

**BEFORE**  
**THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO**

In the Matter of the Application of Ohio )  
 American Water Company to Increase Its ) Case No. 11-4161-WS-AIR  
 Rates for Water Service and Sewer Service. )

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**DIRECT TESTIMONY**  
**OF**  
**PAULINE M. AHERN**  
**ON BEHALF OF**  
**OHIO AMERICAN WATER COMPANY**

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- ☐ Management policies, practice and organization
- ☐ Operating income
- ☐ Rate base
- ☐ Allocations
- ☒ Rate of return
- ☐ Rates and tariffs
- ☐ Other

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1 **Direct Testimony of**

2 **Pauline M. Ahern**

3 **I. WITNESS INTRODUCTION**

4 **Q1. Please state your name, occupation and business address.**

5 A1. My name is Pauline M. Ahern. I am a Principal of AUS Consultants. My business  
6 address is 155 Gaither Drive, Suite A, Mt. Laurel, New Jersey 08054.

7 **Q2. Please summarize your professional experience and educational background.**

8 A2. I have offered expert testimony on behalf of investor-owned utilities before twenty-six  
9 state regulatory commissions on rate of return issues, including but not limited to  
10 common equity cost rate, fair rate of return, capital structure issues, credit quality issues  
11 and the like. I am a graduate of Clark University, Worcester, MA, where I received a  
12 Bachelor of Arts degree with honors in Economics in 1973. In 1991, I received a Master  
13 of Business Administration with high honors and a concentration in finance from Rutgers  
14 University. The details of these appearances, my educational background, presentations I  
15 have given and articles I have co-authored are shown in OAW Exhibit 7.1 supplementing  
16 this testimony.

17 On a monthly basis, I also calculate and maintain the American Gas Association  
18 ("A.G.A.") Gas Index under contract with the A.G.A., which serves as the benchmark  
19 against which the performance of the American Gas Index Fund ("AGIF") is measured.  
20 The A.G.A. Gas Index and AGIF are a market capitalization weighted index and fund,  
21 respectively, comprised of the common stocks of the publicly traded corporate members  
22 of the A.G.A.

23 I am also the Publisher of AUS Utility Reports, responsible for supervising the

1 production, publication, distribution and marketing of its various reports.

2 I am a member of the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts  
3 ("SURFA") where I serve on its Board of Directors, having served two terms as  
4 President, from 2006 – 2008 and 2008 – 2010. Previously, I held the position of  
5 Secretary/Treasurer from 2004 – 2006. In 1992, I was awarded the professional  
6 designation "Certified Rate of Return Analyst" ("CRRRA") by SURFA, which is based  
7 upon education, experience and the successful completion of a comprehensive written  
8 examination.

9 I am also an associate member of the National Association of Water Companies,  
10 serving on its Finance/Accounting/Taxation Committee; a member of the Energy  
11 Association of Pennsylvania, formerly the Pennsylvania Gas Association; and a member  
12 of the American Finance and Financial Management Associations.

13 **Q3. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?**

14 A3. The purpose of my Direct Testimony is to recommend to the Public Utilities Commission  
15 of Ohio ("PUCO" or "the Commission") the appropriate investor-required common  
16 equity cost rate which Ohio American Water Company ("Ohio American" or "the  
17 Company") should be afforded the opportunity to earn on the common equity financed  
18 portion of its jurisdictional rate base.

19 **Q4. What is your recommended common equity cost rate?**

20 A4. I recommend that the Commission authorize the Company the opportunity to earn a  
21 common equity cost rate of 11.50% on the common equity financed portion of its  
22 jurisdictional rate base. A common equity cost rate of 11.50% results in an overall rate of  
23 return of 8.97% when applied to a common equity ratio of 51.69% developed by

Company Witness Gary M. VerDouw as summarized in Table 1 below:

Table 1

<u>Type of Capital</u>	<u>Ratios</u>	<u>Cost Rate</u>	<u>Weighted Cost Rate</u>
Long-Term Debt	48.24%	6.32%	3.05%
Preferred Equity	1.07	8.53	0.09
Common Equity	<u>50.69</u>	11.50	<u>5.83</u>
Total	<u>100.00%</u>		<u>8.97%</u>

**Q5. Have you prepared schedules which support your recommended common equity cost rate?**

A5. Yes. They are included with my Direct Testimony as Schedules PMA-1 through PMA-16.

## II. SUMMARY

**Q6. Please summarize your recommended common equity cost rate.**

A6. My recommended common equity cost rate of 11.50% is summarized on Schedule PMA-1, page 2. As a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Water Works Company, Inc. ("AWK" or "the Parent"), Ohio American's common stock is not publicly traded. Thus, a market-based common equity cost rate cannot be directly observed for the Company. Consequently, in arriving at my recommended common equity cost rate of 11.50%, I have assessed the market-based common equity cost rates of companies of relatively similar, but not necessarily identical risk, i.e., proxy group(s) for insight into a recommended common equity cost rate applicable to Ohio American. Using companies of relatively comparable similar risk as proxies is consistent with the principles of fair rate of return

1 established in the *Hope*<sup>1</sup> and *Bluefield*<sup>2</sup> cases, adding reliability to the informed expert  
2 judgment necessary to arrive at a recommended common equity cost rate. However, no  
3 proxy group(s) can be selected to be identical in risk to Ohio American. Therefore, the  
4 proxy group(s)' results must be adjusted, if necessary, to reflect the unique relative  
5 financial and/or business risk of the Company, as will be discussed in detail subsequently.

6 Consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis ("EMH"), which will be  
7 discussed in more detail below, my recommendation results from the application of  
8 market-based cost of common equity models, the Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF")  
9 approach, the Risk Premium Model ("RPM") and the Capital Asset Pricing Model  
10 ("CAPM") for the proxy group of nine water companies whose selection will be  
11 discussed subsequently. In addition, I also selected a group of domestic, non-price  
12 regulated companies comparable in total risk to the nine water companies, applying the  
13 DCF, RPM and CAPM to them as well as assessing projected returns on book common  
14 equity or partner's capital in accordance with the opportunity cost standards encapsulated  
15 in *Hope* and *Bluefield*.

16 The results derived from each are as follows:

---

<sup>1</sup> Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).

<sup>2</sup> Bluefield Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1922).

Table 2

Proxy Group  
of Nine  
Water  
Companies

Discounted Cash Flow Model	9.54%
Risk Premium Model	10.43
Capital Asset Pricing Model	10.34
Cost of Equity Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies	13.59
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Before Adjustment for Financial Risk, Flotation Costs and Business Risks	11.00
Financial Risk Adjustment	(0.22)
Flotation Cost Adjustment	0.12
Business Risk Adjustment	<u>0.60</u>
Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate	<u>11.50%</u>

After reviewing the cost rates based upon these models, I conclude that a common equity cost rate of 11.00% is indicated before any adjustment for financial and business risks related to Ohio American's lower financial risk and its smaller size relative to the proxy group of nine water companies as well as flotation costs. The indicated common equity cost rate based upon the nine water companies was adjusted downward by 22 basis points (a negative 0.22%) to reflect Ohio American's slightly lower financial risk relative to the nine water companies, upward by 12 basis points (0.12%) for flotation costs and upward by 60 basis points (0.60%) to reflect Ohio American's increased business risk as noted above. These adjustments are discussed below. After adjustment, the financial

1 risk-, flotation cost and business risk-adjusted common equity cost rate is 11.50%, which  
2 is also my recommended common equity cost rate for Ohio American.

### 3 III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

4 **Q7. What general principles have you considered in arriving at your recommended**  
5 **common equity cost rate of 11.50%?**

6 A7. In unregulated industries, the competition of the marketplace is the principal determinant  
7 of the price of products or services. For regulated public utilities, regulation must act as a  
8 substitute for marketplace competition. Assuring that the utility can fulfill its obligations  
9 to the public while providing safe and adequate service at all times requires a level of  
10 earnings sufficient to maintain the integrity of presently invested capital as well as  
11 permitting the attraction of needed new capital at a reasonable cost in competition with  
12 other firms of comparable risk, consistent with the fair rate of return standards established  
13 by the U.S. Supreme Court in the previously cited *Hope* and *Bluefield* cases.  
14 Consequently, marketplace data must be relied upon in assessing a common equity cost  
15 rate appropriate for ratemaking purposes. Therefore, my recommended common equity  
16 cost rate is based upon marketplace data for a proxy group of utilities as similar in risk as  
17 possible to Ohio American, based upon selection criteria which will be discussed  
18 subsequently. Just as the use of the market data for the proxy group(s) adds reliability to  
19 the informed expert judgment used in arriving at a recommended common equity cost  
20 rate, the ability to use multiple common equity cost rate models also adds reliability when  
21 arriving at a company-specific common equity cost rate.



1    **A.     BUSINESS RISK**

2    **Q8.    Please define business risk and explain why it is important to the determination of a**  
3       **fair rate of return.**

4    A8.    Business risk is the riskiness of a company's common stock without the use of debt  
5           and/or preferred capital. Examples of such general business risk to all utilities, i.e., water,  
6           electric and natural gas distribution, include the quality of management, the regulatory  
7           environment, customer mix and concentration of customers, service territory growth,  
8           capital intensity, size, and the like, which have a direct bearing on earnings.

9                 Business risk is important to the determination of a fair rate of return because the  
10                greater the level of risk, the greater the rate of return investors demand, consistent with  
11                the basic financial precept of risk and return.

12   **Q9.    What business risks face the water industry in general?**

13   A9.    Water is essential to life and unlike electricity or natural gas, water is the only utility  
14           product which is ingested. Consequently, water quality is of paramount importance to the  
15           health and well-being of customers and subject to additional health and safety regulations.  
16           In addition, unlike many electric and natural gas utilities, water companies serve a  
17           production function in addition to the delivery functions served by electric and gas  
18           utilities.

19                 Water utilities obtain supply from wells, aquifers, surface water reservoirs,  
20                streams and rivers, or through water rights. Throughout the years, well supplies and  
21                aquifers have been environmentally threatened, with historically minor purification  
22                treatment having given way to major well rehabilitation, treatment or replacement.  
23                Simultaneously, environmental water quality standards have tightened considerably,

1 requiring multiple treatments. In addition, drought, water source overuse, runoff,  
2 threatened species/habitat protection and other factors are limiting supply availability. As  
3 for water rights, their lives are typically finite with renewability uncertain. In the course  
4 of procuring water supplies and treating water so that it meets Safe Drinking Water Act  
5 standards, water utilities have an ever-increasing responsibility to be stewards of the  
6 environment from which supplies are drawn, in order to preserve and protect the natural  
7 resources of the United States.

8 Moreover, electric and natural gas companies, where transmission and distribution  
9 is separate from generation, generally do not produce the electricity or natural gas which  
10 they transmit and distribute. In contrast, water utilities are typically vertically engaged in  
11 the entire process of acquiring supply, production (treatment) and distribution of water.  
12 Hence, water utilities require significant capital investment in sources of supply and  
13 production (wells and treatment facilities), in addition to transmission and distribution  
14 systems, both to serve additional customers and to replace aging systems, creating a major  
15 risk facing the water and wastewater utility industry.

16 Value Line Investment Survey<sup>3</sup> ("Value Line") observes the following about the  
17 water utility industry:

18 Water utility stocks have been met with some resistance since our January  
19 review. Indeed, all but a single issue covered in our *Survey* gave back  
20 some ground. And the exception advanced less than 10% in price. As a  
21 result, the group, as a whole, has slipped into the bottom half of the pack  
22 for Timeliness<sup>4</sup> after residing in the top quartile last time around.  
23

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<sup>3</sup> Value Line Investment Survey, April 22, 2011.

<sup>4</sup> "The Value Line 'Timeliness' measures relative probable price performance of the approximately 1,700 stocks during the next six to 12 months", Complete Overview – The Value Line Investment Survey, Value Line, Inc., 2008, 6.

1 Wall Street's apprehension is not surprising, given that most of the  
2 companies reported disappointing earnings in the fourth-quarter. (First-  
3 quarter results were not released as of the day of this report). Indeed,  
4 revenue growth, although healthy thanks to continued progress on the  
5 regulatory front, seemed to fall short of expectations. Earnings,  
6 meanwhile, were further frustrated by the increasing costs of doing  
7 business.

8  
9 \* \* \*

10  
11 Despite a more favorable regulatory climate, providers still have troubles  
12 facing them. Infrastructures are decaying rapidly and, in many cases, need  
13 complete overhauls. The costs to make the repairs are exorbitant many  
14 operating in this space do not have the funds on hand to foot the bill.  
15 Indeed, most are strapped for cash and will have to look to outside  
16 financiers to keep up. Although consolidation trends present unique  
17 opportunities for those with the financial capabilities to throw their hat in  
18 the ring, such as *Aqua America*, others are just trying to stay afloat.  
19 Unfortunately, the financing costs to stay in business, whether it be  
20 additional share or debt offerings, will probably drown most and dilute  
21 shareholder gains moving ahead.

22  
23 In addition, because the water and wastewater industry is much more capital-intensive  
24 than the electric, natural gas or telephone industries, the investment required to produce a  
25 dollar of revenue is greater. For example, as shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-2, it  
26 took \$3.83 of net utility plant on average to produce \$1.00 in operating revenues in 2010  
27 for the water utility industry as a whole. For Ohio American specifically, it took \$3.15 of  
28 net utility plant to produce \$1.00 in operating revenues in 2010. In contrast, for the  
29 electric, combination electric and gas and natural gas utility industries, on average it took  
30 only \$2.10, \$1.70 and \$1.27, respectively, to produce \$1.00 in operating revenues in  
31 2010. The greater capital intensity of water utilities is not a new phenomenon as water  
32 utilities have exhibited a consistently and significantly greater capital intensity relative to  
33 electric, combination electric and gas and natural gas utilities during the ten years ended  
34 2010, as shown on page 2 of Schedule PMA-2. As financing needs have increased over

1 the last decade, the competition for capital from traditional sources has increased, making  
2 the need to maintain financial integrity and the ability to attract needed new capital  
3 increasingly important. Because investor-owned water utilities typically do not receive  
4 federal funds for infrastructure replacement, the challenge to investor-owned water  
5 utilities is exacerbated and their access to financing is restricted, thus increasing risk.

6 The National Association of Regulatory Commissioners ("NARUC") has also  
7 highlighted the challenges facing the water and wastewater industry stemming from its  
8 capital intensity. NARUC's Board of Directors adopted the following resolution in July  
9 2006:<sup>5</sup>

10 WHEREAS, To meet the challenges of the water and wastewater industry which  
11 may face a combined capital investment requirement nearing one trillion dollars over a  
12 20-year period, the following policies and mechanisms were identified to help ensure  
13 sustainable practices in promoting needed capital investment and cost-effective rates: a)  
14 the use of prospectively relevant test years; b) the distribution system improvement  
15 charge; c) construction work in progress; d) pass-through adjustments; e) staff-assisted  
16 rate cases; f) consolidation to achieve economies of scale; g) acquisition adjustment  
17 policies to promote consolidation and elimination of non-viable systems; h) a streamlined  
18 rate case process; i) mediation and settlement procedures; j) defined timeframes for rate  
19 cases; k) integrated water resource management; l) a fair return on capital investment;  
20 *and* m) improved communications with ratepayers and stakeholders; *and*

21  
22 WHEREAS, Due to the massive capital investment required to meet current and  
23 future water quality and infrastructure requirements, adequately adjusting allowed equity  
24 returns to recognize industry risk in order to provide a fair return on invested capital was  
25 recognized as crucial...

26  
27 RESOLVED, That the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions  
28 ("NARUC"), convened in its July 2006 Summer Meetings in Austin, Texas, conceptually  
29 supports review and consideration of the innovative regulatory policies and practices  
30 identified herein as "best practices;" *and be it further*

31  
32 RESOLVED, That NARUC recommends that economic regulators consider and  
33 adopt as many as appropriate of the regulatory mechanisms identified herein as best

---

<sup>5</sup> "Resolution Supporting Consideration of Regulatory Policies Deemed as 'Best Practices'", Sponsored by the Committee on Water. Adopted by the NARUC Board of Directors, July 27, 2006.

1 practices...

2  
3 Ohio American itself is facing expected significant capital investment as it  
4 projects net capital expenditures of \$23,827,186 for 2011 through 2013, representing an  
5 increase of approximately 21% over 2010 net utility plant of \$114,723,513.

6 The water utility industry also experiences lower relative depreciation rates.  
7 Lower depreciation rates, as one of the principal sources of internal cash flows for all  
8 utilities, mean that water utility depreciation as a source of internally-generated cash is far  
9 less than for electric, natural gas or telephone utilities. Water utilities' assets have longer  
10 lives and, hence, longer capital recovery periods. As such, water utilities face greater risk  
11 due to inflation which results in a higher replacement cost per dollar of net plant than for  
12 other types of utilities. As shown on page 3 of Schedule PMA-2, water utilities  
13 experienced an average depreciation rate of 3.0% for 2010 with Ohio American  
14 experiencing a lower rate of 2.7%. In contrast, in 2010, the electric, combination electric  
15 and gas, natural gas or telephone industries, experienced average depreciation rates of  
16 4.1%, 3.7% and 3.3%, respectively.

17 As with capital intensity, the lower relative depreciation rates of water and  
18 wastewater utilities is not a new phenomenon. As shown on page 4 of Schedule PMA-2,  
19 water utility depreciation rates have been consistently and much lower than those of the  
20 electric, combination electric and gas and natural gas utilities. Such low depreciation  
21 rates signify that the pressure on cash flows remains significantly greater for water  
22 utilities than for other types of utilities.

23 In addition, not only is the water utility industry historically capital intensive, it is  
24 expected to incur significant capital expenditure needs over the next 20 years. Prior to

1 the recent economic and capital market turmoil, Standard & Poor's ("S&P") noted<sup>6</sup>:

2 Standard & Poor's expects the already capital-intensive water utility  
3 industry to become even more so over the next several years. Due to the  
4 aging pipeline infrastructure and more stringent quality standards, the U.S.  
5 Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) foresees a need for \$277 billion  
6 to upgrade and maintain U.S. water utilities through 2022, with about  
7 \$185 billion going toward infrastructure improvements. In addition, about  
8 \$200 billion will be needed for wastewater applications, which suggests  
9 increased capital spending to be a long-term trend in this industry.

10  
11 In line with these trends, many companies have announced aggressive  
12 capital spending programs. Forecast capital spending primarily focuses on  
13 infrastructure replacements and growth initiatives. Over the past five  
14 years, capital spending has been equivalent to about three times its  
15 depreciation expense. However, companies are now forecasting spending  
16 to be at or above four times depreciation expense over the intermediate  
17 term. For companies in regulatory jurisdictions that provide timely cost  
18 recovery for capital expenditures, the increased spending is likely to have a  
19 minimal effect on financial metrics and ratings. However, companies in  
20 areas without these mechanisms, earnings, and cash flow could be  
21 negatively affected by the increased spending levels, which over the longer  
22 term could harm a company's overall credit profile.

23  
24 Due to the high level of capital spending, U.S. investor-owned water  
25 utilities do not generate positive free cash flow. This, coupled with the  
26 forecast increase in capital spending over the intermediate term, will  
27 require additional access to capital markets. We expect rated water  
28 companies to have enough financial flexibility to gain that access. Ratings  
29 actions shouldn't result from this increased market activity because we  
30 expect companies to use a balanced financing approach, which should  
31 maintain debt near existing levels.

32  
33 Specifically, the EPA states the following<sup>7</sup>:

34 The survey found that the total nationwide infrastructure need is \$334.8  
35 billion for the 20-year period from January 2007 through December 2026.  
36 With \$200.8 billion in needs over the next 20 years, transmission and

---

<sup>6</sup> Standard & Poor's, Credit Outlook For U.S. Investor-Owned Water Utilities Should Remain Stable in 2008 (January 31, 2008) 2, 4.

<sup>7</sup> "Fact Sheet: "EPA's 2007 Drinking Water Infrastructure Needs Survey and Assessment", United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, February 2009, 1.

1 distribution projects represent the largest category of need. This result is  
2 consistent with the fact that transmission and distribution mains account  
3 for most of the nation's water infrastructure. The other categories, in  
4 descending order of need are: treatment, storage, source and a  
5 miscellaneous category of needs called "other". The large magnitude of the  
6 national need reflects the challenges confronting water systems as they  
7 deal with an infrastructure network that has aged considerably since these  
8 systems were constructed, in many cases, 50 to 100 years ago.

9  
10 In its 2009 infrastructure Fact Sheet<sup>8</sup> published by the American Society of Civil

11 Engineers ("ASCE") they state:

12 America's drinking water systems face an annual shortfall of at least \$11  
13 billion to replace aging facilities that are near the end of their useful lives  
14 and to comply with existing and future federal water regulations. This does  
15 not account for growth in the demand for drinking water over the next 20  
16 years. Leaking pipes lose an estimated 7 billion gallons of clean drinking  
17 water a day.

18  
19 Water utility capital expenditures as large as projected by the EPA and ASCE will  
20 require significant financing. The three sources typically used for financing are debt,  
21 equity (common and preferred) and cash flow. All three are intricately linked to the  
22 opportunity to earn a sufficient rate of return as well as the ability to achieve that return.  
23 Consistent with the *Bluefield* and *Hope* decisions discussed previously, the return must be  
24 sufficient enough to maintain credit quality as well as enable the attraction of necessary  
25 new capital, be it debt or equity capital. If unable to raise debt or equity capital, the utility  
26 must turn to either retained earnings or free cash flow, both of which are directly linked to  
27 earning a sufficient rate of return. If either is inadequate, it will be nearly impossible for  
28 the utility to invest in needed infrastructure. Since all utilities typically experience  
29 negative free cash flows, it is clear that an insufficient rate of return can be financially

---

<sup>8</sup> 2009 American Society of Civil Engineers, Report Card for America's Infrastructure 2009.

1 devastating for utilities and for its customers, the ratepayers. Page 5 of Schedule PMA-2  
2 demonstrates that the free cash flows (funds from operations minus capital expenditures)  
3 of water utilities as a percent of total operating revenues has been consistently more  
4 negative than that of the electric, combination electric and gas and natural gas utilities for  
5 the ten years ended 2010. Magnifying the impact of water utilities' negative free cash  
6 flow position is a continued inability to achieve what may already be an insufficient  
7 authorized rate of return on common equity, as will be discussed subsequently.

8 Consequently, as with the previously discussed capital intensity and depreciation  
9 rates, significant capital expenditures relative to net plant as well as the consistently and  
10 more significantly negative free cash flow relative to operating revenues of water utilities  
11 indicates greater investment risk for water utilities relative to electric, combination  
12 electric and gas and natural gas utilities.

13 In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the water utility industry's high degree of  
14 capital intensity, low depreciation rates and significant negative free cash flow, coupled  
15 with the need for substantial infrastructure capital spending, requires regulatory support in  
16 the form of adequate and timely rate relief, as recognized by NARUC, so water utilities  
17 will be able to successfully meet the challenges they face.

18 **Q10. Are there other indications that the water utility industry exhibits more investment**  
19 **risk than the electric, combination electric and gas and natural gas utility**  
20 **industries?**

21 A10. Yes. Schedule PMA-3 presents several such indications: total debt / earnings before  
22 interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization ("EBITDA"); funds from operations  
23 ("FFO") / total debt; funds from operations / interest coverage; before-income tax /



1 interest coverage; earned returns on common equity (“ROEs”) and earned v. authorized  
2 ROEs for each utility industry for the ten years ended 2010. The increasing proportion of  
3 total debt to EBITDA for the water utilities indicates significantly increasing and greater  
4 financial risk for water utilities, which began the most recent ten years below that of  
5 electric, combination electric and gas and natural gas utilities.

6 As noted previously, S&P evaluates total debt as a percentage of EBITDA and  
7 FFO as a percentage of debt in the bond / credit rating process. Page 1 of Schedule PMA-  
8 3 shows that total debt / EBITDA has risen steadily for water utilities for the ten years  
9 ended 2010, dropping only slightly for 2010. Notwithstanding the decline in 2010, total  
10 debt / EBITDA is now higher than that for electric, combination electric and gas and  
11 natural gas utilities. Page 2 shows that FFO / total debt has steadily declined for water  
12 utilities over the decade ending 2010, while rising for the other utility groups. The  
13 consistently low level of FFO / total debt for the water utilities, is a further indication of  
14 the pressures upon water utility cash flows and the increased relative investment risk  
15 which the water utility industry faces.

16 Pages 3 and 4 of Schedule PMA-3 confirm the pressures upon both cash flows  
17 and income faced by water utilities. Page 3 shows that FFO / interest coverage for water,  
18 electric, combination electric and gas and natural gas utilities followed a similar pattern to  
19 FFO interest coverage for the ten years ended 2010. FFO interest coverage remained  
20 relative consistent for water utilities, rising and falling between 2.0 and 3.0 times during  
21 the period. A similar pattern was exhibited by electric utilities. However, FFO / total debt  
22 for combination electric and gas as well as natural gas utilities rose during the ten years,  
23 exceeding that of water utilities significantly in 2009 and dropping back somewhat in

1 2010. Page 4 shows that before-income tax coverage interest coverage for water utilities  
2 also remained relatively stable, falling below that of gas utilities in 2002 and below that  
3 of electric and combination electric and gas utilities between 2005 and 2006, where it  
4 remained for the remainder of the ten years. In 2010, in all likelihood due to the “Great  
5 Recession” and the economy’s currently nascent, fragile recovery from it, before-income  
6 tax interest coverage for water, electric and combination electric and gas utilities has  
7 converged at slightly lower than 3.0 times, while natural gas utilities continue to enjoy a  
8 significantly greater before-income tax interest coverage of approximately 4.25 times in  
9 2010. Once again, the consistency and relatively low level of interest coverage ratios for  
10 water utilities are further indications of the pressures upon cash flow which water utilities  
11 face, confirming greater investment risk for water utilities relative to electric,  
12 combination electric and gas and natural gas utilities.

13 A final indication of the relative investment risk of water utilities compared with  
14 electric, combination electric and gas and natural gas utilities, are trends in earned and  
15 authorized ROEs. As shown on page 5 of Schedule PMA-3, earned ROEs, on average, for  
16 water utilities have generally been below those of electric, combination electric and gas  
17 and natural gas utilities during the ten years ended 2010. They have consistently been  
18 lower for the last five years. However, such a comparison would not be complete without  
19 a comparison of earned ROEs with authorized ROEs, as shown on pages 6 and 7 of  
20 Schedule PMA-3. The authorized ROEs are those reported in AUS Utility Reports for  
21 the last month of each year representing the authorized ROEs in effect during the  
22 previous year, rather than the outcomes of rate cases decided during the year. Hence,  
23 these authorized ROEs represent the revenue requirements of each year which give rise to

1 the earned ROEs in each year. Water utilities generally, consistently and dramatically  
2 earned far below their authorized ROEs, while electric and combination electric and gas  
3 utilities earned above their authorized ROEs in some years and below in others. In  
4 contrast, natural gas utilities generally, consistently and dramatically earned above their  
5 authorized ROEs. Notwithstanding the closing of the gap between the average authorized  
6 ROEs for the various utility groups over the ten year period, for the majority of the  
7 period, water utilities have failed to earn their average authorized ROE with earned ROEs  
8 significantly lower than authorized, a likely contributing factor to the greater risk  
9 indicated by the previously discussed coverage metrics.

10 In view of all of the foregoing, it is clear that the investment risk of water utilities  
11 has increased over the most recent ten years and that water utilities currently face greater  
12 investment risk relative to electric, combination electric and gas and natural gas utilities.

13 **Q11. Does Ohio American face additional business risk?**

14 A11. Yes. Ohio American faces additional extraordinary business risk due to its smaller size  
15 relative to the proxy group as well as the unique business risks discussed by Ohio  
16 American Witness Gary M. VerDouw in his direct testimony. I will comment upon those  
17 risks. As discussed above, the greater the level of risk, the greater the rate of return  
18 demanded / required by investors, consistent with the basic financial precept of risk and  
19 return. Therefore an upward adjustment to the indicated common equity cost rate is  
20 necessary to reflect these unique risks of Ohio American and will be discussed  
21 subsequently.

22 **Q12. Please discuss Ohio American's increased relative business risk due to the**  
23 **availability and quality of its source of supply.**

1 A12. As Mr. VerDouw explains in his direct testimony, source water availability and quality  
2 impacts Ohio American's ability to serve the current and future water needs of its  
3 customers. Typically, Ohio American does not own the water used in its operations, with  
4 the availability of water supply established through requirements set by governmental  
5 entities and other provisions of law.

