mr. Murray -- the Commission judges that any of the numbers that Mr. Murray has, including the lines referenced by the company, should be modified, the Commission can insert the number that it judges to be based on the record and apply the mathematical formula if the Commission finds that Mr. Murray's

mathematical methods are appropriate.

2.2

So with that, your Honor, I would object to the motion to strike in its entirety in view of the rulings that have allowed witnesses to talk about conditional benefits and scenarios, alternative scenarios, including those associated with events that are unknown and are conditioned on the Commission approving this or that many years hence.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, just briefly.

Mr. Randazzo is suggesting that the Commission do the math and revise Mr. Murray's testimony. I don't think that's what the parties were directed to do, and the fact is we don't know what the bottom-line impact on these exhibits would be if we adjusted for the math. Unlike the conditional benefit example being referenced, these two things that I mention, the POLR including the full POLR in the baseline, is simply wrong under the remand order and all the other parties have been directed to present revised testimony and have presented revised testimony.

And the same thing with the environmental, KMM-6, that just carries through an adjustment that's already been rejected and clutters up the record with numbers that are not correct.

MR. KUTIK: Your Honor, may I be heard?

EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Kutik.

2.2

MR. KUTIK: Your Honor, the objection that, quote, it's not correct, end quote, is an objection which is basically what counsel has made — is an objection that goes to the weight of the evidence, not as to its admissibility. Counsel spoke about there being orders to correct testimony. The only party that was directed to do a revised version of testimony was the company; no one else did that.

With respect to the changing nature of the landscape, Mr. Murray's testimony, in fact, does account for it given the fact that he has introduced new schedules and I would point the Bench to his Exhibit 11 which is a revised version of his calculation.

So if Mr. Nourse has a problem with Mr. Murray's calculations, he can address that in cross-examination, he can address that in briefs, and Mr. Murray's testimony stands as it will stand.

EXAMINER SEE: After reviewing the second round of motions to strike Mr. Murray's testimony, the Bench is going to allow them to stand. We will proceed with cross-examination.

MR. NOURSE: Okay, your Honor.

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CROSS-EXAMINATION

2 By Mr. Nourse:

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- Q. Good morning, Mr. Murray.
- A. Good morning.
- Q. You're the executive director of IEU?
- A. Yes.
 - Q. Okay. And in what capacity does that position serve the organization?
 - A. The executive director is basically what I would characterize as a managerial position to address the business affairs of the organization as needed.
 - Q. Do you make any decisions in that capacity?
- A. Yes.
- 16 O. Such as what?
 - A. I might execute contracts on behalf of the organization. I may make decisions to, for example, retain outside witnesses or participate in that decision I guess is a better way to characterize it.
 - Q. Do you make decisions regarding cases, case decisions with respect to Commission proceedings?
 - A. No. I would have input into decisions,

but ultimately case decisions are reflective of discussions between counsel and members of the organization.

Q. Okay. So with respect to the situation we're currently considering, the option of a stipulation and whether IEU decides to join or oppose that stipulation, can you tell me the process that was used to reach that decision?

MR. RANDAZZO: I object.

EXAMINER SEE: On what basis,

Mr. Randazzo?

2.2

MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honor, that process is protected attorney-client communications.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I'm not asking about any conversations with counsel. I'm asking from an organizational standpoint what was the process for deciding to join or oppose the stipulation. I believe there's been other questions, similar questions, of organizations that have testified including OEG and AICUO.

MR. RANDAZZO: I'll withdraw the objection.

EXAMINER SEE: You can answer the question.

MR. RANDAZZO: As long as it's focused on

the process.

2.2

EXAMINER SEE: Answer the question, Mr. Murray.

A. The process, as stipulations are under negotiation among parties, we will have periodic communication with members of the organization to update them as to the status of the negotiations.

Ultimately, to the extent the stipulation is reached, we will share that with the members in its entirety.

Typically we will have perhaps a conference call in which we will offer up or the organization and its counsel will offer up their understanding of the effect of the stipulation, individual companies make an assessment of what the stipulation would mean to the rates they pay for electric service, and there is a recommendation whether or not to support or oppose a stipulation. It ultimately is approved or disapproved by the members of the organization.

- Q. So you're saying the decision is made by -- to join or oppose the stipulation by the members of IEU?
 - A. That's correct.
 - Q. And is that achieved through a vote?
 - A. If necessary.

Q. And was that process followed for the stipulation we're talking about today?

A. Yes.

2.2

Q. And was that process -- did that process occur after -- well, let me ask you -- strike that question.

When did that process occur with respect to this stipulation?

- A. I don't recall an exact date. I believe it was after the technical conference as well as the provision of some worksheets, workpapers by the company that allowed parties to get a better numerical assessment of what the stipulation impact would be on members.
- Q. So, first of all, let me ask you about the last part you stated. You're saying it was based on a rate impact analysis of the stipulation?
- A. There were some workpapers provided by the company, my recollection is they were provided sometime after the stipulation was filed, I don't recall if that was before or after the technical conference, but my recollection is the decision by the members whether or not to oppose or support the stipulation was ultimately reached sometime after the technical conference. That's my recollection as to

- the date. Again, I don't recall the exact date.
- Q. Okay. And is it correct that you had attended settlement negotiations representing IEU?
 - A. I attended some settlement negotiations.
 - Q. And did you attend the last meeting which I believe IEU was present on August 26th?
 - A. I don't recall.

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- O. You don't recall?
- A. I don't recall the exact dates in which I attended. I attended some meetings, probably not all.
- Q. Did the IEU's consideration, the members voting against the stipulation, occur during the time that IEU was involved with negotiations or after that time?
- A. Again, I think I just testified it was after the technical conference. So it was after the stipulation was filed.
- Q. Well -- oh, after the technical conference that occurred after the stipulation occurred.
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. Gotcha.
- Now, what interest was served by IEU in this proceeding in terms of its intervention in the

SSO case, let's say?

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- A. Can you clarify what you mean by "interest"?
- Q. Well, is it accurate to say that IEU's intervention was based on an interest in the price, adequacy, and reliability of retail electric service?
- A. For its members served by Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power Company, that's correct.
- Q. Okay. So IEU's focus in this proceeding would be on price, adequacy, and reliability of electric supply?
- A. That's an accurate general characterization. Obviously, there's -- we need to translate that into more specific deliverables in terms of an outcome.
- Q. Are there other major concerns IEU -- you look out for IEU other than price, adequacy, and reliability of electric supply?
- A. Well, one of the considerations that IEU would certainly take into account in the context of an electric security plan proceeding is whether or not a stipulation was lawful.
 - Q. Stipulation was what?
 - A. Lawful.

Q. Lawful. All right. And you weren't involved in that determination, were you?

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- A. No. IEU has counsel that helps in those types of decisions.
- Q. Now, did you examine the rate impact of the proposed stipulation relative to IEU members in deciding whether to oppose the stipulation?
- A. I was involved in the preparation of spreadsheets that we developed to illustrate the effects for certain rate schedules. We developed those for both Ohio Power Company and Columbus Southern Power Company. We distributed them to the members to allow the members to model individual impacts.

In some cases there were specific

IEU-Ohio members that had some -- I had some
interaction with to help them understand the
spreadsheet and make sure that they were trying to
confirm that they were accurately modeling the impact
of the stipulation.

- Q. So is it accurate that you have not calculated the rate impact of the proposed stipulation on each member of IEU?
 - A. I have not.
 - Q. And has anyone at IEU done that?

A. I don't know.

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- Q. Who would know the answer to that question?
- A. Other individuals that are employed on behalf of TEU.
- Q. So you don't know whether the rate impact on IEU members has been done and factored into the decision to oppose the stipulation?
- A. Certainly we provided the information to individual members to allow them to model the individual rate impacts. It would be my expectation that they used that impact to help formulate their decision whether or not to support or oppose the stipulation.
- Q. Okay. I thought you said earlier that IEU evaluated rate impacts of a case or a stipulation as part of the process for deciding whether to oppose the stipulation or join it.
- A. There is information that was provided both in the stipulation itself as well as the testimony supporting the stipulation, the company's workpapers, that will allow you to assess the overall impact of the ESP. In order to assess the impact on individual customers you need to do a more detailed analysis. As I indicated, we provide tools to the

members of IEU to allow them to conduct that analysis and assist them to the extent that they need assistance in using those tools.

MR. NOURSE: Okay. Your Honor, I'd like to mark as an exhibit AEP Exhibit No. 12. It's a discovery response from IEU to Columbus Southern and Ohio Power, second set.

EXAMINER SEE: The exhibit is so marked.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

- Q. Mr. Murray, could you turn to interrogatory 44 in that packet. Are you there?
 - A. I'm there.

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- Q. Okay. And this question asks to identify the members of IEU that would see a decrease in 2012 under the stipulation, and it goes on to ask for certain specified members there. Do you see that question?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And are all those firms that are listed members of IEU?
 - A. I believe so.
- Q. And answer states that "IEU has not performed the calculations" in response to this interrogatory for 46, 48, and 50; is that correct?
 - A. Yes.

- Q. 46 is the same question for the year 2013 for the same firms; is that correct?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. And 48 is the same question for the year 2014 for the same IEU members, correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And question 50 is the same with respect to the year 2015; is that correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. So your answer in 44 answers for all of those years, correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And then you have another sentence in here -- first of all, let me verify that you are familiar with these responses and they are an accurate copy of your recollection, these responses.
 - A. I recall seeing them.
- Q. And the second sentence goes on to say that the information provided by the companies does not reflect the full cost of the settlement.
- A. Which second sentence are you referring to?
- Q. I'm going back to question 44 which addresses all those other questions I believe in one.
 - A. Okay. I see it.

Q. And can you explain what you mean by that sentence?

MR. RANDAZZO: Just so the record's clear, we're talking about the sentence that begins "Based on information"?

MR. NOURSE: Yes.

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MR. RANDAZZO: Thank you.

A. The full cost of the settlement ESP is going to be a function of what I would characterize as placeholders in the stipulation. I discuss some of them in my testimony beginning at page 47, line 19. They are costs associated with the company's alternative energy compliance, costs associated with storm damage recovery mechanism, costs associated with pool termination or modification, costs of up to 350 megawatts of customer sited combined heat and power, waste heat recovery and distributed generation, and additionally costs associated with MR6 which I believe is an acronym standing for Muskingum River 6 which is a gas-fired generating unit that is a placeholder in the stipulation.

- Q. And so that's what you meant by that, the balance of answer 44 was referring to those?
- A. Yes. There are some elements in the stipulation that have not been quantified.

- Q. Okay. Now, those answers weren't supplemented, to your knowledge, right?
 - A. I don't recall.
- Q. And as you sit here today do you know if any IEU members will experience rate decreases under the stipulation in 2012, '13, '14, and '15?

MR. RANDAZZO: I object.

EXAMINER SEE: On what grounds,

Mr. Randazzo?

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MR. RANDAZZO: Confidential information.

MR. NOURSE: Well, we just covered the whole subject through discovery. I'm asking him to supplement on the stand if he has any knowledge about the same set of questions and answers that we just went through. He stated they haven't been formally supplemented.

MR. KUTIK: That wasn't his question. He said he didn't know.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ NOURSE: Correct. I'm not aware of any either.

MR. KUTIK: Well, the record as it stands now is the witness doesn't know.

MR. NOURSE: He doesn't know if they're supplemented, your Honor, but I asked him a different question.

EXAMINER SEE: The objection is overruled.

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THE WITNESS: Could I have the question reread?

(Record read.)

- A. I believe there are some IEU members that will see a decrease in 2012, I believe in the years thereafter everybody will see a rate increase.
- Q. Okay. Did IEU calculate the results under the MRO test in deciding whether to support or oppose the stipulation?
- A. There are results under the MRO test that are reflected in my testimony, so, yes.
- Q. Maybe you didn't -- let me ask you again.

 Did IEU calculate results to the MRO test in deciding to join or oppose the stipulation, in other words, prior to the filing of your testimony?
- A. There were certainly -- my recollection is we did earlier calculations to illustrate various scenarios and shared those with members, so yes, that information -- an early version of what's reflected in my testimony was shared with members.
- Q. So are you testifying that the MRO test results that you've prepared were considered by IEU members in deciding whether or not to vote in favor

or in opposition to the stipulation?

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- A. I believe what I stated was my recollection is an earlier version of an MRO test was shared with members, so we were certainly trying to illustrate to members the results of what we thought would be under various scenarios. I don't recall if the numbers that we shared with members are precisely what ended up in my final testimony.
- Q. And I'm not asking you about various scenarios. I'm asking you about the stipulation and whether you performed or anyone at IEU performed an MRO test based on the stipulation and presented that as part of the decision to join or oppose to IEU members.
- A. Again, my recollection is we provided that type of analysis and shared it with members.
- Q. Well, you're changing my question in your answer. I just want to try to be clear here. Are you saying that at the time you presented information to the IEU members for purposes of deciding whether to join or oppose the stipulation you presented an MRO test results analysis based on the stipulation?
- A. My recollection is yes, we did an early analysis where we illustrated the total company basis, the effects of the ESP stipulation against

what we thought the effects would be under an MRO scenario.

- Q. So you did a total company and not separately for CSP and Ohio Power.
- A. I misstated. The results were company specific based on Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company.
 - Q. Okay. Move to a different subject.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I'd like to mark as an exhibit AEP Exhibit 13. These are IEU replies to Columbus Southern and Ohio Power, the fourth set.

EXAMINER SEE: AEP Exhibit 13 is so marked.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor.

- Q. Mr. Murray, are these interrogatory responses from IEU to AEP Ohio?
 - A. They appear to be.
- Q. And are you familiar with this set of questions?
 - A. I have seen them previously.
- Q. Okay. So directing your attention first to interrogatory 66, it's accurate to say that IEU-Ohio is registered as a CRES provider in Ohio?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. And does IEU serve as a CRES provider for its members?
 - A. Could you repeat the question again?
- Q. Does IEU serve as a CRES provider for its members?
- A. Not presently for providing generation service.

MR. NOURSE: I'm sorry. Could I have your answer reread.

(Record read.)

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- Q. Okay. What services are provided?
- A. IEU-Ohio acts as a curtailment service provider as indicated in the question and answer to interrogatory 74.
- Q. And that's considered a CRES service?

 MR. RANDAZZO: I object. That's a legal question.
 - Q. Well, your understanding.

MR. NOURSE: I asked him about CRES services and he responded with curtailment service provider, so I'm just asking a follow-up clarification question.

MR. KUTIK: Actually the question was what services does --

EXAMINER SEE: Thank you.

1 MR. KUTIK: -- IEU provide.

2 EXAMINER SEE: Yes.

THE WITNESS: Can I have the question

4 reread?

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5 EXAMINER SEE: Yes, you can.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I can try to rephrase it to clarify.

- Q. (By Mr. Nourse) Mr. Murray, you stated in response to my question about CRES services that you're not providing generation services, correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. As a CRES. And my next question is what other services is IEU providing to its members as a CRES provider?
- A. And I believe I indicated, as interrogatory 74 indicates, IEU is a curtailment service provider for CSP.
- Q. And your understanding is that that's a CRES service in Ohio?
- A. My understanding is that, yes, that would require certification from the Commission.
- Q. And is that considered an aggregation service under your understanding?
- A. Yes, you could certainly put it under that classification. It's a type of service that

probably doesn't neatly fit with the labels that the Commission has identified for certification because I believe the types of categories that the Commission developed back in 2000 probably predated the existence of curtailment service providers in Ohio.

- Q. Okay. Curtailment service providers is a term that's used in the PJM tariff; is that correct?
 - A. That's my understanding.

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- Q. And acting as a curtailment service provider means that you're providing -- you're brokering demand response services to IEU members; is that accurate?
- A. I don't know that I would agree with the brokering description. A curtailment service provider is a special class of membership in PJM.

 PJM operates as a limited liability corporation and it's my understanding that in order to transact or do any business in its electricity markets you must be a member of PJM. And PJM has established curtailment service providers as a special class of membership specifically to facilitate the provision of demand response in its markets.
- Q. Okay. And IEU's participation in these cases that we're here today about, was it acting in its capacity as a CRES provider in participating in

these cases?

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MR. RANDAZZO: Could I have the question read back, please?

(Record read.)

MR. RANDAZZO: Thank you.