6 In addition, some of the surface water supplies which Ohio American accesses are  
7 exposed to increased treatment costs and potential interruption of water supplies from  
8 river transportation related accidents, especially in its Lake Erie supply in Ashtabula. As  
9 Mr. VerDouw also notes, Lake Erie barges transport both hazardous and non-hazardous  
10 cargos which have the potential for polluting the water supply of Lake Erie. In addition,  
11 Zebra Mussels in Lake Erie add to the risk because they can clog the intake structure for  
12 the Company's Ashtabula Water Treatment Plant, resulting in extensive and expensive  
13 cleaning. Also, because some of Ohio American's surface water supplies are agricultural  
14 watershed, grazing livestock results in Cryptosporidium and Giardia contamination as  
15 well as herbicide and pesticide contamination. Finally, water utility is at risk from rapid  
16 changes in turbidity which affects both river and stream sources of supply.

17 **Q13. Please discuss how Ohio American's exposure to flooding increases its business risk**  
18 **relative to that of the proxy group.**

19 A13. At Mr. VerDouw explains in his direct testimony, surface water supplies, such as those  
20 from rivers, are at risk of flood damage, unlike groundwater supplies or surface water  
21 supplies from impoundments, such as reservoirs. The Company's pumping and treatment  
22 facilities in Marion and Tiffin are within the floodplains of the Little Scioto and Sandusky  
23 Rivers. Although Ohio American's facilities are protected against 100 year flood levels,

1 potential flooding impacts range from interruption of service to structural and electrical  
2 damage from severe flood events.

3 **Q14. Please discuss how Ohio American's physical composition and service territory**  
4 **increase its business risk relative to that of the proxy group.**

5 A14. Ohio American's service territory stretches from the far southern point of Ohio to the far  
6 northeastern tip of the state. As Mr. VerDouw discusses, this presents some unique risks  
7 for Ohio American. Geographically dispersed operations and varying operational  
8 parameters mean compliance with a widely ranging regulatory requirements relative to  
9 groundwater and surface water sources, expansive water main distribution systems and  
10 multiple discharge points.

11 **Q15. Please discuss Ohio American's specific regulatory risks.**

12 A15. Mr. VerDouw, in his direct testimony, highlights some of Ohio American's specific  
13 regulatory risks. These risks are related to the fact that approximately 80% of the typical  
14 Ohio American bill is volumetric and more subject to fluctuation, uncertainty and the  
15 impact of some of the previously discussed risks. Ohio American also faces increased  
16 regulatory lag due to the fact that straight-fixed variable rate designs are not in place, nor  
17 are pass-throughs for various expenses. Because of the geographical reach of the  
18 Company, there is a greater complexity of rates as well as the likelihood of greater rate  
19 case intervention increasing rate case expense.

20 Finally, as Mr. VerDouw notes, Ohio American has been historically unable to  
21 achieve its authorized rate of return. As shown on Schedule PMA-5, for the five years  
22 ended 2010, Ohio American achieved an average 5.08% negative ROE significantly and  
23 obviously below its average authorized ROE for the period. In contrast, the AUS Utility

1 Reports Water Companies also did not earn their average authorized ROE over the five  
2 years ended 2010, but never fell below an 8.00% ROE during the five years as shown on  
3 page 7 of Schedule PMA-3. As discussed previously, an inability to earn the authorized  
4 ROE puts great pressure on cash flow coverage and cash flow relative to debt metrics,  
5 increasing relative risk.

6 **Q16. Please explain how Ohio American's smaller size increases its business risk relative**  
7 **to the proxy groups.**

8 A16. As will be discussed subsequently, Ohio American's smaller size, \$90.402 million in  
9 estimated market capitalization relative to the average market capitalization of \$1.195  
10 billion for the nine water companies, shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-16, indicates  
11 greater relative business risk because all else equal, size has a bearing on risk. It is clear,  
12 too, that on a relative basis, water utilities on average are smaller in terms of market  
13 capitalization than electric, combination electric and gas and natural gas utilities, as  
14 demonstrated on page 5 of Schedule PMA-3, which shows the market capitalization of  
15 each utility for the ten years ended 2010.

16 **Q17. Please explain why size has a bearing on business risk.**

17 A17. It is conventional wisdom, supported by actual returns over time, that smaller companies  
18 tend to be more risky causing investors to expect greater returns as compensation for that  
19 risk. Smaller companies are simply less able to cope with significant events which affect  
20 sales, revenues and earnings. For example, in general, the loss of revenues from a few  
21 larger customers would have a greater effect on a small company than on a much larger  
22 company with a larger, more diverse, customer base. Moreover, smaller companies are  
23 generally less diverse in their operations as well as experiencing less financial flexibility.

1 In addition, the effect of extreme weather conditions, i.e., prolonged droughts or  
2 extremely wet weather, will have a greater affect upon a small operating water utility than  
3 upon the much larger, more geographically diverse holding companies.

4 Further evidence of the risk effects of size include the fact that investors demand  
5 greater returns to compensate for the lack of marketability and liquidity of the securities  
6 of smaller firms. That it is the use of funds invested and not the source of those funds  
7 which gives rise to the risk of any investment is a basic financial principle<sup>9</sup>. Therefore,  
8 because Ohio American is the regulated utility to whose jurisdictional rate base the  
9 overall cost of capital allowed by the Commission will be applied, the relevant risk  
10 reflected in the cost of capital must be that of Ohio American, including the impact of its  
11 small size on common equity cost rate. As noted previously, Ohio American is smaller  
12 than the average proxy group company based upon the results of a study of the market  
13 capitalization of the nine water companies as shown on Schedule PMA-17.

14 In addition, Brigham<sup>10</sup> states:

15 A number of researchers have observed that portfolios of small-firms have  
16 earned consistently higher average returns than those of large-firms stocks;  
17 this is called "small-firm effect." On the surface, it would seem to be  
18 advantageous to the small firms to provide average returns in a stock  
19 market that are higher than those of larger firms. In reality, it is bad news  
20 for the small firm; what *the small-firm effect means is that the capital*  
21 *market demands higher returns on stocks of small firms than on otherwise*  
22 *similar stocks of the large firms.* (italics added)

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<sup>9</sup> Brealey, Richard A. and Myers, Stewart C., Principles of Corporate Finance (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988) 173 198.

<sup>10</sup> Brigham, Eugene F., Fundamentals of Financial Management, Fifth Edition (The Dryden Press, 1989) 623.

1 **B. FINANCIAL RISK**

2 **Q18. Please define financial risk and explain why it is important to the determination of a**  
3 **fair rate of return.**

4 A18. Financial risk is the additional risk created by the introduction of senior capital, i.e., debt  
5 and preferred stock, into the capital structure. The higher the proportion of senior capital  
6 in the capital structure, the higher the financial risk which must be factored into the  
7 common equity cost rate, consistent with the previously mentioned basic financial  
8 principle of risk and return, i.e., investors demand a higher common equity return as  
9 compensation for bearing higher investment risk.

10 In May 2009, S&P expanded its Business Risk / Financial Risk Matrix in an effort  
11 to augment its independence, strengthen the rating process and increase S&P's  
12 transparency to better serve its markets (see page 4 of Schedule PMA-4). S&P initially  
13 published its electric, gas, and water utility ratings rankings in a framework consistent  
14 with the manner in which it presents its rating conclusions across all other corporate  
15 sectors in November 2007. S&P then stated<sup>11</sup>:

16 Incorporating utility ratings into a shared framework to communicate the  
17 fundamental credit analysis of a company furthers the goals of  
18 transparency and comparability in the ratings process.

19 \* \* \*

20  
21  
22 The utilities rating methodology remains unchanged, and the use of the  
23 corporate risk matrix has not resulted in any changes to ratings or  
24 outlooks. The same five factors that we analyzed to produce a business  
25 risk score in the familiar 10-point scale are used in determining whether a  
26 utility possesses an "Excellent," "Strong," "Satisfactory," "Weak," or  
27 "Vulnerable" business risk profile.

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<sup>11</sup> Standard & Poor's – Ratings Direct – "U.S. Utilities Ratings Analysis Now Portrayed In The S&P Corporate Ratings Matrix" (November, 30, 2007) 2.



1  
2 In May 2009, S&P revised its Business Risk / Financial Risk Matrix with the new  
3 business risk/financial risk matrix shown in Table 1 on page 2 of Schedule PMA-4 and  
4 financial risk indicative ratios for utilities shown in Table 2 on page 4. Notwithstanding  
5 the metrics published in Table 2, S&P stated:

6 The rating matrix indicative outcomes are what we typically observe – but  
7 are not meant to be precise indications or guarantees of future rating  
8 opinions. Positive and negative nuances in our analysis may lead to a  
9 notch higher or lower than the outcomes indicated in the various cells of  
10 the matrix.

11  
12 As shown on Schedule PMA-10, page 2, the average S&P bond rating (issuer  
13 credit rating), business risk profile and financial risk profile of the nine water companies  
14 are split A+ (A), Excellent and Intermediate.

15 **Q19. Please describe Ohio American's degree of financial risk relative to the proxy group.**

16 A19. Although Ohio American's ratemaking capital structure ratios and hence, financial risk  
17 are similar to the nine water companies on average, Ohio American's consolidated long-  
18 term debt ratio at December 31, 2010, of 48.24% is somewhat lower than the average  
19 long-term debt ratio of the nine water companies, 50.97%, at December 31, 2010.  
20 Therefore, Ohio American's financial risk, although similar, is slightly lower than that of  
21 the nine water companies. Consistent with the previously mentioned financial principle  
22 of risk and return, the lower financial risk of Ohio American must be reflected in the  
23 recommended common equity cost rate. Consequently, a downward adjustment of 22  
24 basis points (a negative 0.22%) was made to the indicated common equity cost rate of  
25 11.00% based upon the nine water companies before adjustment for financial risk,  
26 flotation cost and business risk. The derivation of this adjustment is discussed below.

1 **Q20. Nevertheless, can the combined business risks, i.e., investment risk of an enterprise,**  
2 **be proxied by bond and credit ratings?**

3 A20. Yes, similar bond ratings/issuer credit (bond/credit) ratings reflect and are representative  
4 of similar combined business and financial risks, i.e., total risk faced by bond investors.  
5 Although specific business or financial risks may differ between companies, the same  
6 bond/credit rating indicates that the combined risks are similar, albeit not necessarily  
7 equal, as the purpose of the bond/credit rating process is to assess credit quality or credit  
8 risk and not common equity risk. Risk distinctions within S&P's bond rating categories  
9 are recognized by a plus or minus, i.e., within the A category, an S&P rating can be at  
10 A+, A, or A-. Similarly, risk distinctions for Moody's ratings are distinguished by  
11 numerical rating gradations, i.e., within the A category, a Moody's rating can be A1, A2  
12 and A3. For S&P, additional risk distinctions are reflected in the assignment of one of  
13 the six business risk profiles and six financial risk profiles, shown in Tables 1 and 2 on  
14 pages 2 and 4 of Schedule PMA-4.

15 In summary, it is clear that S&P's bond/credit rating process encompasses a  
16 qualitative analysis of business and financial risks (see page 3 of Schedule PMA-4).  
17 While not a means by which one can specifically quantify the differential in common  
18 equity risk between companies, bond/credit ratings provide a useful means with which to  
19 compare/differentiate investment risk between companies because they are the result of a  
20 thorough and comprehensive analysis of all diversifiable business risks, i.e., investment  
21 risk.

**C. OHIO AMERICAN WATER COMPANY**

**Q21. Have you reviewed the rate filing of Ohio American?**

A21. Yes. As of April 30, 2011, Ohio American provides water and wastewater service to approximately 50,903 customers in portions of Ashtabula, Lawrence, Richland, Marion, Morrow, Preble, Pike, Seneca, Franklin and Portage counties. As a wholly-owned subsidiary of AWK, Ohio American's common stock is not publicly traded.

As shown on Schedule PMA-5, during the five-year period ending 2010, the achieved average earnings on book common equity for Ohio American was a negative 5.08%, ranging from a negative 10.47% in 2006 to a positive 1.70% in 2010. The five-year ending 2010 average common equity ratio based upon total permanent capital (excluding short-term debt) was 48.89%, while the five-year average dividend payout ratio was 23.11%.

Total debt as a percentage of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization ("EBITDA") for the years 2006-2010 ranged between 4.63 and 5.85 times, averaging 5.36 times during the period.

**D. PROXY GROUP**

**Q22. Please explain how you chose the proxy group of nine water companies.**

A22. The basis of selection for the proxy group was to select those companies which meet the following criteria: 1) they are included in the Water Company Group of AUS Utility Reports (June 2011); 2) they have Value Line, Reuters, Zacks or Yahoo! Finance, consensus five-year earnings per share ("EPS") growth rate projections; 3) they have a positive Value Line five-year dividends per share ("DPS") growth rate projection; 4) they have a Value Line adjusted beta; 5) they have not cut or omitted their common dividends

1 during the five years ending 2010 or through the time of the preparation of this testimony;  
2 6) they have 60% or greater of 2010 total operating income derived from and 60% or  
3 greater of 2010 total assets devoted to regulated water operations; and 7) at the time of  
4 the preparation of this testimony, they had not publicly announced that they were  
5 involved in any major merger or acquisition activity, e.g., one publicly-traded utility  
6 merging with or acquiring another.

7 The following companies met these criteria: American States Water Co.,  
8 American Water Works Co., Inc., Aqua America, Inc., Artesian Resources Corp.,  
9 California Water Service Corp., Connecticut Water Service, Inc., Middlesex Water  
10 Company, SJW Corporation and York Water Company.

11 **Q23. Please describe Schedule PMA-6.**

12 A23. Schedule PMA-6 contains comparative capitalization and financial statistics for the nine  
13 water companies for the years 2006-2010.

14 During the five-year period ending 2010, the historically achieved average  
15 earnings rate on book common equity for the group averaged 7.51%. The average  
16 common equity ratio based upon total permanent capital (excluding short-term debt) was  
17 49.71%, and the average dividend payout ratio was 63.57%.

18 Total debt as a percent of EBITDA for the years 2006-2010 ranged between 4.56  
19 and 9.07 times, averaging 5.90 times, while funds from operations relative to total debt  
20 ranged from 15.04% to 17.10%, averaging 16.25%.

## V. COMMON EQUITY COST RATE MODELS

### A. THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS (“EMH”)

**Q24. Please describe the conceptual basis of the EMH.**

A24. The EMH, which is the foundation of modern investment theory, was pioneered by Eugene F. Fama<sup>12</sup> in 1970. An efficient market is one in which security prices reflect all relevant information all the time, with the implication that prices adjust instantaneously to new information, thus reflecting the intrinsic fundamental economic value of a security.<sup>13</sup>

The generally-accepted “semistrong” form of the EMH asserts that all publicly available information is fully reflected in securities prices, i.e., that fundamental analysis cannot enable an investor to “out-perform the market” in the long-run as noted by Brealey and Myers<sup>14</sup>. The “semistrong” form of the EMH is generally held to be true because the use of insider information often enables investors to earn excessive returns by “outperforming the market” in the short-run. This means that all perceived risks and publicly-available information are taken into account by investors in the prices they pay for securities, such as bond/credit ratings, discussions about companies by bond/credit rating agencies and investment analysts as well as the discussions of the various common equity cost rate methodologies (models) in the financial literature. In an attempt to emulate investor behavior, no single common equity cost rate model should be relied upon exclusively in determining a cost rate of common equity and the results of multiple

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<sup>12</sup> Fama, Eugene F., “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work” (Journal of Finance, May 1970) 383-417.

<sup>13</sup> Morin, Roger A., New Regulatory Finance (Public Utility Reports, Inc., 2006) 279-281.

<sup>14</sup> Brealey, Richard A. and Myers, Stewart C., Principles of Corporate Finance First Edition, (McGraw-Hill, 1996) 329.

costs of common equity models should be taken into account. In addition, the academic literature provides substantial support for the need to rely upon more than one cost of common equity model in arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate.<sup>15</sup>

**Q25. Are the cost of common equity models you use market-based models, and hence based upon the EMH?**

A25. Yes. The DCF model is market-based in that market prices are utilized in developing the dividend yield component of the model. The RPM is market-based in that the bond ratings and expected bond yields used in the application of the RPM reflect the market's assessment of bond/credit risk. In addition, the use of betas to determine the equity risk premium also reflects the market's assessment of market/systematic risk as betas are derived from regression analyses of market prices. The CAPM is market-based for many of the same reasons that the RPM is market-based i.e., the use of expected bond (Treasury bond) yields and betas. The process of selecting the comparable risk non-utility companies is market-based in that it is based upon statistics which result from regression analyses of market prices and reflect the market's assessment of total risk. Therefore, all the cost of common equity models I utilize are market-based models, and hence based upon the EMH.

**B. DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL ("DCF")**

**Q26. What is the theoretical basis of the DCF model?**

A26. The theory underlying the DCF model is that the present value of an expected future

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<sup>15</sup> Morin 428-431.  
Brigham, Eugene F. and Gapenski, Louis C., Financial Management – Theory and Practice Fourth Edition, (The Dryden Press, 1985) 256.  
Brigham, Eugene F. and Daves, Phillip R., Intermediate Financial Management, (Thomson-Southwestern, 2007) 332-333.

1 stream of net cash flows during the investment holding period can be determined by  
2 discounting those cash flows at the cost of capital, or the investors' capitalization rate.  
3 DCF theory indicates that an investor buys a stock for an expected total return rate which  
4 is derived from cash flows received in the form of dividends plus appreciation in market  
5 price (the expected growth rate). Mathematically, the dividend yield on market price plus  
6 a growth rate equals the capitalization rate, i.e., the total common equity return rate  
7 expected by investors.

8 **Q27. Which version of the DCF model do you use?**

9 A27. I utilize the single-stage constant growth DCF model because, in my experience, it is the  
10 most widely utilized version of the DCF used in public utility rate regulation. In my  
11 opinion, it is widely utilized because utilities are generally in the mature stage of their  
12 lifecycles and not transitioning from one growth stage to another. This is especially true  
13 for water utilities.

14 All companies, including utilities, go through typical life cycles in their  
15 development, initially progressing through a growth stage, moving onto a transition stage  
16 and finally assuming a steady-state or constant growth state. However, the U.S. public  
17 utility industry is a long-standing industry, dating back to approximately 1882. The  
18 standards of rate of return regulation of public utilities date back to the previously  
19 discussed principles of fair rate of return established in the *Hope* and *Bluefield* decisions  
20 of 1944 and 1923, respectively. Hence, the public utility industry in the U.S. is a stable  
21 and mature industry characterized by the steady-state or constant-growth stage of a multi-  
22 stage DCF model. The regulated economics of the utility industry further reflect the

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1 features of this relative stability and demand maturity. Their returns on capital  
2 investment, i.e., rate base, are set through a ratemaking process and not determined in the  
3 competitive markets. This characteristic, taken together with the longevity of the public  
4 utility industry at large, all contribute to the stability and maturity of the industry,  
5 including the water utility industry.

6 Since there is no basis for applying multi-stage growth versions of the DCF model  
7 to determine the common equity cost rates of mature public utility companies, the  
8 constant growth model is most appropriate.

9 **Q28. Please describe the dividend yield you used in your application of the DCF model.**

10 A28. The unadjusted dividend yields are based upon a recent (June 17, 2011) indicated  
11 dividend divided by the average of closing market prices for the 60 days ending June 17,  
12 2011 as shown in Column 1 on page 1 of Schedule PMA-7.

13 **Q29. Please explain the adjusted dividend yield shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-7,**  
14 **Column 7.**

15 A29. Because dividends are paid quarterly, or periodically, as opposed to continuously (daily),  
16 an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is often referred to as the  
17 discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF model.

18 DCF theory calls for the use of the full growth rate, or  $D_1$ , in calculating the  
19 dividend yield component of the model. However, since the various companies in the  
20 proxy group increase their quarterly dividend at various times during the year, a  
21 reasonable assumption is to reflect one-half the annual dividend growth rate in the  
22 dividend yield component, or  $D_{1/2}$ . This is a conservative approach which does not  
23 overstate the dividend yield which should be representative of the next twelve-month



1 period. Therefore, the actual average dividend yields in Column 1 on page 1 of Schedule  
2 PMA-7 have been adjusted upward to reflect one-half the average projected growth rate  
3 shown in Column 6.

4 **Q30. Please explain the basis of the growth rates of the proxy group which you use in**  
5 **your application of the DCF model.**

6 A30. Schedule PMA-8 shows that approximately 53% of the common shares of the nine water  
7 companies are held by individuals as opposed to institutional investors. Institutional  
8 investors tend to have more extensive informational resources than most individual  
9 investors. Individual investors, with more limited resources, are therefore likely to place  
10 great significance on the opinions expressed by financial information services, such as  
11 Value Line, Reuters, Zacks and Yahoo! Finance, which are easily accessible and/or  
12 available on the Internet and through public libraries. Investors realize that analysts have  
13 significant insight into the dynamics of the industries and individual companies they  
14 analyze, as well as company's abilities to effectively manage the effects of changing laws  
15 and regulations and ever changing economic and market conditions.

16 Over the long run, there can be no growth in DPS without growth in EPS.  
17 Security analysts' earnings expectations have a more significant, but not sole, influence  
18 on market prices than dividend expectations. Thus, the use of earnings growth rates in a  
19 DCF analysis provides a better matching between investors' market price appreciation  
20 expectations and the growth rate component of the DCF. Earnings expectations have a  
21 significant influence on market prices and their appreciation or "growth" experienced by

1 investors.<sup>16</sup> This should be evident even to relatively unsophisticated investors just by  
2 listening to financial new reports on radio, TV or reading the newspapers.

3 In addition, Myron Gordon, the “father” of the standard regulatory version of the  
4 DCF model widely utilized throughout the United States in rate base/rate of return  
5 regulation has recognized the significance of analysts’ forecasts of growth in EPS in a  
6 speech he gave in March 1990 before the Institute for Quantitative Research and Finance.  
7 He said:

8 We have seen that earnings and growth estimates by security analysts were  
9 found by Malkiel and Cragg to be superior to data obtained from financial  
10 statements for the explanation of variation in price among common stocks.  
11 . . . estimates by security analysts available from sources such as IBES are  
12 far superior to the data available to Malkiel and Cragg. Eq (7) is not as  
13 elegant as Eq (4), but it has a good deal more intuitive appeal. It says that  
14 investors buy earnings, but what they will pay for a dollar of earnings  
15 increases with the extent to which the earnings are reflected in the  
16 dividend or in appreciation through growth.

17  
18 Professor Gordon recognized that total return is largely affected by the terminal price  
19 which is mostly affected by earnings (hence price / earnings multiples). However, while  
20 EPS is the most significant factor influencing market prices, it is by no means the only  
21 factor that affects market prices, as recognized by Bonbright<sup>17</sup>:

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<sup>16</sup> Morin 298 - 303.

<sup>17</sup> Bonbright, James C., Danielsen, Albert L., Kamerschen, David R., Principles of Public Utility Rates (Public Utilities Reports, Inc., 1988) 334.

1 In the first place, commissions cannot forecast, except within wide limits,  
2 the effect their rate orders will have on the market prices of the stocks of  
3 the companies they regulate. In the second place, *whatever the initial*  
4 *market prices may be, they are sure to change not only with the changing*  
5 *prospects for earnings, but with the changing outlook of an inherently*  
6 *volatile stock market.* In short, market prices are beyond the control,  
7 though not beyond the influence of rate regulation. Moreover, even if a  
8 commission did possess the power of control, any attempt to exercise it ...  
9 would result in harmful, uneconomic shifts in public utility rate levels.  
10 (italics added)  
11

12 Studies performed by Cragg and Malkiel<sup>18</sup> demonstrate that analysts' forecasts are  
13 superior to historical growth rate extrapolations. Some question the accuracy of analysts'  
14 forecast of EPS growth, however, it does not really matter what the level of accuracy of  
15 those analysts' forecasts is well after the fact. What is important is that they reflect  
16 widely held expectations influencing investors at the time they make their pricing  
17 decisions and hence the market prices they pay. Moreover, there is no empirical evidence  
18 that investors, consistent with the EMH, would disregard analysts' estimates of growth in  
19 earnings per share.<sup>19</sup> As stated previously, the "semistrong" form of the EMH, which is  
20 generally held to be true, indicates investors are aware of all publicly-available  
21 information, including the many security analysts' earnings growth rate forecasts  
22 available. Investors are also aware of the accuracy of past forecasts, whether for EPS or  
23 DPS growth or for interest rates levels. Investors have no prior knowledge of the  
24 accuracy of any forecasts available at the time they make their investment decisions, as

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<sup>18</sup> Cragg, John G. and Malkiel, Burton G., Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices (University of Chicago Press, 1982) Chapter 4.

<sup>19</sup> Agrawal, Anup and Chen, Mark A., "Do Analysts' Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations", (Journal of Law and Economics, August 2008), Vol. 51.

1 that accuracy only becomes known after some future period of time has elapsed.  
2 Therefore, given the overwhelming academic/empirical support regarding the superiority  
3 of security analysts' EPS growth rate forecasts, such EPS growth rate projections should  
4 be relied upon in a cost of common equity analysis.

5 In response to recent concern about the use of security analysts' EPS growth rate  
6 forecasts, Malkiel<sup>20</sup> affirmed his belief in the superiority of analysts' earnings forecasts  
7 when he testified before the Public Service Commission of South Carolina, in November  
8 2002:

9 With all the publicity given to tainted analysts' forecasts and  
10 investigations instituted by the New York Attorney General, the National  
11 Association of Securities Dealers, and the Securities & Exchange  
12 Commission, I believe the upward bias that existed in the late 1990s has  
13 indeed diminished. In summary, I believe that current analysts' forecasts  
14 are more reliable than they were during the late 1990s. Therefore,  
15 analysts' forecasts remain the proper tool to use in performing a Gordon  
16 Model DCF analysis.

17 Consequently, I have reviewed security analysts' projected growth rates in EPS, as  
18 well as Value Line's projected five-year compound growth rates in EPS for each  
19 company in the proxy group as shown in Columns 2 through 5, on page 1 of Schedule  
20 PMA-7.

21 **Q31. Please summarize the DCF model results.**

22 A31. As shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-7, the median result of the application of the  
23 single-stage DCF model is 9.54% for the nine water companies. In arriving at a  
24 conclusion of a DCF-indicated common equity cost rate for the proxy group, I have relied

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<sup>20</sup> Burton A. Malkiel, the Chemical Bank Chairman's Professor of Economics at Princeton University and author of the widely-read national bestselling book on investing entitled, "A Random Walk Down Wall Street: The Time-Tested Strategy for Successful Investing (Completely Revised and Updated)" (W.W. Norton & Co. 2011).

1 upon the median of the results of the DCF, due to the wide range of DCF results as well  
2 as the continuing volatile capital market conditions and to not give undue weight to  
3 outliers on either the high or the low side. In my opinion, the median is a more accurate  
4 and reliable measure of central tendency, and provides recognition of all the DCF results.

5 **C. THE RISK PREMIUM MODEL ("RPM")**

6 **Q32. Please describe the theoretical basis of the RPM.**

7 A32. The RPM is based upon the basic financial principle of risk and return, namely, that  
8 investors require greater returns for bearing greater risk. The RPM recognizes that  
9 common equity capital has greater investment risk than debt capital, as common equity  
10 shareholders are last in line in any claim on a company's assets and earnings, with debt  
11 holders being first in line. Therefore, investors require higher returns from common  
12 stocks than from investment in bonds, to compensate them for bearing the additional risk.

13 While the investors' required common equity return cannot be directly determined  
14 or observed, it is possible to directly observe bond returns and yields. According to RPM  
15 theory, one can assess a common equity risk premium over bonds, either historically or  
16 prospectively, and then use that premium to derive a cost rate of common equity.

17 In summary, according to RPM theory, the cost of common equity equals the  
18 expected cost rate for long-term debt capital plus a risk premium over that cost rate to  
19 compensate common shareholders for the added risk of being unsecured and last-in-line  
20 for any claim on the corporation's assets and earnings.

21 **Q33. Some analysts state that the RPM is another form of the CAPM. Do you agree?**

22 A33. While there are some similarities, there is a very significant distinction between the two  
23 models. The RPM and CAPM both add a "risk premium" to an interest rate. However,

1 the beta approach to the determination of an equity risk premium in the RPM should not  
2 be confused with the CAPM. Beta is a measure of systematic, or market, risk, a relatively  
3 small percentage of total risk (the sum of both non-diversifiable systematic and  
4 diversifiable unsystematic risk). Unsystematic risk is fully captured in the RPM through  
5 the use of the long-term public utility bond yield as can be shown by reference to page 3  
6 of Schedule PMA-4 which confirms that the bond/credit rating process involves a  
7 comprehensive assessment of both business and financial risks. In contrast, the use of a  
8 risk-free rate of return in the CAPM does not, and by definition cannot, reflect a  
9 company's specific, i.e., unsystematic, risk. Consequently, a much larger portion of the  
10 total common equity cost rate is reflected in the company- or proxy group-specific bond  
11 yield (a product of the bond rating) than is reflected in the risk-free rate in the CAPM, or  
12 even by the dividend yield employed in the DCF model. Moreover, the financial  
13 literature recognizes the RPM and CAPM as two separate and distinct cost of common  
14 equity models.