- A. IEU was acting on behalf of its members.
- Q. And in pursuing -- we talked earlier about the intervention basis for IEU being able to address price adequacy and reliability of electric supply, correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And does that purpose include IEU's role as a CRES supplier?
- A. IEU acts as a CRES provider in order to provide service to member companies, so tangentially I think you could say it may be related.
- Q. In your answer when you talk about providing service to members, are you saying CRES services?
- A. Again, I think I've previously testified IEU currently acts as a curtailment service provider to members in Ohio, it's my understanding that that requires certification as a CRES.
- Q. And just to be clear, you're saying that that's the only CRES-related service that IEU

presently provides to its members?

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- A. That's my recollection.
- Q. Okay. Does IEU the CRES provider have any employees?
- A. My understanding is IEU as the corporation doesn't have any employees. It utilizes individuals in a contract capacity. For example, I'm executive director of IEU, but as my testimony indicates I'm employed by McNees, Wallace & Nurick, LLC.
- Q. So does IEU the CRES entity have agreements with other CRES providers in providing service to its members?
 - A. I don't recall. Or I don't know.
- Q. Okay. Let me ask you about the joint defense agreement. I believe there's been discussion on the record and I don't know if you've been present during that or not, about a joint defense agreement between IEU and other parties that are opposing the stipulation entered into around September 1st, I believe. Are you familiar with that?
- A. I'm aware that there is a joint defense agreement. I have never seen the document.
- Q. You're aware of the joint defense agreement?

A. Again, I just testified I'm aware that one exists. I have not seen the actual document.

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- Q. What's your understanding of the joint defense agreement?
- A. My layman's understanding is that a joint defense agreement, when parties agree to it, it is intended to I think broaden the scope of what would be considered the attorney-client privilege. It allows those parties to have communications that I guess would be considered confidential.
- Q. And would you also agree that the premise would be that those parties are of a common interest and have the same goals, essentially, in the litigation?

MR. RANDAZZO: I object, your Honor. We have a generic discussion about joint defense agreements. Mr. Murray's indicated he hasn't seen the one that Mr. Nourse is inquiring about. I don't know how the general understanding of these documents relates to any issues that are in this case, but if there is any relevancy, it has to be related to the specific document which Mr. Murray has not seen.

MR. NOURSE: Well, I'm exploring the specific joint defense agreement which he said he was aware of. I'm exploring his understanding in the

context of that agreement, that there have been issues raised in this case about negotiations, and so I think I'm entitled to ask him a few questions about that.

MR. KUTIK: I have an objection on a different basis and that is it calls for a legal conclusion.

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MR. ETTER: OCC joins the objection.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, the witness is the one that raised the attorney-client privilege issue, and I'm not asking anything about legal issues.

How about if I ask a different question and see where that leads?

Q. (By Mr. Nourse) Mr. Murray, is it your understanding that the determination to jointly oppose the stipulation was made by the parties that entered into the joint defense agreement prior to entering into the joint defense agreement?

MR. KUTIK: Objection. To the extent it calls for speculation of what other parties thought.

MR. NOURSE: I'm asking him based on his own knowledge.

MR. RANDAZZO: No foundation. And I object.

EXAMINER SEE: The objection is sustained.

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- Q. (By Mr. Nourse) Mr. Murray, do you know, had IEU determined it would oppose the stipulation when it entered into the joint defense agreement?
- A. I believe earlier in your questions you identified a specific date associated with a joint defense agreement. I don't recall sitting here what that was. As I previously testified, the ultimate decision by IEU whether or not to oppose or support the stipulation occurred after the technical conference; I believe the joint defense agreement was in place prior to that date but I don't know the exact date.
- Q. Okay, Mr. Murray, let me shift gears.

 Now, you're a technical specialist for the law firm.
 - A. That's my title.
 - Q. What does that entail generally?
- A. I provide analytical support to the attorneys in the firm and also provide analytical support to IEU members as well as other clients of the firm.
- Q. And part of your duties, are they not, to review filings and workpapers that go with filings?
 - A. Yes.

- Q. And as part of that evaluation activity is it accurate to say that you frequently work with Excel spreadsheets?
- A. I use Excel spreadsheets. Whether or not you want to characterize that as frequent or infrequent would be a matter of individual judgment I guess. I certainly don't use Excel spreadsheets on a day-to-day basis.
- Q. Okay. So you're not considering yourself as a proficient user of Excel, or do you?
- A. I'm proficient in the features I use in Excel. There are certainly features in Excel that I don't use on a day-to-day basis.
- Q. Okay. We'll get back to that later. Car I clarify your overall recommendation in your testimony, is it simply to reject the stipulation?
- A. Do you have a specific reference in my testimony you're referring to?
 - Q. No, I don't.

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THE WITNESS: Could I have the question reread?

(Record read.)

A. Beginning on page 53 of my testimony where I offer conclusions, my overall conclusion as reflected in question 61 and the answer that follows

is that the ESP stipulation be rejected, however, to the extent that the Commission disagrees with that recommendation I've offered up several suggested modifications to the stipulation in my testimony.

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- Q. And is it your understanding that the companies have to accept those modifications if the Commission takes up that part of your recommendation?
 - A. That would be my understanding.
- Q. And I want to drill down a little bit on some of the individual cases being addressed in the stipulation and get IEU's position for clarity on those. And the first one is the merger of Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power. Is there opposition from IEU on the merger proposal outside the context of the stipulation?

MR. RANDAZZO: I object.

EXAMINER SEE: Grounds, Mr. Randazzo?

MR. RANDAZZO: The stipulation has been presented by a package. There is a specific section of the stipulation that says that it's an integrated settlement and that individual items can't be severed or separated. The focus of this hearing is the reasonableness of the settlement. The process associated with these other cases is being held in abeyance at the request of signatory parties. I

think the question is irrelevant.

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MR. NOURSE: Let me try a different way.

Q. Mr. Murray, in your recommendations and testimony about the stipulation, which is a package of terms and conditions in various cases, do you have specific terms or recommendations relating to the merger proposal component of the stipulation?

MR. RANDAZZO: For the record, could Mr. Nourse identify the merger provision in the stipulation.

MR. NOURSE: I can do that. It's under section IV of the stipulation and paragraph 3 on page 24.

THE WITNESS: Could I have the question reread?

- Q. We'll try it again. Do you have paragraph 3 on page 24 of the stipulation?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And this part of the stipulation would resolve the proposed merger, so does IEU -- does your testimony on this subject have any specific recommendations?

MR. RANDAZZO: I object to the form of the question. Mr. Nourse said that this section resolves the proposed merger. What this section says

is that the Commission would approve the merger.

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MR. NOURSE: It resolves it by approving it, that's correct.

A. Well, there's at least two aspects of my testimony that I believe would touch upon this, first, again, as an overall recommendation I recommend the Commission reject the stipulation. If that happens, the merger would not be approved.

The second part of my testimony that touches upon this is in my testimony at the top of page 5, I request the Commission modify the stipulation ESP and retain separate generation, transmission, and distribution rates for Ohio Power Company and Columbus Southern Power Company, and that would obviously affect the last sentence of paragraph 3 in the stipulation.

MR. RANDAZZO: Mr. Murray, paragraph 3 on page 24?

THE WITNESS: That's correct.

Q. So to be more specific, are you saying that IEU opposes the consolidation of generation and transmission rates for AEP Ohio? This the context of the stipulation?

A. AEP Ohio doesn't exist.

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Q. Okay. Well, I said the consolidation of rates for AEP Ohio which is commonly referred to as the collective reference for Ohio Power and Columbus Southern Power. We can rephrase the question if you want to do that.

Mr. Murray, are you saying that in the context of evaluating the stipulation IEU opposes the consolidation of transmission and generation rates for Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power?

MR. RANDAZZO: I object. Now we're going

to go through individual provisions of the settlement when the settlement is presented as a package.

Mr. Murray has already testified that he is recommending rejection of the package, the consequence of that affects the merger recommendation that's in the settlement. I object.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I'm just following up to his last statement about page 5 of his testimony to clarify what he said about the last sentence in paragraph 3.a.

EXAMINER SEE: And the objection is overruled.

THE WITNESS: Could I have the question reread?

(Record read.)

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- A. The answer would be yes.
- Q. Okay. And the other area that, one of the other cases, set of cases, resolved by the stipulation is on the same page here, 24 of the stip, the ECS cases. And in the context of the stipulation does IEU oppose the stipulation's recommendation to resolve Case Nos. 10-343 and 344?
- A. Again, my overall recommendation is that the Commission reject the stipulation. I have offered up as an alternative some specific modifications to the stipulation and my recollection is I don't believe I proposed modifying this aspect of the settlement.
 - Q. Okay. Fair enough.

Let me ask you to turn to page 4 of your testimony. At the bottom half of the page you're making a revenue comparison between the application in this case and the stipulation; is that correct?

- A. Yes.
- Q. And I believe in line 17 you're -- well, line 17, that figure as well as the figure in line 19, you're saying, are you not, that there's a difference of less than 10 million in 2012 revenue under the stipulation as compared to the application?

A. Yes.

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- Q. Now, is the purpose of this discussion to suggest that AEP did not -- well, that the stipulation does not reflect substantial compromise by AEP from its application proposal?
- A. What the settlement -- what the sentence indicates is if you simply do the math, you'll see that there's very little difference in the revenue that's produced under the stipulation versus what was characterized by the company as revenue under their application.

I would add, though, that I think what the sentence also allows you to conclude is that the original application had a number of placeholder riders that weren't quantified and probably weren't reflected in terms of what the company indicated as a revenue impact.

- Q. Okay, Mr. Murray. Do you have your workpapers with you?
 - A. Yes.

MR. NOURSE: I'd like to mark as AEP Exhibit 14 a workpaper.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

Q. I'll give you that sheet and you may be able to match it up with your own copy.

Mr. Murray, does this look to be a copy of one of your workpapers?

A. Yes.

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- Q. Okay. And this is the workpaper that you used to calculate the 9.6 million that appears at the bottom of page 4 --
 - A. Yes.
- Q. -- of your testimony. Okay. And can you walk us through the math that was done? You mentioned doing the math in your last answer.
- A. Yes. There is a kilowatt-hour figure shown of 43,503,500,009, and that is multiplied by 8.8 cents per kilowatt-hour to generate a revenue of 1,707,494,974. Similar calculations in the same kilowatt-hour figures in an average cost per kilowatt-hour of 8.93 cents was used to generate the number of 1,717,109,247. The difference between those two numbers is the \$9,614,274 that's shown in my testimony.
- Q. Okay. And when you say used the 43 billion usage to multiply -- provide the 8.88 cents to get 1.7 billion, could you be more specific about the math you did to arrive at that?
 - A. I don't understand your question.
 - Q. Did you multiply the 43 billion by 8.8

and then divide by a thousand?

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- A. I'd have to look at my actual workpapers.
- Q. Do you have -- I'm sorry.
- A. I believe that's -- because the values shown there are in cents per kilowatt-hour --
 - Q. Right.
- A. -- I believe that's what you'd have to do.
 - Q. Do you have a calculator in your box?
- A. Yeah, I'm not sure it goes out that many digits.
- Q. We've got a jumbo calculator over here if you need to use it.
 - A. Sure. This calculator's got me stumped, so I'll try mine.
 - Q. Okay.

MR. RANDAZZO: Well, could the record reflect what it is that Mr. Murray is supposed to be calculating?

MR. NOURSE: I want him to check the numbers on this workpaper as he's explained the math.

A. I have my actual workpaper here electronically so I'd like to bring that up if that's okay.

EXAMINER SEE: That would answer the

question posed to you?

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THE WITNESS: Hopefully.

EXAMINER SEE: Okay.

MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, might I suggest we take a break, we'll probably do one anyway, and Mr. Murray can work on the answer to the question during the break, or maybe take a short break himself, but it might be a good use of time.

MR. NOURSE: We can certainly do that, and just to make it clear, I'm asking Mr. Murray to double-check the calculations that would -- that led up to his \$9.6 million bottom line to determine whether a mistake in the math was made. Thank you.

EXAMINER SEE: Thanks. With that we'll take a five-minute break and reconvene at 11:31.

(Recess taken.)

EXAMINER SEE: Let's go back on the record.

- Q. (By Mr. Nourse) Mr. Murray, have you had a chance to check the math on your workpaper in Exhibit AEP 14?
- A. Yes. And I thought I had a copy of the workpaper, but it turns out I don't, but I've replicated in an Excel spreadsheet the calculations and it would appear I have an error in my original

workpaper.

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I multiply the 43,503,500,009

kilowatt-hours times 8.8 cents per kilowatt-hour

produces a value of 386,000,311 -- 311,080 dollars.

When I multiply that same volume times cents per

kilowatt-hour of 8.93 cents per kilowatt-hour, it

produces a dollar value of \$388,499,650. The

difference between those two is 2,188,570.

EXAMINER SEE: I'm sorry, that was 507?

MR. NOURSE: 507.

EXAMINER SEE: 70?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

EXAMINER SEE: Thank you.

- Q. Mr. Murray, do you still have your calculator?
 - A. I have the Excel spreadsheet.
- Q. Okay. Are you multiplying the 43.5 billion by 8.88 and then dividing by a hundred?
- A. By a thousand. You're right. I should have been dividing by a hundred.
 - Q. Right. So can you redo that with that formula?
- A. Okay. When I make that correction and multiply it by 100, the 43,503,500,009 times 8.8 cents produces a value of \$3,863,110,801 multiplied

by 8.93 produces a value of 3,000,884,996 -- I'm sorry, \$3,884,996,501. The difference is 21,885,700.

- Q. Okay. I think that takes us back to page 4 of your testimony, and 9.6 million at the bottom of page 4 really should be 21.8 million; is that correct?
 - A. That appears to be the case.
 - Q. Okay. Now, the --

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- A. Obviously, the total revenue values that are shown on lines 17 and 19 would also have to change.
- Q. Okay. Now let me ask you a couple more questions about the 8.8 cents on your workpaper, back on your workpaper here. The 8.88 cents that you used, which is the stipulation, from stipulation testimony of David Roush, Exhibit DMR-1, correct?
 - A. I believe so, but let me check.

The 8.88 cents per kilowatt-hour is shown on the testimony of David Roush in support of the stipulation and recommendation, Exhibit DMR-1, page 1 of 2, there's a line showing AEP Ohio total 2012 rates with proposed ESP, and again, I don't believe I have a copy of his original testimony in support of the application, but there was a similar exhibit and that's where the 8.93 value came from. There was an

identical exhibit to his testimony in the original application.

- O. Identical in form with different numbers.
- A. Yes, obviously.

2.2

- Q. Okay. So with respect to the one you're looking at there from the stipulation, DMR-1, the 8.88 cents, that does include DIR revenue charges; does it not?
- A. That would be a better question directed at David Roush.
- Q. Well, you're saying you used that number and you're looking at the schedule. So I'm asking you if the number you used includes DIR in this calculation.
- A. I would have to go back and spend some time looking at Mr. Roush's workpapers. I was simply trying to compare and contrast this exhibit as it appears in the testimony in support of the stipulation versus the exhibit that was filed originally with the application.
- Q. Again, Mr. Murray, you're looking at DMR-1 from the stipulation, supporting the stipulation, correct?
- A. That's where the 8.88-cent per kilowatt-hour comes from.

- Q. Okay. And the notes on the right-hand side of the sheet that correspond to the 2012 rates with the proposed ESP, do they indicate in the second line that it reflects distribution investment recovery rider at settlement maximum amount?
 - A. I see that now.

2.2

Q. So the Projected Distribution column on the right-hand side of the chart, the 2.24 cents that went into the 8.88 would reflect DIR revenue, correct?

THE WITNESS: Could I have the question reread?

(Record read.)

- A. Subject to check to verify that that's where Mr. Roush included the DIR revenue, that would be my understanding.
- Q. Okay. Have you done a calculation of what 8.88 cents would be without the DIR included?
 - A. No.
- Q. And, therefore, you've not done a calculation of what the revenue difference would be if that difference were accounted for, have you?
- A. Well, the revenue difference associated with rider DIR is readily identifiable from the stipulation itself. Working from memory I can -- I

can look at the stipulation and refresh my memory.