15 **Q34. Please explain the basis of the expected bond yield of 6.00% applicable to the proxy**  
16 **group of nine water companies shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-9.**

17 A34. The first step in the RPM analysis is to determine the expected bond yield. Because both  
18 ratemaking and the cost of capital, including common equity cost rate, are prospective in  
19 nature, a prospective yield on similarly-rated long-term debt is essential. Since both  
20 ratemaking and the cost of capital are prospective in nature, I rely upon a consensus  
21 forecast of about 50 economists of the expected yield on Aaa rated corporate bonds for  
22 the six calendar quarters ending with the third calendar quarter of 2012 as derived from  
23 the June 1, 2011 Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (shown on page 7 of Schedule PMA-9).

1 As shown on Line No. 1 of page 1 of Schedule PMA-9, the average expected yield on  
2 Moody's Aaa rated corporate bonds is 5.43%. An adjustment of 43 basis points (0.43%)  
3 is necessary to adjust that average Aaa corporate bond yield to be equivalent to a  
4 Moody's A2 rated public utility bond as shown on Line No. 2 and explained in Note 2  
5 resulting in an expected bond yield applicable to a Moody's A rated public utility bond of  
6 5.86% as shown on Line No. 3.

7 Since the nine water companies average Moody's bond rating is A3, an  
8 adjustment of 14 basis points (0.14%) is necessary to make the prospective bond yield  
9 applicable to an A3 public utility bond, as detailed in Note 3 on page 1 of Schedule PMA-  
10 9. Therefore, the expected specific bond yield is 6.00% for the nine water companies as  
11 shown on Line No. 5.

12 **Q35. Please explain the method utilized to estimate the equity risk premium.**

13 A35. I evaluated the results of two different historical equity risk premium studies, as well as  
14 Value Line's forecasted total annual market return in excess of the prospective yield on  
15 Moody's Aaa corporate bonds, as detailed on pages 5, 6 and 8 of Schedule PMA-9. As  
16 shown on Line No. 3, page 5, the mean equity risk premium is 4.43% applicable to the  
17 nine water companies. This estimate is the result of an average of a beta-derived equity  
18 risk premium as well as the mean historical equity risk premium applicable to public  
19 utilities with bonds rated A based upon holding period returns. The basis of the beta-  
20 derived equity risk premium applicable to the proxy group is shown on page 6 of  
21 Schedule PMA-9. The beta-determined equity risk premium should receive substantial  
22 weight because betas are derived from the market prices of common stocks over a recent  
23 five-year period. Beta is a meaningful measure of prospective relative risk to the market

1 as a whole and a logical means by which to allocate a company's/proxy group's share of  
2 the market's total equity risk premium relative to corporate bond yields.

3 The total market equity risk premium utilized is 6.76% and is based upon an  
4 average of the long-term historical market risk premium and forecasted market risk  
5 premium. To derive the historical market equity risk premium, I used the most recent  
6 Morningstar<sup>21</sup> data on holding period returns for the S&P 500 Composite Index from the  
7 Ibbotson® SBBI® – 2011 Valuation Yearbook – Market Results for Stocks, Bonds, Bills  
8 and Inflation – 1926-2010 (SBBI – 2011) and the average historical yield on Moody's  
9 Aaa and Aa rated corporate bonds for the period 1926-2010. The use of holding period  
10 returns over a very long period of time is useful because it is consistent with the long-  
11 term investment horizon presumed by the DCF model. As the SBBI – 2011 states<sup>22</sup>:

12 The estimate of the equity risk premium depends on the length of the data  
13 series studied. A proper estimate of the equity risk premium requires a  
14 data series long enough to give a reliable average without being unduly  
15 influenced by very good and very poor short-term returns. When  
16 calculated using a long data series, the historical equity risk premium is  
17 relatively stable.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, because an average of the realized equity  
18 risk premium is quite volatile when calculated using a short history, using  
19 a long series makes it less likely that the analyst can justify any number he  
20 or she wants. The magnitude of how shorter periods can affect the result  
21 will be explored later in this chapter.

22  
23 Some analysts estimate the expected equity risk premium using a shorter,  
24 more recent time period on the basis that recent events are more likely to  
25 be repeated in the near future; furthermore, they believe that the 1920s,  
26 1930s and 1940s contain too many unusual events. This view is suspect  
27 because all periods contain "unusual" events. Some of the most unusual  
28 events of the last hundred years took place quite recently, including the  
29 inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the October 1987 stock market

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<sup>21</sup> Morningstar, Inc. acquired Ibbotson Associates in 2006.

<sup>22</sup> Ibbotson® SBBI® – 2011 Valuation Yearbook – Market Results for Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation – 1926 – 2010 (SBBI 2011) (Morningstar, Inc., 2010) 59.



1 crash, the collapse of the high-yield bond market, the major contraction  
2 and consolidation of the thrift industry, the collapse of the Soviet Union,  
3 the development of the European Economic Community, and the attacks  
4 of September 11, 2001 and the more recent liquidity crisis of 2008 and  
5 2009.

6  
7 It is even difficult for economists to predict the economic environment of  
8 the future. For example, if one were analyzing the stock market in 1987  
9 before the crash, it would be statistically improbable to predict the  
10 impending short-term volatility without considering the stock market crash  
11 and market volatility of the 1929-1931 period.

12  
13 Without an appreciation of the 1920s and 1930s, no one would believe that  
14 such events could happen. The 85-year period starting with 1926 is  
15 representative of what can happen: it includes high and low returns,  
16 volatile and quiet markets, war and peace, inflation and deflation, and  
17 prosperity and depression. Restricting attention to a shorter historical  
18 period underestimates the amount of change that could occur in a long  
19 future period. Finally, because historical event-types (not specific events)  
20 tend to repeat themselves, long-run capital market return studies can reveal  
21 a great deal about the future. Investors probably expect “unusual” events  
22 to occur from time to time, and their return expectations reflect this.  
23 (footnote omitted)

24  
25 Consequently, the long-term arithmetic mean total return rates on the market as a whole  
26 of 11.90% and the long-term arithmetic mean yield on corporate bonds of 6.10% were  
27 used, as shown at Line Nos. 1 and 2 of page 6 of Schedule PMA-9. As shown on Line  
28 No. 3, the resultant long-term historical equity risk premium on the market as a whole is  
29 5.80%.

30 I used arithmetic mean return rates and yields (income returns) because they are  
31 appropriate for cost of capital purposes as noted in the SBBI – 2011. Arithmetic mean  
32 return rates and yields are appropriate because ex-post (historical) total returns and equity  
33 risk premiums differ in size and direction over time, providing insight into the variance  
34 and standard deviation of returns. Because the arithmetic mean captures the prospect for  
35 variance in returns and equity risk premiums, it provides the valuable insight needed by

1 investors in estimating future risk when making a current investment. Absent such  
2 valuable insight into the potential variance of returns, investors cannot meaningfully  
3 evaluate prospective risk. If investors alternatively relied upon the geometric mean of ex-  
4 post equity risk premiums, they would have no insight into the potential variance of  
5 future returns because the geometric mean relates the change over many periods to a  
6 constant rate of change, thereby obviating the year-to-year fluctuations, or variance,  
7 *critical to risk analysis.*

8 The financial literature is quite clear on this point, that risk is measured by the  
9 variability of expected returns, i.e., the probability distribution of returns.<sup>23</sup> In addition,  
10 Weston and Brigham<sup>24</sup> provide the standard financial textbook definition of the riskiness  
11 of an asset when they state:

12 The riskiness of an asset is defined in terms of the *likely variability of*  
13 *future returns from the asset.* (emphasis added)

14  
15 And Morin states<sup>25</sup>:

16 The geometric mean answers the question of *what constant return* you  
17 would have to achieve in each year to have your investment growth match  
18 the return achieved by the stock market. The arithmetic mean answers the  
19 question of what growth rate is the best estimate of the future amount of  
20 money that will be produced by continually reinvesting in the stock  
21 market. It is the rate of return which, compounded over multiple periods,  
22 gives the mean of the probability distribution of ending wealth. (emphasis  
23 added)

24  
25 In addition, Brealey and Myers<sup>26</sup> note:

---

<sup>23</sup> Brigham (1989) 639.

<sup>24</sup> Weston, J. Fred and Brigham, Eugene F., Essentials of Managerial Finance Third Edition (The Dryden Press, 1974) 272.

<sup>25</sup> Morin 133.

<sup>26</sup> Brealey and Myers 146-147.

1 The proper uses of arithmetic and compound rates of return from past  
2 investments are often misunderstood. . . Thus the arithmetic average of  
3 the returns correctly measures the opportunity cost of capital for  
4 investments. . . *Moral:* If the cost of capital is estimated from historical  
5 returns or risk premiums, use arithmetic averages, not compound annual  
6 rates of return. (*italics in original*)

7  
8 Also, Giaacchino and Lesser<sup>27</sup> state:

9 The appropriateness of using either a geometric or arithmetic mean  
10 depends on the context.<sup>12</sup>(footnote omitted) If you are evaluating the past  
11 performance of a stock, the geometric mean is appropriate: it represents  
12 the compound average return over time.

13  
14 \* \* \*

15 If, instead, you wish to estimate future growth, you need to use an  
16 arithmetic mean . . . compounding the stock at the arithmetic mean . . .  
17 gives us the expected (average) stock price . . . compounding at the  
18 geometric mean leads to the median stock price.

19  
20 As previously discussed, investors gain insight into relative riskiness by analyzing  
21 expected future variability. This is accomplished by the use of the arithmetic mean of a  
22 distribution of returns / premiums. Only the arithmetic mean takes into account all of the  
23 returns / premiums, hence, providing meaningful insight into the variance and standard  
24 deviation of those returns / premiums.

25 **Q36. Can it be demonstrated that the arithmetic mean takes into account all of the**  
26 **returns and therefore, that the arithmetic mean is appropriate to use when**  
27 **estimating the opportunity cost of capital in contrast to the geometric mean?**

28 A36. Yes. Pages 1 through 3 of Schedule PMA-10 graphically demonstrate this premise. It is  
29 clear from observing the year-to-year variation (the returns on large company stocks for  
30 each and every year, 1926 through 2010 on page 1), that stock market returns, and hence,

---

<sup>27</sup> Giaacchino, Leonardo R. and Lesser, Jonathan A., Principles of Utility Corporate Finance (Public Utilities Reports, Inc., 2011) 38-41 and 233-234.

1 equity risk premiums, vary.

2 There is a clear bell-shaped pattern to the probability distribution of these returns  
3 shown on page 2, an indication that they are randomly generated and not serially  
4 correlated. The arithmetic mean of this distribution of returns considers each and every  
5 return in the distribution, taking into account the standard deviation or likely variance  
6 which may be experienced in the future when estimating the rate of return based upon  
7 such historical returns. In contrast, page 3 demonstrates that when the geometric mean is  
8 calculated, only two of the returns are considered, namely the initial and terminal years,  
9 i.e., 1926 and 2010. Based upon only those two years, a constant rate of return is  
10 calculated by the geometric average. That constant return is graphically represented by a  
11 flat line, showing no year-to-year variation, over the entire 1926 to 2010 time period,  
12 which is obviously far different from reality, based upon the probability distribution of  
13 returns shown on page 2 and demonstrated on page 1.

14 Consequently, only the arithmetic mean takes into account the standard deviation  
15 of returns which is critical to risk analysis. The geometric mean is appropriate only when  
16 measuring historical performance and should not be used to estimate the investors  
17 required rate of return.

18 **Q37. How did you incorporate Value Line's forecasted total annual market return in**  
19 **excess of the prospective yield on high rated corporate bonds in your development**  
20 **of an equity risk premium for your RPM analysis?**

21 A37. Once again, because both ratemaking and the cost of capital, including the cost rate of  
22 common equity are prospective, a prospective market equity risk premium is essential.

1 The basis of the forecasted or prospective market equity risk premium can be found on  
2 Line Nos. 4 through 6 on page 6 of Schedule PMA-9. Consistent with the development  
3 of the dividend yield component of my DCF analysis, it is derived from an average of the  
4 most recent thirteen weeks ending June 10, 2011 3-5 year median market price  
5 appreciation potentials by Value Line plus an average of the median estimated dividend  
6 yield for the common stocks of the 1,700 firms covered in Value Line's Standard Edition  
7 as explained in detail in Note 1 on page 2 of Schedule PMA-11.

8 The average median expected price appreciation is 53% which translates to an  
9 11.22% annual appreciation and, when added to the average (similarly calculated) median  
10 dividend yield of 1.92% equates to a forecasted annual total return rate on the market as a  
11 whole of 13.14%. The forecasted total market equity risk premium of 7.71% is derived by  
12 deducting the June 1, 2011 Blue Chip Financial Forecasts consensus estimate of about 50  
13 economists of the expected yield on Moody's Aaa rated corporate bonds for the six  
14 calendar quarters ending with the third calendar quarter 2012 of 5.43% shown on  
15 Schedule PMA-9, page 6, Line No. 6 ( $7.71\% = 13.14\% - 5.43\%$ ).

16 In arriving at my conclusion of equity risk premium of 6.76% on Line No. 7 on  
17 page 6, I have given equal weight to the historical equity risk premium of 5.80% and the  
18 forecasted equity risk premium of 7.71% shown on Line Nos. 3 and 6, respectively  
19 ( $6.76\% = (5.80\% + 7.71\%)/2$ ).

20 **Q38. What is your conclusion of an equity risk premium for use in your RPM analysis?**

21 A38. On page 1 of Schedule PMA-9, the most current Value Line betas for the companies in  
22 the proxy group are shown. Applying the median beta of the proxy group of 0.70  
23 (consistent with my reliance upon the median DCF results as previously discussed), to the

1 market equity risk premium of 6.76% results in a beta adjusted equity risk premium of  
2 4.73% for the proxy group of nine water companies.

3 A mean equity risk premium of 4.12% applicable to utilities with A rated public  
4 utility bonds such as the proxy group of nine water companies was calculated based upon  
5 holding period returns from a study using public utilities, as shown on Line No. 2, page 5  
6 of Schedule PMA-9 and is detailed on page 8.

7 The equity risk premium applicable to the proxy group of nine water companies is  
8 the average of the beta-derived premium, 4.75%, and that based upon the holding period  
9 returns of public utilities with A rated bonds, 4.12%, as summarized on Schedule PMA-9,  
10 page 5, i.e., 4.43% ( $4.43\% = (4.75\% + 4.12\%)/2$ ).

11 **Q39. What is the indicated RPM common equity cost rate?**

12 A39. It is 10.43% for the nine water companies as shown on Schedule PMA-9, page 1.

13 **Q40. Is the presumption of a constant equity risk premium in the RPM model a weakness**  
14 **in the model?**

15 A40. No. The equity risk premium varies inversely with interest rate changes, although not in  
16 tandem with those changes. However, the presumption of a constant equity risk premium  
17 is no different than the presumption of a constant "g", or growth component, in the DCF  
18 model. If one calculates a DCF cost rate today, the absolute result "k", as well as the  
19 growth component "g", would invariably differ from a calculation made just one or  
20 several months earlier or later. This implies that "g" does change, although in the  
21 application of the standard DCF model, "g" is presumed to be constant. Hence, there is  
22 no difference between the RPM and DCF models in that both models assume a constant  
23 component, but in reality, these components, "g" and the equity risk premium both

1 change.

2 As Morin<sup>28</sup> states with respect to the DCF model:

3 It is not necessary that  $g$  be constant year after year to make the model  
4 valid. *The growth rate may vary randomly around some average expected*  
5 *value. Random variations around trend are perfectly acceptable, as long*  
6 *as the mean expected growth is constant.* The growth rate must be  
7 'expectationally constant' to use formal statistical jargon. (italics added)  
8

9 The foregoing confirms that the RPM is similar to the DCF model. Both assume  
10 an "expectationally constant" risk premium and growth rate, respectively, but in reality  
11 both vary (change) randomly around an arithmetic mean. Consequently, the use of the  
12 arithmetic mean, and not the geometric mean is confirmed as appropriate in the  
13 determination of an equity risk premium as discussed previously.

#### 14 **D. THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL ("CAPM")**

15 **Q41. Please explain the theoretical basis of the CAPM.**

16 A41. CAPM theory defines risk as the covariability of a security's returns with the market's  
17 returns as measured by beta (" $\beta$ "). A beta less than 1.0 indicates lower variability while a  
18 beta greater than 1.0 indicates greater variability than the market.

19 The CAPM assumes that all other risk, i.e., all non-market or unsystematic risk,  
20 can be eliminated through diversification. The risk that cannot be eliminated through  
21 diversification is called market, or systematic, risk. In addition, the CAPM presumes that  
22 investors require compensation only for these systematic risks which are the result of  
23 macroeconomic and other events that affect the returns on all assets. The model is applied  
24 by adding a risk-free rate of return to a market risk premium, which is adjusted

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<sup>28</sup> Morin 256.

proportionately to reflect the systematic risk of the individual security relative to the total market as measured by beta. The traditional CAPM model is expressed as:

$$R_s = R_f + \beta(R_m - R_f)$$

Where:  $R_s$  = Return rate on the common stock

$R_f$  = Risk-free rate of return

$R_m$  = Return rate on the market as a whole

$\beta$  = Adjusted beta (volatility of the security relative to the market as a whole)

Numerous tests of the CAPM have measured the extent to which security returns and betas are related as predicted by the CAPM confirming its validity. The empirical CAPM ("ECAPM") reflects the reality that while the results of these tests support the notion that beta is related to security returns, the empirical Security Market Line ("SML") described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. Morin<sup>29</sup> states:

With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that ... low-beta securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than predicted.

\* \* \*

Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the expected return on a security is related to its risk by the following approximation:

$$K = R_F + x \beta(R_M - R_F) + (1-x) \beta(R_M - R_F)$$

where x is a fraction to be determined empirically. The value of x that best explains the observed relationship  $\text{Return} = 0.0829 + 0.0520 \beta$  is between 0.25 and 0.30. If  $x = 0.25$ , the equation becomes:

---

<sup>29</sup> Morin 175.



1 
$$K = R_F + 0.25(R_M - R_F) + 0.75 \beta(R_M - R_F)^{30}$$

2  
3 In view of theory and practical research, I have applied both the traditional CAPM and  
4 the ECAPM to the companies in the proxy group and averaged the results.

5 **Q42. Please describe your selection of a risk-free rate of return.**

6 A42. As shown in column 3 on page 1 of Schedule PMA-11, the risk-free rate adopted for both  
7 applications of the CAPM is 4.78%. Again, because both ratemaking and the cost of  
8 capital, including common equity, are prospective, the risk-free rate for my CAPM  
9 analysis is based upon the average consensus forecast of the reporting economists in the  
10 June 1, 2011 Blue Chip Financial Forecasts as shown in Note 2, page 2, of the expected  
11 yields on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds for the six quarters ending with the third calendar  
12 quarter 2012.

13 **Q43. Why is the prospective yield on long-term U.S. Treasury Bonds appropriate for use**  
14 **as the risk-free rate?**

15 A43. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury T-Bonds is almost risk-free and its term is  
16 consistent with the long-term cost of capital to public utilities measured by the yields on  
17 A rated public utility bonds, the long-term investment horizon inherent in utilities'  
18 common stocks, the long-term investment horizon presumed in the standard DCF model  
19 employed in regulatory ratemaking, and the long-term life of the jurisdictional rate base  
20 to which the allowed fair rate of return, i.e., cost of capital will be applied. In contrast,  
21 short-term U.S. Treasury yields are more volatile and largely a function of Federal  
22 Reserve monetary policy.

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<sup>30</sup> Morin 190.

1 In addition, noted in the SBBI - 2011<sup>31</sup>:

2 Although the equity risk premia of several horizons are available, the long-  
3 horizon equity risk premium is preferable for use in most business-  
4 valuation settings, even if an investor has a shorter time horizon.  
5 Companies are entities that generally have no defined life span; when  
6 determining a company's value, it is important to use a long-term discount  
7 rate because the life of the company is assumed to be infinite. For this  
8 reason, it is appropriate in most cases to use the long-horizon equity risk  
9 premium for business valuation.

10  
11 **Q44. Please explain the estimation of the expected equity risk premium for the market.**

12 A44. The basis of the market equity risk premium is explained in detail in Note 1 on page 2 of  
13 Schedule PMA-11. It is derived from an average of the most recent thirteen weeks  
14 ending June 10, 2011 3-5 year median total market price appreciation projects from Value  
15 Line, resulting in a total annual return of 13.14% as discussed previously, and the long-  
16 term historical arithmetic mean total returns for the years 1926 – 2010 on large company  
17 stocks from the SBBI - 2011 of 11.90%. From these returns, the appropriate projected  
18 and historical risk-free rates are subtracted to arrive at a projected and historical equity  
19 risk premium for the market.

20 For example, the forecasted total market equity risk premium is derived by  
21 deducting the June 1, 2011 Blue Chip Financial Forecasts consensus estimate of about 50  
22 economists of the expected yield on U.S. Treasury Notes of 4.78% from the Value Line  
23 projected total annual market return of 13.14%, resulting in a forecasted total market  
24 equity risk premium of 8.36%. From SBBI – 2011 historical total market return of  
25 11.90%, the long-term income return on U.S. Government Securities of 5.20% was  
26 deducted resulting in an historical equity risk premium of 6.70% which results in an

---

<sup>31</sup> SBBI 2011 55.

1 average total market equity risk premium of 7.53% ( $7.52\% = (8.36\% + 6.70\%)/2$ ).

2 **Q45. What are the results of your application of the traditional and empirical CAPM to**  
3 **the proxy group?**

4 A45. As shown on Schedule PMA-11, page 1, the median traditional CAPM cost rate is  
5 10.05% for the nine water companies and the median ECAPM cost rate is 10.62%.  
6 Consistent with my reliance upon the median DCF results discussed previously, I rely  
7 upon the median results of the traditional CAPM and ECAPM for the proxy group. Thus,  
8 as shown on column 6 on page 1, the CAPM cost rate applicable to the proxy group of  
9 nine water companies is 10.34% based upon an average of the traditional CAPM and  
10 ECAPM results for the proxy group.

11 **Q46. Does the use of adjusted betas in a traditional CAPM model render that model the**  
12 **equivalent of the ECAPM model?**

13 A46. No. Using adjusted betas in a CAPM analysis is not equivalent to the ECAPM. Betas are  
14 adjusted because of the general regression tendency of betas to converge toward 1.0 over  
15 time, i.e., over successive calculations of beta. As noted above, numerous studies have  
16 determined that the SML described by the CAPM formula at any given moment in time is  
17 not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. Morin<sup>32</sup> states:

18 Some have argued that the use of the ECAPM is inconsistent with the use  
19 of adjusted betas, such as those supplied by Value Line and Bloomberg.  
20 This is because the reason for using the ECAPM is to allow for the  
21 tendency of betas to regress toward the mean value of 1.00 over time, and,  
22 since Value Line betas are already adjusted for such trend [sic], an  
23 ECAPM analysis results in double-counting. This argument is erroneous.  
24 Fundamentally, the ECAPM is not an adjustment, increase or decrease, in  
25 beta. This is obvious from the fact that the expected return on high beta  
26 securities is actually lower than that produced by the CAPM estimate. The

---

<sup>32</sup> Morin 191.

ECAPM is a formal recognition that the observed risk-return tradeoff is flatter than predicted by the CAPM based on myriad empirical evidence. The ECAPM and the use of adjusted betas comprised two separate features of asset pricing. Even if a company's beta is estimated accurately, the CAPM still understates the return for low-beta stocks. Even if the ECAPM is used, the return for low-beta securities is understated if the betas are understated. Referring back to Figure 6-1, the ECAPM is a return (vertical axis) adjustment and not a beta (horizontal axis) adjustment. Both adjustments are necessary.

Moreover, the slope of the SML should not be confused with beta. As Brigham states<sup>33</sup> :

The slope of the SML reflects the degree of risk aversion in the economy – the greater the average investor's aversion to risk, then (1) the steeper is the slope of the line, (2) the greater is the risk premium for any risky asset, and (3) the higher is the required rate of return on risky assets.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup>Students sometimes confuse beta with the slope of the SML. This is a mistake. As we saw earlier in connection with Figure 6-8, and as is developed further in Appendix 6A, beta does represent the slope of a line, but *not* the Security Market Line. This confusion arises partly because the SML equation is generally written, in this book and throughout the finance literature, as  $k_i = R_F + b_i(k_M - R_F)$ , and in this form  $b_i$  looks like the slope coefficient and  $(k_M - R_F)$  the variable. It would perhaps be less confusing if the second term were written  $(k_M - R_F)b_i$ , but this is not generally done.

Regulatory support for the ECAPM can be found in the New York Public Service Commission's Generic Financing Docket, Case 91-M-0509. Also, the Regulatory Commission of Alaska has stated<sup>34</sup>:

Although we primarily rely upon Tesoro's recommendation, we are concerned, however, about Tesoro's CAPM analysis. Tesoro averaged the results it obtained from CAPM and ECAPM while at the same time providing empirical testimony<sup>604</sup> that the ECAPM results are more

<sup>33</sup> Brigham and Gapenski 203.

<sup>34</sup> In the Matter of the Correct Calculation and Use of Acceptable Input Data to Calculate the 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 Tariff Rates for the Intrastate Transportation of Petroleum over the TransAlaska Pipeline System, Docket No P-97-4, Order No. 151, p. 146 (Reg. Comm'n AK 11/27/02).

1 accurate then [sic] traditional CAPM results. The reasonable investor  
2 would be aware of these empirical results. Therefore, we adjust Tesoro's  
3 recommendation to reflect only the ECAPM result. (footnote omitted)  
4

5 Thus, using adjusted betas in an ECAPM analysis is not incorrect nor inconsistent  
6 with either their financial literature or regulatory precedent. Notwithstanding empirical  
7 and regulatory support for the use of only the ECAPM, my CAPM analysis, which  
8 includes both the traditional CAPM and the ECAPM, is a conservative approach resulting  
9 in a reasonable estimate of the cost of common equity.

10 **V. COST OF COMMON EQUITY MODELS APPLIED TO COMPARABLE,**  
11 **DOMESTIC, NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES**

12 **Q47. Please describe the basis of applying cost of common equity models to comparable**  
13 **risk, non-price regulated companies.**

14 A47. Applying cost of equity models to non-price regulated companies, comparable in total  
15 risk, is derived from the "*corresponding risk*" standard of the landmark cases of the U.S.  
16 Supreme Court, i.e., *Hope* and *Bluefield*, previously discussed. Therefore, it is consistent  
17 with the *Hope* doctrine that the return to the equity investor should be commensurate with  
18 returns on investments in other firms having corresponding risks based upon the  
19 fundamental economic concept of opportunity cost which maintains that the true cost of  
20 an investment is equal to the cost of the best available alternative use of the funds to be  
21 invested. The opportunity cost principle is also consistent with one of the fundamental  
22 principles upon which regulation rests: that regulation is intended to act as a surrogate for  
23 competition and to provide a fair rate of return to investors.

24 The first step in determining such an opportunity cost of common equity based  
25 upon the non-price regulated companies comparable in total risk to the nine water

1 companies is to choose an appropriate proxy group(s) of non-price regulated firms  
2 comparable in total risk to the proxy group(s) of price-regulated utilities. The proxy  
3 group(s) should be broad-based in order to obviate any company-specific aberrations and  
4 should exclude utilities to avoid circularity since the achieved returns on book common  
5 equity of utilities, being a function of the regulatory process, are substantially influenced  
6 by regulatory awards.

7 As stated previously, my selection criteria for the non-price regulated firms of  
8 comparable risk are based upon statistics derived from the market prices paid by  
9 investors. Value Line betas were used as a measure of systematic risk. The standard  
10 error of the regression was used as a measure of each firm's unsystematic or specific risk  
11 with the standard error of the regression reflecting the extent to which events specific to a  
12 company's operations affect its stock price. In essence, companies which have similar  
13 betas and standard errors of the regressions, have similar total investment risk, i.e., the  
14 sum of systematic (market) risk as reflected by beta and unsystematic (business and  
15 financial) risk, as reflected by the standard error of the regression. These statistics are  
16 derived from regression analyses using market prices which, under the EMH, reflect all  
17 relevant risks. An additional criterion used in the selection of these proxy companies  
18 were that they be domestic non-utility companies. The application of these criteria results  
19 in a proxy group of non-price regulated firms comparable in total risk to the average  
20 utility in the proxy group of water companies. The proxy group of forty-one non-utility  
21 companies comparable in total investment risk to the nine water companies is listed on  
22 page 3 of Schedule PMA-12.

23 Using a Value Line, Inc. proprietary database dated March 15, 2011, a proxy

1 group of forty-one non-price regulated companies was chosen based upon ranges of  
2 unadjusted beta and standard error of the regression shown on page 2 of Schedule PMA-  
3 12. The ranges were based upon the standard deviations of the unadjusted beta and the  
4 average standard error of the regression for the proxy group of nine water companies as  
5 explained on page 4 of Schedule PMA-12.