Q. Okay.

2.2

- A. On page 9 of the stipulation and recommendation it specifies that "The DIR annual revenue shall be capped at \$86 million in 2012, \$104 million in 2013, \$124 million in 2014 and the first five months of 2015." So for 2015 you'd have to take 124 million and multiply by 5 divided by 12, I think working from memory that's about \$52 million.
- Q. That would add to the delta that you presented between the application and the stipulation revenue, then?
- A. If you sum those four values, it would identify or reflect the maximum DIR revenues that I understand would be permitted under the stipulation.
- Q. Now, with respect to the 8.93 cents in your workpaper, that, again, was referring to the application, correct?
- A. Yes. As I've indicated, there was a substantially similar form in Exhibit DMR-1 to the original application.
- Q. Okay. And do you know if the 8.93 cents presentation in the application's DMR-1 included incremental 2011 environmental revenue?
 - A. I don't recall. I'd have to go back and

review those.

2.2

- Q. Does the stipulation Exhibit DMR-1 that you have before you include the incremental 2011 environmental?
- A. Can you be more specific about what you're referring to as "incremental 2011 environmental"?
 - O. Well --
- A. Is there a particular provision in the stipulation you can point to?
- Q. No. I'm asking you about the application right now. The 8.93 percent -- sorry, 8.93 cents associated with the DMR-1 from the application.
- A. Again, I don't have that with me and I don't recall what was rolled into that number.
- Q. Okay. And do you recall whether the 8.93 cents from the application DMR-1 would have included revenue from any of the other proposed riders in the application?
- A. Again, I don't have that testimony with me and I would have to refer to it to identify what's in or not in.
- Q. Wasn't one of your criticisms of the application proposal that the other proposed riders were not quantified at all in the company's filings?

A. That was a criticism.

2.2

- Q. And so would it be your recollection that DMR-1 did or did not reflect quantification of those other riders?
- A. My recollection is there may have been some riders reflected in DMR-1 attached to Mr. Roush's testimony for the original application, but it certainly didn't reflect all riders because there were some riders that hadn't been quantified by the company.
- Q. And the riders that had not been quantified, would that include the facilities closure cost rider, the NERC, N-E-R-C, compliance rider, the carbon capture and sequestration rider, and/or the rate stabilization rider?
- A. My recollection is the, certainly the first three riders you mentioned. My memory is failing me on what the rate stabilization rider is or was in the original application.
- Q. Okay. Did you do -- this revenue comparison you did on page 4 was for 2012, correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Did you do a similar calculation for any of the other years in the ESP term?
 - A. No.

1 Would you agree that there are many Ο. 2 compromises reflected in the stipulation that the 3 company made compared to the initial application? 4 Α. No. 5 So it's your position that the company's Q. 6 proposal in the application was not compromised 7 relative to the outcome proposed in the stipulation? 8 MR. RANDAZZO: I object. Asked and 9 answered. 10 MR. NOURSE: I'm trying to clarify his 11 testimony. 12 MR. RANDAZZO: It's the same question. 13 EXAMINER SEE: The objection is 14 overruled. 15 THE WITNESS: Can I have the question 16 reread? 17 (Record read.) 18 What I've tried to indicate or illustrate Α. 19 in my testimony page 4 is I think if you look at the 20 overall revenues the companies will receive under the 21 stipulation, at least with respect to the year 2012, 2.2 there's very little movement between what the 23 application and what the stipulation produces. 24 I think if you look at the relative

numbers, the original application had, I'm working

from memory here, I believe increases in year 1 and year 2 and no increase in year 3. The stipulation kind of flips that, provides for increases of a lesser magnitude in the first year but basically backloads increases in the later years.

2.2

So relatively speaking I don't think that where things ended up reflect that much of a compromise by the company, at least with respect to financial outcomes.

Q. Mr. Murray, are IEU members better off under the stipulation than they would have been under the application?

MR. RANDAZZO: I object. It's irrelevant. The focus here is the stipulation.

MR. NOURSE: His testimony compares it to the application and he just stated he didn't think there was sufficient compromise.

EXAMINER SEE: The objection is overruled.

THE WITNESS: Could I have the question reread?

(Record read.)

A. Again, this is my opinion, but if you look at the effect over the term of the ESP, my assessment would be they're worse off.

- Q. Mr. Murray, let me direct your attention to the section in the testimony which I believe is pages 3 to 9 where you deal with the first prong of the three-part test and we'll start on page 3. Are you there?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. Now, would you agree that your understanding of the first prong of the test is that the stipulation would be a product of knowledgeable, capable parties?
 - A. That's my understanding.
- Q. And yet in your testimony at lines 18 through 19 you add a phrase "...that set about to produce a reasonable compromise of the contested issues based on the facts and the law." Do you see that?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Is that a standard part of the first prong of the test?
- A. I believe you could characterize it that way. Serious bargaining, in my judgment, needs to produce a result that is lawful, and if you simply get a bunch of people to agree to a stipulation that is as a package or as individual components is unlawful, I don't believe it constitutes serious

bargaining.

2.2

- Q. Okay. Well, again, my questions at this time are focused on part one of the test, the first prong. So the language you've added there that I just read on lines 18 and 19, is that language that the Commission has applied in any prior cases, to your knowledge?
- A. I have not done that analysis. This is my testimony.
- Q. So you made up those words to say what you think the first prong should be; is that what you're saying?
- A. Again, as I've indicated in my testimony,
 I think -- and clarified here on the stand, I think
 serious bargaining needs to reflect an outcome that's
 lawful.
- Q. And is that what the rest of that language, "that set about," et cetera, means, is that it needs to be lawful?
- A. No. I think I describe a broader range of concerns in my testimony.
- Q. Has the Commission ever applied the first prong, to your knowledge, to judge the substantive results of a stipulation like you've done here?
 - A. I don't know.

Q. Would you agree that each of the signatory parties has a history of participation in matters before the Commission and is represented by experienced and competent counsel?

2.2

A. There are certainly some parties that I would agree with that characterization. There are other parties that I don't believe have a history of participation at the Commission. A couple of examples come to mind. City of Grove City, the City of Hilliard, I don't recall other than this proceeding them ever intervening in a Commission proceeding.

We also have I believe the party Paulding Wind Farm, some name close to that, they are constructing several wind farms in Ohio, obviously they would have had to have gone through Power Siting Board proceedings to get the approval to construct those facilities, but other than that my recollection is this is probably one of the first cases I've seen them involved with.

- Q. Okay. And those two parties or three parties you just mentioned are represented by the Schottenstein and the Bricker law firms respectively; is that correct?
 - A. I would have to check. I don't know. I

think Paulding is represented by Bricker.

2.2

- Q. And would you consider those law firms experienced and competent counsel?
- A. You said "those law firms," and, again, my recollection is Paulding is represented by Bricker. So it's not clear to me what you're referring to by "those law firms."
- Q. You also mentioned the City of Hilliard and Grove City I believe which are represented by the Schottenstein law firm.
- A. I don't recall who they're represented by.
- Q. Are you reaching a conclusion about the counsel for those parties, then, or not?
- A. Again, I don't recall who they're represented by.
- Q. But you mentioned them in response to my question about having experienced and competent counsel; did you not?
- A. No. My response had nothing to do with whether or not they had experienced or competent counsel. I identified them as parties that, to my knowledge, have never participated in a PUCO proceeding other than the instant one.
 - Q. Well, my question did have that included

so you didn't answer that part of the question?

MR. KUTIK: Objection. Argumentative.

MR. RANDAZZO: Objection.

EXAMINER SEE: And what was your

objection based on, Mr. Randazzo?

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MR. RANDAZZO: Argumentative.

EXAMINER SEE: Okay, you both said it at the same time so I couldn't tell.

MR. NOURSE: We can move on, your Honor.

EXAMINER SEE: Thank you.

- Q. (By Mr. Nourse) Now, you criticize, do you not, that it's your belief that certain parties didn't actually evaluate all of the stipulation provisions and conclude under the MRO test that the stipulation passed before they signed; is that accurate?
- A. Do you have a specific reference in my testimony?
- Q. Well, on pages 7 and 8 in this section you do raise those issues. Without respect to specific references I'm asking you is that your criticism, that parties didn't fully understand all the provisions or do a full-blown MRO test before they signed the stipulation?
 - A. My understanding, and again this is based

upon responses to interrogatories, is that some parties performed no analysis of the effect of the ESP versus an MRO. They were relying upon analysis of others that at the time may have not even been performed. So if you have no knowledge of whether or not the ESP is more favorable in the aggregate than the MRO, I don't know how you would conclude the stipulation produces an outcome that's lawful.

2.2

- Q. So is it your position, then, that the results of the MRO test are of paramount importance and are more important than impacts on particular customers that may be supporting the stipulation?
- A. My understanding is that the Commission's statutorily obligated to conclude an ESP is more favorable in the aggregate than an MRO. Unless it can make that finding it can't approve an ESP irrespective of the impacts to each of the customers.
- Q. Has IEU supported stipulations in SSO cases such as FirstEnergy's 10-388 case?
- A. IEU has supported stipulations in ESP cases, I believe that case number you're referring to is FirstEnergy's most recent case.
- Q. Correct. So did IEU sponsor or present an MRO test analysis in support of the stipulation in that case?

A. I don't recall. My recollection is I don't believe so.

2.2

- Q. Is it your belief that the statutory MRO test governs an individual party's decision to support a stipulation?
- A. Individual parties are free to agree to whatever they want to agree to in a stipulation.

 That doesn't change the end result of whether or not the Commission must find the stipulation as lawful.
- Q. And in order for the Commission to find that the MRO test is passed, is it necessary for each and every party to present evidence or do analysis supporting that kind of finding?
- A. I don't believe it's necessary for every individual party to support evidence. There has to be some evidence for the Commission to reach a conclusion that the ESP is more favorable than the MRO.
- Q. What's your understanding of who bears the burden of demonstrating the MRO test has been satisfied?
- A. My understanding is it's the -- the burden of proof is on Ohio Power Company and Columbus Southern Power Company.
 - Q. On page 4 of your testimony at lines 1

and 2 you state that the Appendix C -- let me make sure I get the context that carries over from page 3.

You're saying versions of the stipulation like Appendix C were not disclosed to all the parties prior to the stipulation being filed, correct?

A. That's correct.

2.2

- Q. And what's your specific basis for saying Appendix C was not disclosed to all the parties?
- A. My recollection of the chain of events is that all parties were engaged in settlement discussions up until roughly the last week in August. There was some back-and-forth at that particular point in time about whether or not to request the Commission for an extension of testimony due dates. A number of parties ended up requesting the Commission to extend testimony due dates. There were some parties, including IEU, that filed pleadings indicating that they didn't think that that was productive.

Thereafter, those parties were excluded from what I understand were ongoing settlement discussions with the other parties. On the evening, I guess September 6th around 10 o'clock at night all parties were provided a copy of what was represented to be a near-final version of the stipulation; that

document did not contain Appendix C, at least that's my recollection.

2.2

Parties where told they could offer counterproposals through I think an 8 a.m. deadline the next day. Parties then assembled that morning and, again, my recollection is that parties that indicated that they still had some opposition to the stipulation were never shown Appendix C.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, objection.

- A. The stipulation was filed later that day.
- Q. Mr. Murray, I asked you a very narrow question. We'll get back to your statements about the negotiation in a little bit. I asked you what the basis, specific basis, for your statement that parties did not receive Appendix C prior to the stipulation being filed.

MR. KUTIK: Objection. Asked and answered.

MR. RANDAZZO: And he misquotes the testimony. Mr. Murray said that all parties were not given the information prior to the stipulation being filed, and it's asked and answered.

MR. NOURSE: Okay. I first asked him whether I stated his testimony correctly, I tried to do so. Let me come at it a different way, your

1 Honor.

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EXAMINER SEE: Okay.

- Q. (By Mr. Nourse) Mr. Murray, are you saying that IEU did not get a copy of Appendix C prior to the stipulation being filed?
- A. IEU was certainly one of the parties that were excluded from a meeting that took place on the morning of September 7th or was very briefly allowed in the room and then asked to leave.
- Q. Okay. That's not what I'm asking you,
 Mr. Murray. First of all, I want to direct your
 answers to your own personal knowledge. I'm asking
 you about your statements about the circulation of
 Appendix C, and is it your understanding that IEU did
 not receive a copy of Appendix C prior to the filing
 of the stipulation?
- A. I certainly didn't see one and I was involved in the negotiations.
- Q. And do you have any personal knowledge about whether other parties received a copy of Appendix C prior to the filing of the stipulation?

 MR. RANDAZZO: Could I have the question read back?

24 (Record read.)

MR. RANDAZZO: Thank you.

A. Again, I'm aware that there were some parties that were asked to leave the meeting on the morning of September 6th. I do not know whether or not they did receive a copy of Appendix C.

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MR. RANDAZZO: Mr. Murray, you said the morning of the 6th. Did you mean the 7th?

THE WITNESS: That's correct.

- Q. Okay, Mr. Murray, you seem to want to talk about the negotiation process so let's do that. You stated earlier that you were at multiple meetings representing IEU in the settlement process of this case, correct?
- A. I've participated in multiple settlement meetings on behalf of IEU. IEU was represented by counsel, so my participation was in the context of providing analytical support.
- Q. And did you not appear and directly participate in the settlement discussions leading up to the stipulation?
- A. I previously testified I attended some settlement meetings. I don't recall if I attended all of them and, again, I think after late-August there were certain meetings to which IEU was not invited.
 - Q. But you did appear and make statements

and represent IEU directly, not necessarily all through counsel, correct?

2.2

- A. Again, your term "represent" to me has a connotation of representing as a legal representation. I certainly participated in settlement meetings on behalf of IEU and was actively involved in the negotiations.
- Q. And were you present at a meeting on August 26th that started at 2 p.m. Friday afternoon?
- A. Again, I don't recall specific dates and times. I attended a number of settlement meetings.
- Q. Were you present at a meeting where the company asked parties to indicate whether the then-current framework of settlement was acceptable for proceeding forward?
- A. I can recall being at a meeting where a discussion similar to that took place. I don't recall the exact date or time.
- Q. And do you recall the nature of IEU's response to that question?
- A. Yes. I think IEU has consistently conveyed the view that the framework of the settlement produces a result that's unlawful.
- Q. And is it also accurate that IEU stated that the framework did not provide a basis for moving

forward with further discussions on that basis?

MR. KUTIK: May I have the question read,

please?

(Record read.)

2.2

MR. RANDAZZO: Okay. I'm going to -- I need to say something on the record here.

EXAMINER SEE: We haven't gone off the record.

MR. RANDAZZO: Yeah. Just so the record is clear, I'm comfortable with these questions. But counsel is opening the door to having discussions about what went on in the settlement discussions at the point in time where a local newspaper is seeking to discover that. So is counsel waiving any objection to the disclosure of this information?

MR. NOURSE: No, your Honor, and I'm carefully avoiding and none of my questions go to the substance of any compromise offer or the contents of any term sheet or stipulation and they relate directly to the process and the issues being discussed in testimony in this case.

MR. RANDAZZO: You have discussed the settlement, what went on in settlement negotiations --

EXAMINER SEE: Mr. Randazzo, the Bench is

aware that there are some issues outstanding regarding the content of settlement negotiations. It's wise for all counsel to be aware of the fact that the public records request is out there and to tread very carefully. With that --

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MR. KUTIK: Well, your Honor, the reason I asked for the question to be reread is that I do believe that this particular question gets into the substance of the settlement discussions and the specific position that was taken by a party in the context of settlement discussions. So I would object to the question on the grounds that it gets into settlement discussions which has previously been ruled as out of bound by the Bench.

MR. RANDAZZO: Yeah, and, your Honors, if I might, in the interest of the concerns that you referenced I would move to strike all questions that have been asked about the settlement and IEU's position, and if that motion is not granted, I intend to go into this on redirect. I think counsel has opened the door and any claim now that this stuff is private and confidential has been waived.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, I totally disagree. And certainly I can only speak to AEP Ohio's position which has been that the substance

of draft term sheets and settlement offers as well as draft stipulations that reflect compromise offers are confidential and not everything that relates to settlement is confidential.

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Certainly the first prong of the test is the testimony here that's being addressed and the Commission has used that and the Supreme Court of Ohio has used that in measuring partial stipulations and so it's certainly not correct that anything relating to the settlement is confidential. And I think that belies the positions that have been taken previously in this proceeding.

As to Mr. Randazzo's request to strike all questions, I'm not sure what that means. So I certainly would want to get a better understanding of that before responding.

EXAMINER SEE: Okay.

MR. KUTIK: Counsel takes the remarkable position that it's only AEP's position or those folks on AEP's side of this dispute that is subject to protection by claiming that term sheets that were distributed by AEP are protected.

The substantive positions of every party, if AEP's position is entitled to protection, the substantive position of every party during those

discussions is subject to the same protection.

MR. NOURSE: No, I didn't disagree with that statement, Mr. Kutik. I said I can only speak for AEP Ohio.

But, your Honor, I think if you look at the transcript here, you'll see very clearly I was asking Mr. Murray some very narrow questions about the distribution of Appendix C.

MR. RANDAZZO: No.

MR. NOURSE: And he launched off into a whole speech about being excluded from negotiations on two occasions and I was not going there unless he did. And he certainly did.

MR. KUTIK: The question specifically asked --

16 EXAMINER SEE: Thank you, gentlemen.

17 Have a seat.

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MR. NOURSE: And, your Honor, if I can
just offer --

20 EXAMINER SEE: No, Mr. Nourse, no.

MR. NOURSE: I've got a solution, but

22 that's all right.

EXAMINER SEE: Hold on.

Do you still wish to propose a solution,

25 Mr. Nourse?

MR. NOURSE: Certainly, your Honor. If the two answers that Mr. Murray gave that referenced the negotiation and being excluded are stricken from the record, I'll be happy to move on without an answer to the current question, because I wasn't going to raise this unless he did, and he did.

MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honors, may I?

EXAMINER SEE: You want to respond to that proposed solution?

2.2

MR. RANDAZZO: Yes. I don't think it's a solution, your Honor. It's an effort to try and

12 extract counsel from a problem that he's created.

At page 4 Mr. Nourse was asking
Mr. Murray about his statement that Appendix C was
not disclosed to all parties prior to the stipulation
being filed. Mr. Murray has explained why that
statement is true in response to questions from
Mr. Nourse.

Mr. Nourse has now gone into specific questions about positions that IEU expressed regarding settlement proposals and specifically the settlement framework prior to there being a stipulation being filed at the Commission. That is inappropriate. But, now that he's opened the door it's in the public and to the extent that people are

advocating in favor of not disclosing these kinds of things and have motions pending at the Commission, they're now going both ways on the subject.

2.2

This door is open, we intend to pursue it on redirect.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, you know, for Mr. Randazzo to state my questions are inappropriate, I certainly disagree with that. None of my questions have been seeking information about the content of any settlement offer made by any party in the negotiations.

I asked a narrow question about why he thought Appendix C was not circulated, and he's the one that raised this whole issue. If you look at his answers, and arguably they could have been stricken as nonresponsive, frankly, but he kept -- he raised that on two occasions and I'm not the one that opened that door.

EXAMINER SEE: We're off the record.

(Recess taken.)

EXAMINER SEE: Let's go back on the record. Prior to the objections being raised by IEU and FES the question posed by Mr. Nourse was "And is it also accurate that IEU stated that the framework did not provide a basis for moving forward with

further discussions on this basis?"

2.2

After reviewing the transcript the Bench does not believe that that puts into the public record any substantive information about the negotiations and I'm going to direct Mr. Murray to answer just that question and, Mr. Nourse, move on.

THE WITNESS: Can I have the question reread?

(Record read.)

- A. My recollection is that's certainly a position that IEU conveyed at some point in the settlement negotiations.
 - Q. Thank you, Mr. Murray.

So I believe we were talking about the MRO test and your views about the importance of the MRO test in the context of supporting or opposing a stipulation, so let me get back to that briefly.

Would IEU reject a stipulation that benefited its members if there was a dispute about the MRO test results?

A. I don't know. Again, as I've previously testified, the decision to support or oppose the stipulation is one made by the members based upon the facts and specific circumstances they confront at the time. So your hypothetical situation doesn't really

have a context.

2.2

- Q. That's a general question. So let me ask you, before you were stating I believe, and correct me if I don't state this correctly, I believe you stated that the MRO test results could create a situation where a stipulation would be unlawful and I believe, to use your term, and that would cause it to fail the first prong of the three-part test. Is that your testimony?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. Let me shift to the second prong which I believe you cover in the bulk of your testimony, I'll say, from pages 9 through 49, correct?
- A. I believe beginning on page 9 of my testimony I begin to talk about whether the stipulation violates any important regulatory principle or practice.
- Q. And that discussion carries clear through to page 49, correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. The first area I want to cover in that section relates to what I believe you're referring to in your testimony as a second transition period that starts on page 10 and goes for several

pages to maybe the top of 15. Does that sound about right?

A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. Okay. And is it your position that Senate Bill 3 created a transition period and that your opinion is that the stipulation improperly creates a second transition period?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. So in making that argument you're stating, are you not, that the stipulation's so-called second transition period is similar to Senate Bill 3's transition period?
- A. No. I think, as I discuss in my testimony, there are quite a few significant differences between the transition period created by SB 3 and how it balanced the relative interests of customers and the utility versus what's reflected in the stipulation.
- Q. So the difference being that you believe Senate Bill 3's transition period is balanced and the stipulation so-called transition period is not balanced. Is that accurate?
- A. Again, I discuss in my testimony there was fairly significant differences between the transition period and the characterizations or the

requirements of those transition periods under SB 3 and what would be produced by the stipulation.

2.2

- Q. Okay. But since your testimony harkens back to the Senate Bill 3 transition period, I'm trying to understand why you're applying the Senate Bill 3 transition period again to the current transition in the stipulation. Can you explain that to me?
- A. Well, if you want to -- if you accept the premise that a transition period is appropriate, which I do not, and you compare it and contrast the transition period and results that would result from a stipulation to what was required under SB 3, there are fairly dramatic differences.

SB 3 required rates to be unbundled but capped at the levels that were in effect prior to the enactment of SB 3. Fuel rates were rolled into base rates. Rates for residential customers were reduced by 5 percent. So customers started out from a position where they were no worse off than what had been in place prior to SB 3.

Customers were then given the opportunity to get a better outcome by going to the market for power. That's fundamentally different than what's reflected in the stipulation. The stipulation would

immediately raise rates, it would provide for pass-through of cost changes associated with the fuel adjustment clause, so the rate increases reflected in the stipulation may ultimately be higher.

We've got a number of placeholder riders that could further increase rates and we've got the provisions in the stipulation that are designed to economically ration shopping. By the company's own admission there will not be any shopping above the caps that are associated with the RPM price of capacity that's set aside in the stipulation.

- Q. Okay. Well, let's start with your last statement there, Mr. Murray. You say that by the company's admission that there will not be shopping above the RPM set-aside levels. Did I hear you correctly?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. Okay. And what exactly is the basis for your statement that the companies admitted what you said?
- A. If you could bear with me a minute, I have a document I need to refer to.

Okay, on September 7th, 2011, which is the date the stipulation was filed, shortly after the stipulation was filed AEP hosted a conference call

with investment analysts. I have a copy of the transcript from that call. And during that call there is a series of questions and answers, there was a question from Dan Eggers with Credit Suisse and he was questioning, I'll read here, "How would shopping competitively work if the headroom kind of vanished out of that customer class going forward? Is it realistic that you'll get to the kind of the 20 percent, 30 percent, or 40 percent shopping given where your new rates would be versus where the market is?"

2.2

Richard Munczinski, who's a vice president with AEP, responded to the question and his response is: "Yeah, it is, Dan. Again, it's Rich. What happens is those customers that get the discount, as Brian mentioned, is priced out at the RPM prices. So the \$100, the \$16 and I think the \$26 going forward. Over those percentages, if you want to shop, you pay the full cost of the \$255 per megawatt-day. So, the thought and the theory is that the shopping will be constrained to the discounted RPM price."

Q. Okay. So Mr. Munczinski stated that the thought and the theory was that there may not be shopping above the RPM prices; is that what you're

basing your statement on?

2.2

- A. I read Mr. Munczinski's response. I believe what he is indicating is the stipulation by design will restrict shopping to no more than the caps.
- Q. Well, I want to explore that, Mr. Murray. When you say "by design," that's the part that I fail to see the connection to the quote you just read. Is all you're saying that the companies may have forecasted or predicted as an economic matter that could be a result of the stipulation?
- A. Again, Mr. Munczinski stated, "So, the thought and the theory is that the shopping will be constrained to the discounted RPM price." So I would presume the company has modeled that as a financial outcome, yes.
 - Q. Okay.
 - MR. NOURSE: Let me mark AEP Exhibit 15. (EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)
- Q. And this is a discovery question and answer in this case about exactly the quote you just made from the September 7th conference. Have you reviewed this?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. Can you read the response into the

record?

2.2

- A. The response is "In a strict economic sense, any increased price input for providing service acts as a constraint on retail shopping, albeit an appropriate cost-based constraint. While shopping might increase if AEP Ohio provided free capacity for use by CRES providers, that would be inappropriate. The stipulated capacity rate of \$255 per megawatt-day is reasonable and supported by the filed testimony. See the testimony of Company Witness Munczinski and Pearce."
- Q. Okay. So this is the company's explanation of the constraint comment that you read from the transcript; is that your understanding?
- A. I think this is the company's attempt to rehabilitate the statements that Mr. Munczinski's publicly made about what the intended effect of the stipulation is.
- Q. Okay, Mr. Murray. Now, I believe as part of your prior answer -- well, first of all, before we move on, so is it your understanding that no CRES provider would make an offer to support retail shopping at the \$255 per megawatt-day rate of capacity?
 - A. I can't speak to what any individual CRES

provider would or would not do. That, ultimately, is a business decision that they have to make. What I've testified at is the company has identified intent in the stipulation is to restrict shopping to no more than the caps that are in the stipulation.

2.2

- Q. Well, we've already explored your basis for attributing intent in the stipulation. What I'm asking you is your opinion, sir. And are you saying that you don't have any knowledge or basis to conclude whether a CRES provider would make an offer supporting retail competition at \$255 per megawatt-day?
- A. I think you could look at the numbers that are reflected in the testimony of Laura Thomas that illustrate what relative prices are for capacity, you can compare that to what people have estimated is prevailing market prices with and without that capacity and I think you can very quickly conclude that it would be uneconomic for a CRES provider to try to make an offer at \$255 a day capacity.

That's not to say that some, you know, there are CRES providers that engage in a business strategy that isn't always predicated on how much money you make. Companies may make a decision that

says I'm going to get the market and I'm going to be a loss leader to get market share.

2.2

- Q. Well, Mr. Murray, aren't the conclusions about future shopping based on a number of assumptions that one might make to reach that conclusion?
- A. Again, the conclusions are based upon what you might assume is reasonable in terms of the projections of the market prices under the term of the ESP.
- Q. And would you agree that a capacity charge that might be paid by a CRES provider is one of many factors that would influence whether or not offers are made and shopping occurs?
- A. It is a factor that they will have to recognize in their business decisions.
- Q. And is it your understanding that CRES providers could also blend rates over the ESP term and effectively make an offer based on a capacity charge that's lower than 255 per megawatt-day?

MR. KUTIK: Objection. Lack of foundation. Assumes facts that certainly aren't in evidence and certainly aren't part of the stipulation.

MR. NOURSE: It's not assuming evidence.

I'm asking him a conceptual based on the same line we've been talking about, a conceptual question.

MR. KUTIK: Well, he's asking a hypothetical that wouldn't happen under the stipulation.

EXAMINER SEE: The objection is overruled.

THE WITNESS: Can I have the question reread?

(Record read.)

- A. My understanding is that the pricing of capacity is subject to the caps in the stipulation.

 Once we get to a level where the caps are met or exceeded, then all capacity from that point forward to a CRES provider would be priced at \$255 a megawatt-day for the term of the stipulation. So I'm not, you know, I don't follow your question in that --
 - Q. Okay.
- A. -- there doesn't seem to be any mathematical opportunity to blend 255 with another number.
- Q. Let me ask it this way, if the 2012 RPM set-aside has already been exceeded so that the 21 percent that applies in 2012 would not be

available, would CRES providers still be able to make an offer based on a three-year contract that would get in on the 2013 and '14 RPM set-aside and would pay 255 for the period of 2012? That's what I meant by "blending." Do you understand that?

2.2

- A. Not exactly. Could I have the question reread?
 - Q. That's okay. Let's move on.

So these were sidetracks based on your comments when I asked you a question about the transition period in Senate Bill 3. Let's get back to that, Mr. Murray. I want to get into some detail about Senate Bill 3's transition period.

First of all, when you talk about Senate Bill 3's transition period, are you talking about the --

MR. RANDAZZO: If we're switching -- I'm sorry to interrupt, Steve. If we're switching gears, Mr. Murray's been on the stand for three hours and 15 minutes, more or less, based upon a 90-minute estimate of cross. I'd like to inquire how much more time there is. We, based upon the estimated cross, we made commitments for other meetings which I'll need to cancel this afternoon, but that's our problem, not yours. But if there's going to be a

lunch break or not a lunch break, it would be helpful to us for purposes of doing what we need to do for the balance of the day.

MR. NOURSE: Yes, we should definitely take a lunch break, your Honor. This is not going as quickly as I had hoped it would go.

EXAMINER SEE: Okay. If you are about to switch subjects, then we're going to take a short lunch. Reconvene at 2.

Let's go off the record.

(Thereupon, at 1:12 p.m., a lunch recess was taken.)

2.2

Thursday Afternoon Session,

October 20, 2011.

EXAMINER SEE: Let's go back on the record. Continuing with the cross-examination of Mr. Murray.

Mr. Nourse.

MR. NOURSE: Thank you, your Honor.

2.2

KEVIN M. MURRAY

being previously duly sworn, as prescribed by law, was examined and testified further as follows:

CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

By Mr. Nourse:

- Q. Mr. Murray, we were discussing Senate
 Bill 3 and the transition plan, I believe, at the
 break. And I can't remember if I asked you this
 question right before we broke or not, when you refer
 to the transition period of Senate Bill 3, are you
 talking about the five-year market development
 period?
- A. Senate Bill 3 had a market development period of five years, it also had a provision that provided for the collection of any regulatory transition charges, could be longer than five years,

but had to conclude within ten years. So, you know, in terms of the transition period I think you can appropriately characterize SB 3 as containing up to a ten-year transition period.

2.2

- Q. And the transition revenues I think you referred to there, that related to, among other things, recovery of stranded generation investment; is that --
- A. SB 3 identified that was one element that could be addressed in transition plans.
- Q. Okay. And in determining what investment was stranded, what's your understanding of the issue or the determination that had to be made in order to conclude that generation investment was stranded?
- A. The transition plans filed by all of the utilities did a -- included a forward projection of likely market prices, and the stranded cost claims were based in large measures on an assessment of whether or not if we went immediately to generation prices that reflected prevailing market prices, whether or not the utilities would be allowed to collect their full generation cost as reflected in their book value of assets at that time as well as any regulatory assets that were on their books.

So that conceptually is the framework

provided for under SB 3. In practice, all -- my recollection is all of the transition plans submitted by utilities ultimately produced stipulations which, in the context of the stipulation, resolved the transition cost charges.

- Q. Okay. But the basis of saying the generation investment was stranded was a comparison of book value to the then-current market and projections of market prices? That's accurate?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. And you agree that market rates change over time as do forward projections of market rates.
 - A. They can.
 - Q. They can and they do; is that accurate?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And so would the forward projection of market rates at that time, under Senate Bill 3, have included, among other things, the then-current view of environmental regulations?
- A. I don't recall that level of detail and what was reflected in the witness testimony.
- Q. Would it make sense to you that that would have to be part of the analysis?
- 24 THE WITNESS: Could I have the original question reread?

(Record read.)

2.2

- A. Yeah, my recollection of some of the econometric modeling done by witnesses to project market prices is it either implicitly or explicitly reflects assumptions about pending environmental regulations.
- Q. And, in fact, is it fair to say that the review, the issue at that time, was the known costs including book value versus the projected market price and a comparison of whether the costs were above market?
- A. It's not clear to me. Your question refers to "the issue." What issue were you referring to?
- Q. We're still talking about stranded investment determinations under Senate Bill 3.
- A. Yes. The stranded investment determination was based upon estimates of prevailing market prices.
- Q. Now, is it your position currently in this case, relative to the stipulation, that any price for capacity that's above the RPM price is inappropriate for recovery by AEP Ohio?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. And when you talk about market prices in

your testimony, you're really referring to RPM auction clearing prices.

2.2

- A. Do you have a specific reference in my testimony?
- Q. I did. Let me see if I can find it. We can come back to that, perhaps.

Now, would you agree that the -- let me back up.