6 This selection criteria are meaningful and effectively respond to the criticisms  
7 normally associated with the selection of non-regulated firms presumed to be comparable  
8 in total risk. The criteria do so because the selection of non-price regulated companies  
9 comparable in total risk is based upon regression analyses of market prices which reflect  
10 investors' assessment of all risks, diversifiable and non-diversifiable, and is thus market-  
11 based.

12 The first method of measuring such an opportunity cost is shown in Schedule  
13 PMA-13. It measures the returns expected to be earned on the book common equity, net  
14 worth, or partner's capital of non-price regulated enterprises of comparable total risk as  
15 the nine water companies. The second method is to apply the DCF, RPM and CAPM to  
16 the same non-price regulated companies comparable in total risk to the nine water  
17 companies as shown on Schedule PMA-14.

18 **A. EXPECTED RETURN ON BOOK EQUITY FOR THE PROXY GROUP OF**  
19 **DOMESTIC, NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES**

20 **Q48. Did you evaluate the expected return on book common equity, net worth, or**  
21 **partner's capital for the proxy group of domestic, non-price regulated companies**  
22 **that are comparable in total risk to the utility proxy group?**

23 **A48. Yes. Measuring the expected return on book common equity, net worth, or partner's**

capital provides a direct measure of return, since it translates into practice the competitive principle upon which regulation rests. In my opinion, it is inappropriate to use the achieved returns of regulated utilities of similar risk because to do so would be circular, as achieved returns are a function of authorized ROEs, i.e., the regulatory process itself, and inconsistent with the principle of equality of risk with non-price regulated firms. As shown on Schedule PMA-14, the expected rate of return on book equity, net worth, or partner's capital was gathered from Value Line's Standard Edition (various issues). After applying a test of significance (Student's t-statistic) to determine whether any of the projected returns are significantly different from the mean at the 95% confidence level, the projected return of one company has been excluded. After excluding this outlier, my conclusion of the expected return on book common equity net worth or partner's capital is 15.50%.

**B. COST RATES FOR THE PROXY GROUP OF DOMESTIC, NON-PRICE  
REGULATED COMPANIES BASED UPON THE DCF, RPM AND CAPM**

**Q49. Did you calculate common equity cost rates using the DCF, RPM and CAPM for the proxy group of domestic, non-price regulated companies that are comparable in total risk to the utility proxy group?**

A49. Yes. Because the DCF, RPM and CAPM have been applied in an identical manner as described previously relative to the market data of the nine water companies, I will not repeat the details of the rationale and application of each model shown in Schedule PMA-14. The only exception is that, in the application of the RPM, I did not use public utility-specific equity risk premiums.

Page 1 of Schedule PMA-14 contains the derivation of the DCF cost rates. As



1 shown, the median DCF cost rate for the proxy group of forty-one non-price regulated  
2 companies comparable in total risk to the proxy group of nine water companies, is 12.94%.

3 Pages 2 through 4 contain information relating to the 11.40% RPM cost rate for the  
4 proxy group of forty-one non-price regulated companies summarized on page 2. As shown  
5 on Line 1 of page 2 of Schedule PMA-14, the consensus prospective yield on Moody's  
6 Baa rated corporate bonds for the six quarters ending with the third quarter of 2012 from  
7 the June 1, 2011 Blue Chip Financial Forecasts is 6.33%, which is appropriate since the  
8 average Moody's bond rating of the proxy group of forty-one non-price regulated  
9 companies is Baa2 as shown on page 3 of Schedule PMA-14. When the risk premium of  
10 5.07% derived on page 4 is added to the prospective Baa rated corporate bond yield of  
11 6.33%, the indicated RPM cost rate is 11.40%. The average estimated equity risk  
12 premium is based upon the average of the historical and projected market risk premiums of  
13 6.76%, adjusted by the group's median beta of 0.75, resulting in an equity risk premium of  
14 5.07% as shown on Line 9, page 4 of Schedule PMA-14.

15 Page 5 contains the details of the application of the traditional CAPM and ECAPM  
16 to the forty-one non-price regulated companies comparable in total risk to the nine water  
17 companies. As shown, the median cost rates are 10.43% and 10.90%, respectively which,  
18 when averaged, results in an indicated CAPM cost rate of 10.67%.

19 **Q50. What are the cost rates, based upon the DCF, RPM and CAPM, related to the**  
20 **domestic, non-price regulated proxy group comparable in total risk to the utility**  
21 **proxy group?**

22 A50. The cost rates based upon application of the DCF, RPM and CAPM/ECAPM models to  
23 the non-utility group are 12.94%, 11.40% and 10.67%, respectively, averaging 11.67% as

1 summarized on page 1 of Schedule PMA-12.

2 **Q51. What is your conclusion of the cost rate of common equity based upon the proxy**  
3 **group of forty-one non-price regulated companies comparable in total risk to the**  
4 **nine water companies?**

5 A51. As shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-12, my conclusion of the projected return on book  
6 equity, partner's capital or net worth of the comparable group is 15.50% and my  
7 conclusion is 11.67% for the results of the DCF, RPM and CAPM applied to the  
8 comparable group. Based upon these results, I conclude a cost of common equity of  
9 13.59% for the non-price regulated companies.

10 **C. CONCLUSION OF COMMON EQUITY COST RATE**

11 **Q52. What is your recommended common equity cost rate?**

12 A52. It is 11.50% based upon the common equity cost rates resulting from the application of  
13 cost of common equity models to the nine water companies as well as a proxy group of  
14 non-utility companies comparable in total risk to the nine water companies, as adjusted  
15 for financial and business risks due to Ohio American's greater financial risk and smaller  
16 relative size, as well as flotation costs.

17 As discussed previously, reliance upon multiple models is consistent with the  
18 EMH, upon which all of my models are premised. I employ all of my cost of common  
19 equity models as primary tools in arriving at my recommended common equity cost rate  
20 because; 1) no single model is so inherently precise that it can be relied upon solely to the  
21 exclusion of other theoretically sound models; 2) all of my models are based upon the  
22 Efficient Market Hypothesis ("EMH"); and 3) as demonstrated previously, the prudence  
23 of using multiple cost of common equity models is supported in both the financial

1 literature and regulatory precedent. Therefore, none should be relied upon exclusively to  
2 estimate investors' required rate of return on common equity.

3 The results of my cost of common equity models applied to the nine water  
4 companies are shown on Schedule PMA-1, page 2 and summarized below:

5 Table 3

	Proxy Group of Nine Water <u>Companies</u>
Discounted Cash Flow Model	9.54%
Risk Premium Model	10.43
Capital Asset Pricing Model	10.34
Cost of Equity Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies	13.59
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Before Adjustment for Financial Risk, Flotation Costs and Business Risks	11.00
Financial Risk Adjustment	(0.22)
Flotation Cost Adjustment	0.12
Business Risk Adjustment	<u>0.60</u>
Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate	<u>11.50%</u>

31  
32 Based upon these common equity cost rate results, I conclude that a common equity cost  
33 rate of 10.85% is indicated for the nine water companies before the financial and business  
34 risk adjustments previously discussed, shown on Line Nos. 6, 7 and 8 on page 2 of  
35 Schedule PMA-1.

## VI. ADJUSTMENTS

### A. FINANCIAL RISK ADJUSTMENT

**Q53. Is there a way to quantify a financial risk adjustment due to Ohio American's previously discussed lower financial risk relative to the proxy group?**

**A53.** Yes. As shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-1, the Company's ratemaking total equity ratio (common equity plus preferred stock) is 51.76% based upon Ohio American's capital structure at April 30, 2011 which is slightly higher than the average 2010 total equity ratio maintained, on average, by the nine water companies, 49.03%. Conversely, Ohio American's ratemaking long-term debt ratio at April 30, 2011, 48.24% is somewhat lower than the average 2010 long-term debt ratio of the proxy group, 50.97%. Thus, Ohio American has somewhat lower financial risk than the companies in the proxy group. Because investors require a higher return in exchange for bearing higher risk, a downward adjustment to the common equity cost rate derived from the market data of the proxy group companies which have a somewhat higher degree of financial risk than Ohio American is necessary.

An indication of the magnitude of the necessary financial risk adjustment is given by the Hamada equation<sup>35</sup>, which un-levers and then re-levers betas based upon changes in capital structure.

The Hamada equation un-levers the median beta of the proxy group of nine water companies of 0.70 with an average December 31, 2010 total equity ratio of 49.03% to 0.42 when applied to a 100% common equity ratio and then levers the beta to 0.67 using

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<sup>35</sup> Brigham and Daves 533.

Ohio American's total equity ratio of 50.64% at April 30, 2011. The re-levered beta, applied to a 7.53% market risk premium and a 4.78% risk-free rate translates to a 9.83%<sup>36</sup> common equity cost rate. The difference between the 9.83% relevered beta common equity cost rate and the result of the traditional CAPM for the proxy group with a median beta of 0.70, 10.05%<sup>37</sup> is a negative 22 basis points (-0.22%). A downward financial adjustment of 22 basis points (-0.22%), reflects the somewhat lower financial risk of Ohio American attributable to its higher April 30, 2011 total equity ratio of 51.76% compared with the proxy group's average total equity ratio of 49.03% at December 31, 2010. The Hamada Equation and calculations are as follows:

$$b_l = b_u [1 + (1 - T)(D / S)]$$

Where  $b_l$  = Levered beta

$b_u$  = Un-levered beta

$T$  = Tax Rate

$(D / S)$  = Debt to Common Equity Ratio

To un-lever the beta from a 49.03% average proxy group total equity ratio, the following equation is used:

$$0.70 = b_u [1 + (1 - 0.35) (50.97\%/49.03\%)]$$

When solved for  $b_u$ ,  $b_u = 0.42$ , indicating that the beta for the proxy group of nine water companies would be 0.42 if their average capital structure contained 100% total equity.

To re-lever the beta relative to Ohio American's 50.64% for April 30, 2011 total equity ratio, the following equation is used:

$$b_l = 0.42 [1 + (1 - 0.35) (48.24\%/51.76\%)]$$

<sup>36</sup> 9.83% = (0.67 x 7.53%) + 4.78%.

<sup>37</sup> 10.05% = (0.70 x 7.53%) + 4.78%.

When solved for  $b_l$ ,  $b_l = 0.67$ , indicating that the beta for the proxy group of nine water companies would be 0.67, if their average capital structure contained 50.64% total equity.

## **B. FLOTATION COST ADJUSTMENT**

### **Q54. What are flotation costs?**

A54. Flotation costs are those costs associated with the sale of new issuances of common stock. They include market pressure and the essential costs of issuance, e.g., underwriting fees and out-of-pocket costs for printing, legal, registration, etc.

### **Q55. Why is it important to recognize flotation costs in the allowed common equity cost rate?**

A55. It is important because there is no other mechanism in the ratemaking paradigm with which such costs can be recovered. Because these costs are real and legitimate, recovery of these costs should be permitted. As noted by Morin:

The costs of issuing these securities are just as real as operating and maintenance expenses or costs incurred to build utility plants, and fair regulatory treatment must permit recovery of these costs....

The simple fact of the matter is that common equity capital is not free....[Flotation costs] must be recovered through a rate of return adjustment<sup>38</sup>

### **Q56. Should flotation costs be recognized only when there was an issuance during the test year or there is an imminent post-test year issuance of additional common stock?**

A56. No. As noted above, there is no mechanism to recapture such costs in the ratemaking paradigm other than an adjustment to the allowed common equity cost rate. Flotation costs are charged to capital accounts and are not expensed on a utility's income statement.

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<sup>38</sup> Morin 321.

1 As such, flotation costs are analogous to capital investments reflected on the balance  
2 sheet. Recovery of capital investments relates to the expected useful lives of the  
3 investment. Since common equity has a very long and indefinite life (assumed to be  
4 infinity in the standard regulatory DCF model), flotation costs should be recovered  
5 through an adjustment to common equity cost rate even when there has not been an  
6 issuance during the test year or in the absence of an expected imminent issuance of  
7 additional shares of common stock.

8 **Q57. Ohio American is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Water Works Company,**  
9 **Inc. Is there a need to reflect flotation costs in this situation?**

10 A57. Yes. With the exception of retained earnings, Ohio American receives common equity  
11 capital from American Water, raised in the capital markets through public offerings of its  
12 common stock, incurring issuance costs to do so. Denying recovery of the issuance costs  
13 associated with the common equity capital that is invested in Ohio American would  
14 penalize investors, making it more difficult to raise new equity capital at a reasonable  
15 cost.

16 **Q58. Do the common equity cost rate models you have used already reflect investors'**  
17 **anticipation of flotation costs?**

18 A58. No. All of these models assume no transaction costs. The literature is quite clear that  
19 these costs are not reflected in market prices paid for common stocks. For example,  
20 Brigham and Daves confirm this and provide the methodology utilized to calculate the  
21 flotation adjustment which will be discussed subsequently<sup>39</sup> and shown on pages 1 and 2

1 of Schedule PMA-15. In addition, Morin confirms this as well including the need for  
2 such an adjustment even when no new issue is imminent as previously noted.<sup>40</sup>  
3 Consequently, it is proper to include a flotation cost adjustment when using cost of  
4 common equity models to estimate the common equity cost rate.

5 **Q59. How did you calculate the flotation cost allowance?**

6 A59. I modified the DCF calculation to provide a dividend yield that would reimburse  
7 investors for issuance costs in accordance with the previously cited literature by Brigham  
8 and Daves as well as Morin. The flotation cost adjustment recognizes the costs of issuing  
9 equity that were incurred by Ohio American since 2008. Based upon the issuance costs  
10 shown on page 1 of Schedule PMA-15, an adjustment of 12 basis points (0.12%), is  
11 required to reflect the flotation costs applicable to the proxy group as shown on Line No.  
12 7 on Schedule PMA-1, page 1.

13 **C. BUSINESS RISK ADJUSTMENT**

14 **Q60. Is there a way to quantify a business risk adjustment due to Ohio American's small**  
15 **size relative to the proxy group?**

16 A60. Yes.

17 **Q61. Is there a way to quantify a business risk adjustment due to Ohio American's**  
18 **greater business risk relative to the proxy group?**

19 A61. Although there is no way to directly quantify a business risk adjustment due to Ohio  
20 American's unique business risks discussed above and in Mr. VerDouw' direct testimony,  
21 i.e., availability / quality of supply; flood exposure; service territory issues; and,  
22 regulatory risks, an indication of an adjustment is given by Ibbotson Associates size

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<sup>39</sup> Brigham and Daves 342.



premium study discussed below.

As discussed previously, the Company has greater business risk than the average company in the proxy group because of its smaller size relative to the group, measured by either book capitalization or the market capitalization of common equity (estimated market capitalization for Ohio American, whose common stock is not traded).

Table 4

	Market Capitalization(1) (\$ Millions)	Times Greater than <u>the Company</u>
Ohio American	\$90.402	
Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies	1,195.273	13.2x

(1) From page 1 of Schedule PMA-16.

Because the Company's common stock is not publicly traded, I have assumed that if it were, the common shares would be selling at the same market-to-book ratio as the average market-to-book ratio for the proxy group, 181.3%, on June 17, 2011 as shown on page 2 of Schedule PMA-16. Since my recommended common equity cost rate is based upon the market data of the proxy group, it is reasonable to use the market-to-book ratios of the proxy group to estimate Ohio American's market capitalization. Hence, the Company's market capitalization is estimated at \$90.402 million based upon the average market-to-book ratio of the proxy group. In contrast, the market capitalization of the average water company was \$1.195 billion on June 17, 2011, or 13.2 times the size of Ohio American's estimated market capitalization.

1           Therefore, it is necessary to upwardly adjust the common equity cost rate of  
2           11.00% based upon the nine water companies to reflect Ohio American's greater risk due  
3           to its smaller relative size. The determination is based upon the size premiums for decile  
4           portfolios of New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), American Stock Exchange  
5           ("AMEX") and NASDAQ listed companies for the 1926-2010 period and related data  
6           from SBBI-2011. The average size premium for the decile in which the proxy group falls  
7           has been compared with the average size premium for the decile in which the market  
8           capitalization of Ohio American would fall if its stock were traded and sold at the June  
9           17, 2011 average market/book ratio of 181.34% experienced by the proxy group. As  
10          shown on page 1, because Ohio American falls in the 10<sup>th</sup> decile and the nine water  
11          companies fall between the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> deciles, the size premium spread between the  
12          Company and the nine water companies is 451 basis points (4.51%).

13           In view of the foregoing, an upward adjustment of 60 basis points (0.60%) to  
14          reflect Ohio American's greater relative business risk due to its smaller size, as well as  
15          issues surrounding the availability and quality of its water supply, its flood exposure,  
16          service territory issues and regulatory risks as discussed in Mr. VerDouw' direct  
17          testimony is warranted. A business risk adjustment of 60 basis points (0.60%), coupled  
18          with the previously discussed financial risk adjustment of a negative 22 basis points (-  
19          0.22%) and flotation cost adjustment of 12 basis points (0.12%), when added to the  
20          11.00% indicated common equity cost rate based upon the nine water companies before  
21          adjustment, results in a financial risk; flotation cost and business risk-adjusted common

1 equity cost rate of 11.50%<sup>41</sup> which is my recommendation.

2 A common equity cost rate of 11.50%, when applied to the consolidated common  
3 equity ratio of 50.69% at April 30, 2011, results in an overall rate of return of 8.97%. In  
4 my opinion, this overall rate of return is both reasonable and conservative, providing  
5 Ohio American with sufficient earnings to enable it to attract necessary new capital.

6 **Q62. Does that conclude your direct testimony?**

7 A62. Yes.

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<sup>41</sup> 11.30% = 10.85% - 0.07% + 0.12% + 0.40%.

PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS  
OF  
PAULINE M. AHERN, CRRA  
PRINCIPAL  
AUS CONSULTANTS

**PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS  
OF  
PAULINE M. AHERN, CRRA  
PRINCIPAL  
AUS CONSULTANTS**

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

1994-Present

In 1996, I became a Principal of AUS Consultants, continuing to offer testimony as an expert witness on the subjects of fair rate of return, cost of capital and related issues before state public utility commissions. I provide assistance and support to clients throughout the entire ratemaking litigation process. In addition, I supervise the financial analyst and administrative staff in the preparation of fair rate of return and cost of capital exhibits which are filed along with expert testimony before various state and federal public utility regulatory bodies. The team also assists in the preparation of interrogatory responses, as well as rebuttal exhibits.

As the Publisher of AUS Utility Reports (formerly C. A. Turner Utility Reports), I am responsible for the production, publishing, and distribution of the reports. AUS Utility Reports provides financial data and related ratios for about 120 public utilities, i.e., electric, combination gas and electric, natural gas distribution, natural gas transmission, telephone, and water utilities, on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis. Among the subscribers of AUS Utility Reports are utilities, many state regulatory commissions, federal agencies, individuals, brokerage firms, attorneys, as well as public and academic libraries. The publication has continuously provided financial statistics on the utility industry since 1930.

As the Publisher of AUS Utility Reports, I also supervise the production, publishing, and distribution of the AGA Rate Service publications under license from the American Gas Association. I am also responsible for maintaining and calculating the performance of the AGA Index, a market capitalization weighted index of the common stocks of the approximately 70 corporate members of the AGA, which serves as the benchmark for the AGA Gas Index Fund.

As an Assistant Vice President from 1994 - 1996, I prepared fair rate of return and cost of capital exhibits which were filed along with expert testimony before various state and federal public utility regulatory bodies. These supporting exhibits include the determination of an appropriate ratemaking capital structure and the development of embedded cost rates of senior capital. The exhibits also support the determination of a recommended return on common equity through the use of various market models, such as, but not limited to, Discounted Cash Flow analysis, Capital Asset Pricing Model and Risk Premium Methodology, as well as an assessment of the risk characteristics of the client utility. I also assisted in the preparation of responses to any interrogatories received regarding such testimonies filed on behalf of client utilities. Following the filing of fair rate of return testimonies, I assisted in the evaluation of opposition testimony in order to prepare interrogatory questions, areas of cross-examination, and rebuttal testimony. I also evaluated and assisted in the preparation of briefs and exceptions following the hearing process. I also submitted testimony before state public utility commissions regarding appropriate capital structure ratios and fixed capital cost rates.

1990-1994

As a Senior Financial Analyst, I supervised two analysts and assisted in the preparation of fair rate of return and cost of capital exhibits which are filed along with expert testimony before various state and federal public utility regulatory bodies. The team also assisted in the preparation of interrogatory responses.

I evaluated the final orders and decisions of various commissions to determine whether further actions were warranted and to gain insight which assisted in the preparation of future rate of return studies.

I assisted in the preparation of an article authored by Frank J. Hanley and A. Gerald Harris entitled "Does Diversification Increase the Cost of Equity Capital?" published in the July 15, 1991 issue of Public Utilities Fortnightly.

In 1992, I was awarded the professional designation "Certified Rate of Return Analyst" (CRRA) by the

National Society of Rate of Return Analysts (now the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts (SURFA)). This designation is based upon education, experience and the successful completion of a comprehensive examination.

As Administrator of Financial Analysis for AUS Utility Reports, which then reported financial data for over 200 utility companies with approximately 1,000 subscribers, I oversaw the preparation of this monthly publication, as well as the accompanying annual publication, Financial Statistics - Public Utilities.

#### 1988-1990

As a Financial Analyst, I assisted in the preparation of fair rate of return studies including capital structure determination, development of senior capital cost rates, as well as the determination of an appropriate rate of return on equity. I also assisted in the preparation of interrogatory responses, interrogatory questions of the opposition, areas of cross-examination and rebuttal testimony. I also assisted in the preparation of the annual publication C. A. Turner Utility Reports - Financial Statistics -Public Utilities.

#### 1973-1975

As a Research Assistant in the Research Department of the Regional Economics Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, I was involved in the development and maintenance of econometric models to simulate regional economic conditions in New England in order to study the effects of, among other things, the energy crisis of the early 1970's and property tax revaluations on the economy of New England. I was also involved in the statistical analysis and preparation of articles for the New England Economic Review. Also, I was Assistant Editor of New England Business Indicators.

#### 1972

As a Research Assistant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Treasury Department, Washington, D.C., I developed and maintained econometric models which simulated the economy of the United States in order to study the results of various alternate foreign trade policies so that national trade policy could be formulated and recommended.

#### Clients Served

I have offered expert testimony before the following commissions:

Arkansas	Maryland
California	Michigan
Connecticut	Missouri
Delaware	Nevada
Florida	New Jersey
Hawaii	New York
Idaho	North Carolina
Illinois	Ohio
Indiana	Pennsylvania
Iowa	Rhode Island
Kentucky	South Carolina
Louisiana	Virginia
Maine	Washington

I have sponsored testimony on generic/uniform methodologies for determining the return on common equity for:

Aquarion Water Company  
The Connecticut Water Company

United Water Connecticut, Inc.  
Utilities, Inc.

I have sponsored testimony on the rate of return and capital structure effects of merger and acquisition issues for:

California-American Water Company

New Jersey-American Water Company

I have sponsored testimony on fair rate of return and related issues for:

Alpena Power Company  
Apple Canyon Utility Company  
Applied Wastewater Management, Inc.  
Aqua Illinois, Inc.  
Aqua New Jersey, Inc.  
Aqua North Carolina, Inc.  
Aqua Virginia, Inc.  
Aquarion Water Company  
Artesian Water Company  
The Atlantic City Sewerage Company  
Audubon Water Company  
The Borough of Hanover, PA  
Carolina Pines Utilities, Inc.  
Carolina Water Service, Inc. of NC  
Carolina Water Service, Inc. of SC  
The Columbia Water Company  
The Connecticut Water Company  
Consumers Illinois Water Company  
Consumers Maine Water Company  
Consumers New Jersey Water Company  
City of DuBois, Pennsylvania  
Elizabethtown Water Company  
Emporium Water Company  
GTE Hawaiian Telephone Inc.  
Greenridge Utilities, Inc.  
Illinois American Water Company  
Iowa American Water Company  
Water Services Corp. of Kentucky  
Lake Wildwood Utilities Corp.  
Land'Or Utility Company  
Long Island American Water Company  
Long Neck Water Company  
Louisiana Water Service, Inc.  
Massanutten Public Service Company  
Middlesex Water Company  
Missouri-American Water Company  
Mt. Holly Water Company  
Nero Utility Services, Inc.  
New Jersey-American Water Company  
The Newtown Artesian Water Company  
NRG Energy Center Pittsburgh LLC  
NRG Energy Center Harrisburg LLC  
Ohio American Water Company

Penn Estates Utilities  
Pinelands Water Company  
Pinelands Waste Water Company  
Pittsburgh Thermal  
San Jose Water Company  
Southland Utilities, Inc.  
Spring Creek Utilities, Inc.  
Sussex Shores Water Company  
Tega Cay Water Service, Inc.  
Total Environmental Services, Inc. –  
Treasure Lake Water & Sewer Divisions  
Thames Water Americas  
Tidewater Utilities, Inc.  
Transylvania Utilities, Inc.  
Trigen – Philadelphia Energy Corporation  
Twin Lakes Utilities, Inc.  
United Utility Companies  
United Water Arkansas, Inc.  
United Water Arlington Hills Sewerage, Inc.  
United Water Connecticut, Inc.  
United Water Delaware, Inc.  
United Water Great Gorge Inc. / United Water  
Vernon Transmission, Inc.  
United Water Idaho, Inc.  
United Water Indiana, Inc.  
United Water New Jersey, Inc.  
United Water New Rochelle, Inc.  
United Water New York, Inc.  
United Water Owego / Nichols, Inc.  
United Water Pennsylvania, Inc.  
United Water Rhode Island, Inc.  
United Water South County, Inc.  
United Water Toms River, Inc.  
United Water Vernon Sewage Inc.  
United Water Virginia, Inc.  
United Water Westchester, Inc.  
United Water West Lafayette, Inc.  
United Water West Milford, Inc.  
Utilities, Inc.  
Utilities Inc. of Central Nevada  
Utilities, Inc. of Florida  
Utilities, Inc. of Louisiana

(Testimony on Rate of Return Clients Continued)

Utilities, Inc. of Nevada  
Utilities, Inc. of Pennsylvania  
Utilities, Inc. - Westgate  
Utilities Services of South Carolina

Utility Center, Inc.  
Valley Energy, Inc.  
Wellsboro Electric Company  
Western Utilities, Inc.

I have sponsored testimony on capital structure and senior capital cost rates for the following clients:

Alpena Power Company  
Arkansas-Western Gas Company  
Associated Natural Gas Company

PG Energy Inc.  
United Water Delaware, Inc.  
Washington Natural Gas Company

I have assisted in the preparation of rate of return studies on behalf of the following clients:

Algonquin Gas Transmission Company  
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation  
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Company  
Arkansas Western Gas Company  
Artesian Water Company  
Associated Natural Gas Company  
Atlantic City Electric Company  
Bridgeport-Hydraulic Company  
Cambridge Electric Light Company  
Carolina Power & Light Company  
Citizens Gas and Coke Utility  
City of Vernon, CA  
Columbia Gas/Gulf Transmission Cos.  
Commonwealth Electric Company  
Commonwealth Telephone Company  
Conestoga Telephone & Telegraph Co.  
Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation  
Consolidated Gas Transmission Company  
Consumers Power Company  
CWS Systems, Inc.  
Delmarva Power & Light Company  
East Honolulu Community Services, Inc.  
Equitable Gas Company  
Equitrans, Inc.  
Florida Power & Light Company  
Gary Hobart Water Company  
Gasco, Inc.  
GTE Arkansas, Inc.  
GTE California, Inc.  
GTE Florida, Inc.  
GTE Hawaiian Telephone  
GTE North, Inc.  
GTE Northwest, Inc.  
GTE Southwest, Inc.  
Great Lakes Gas Transmission L.P.  
Hawaiian Electric Company  
Hawaiian Electric Light Company  
IES Utilities Inc.

Illinois Power Company  
Interstate Power Company  
Interstate Power & Light Co.  
Iowa Electric Light and Power Company  
Iowa Southern Utilities Company  
Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Company  
Lockhart Power Company  
Middlesex Water Company  
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewer District  
Mountaineer Gas Company  
National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp.  
National Fuel Gas Supply Corp.  
Newco Waste Systems of NJ, Inc.  
New Jersey Natural Gas Company  
New Jersey-American Water Company  
New York-American Water Company  
North Carolina Natural Gas Corp.  
Northumbrian Water Company  
Ohio American Water Company  
Oklahoma Natural Gas Company  
Orange and Rockland Utilities  
Paiute Pipeline Company  
PECO Energy Company  
Penn Estates Utilities, Inc.  
Penn-York Energy Corporation  
Pennsylvania-American Water Co.  
PG Energy Inc.  
Philadelphia Electric Company  
Providence Gas Company  
South Carolina Pipeline Company  
Southwest Gas Corporation  
Stamford Water Company  
Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Company  
Tesoro Refining & Marketing Co.  
United Telephone of New Jersey  
United Utility Companies  
United Water Arkansas, Inc.  
United Water Delaware, Inc.



(Rate of Return Study Clients Continued)

United Water Idaho, Inc.  
United Water Indiana, Inc.  
United Water New Jersey, Inc.  
United Water New York, Inc.  
United Water Pennsylvania, Inc.  
United Water Virginia, Inc.  
United Water West Lafayette, Inc.  
Utilities, Inc. of Pennsylvania  
Utilities, Inc. - Westgate  
Vista-United Telecommunications Corp.

Washington Gas Light Company  
Washington Natural Gas Company  
Washington Water Power Corporation  
Waste Management of New Jersey –  
Transfer Station A  
Wellsboro Electric Company  
Western Reserve Telephone Company  
Western Utilities, Inc.  
Wisconsin Power and Light Company

EDUCATION:

1973 – Clark University – B.A. – Honors in Economics (Concentration: Econometrics and  
Regional/International Economics)

1991 – Rutgers University – M.B.A. – High Honors (Concentration: Corporate Finance)

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS:

American Finance Association  
Financial Management Association  
Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts  
Member, Board of Directors – 2010-2012  
President – 2006-2008 and 2008-2010  
Secretary/Treasurer – 2004-2006  
Energy Association of Pennsylvania  
National Association of Water Companies – Member of the Finance/Accounting/Taxation Committee

SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS:

“Public Utility Betas and the Cost of Capital”, (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D.) – Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, 30<sup>th</sup> Annual Eastern Conference of the Center for Research in Regulated Industries (CRRI), May 20, 2011, Rutgers University, Skytop, PA.

Moderator: Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 43<sup>rd</sup> Financial Forum – “Impact of Cost Recovery Mechanisms on the Perception of Public Utility Risk”, April 14-15, 2011, Washington, DC.

“A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities”, (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D.) – Hot Topic Hotline Webinar, December 3, 2010, Financial Research Institute of the University of Missouri.

“A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities”, (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D.) before the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission Cost of Capital Task Force, September 28, 2010, Indianapolis, IN

Tomorrow’s Cost of Capital: Cost of Capital Issues 2010, Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions, 2010 Deloitte Energy Conference, “Changing the Great Game: Climate, Customers and Capital”, June 7-8, 2010, Washington, DC.

“Cost of Capital Issues – 2010” – Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions 2010 Energy Conference: Changing the Great Game: Climate, Consumers and Capital, June 7-8, 2010, Washington, DC

“A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities”, (co-presenter with Richard A.

Michelfelder, Ph.D.) – Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, 29<sup>th</sup> Annual Eastern Conference of the Center for Research in Regulated Industries (CRRRI), May 20, 2010, Rutgers University, Skytop, PA

Moderator: Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 42<sup>nd</sup> Financial Forum – “The Changing Economic and Capital Market Environment and the Utility Industry”, April 29-30, 2010, Washington, DC

“A New Model for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities” (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D.) – Spring 2010 Meeting of the Staff Subcommittee on Accounting and Finance of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, March 17, 2010, Charleston, SC

“New Approach to Estimating the Cost of Common Equity Capital for Public Utilities” (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D.) - Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, 28<sup>th</sup> Annual Eastern Conference of the Center for Research in Regulated Industries (CRRRI), May 14, 2009, Rutgers University, Skytop, PA

Moderator: Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 41<sup>st</sup> Financial Forum – “Estimating the Cost of Capital in Today’s Economic and Capital Market Environment”, April 16-17, 2009, Washington, DC

“Water Utility Financing: Where Does All That Cash Come From?”, AWWA Pre-Conference Workshop: Water Utility Ratemaking, March 25, 2008, Atlantic City, NJ

#### PAPERS:

“Public Utility Beta Adjustment and the Cost of Capital”, co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D. and Panayiotis Theodossiou, Ph.D.

“A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities”, co-authored with Frank J. Hanley and Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D. (forthcoming in The Journal of Regulatory Economics).

“Comparable Earnings: New Life for an Old Precept” co-authored with Frank J. Hanley, Financial Quarterly Review, (American Gas Association), Summer 1994.

Ohio-American Water Company  
Case No. 11-4161-WS-AIR

BEFORE THE  
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

PMA EXHIBIT NO. 1  
TO ACCOMPANY THE  
PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF  
PAULINE M. AHERN, CRRA  
PRINCIPAL  
AUS CONSULTANTS

ON BEHALF OF  
OHIO-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY

CONCERNING  
FAIR RATE OF RETURN

JULY 2011

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to the Financial Supporting Exhibit  
of Pauline M. Ahern, CRRA

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Ohio-American Water Company  
Summary of Cost of Capital and Fair Rate of Return  
Based upon the Actual Capital Structure of Ohio-American Water Company  
at April 30, 2011

<u>Type of Capital</u>	<u>Ratios (1)</u>	<u>Cost Rate</u>	<u>Weighted Cost Rate</u>
Long-Term Debt	48.24%	6.32% (1)	3.05%
Preferred Equity	1.07%	8.53% (1)	0.09%
Common Equity	<u>50.69%</u>	11.50% (2)	<u>5.83%</u>
Total	<u>100.00%</u>		<u>8.97%</u>

Notes:

- (1) From Schedule D-1; Sponsored by Company Witness Gary M. VerDouw.
- (2) Based upon informed judgment from the entire study, the principal results of which are summarized on page 2.


Ohio-American Water Company  
Brief Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate

No.	Principal Methods	Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies
1.	Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)	9.54 %
2.	Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)	10.43
3.	Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)	10.34
4.	Comparable Earnings Model (CEM) (4)	13.59
5.	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate before Adjustment for Business Risks	11.00 %
6.	Financial Risk Adjustment (5)	(0.22)
7.	Flotation Cost Adjustment (6)	0.12
8.	Business Risk Adjustment (7)	<u>0.60</u>
9.	Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate	<u><u>11.50 %</u></u>

- Notes: (1) From Schedule 7.  
(2) From page 1 of Schedule 9.  
(3) From page 1 of Schedule 11.  
(4) From page 1 of Schedule 12.  
(5) Financial risk adjustment to reflect the financial risk of the capital structure employed by Ohio-American Water Company's relative to the proxy group as detailed in Ms. Ahern's accompanying direct testimony.  
(6) From Schedule 15.  
(7) Business risk adjustment to reflect Ohio-American Water Company's greater business risk relative to the proxy group as detailed in Ms. Ahern's accompanying direct testimony.

Ohio-American Water Company  
2010 Capital Intensity of Ohio-American Water Company and  
AUS Utility Reports Utility Companies Industry Averages

	Average Net Plant (\$ mill)	Average Operating Revenue (\$ mill)	Capital Intensity (\$)	Capital Intensity of Ohio-American v. Other Industries ( times )
Ohio-American Water Company	\$ 118.51	\$ 37.66	\$ 3.15	--
Water Industry Average	\$ 1,844.30	\$ 482.13	\$ 3.83	82.25%
Electric Industry Average	\$ 11,837.65	\$ 5,632.21	\$ 2.10	150.00%
Combination Elec. & Gas Industry Average	\$ 10,560.09	\$ 6,201.97	\$ 1.70	185.29%
Gas Distribution Average	\$ 29,114.85	\$ 23,008.63	\$ 1.27	248.03%



Notes:

Capital Intensity is equal to Net Plant divided by Total Operating Revenue.

Source of Information:


EDGAR Online's I-Metrix Database  
Company Annual Forms 10-K

AUS Utility Reports - May 2011

Published By AUS Consultants

Company Provided Information

# Capital Intensity of the AUS Utility Reports Companies 2001 - 2010




Source of Information: SEC Edgar I-Metrix Online Database



Ohio-American Water Company  
2010 Depreciation Rate of Ohio-American Water Company and  
AUS Utility Reports Utility Companies Industry Averages

	Depreciation Depletion & Amort. Expense (\$ mill)	Average Total Gross Plant Less CWIP (\$ mill)	Depreciation Rate (%)	Depreciation Rate of Ohio-American v. Other Industries ( times )
Ohio-American Water Company	\$ 4.41	\$ 165.06	2.7%	--
Water Industry Average	\$ 61.69	\$ 2,028.31	3.0%	90.00%
Electric Industry Average	\$ 581.88	\$ 14,344.68	4.1%	65.85%
Combination Elec. & Gas Industry Average	\$ 541.94	\$ 14,532.61	3.7%	72.97%
LDC Gas Distribution Industry Average	\$ 132.73	\$ 4,051.67	3.3%	81.82%

## 2010 Effective Depreciation Rate



**Notes:**

Effective Depreciation Rate is equal to Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization Expense divided by average beginning and ending year's Gross Plant minus Construction Work in Progress.

**Source of Information:**


EDGAR Online's I-Metrix Database  
Company Annual Forms 10-K

**AUS Utility Report - May 2011**

Published by AUS Consultants


**Company Provided Information**

## Depreciation Rates for the AUS Utility Reports Companies 2001-2010




Source of Information: SEC Edgar I-Matrix Online Database

# Free Cash Flow / Operating Revenues for the AUS Utility Reports Companies 2001 - 2010




Source of Information: SEC Edgar I-Metrix Online Database

# Total Debt / EBITDA for the AUS Utility Reports Companies 2001 - 2010




Source of Information: SEC Edgar I-Metrix Online Database

# Funds From Ops / Total Debt for the AUS Utility Reports Cos. 2001- 2010




Source of Information: SEC Edgar I-Metrix Online Database

# Funds From Ops / Interest Cov. for the AUS Utility Reports Cos. 2001 - 2010




Source of Information: SEC Edgar I-Metrix Online Database

# Before-Inc. Tax / Interest Cov. for the AUS Utility Reports Cos. 2001 - 2010



Source of Information: SEC Edgar I-Matrix Online Database


# Market Capitalization for the AUS Utility Reports Companies 2001 - 2010



Source of Information: SEC Edgar I-Matrix Online Database




# Earned Returns on Common Equity for the AUS Utility Reports Cos. 2001 - 2010




Source of Information: SEC Edgar I-Metrix Online Database

# **Earned ROE v Authorized ROE for the AUS Utility Reports Water Companies 2001 - 2010**




Source of Information: SEC Edgar I-Metrix Online Database & AUS Utility Reports

# **Earned ROE v Authorized ROE for the AUS Utility Reports Electric Companies 2001 - 2010**




Source of Information: SEC Edgar I-Metrix Online Database & AUS Utility Reports

# Earned ROE v Authorized ROE for the AUS Utility Reports Combination Companies 2001 - 2010



Source of Information: SEC Edgar I-Metrix Online Database & AUS Utility Reports

# **Earned ROE v Authorized ROE for the AUS Utility Reports LDC Companies 2001 - 2010**



Source of Information: SEC Edgar I-Metrix Online Database & AUS Utility Reports



**Criteria | Corporates | General:**  
**Criteria Methodology: Business  
Risk/Financial Risk Matrix  
Expanded**

**Primary Credit Analysts:**

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Emmanuel Dubois-Pelerin, Paris (33) 1-4420-6673; emmanuel\_dubois-pelerin@standardandpoors.com

**Table Of Contents**

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Business Risk/Financial Risk Framework

Updated Matrix

Financial Benchmarks

How To Use The Matrix--And Its Limitations

Related Articles

## Criteria | Corporates | General:

# Criteria Methodology: Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix Expanded

*(Editor's Note: In the previous version of this article published on May 26, certain of the rating outcomes in the table 1 matrix were misspelled. A corrected version follows.)*

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services is refining its methodology for corporate ratings related to its business risk/financial risk matrix, which we published as part of 2008 Corporate Ratings Criteria on April 15, 2008, on RatingsDirect at [www.ratingsdirect.com](http://www.ratingsdirect.com) and Standard & Poor's Web site at [www.standardandpoors.com](http://www.standardandpoors.com).

This article amends and supersedes the criteria as published in Corporate Ratings Criteria, page 21, and the articles listed in the "Related Articles" section at the end of this report.

This article is part of a broad series of measures announced last year to enhance our governance, analytics, dissemination of information, and investor education initiatives. These initiatives are aimed at augmenting our independence, strengthening the rating process, and increasing our transparency to better serve the global markets.

We introduced the business risk/financial risk matrix four years ago. The relationships depicted in the matrix represent an essential element of our corporate analytical methodology.

We are now expanding the matrix, by adding one category to both business and financial risks (see table 1). As a result, the matrix allows for greater differentiation regarding companies rated lower than investment grade (i.e., 'BB' and below).

**Table 1**

<b>Business And Financial Risk Profile Matrix</b>						
<b>Business Risk Profile</b>	<b>Financial Risk Profile</b>					
	<b>Minimal</b>	<b>Modest</b>	<b>Intermediate</b>	<b>Significant</b>	<b>Aggressive</b>	<b>Highly Leveraged</b>
Excellent	AAA	AA	A	A-	BBB	--
Strong	AA	A	A-	BBB	BB	BB-
Satisfactory	A-	BBB+	BBB	BB+	BB-	B+
Fair	--	BBB-	BB+	BB	BB-	B
Weak	--	--	BB	BB-	B+	B-
Vulnerable	--	--	--	B+	B	CCC+

These rating outcomes are shown for guidance purposes only. Actual rating should be within one notch of indicated rating outcomes

The rating outcomes refer to issuer credit ratings. The ratings indicated in each cell of the matrix are the midpoints of a range of likely rating possibilities. This range would ordinarily span one notch above and below the indicated rating.

*Criteria | Corporates | General: Criteria Methodology: Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix Expanded*

## **Business Risk/Financial Risk Framework**

Our corporate analytical methodology organizes the analytical process according to a common framework, and it divides the task into several categories so that all salient issues are considered. The first categories involve fundamental business analysis; the financial analysis categories follow.

Our ratings analysis starts with the assessment of the business and competitive profile of the company. Two companies with identical financial metrics can be rated very differently, to the extent that their business challenges and prospects differ. The categories underlying our business and financial risk assessments are:

### **Business risk**

- Country risk
- Industry risk
- Competitive position
- Profitability/Peer group comparisons

### **Financial risk**

- Accounting
- Financial governance and policies/risk tolerance
- Cash flow adequacy
- Capital structure/asset protection
- Liquidity/short-term factors

We do not have any predetermined weights for these categories. The significance of specific factors varies from situation to situation.

## **Updated Matrix**

We developed the matrix to make explicit the rating outcomes that are typical for various business risk/financial risk combinations. It illustrates the relationship of business and financial risk profiles to the issuer credit rating.

We tend to weight business risk slightly more than financial risk when differentiating among investment-grade ratings. Conversely, we place slightly more weight on financial risk for speculative-grade issuers (see table 1, again). There also is a subtle compounding effect when both business risk and financial risk are aligned at extremes (i.e., excellent/minimal and vulnerable/highly leveraged.)

The new, more granular version of the matrix represents a refinement—not any change in rating criteria or standards—and, consequently, holds no implications for any changes to existing ratings. However, the expanded matrix should enhance the transparency of the analytical process.

## **Financial Benchmarks**



*Criteria | Corporates | General: Criteria Methodology: Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix Expanded*

**Table 2**

<b>Financial Risk Indicative Ratios (Corporates)</b>			
	<b>FFO/Debt (%)</b>	<b>Debt/EBITDA (x)</b>	<b>Debt/Capital (%)</b>
Minimal	greater than 60	less than 1.5	less than 25
Modest	45-60	1.5-2	25-35
Intermediate	30-45	2-3	35-45
Significant	20-30	3-4	45-50
Aggressive	12-20	4-5	50-60
Highly Leveraged	less than 12	greater than 5	greater than 60

## How To Use The Matrix--And Its Limitations

The rating matrix indicative outcomes are what we typically observe--but are not meant to be precise indications or guarantees of future rating opinions. Positive and negative nuances in our analysis may lead to a notch higher or lower than the outcomes indicated in the various cells of the matrix.

In certain situations there may be specific, overarching risks that are outside the standard framework, e.g., a liquidity crisis, major litigation, or large acquisition. This often is the case regarding credits at the lowest end of the credit spectrum--i.e., the 'CCC' category and lower. These ratings, by definition, reflect some impending crisis or acute vulnerability, and the balanced approach that underlies the matrix framework just does not lend itself to such situations.

Similarly, some matrix cells are blank because the underlying combinations are highly unusual--and presumably would involve complicated factors and analysis.

The following hypothetical example illustrates how the tables can be used to better understand our rating process (see tables 1 and 2).

We believe that Company ABC has a satisfactory business risk profile, typical of a low investment-grade industrial issuer. If we believed its financial risk were intermediate, the expected rating outcome should be within one notch of 'BBB'. ABC's ratios of cash flow to debt (35%) and debt leverage (total debt to EBITDA of 2.5x) are indeed characteristic of intermediate financial risk.

It might be possible for Company ABC to be upgraded to the 'A' category by, for example, reducing its debt burden to the point that financial risk is viewed as minimal. Funds from operations (FFO) to debt of more than 60% and debt to EBITDA of only 1.5x would, in most cases, indicate minimal.

Conversely, ABC may choose to become more financially aggressive--perhaps it decides to reward shareholders by borrowing to repurchase its stock. It is possible that the company may fall into the 'BB' category if we view its financial risk as significant. FFO to debt of 20% and debt to EBITDA 4x would, in our view, typify the significant financial risk category.

Still, it is essential to realize that the financial benchmarks are guidelines, neither gospel nor guarantees. They can vary in nonstandard cases: For example, if a company's financial measures exhibit very little volatility, benchmarks may be somewhat more relaxed.

*Criteria | Corporates | General: Criteria Methodology: Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix Expanded*

Moreover, our assessment of financial risk is not as simplistic as looking at a few ratios. It encompasses:

- a view of accounting and disclosure practices;
- a view of corporate governance, financial policies, and risk tolerance;
- the degree of capital intensity, flexibility regarding capital expenditures and other cash needs, including acquisitions and shareholder distributions; and
- various aspects of liquidity--including the risk of refinancing near-term maturities.

The matrix addresses a company's standalone credit profile, and does not take account of external influences, which would pertain in the case of government-related entities or subsidiaries that in our view may benefit or suffer from affiliation with a stronger or weaker group. The matrix refers only to local-currency ratings, rather than foreign-currency ratings, which incorporate additional transfer and convertibility risks. Finally, the matrix does not apply to project finance or corporate securitizations.

## Related Articles

Industrials' Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix--A Fundamental Perspective On Corporate Ratings, published April 7, 2005, on RatingsDirect.

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Ohio-American Water Company  
CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1)  
2006 - 2010, INCLUSIVE

	<u>2010</u>	<u>2009</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>2006</u>	
	(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)					
<u>CAPITALIZATION STATISTICS</u>						
<u>AMOUNT OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED</u>						
TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL	\$ 101.964	\$ 102.091	\$ 91.663	\$ 83.095	\$ 51.346	
SHORT-TERM DEBT	5.041	0.003	2.497	-	29.734	
TOTAL-CAPITAL EMPLOYED	<u>\$ 107.005</u>	<u>\$ 102.094</u>	<u>\$ 94.160</u>	<u>\$ 83.095</u>	<u>\$ 81.080</u>	
<u>INDICATED AVERAGE CAPITAL COST RATES (2)</u>						
TOTAL DEBT	6.00 %	6.03 %	6.18 %	6.16 %	5.51 %	
PREFERRED STOCK	8.33	8.33	8.28	8.24	8.24	
<u>CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS</u>						
BASED ON TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL:						5 YEAR AVERAGE
LONG-TERM DEBT	49.99 %	49.97 %	52.04 %	57.40 %	42.85 %	50.45 %
PREFERRED STOCK	1.12	1.13	1.27	1.41	2.30	1.45
COMMON EQUITY	<u>48.89</u>	<u>48.90</u>	<u>46.69</u>	<u>41.19</u>	<u>54.85</u>	<u>48.10</u>
TOTAL	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
BASED ON TOTAL CAPITAL:						
TOTAL DEBT, INCLUDING SHORT-TERM	52.35 %	49.97 %	53.31 %	57.40 %	63.80 %	55.37 %
PREFERRED STOCK	1.07	1.13	1.24	1.41	1.46	1.26
COMMON EQUITY	<u>46.58</u>	<u>48.90</u>	<u>45.45</u>	<u>41.19</u>	<u>34.74</u>	<u>43.37</u>
TOTAL	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
<u>DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO</u>	115.55 %	- %	- %	- %	- %	23.11 %
<u>RATE OF RETURN ON AVERAGE COMMON EQUITY</u>	1.20 %	(1.96) %	(6.36) %	(7.83) %	(10.47) %	(5.08) %
<u>TOTAL DEBT / EBITDA (3)</u>	6.24 x	8.38 x	12.73 x	13.09 x	19.35 x	11.96 x
<u>TOTAL DEBT / TOTAL CAPITAL</u>	52.35 %	49.97 %	53.31 %	57.40 %	63.80 %	55.37 %

Notes:

- (1) All capitalization and financial statistics for the group are the arithmetic average of the achieved results for each individual company in the group, and are based upon financial statements as originally reported in each year.
- (2) Computed by relating actual total debt interest or preferred stock dividends booked to average of beginning and ending total debt or preferred stock reported to be outstanding.
- (3) Total debt as a percentage of EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization)

Source of Information: Ohio-American Water Company's Annual Reports to the Public Utility Commission of Ohio

Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies  
**CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1)**  
2006 - 2010, Inclusive

	<u>2010</u>	<u>2009</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>2006</u>	
	(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)					
<u>CAPITALIZATION STATISTICS</u>						
<u>AMOUNT OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED</u>						
TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL	\$1,712.951	\$1,641.561	\$1,537.371	\$1,561.064	\$1,274.261	
SHORT-TERM DEBT	<u>\$53.463</u>	<u>\$31.243</u>	<u>\$84.104</u>	<u>\$37.360</u>	<u>\$100.228</u>	
TOTAL CAPITAL EMPLOYED	<u>\$1,766.414</u>	<u>\$1,672.804</u>	<u>\$1,621.475</u>	<u>\$1,598.424</u>	<u>\$1,374.489</u>	
<u>INDICATED AVERAGE CAPITAL COST RATES (2)</u>						
TOTAL DEBT	5.37 %	5.31 %	5.58 %	6.08 %	6.62 %	
PREFERRED STOCK	5.54	5.54	5.75	4.36	4.07	
						<u>5 YEAR</u> <u>AVERAGE</u>
<u>CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS</u>						
BASED ON TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL:						
LONG-TERM DEBT	50.97 %	50.80 %	50.35 %	49.46 %	48.48 %	50.01 %
PREFERRED STOCK	0.19	0.21	0.22	0.31	0.46	0.28
COMMON EQUITY	<u>48.84</u>	<u>48.99</u>	<u>49.43</u>	<u>50.23</u>	<u>51.06</u>	<u>49.71</u>
TOTAL	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
BASED ON TOTAL CAPITAL:						
TOTAL DEBT, INCLUDING SHORT-TERM	53.49 %	53.33 %	53.43 %	50.59 %	50.32 %	52.23 %
PREFERRED STOCK	0.18	0.19	0.21	0.31	0.45	0.27
COMMON EQUITY	<u>46.33</u>	<u>46.48</u>	<u>46.36</u>	<u>49.10</u>	<u>49.23</u>	<u>47.50</u>
TOTAL	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
<u>FINANCIAL STATISTICS</u>						
<u>FINANCIAL RATIOS - MARKET BASED</u>						
EARNINGS / PRICE RATIO	5.35 %	3.74 %	2.30 %	4.41 %	4.79 %	4.12 %
MARKET / AVERAGE BOOK RATIO	171.30	158.51	166.65	210.86	218.62	185.19
DIVIDEND YIELD	3.62	4.02	3.84	3.30	3.30	3.62
DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO	66.67	60.06	64.23	63.89	63.02	63.57
<u>RATE OF RETURN ON AVERAGE BOOK COMMON EQUITY</u>	8.98 %	6.99 %	6.39 %	7.09 %	8.09 %	7.51 %
<u>TOTAL DEBT / EBITDA (3)</u>	4.75 X	5.53 X	9.07 X	5.59 X	4.56 X	5.90 X
<u>FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS / TOTAL DEBT (4)</u>	17.10 %	16.41 %	16.14 %	15.04 %	16.58 %	16.25 %
TOTAL DEBT / TOTAL CAPITAL	53.49 %	53.33 %	53.43 %	50.59 %	50.32 %	52.23 %

Notes:

- (1) All capitalization and financial statistics for the group are the arithmetic average of the achieved results for each individual company in the group, and are based upon financial statements as originally reported in each year.
- (2) Computed by relating actual total debt interest or preferred stock dividends booked to average of beginning and ending total debt or preferred stock reported to be outstanding.
- (3) Total debt as a percentage of EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization).
- (4) Funds from operations (sum of net income, depreciation, amortization, net deferred income tax and investment tax credits, less total AFUDC) plus interest charges as a percentage of total debt.

Source of Information: I-Metrix Database  
Company SEC Form 10-K

Capital Structure Based upon Total Permanent Capital for the  
Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies  
2006 - 2010, Inclusive

	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	5 YEAR AVERAGE
<u>American States Water Co.</u>						
Long-Term Debt	44.30 %	46.95 %	46.25 %	46.99 %	48.81 %	46.62 %
Preferred Stock	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Common Equity	55.70	53.05	53.75	53.01	51.39	53.38
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
<u>American Water Works Co., Inc.</u>						
Long-Term Debt	56.73 %	56.98 %	53.75 %	51.05 %	46.93 %	53.08 %
Preferred Stock	0.29	0.30	0.32	0.31	0.06	0.26
Common Equity	42.98	42.72	45.93	48.64	53.01	46.66
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
<u>Aqua America, Inc.</u>						
Long-Term Debt	57.05 %	56.59 %	54.21 %	55.88 %	51.55 %	55.06 %
Preferred Stock	0.02	0.02	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.06
Common Equity	42.93	43.39	45.70	44.03	48.35	44.88
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
<u>Artesian Resources Corp.</u>						
Long-Term Debt	52.84 %	54.12 %	59.57 %	52.20 %	61.87 %	56.12 %
Preferred Stock	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Common Equity	47.16	45.88	40.43	47.80	38.13	43.88
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
<u>California Water Service Group</u>						
Long-Term Debt	52.51 %	47.93 %	41.88 %	42.86 %	43.47 %	45.73 %
Preferred Stock	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.51	0.51	0.20
Common Equity	47.49	52.07	58.12	56.63	56.02	54.07
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
<u>Connecticut Water Service, Inc.</u>						
Long-Term Debt	49.32 %	50.59 %	46.94 %	47.76 %	44.42 %	47.81 %
Preferred Stock	0.34	0.35	0.39	0.44	0.49	0.40
Common Equity	50.34	49.06	52.67	51.80	55.09	51.79
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
<u>Middlesex Water Company</u>						
Long-Term Debt	43.91 %	47.35 %	49.10 %	49.48 %	48.78 %	47.72 %
Preferred Stock	1.07	1.24	1.22	1.46	2.95	1.59
Common Equity	55.02	51.41	49.68	49.06	48.27	50.69
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
<u>SJW Corporation</u>						
Long-Term Debt	53.79 %	49.52 %	46.08 %	47.79 %	41.83 %	47.80 %
Preferred Stock	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00
Common Equity	46.21	50.48	53.92	52.20	58.16	52.20
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
<u>York Water Company</u>						
Long-Term Debt	48.28 %	47.16 %	55.31 %	51.17 %	48.82 %	50.15 %
Preferred Stock	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Common Equity	51.72	52.84	44.69	48.83	51.18	49.85
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
<u>Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies</u>						
Long-Term Debt	50.97 %	50.80 %	50.35 %	49.46 %	48.48 %	50.01 %
Preferred Stock	0.19	0.21	0.22	0.31	0.46	0.28
Common Equity	48.84	48.99	49.43	50.23	51.06	49.71
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %

Source of Information  
EDGAR Online's I-Metrix Database  
Annual Forms 10-K

Ohio-American Water Company  
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model for the  
Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies

	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>
	Average Dividend Yield (1)	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (2)	Reuters Mean Consensus Projected Five Year Growth Rate in EPS	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (3)	Adjusted Dividend Yield (4)	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (5)
<u>Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies</u>								
American States Water Co.	3.27 %	8.00 %	5.50 %	NA %	5.50 %	6.33 %	3.37 %	9.70 %
American Water Works Co., Inc.	3.05	8.50	11.00	8.70	8.70	9.23	3.19	12.42
Aqua America, Inc.	2.79	10.00	7.20	6.50	6.00	7.43	2.89	10.32
Artesian Resources Corp.	3.95	3.60	4.50	3.60	4.53	4.06	4.03	8.09
California Water Service Group	3.34	3.00	6.30	NA	9.00	6.10	3.44	9.54
Connecticut Water Service, Inc.	3.70	4.00	5.50	4.00	3.00	4.13	3.78	7.91
Middlesex Water Company	4.00	3.00	(1.00)	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.06	7.06
SJW Corporation	3.04	9.00	14.00	NA	14.00	12.33	3.23	15.56
York Water Company	3.09	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	3.18	9.18
Average								<u>9.98 %</u>
Median								<u>9.54 %</u>

NA= Not Available

Notes:

- (1) Indicated dividend at 6/17/2011 divided by the average closing price of the last 60 trading days ending 6/17/2011 for each company.
- (2) From pages 2 through 10 of this Schedule.
- (3) Average of columns 2 through 5 excluding negative growth rates.
- (4) This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclusion of growth rate (from column 6) x column 1 to reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the continuous payment. Thus, for American States Water Co. ,  $3.27\% \times (1 + (1/2 \times 6.33\%)) = 3.37\%$ .
- (5) Column 6 + column 7.