At the end of the transition period under Senate Bill 3 would you agree that the utilities were to be charging market-based price starting in 2006?

MR. RANDAZZO: Could I have the question read back, please?

(Record read.)

- A. As I've previously responded, I believe SB 3 would make a reference to a transition period. In SB 3, it was a five-year market development period. There was a longer period of time of up to ten years that allowed for recovery of regulatory transition costs. My recollection of SB 3 as originally enacted was that it called for rates to be market based at the end of the market development period.
- Q. Okay. So your qualification about the up to ten-year period for recovery of stranded

investment would simply mean that if the Commission allowed stranded investment for ten years and part of that was still left in 2006, that part that was left would be added to the market-based price, is that what you're saying?

2.2

- A. Yes, that's one aspect of it. My recollection is that there were also circumstances in which the market development period could have been less than five years. At least under some of the stipulations that were ultimately reached in the transition plan cases.
- Q. Okay. And, in fact, were the utilities permitted to charge market-based rates beginning in 2006?
- A. Actually, what was then Cincinnati Gas & Electric went to market-based rates for its commercial and industrial customers in I believe 2004.
- Q. Okay. Well, let's stick with AEP Ohio,
 Columbus Southern, and Ohio Power. Was AEP Ohio
 permitted to charge a market-based SSO rate starting
 in 2006?
- A. Starting in -- or, beginning in 2006

 AEP's rates were established pursuant to what were called rate stabilization plans. The rate

stabilization plans were largely a negotiated result, so it's difficult to characterize the resultant rates as either cost based or market rates, they were rates that were agreed to by parties that supported stipulations.

- Q. Is it your understanding that AEP Ohio's rate stabilization plan rates were above or below market rates?
- A. If I could follow up on my immediately prior response, again, I don't know that it's possible to characterized the rate stabilization plan rates as either cost based or market based. My recollection is AEP has historically characterized them as market based.
 - Q. Okay.

2.2

- A. Could I have the other question read?
- Q. Sure.

(Record read.)

A. I think at the time stipulations were reached in those cases there was --

THE WITNESS: Could I have the question reread again?

(Record read.)

A. Again, the answer to that question probably varies depending on which party you would

ask. My opinion is AEP's initial rate stabilization plan rates were, again, at the time of the stipulation projected to be lower than market, market-based price projections at that time.

- Q. Thank you. Now, was the rate stabilization plans that were implemented, were they a second transition, in your view?
- A. The rate stabilization plans, I think, are an outcome that resulted from a general realization that the development of competitive markets hadn't materialized in both scope and pace that was expected at the time SB 3 was enacted. So you could certainly characterize the rate stabilization plans as providing a further transition.
- Q. Now, the rate stabilization plans were implemented during the time which Senate Bill 3 was still in effect, correct, and prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 221?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

Q. Okay. And is it accurate to say that the market-based price, SSO pricing standard in Senate Bill 3 was replaced with the ESP and MRO options enacted as part of Senate Bill 221?

THE WITNESS: Could I have the question

reread?

2.2

(Record read.)

- A. Again, SB 3 originally contemplated that there would be market-based rates in 2006 or sooner in some cases. The rate stabilization plans I think, again, produced a negotiated outcome. Ultimately SB 221 was passed and that governed rates in effect on and after the intention was January 1, 2009.
- Q. And my question was whether Senate Bill 3's SSO pricing that I think we've agreed was market-based pricing was replaced through the enactment of Senate Bill 221 with the ESP option and the MRO option. Do you agree with that?
- A. Again, SB 221 superseded some of the pricing provisions provided for by SB 3.
- Q. Including the market-based pricing mechanism?

MR. RANDAZZO: May I inquire, are we talking about for standard service offer?

MR. NOURSE: That's what I believe I stated, yes.

A. Again, SB 3 contemplated market-based rates on and after 2006 or sooner in some cases.

SB 221 provides for prices established either pursuant to an electric security plan or a market

rate option. In my judgment both an electric security plan and a market rate option reflect market-based prices.

- Q. Okay. So you would characterize an ESP rate plan as market-based pricing?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. Would you agree that the ESP statute includes several cost-based rate adjustments?
- A. There are elements of an ESP that can reflect a pass-through of costs, but ultimately the test of the ESPs -- whether or not the ESP rates can be approved is a comparison to market rates. And ESP rates themselves have been characterized as market-based rates in all of the electric security plans that I'm aware of.
 - Q. Characterized by whom?
 - A. At least some of the parties.
- Q. Okay. And would you agree that even the market rate option during the price blending period contains explicit cost-based rate adjustments for the nonmarket portion?
- A. For an MRO for a utility that is subject to blending, which is a utility that owned generation assets as of a date certain, the competitive bid price is required to be blended with the legacy ESP

rate. Now, the legacy ESP rate, as I've indicated, is a market-based rate, but in an ESP there are pricing provisions such as a fuel clause that are permitted that are developed relative to a measure of the utility's costs.

2.2

Q. And my current question relates to an MRO and the nonmarket portion of the price blend, and would you agree that the legacy SSO rate is adjusted based on the cost of fuel, number one, environmental costs, number two, and renewable costs, number three?

MR. RANDAZZO: Did you say is or may be adjusted?

MR. NOURSE: Is adjusted under the nonmarket portion of the blend.

- A. My recollection is it's adjusted for fuel. As to the other two elements, I'd have to look at the statute to refresh my memory.
- Q. Okay, what's your understanding of the minimum period for transition, and let's stick to AEP Ohio for now with these questions, the minimum transition period to full market rates under an MRO?
- A. The minimum period is five years, but there is a provision in the law that, my understanding, the Commission has interpreted as allowing it to revisit the blending after the second

year. That question was explicitly one of the issues in a market rate proposal filed by Duke Energy-Ohio late last year, and the Commission ultimately determined, again, an initial MRO application is required and is constrained to have a minimum blending period of five years.

2.2

Q. Was it -- just to clarify that, and I'm certainly not asking for any legal conclusions in this discussion, but was it five years or was it effectively six years?

MR. RANDAZZO: I object to the form of the question. Are you talking about the application or what the Commission can do in response to the application?

MR. NOURSE: Yeah.

- Q. And I'm not talking about the Duke case and I'm not asking you for a legal opinion, I'm just asking for your understanding of the MRO statute and I believe there's a requirement for 50 percent, no more than 50 percent in the fifth year, and my question is to get to 100 percent isn't the minimum really six years?
- A. Yes. If you were to assume that the blending is not modified by the Commission such that MRO steps through the blending for the first five

years, you wouldn't be at 100 percent market until the start of the sixth year.

- Q. Mr. Murray, would you agree that for AEP to terminate or modify its generation pool and to achieve structural separation those are significant changes to the AEP current business model?
 - A. Not necessarily.

- Q. So those, in your view, would be characterized as minor changes to the AEP business model?
- MR. RANDAZZO: Can we -- you said "AEP business model."

MR. NOURSE: AEP Ohio.

- A. Can you clarify what you mean by the "AEP business model"?
- Q. Well, currently there's not structural separation within AEP Ohio; is that correct?
 - A. That's my understanding.
- Q. And currently AEP Ohio participates in a generation pool with other AEP operating companies in the east; is that correct?
- THE WITNESS: Can I have the question reread?
- 24 (Record read.)
 - A. I believe the answer is Columbus Southern

Power Company and Ohio Power Company participate with the other operating companies. AEP Ohio is an entity that doesn't exist, but with that clarification, yes, that's my understanding.

- Q. And we talked about this before,
 Mr. Murray. When I refer to AEP Ohio, I am referring
 collectively to Columbus Southern Power and Ohio
 Power, okay?
- A. Again, just to avoid confusion I may make my answer very clear.
- Q. Okay. On page 14 of your testimony you make a statement beginning on line 5 and ending on line 8, and I'm paraphrasing, that the second transition period that you talk about has no basis in law. Do you see that?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. Okay. And I don't see any qualifications here, but is it fair to say that to the extent you're making legal assertions in your testimony, those are really based on the advice of counsel?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Now, so with respect to your understanding of that statement that you make, does this mean that the beginning point of the current plan or the end point provided for in the stipulation

is unlawful?

2.2

MR. KUTIK: May I have the question read, please?

(Record read.)

A. The additional transition that I'm referring to is, in part, a function of the capacity pricing mechanism and the fact that there are caps on the amount of capacity that are available to RPM pricing. And capacity above that level is available at 255 a megawatt-day which, in my judgment, provided the company with additional transition revenues to insulate its generating assets from revealing market prices. That provision exists both, certainly exists at the beginning of the period of the ESP. I need to refresh my memory on the stipulation here.

So the capacity pricing set-asides continued through the first half of 2015 or May of 2015, actually, so thereafter capacity is going to be priced based upon the RPM price.

- Q. So are you saying in this statement we referenced on page 14 that any capacity price above RPM is unlawful?
- A. My understanding is there's no basis for it in the law.
 - Q. Okay. That understanding is based on the

advice of counsel?

2.2

- A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. On page 13 of your testimony you reference testimony of Staff Witness Jodi J. Bair with a quote in the middle of the page there on page 13. Do you see that?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. Was it your understanding of the testimony you were quoting that that testimony was addressing capacity charges?
- A. I don't have a copy of her testimony in front of me to refresh my memory, but my recollection is I think her testimony was broader than simply referring to capacity pricing, it was referring to the intention of SB 3 to move utilities entirely to market after the end of the transition period.
- Q. So when you say it was broader than, did it address capacity charges at all?
- A. When you said "it," are you referring to her testimony?
 - O. Yes.
- A. Again, I'm working from recollection. I think my recollection of her testimony was broader. I don't recall if she explicitly addressed capacity pricing or not in her testimony.

- Q. Turn to page 17, you have a question and answer at the top of the page about how in your opinion the stipulation blocks shopping. Do you see that?
 - A. Yes, I do.

2.2

- Q. Okay. Now, do you agree that the stipulation does not literally impose shopping caps?
- A. Agree. I think I've recognized in my written testimony as well as the discussions we had earlier today that the caps are based upon economic considerations as opposed to an absolute cap on shopping.
- Q. Do you know whether the imposition of limits on shopping is permitted under Senate Bill 221?
- A. I don't have a copy of the statute with me. My recollection is there is a provision that gives the Commission some discretion relative to how quickly shopping may occur. You've got to I think read that in context with other provisions of the SB 221. For example, SB 221 explicitly requires the Commission to encourage large-scale governmental aggregation, so that obviously would suggest that the Commission is supposed to be encouraging shopping as much as possible.

Q. So would you agree that the ESP statute does permit the Commission to impose shopping limits if it wants to?

MR. RANDAZZO: I object. Asked and answered.

2.2

MR. NOURSE: No, your Honor, I don't think he answered that question.

EXAMINER SEE: The objection is overruled.

- A. Again, I don't have a copy of the statute here in front of me. Again, my recollection is there's a provision that provides the Commission some discretion relative to how quickly shopping may occur.
- Q. Okay. So would you agree that a projection of no additional shopping at \$255 per megawatt-day is not the same as imposing a shopping cap?

THE WITNESS: Could I have the question reread?

(Record read.)

A. I think that illuminates form over substance, the company has identified the intent of the capacity pricing provision is to cap shopping at the limits of the stipulation.

Q. Well, Mr. Murray, we're not going to go back through that, your characterization of intention of the stipulation again. What I'm asking you is --

2.2

MR. RANDAZZO: I object to the statement. It wasn't his characterization. He was testifying as to what the company characterized.

MR. NOURSE: Yeah, and we went through that and it wasn't anything about anybody's intent. So we'll let the record stand on that.

Q. What I'm asking you is whether a projection of something happening, in other words shopping over \$255 per megawatt-day, is the same as imposing a shopping cap?

MR. KUTIK: Objection. Asked and answered.

EXAMINER SEE: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: Can I have the question reread, please?

(Record read.)

- A. Your question doesn't make any sense to me because you're talking about shopping over \$255 a megawatt-day. The caps that are in the stipulation are percentage caps on the amount of shopping.
- Q. Let me ask you this, Mr. Murray, if we were to assume that the stipulation is adopted and

the applicable price for capacity for shopping above and beyond the RPM set-asides in the stipulation will be \$255 per megawatt-day -- are you with me so far?

A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. -- and sitting here today can you tell me whether there will be shopping at \$255 per megawatt-day or not?
- A. Again, I've testified earlier I can't predict what CRES suppliers may make available in the way of offers. I'd indicated that in my judgment a CRES provider couldn't economically make an offer at \$255 a megawatt-day, but we've seen in years past CRES providers adopt business strategies that weren't necessarily based upon all transactions being profitable. In some cases CRES providers are willing to be what I would characterize as a loss leader to get entry into the market.
- Q. Okay. Well, that's not what I'm asking you about. My question -- I don't want you to assume anything about loss leaders. I'm asking you about a profit making competitive opportunity. Is it true that any projection that there will not be shopping based on a capacity charge of \$255 a megawatt-day is based on a number of assumptions that cannot currently be known?

- A. All assumptions are assumptions, so yes, they're projections, not a given.
- Q. So you can't say as you sit here today that there will be no shopping where \$255 per megawatt-day is the applicable capacity charge for shopping, can you?
- A. In my judgment you will not see shopping above the caps.
- Q. And that's based on your current assumption of energy prices and other things?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. Okay. And those assumptions could turn out to be wrong, correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Is there a level above RPM price charged for capacity that does not cap shopping, in your opinion? In other words, a level between \$255 per megawatt-day and the applicable RPM auction clearing prices.
 - A. I haven't attempted to do that analysis.
- Q. Have AEP Ohio's customers been blocked from shopping during the past ten years when regulated rates were lower than market offers?
- A. What do you mean by "blocked from shopping"?

Q. I'm trying to use the same concept that you use on page 17 about blocking shopping.

THE WITNESS: Can I have the question reread?

(Record read.)

- A. They have not been blocked from shopping, but, again, as we previously discussed, the presence of things like a regulatory transition charge could act as an economic hurdle that may or may not allow certain customers to -- be economical for them to switch.
- Q. Okay, Mr. Murray, can you turn to page 18. In question and answer 16, the top half of the page -- do you see that?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. -- are you saying there that IEU would prefer cost-based regulated rates to market rates going into the future?
- THE WITNESS: Could you reread the question, please?

(Record read.)

A. No. What I'm testifying here is that the prevailing market prices in June 2014 through
May 2015 reflect higher prices than in the preceding years. And in my judgment those prices reflect some

degree of expectations about the impact of U.S. EPA regulations.

2.2

Q. Well, is it IEU's position going into the future that IEU members would prefer to be regulated based on cost-based regulated rates versus market-based rates?

MR. RANDAZZO: I object. IEU members are not regulated, number one. Number two, once we clean that problem up could you define what you mean by "cost-based regulation"?

MR. NOURSE: Well, I don't think I said anything about IEU members being regulated. I'm asking whether IEU members going into the future would prefer to be served generation rates that are cost based or market based.

EXAMINER SEE: The objection is overruled with the clarification that was made.

- A. Your question doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me because, as I have testified, in my judgment rates under either an ESP or MRO are market based. So when you ask whether or not IEU members would prefer cost-based rates, you are talking about something that's not contemplated currently under the law and you would have to define what that is.
 - Q. So you don't know what I mean by

"cost-based rates"?

2.2

A. Cost-based rates can have a number of definitions. In Ohio the definition of cost-based rates has changed over time. If you go back historically, prior to my time, my understanding is we used to have cost-based rates based upon a concept called reproduction costs new. The most recent vintage of cost-based rates as it existed prior to the enactment of SB 3 was what I would call net depreciated plant plus expenses equal your revenue requirement.

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has several of its own variations of what it deems as appropriate cost-based rates. So there has to be some specificity about what you mean when you refer to cost-based rates for there to be any context to the question.

- Q. Well, Mr. Murray, you can certainly specify any flavor of cost-based rates that you are endorsing in your answer, but let me ask you a different question. Do IEU members prefer, going into the future, for generation rates to be served under an ESP or an MRO?
- A. That's not a decision that IEU members get to make. The Commission -- electric utilities

have the option about whether or not to file an ESP or an MRO, and my understanding is that's an election by the electric distribution utility, the Commission can't compel them to do one or the other. For the Commission to approve an ESP there has to be a demonstration that it's more favorable than an MRO.

2.2

You know, for an MRO there are other statutory tests that the Commission has to perform and conclude the MRO satisfies before it can approve it. So, you know, the reference to cost-based rates here is not making a whole lot of sense to me.