Source of Information:

Value Line Investment Survey: April 22, 2011  
www.reuters.com Downloaded on 06/20/2011  
www.zacks.com Downloaded on 06/20/2011  
www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 06/20/2011

[illegible]

(B) Dividends historically paid in early March, June, September, and December. ■ Div'd reinvestment plan available.

Company's Financial Strength	B++
Stock's Price Stability	85
Price Growth Persistence	70
Earnings Predictability	85

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AMERICAN WATER NYSE-AWK										RECENT PRICE	27.90	P/E RATIO	16.8 (Trailing: 18.1; Median: NMF)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	1.01	DIVID YLD	3.2%	VALUE LINE	
TIMELINESS	1	New 10/22/10																	
SAFETY	3	New 7/25/08																	
TECHNICAL	4	Lowered 3/11/11																	
BETA	.65	(1.00 = Market)																	
2014-16 PROJECTIONS																			
High	50	Gain (+80%)	18%																
Low	35	Gain (+25%)	9%																
Insider Decisions																			
M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J											
to Buy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0											
Options	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0											
to Sell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0											
Institutional Decisions																			
202010	302010	402010																	
to Buy	134	146	145																
to Sell	107	93	119																
Hld's(000)	154379	149349	145430																
Percent shares traded	21	14	7																
1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012		
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	13.08	13.84	14.61	13.98	15.49	16.10	16.35	Revenues per sh	17.95
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.65	.47	2.87	2.89	3.56	3.50	3.80	"Cash Flow" per sh	4.10
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.97	.12	1.10	1.25	1.53	1.70	1.80	Earnings per sh <sup>A</sup>	2.10
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.40	.82	.86	.90	.94	Div'd Decl'd per sh <sup>B</sup>	1.10
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4.31	4.74	6.31	4.50	4.38	4.30	4.25	Cap'l Spending per sh	4.20
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	23.86	28.39	25.64	22.91	23.59	23.60	23.40	Book Value per sh <sup>D</sup>	23.60
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	160.00	160.00	160.00	174.63	175.00	180.00	185.00	Common Shs Outst'g <sup>C</sup>	195.00
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	18.9	15.6	14.6	<i>Bold figures are Value Line estimates</i>		Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio	20.0
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.14	1.04	.94			Relative P/E Ratio	1.35
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.9%	4.2%	3.8%			Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield	2.6%
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 12/31/10											2093.1	2214.2	2336.9	2440.7	2710.7	2875	3025	Revenues (\$mill)	3500
Total Debt \$5478.3 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$201.9 mill.											d155.8	d342.3	187.2	209.9	267.8	300	330	Net Profit (\$mill)	410
LT Debt \$5433.5 mill. LT Interest \$315.0 mill.											--	--	--	37.4%	37.9%	40.4%	39.0%	Income Tax Rate	38.0%
(Total interest coverage: 2.4x) (57% of Cap'l)											--	--	--	--	12.5%	10.0%	10.0%	AFUDC % to Net Profit	15.0%
Leases, Uncapitalized: Annual rentals \$25.7 mill.											56.1%	50.9%	53.1%	56.9%	56.8%	56.5%	56.5%	Long-Term Debt Ratio	56.5%
Pension Assets-12/10 \$861.0 mill.											43.9%	49.1%	46.9%	43.1%	43.2%	43.5%	43.5%	Common Equity Ratio	43.5%
Oblig. \$1285.5 mill.											8692.8	9245.7	8750.2	9289.0	9561.3	9850	10100	Total Capital (\$mill)	10600
Pfd Stock \$23.9 mill. Pfd Div'd NMF											8720.6	9318.0	9991.8	10524	11059	11450	11875	Net Plant (\$mill)	13150
Common Stock 175,211,592 shs. as of 2/22/11											NMF	NMF	3.7%	3.8%	4.4%	4.5%	5.0%	Return on Total Cap'l	5.5%
MARKET CAP: \$4.9 billion (Mid Cap)											NMF	NMF	4.6%	5.2%	6.5%	7.0%	7.5%	Return on Shr. Equity	9.0%
CURRENT POSITION 2008 2009 12/31/10 (\$mill.)											NMF	NMF	3.0%	1.8%	2.8%	3.5%	3.5%	Return on Com Equity	9.0%
Cash Assets											--	--	--	34%	65%	56%	54%	Retained to Com Eq	4.5%
Other											--	--	--	--	--	--	--	All Div'ds to Net Prof	52%
Current Assets											9.5	22.3	13.1						
Accts Payable											408.2	476.8	521.2						
Debt Due											417.7	499.1	534.3						
Other											149.8	138.6	199.2						
Current Liab.											654.8	173.6	44.8						
Fix. Chg. Cov.											300.2	295.2	530.5						
ANNUAL RATES Past 10 Yrs. Past 5 Yrs. Est'd '08-'10 of change (per sh)											1104.8	607.4	774.5						
Revenues											197%	210%	237%						
"Cash Flow"											--	--	3.5%						
Earnings											--	--	5.0%						
Dividends											--	--	8.5%						
Book Value											--	--	8.0%						
Cal-endar											--	--	-5%						
QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$mill.)																			
Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Full Year																			
2008											506.8	589.4	672.2	568.5	2336.9				
2009											550.2	612.7	680.0	597.8	2440.7				
2010											588.1	671.2	786.9	664.5	2710.7				
2011											620	715	820	725	2875				
2012											650	750	865	760	3025				
Cal-endar																			
EARNINGS PER SHARE <sup>A</sup>																			
Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Full Year																			
2008											.04	.28	.55	.23	1.10				
2009											.19	.32	.52	.21	1.25				
2010											.18	.42	.71	.23	1.53				
2011											.22	.46	.75	.27	1.70				
2012											.24	.49	.79	.28	1.80				
Cal-endar																			
QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID <sup>B</sup>																			
Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Full Year																			
2007											--	--	--	--	--				
2008											--	--	.20	.20	.40				
2009											.20	.20	.21	.21	.82				
2010											.21	.21	.22	.22	.86				
2011											.22								

(A) Diluted earnings. Excludes nonrecurring gains (losses): '08, (\$4.62); '09, (\$2.63). Discontinued operations: '06, (\$4.6). Next earnings report due early May. Quarterly

earnings may not sum due to rounding. (B) Dividends to be paid in February, May, August, and November. \* Div. reinvestment available.

(C) In millions. (D) Includes intangibles. In 2010: \$1.251 billion, \$7.15/share.

Company's Financial Strength B  
Stock's Price Stability 85  
Price Growth Persistence NMF  
Earnings Predictability 10

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**BUSINESS:** American Water Works Company, Inc. is the largest investor-owned water and wastewater utility in the U.S., providing services to over 15 million people in over 30 states and Canada. Its nonregulated business assists municipalities and military bases with the maintenance and upkeep as well. Regulated operations made up over 89% of 2010 revenues. New Jersey is its biggest

AQUA AMERICA NYSE-WTR			RECENT PRICE 21.94		P/E RATIO 23.8 (Trading: 24.4 Median: 25.0)		RELATIVE P/E RATIO 1.43		DIV YLD 2.8%		VALUE LINE	
TIMELINESS 3 Lowered 1/21/11			High: 12.0 Low: 6.3		14.8 15.0 16.8 18.5 19.2 20.1 20.6 22.0 21.5 23.0 23.8						Target Price Range 2014 2015 2016	
SAFETY 3 Lowered 8/1/03												
TECHNICAL 3 Raised 4/8/11												
BETA .65 (1.00 = Market)												
2014-16 PROJECTIONS												
Price Gain Ann'l Total												
High 35 (+60%) 15%												
Low 25 (+15%) 3%												
Insider Decisions												
M J J A S O N D J												
to Buy 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0												
Options 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0												
to Sell 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 0												
Institutional Decisions												
2Q2010 3Q2010 4Q2010												
to Buy 92 90 101												
to Sell 119 101 94												
Hd's(W%) 60854 59791 55463												
Percent shares traded												
15 10 5												
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012												
1.84 1.86 2.02 2.09 2.41 2.46 2.70 2.85 2.97 3.48 3.85 4.03 4.52 4.63 4.91 5.26 5.60 5.90												
.47 .50 .56 .61 .72 .76 .86 .94 .96 1.09 1.21 1.26 1.37 1.42 1.61 1.78 1.85 1.95												
.29 .30 .34 .40 .42 .47 .51 .54 .57 .64 .71 .70 .71 .73 .77 .90 .95 1.05												
.22 .23 .24 .26 .27 .28 .30 .32 .35 .37 .40 .44 .48 .51 .55 .59 .63 .67												
.52 .48 .58 .82 .90 1.16 1.09 1.20 1.32 1.54 1.84 2.05 1.79 1.98 2.08 2.37 2.45 1.55												
2.46 2.69 2.84 3.21 3.42 3.85 4.15 4.36 5.34 5.89 6.30 6.96 7.32 7.82 8.12 8.51 8.75 9.10												
63.74 65.75 67.47 72.20 106.80 111.82 113.97 113.19 123.45 127.18 128.97 132.33 133.40 135.37 136.49 137.97 138.90 139.90												
12.0 15.6 17.8 22.5 21.2 18.2 23.6 23.6 24.5 25.1 31.8 34.7 32.0 24.9 23.1 21.1 21.1												
.80 .98 1.03 1.17 1.21 1.18 1.21 1.29 1.40 1.33 1.69 1.87 1.70 1.50 1.54 1.36												
6.2% 4.9% 3.8% 2.9% 3.0% 3.3% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.3% 1.8% 1.8% 2.1% 2.8% 3.1% 3.1%												
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 12/31/10												
Total Debt \$1560.4 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$316 mill.												
LT Debt \$1531.9 mill. LT Interest \$70.6 mill.												
(LT interest earned: 4.5x; total interest coverage: 4.5x)												
(57% of Cap'l)												
Pension Assets-12/10 \$159.2 mill.												
Oblig. \$234.9 mill.												
Pfd Stock None												
Common Stock 137,968,188 shares as of 2/11/11												
MARKET CAP: \$3.0 billion (Mid Cap)												
CURRENT POSITION (MILL.)												
2008 2009 12/31/10												
Cash Assets 14.9 21.9 5.9												
Receivables 84.5 78.7 85.9												
Inventory (AvgCst) 9.8 9.5 9.2												
Other 11.8 11.5 44.4												
Current Assets 121.0 121.6 145.4												
Accts Payable 50.0 57.9 45.3												
Debt Due 87.9 87.0 28.5												
Other 55.3 56.1 149.9												
Current Liab. 193.2 201.0 223.7												
Fix. Chg. Cov. 329% 346% 290%												
ANNUAL RATES Past 10 Yrs. Past 5 Yrs. Est'd '08-'10 of change (per sh)												
Revenues 8.0% 7.5% 6.5%												
"Cash Flow" 8.5% 8.0% 8.0%												
Earnings 6.5% 4.5% 10.0%												
Dividends 7.5% 8.0% 6.0%												
Book Value 9.0% 7.0% 5.0%												
Cal-endar												
QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.)												
Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Full Year												
2008 139.3 151.0 177.1 159.6 627.0												
2009 154.5 167.3 180.8 167.9 670.5												
2010 160.5 178.4 207.8 179.3 726.0												
2011 180 185 215 195 775												
2012 195 200 230 200 825												
Cal-endar												
EARNINGS PER SHARE \$												
Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Full Year												
2008 .11 .17 .26 .19 .73												
2009 .14 .19 .25 .20 .77												
2010 .16 .22 .32 .20 .90												
2011 .16 .22 .34 .23 .95												
2012 .18 .24 .36 .27 1.05												
Cal-endar												
QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID \$												
Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Full Year												
2007 .115 .115 .125 .125 .48												
2008 .125 .125 .125 .135 .51												
2009 .135 .135 .135 .145 .55												
2010 .145 .145 .145 .155 .59												
2011 .155												
BUSINESS: Aqua America, Inc. is the holding company for water and wastewater utilities that serve approximately three million residents in Pennsylvania, Ohio, North Carolina, Illinois, Texas, New Jersey, Florida, Indiana, and five other states. Divested three of four non-water businesses in '91; telemarketing group in '93; and others. Acquired AquaSource, 7/03; Consumers Water, 4/99; and												
Shale. As the drilling requires significant water use, we expect drilling-related water consumption to increase in the future, adding to the revenue stream. Furthermore as the Marcellus Shale is set to provide impetus to many states that the company serves, we anticipate organic growth to increase over the next few years.												
Long-term prospects look bright for Aqua America. It looks ever likely that the company will benefit both from acquisition-driven growth and organic growth. Finally, Aqua America's diversification into other sectors continues. It is looking at three to four more solar operations this year, and is quite likely to ramp up production from 2012 onward, as these projects are turning out to be quite profitable in the near and long term. The company is also cutting down on costs, which should aid in boosting the bottom line over the next few years.												
Income investors should find this issue of interest. This equity's dividend yield is well above the industry average. Furthermore, the company has a history of steady dividend increases.												
Sahana Zutshi												
April 22, 2011												

Company's Financial Strength	B+
Stock's Price Stability	100
Price Growth Persistence	70
Earnings Predictability	100

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
ARTESIAN RES. CORP. NDQ-ARTNA			RECENT PRICE	19.42	TRAILING P/E RATIO	19.4	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	1.06	DIV'D YLD	3.9%	VALUE LINE	
RANKS	15.38	19.83	20.04	22.62	22.33	20.67	19.31	18.73	19.59	19.99	High	Low
PERFORMANCE 3	Average											
Technical 3	Average											
SAFETY 2	Above Average											
BETA .80	(1.00 = Market)											
Financial Strength	B+											
Price Stability	100											
Price Growth Persistence	45											
Earnings Predictability	90											
<div> <div>LEGENDS</div> <div> 12 Mos. Mov. Avg.  Rel. Price Strength  3-for-2 split 7/03  3-for-2 split 7/06  Shaded area indicates recession </div> </div>												
© VALUE LINE PUBLISHING LLC	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011/2012		
SALES PER SH	5.97	6.20	6.67	7.52	7.77	7.20	7.59	8.11	8.48			
"CASH FLOW" PER SH	1.27	1.28	1.42	1.56	1.75	1.57	1.65	1.84	1.92			
EARNINGS PER SH	.76	.64	.72	.84	.97	.90	.86	.97	1.00			
DIV'D DECL'D PER SH	.52	1.06	1.11	1.16	.61	.66	.71	.72	.75			
CAP'L SPENDING PER SH	3.18	4.20	4.82	3.35	5.08	3.66	6.09	2.32	2.57			
BOOK VALUE PER SH	8.84	9.01	9.26	9.60	10.15	11.66	11.86	12.15	12.44			
COMMON SHS OUTST'G (MILL)	5.79	5.85	5.93	6.02	6.09	7.30	7.40	7.51	7.65			
AVG ANN'L P/E RATIO	17.3	24.7	25.4	23.5	20.3	21.5	20.1	16.4	18.2			
RELATIVE P/E RATIO	.94	1.41	1.34	1.24	1.10	1.14	1.21	1.09	1.17			
AVG ANN'L DIV'D YIELD	3.9%	6.7%	6.1%	5.9%	3.1%	3.4%	4.1%	4.5%	4.1%			
SALES (\$MILL)	34.6	36.3	39.6	45.3	47.3	52.5	56.2	60.9	64.9			
OPERATING MARGIN	99.6%	--	--	100.0%	45.6%	45.6%	45.1%	46.9%	46.5%			
DEPRECIATION (\$MILL)	3.2	3.6	4.0	4.4	4.6	5.2	5.8	6.6	7.0			
NET PROFIT (\$MILL)	4.2	3.9	4.4	5.0	6.1	6.3	6.4	7.3	7.6			
INCOME TAX RATE	40.4%	37.9%	39.6%	39.9%	39.0%	39.8%	40.8%	40.1%	40.0%			
NET PROFIT MARGIN	12.0%	10.8%	11.1%	11.1%	12.8%	11.9%	11.4%	11.9%	11.7%			
WORKING CAP'L (\$MILL)	2.4	d10.5	d8.7	d1.8	d8.8	2.5	d20.9	d23.3	d27.9			
LONG-TERM DEBT (\$MILL)	64.0	80.6	82.4	92.4	92.1	91.8	107.6	106.0	105.1			
SHR. EQUITY (\$MILL)	51.3	52.7	54.9	57.8	61.8	85.1	87.8	91.2	95.1			
RETURN ON TOTAL CAP'L	5.6%	4.5%	5.1%	5.3%	5.8%	5.3%	4.7%	5.2%	5.6%			
RETURN ON SHR. EQUITY	8.1%	7.4%	8.0%	8.7%	9.8%	7.4%	7.3%	8.0%	8.0%			
RETAINED TO COM EQ	2.8%	1.4%	2.1%	2.7%	3.8%	2.1%	1.4%	2.1%	2.0%			
ALL DIV'DS TO NET PROF	65%	81%	74%	69%	61%	71%	81%	74%	75%			
A No. of analysts changing earn. est. in last 9 days: 0 up, 0 down, consensus 5-year earnings growth 3.6% per year. B Based upon 3 analysts' estimates. C Based upon 3 analysts' estimates.												
ANNUAL RATES												
of change (per share)	5 Yrs.	1 Yr.										
Sales	3.5%	4.5%										
"Cash Flow"	5.0%	4.0%										
Earnings	5.0%	3.0%										
Dividends	-8.0%	4.5%										
Book Value	5.5%	2.5%										
Fiscal Year	QUARTERLY SALES (\$mill.)	Full Year										
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q								
12/31/08	12.3	13.9	15.7	14.3	56.2							
12/31/09	13.9	15.4	16.1	15.5	60.9							
12/31/10	15.0	16.0	18.0	15.9	64.9							
12/31/11												
Fiscal Year	EARNINGS PER SHARE	Full Year										
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q								
12/31/07	.18	.19	.37	.14	.90							
12/31/08	.13	.21	.35	.17	.86							
12/31/09	.22	.27	.28	.20	.97							
12/31/10	.22	.24	.38	.16	1.00							
12/31/11	.21	.25	.37									
Cal-endar	QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID	Full Year										
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q								
2008	.172	.178	.178	.178	.71							
2009	.178	.178	.178	.187	.72							
2010	.187	.188	.188	.189	.75							
2011	.197											
INSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS												
	2Q'10	3Q'10	4Q'10									
to Buy	26	17	23									
to Sell	15	20	21									
Hld's(000)	2151	2148	2190									
ASSETS (\$mill.)												
	2008	2009	12/31/10									
Cash Assets	2.9	.5	.2									
Receivables	7.8	9.0	5.1									
Inventory	1.1	1.2	1.2									
Other	1.7	2.5	7.5									
Current Assets	13.5	13.2	14.0									
Property, Plant & Equip, at cost	386.5	403.0	414.6									
Accum Depreciation	58.8	64.9	69.2									
Net Property	327.7	338.1	345.4									
Other	7.5	7.6	12.1									
Total Assets	348.7	358.9	371.5									
LIABILITIES (\$mill.)												
	2008	2009	12/31/10									
Accts Payable	4.6	3.7	3.4									
Debt Due	22.6	27.7	30.6									
Other	7.2	5.1	7.9									
Current Liab	34.4	36.5	41.9									
LONG-TERM DEBT AND EQUITY as of 12/31/10												
Total Debt \$135.7 mill.												
LT Debt \$105.1 mill.												
Including Cap. Leases None												
Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals \$.1 mill.												
Pension Liability \$.5 mill. in '10 vs. \$.7 mill. in '09												
Pfd Stock None												
Pfd Div'd Paid None												
Common Stock 7,649,435 shares												
(48% of Cap'l)												
INDUSTRY: Water Utility												
BUSINESS: Artesian Resources Corporation, through its subsidiaries, provides water, wastewater and other services on the Delmarva Peninsula. The company distributes and sells water, including water for public and private fire protection, to residential, commercial, industrial, municipal and utility customers throughout the states of Delaware, Maryland and Pennsylvania. It also provides wastewater services to customers in Delaware and has entered into purchase agreements to provide wastewater services in the State of Maryland. In addition, Artesian provides contract water and wastewater operations, water and sewer Service Line Protection Plans, wastewater management services, and design, construction and engineering services. Artesian Resources is the parent holding company of Artesian Water Company, Inc., Artesian Water Pennsylvania, Inc., Artesian Water Maryland, Inc., Artesian Wastewater Management, Inc., Artesian Wastewater Maryland, Inc. and three other entities. Has 238 employees. Chairman, C.E.O. & President: Dian C. Taylor. Address: 664 Churchmans Rd., Newark, DE 19702. Tel.: 302 453-6900. Internet: http://www.artesianwater.com. W.T.												
April 22, 2011												
TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURN												
Dividends plus appreciation as of 3/31/2011												
	3 Mos.	6 Mos.	1 Yr.	3 Yrs.	5 Yrs.							
	3.86%	4.22%	14.86%	19.74%	6.44%							

[illegible]

(A) Basic EPS. Excl. nonrecurring gain (loss): '00, .7¢; '01, .4¢; '02, 8¢. Next earnings report due April 28th.	(B) Dividends historically paid in early Feb., May, Aug., and Nov. ■ Div'd reinvestment plan available.	(C) Incl deferred charges in '10: \$2.2 mill., \$0.11/sh. (D) In millions, adjusted for split. (E) Excludes non-reg. rev.	<b>Company's Financial Strength</b> B+ <b>Stock's Price Stability</b> 90 <b>Price Growth Persistence</b> 70 <b>Earnings Predictability</b> 85
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CONN. WATER SERVICES			NDQ-CTWS		RECENT PRICE		25.01		TRAILING P/E RATIO		22.1		RELATIVE P/E RATIO		1.21		DIV'D YLD		3.7%		VALUE LINE		
RANKS			31.09 20.35		30.41 24.00		29.76 23.83		28.17 21.91		27.71 20.29		25.61 22.40		28.95 19.26		26.44 17.31		27.90 20.00		28.27 23.27		High Low
PERFORMANCE 3			Average		Average		Average		Average		Average		Average		Average		Average		Average		Average		45
Technical 3			Average		Average		Average		Average		Average		Average		Average		Average		Average		Average		30
SAFETY 2			Above		Above		Above		Above		Above		Above		Above		Above		Above		Above		22.5
BETA .80			(1.00 = Market)																				13
Financial Strength			B+																				9
Price Stability			95																				6
Price Growth Persistence			25																				4
Earnings Predictability			80																				3
VOL. (thous.)																							550
© VALUE LINE PUBLISHING LLC			2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011/2012		
SALES PER SH			5.77		5.91		6.04		5.81		5.68		7.05		7.24		6.93		7.65				
"CASH FLOW" PER SH			1.78		1.89		1.91		1.62		1.52		1.90		1.95		1.93		2.04				
EARNINGS PER SH			1.12		1.15		1.16		.88		.81		1.05		1.11		1.19		1.13				1.20 <sup>A,B</sup> /1.24 <sup>C</sup>
DIV'D'S DECL'D PER SH			.81		.83		.84		.85		.86		.87		.88		.90		.92				
CAP'L SPENDING PER SH			1.98		1.49		1.58		1.96		1.96		2.24		2.44		3.28		3.06				
BOOK VALUE PER SH			10.06		10.46		10.94		11.52		11.60		11.95		12.23		12.67		13.05				
COMMON SHS OUTST'G (MILL)			7.94		7.97		8.04		8.17		8.27		8.38		8.46		8.57		8.68				
AVG ANN'L P/E RATIO			24.3		23.5		22.9		28.6		29.0		23.0		22.2		18.4		20.7				20.8/20.2
RELATIVE P/E RATIO			1.33		1.34		1.21		1.51		1.57		1.22		1.34		1.22		1.33				
AVG ANN'L DIV'D YIELD			3.0%		3.0%		3.1%		3.4%		3.6%		3.6%		3.6%		4.1%		3.9%				
SALES (\$MILL)			45.8		47.1		48.5		47.5		46.9		59.0		61.3		59.4		66.4				Bold figures are consensus earnings estimates and, using the recent prices, P/E ratios.
OPERATING MARGIN			57.7%		52.1%		51.0%		48.3%		43.7%		40.8%		49.0%		35.8%		40.7%				
DEPRECIATION (\$MILL)			5.4		5.9		6.0		6.1		5.9		7.2		7.1		6.4		7.9				
NET PROFIT (\$MILL)			8.8		9.2		9.4		7.2		6.7		8.8		9.4		10.2		9.8				
INCOME TAX RATE			33.8%		17.9%		22.9%		—		23.5%		32.4%		27.2%		19.5%		35.2%				
NET PROFIT MARGIN			19.2%		19.5%		19.4%		15.1%		14.3%		14.9%		15.4%		17.2%		14.8%				
WORKING CAP'L (\$MILL)			d5.1		d3.9		d.7		13.0		1.2		8.1		d3.3		d13.1		d14.7				
LONG-TERM DEBT (\$MILL)			64.8		64.8		66.4		77.4		77.3		92.3		92.2		112.0		111.7				
SHR. EQUITY (\$MILL)			80.7		84.2		88.7		94.9		96.7		100.9		104.2		109.3		114.0				
RETURN ON TOTAL CAP'L			7.4%		7.5%		7.0%		5.0%		4.9%		5.5%		5.9%		5.5%		5.4%				
RETURN ON SHR. EQUITY			10.9%		10.9%		10.6%		7.5%		6.9%		8.7%		9.0%		9.3%		8.6%				
RETAINED TO COM EQ			3.1%		3.2%		3.1%		.3%		NMF		1.6%		1.9%		2.3%		1.6%				
ALL DIV'D'S TO NET PROF			72%		71%		71%		95%		105%		82%		79%		76%		81%				
<sup>A</sup> No. of analysts changing earn. est. in last 9 days: 0 up, 0 down, consensus 5-year earnings growth 4.0% per year. <sup>B</sup> Based upon 3 analysts' estimates. <sup>C</sup> Based upon 3 analysts' estimates.																							
ANNUAL RATES			ASSETS (\$mill.)			2008	2009	12/31/10	INDUSTRY: Water Utility														
of change (per share)			Cash Assets			.7	5.4	1.0	<b>BUSINESS:</b> Connecticut Water Service, Inc. primarily operates as a water utility provider. The company operates through three segments: Water Activities, Real Estate Transactions, and Services and Rentals. The Water Activities segment supplies public drinking water to its customers. Its Real Estate Transactions segment involves in the sale of its limited excess real estate holdings. The Services and Rentals segment provides contracted services to water and wastewater utilities and other clients, as well as leases certain properties to third parties. This segment's services include contract operations of water and wastewater facilities; Linebacker, its service line protection plan for public drinking water customers; and provision of bulk deliveries of emergency drinking water to businesses and residences via tanker truck. As of December 31, 2010, Connecticut Water Service provided water to approximately 90,000 customers in 55 towns throughout Connecticut. Has 225 employees. Chairman, C.F.O. & President: Eric W. Thornburg, Inc.: CT. Address: 93 West Main Street, Clinton, CT 06413. Tel.: (860) 669-8636. Internet: <a href="http://www.ctwater.com">http://www.ctwater.com</a> .														
5 Yrs.			Receivables			12.0	6.5	10.1															
1 Yr.			Inventory (Avg cost)			1.1	1.1	1.7															
Sales			Other			2.0	7.0	7.6															
"Cash Flow"			Current Assets			15.8	20.0	20.4															
Earnings			Property, Plant & Equip., at cost			418.1	448.2	471.6															
Dividends			Accum Depreciation			115.8	123.0	127.4															
Book Value			Net Property			302.3	325.2	344.2															
			Other			54.3	70.1	60.6															
			Total Assets			372.4	415.3	425.2															
Fiscal Year			LIABILITIES (\$mill.)			2008	2009	12/31/10	<b>TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURN</b> Dividends plus appreciation as of 3/31/2011														
1Q			Accts Payable			5.7	6.5	6.6															
2Q			Debt Due			12.1	25.0	26.3															
3Q			Other			1.3	1.6	2.2															
4Q			Current Liab			19.1	33.1	35.1															
Full Year			LONG-TERM DEBT AND EQUITY as of 12/31/10			Total Debt \$138.0 mill. Due in 5 Yrs. \$26.3 mill.																	
12/31/08			LT Debt \$111.7 mill.			Including Cap. Leases None																	
12/31/09			(49% of Cap'l)			Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals \$3 mill.																	
12/31/10			Pension Liability \$16.7 mill. in '10 vs. \$14.9 mill. in '09			Pfd Stock \$.8 mill. Pfd Div'd Paid Nil																	
12/31/11			Common Stock 8,676,849 shares			(51% of Cap'l)																	
Fiscal Year			QUARTERLY SALES (\$mill.)			2008	2009	12/31/10	<b>3 Mos.</b> <b>6 Mos.</b> <b>1 Yr.</b> <b>3 Yrs.</b> <b>5 Yrs.</b> -4.61%      12.06%      17.78%      25.16%      21.46%														
1Q			Earnings Per Share			2Q'10      3Q'10      4Q'10																	
2Q			1Q			to Buy      30      21      27																	
3Q			2Q			to Sell      23      21      19																	
4Q			3Q			Hld's(000)      2790      2747      2764																	
Full Year			4Q																				
12/31/07			2008																				
12/31/08			2009																				
12/31/09			2010																				
12/31/10			2011																				
12/31/11																							
Cal-endar			QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID			2008	2009	2010	2011	<b>INSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS</b>													
1Q			1Q			2Q'10      3Q'10      4Q'10																	
2Q			2Q			to Buy      30      21      27																	
3Q			3Q			to Sell      23      21      19																	
4Q			4Q			Hld's(000)      2790      2747      2764																	
Full Year			Full Year																				
2008			2008																				
2009			2009																				
2010			2010																				
2011			2011																				
2012			2012																				

MIDDLESEX WATER NDQ-MSEX										RECENT PRICE	18.14	TRAILING P/E RATIO	18.9	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	1.04	DIVID YLD	4.0%	VALUE LINE		
RANKS										20.04 13.73	21.23 15.77	21.81 16.65	23.47 17.07	20.50 16.50	20.24 16.93	19.83 12.05	17.91 11.64	19.31 14.74	19.31 17.35	High Low
PERFORMANCE	3	Average	<div>LEGENDS</div> <div>— 12 Mos Mov Avg</div> <div>... Rel Price Strength</div> <div>3-for-2 split 1/02</div> <div>4-for-3 split 11/03</div> <div>Shaded area indicates recession</div> 																	
Technical	3	Average																		
SAFETY	2	Above Average																		
BETA	.75	(1.00 = Market)																		
Financial Strength	B++																			
Price Stability	95																			
Price Growth Persistence	30																			
Earnings Predictability	90																			
© VALUE LINE PUBLISHING LLC										2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011/2012	
SALES PER SH										5.98	6.12	6.25	6.44	6.16	6.50	6.79	6.75	6.60		
"CASH FLOW" PER SH										1.20	1.15	1.28	1.33	1.33	1.49	1.53	1.40	1.55		
EARNINGS PER SH										.73	.61	.73	.71	.82	.87	.89	.72	.96	.95 <sup>A</sup> /.99 <sup>C</sup>	
DIV'DS DECL'D PER SH										.63	.65	.66	.67	.68	.69	.70	.71	.72		
CAP'L SPENDING PER SH										1.59	1.87	2.54	2.18	2.31	1.66	2.12	1.49	1.90		
BOOK VALUE PER SH										7.39	7.60	8.02	8.26	9.52	10.05	10.03	10.33	11.13		
COMMON SHS OUTST'G (MILL)										10.36	10.48	11.36	11.58	13.17	13.25	13.40	13.52	15.57		
AVG ANN'L P/E RATIO										23.5	30.0	26.4	27.4	22.7	21.6	19.8	21.0	17.8	19.1/18.3	
RELATIVE P/E RATIO										1.28	1.71	1.39	1.45	1.23	1.15	1.19	1.40	1.14		
AVG ANN'L DIV'D YIELD										3.7%	3.5%	3.4%	3.5%	3.7%	3.7%	4.0%	4.7%	4.2%		
SALES (\$MILL)										61.9	64.1	71.0	74.6	81.1	86.1	91.0	91.2	102.7	Bold figures are consensus earnings estimates and, using the recent prices, P/E ratios.	
OPERATING MARGIN										47.1%	44.0%	44.4%	44.4%	47.4%	47.0%	46.9%	42.6%	46.7%		
DEPRECIATION (\$MILL)										5.0	5.6	6.4	7.2	7.8	8.2	8.5	9.2	10.0		
NET PROFIT (\$MILL)										7.8	6.6	8.4	8.5	10.0	11.8	12.2	10.0	14.3		
INCOME TAX RATE										33.3%	32.8%	31.1%	27.6%	33.4%	32.6%	33.2%	34.1%	32.1%		
NET PROFIT MARGIN										12.5%	10.3%	11.9%	11.4%	12.4%	13.8%	13.4%	10.9%	13.9%		
WORKING CAP'L (\$MILL)										d9.3	d13.3	d11.8	d4.5	2.8	d9.6	d40.9	d38.6	d17.9		
LONG-TERM DEBT (\$MILL)										87.5	97.4	115.3	128.2	130.7	131.6	118.2	124.9	133.8		
SHR. EQUITY (\$MILL)										80.6	83.7	99.2	103.6	133.3	137.1	141.2	143.0	176.6		
RETURN ON TOTAL CAP'L										6.0%	5.0%	5.1%	5.0%	5.1%	5.6%	5.8%	5.0%	5.7%		
RETURN ON SHR. EQUITY										9.6%	7.9%	8.5%	8.2%	7.5%	8.6%	8.6%	7.0%	8.1%		
RETAINED TO COM EQ										1.3%	NMF	.9%	.6%	1.3%	1.8%	2.0%	.1%	2.1%		
ALL DIV'DS TO NET PROF										87%	106%	90%	94%	84%	79%	78%	98%	75%		
<sup>A</sup> No. of analysts changing eam. est. in last 9 days: 0 up, 0 down, consensus 5-year earnings growth 3.0% per year. <sup>B</sup> Based upon 2 analysts' estimates. <sup>C</sup> Based upon 2 analysts' estimates.																				
ANNUAL RATES										INDUSTRY: Water Utility										
of change (per share)										<b>BUSINESS:</b> Middlesex Water Company engages in the ownership and operation of regulated water utility systems in New Jersey and Delaware, and a regulated wastewater utility in NJ. The company offers contract operations services and a service line maintenance program through its nonregulated subsidiary, Utility Service Affiliates, Inc. Its water utility system treats, stores, and distributes water for residential, commercial, industrial, and fire prevention purposes. It also provides water treatment and pumping services to the Township of East Brunswick, as well as water and wastewater services to residents in Southampton Township. Middlesex Water's Delaware subsidiaries provide water services to retail customers in New Castle, Kent, and Sussex counties. In February, Middlesex Water announced the retirement of J. Richard Tompkins, who will not seek re-election when his term expires in May 2011. Has 285 employees. Chairman: Dennis W. Doll. Address: 1500 Ronson Rd, P.O. BOX 1500, Iselin, NJ 08830. Tel.: 732-634-1500. Internet: <a href="http://www.middlesexwater.com">http://www.middlesexwater.com</a> .										
5 Yrs.																				
1 Yr.																				
Sales																				
"Cash Flow"																				
Earnings																				
Dividends																				
Book Value																				
Fiscal Year	QUARTERLY SALES (\$mill.)				Full Year	ASSETS (\$mill.)				2008	2009	12/31/10	<b>LIABILITIES (\$mill.)</b> Accts Payable 5.7 4.3 6.4 Debt Due 43.9 46.6 21.4 Other 11.9 9.8 12.9 Current Liab 61.5 60.7 40.7  <b>LONG-TERM DEBT AND EQUITY as of 12/31/10</b> Total Debt \$155.3 mill. Due in 5 Yrs. \$40.1 mill. LT Debt \$133.8 mill. Including Cap. Leases None (43% of Cap'l) Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals None  Pension Liability \$28.6 mill. in '10 vs. \$25.7 mill. in '09 Pfd Stock \$3.4 mill. Pfd Div'd Paid \$2 mill. (1% of Cap'l) Common Stock 15,568,000 shares (56% of Cap'l)							
1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q		Property, Plant & Equip, at cost	436.8	453.6	490.6												
12/31/08	20.8	23.0	25.7	21.5	91.0	Accum Depreciation	70.5	77.1	84.7											
12/31/09	20.6	23.1	25.5	22.0	91.2	Net Property	366.3	376.5	405.9											
12/31/10	21.6	26.5	29.6	25.0	102.7	Other	53.1	59.6	60.5											
12/31/11						Total Assets	440.0	458.1	489.2											
Fiscal Year	EARNINGS PER SHARE				Full Year					2008	2009	12/31/10	<b>TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURN</b> Dividends plus appreciation as of 3/31/2011 3 Mos. 6 Mos. 1 Yr. 3 Yrs. 5 Yrs. 0.10% 10.18% 11.08% 13.92% 16.41%							
1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q		12/31/07	.13	.24	.31	.19	.87										
12/31/08	.15	.26	.35	.13	.89	12/31/08	.15	.26	.35	.13	.89									
12/31/09	.10	.21	.29	.12	.72	12/31/09	.10	.21	.29	.12	.72									
12/31/10	.11	.31	.37	.17	.96	12/31/10	.11	.31	.37	.17	.96									
12/31/11	.11	.29	.34			12/31/11	.11	.29	.34											
Cal-endar	QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID				Full Year					2008	2009	12/31/10	<b>INSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS</b> 2Q'10 3Q'10 4Q'10 to Buy 40 30 39 to Sell 21 24 21 Hld's(000) 5706 5930 6031							
1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q		2008	.175	.175	.175	.178	.70										
2009	.178	.178	.178	.18	.71	2009	.178	.178	.178	.18	.71									
2010	.18	.18	.18	.183	.72	2010	.18	.18	.18	.183	.72									
2011	.183					2011	.183													





YORK WATER CO		NDQ-YORW		RECENT PRICE	16.52	TRAILING P/E RATIO	23.3	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	1.27	DIV'D YLD	3.2%	VALUE LINE	
RANKS		13.45	13.49	14.03	17.87	20.99	18.55	16.50	17.95	18.00	17.60	High	Low
PERFORMANCE	4	Below Average											
Technical	4	Below Average											
SAFETY	2	Above Average											
BETA	.70	(1.00 = Market)											
Financial Strength	B++												
Price Stability	90												
Price Growth Persistence	60												
Earnings Predictability	100												
© VALUE LINE PUBLISHING LLC		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011/2012		
REVENUES PER SH		2.05	2.17	2.18	2.58	2.56	2.79	2.89	2.95	3.07			
"CASH FLOW" PER SH		.57	.65	.65	.79	.77	.86	.88	.95	1.07			
EARNINGS PER SH		.40	.47	.49	.56	.58	.57	.57	.64	.71			
DIV'D DECL'D PER SH		.35	.37	.39	.42	.45	.48	.49	.51	.52			
CAP'L SPENDING PER SH		.66	1.07	2.50	1.69	1.85	1.69	2.17	1.18	.83			
BOOK VALUE PER SH		3.90	4.06	4.65	4.85	5.84	5.97	6.14	6.92	7.19			
COMMON SHS OUTST'G (MILL)		9.55	9.63	10.33	10.40	11.20	11.27	11.37	12.56	12.69			
AVG ANN'L P/E RATIO		26.9	24.5	25.7	26.3	31.2	30.3	24.6	21.9	20.7			
RELATIVE P/E RATIO		1.47	1.40	1.36	1.39	1.68	1.61	1.48	1.46	1.33			
AVG ANN'L DIV'D YIELD		3.3%	3.2%	3.1%	2.9%	2.5%	2.8%	3.5%	3.6%	3.5%			
REVENUES (\$MILL)		19.6	20.9	22.5	26.8	28.7	31.4	32.8	37.0	39.0			
NET PROFIT (\$MILL)		3.8	4.4	4.8	5.8	6.1	6.4	6.4	7.5	8.9			
INCOME TAX RATE		34.9%	34.8%	36.7%	36.7%	34.4%	36.5%	36.1%	37.9%	38.5%			
AFUDC % TO NET PROFIT		3.7%	--	--	--	7.2%	3.6%	10.1%	--	1.2%			
LONG-TERM DEBT RATIO		46.7%	43.4%	42.5%	44.1%	48.3%	46.5%	54.5%	45.7%	48.3%			
COMMON EQUITY RATIO		53.3%	56.6%	57.5%	55.9%	51.7%	53.5%	45.5%	54.3%	51.7%			
TOTAL CAPITAL (\$MILL)		69.9	69.0	83.6	90.3	126.5	125.7	153.4	160.1	176.4			
NET PLANT (\$MILL)		106.7	116.5	140.0	155.3	174.4	191.6	211.4	222.0	228.4			
RETURN ON TOTAL CAP'L		7.4%	8.5%	7.6%	8.4%	6.2%	6.7%	5.7%	6.2%	6.5%			
RETURN ON SHR. EQUITY		10.2%	11.4%	10.0%	11.6%	9.3%	9.5%	9.2%	8.6%	9.8%			
RETURN ON COM EQUITY		10.2%	11.4%	10.0%	11.6%	9.3%	9.5%	9.2%	8.6%	9.8%			
RETAINED TO COM EQ		1.3%	2.6%	2.1%	3.0%	2.2%	1.7%	1.4%	1.9%	2.7%			
ALL DIV'DS TO NET PROF		88%	77%	79%	74%	77%	82%	85%	78%	72%			
*No. of analysts changing earn. est. in last 9 days: 0 up, 0 down, consensus 5-year earnings growth 6.0% per year. <sup>B</sup> Based upon 4 analysts' estimates. <sup>C</sup> Based upon 4 analysts' estimates.													
ANNUAL RATES		5 Yrs.	1 Yr.	5 Yrs.	1 Yr.	5 Yrs.	1 Yr.	5 Yrs.	1 Yr.	5 Yrs.	1 Yr.	5 Yrs.	1 Yr.
of change (per share)		5.0%	4.0%	5.0%	4.0%	5.0%	4.0%	5.0%	4.0%	5.0%	4.0%	5.0%	4.0%
Revenues		5.0%	4.0%	5.0%	4.0%	5.0%	4.0%	5.0%	4.0%	5.0%	4.0%	5.0%	4.0%
"Cash Flow"		7.0%	12.0%	7.0%	12.0%	7.0%	12.0%	7.0%	12.0%	7.0%	12.0%	7.0%	12.0%
Earnings		5.0%	11.0%	5.0%	11.0%	5.0%	11.0%	5.0%	11.0%	5.0%	11.0%	5.0%	11.0%
Dividends		5.0%	2.0%	5.0%	2.0%	5.0%	2.0%	5.0%	2.0%	5.0%	2.0%	5.0%	2.0%
Book Value		8.5%	4.0%	8.5%	4.0%	8.5%	4.0%	8.5%	4.0%	8.5%	4.0%	8.5%	4.0%
Fiscal Year	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Full Year	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Full Year	1Q	2Q	3Q
12/31/08	7.5	7.8	8.6	8.9	32.8	7.5	7.8	8.6	8.9	32.8	7.5	7.8	8.6
12/31/09	8.8	9.2	9.8	9.2	37.0	8.8	9.2	9.8	9.2	37.0	8.8	9.2	9.8
12/31/10	9.0	9.7	10.5	9.8	39.0	9.0	9.7	10.5	9.8	39.0	9.0	9.7	10.5
12/31/11													
Fiscal Year	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Full Year	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Full Year	1Q	2Q	3Q
12/31/07	.12	.15	.15	.15	.57	.12	.15	.15	.15	.57	.12	.15	.15
12/31/08	.11	.13	.15	.18	.57	.11	.13	.15	.18	.57	.11	.13	.15
12/31/09	.13	.17	.18	.16	.64	.13	.17	.18	.16	.64	.13	.17	.18
12/31/10	.15	.18	.21	.17	.71	.15	.18	.21	.17	.71	.15	.18	.21
12/31/11	.17	.20	.22			.17	.20	.22			.17	.20	.22
Fiscal Year	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Full Year	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Full Year	1Q	2Q	3Q
12/31/07	.12	.15	.15	.15	.57	.12	.15	.15	.15	.57	.12	.15	.15
12/31/08	.11	.13	.15	.18	.57	.11	.13	.15	.18	.57	.11	.13	.15
12/31/09	.13	.17	.18	.16	.64	.13	.17	.18	.16	.64	.13	.17	.18
12/31/10	.15	.18	.21	.17	.71	.15	.18	.21	.17	.71	.15	.18	.21
12/31/11	.17	.20	.22			.17	.20	.22			.17	.20	.22
Cal-endar	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Full Year	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Full Year	1Q	2Q	3Q
2008	.121	.121	.121	.121	.48	.121	.121	.121	.121	.48	.121	.121	.121
2009	.126	.126	.126	.126	.50	.126	.126	.126	.126	.50	.126	.126	.126
2010	.128	.128	.128	.128	.51	.128	.128	.128	.128	.51	.128	.128	.128
2011	.131	.13				.131	.13				.131	.13	
INSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS		2Q'10	3Q'10	4Q'10		2Q'10	3Q'10	4Q'10		2Q'10	3Q'10	4Q'10	
to Buy		29	21	25		29	21	25		29	21	25	
to Sell		19	18	16		19	18	16		19	18	16	
Hld's(000)		2811	3078	3107		2811	3078	3107		2811	3078	3107	
Pension Liability \$9.8 mill. in '10 vs. \$8.8 mill. in '09													
Pld Stock None													
Common Stock 12,692,000 shares													
Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals None													
Pld Div'd Paid None													
Common Stock 12,692,000 shares													
Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals None													
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Common Stock 12,692,000 shares													
Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals None													
Pld Div'd Paid None													
Common Stock 12,692,000 shares													
Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals None													
Pld Div'd Paid None													
Common Stock 12,692,000 shares													
Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals None													
Pld Div'd Paid None													



Ohio-American Water Company  
Current Institutional Holdings and Individual Holdings  
the Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies

	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
	June 17, 2011 Percentage of Institutional Holdings	June 17, 2011 Percentage of Individual Holdings (1)
Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies		
American States Water Co.	62.43 %	37.57 %
American Water Works Co., Inc.	84.22	15.78
Aqua America, Inc.	41.73	58.27
Artesian Resources Corp.	34.02	65.98
California Water Service Group	52.87	47.13
Connecticut Water Service, Inc.	32.93	67.07
Middlesex Water Company	39.97	60.03
SJW Corporation	47.11	52.89
York Water Company	24.26	75.74
Average	<u>46.62 %</u>	<u>53.38 %</u>

Notes:

(1) (1 - column 1).

Source of Information: pro.edgar-online.com, June 17, 2011

Ohio-American Water Company  
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate  
Through Use of a Risk Premium Model  
Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

<u>Line No.</u>		<u>Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies</u>
1.	Prospective Yield on Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (1)	5.43 %
2.	Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds and A Rated Public Utility Bonds	<u>0.43 (2)</u>
3.	Adjusted Prospective Yield on A Rated Public Utility Bonds	5.86 %
4.	Adjustment to Reflect Bond Rating Difference of Proxy Group	<u>0.14 (3)</u>
5.	Adjusted Prospective Bond Yield	6.00
6.	Equity Risk Premium (5)	<u>4.43</u>
7.	Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate	<u><u>10.43 %</u></u>

- Notes:
- (1) Derived in Note (4) on page 6 of this Schedule.
  - (2) The average yield spread of A rated public utility bonds over Aaa rated corporate bonds of 0.43% from page 4 of this Schedule.
  - (3) Adjustment to reflect the A3 Moody's bond rating of the proxy group of nine water companies as shown on page 2 of this Schedule. The 14 basis point adjustment is derived by taking 1/3 of the spread between Baa2 and A2 Public Utility Bonds ( $1/3 * 0.42\% = 0.14\%$ ).
  - (4) From page 5 of this Schedule.

Notes: (1) From page 3 of this Schedule. (2) From Standard & Poor's issuer Ranking. U.S. investor-Owned Water Utilities, Strongest to Weakest, April 21, 2011. (3) Ratings, business risk and financial risk profiles are those of Golden State Water Company. (4) Ratings, business risk and financial risk profiles are those of Pennsylvania and Idaho American Water. (5) Ratings, business risk and financial risk profiles are those of Aqua Pennsylvania, Inc. (6) Ratings, business risk and financial risk profiles are those of California Water Service Co. (7) Ratings, business risk and financial risk profiles are those of Connecticut Water Company. (8) Ratings, business risk and financial risk profiles are those of San Jose Water Co.

**Source information:** Moody's Investors Service  
Standard & Poor's Global Utilities Rating Service

Ohio-American Water Company  
Numerical Assignment for  
Moody's and Standard & Poor's Bond Ratings  
and Standard & Poor's Business and Financial Risk Profiles

<u>Moody's Bond Rating</u>	<u>Numerical Bond Weighting</u>	<u>Standard &amp; Poor's Bond Rating</u>
Aaa	1	AAA
Aa1	2	AA+
Aa2	3	AA
Aa3	4	AA-
A1	5	A+
A2	6	A
A3	7	A-
Baa1	8	BBB+
Baa2	9	BBB
Baa3	10	BBB-
Ba1	11	BB+
Ba2	12	BB
Ba3	13	BB-

Standard & Poor's

<u>Business Risk Profile</u>	<u>Numerical Weighting</u>	<u>Financial Risk Profile</u>	<u>Numerical Weighting</u>
Excellent	1	Minimal	1
Strong	2	Modest	2
Satisfactory	3	Intermediate	3
Fair	4	Significant	4
Weak	5	Aggressive	5
Vulnerable	6	Highly Leveraged	6

Moody's  
Comparison of Interest Rate Trends  
for the Three Months Ending April 2011 (1)

Months	Corporate Bonds		Public Utility Bonds		Spread - Corporate v. Public Utility Bonds		Spread - Public Utility Bonds	
	Aaa Rated		Aa Rated	A Rated	Aa (Pub. Util.) over Aaa (Corp.)	A (Pub. Util.) over Aaa (Corp.)	A over Aa	Baa over A
April-11	5.16 %		5.32 %	5.55 %				
March-11	5.13		5.33	5.56				
February-11	5.22		5.42	5.68				
Average of Last 3 Months	5.17 %		5.36 %	5.60 %	0.19 %	0.43 %	0.24 %	0.42 %

Notes: (1) All yields are distributed yields.

Source of information: Mergent Bond Record, June 2011, Vol. 78, No. 6.

Ohio-American Water Company  
Judgment of Equity Risk Premium for  
the Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies

<u>Line No.</u>		<u>Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies</u>
1.	Calculated equity risk premium based on the total market using the beta approach (1)	4.73
2.	Mean equity risk premium based on a study using the holding period returns of public utilities with A rated bonds (2)	<u>4.12</u>
3.	Average equity risk premium	<u><u>4.43</u></u> %

Notes: (1) From page 6 of this Schedule.  
(2) From page 8 of this Schedule.

Ohio-American Water Company  
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach  
Using the Beta for  
the Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies

<u>Line No.</u>		<u>Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies</u>
1.	Arithmetic mean total return rate on the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Index - 1926-2010 (1)	11.90 %
2.	Arithmetic mean yield on Aaa and Aa Corporate Bonds 1926-2010 (2)	<u>(6.10)</u>
3.	Historical Equity Risk Premium	<u>5.80 %</u>
4.	Forecasted 3-5 year Total Annual Market Return (3)	13.14 %
5.	Prospective Yield an Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (4)	<u>(5.43)</u>
6.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	<u>7.71 %</u>
7.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium (5)	6.76 %
8.	Adjusted Value Line Beta (6)	<u>0.70</u>
9.	Beta Adjusted Equity Risk Premium	<u>4.73 %</u>

- Notes: (1) Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - Market Results for 1926-2010 Yearbook  
Valuation Edition, Morningstar, Inc., 2011 Chicago, IL.
- (2) From Moody's Industrial Manual and Mergent Bond Record Monthly Update.
- (3) From page 2 of Schedule 11.
- (4) Average forecast based upon six quarterly estimates of Aaa rated corporate bonds  
per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial  
Forecasts dated June 1, 2010 (see page 7 of this Schedule). The estimates are  
detailed below.
- |                     |               |
|---------------------|---------------|
| Second Quarter 2011 | 5.00 %        |
| Third Quarter 2011  | 5.20          |
| Fourth Quarter 2011 | 5.40          |
| First Quarter 2012  | 5.50          |
| Second Quarter 2012 | 5.70          |
| Third Quarter 2012  | <u>5.80</u>   |
| Average             | <u>5.43 %</u> |
- (5) The average of the historical equity risk premium of 5.80% from Line No. 3 and  
the forecasted equity risk premium of 7.71% from Line No. 6  $((5.80\% + 7.71\%) /$   
 $2 = 6.76\%$ .
- (6) From page 1 of Schedule 11.


Consensus Forecasts Of U.S. Interest Rates And Key Assumptions<sup>1</sup>

	History								Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly Avg.						
	Average For Week End				Average For Month				Latest Q	2Q 2011	3Q 2011	4Q 2011	1Q 2012	2Q 2012	3Q 2012
	May 20	May 13	May 6	Apr. 29	Apr.	Mar.	Feb.	1Q 2011							
Interest Rates	May 20	May 13	May 6	Apr. 29	Apr.	Mar.	Feb.	1Q 2011							
Federal Funds Rate	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.14	0.16	0.16	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.8	1.2	
Prime Rate	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.8	4.2	
LIBOR, 3-mo.	0.26	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.7	1.0	1.4	
Commercial Paper, 1-mo.	0.10	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.18	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.4	
Treasury bill, 3-mo.	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.13	0.13	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.8	1.2	
Treasury bill, 6-mo.	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.11	0.12	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	1.0	1.4	
Treasury bill, 1 yr.	0.19	0.18	0.20	0.22	0.25	0.26	0.29	0.27	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.2	1.6	
Treasury note, 2 yr.	0.55	0.57	0.59	0.64	0.73	0.70	0.77	0.69	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.8	2.1	
Treasury note, 5 yr.	1.83	1.87	1.92	2.04	2.17	2.11	2.26	2.12	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.8	3.0	3.3	
Treasury note, 10 yr.	3.15	3.20	3.24	3.36	3.46	3.41	3.58	3.46	3.4	3.5	3.7	3.9	4.1	4.3	
Treasury note, 30 yr.	4.28	4.33	4.32	4.42	4.50	4.51	4.65	4.56	4.4	4.6	4.7	4.8	5.0	5.2	
Corporate Aaa bond	4.93	4.98	5.00	5.13	5.16	5.13	5.22	5.13	5.0	5.2	5.4	5.5	5.7	5.8	
Corporate Baa bond	5.76	5.83	5.82	5.93	6.02	6.03	6.15	6.09	5.9	6.1	6.2	6.4	6.6	6.8	
State & Local bonds	4.55	4.61	4.69	4.86	4.99	4.92	5.15	5.12	4.8	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.4	
Home mortgage rate	4.61	4.63	4.71	4.78	4.84	4.84	4.95	4.85	4.8	4.9	5.1	5.3	5.5	5.7	
	History								Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly						
	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	
Key Assumptions	2009	2009	2009	2010	2010	2010	2010	2011	2011	2011	2011	2012	2012	2012	
Major Currency Index	79.6	76.4	72.8	74.8	77.6	75.9	73.0	71.9	70.4	70.3	70.5	70.8	71.1	71.4	
Real GDP	-0.7	1.6	5.0	3.7	1.7	2.6	3.1	1.8	3.0	3.3	3.3	3.0	3.2	3.2	
GDP Price Index	0.3	0.7	-0.2	1.0	1.9	2.1	0.4	1.9	2.2	1.8	1.7	2.0	2.0	2.0	
Consumer Price Index	1.9	3.7	2.7	1.3	-0.5	1.4	2.6	5.2	3.6	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.3	

Forecasts for interest rates and the Federal Reserve's Major Currency Index represent averages for the quarter. Forecasts for Real GDP, GDP Price Index and Consumer Price Index are seasonally-adjusted annual rates of change (saar). Individual panel members' forecasts are on pages 4 through 9. Historical data for interest rates except LIBOR is from Federal Reserve Release (FRSR) H.15. LIBOR quotes available from *The Wall Street Journal*. Interest rate definitions are the same as those in FRSR H.15. Treasury yields are reported on a constant maturity basis. Historical data for the Fed's Major Currency Index is from FRSR H.10 and G.5. Historical data for Real GDP and GDP Chained Price Index are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Consumer Price Index (CPI) history is from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).