Q. Well, Mr. Murray, if you got to advise the company on which option to pick, what would your advice be?

MR. RANDAZZO: I object. Mr. Murray's already indicated three times now that you need more specificity around the comparison Mr. Nourse thinks can be made on the back of an envelope before you can draw any conclusions about one or the other. I object.

EXAMINER SEE: Did you want to respond, Mr. Nourse?

MR. NOURSE: I don't think the question's been answered. He's reciting his understanding of the law and the statute, and I'm asking a simple

question as to whether he's endorsing that AEP Ohio go to a market rate offer.

EXAMINER SEE: The objection is overruled.

THE WITNESS: Could I have the question reread?

(Record read.)

- A. I couldn't advise the company one way or the other without more specificity about what you mean by "cost-based rates." I will tell you, based upon my experience, I think the company would pick whichever outcome produced, in its judgment, the highest level of revenues.
- Q. Okay, Mr. Murray, let's talk about the MRO test. You've got a section in your testimony from pages 25 to 49 that discuss different aspects of the MRO test; is that correct?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

Q. And is it fair to say your basic conclusion there -- let me back up.

One of your components of your MRO test is to develop a competitive benchmark price, correct?

- A. Do you have a specific reference in my testimony?
 - Q. No.

A. Yes, to do an MRO comparison you have to come up with an estimated market price.

2.2

- Q. And is it fair to say your basic position on the competitive market price is that it's not necessary to create an administrative price because the Commission should look to the results from the FirstEnergy auctions that you discuss in your testimony?
- A. There's no reason to use administratively developed estimates when we have readily observable actual market transactions.
- Q. Okay. And that statement presumes, does it not, that the auction clearing prices from the FirstEnergy auctions are comparable to what would apply for AEP Ohio?
- A. They're actual market results for the purposes of performing the analysis. I used those results to do the analysis. I've provided other examples in my testimony to support the view that those auction prices are representative of the prevailing market prices.
- Q. Okay. I didn't want to go through all your arguments. I'm just asking you whether your position is based on the FirstEnergy auction price results being comparable to what would apply for

AEP Ohio.

2.2

reread?

- A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. So if the auction results are not comparable, then the competitive benchmark price based on those auction results would be inappropriate; do you agree?

MR. RANDAZZO: Objection. Mr. Murray said that he -- the testimony he just gave indicates that he relied upon the FirstEnergy auction and other things. I object to the form of the question.

MR. NOURSE: I think that's -- well, I think he should be able to answer the question without assistance from counsel.

answer the question. The objection is overruled.

THE WITNESS: Can I have the question

(Record read.)

A. If the auction results are not comparable, you would get a different mathematical result. I've illustrated, based upon the FirstEnergy auction price, my estimate in the MRO versus ESP comparison. We've had three other witnesses at this point in time do their own analysis all based upon a set of assumptions and all three witnesses now

conclude based, upon the Commission's remand order that on a quantitative basis the ESP is not more favorable than the MRO.

So I don't know how anybody concludes under any set of assumptions the ESP is more favorable than the MRO.

- Q. Mr. Murray, you do yourself find it necessary to create a price for the '15-'16 period; is that correct?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. And that's because the FirstEnergy auctions don't cover that period; is that true?
 - A. Yes, that's correct.
- Q. Okay. So in that instance there's no comparable auction clearing price and that's why you deem it necessary, correct?
- A. There's no FirstEnergy comparable auction clearing price. I believe if you look at what I did in my testimony, I used the price from a prior year to be conservative.
- Q. Okay. Now, is it your position that only the price test component of the MRO test is applicable?
- A. No. As I've previously stated, my understanding of the Commission's statutory

obligation is it's required to evaluate the ESP and all of its terms and conditions and reach a conclusion that it's more favorable in the aggregate than an MRO.

- Q. My question to you is whether only the price test component is applicable.
- A. Again, I think there's other factors the Commission is required to examine, I've identified a number of them in my testimony, and I think when you examine the impact of those other factors, it actually makes the ESP worse.
- Q. Okay. So is it fair, then, to say that you agree the MRO test does include both quantitative and qualitative considerations?
- A. Again, I've conveyed my understanding of the analysis of the Commission to undertake. It's the ESP in the aggregate has to be more favorable than the MRO.
- Q. And does that include qualitative as well as quantitative considerations?
 - A. It may.

2.2

- Q. To your understanding has the Commission in the past considered qualitative as well as quantitative aspects in the ESP?
 - A. That's my understanding.

- Q. Okay. Now, let me ask you to turn to KMM-2, Exhibit 2. And this is the "Competitive Bid Auction Schedule Approved in Case 10-388."
 - A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. And that's the FirstEnergy -- FirstEnergy's recent SSO case.
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And would you agree that the auction delivery periods covered in these auctions reflect different auction times and dates as compared to the stipulation's contemplated auctions?
- A. It's not clear to me what you're referring to when you say the "stipulation's contemplated auctions." There's a provision in the stipulation that calls for a competitive bid process in later years in the ESP. If there's an auction requirement, you'll have to point me to it.
- Q. Okay. Well, are you making a distinction between a competitive bid process and an auction?
- A. I'm saying there can be differences.

 What I was trying to point out is, you know, I don't believe that there's any requirement in the stipulation for a competitive bid in the initial years of the ESP.
 - Q. Correct. Up through mid-2015 is what you

mean by "the earlier years"?

A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. Okay. I'd like to go through some of the components of your competitive benchmark price comparison and discuss, in these questions I'd like to discuss potential differences between FirstEnergy auction results and what would apply to AEP Ohio, okay? You understand that?
 - A. I'm waiting for the guestion.
- Q. I asked you if you understood what I wanted to talk about.
- A. I may or may not depending on what the question is.
- Q. Do you have various components for your competitive benchmark analysis including the simple swap component?
- A. I don't have a simple swap component in my benchmark comparison.
- Q. Would you agree that the auction clearing price for the FirstEnergy auction would reflect a simple swap component?
 - A. No.
 - Q. Why not?
- A. The FirstEnergy auctions were auctions
 for a full requirement product that includes all

capacity, energy, and from working from memory here, I've got a document I can refresh myself if need be, transmission losses, distribution losses. So it was an all-in type of product intended to reflect all of the generation services necessary to provide or -- to provide the standard service offer.

So there's no explicit, you know, bidders indicated a price at which they were willing to provide all of those products and services. Whether or not there was something akin to a simple swap reflected in the bid prices that they ultimately were willing to offer is a question only a bidder could answer.

- Q. You did state that the auction clearing prices would include as an all-in product capacity, energy, losses, correct?
 - A. Correct.

2.2

- Q. Okay. So in including the energy component wouldn't there be a forward energy price that would be part of the auction clearing price?
 - A. Not necessarily.
- Q. Okay. Your answer is the same for capacity?
- A. In the FirstEnergy auctions, because

 FirstEnergy is in -- had to elect a fixed resource

requirement alternative to deal with the fact that they were out of sync with the RPM timing,

FirstEnergy conducted a separate auction in order to secure capacity that FirstEnergy would point to and identify to PJM in order to satisfy its obligations as a load-serving entity under a fixed resource requirement plan.

2.2

The bidders were instructed that they would receive a capacity price in accordance with the results of that auction for the first two years, first two delivery years, and in the third delivery year the capacity would be provided pursuant to the prevailing RPM process.

So bidders have the capacity identified to them as a known dollar amount that they may or may not ultimately reflect in their bid price.

- Q. You say they may not reflect it in their bid price?
- A. Again, it's a descending clock auction. So ultimately, at the end of the day, the bidders have to decide if they're willing to offer an all-in product at whatever the then-clearing auction price is.
- Q. Okay. Would you agree on those special FirstEnergy auctions that were done they were not

cleared three years in advance like the base residual auction?

THE WITNESS: I got more siren than question, so if you could reread it for me.

- Q. I'll ask it again, Mr. Murray. You referred to the special FirstEnergy auctions to integrate into RPM, correct?
 - A. You said referred to, are you --
 - Q. In your answer.

2.2

- A. Do you have a specific reference to my testimony?
 - Q. In your answer that you just gave.
- A. Yeah, those auctions were conducted out of sync. They weren't done three years in advance.
- Q. Okay. Now, is it your understanding that the FE auction price applies to loss adjusted megawatt-hours?
- A. I have with me a document that I downloaded from FirstEnergy's website that's titled "Master Standard Service Offer Supply Agreement Between The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, The Toledo Edison Company, Ohio Edison Company and Each SSO Supplier Set Forth on Appendix A hereto." This was posted along with other documents that governed how the auctions were going to take place.

There are a number of definitions in the document itself that I'll read through here that specifically identify what bidders were bidding on.

SSO load means the full electricity requirements for SSO Service of SSO customers.

2.2

SSO Service means Standard Service Offer service that is not provided by a CRES Supplier and excludes the load of customers served via a Percentage of Income Payment Plan.

SSO Supplier Responsibility Share means, for each SSO Supplier, the fixed percentage share of the SSO Load for which the SSO Supplier is responsible as set forth in Appendix A...stated percentage is determined by dividing the number of tranches won by the SSO Supplier in the solicitation --

MR. RANDAZZO: Mr. Murray, take your time.

A. -- by the total number of tranches.

SSO Supply means unbundled Energy,
Capacity, and Ancillary Services, including, to the
extent not expressly assumed by the Companies
pursuant to Section 2.3...all transmission and
distribution losses and congestion and imbalance
costs associated with provision of such said services

as measured and reported to PJM, and such other services or products that an SSO Supplier may be required to provide, by PJM or other Governmental Authority, in order to meet the requirements of SSO Service.

2.2

market-based standard service offer of all competitive retail electric services necessary to maintain essential electric service to Customers, including unbundled Energy, Capacity, Ancillary Services and Firm Transmission Service, including all transmission and distribution losses, congestion and imbalance costs associated with the provision of the foregoing services, other obligations or responsibilities currently imposed or that may be imposed by PJM, and such other services or products that are provided by a CRES Supplier or an SSO Supplier to fulfill its obligations to serve customer load, as required by Section 4928.141 of the Ohio Revised Code.

MR. NOURSE: Your Honor.

- A. That's my understanding.
- Q. Now that you've read that all into the record, Mr. Murray, I'm going to ask you the same question again, maybe that all refreshed your

recollection.

2.2

Is it your understanding that the FirstEnergy auction price applies to lost adjusted megawatt hours?

- A. Yes. This definition indicated it includes all transmission and distribution losses.
- Q. Okay. And is it your understanding that the analysis of Company Witness Thomas supporting her competitive benchmark price, that the losses are built into the -- that they're applied to metered kWh?
- A. Do you have a specific reference to her testimony I can look at?
- Q. No, I'm just asking you your understanding.
- A. Again, if you can point to something specific in her testimony, I'd be happy to look at it.
- Q. So you don't recall -- you don't have an understanding of that?
- A. She did an administratively estimated market price. I think I have a replication of one of her exhibits, let me look.

In her testimony in support of the stipulation Ms. Thomas includes Exhibit LJT-1, there

are three pages, it shows a rollup or administratively estimated market price, it's built up using ten elements and one of those elements is losses.

- Q. Okay, Mr. Murray, can you turn to page 34. You make a statement in lines 3 through 6 about the FirstEnergy auction, I believe, saying that bidders were required to rely on capacity secured in the two integration auctions. Do you see that?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. And in the context of a CBP for an auction supporting SSO load, do bidders normally rely on the base residual auction clearing prices?

 THE WITNESS: Can I have the question
- reread?

(Record read.)

- A. That would I think depend on the particulars of the competitive bid process.
- Q. Okay. On page 35 of your testimony on line 12 you make a reference there to prevailing market prices. Do you see that?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And in your mind is that just another way to say RPM prices?
 - A. No. But we're going into areas that are

confidential.

2.2

- Q. That's not confidential, sir. I'm asking you what you meant by that phrase.
- A. You asked me what I -- could I have the question --
 - Q. It's line 12.

THE WITNESS: Could I have the question reread, please?

EXAMINER TAUBER: Yes.

(Record read.)

- A. And my answer is no. RPM prices is one indication of prevailing market prices. There are others that I have relied upon for the purposes of my testimony. Those other prices are confidential.
- Q. And I didn't ask you to talk about that so we don't need to.

You start on page 36, I believe, talking about what I'll refer to as the RAA. You understand what I mean?

- A. If your reference to RAA is the reliability assurance agreement, yes.
- Q. Okay. Is it your understanding that the RAA is a FERC-approved tariff applicable to wholesale capacity charges?
 - A. Yes.

Q. And under the state compensation mechanism provision in the RAA is it your understanding that that provision permits retail charges?

A. No.

2.2

- Q. It does not permit retail charges?
- A. The state compensation mechanism that's referred to in this provision refers to the capacity prices that a competitive retail electric supplier may pay AEP in instances where a CRES supplier acquires load and AEP is operating under a fixed resource requirement plan.

When CRES suppliers are obtaining and paying AEP for capacity, my understanding is that's a wholesale transaction. The state pricing mechanism, as it's identified here in the tariff, allows in certain circumstances for the State Commission to identify what that price will be, but it is, in my understanding, a wholesale transaction.

- Q. So you're saying the RAA allows a State Commission like the PUCO to establish a wholesale charge?
- A. It provides that the pricing for wholesale transaction may, under certain circumstances, be established by a state commission.

- Q. And that pricing applies to a -- is a wholesale charge, is it not?
 - A. That's my understanding.
- Q. Okay. On page 40 -- I'm sorry, question and answer 40 which is page 37, I believe. Do you see that?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

Q. Are you asserting that an FRR entity who's opted out of the RPM market would be stuck with RPM prices for its capacity under a CBP auction?

THE WITNESS: Can you reread the question, please?

(Record read.)

- A. You would -- again, there's a reference to a competitive bid process in your question without defining what that competitive bid process is, so I can't respond to your question. I'm incapable of responding.
- Q. Well, Mr. Murray, can you read question 40 aloud, please?
- A. "How would capacity be priced if a competitive bid was conducted while the Companies are an FRR entity?"
- Q. And that's the context of my question. I referred you to question and answer 40.

- A. Your questions, maybe it could be reread,
 I believe your question said if the company opted out
 of its FRR status.
- Q. No. My question is that are you -- I'm asking you in this answer 40 if you are asserting that an FRR entity who has opted out of the RPM market would be required to accept RPM prices for its capacity under a competitive bidding auction.

THE WITNESS: Could I have the question reread?

(Record read.)

- A. An FRR entity that has opted out of its FRR status would be subject to RPM, which is the prevailing mechanism for pricing capacity in PJM if you're not an FRR entity. What's reflected in the competitive bid would be a function of what products and services bidders are asked to supply in that competitive bid.
- Q. I didn't ask you about an FRR entity that opted out of its FRR status.
- MR. RANDAZZO: I object. That's exactly what he asked.
- MR. NOURSE: No, it's not, I said --
- MR. RANDAZZO: Can I have the question
- 25 read back?

2.2

EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Randazzo, please wait a minute.

Mr. Nourse.

2.2

MR. NOURSE: That's not what I said and I'm happy to read it back and I'm happy to break it down and go through this one step at a time.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Let's do that.

MR. NOURSE: Okay.

- Q. (By Mr. Nourse) Mr. Murray, is it your understanding that an FRR entity has opted out of the RPM-pricing market?
- A. A load-serving entity that elects a fixed resource requirement alternative is not subject to capacity priced through the RPM auction mechanism.
- Q. Okay. And in answer 40 on page 37 are you asserting that an FRR entity would be required to accept RPM prices for capacity under a competitive bidding process?
- A. What I'm attempting to identify in the question and answer to 40 is that AEP is an FRR entity, at least as things stand today. The FRR entity is the entity that bears, in PJM's tariff, the responsibility for satisfying capacity obligations.

We have seen, and the FirstEnergy transition auctions are a good example of how the

load-serving entity could transfer that capacity obligation to others, effectively, by, for example, saying rather than relying upon capacity that I own, I'll solicit capacity through a competitive bid process, you could negotiate bilateral contracts, but you would in turn rely upon that capacity and that's the capacity that the load-serving entity would point to in terms of identifying its responsibilities for PJM.

2.2

In AEP's case they are an FRR entity, so if there is a competitive bid process, okay, AEP ultimately still remains the entity that has to satisfy the capacity obligation to PJM. The Commission could, in my judgment, tell AEP "We're going to require you to solicit capacity like FirstEnergy did in its auction and rather than pointing to your own owned generating units substitute those in your FRR plan."

What I'm also attempting to identify, and this goes further on in my testimony on pages 38 and 39 --

- Q. Well, Mr. Murray, I'm asking you about one --
- MR. KUTIK: Can he finish his answer, please?

EXAMINER TAUBER: Please allow the witness to finish.

- A. -- that if you were to conduct a competitive bidding process, in my judgment competitive bidders would not be willing to pay more than prevailing market price for capacity in order to submit the lowest bid.
 - Q. Are you finished?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. Okay. Now, did I understand you to say that, first of all, with a competitive bidding process like we're talking about, this is in the context of an SSO competitive bidding process, correct, for nonshopping load?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And are you saying the RAA applies or does not apply to that context?
- A. What part of the RAA? The RAA is a fairly broad document.
- Q. Okay. The part that you quote in your testimony on page 36, section D.8.
- A. What I've attempted to identify in this section of my testimony is that if we were to do a competitive bid process, the state compensation mechanism that's specified in Section D.8 of the PJM

reliability assurance agreement wouldn't apply because a competitive bidding process doesn't involve CRES suppliers. It's a wholesale bid.

2.2

- Q. Okay. So let me clarify this a little further. Are you aware of AEP's Section 205 application pending at the FERC?
- A. You'd have to be a bit more specific about what you're referring to there.
- Q. The application to change the capacity rate under the RAA provision we've been discussing from RPM to a cost-based rate.
- A. I don't believe there's an application that's pending. There was an application that was filed and, my recollection is, rejected by FERC.

 There's a complaint case that was initiated by AEP.
- Q. So is it your understanding that the Section 205 application that you're referring to as being rejected, is that pending on rehearing?
- A. I believe so, but there's a provision in the stipulation that I think --
- Q. I just want to make sure we're referring to the same case. Then we can move on. Are we referring to the same case?
 - A. I believe we are.
 - Q. Okay. So if the FERC changes its

- direction on rehearing and ultimately grants

 AEP Ohio's application, are you saying the result of that case would not apply in the context of an SSO auction?
- A. Absolutely. Because, again, that complaint deals with the state compensation mechanism. If you're doing a competitive bid, it's a wholesale transaction.
- Q. Well, Mr. Murray, the complaint -- I wasn't asking you about the complaint, so are you saying the 205 case --
 - A. 205 section as well.

2.2

- Q. -- the 205 case deals with the state compensation mechanism?
 - A. That's my recollection.
- Q. Which was filed first, the 205 case or the Commission's December 2010 entry establishing the state compensation mechanism?
- A. My recollection is the 205 application was submitted prior to a December entry in which the Commission tried to clear up any doubt as to whether or not there was a state compensation mechanism in place.
- Q. So it's your belief that a state compensation mechanism existed in Ohio prior to

December 2010?

2.2

- A. I think that's the Commission's belief.
- Q. I'm not asking you about your interpretation. I'm asking your belief. Are you affirming your belief that a state compensation mechanism existed in Ohio under the RAA prior to December 2010?
- A. The state of affairs prior to AEP initiating the 205 application was that CRES suppliers were charged the prevailing price for capacity under RPM. So there was no need for the State Commission to opine one way or the other whether or not there was any state compensation mechanism.

Now, my take on things is the Commission issued the entry when AEP filed the 205 application and raised a question of whether or not there was a state compensation mechanism in place.

- Q. So you're saying there was no need for the PUCO to opine as to whether a state compensation mechanism existed, but in your view it did exist prior to December 2010; is that correct?
- A. Not my view. My interpretation of what I think the Commission said in the December 8th entry was in its view it believed that the Commission had

1916 1 spoken on an appropriate state compensation 2 mechanism. 3 MR. NOURSE: Your Honor, that's all the 4 questions I have. Thank you. EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. 5 Mr. Howard, do you have any questions? 6 7 MR. HOWARD: No, thank you, your Honor. 8 No questions. 9 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Yurick? 10 MR. YURICK: No, your Honor, thank you. 11 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Kurtz? 12 MR. KURTZ: Thank you, your Honor. 13 14 CROSS-EXAMINATION 15 By Mr. Kurtz: 16 Good afternoon, Mr. Murray. Do you have 17 your Exhibit KMM-11 in front of you? Excuse me. Mr. Kurtz, you might need to 18 Α. 19 use a microphone, we've got a fan back here. 20 Do you have that exhibit in front of you? Q. 21 Which exhibit, please? Α. 2.2 Q. 11. 23 MR. RANDAZZO: KMM-11, right, is what

MR. KURTZ: Yes.

24

25

you're referring to?

- A. I have a document that was entitled Exhibit KMM-11 that I believe has been marked as IEU Exhibit 10.
- Q. Okay. This is your MRO versus ESP comparison spreadsheet.
- A. This is a comparison that I updated to reflect my understanding of the Commission's remand order.
- Q. So, for example, this takes out the POLR revenues from the appropriate spots?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. Does this exhibit -- this exhibit is for CSP and Ohio Power individually?
- A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. Does this exhibit supersede your Exhibits 5 and 6, KMM-5 and 6?
- A. I would not characterize it as superseding the exhibits. As I discuss in my testimony, the state of affairs at the time I filed my direct testimony was unsettled with respect to what the Commission may or may not have done under the remand order. So I prepared Exhibits 5 and 6 to, as I characterize it, book end the range of possibilities.

What I've done in Exhibit KMM-11 is in

essence taken the results in KMM-5 and reflected my understanding of the Commission's remand order. We may have parties seek rehearing of the remand order, and I was here earlier at the start of the evidentiary hearing where at least it's apparent to me that there's a difference of opinion between at least some parties and the company about what they believe the effect of the remand order is.

2.2

- Q. This exhibit, No. 11, is your effort to quantify the relative pricing provisions of an ESP versus an MRO, or this ESP stipulation versus the expected result of an MRO.
- A. It quantifies those elements that are known. There are -- as I discuss in my written testimony, there are some additional economic impacts that I believe need to be reflected in the overall comparison. So this is the price-to-price comparison.
- Q. This is your quantification of the known pricing provisions of the ESP stipulation versus the expected results of MRO pricing.
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. I'd like to ask you just how you believe this exhibit should be used. You've concluded that an expected MRO would be much less

expensive pricing than the ESP stipulation; is that what this concludes?

2.2

- A. That's one of the conclusions that can be supported by the exhibit.
- Q. Okay. Well, it does -- as I understand your testimony, one of your big points is an MRO would be cheaper, therefore, the ESP stipulation fails the MRO versus ESP test. Did I miss something there?
- A. No. As I've testified, I think the Commission has to conclude that the ESP is more favorable than the MRO in order to approve it and I think what Exhibit KMM-11 demonstrates is the stipulation can't pass that test.
- Q. Is it your position and understanding that if this exhibit shows that an MRO is less expensive than the ESP stipulation, that the Commission cannot approve the ESP stipulation?

 THE WITNESS: Could I have the question reread?

(Record read.)

A. Again, the Commission is going to have to base its decision on some evidence that's in the record. The Commission could obviously look at the information reflected in KMM-11 and reach a

different -- not agree with me, for example. But based upon my analysis it fails the test, therefore, the Commission has got several option, it can either reject the stipulation. It could also I guess, theoretically, modify the stipulation in a way that it believed would produce an ESP outcome that was more favorable than the MRO. The company would at that point have the option to accept or not accept those changes.

2.2

- Q. Is it your belief that the Commission cannot approve the ESP stipulation if this piece of paper shows that the expected MRO is going to be less expensive than the ESP stipulation?
- A. It is my position that the Commission can't approve a stipulation that's unlawful. So there has to be something to support a conclusion that the ESP is more favorable than the MRO. I have not seen anything in the hearing to date that in my judgment would support that conclusion.
- Q. Let me ask you this again and ask you to answer the question, if this piece of paper shows that an MRO is one dollar less expensive than the ESP stipulation, it's your belief that it would be unlawful for the Commission to approve the stipulation.

MR. RANDAZZO: I object. Asked and answered.

2.2

EXAMINER TAUBER: Overruled. Mr. Murray, please try to answer the question.

- A. As I've indicated, this is my quantification of the ESP versus MRO comparison. The Commission is free to give this whatever weight it thinks is appropriate. If it disagrees with my recommendation, it may reach a different conclusion.
- Q. So I guess what you're saying is that the MRO versus ESP quantitative pricing test is only one element in the Commission's approval process?
- A. And as I've testified previously, there are both quantitative and qualitative elements in the comparison.
- Q. So even if this spreadsheet shows that the ESP stipulation is one dollar more expensive than the MRO, there could be other terms and conditions of the stipulation which tilt the balance in favor of the stipulation; is that correct?
- A. Yes. As I've testified, the Commission might not accept what's in this exhibit.
- Q. Okay. Let's look at your actual Exhibit 11, a few of the items. I just want to focus on the Columbus & Southern portion of it. Do you have that

page 2 of 2, Exhibit 11?

2.2

- A. Yes.
- Q. You have a line in the ESP stipulation enhanced service reliability rider of 62 cents per megawatt-hour in the first year. Do you see that line?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. This is a provision of the ESP that costs money that's not included in the MRO because, in your opinion, such a rider could not be part of an MRO.
 - A. That's my understanding.
- Q. Okay. Now, do you think the Commission would approve an enhanced service reliability rider if there were no benefits to it?

MR. RANDAZZO: I'll object to the question. I don't know how Mr. Murray is going to speculate about what the Commission might approve. We've already seen the Commission approve things for which there was no basis in law, so I object.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Murray, could you please answer the question?

THE WITNESS: Could I have the question reread?

EXAMINER TAUBER: Sure.

25 (Record read.)

- A. It's certainly a possibility.
- Q. Your spreadsheet does not show any offsetting benefits, it only has the costs; is that correct?
 - A. That's correct.

2.2

- Q. Same with the gridSMART rider line 7 under the ESP stipulation, you show 37 cents a megawatt-hour for each year of the ESP stipulation, but you show no offsetting benefit.
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Line 10, the distribution investment rider starting out at a dollar 80 per megawatt-hour. Do you see that?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. You have no distribution reliability rider costs in the MRO based upon your belief that such a rider would not be lawful in an MRO?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Wouldn't it be possible for the utility to file distribution rate cases if it were in an MRO?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. So it could recover some of the same, if not all the same, types of costs through distribution rate cases in an MRO?
 - A. Not the rider that is reflected in the

stipulation.

2.2

- Q. So the rider reflects incremental distribution costs over some baseline year, et cetera, but we're talking about distribution expenses in the DIR rider, are we not?
- A. My understanding of the DIR rider is it reaches back and looks at investment, plant in service after I think the year 2000. If you had a rate case, there would be a date certain, plant in service would be established as of a date certain and a revenue requirement approved and there wouldn't be the ability to -- so there wouldn't be a legal ability, in my judgment, to set up a rider that reached back and allowed the companies in essence duplicative revenues for plant in service that's recognized in rate base.
- Q. I don't want to debate ratemaking with you. But in a distribution rate case when you have a date certain, it will be plant in service as of that date and the plant could be 30, 40, 20, 15 years old or brand new reflected in the distribution rate case; isn't that correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And there's no prohibition against distribution rate cases in an MRO, is there?

- A. That's my recollection.
- Q. And you've made no provision for possible distribution rate cases in your comparison, have you?
- A. Again, no, but I think as we're aware of there are, for Ohio Power Company and Columbus

 Southern Power Company, there are rate cases pending as we speak.
- Q. Let's look at the last -- your last line, last column I guess, the June 2015 through May 2016 expected results of an MRO versus the ESP stipulation comparison. Do you see that column?
 - A. Yes.

2.2

- Q. Several witnesses have prepared exhibits similar to this but none of those had a column for this time period, did they?
 - A. That's my recollection.
- Q. So you're the only witness who did a comparison for the June '15 to May '16 time frame?
 - A. That's my recollection.
- Q. Now, under the ESP stipulation at this point in time the utilities are not expected to own any power plants, they're expected to have divested their generation by this period; isn't that correct?
- A. Provided other conditional provisions of the stipulation happen, yes.

- Q. All right. Now, in the last year of this MRO, in the fifth year of this MRO, on line 26 we see that the ESP portion is 90 percent in year 1, 80 percent in year 2, 70, 66 percent, and in the final year of the MRO, in the final year of your analysis, you're assuming that 56 percent of the power supplied to load would come from the ESP legacy pricing, correct?
- A. The mathematical weighting reflects 56 percent at the legacy ESP price.
- Q. Now, you're assuming 56 percent pricing at the legacy generation asset price when, in fact, the utilities would not own any generation at that point in time.
 - A. That's correct.

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- Q. So the power couldn't really come from power plants that utilities don't own at legacy price, could it?
- A. My understanding of the MRO statute is it requires a blending of a bid price and an ESP price and whether or not the utility owns any generation is irrelevant.
- Q. Okay. In the real world if the utility had to provide auction -- had to provide SSO load in the final year of an MRO and it didn't own any power

plants, it would have to buy that power, wouldn't it?

MR. CONWAY: Could I have the ESP -- I'm

sorry, could I have the question reread?

MR. KURTZ: Let me rephrase it.

- Q. In the real world in the fifth year of an MRO for a utility that doesn't own any power plants it would have to buy the power to serve the SSO load, wouldn't it?
 - A. That's one possibility.

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- Q. You understand that the MRO statute allows for four additions to the legacy pricing, you're aware of that, fuel, environmental, alternative energy, and purchased power?
- A. I believe I testified earlier that I was familiar that it allowed for fuel. I would have to go back and refresh my memory on all the provisions in the statute.
- Q. I'll read you the relevant provision.

 4928.142(D)(1), for any one or more of the following costs as reflected in that most recent standard service offer price, one, the EDU's prudently incurred cost of fuel -- I'm paraphrasing just a tad. If you want to look at the statute, I'll show it to you -- prudently incurred purchased power costs, three, prudently incurred costs of satisfying the

supply and demand portfolio requirements in the state including, but not limited to, renewable energy and energy efficiency, four, prudently incurred costs to comply with environmental laws and regulations.

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Let me go back to my question. Couldn't a utility adjust the legacy ESP pricing for prudently incurred costs of purchased power?

MR. RANDAZZO: I object. Form of the question. The utility can't adjust anything.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}\xspace$. KURTZ: The Commission adjusts.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

A. I think the key word in your question is the use of the term "prudently incurred." If a utility is statutorily obligated to blend a legacy ESP price for five years and turns around and divests its generation so that its exposure in order to provide a portion of the load that it's required to be priced at the legacy ESP price is unhedged.

I think there's an open question as to whether or not that, in fact, is a prudent course of behavior. We actually have a history here in Ohio, not completely analogous, but certainly similar where if you go back into 2003-2004 time period Monongahela Power in its transition plan had a provision that allowed it to go to market early for commercial and

industrial customers.

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There was a skirmish over what that meant and its obligations I won't go over here, but my recollection is it was a finding by this Commission that under certain circumstances the decision to leave its standard service offer obligation unhedged in that particular set of circumstances was imprudent.

Now, if you follow history, that case eventually made its way to federal court and ultimately was resolved by stipulation, but, again, it doesn't strike me as a reasonable course of action that if you've got an obligation to provide a portion of the load at a default price, why you would leave yourself unhedged in that position. And the question of whether or not we're required to blend for the full five years has been tested in the Duke MRO case that I talked about earlier.

Q. So you believe that in the final -- in the fifth year of an MRO for a utility that doesn't own any generation, that if it had to buy power to serve the SSO load to keep the lights on, that that purchase may not be prudent?

MR. RANDAZZO: I object. There's no foundation for anybody buying power to keep the

lights on. We're way far away from any of the scenarios that are addressed by Mr. Murray's testimony.

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MR. KURTZ: This is exactly his scenario in the fifth year. He's assuming that in the fifth year of an MRO 56 percent of the energy sold to the SSO load would be at the legacy ESP pricing even though the utility doesn't own any power plants.

Now, there's a provision in the MRO statute that allows the utility in this circumstance to recover purchased power costs.

The point I'm getting to is that there's no line item for purchased power costs in the MRO and if there were it would be an offsetting adjustment to the analysis that the witness did, in fact, make.

MR. RANDAZZO: Well, your Honor, that's evidence that OEG can put on. That's not evidence that's supported -- that scenario that's being discussed here has no foundation whatsoever in the record.

MR. KURTZ: Your Honor, I was responding to counsel's objection that the question had no foundation. I think this is exactly what it's leading up to.

EXAMINER TAUBER: The objection is

overruled.

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Please continue, Mr. Kurtz.

- Q. (By Mr. Kurtz) Do you think it may be imprudent for a utility which owns no power plants in the fifth year of an MRO to go out and purchase power to serve the SSO load and, therefore, maybe that purchase would not be reflected in an MRO?
- A. What I've testified is given that that obligation is known up front, I think a utility leaving itself unhedged as to that position raises questions of whether or not that decision is prudent.
- Q. Let's assume the Commission found that the purchase was prudent. There's no cost line item in your MRO to reflect that purchased power cost, is there?
- A. I would presume that in order for the Commission to find that that decision was prudent, it would have to conclude that the results are better than the results otherwise would be. So I think for the point of my comparison it would actually make the results worse.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ KURTZ: Thank you, your Honor. Those are all my questions.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

Mr. Margard?

MR. MARGARD: No questions. Thank you,
your Honor.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Randazzo, redirect?

MR. RANDAZZO: If I could just have two

EXAMINER TAUBER: I'll actually give you five minutes. Let's go off the record.

(Recess taken.)

EXAMINER TAUBER: Let's go back on the record.

Mr. Randazzo, on redirect?

MR. RANDAZZO: Thank you, your Honor.

Just a couple things.

14

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

By Mr. Randazzo:

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seconds.

Q. Mr. Murray, during the cross-examination of Mr. Nourse you got into a discussion about some of the components of the product that was part of the auction for generation supply, standard service offer generation supply in the case of Cleveland Electric Illuminating, Toledo Edison, and Ohio Edison. Do you recall that discussion?

- A. Yes.
- Q. And in the course of discussing that

subject you indicated that the master supply agreement and the definitions therein excluded a percentage of income payment plan customers. Did I correctly hear your testimony?

A. Yes, you did.

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- Q. And do you know why those customers were excluded?
- A. In the stipulation that was reached in that case there was a provision that provided that PIPP customers would be served at a discount relative to the auction price that prevailed in the competitive bidding process. So that discount was an additional benefit that could be quantified and valued in the ESP versus MRO.
- Q. And if you know, are there opportunities in the law to competitively source for percentage of income payment customers?
- A. Yes. My understanding is the Ohio

 Department of Development has statutory authority

 that allows them to bid out PIPP customers either on
 an individual utility basis for statewide.
- Q. Now, during your cross-examination by Mr. Nourse also you were shown an interrogatory response that's marked as AEP Exhibit No. 15. Do you have that in front of you?

A. Yes.

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- Q. Were there other discovery responses that were related to the subject that's covered by AEP Exhibit 15 and the discussion that you had with Mr. Nourse regarding the statement by
- Mr. Munczinski --
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. -- on September 7th? The answer?
- A. Yes, there were.
- MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honor, at this time I would have marked for identification purposes IEU Exhibit No. 13.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

- Q. Mr. Murray, I've handed you what has been marked as IEU Exhibit No. 13, at the top it has Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company's Response to FirstEnergy Solutions' Discovery Request Twenty-First Set. Do you have the same document I do?
 - A. Yes, I do.
- Q. And it refers to interrogatory

 STIP-FES-RFA-21-002. Is that what you're document shows?
- A. Yes, it does.
- Q. And by whom was this response prepared?

- A. It was prepared by Richard E. Munczinski.
- Q. And is that the same Mr. Munczinski that you quoted from the transcript earlier?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And does the language above the response, is it the same as you quoted earlier from the transcript?
- A. Let me get the document and do the comparison.

MR. NOURSE: We'll stipulate that it is.

- Q. And the response is to a request that that statement was made on September 7th, 2011, regarding the stipulation; is that correct?
 - A. Yes.

MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honor, that's all the questions I have. I would move IEU Exhibits 9A and 9B, 9B being subject to the protective order, IEU Exhibit 10, and IEU Exhibit No. 13.

EXAMINER TAUBER: We'll note that. Are there any questions on recross?

MR. NOURSE: Yes, your Honor.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Nourse.

MR. NOURSE: Just briefly.

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RECROSS-EXAMINATION

By Mr. Nourse:

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- Q. Mr. Murray, with your counsel you just reviewed part of the -- I believe part of the 10-388 FirstEnergy stipulation and auction relating to PIPP customers. Do you recall that?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And you referred to a benefit that PIPP customers receive under that provision.
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Could you tell me what the benefit that customers receive is?
- A. My recollection of the stipulation is that FirstEnergy Solutions agreed to supply PIPP customers at a discount relative to whatever price prevailed in the auction. I don't recall off the top of my head the exact percentages.
- Q. Does that discount lower a PIPP customer's bill that they have to pay?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. That's your understanding.
- A. It lowers the total bill of a PIPP customer. A PIPP customer doesn't pay its total bill. A PIPP customer pays a portion of the bill based upon their income. The portion of their bill

that isn't paid is picked up and recovered from other customers through the universal service fund. So ultimately the beneficiaries of that provision, you know, are actually the remaining customers of FirstEnergy.

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- Q. So you agree that PIPP customers do not benefit directly by that provision?
- A. Well, again, a PIPP customer pays a -- based upon their income. It's possible that you might get to a result where their income matches the actual bill or their ability to pay matches their actual bill so they would obviously benefit.
- Q. But their expected to pay based on a percentage of income doesn't change as a result of the percentage discount you referenced, does it?
- A. Yes. That's my testimony. And, again, as I indicated, the beneficiaries ultimately are actually the other customers.
- Q. Okay. Just to be clear, I asked you if it does, the bill of the PIPP customer doesn't change, and you answered "yes." Yes, it doesn't change?
- A. The bill of a PIPP customer -- the portion of its bill that a PIPP customer pays is capped based upon their income. So the discount

that's provided for under the stipulation provided a benefit in that it may ultimately lower the portion of a PIPP customer's bill that's subsidized by other customers.

Q. So it benefits other non-PIPP customers, correct?

A. Yes.

MR. NOURSE: Thank you. That's all.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

Mr. Howard?

MR. HOWARD: No, thank you, your Honor.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Yurick?

MR. YURICK: No questions, your Honor,

thank you.

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EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Kurtz?

MR. KURTZ: No questions.

17 EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Margard?

MR. MARGARD: No, thank you.

19 EXAMINER TAUBER: At this time IEU has

20 moved for the admission of Exhibits 9A, 9B, 10, and

21 | 13. Are there any objections to IEU exhibits?

(No response.)

23 EXAMINER TAUBER: Hearing none, IEU

24 Exhibits 9A, 9B, 10, and 13 shall be admitted into

25 the record.

(EXHIBITS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 1 2 MR. NOURSE: And, your Honor, AEP Ohio 3 moves for admission of Exhibits 12, 13, 14, and 15 we 4 used during cross-examination. 5 EXAMINER TAUBER: Are there any 6 objections to AEP Ohio Exhibits 12, 13, 14, and 15? 7 (No response.) 8 EXAMINER TAUBER: Hearing none, AEP Ohio Exhibits 12, 13, 14, and 15 shall be admitted into 9 10 the record. 11 (EXHIBITS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.) 12 EXAMINER TAUBER: You may be excused. 13 Thank you. 14 MR. SATTERWHITE: Your Honor. 15 EXAMINER TAUBER: Yes. 16 MR. SATTERWHITE: AEP has a couple of 17 cleanup matters, I think it might help for some stuff 18 from discovery placed in the record. This morning I 19 passed around a summary of some of the discovery 20 matters we intended to introduce at this time so all 21 the parties could see it, I'd like to mark those now. 2.2 Yeah. 23 EXAMINER TAUBER: We can do that. 24 MR. KUTIK: May we go off the record for 25 a moment?

EXAMINER TAUBER: Sure. Let's go off the record first.

(Discussion off the record.)

EXAMINER TAUBER: Let's go back on the record.

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(EXHIBITS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

MR. SATTERWHITE: Thank you, your Honor. The first document I have labeled AEP Exhibit 16 is a FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. Supplemental Response to Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power Companies' First Set of Discovery, and in particular I have attached a cover page for point of reference, and what we're seeking to add to the record are the Responses to Request for Admissions No. 2 and No. 3. I'll point out that in this document the answer to 3 carries over to the following page so 4 and 5 are not intended to be put into the record.

EXAMINER TAUBER: So just Request for Admissions 2 and 3?

MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes. I wanted to represent what was provided by FES.

AEP Exhibit No. 17 that I've marked, it's the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel's Responses and Objections to CSP and OP's First Set of Discovery, I've provided a cover page and then page

29 to point out it's a request for admissions, but what I'd like to admit is their request or the responses to request for admissions 2, 3, and 4 that appear on page 30 of that document.

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Exhibit No. 18, it's the Appalachian Peace and
Justice Network's responses to Columbus Southern
Power and Ohio Power's Second Set of Interrogatories.
For this I'm seeking admission of the response to request for admission No. 2 which appears on the second page, I've also included a cover page and the page where that request for admission appears.

So just so I get all the cleanup matters out of the way, I also, to the extent the Bench thinks it's necessary, I know a number of times we cited to Case 10-388, the FirstEnergy SSO, I referred to it the other day talking to Mr. Bowser, I think we just had some comments on the PIPP findings in there, to the extent the Bench thinks it's necessary I think it would be appropriate to take administrative notice of the opinion and order in that case so that people can cite to it on brief if they need to.

And the final point was earlier the company asked the Bench their preference on marking the stipulation, the detailed implementation plan,

and we marked those as Joint Exhibits 1 and 2. I just request that be admitted into evidence.

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EXAMINER TAUBER: Okay. Are there any objections to AEP Exhibits 16, 17, and 18 which are the supplemental responses?

MR. KUTIK: Your Honor, I think I want to make sure that it's clear on the record that Exhibit 16 will only be admitted for the purpose of the response to request for admission No. 2 and request for admission No. 3. The reason I say that is because it does include other responses including the partial response to No. 5. So I want to make sure for fairness that the parties are on notice that the only thing that can be cited from this, if anything, is the request to responses 2 and 3.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. We'll note that for AEP Ohio Exhibit No. 16 it's just request for admission 2 and 3, and then for 17 it's just request for admission 2, 3, and 4, and on AEP Ohio 18 it's just request for admission number 2.

(EXHIBITS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.)

EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Randazzo.

MR. RANDAZZO: I have nothing on the exhibits that relate to the admissions, it was with regard to the request that the Commission take

administrative notice of the opinion and order in the FirstEnergy ESP cases.

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We've noted earlier that case was a product of a settlement, that settlement specifically stated that the settlement would not be cited as precedent in any other case. We happen to believe that that means something that's important and, as a result, to the extent the Commission would take administrative notice of that we would also ask that the Commission take administrative notice of that language in the summary.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you.

MR. ETTER: OCC joins in that as well, your Honor.

MR. KUTIK: As does FES.

MR. SATTERWHITE: And I believe the stipulation in that case was already put in the record with my cross of Mr. Bowser so that would already be in there for a citation. I think the point was it's been referred to multiple times, it's underlying a lot of the analysis, and if the Bench doesn't think it's necessary, then we can just cite it's a valid Commission order and we just cite to it.

I just want to be extra sure that we're able to round out the parsing that's been provided in

this in the briefs so the Commission can have the full benefit and the parties can have the full benefit in their briefs using that.

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EXAMINER TAUBER: As we have in other cases we'll take administrative notice of that with the caveat that Mr. Randazzo brought forward.

MR. RANDAZZO: Thank you, your Honor.

EXAMINER TAUBER: And then at this time we still have AEP Ohio Exhibits 16, 17, and 18 with the notations out. Are there any objections to those? Hearing none, AEP Ohio Exhibits 16, 17, and 18 shall be admitted into the record.

(EXHIBITS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.)

EXAMINER TAUBER: Mr. Oliker.

MR. SATTERWHITE: Your Honor, I'm sorry, I want to make sure, I don't know if you're going to do it after this or not, but Joint 1 and 2 is the third cleanup matter I brought up.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Thank you. Joint Exhibit 1, which is the stipulation, is there any objection to that?

MR. RANDAZZO: Your Honor, we previously moved to dismiss based upon the failure of the parties to the settlement, AEP specifically which has a statutory burden of proof, to provide any support,

evidentiary support, for the application to which the stipulation is connected, and subject -- you took that ruling under advisement and I think that the appropriate thing to do would be in recognition of taking that ruling under advisement to take this request under advisement to the same extent.

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EXAMINER TAUBER: We'll take both of those under advisement at this point in time. So with Joint Exhibit 1 and 2 being taken under advisement, we'll move on to Mr. Oliker.

MR. OLIKER: Your Honor, I believe you and the reporter are the only two people who have copies of this.

MR. RANDAZZO: Maybe they want it that way.

MR. OLIKER: I'd like to mark this as
IEU-Ohio Exhibit 14. These are admissions of the
signatory parties. In particular, your Honor, these
are admissions of the Natural Resource Defense
Council, Ohio Environmental Council, Environmental
Law and Policy Center, AEP Retail Energy Partners,
LLC, Paulding Wind Farm, II, LLC, the Association of
Independent Colleges and Universities of Ohio, Duke
Energy Retail Sales, LLC, the City of Hilliard, Ohio,
the City of Grove City, Ohio, the Kroger Company, the

OMA Energy Group, the Ohio Hospital Association, the
Retail Energy Supply Association, EnerNOC, Inc.,
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Constellation
NewEnergy, Inc., and Constellation Energy Commodities
Group, Inc., and PJM Power Providers Group.

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And particularly, your Honor, we are moving for the admission of the following statement, "Admit that on September 7th, 2011, You did not have information from AEP-Ohio that the RPM-priced capacity set aside allocation in Appendix C of the Stipulation had been fully awarded for any customer class.

Each these parties has admitted to the truth of this statement, and I would move for the admission of those statements, particularly in this exhibit.

(EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.)

EXAMINER TAUBER: Are there any objections to IEU Ohio's Exhibit No. 18 which is the -- or 14, excuse me.

MR. NOURSE: I thought it was 14.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Excuse me. 14.

MR. NOURSE: I'm sorry, maybe I misunderstood. Is it the whole document including all the attachments is what is being sought for

admission?

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MR. OLIKER: Steve, we are moving the exhibit but it's limited to that admission in each of the sets of responses.

MR. NOURSE: So, for example, the attachment 14, there's other materials which I think includes a typo that was brought out earlier in the record, those are extraneous and they're not being admitted as part of this exhibit?

MR. OLIKER: Correct, just the admission.

MR. NOURSE: Well, I'm not sure why we can't prepare an exhibit that only includes the materials sought for admission, your Honor. That's what I would suggest.

MR. OLIKER: You will also notice all the admissions are on the same page typically in their response.

MR. NOURSE: Okay. I guess if it's clear in the record that those other matters are not being admitted, then we're fine with that clarification.

EXAMINER TAUBER: We'll note the clarification. Are there any objections to IEU-Ohio Exhibit 14?

(No response.)

EXAMINER TAUBER: Hearing none, IEU-Ohio

Exhibit No. 14, the factual admissions made in response to the noted discovery request, shall be admitted into the record.

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(EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.)

5 EXAMINER TAUBER: Are there any other 6 matters?

MR. KUTIK: Your Honor, are you prepared at this time to discuss the schedule for the rest of the case?

EXAMINER TAUBER: Yes. Let's go off the record and discuss it.

(Discussion off the record.)

EXAMINER TAUBER: Let's go back on the record. At this point in time the hearing shall be adjourned until further notification is set. Thank you.

MR. KUTIK: Before we go off the record, so it's the understanding that staff and AEP will be filing rebuttal testimony by 4 or 5 o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

EXAMINER TAUBER: Correct, as noted off the record. Thank you, Mr. Kutik.

Let's go off the record.

24 (Thereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 25 4:21 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE

I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings taken by me in this matter on Thursday, October 20, 2011, and carefully compared with my original stenographic notes.

Maria DiPaolo Jones, Registered Diplomate Reporter and CRR and Notary Public in and for the State of Ohio.

My commission expires June 19, 2016.

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ARMSTRONG & OKEY, INC., Columbus, Ohio (614) 224-9481

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Summary: Transcript Transcript of Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company hearing held on 10/20/11 - Vol XI electronically filed by Mrs. Jennifer Duffer on behalf of Armstrong & Okey, Inc. and Jones, Maria DiPaolo Mrs.