## U.S. Treasury Yield Curve

Week ended May 20, 2011 and Year Ago vs.  
2Q 2011 and 3Q 2012 Consensus Forecasts




## U.S. 3-Mo. T-Bills &amp; 10-Yr. T-Note Yield

(Quarterly Average) History Forecast




## Corporate Bond Spreads

As of week ended May 20, 2011



## U.S. Treasury Yield Curve

As of week ended May 20, 2011






Ohio-American Water Company  
Derivation of Mean Equity Risk Premium Based on a Study  
Using Holding Period Returns of Public Utilities

<u>Line No.</u>	<u>Over A Rated Moody's Public Utility Bonds - AUS Consultants Study (1)</u>
1.	<div>Arithmetic Mean Holding Period Returns on the Standard &amp; Poor's Utility Index 1926- 2010 (2):</div> <div style="text-align: right;">10.69 %</div>
2.	<div>Arithmetic Mean Yield on Moody's A Rated Public Utility Yields 1926-2010</div> <div style="text-align: right;"><u>(6.57)</u></div>
3.	<div>Equity Risk Premium</div> <div style="text-align: right;"><u><u>4.12 %</u></u></div>
Notes: (1)	
	S&P Public Utility Index and Moody's Public Utility Bond Average Annual Yields 1928-2010, (AUS Consultants, 2011).
(2)	Holding period returns are calculated based upon income received (dividends and interest) plus the relative change in the market value of a security over a one-year holding period.

# Large Company Stock Returns From 1926 to 2010



Source of Information:  
Ibbotson® SBI® - 2011 Valuation Yearbook - Market Results for Stocks Bonds Bills and Inflation - 1926-2010,  
Morningstar, Inc., 2011 Chicago, IL.



# Total Returns on Large Company Stocks 1926 to 2010

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## Large Company Stocks

	2010											
	1926											
	-50%	-40%	-30%	-20%	-10%	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%

$$\text{Geometric Mean: } r_G = \left[ V_n / V_0 \right]^{1/n} - 1$$

Source: Ibbotson® S&P® - 2011 Valuation Yearbook - Market Results  
for Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 1926-2010  
Morningstar, Inc., 2011 Chicago, IL

Ohio-American Water Company  
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use  
of the Traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model (ECAPM)

	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>
<u>Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies</u>	<u>Value Line Adjusted Beta</u>	<u>Market Risk Premium (1)</u>	<u>Risk-Free Rate (2)</u>	<u>Traditional CAPM Cost Rate (3)</u>	<u>ECAPM Cost Rate (4)</u>	<u>Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (5)</u>
American States Water Co.	0.75	7.53 %	4.78 %	10.43 %	10.90 %	
American Water Works Co., Inc.	0.65	7.53	4.78	9.67	10.33	
Aqua America, Inc.	0.65	7.53	4.78	9.67	10.33	
Artesian Resources Corp.	0.60	7.53	4.78	9.30	10.05	
California Water Service Group	0.70	7.53	4.78	10.05	10.62	
Connecticut Water Service, Inc.	0.80	7.53	4.78	10.80	11.18	
Middlesex Water Company	0.75	7.53	4.78	10.43	10.90	
SJW Corporation	0.90	7.53	4.78	11.56	11.75	
York Water Company	0.70	7.53	4.78	10.05	10.62	
Average				<u>10.22 %</u>	<u>10.74 %</u>	<u>10.48 %</u>
Median				<u>10.05 %</u>	<u>10.62 %</u>	<u>10.34 %</u>

See page 2 for notes.

Ohio-American Water Company  
Development of the Market-Required Rate of Return on Common Equity Using  
the Capital Asset Pricing Model for  
the Proxy Group of Nine AUS Utility Reports Water Companies  
Adjusted to Reflect a Forecasted Risk-Free Rate and Market Return

Notes:

- (1) For reasons explained in Ms. Ahern's accompanying direct testimony, from the thirteen weeks ending June 24, 2011, Value Line Summary & Index, a forecasted 3-5 year total annual market return of 13.14% can be derived by averaging the thirteen weeks ended June 24, 2011 forecasted total 3-5 year total appreciation, converting it into an annual market appreciation and adding the Value Line average forecasted annual dividend yield.

The 3-5 year average total market appreciation of 53% produces a four-year average annual return of 11.22%  $((1.53^{25}) - 1)$ . When the average annual forecasted dividend yield of 1.92% is added, a total average market return of 13.14%  $(1.92\% + 11.22\%)$  is derived.

The thirteen week forecasted total market return of 13.14% minus the forecasted risk-free rate of 4.78% (developed in Note 2) is 8.36%  $(13.14\% - 4.78\%)$ . The Morningstar, Inc. (Ibbotson Associates) calculated market premium of 6.70% for the period 1926-2010 results from a total market return of 11.90% less the average income return on long-term U.S. Government Securities of 5.20%  $(11.90\% - 5.20\% = 6.70\%)$ . This is then averaged with the 8.36% Value Line market premium resulting in a 7.53% market premium. The 7.53% market premium is then multiplied by the beta in column 1 of page 1 of this Schedule.

- (2) The average forecast based upon six quarterly estimates of 30-year Treasury Note yields per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts dated June 1, 2011 (see page 7 of Schedule 9). The estimates are detailed below:

	<u>30-Year Treasury Note Yield</u>
Second Quarter 2011	4.40
Third Quarter 2011	4.60
Fourth Quarter 2011	4.70
First Quarter 2012	4.80
Second Quarter 2012	5.00
Third Quarter 2012	5.20
Average	<u>4.78%</u>

- (3) The traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is applied using the following formula:

$$R_S = R_F + \beta (R_M - R_F)$$

Where  $R_S$  = Return rate of common stock  
 $R_F$  = Risk Free Rate  
 $\beta$  = Value Line Adjusted Beta  
 $R_M$  = Return on the market as a whole

- (4) The empirical CAPM is applied using the following formula:

$$R_S = R_F + .25 (R_M - R_F) + .75 \beta (R_M - R_F)$$

Where  $R_S$  = Return rate of common stock  
 $R_F$  = Risk-Free Rate  
 $\beta$  = Value Line Adjusted Beta  
 $R_M$  = Return on the market as a whole

Source of Information: Value Line Summary & Index  
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2011  
Value Line Investment Survey, April 22, 2011  
Standard Edition and Small and Mid-Cap Edition  
Ibbotson® SBI® 2011 Valuation Yearbook – Market Results for  
Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation – 1926 – 2010, Morningstar, Inc., 2011 Chicago, IL

Ohio-American Water Company  
Summary of Cost of Equity Models Applied to the  
Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Utility Companies  
Comparable in Total Risk to the  
Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies

<u>Principal Methods</u>	<u>Proxy Group of Forty- One Non-Utility Companies</u>
Projected Return on Book Common Equity (1)	15.50 %
Average of Market-Based Models (2)	<u>11.67 %</u>
Average	<u><u>13.59 %</u></u>

Notes:

- (1) From Schedule 13.
- (2) Average of the results of the DCF (12.94%), RPM (11.40%), and CAPM / ECAPM (10.67%) analyses as shown on pages 1, 2, and 5 of Schedule 14 respectively.

Ohio-American Water Company  
Basis of Selection of Comparable Risk  
Domestic Non-Price Regulated Companies

<u>Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies</u>	<u>VL Adjusted Beta</u>	<u>Unadjusted Beta</u>	<u>Residual Standard Error of the Regression</u>
American States Water Co.	0.75	0.59	3.6645
American Water Works Co., Inc.	0.65	0.42	3.6242
Aqua America, Inc.	0.65	0.40	2.8525
Artesian Resources Corp.	0.60	0.33	2.5273
California Water Service Group	0.70	0.51	3.5171
Connecticut Water Service, Inc.	0.80	0.63	2.8968
Middlesex Water Company	0.75	0.57	2.7504
SJW Corporation	0.90	0.83	4.3743
York Water Company	0.70	0.48	3.3493
Average	<u>0.72</u>	<u>0.53</u>	<u>3.2840</u>
Beta Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of Beta)	0.39	0.67	
2 std. Devs. of Beta	0.14		
Residual Std. Err. Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of the Residual Std. Err.)	2.9954	3.5726	
Std. dev. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.1443		
2 std. devs. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.2886		



Ohio-American Water Company  
Domestic, Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the  
Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies

<u>Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Utility Companies</u>	<u>VL Adjusted Beta</u>	<u>Unadjusted Beta</u>	<u>Residual Standard Error of the Regression</u>
Gallagher (Arthur J.)	0.70	0.54	3.0490
Amgen	0.65	0.43	3.5693
AutoZone Inc.	0.70	0.52	3.3634
Bristol-Myers Squibb	0.75	0.57	3.1127
Brown & Brown	0.70	0.48	3.1156
Capitol Fed. Finl	0.65	0.44	3.2656
CVS Caremark Corp.	0.80	0.66	3.0153
Forest Labs.	0.80	0.63	3.3086
Hasbro, Inc.	0.75	0.59	3.4132
Hudson City Bancorp	0.80	0.67	3.1736
IAC/InterActiveCorp	0.70	0.47	3.2320
Investors Bancorp	0.75	0.55	3.4197
J&J Snack Foods	0.70	0.49	3.4412
Kroger Co.	0.60	0.39	3.0187
Lancaster Colony	0.75	0.56	3.3353
Lincare Holdings	0.65	0.44	3.5440
McKesson Corp.	0.75	0.57	3.3442
Medtronic, Inc.	0.80	0.67	3.5188
Medco Health Solutions	0.70	0.51	3.5319
Marsh & McLennan	0.75	0.59	2.9981
MAXIMUS Inc.	0.75	0.62	3.4728
Owens & Minor	0.65	0.46	3.3797
O'Reilly Automotive	0.80	0.62	3.5701
Peoples United Finl	0.65	0.40	3.0990
Ruddick Corp.	0.60	0.39	3.5204
Rollins, Inc.	0.80	0.65	3.0560
Sherwin-Williams	0.70	0.51	3.3866
Smucker (J.M.)	0.70	0.48	3.0520
Sara Lee Corp.	0.80	0.66	3.2503
Stericycle Inc.	0.65	0.46	3.1729
Safeway Inc.	0.70	0.49	3.1427
Stryker Corp.	0.80	0.66	3.1615
TJX Companies	0.80	0.65	3.0480
Walgreen Co.	0.75	0.61	3.2371
WD-40 Co.	0.75	0.56	3.4945
Weis Markets	0.65	0.45	3.0521
Watson Pharmac.	0.75	0.56	3.1513
Berkley (W.R.)	0.70	0.50	3.0820
West Pharmac. Svcs.	0.80	0.63	3.5242
World Wrestling Ent.	0.80	0.64	3.4439
Alleghany Corp.	0.80	0.66	3.2303
Average	0.73	0.55	3.2800
Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies	0.72	0.53	3.2840

Ohio-American Water Company  
Basis of Selection of Group of Domestic, Non-Price Regulated Companies  
Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies

- (1) The proxy group of forty-one non-utility companies was selected based upon the proxy group of nine water companies unadjusted beta range of 0.39 – 0.67 and standard error of the regression range of 2.9954 – 3.5726. These ranges are based upon plus or minus two standard deviations of the unadjusted beta and standard error of the regression as detailed in Ms. Ahern's direct testimony. Plus or minus two standard deviations captures 95.50% of the distribution of unadjusted betas and standard errors of the regression.
- (2) The standard deviation of group of nine water companies' standard error of the regression is 0.1443. The standard deviation of the standard error of the regression is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Standard Deviation of the Std. Err. of the Regr.} = \frac{\text{Standard Error of the Regression}}{\sqrt{2N}}$$

where: N = number of observations. Since Value Line betas are derived from weekly price change observations over a period of five years, N = 259

$$\text{Thus, } 0.1443 = \frac{3.2840}{\sqrt{518}} = \frac{3.2840}{22.7596}$$

Source of Information: Value Line, Inc., March 15, 2011  
Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition)

Ohio-American Water Company  
Comparable Earnings Analysis  
for a Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Utility Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the  
Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies(1)

Company Name	VL Adjusted Beta	Unadjusted Beta	Residual Standard Error of the Regression	Standard Deviation of Beta	Rate of Return on Book Common Equity, Net Worth, or Partner's Capital	
					5-Year Projected (2)	
					5 Year Projection	Student's T Statistic
Gallagher (Arthur J.)	0.70	0.54	3.0490	0.0629	13.00 %	(0.4)
Amgen	0.65	0.43	3.5693	0.0737	16.00	(0.2)
AutoZone Inc.	0.70	0.52	3.3634	0.0694	NMF	(1.3)
Bristol-Myers Squibb	0.75	0.57	3.1127	0.0642	20.00	0.1
Brown & Brown	0.70	0.48	3.1156	0.0643	12.00	(0.4)
Capitol Fed. Finl	0.65	0.44	3.2656	0.0674	3.50	(1.0)
CVS Caremark Corp.	0.80	0.66	3.0153	0.0622	10.50	(0.5)
Forest Labs.	0.80	0.63	3.3086	0.0683	28.00	0.7
Hasbro, Inc.	0.75	0.59	3.4132	0.0705	10.00	(0.6)
Hudson City Bancorp	0.80	0.67	3.1736	0.0655	4.50	(0.9)
IAC/InterActiveCorp	0.70	0.47	3.2320	0.0755	9.50	(0.6)
Investors Bancorp	0.75	0.55	3.4197	0.0706	13.00	(0.4)
J&J Snack Foods	0.70	0.49	3.4412	0.0710	20.00	0.1
Kroger Co.	0.60	0.39	3.0187	0.0623	20.00	0.1
Lancaster Colony	0.75	0.56	3.3353	0.0688	17.50	(0.1)
Lincare Holdings	0.65	0.44	3.5440	0.0732	24.00	0.4
McKesson Corp.	0.75	0.57	3.3442	0.0690	14.50	(0.3)
Medtronic, Inc.	0.80	0.67	3.5188	0.0726	16.00	(0.2)
Medco Health Solutions	0.70	0.51	3.5319	0.0729	20.50	0.2
Marsh & McLennan	0.75	0.59	2.9881	0.0619	15.00	(0.2)
MAXIMUS Inc.	0.75	0.62	3.4728	0.0717	35.00	1.1
Owens & Minor	0.65	0.46	3.3797	0.0698	16.00	(0.2)
O'Reilly Automotive	0.80	0.62	3.5701	0.0737	11.50	(0.5)
Peoples United Finl	0.65	0.40	3.0990	0.0640	5.00	(0.9)
Ruddick Corp.	0.60	0.39	3.5204	0.0727	11.50	(0.5)
Rollins, Inc.	0.80	0.65	3.0560	0.0631	32.00	0.9
Sherwin-Williams	0.70	0.51	3.3866	0.0699	24.50	0.4
Smucker (J.M.)	0.70	0.48	3.0520	0.0630	11.50	(0.5)
Sara Lee Corp.	0.80	0.66	3.2503	0.0671	94.00 (3)	5.2
Stericycle Inc.	0.65	0.46	3.1729	0.0655	15.50	(0.2)
Safeway Inc.	0.70	0.49	3.1427	0.0649	17.00	(0.1)
Stryker Corp.	0.80	0.66	3.1615	0.0653	19.50	0.1
TJX Companies	0.80	0.65	3.0480	0.0629	44.00	1.8
Walgreen Co.	0.75	0.61	3.2371	0.0668	20.50	0.2
WD-40 Co.	0.75	0.56	3.4946	0.0721	15.50	(0.2)
Weis Markets	0.65	0.45	3.0521	0.0630	9.00	(0.6)
Watson Pharmac.	0.75	0.56	3.1513	0.0650	13.50	(0.3)
Berkley (W.R.)	0.70	0.50	3.0820	0.0636	13.50	(0.3)
West Pharmac. Svcs.	0.80	0.63	3.5242	0.0727	14.50	(0.3)
World Wrestling Ent.	0.80	0.64	3.4439	0.0711	16.50	(0.1)
Alleghany Corp.	0.80	0.66	3.2303	0.0667	6.50	(0.8)
Average	<u>0.73</u>	<u>0.55</u>	<u>3.2756</u>	<u>0.0678</u>		
Average for the Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies	<u>0.72</u>	<u>0.53</u>	<u>3.2840</u> (1)	<u>0.0687</u>		
Median (4)					<u>15.50%</u>	
Conservative Median (5)					<u>15.50%</u>	

Notes:

- (1) See page 4 of Schedule 12.
- (2) From Value Line Investment Survey, various issues for the years 2013 - 2015 / 2014 - 2016.
- (3) The student's T statistic associated with these returns exceeds 1.96 at the 95% level of confidence. Therefore, they have been excluded, as outliers, to arrive at proper projected returns as fully explained in Ms. Ahern's testimony.
- (4) Median five year projected rate of return on book common equity, shareholders' equity, net worth, or partners' capital including returns identified as outliers as outlined in note (3) above.
- (5) Median five year projected rate of return on book common equity, shareholders' equity, net worth, or partners' capital excluding returns identified as outliers as outlined in note (3) above.

Ohio-American Water Company  
DCF Results for the Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Utility Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the  
Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies (1)

Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Utility Companies	Average Dividend Yield	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Reuters Mean Consensus Projected Five Year Growth Rate in EPS	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth Rate in EPS	Adjusted Dividend Yield	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate
Gallagher (Arthur J.	4.50 %	8.50 %	NA %	NA %	NA %	8.50 %	4.69 %	13.19 %
Amgen	-	8.00	8.00	8.60	7.44	8.01	-	NA
AutoZone Inc.	-	14.50	15.00	13.50	14.67	14.42	-	NA
Bristol-Myers Squibb	4.73	7.50	11.00	NA	9.67	9.39	4.96	14.35
Brown & Brown	1.24	7.00	0.40	NA	(1.60)	3.70	1.27	4.97
Capitol Fed. Finl	2.62	12.00	11.00	13.30	11.60	11.98	2.78	14.76
CVS Caremark Corp.	1.36	8.00	NA	NA	NA	8.00	1.42	9.42
Forest Labs.	-	NMF	11.00	11.20	10.94	11.00	-	NA
Hasbro, Inc.	2.61	10.00	3.30	(1.20)	(1.14)	6.65	2.69	9.34
Hudson City Bancorp	3.45	3.50	9.00	9.80	9.00	7.83	3.59	11.42
IAC/InterActiveCorp	-	22.50	12.00	NA	13.55	22.50	-	NA
Investors Bancorp In	-	NMF	4.50	NA	5.00	4.75	-	NA
J&J Snack Foods	0.97	10.50	(35.00)	25.00	(25.40)	17.75	1.05	18.80
Kroger Co.	1.74	7.50	15.00	15.00	15.00	13.13	1.85	14.98
Lancaster Colony	2.18	9.00	NA	NA	NA	9.00	2.28	11.28
Lincare Holdings	2.65	12.00	9.20	8.60	9.10	9.73	2.78	12.51
McKesson Corp.	0.97	9.50	NA	NA	10.00	9.75	1.02	10.77
Medtronic, Inc.	2.23	6.50	15.00	17.50	15.67	13.67	2.38	16.05
Medco Health Solutio	0.00	15.50	8.50	10.70	8.54	10.81	-	NA
Marsh & McLennan	2.80	28.50	10.00	NA	10.00	16.17	3.03	19.20
MAXIMUS Inc.	0.75	18.00	11.00	10.50	13.70	13.30	0.80	14.10
Owens & Minor	2.39	11.00	15.00	14.00	14.99	13.75	2.56	16.31
O'Reilly Automotive	-	15.50	8.00	7.50	7.91	9.73	-	NA
Peoples United Fin	4.83	13.00	15.00	15.80	15.97	14.94	5.19	20.13
Ruddick Corp.	1.27	8.50	10.00	11.50	10.07	10.02	1.34	11.36
Rollins, Inc.	1.40	14.50	7.60	7.50	7.67	9.32	1.47	10.79
Sherwin-Williams	1.73	11.00	NA	NA	10.00	10.50	1.83	12.33
Smucker (J.M.)	2.34	10.50	12.00	12.00	12.00	11.63	2.48	14.11
Sara Lee Corp.	2.45	6.00	10.00	10.70	10.43	9.28	2.56	11.84
Stericycle Inc.	-	14.50	8.70	6.00	9.48	9.67	-	NA
Safeway Inc.	2.01	6.50	11.00	10.40	11.70	9.90	2.11	12.01
Stryker Corp.	1.19	13.00	6.90	8.00	7.08	8.75	1.24	9.99
TJX Companies	1.47	13.50	17.00	16.70	15.00	15.55	1.58	17.13
Walgreen Co.	1.64	12.00	11.00	11.20	10.55	11.19	1.73	12.92
WD-40 Co.	2.63	9.00	13.00	14.60	13.35	12.49	2.79	15.28
Weis Markets	2.90	6.50	13.00	13.00	13.00	11.38	3.06	14.44
Watson Pharmac.	-	11.50	11.00	12.50	12.37	11.84	-	NA
Berkley (W.R.)	1.00	11.50	12.00	12.00	12.00	11.88	1.06	12.94
West Pharmac. Svcs.	1.50	8.50	NA	NA	NA	8.50	1.57	10.07
World Wrestling Entl.	4.40	5.00	20.00	NA	15.00	13.33	4.70	18.03
Alleghany Corp.	-	13.00	9.40	8.60	8.56	9.89	-	NA
Average								<u>13.38 %</u>
Median								<u>12.94 %</u>

NA= Not Available

NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

From Ms. Ahern's application of the DCF model to the domestic, non-price regulated comparable risk companies is identical to the application of the DCF to her proxy group of water companies. She uses the 60 day average price and the spot indicated dividend as of 5/31/2011 for her dividend yield and then adjusts that yield for 1/2 the average projected growth rate in EPS, which is calculated by averaging the long-term projected growth in EPS provided by Value Line, www.reuters.com, www.zacks.com, and www.yahoo.com (excluding any negative growth rates) and then adding that growth rate to the adjusted dividend yield.

Source of Information: Value Line Investment Survey:

www.reuters.com Downloaded on 06/20/2011

www.zacks.com Downloaded on 06/20/2011

www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 06/20/2011

Ohio-American Water Company  
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate  
Through Use of a Risk Premium Model  
Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

<u>Line No.</u>		<u>Proxy Group of Forty-One Non- Utility Companies</u>
1.	Prospective Yield on Baa Rated Corporate Bonds (1)	6.33 %
2.	Equity Risk Premium (2)	<u>5.07</u>
3.	Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate	<u>11.40 %</u>

Notes: (1) Average forecast based upon six quarterly estimates of Baa rated corporate bonds per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts dated June 1, 2011 (see page 7 of Schedule PMA-9). The estimates are detailed below.

Second Quarter 2011	5.90 %
Third Quarter 2011	6.10
Fourth Quarter 2011	6.20
First Quarter 2012	6.40
Second Quarter 2012	6.60
Third Quarter 2012	<u>6.80</u>
Average	<u>6.33 %</u>

(2) From page 4 of this Schedule.

From page 3 of Schedule 9.

Ohio-American Water Company  
Comparison of Bond Ratings for the  
Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Utility Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the  
Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies

Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Utility Companies	Moody's Bond Rating May 2011		Standard & Poor's Bond Rating May 2011	
	Bond Rating	Numerical Weighting (1)	Bond Rating	Numerical Weighting (1)
Gallagher (Arthur J.)	NR	--	NR	--
Amgen	A3	7.0	A+	5.0
AutoZone Inc.	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Bristol-Myers Squibb	A2	6.0	A+	5.0
Brown & Brown	NR	--	NR	--
Capitol Fed. Finl	NR	--	NR	--
CVS Caremark Corp.	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
Forest Labs.	NR	--	NR	--
Hasbro, Inc.	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Hudson City Bancorp	NR	--	NR	--
IAC/InterActiveCorp	Ba2	12.0	NR	--
Investors Bancorp	NR	--	NR	--
J&J Snack Foods	NR	--	NR	--
Kroger Co.	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Lancaster Colony	NR	--	NR	--
Lincare Holdings	NR	--	NR	--
McKesson Corp.	Baa2	9.0	A-	7.0
Medtronic, Inc.	A1	5.0	NR	--
Medco Health Solutions	Baa3	10.0	NR	--
Marsh & McLennan	Baa2	9.0	BBB-	9.0
MAXIMUS Inc.	NR	--	NR	--
Owens & Minor	Ba2	12.0	BBB-	10.0
O'Reilly Automotive	Baa3	10.0	NR	--
Peoples United Finl	A3	7.0	NR	--
Ruddick Corp.	NR	--	NR	--
Rollins, Inc.	NR	--	NR	--
Sherwin-Williams	A3	7.0	A	6.0
Smucker (J.M.)	NR	--	NR	--
Sara Lee Corp.	Baa1	8.0	BBB	9.0
Stericycle Inc.	NR	--	NR	--
Safeway Inc.	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Stryker Corp.	A3	7.0	NR	--
TJX Companies	A3	7.0	NR	--
Walgreen Co.	A2	6.0	A	6.0
WD-40 Co.	NR	--	NR	--
Weis Markets	NR	--	NR	--
Watson Pharmac.	Baa3	10.0	NR	--
Berkley (W.R.)	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
West Pharmac. Svcs.	NR	--	NR	--
World Wrestling Ent.	NR	--	NR	--
Alleghany Corp.	Baa2	9.0	NR	--
Average	<u>Baa2</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>BBB</u>	<u>7.8</u>

Notes:

(1) From page 3 of Schedule 9.

Source of Information:

Standard & Poor's Bond Guide June 2011  
www.moodys.com; downloaded 6/1/2011

Ohio-American Water Company  
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach  
Using the Beta for  
the Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Utility Companies  
Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies

<u>Line No.</u>		<u>Proxy Group of Forty-One Non- Utility Companies</u>
1.	Arithmetic mean total return rate on the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Index - 1926-2010 (1)	11.90 %
2.	Arithmetic mean yield on Aaa and Aa Corporate Bonds 1926-2010 (2)	<u>(6.10)</u>
3.	Historical Equity Risk Premium	<u>5.80 %</u>
4.	Forecasted 3-5 year Total Annual Market Return (3)	13.14 %
5.	Prospective Yield an Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (4)	<u>(5.43)</u>
6.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	<u>7.71 %</u>
7.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium (5)	6.76 %
8.	Adjusted Value Line Beta (6)	<u>0.75</u>
9.	Beta Adjusted Equity Risk Premium	<u>5.07 %</u>

- Notes: (1) Ibbotson Associates 2011 Valuation Yearbook - Market Results for 1926-2010, Morningstar, Inc., 2011 Chicago, IL.  
(2) From Moody's Industrial Manual and Mergent Bond Record Monthly Update.  
(3) From page 2 of Schedule 11.  
(4) Average forecast based upon six quarterly estimates of Aaa rated corporate bonds per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts dated June 1, 2011 (see page 7 of Schedule 9). The estimates are detailed below.

Second Quarter 2011	5.00 %
Third Quarter 2011	5.20
Fourth Quarter 2011	5.40
First Quarter 2012	5.50
Second Quarter 2012	5.70
Third Quarter 2012	<u>5.80</u>
Average	<u>5.43 %</u>

- (5) The average of the historical equity risk premium of 5.80% from Line No. 3 and the forecasted equity risk premium of 7.71% from Line No. 6  $((5.80\% + 7.71\%) / 2 = 6.76\%$ .

From Median beta from page 5 of this Schedule.



Ohio-American Water Company  
Traditional CAPM and ECAPM Results for the Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Utility Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the  
Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies

Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Utility Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Market Risk Premium (1)	Risk-Free Rate (2)	Traditional CAPM Cost Rate (3)	ECAPM Cost Rate (4)	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (5)
Gallagher (Arthur J.)	0.70	7.53	4.78	10.05	10.62	
Amgen	0.65	7.53	4.78	9.67	10.33	
AutoZone Inc.	0.70	7.53	4.78	10.05	10.62	
Bristol-Myers Squibb	0.75	7.53	4.78	10.43	10.90	
Brown & Brown	0.70	7.53	4.78	10.05	10.62	
Capitol Fed. Finl	0.65	7.53	4.78	9.67	10.33	
CVS Caremark Corp.	0.80	7.53	4.78	10.80	11.18	
Forest Labs.	0.80	7.53	4.78	10.80	11.18	
Hasbro, Inc.	0.75	7.53	4.78	10.43	10.90	
Hudson City Bancorp	0.80	7.53	4.78	10.80	11.18	
IAC/InterActiveCorp	0.70	7.53	4.78	10.05	10.62	
Investors Bancorp	0.75	7.53	4.78	10.43	10.90	
J&J Snack Foods	0.70	7.53	4.78	10.05	10.62	
Kroger Co.	0.60	7.53	4.78	9.30	10.05	
Lancaster Colony	0.75	7.53	4.78	10.43	10.90	
Lincare Holdings	0.65	7.53	4.78	9.67	10.33	
McKesson Corp.	0.75	7.53	4.78	10.43	10.90	
Medtronic, Inc.	0.85	7.53	4.78	11.18	11.46	
Medco Health Solutions	0.70	7.53	4.78	10.05	10.62	
Marsh & McLennan	0.75	7.53	4.78	10.43	10.90	
MAXIMUS Inc.	0.80	7.53	4.78	10.80	11.18	
Owens & Minor	0.65	7.53	4.78	9.67	10.33	
O'Reilly Automotive	0.80	7.53	4.78	10.80	11.18	
Peoples United Finl	0.65	7.53	4.78	9.67	10.33	
Ruddick Corp.	0.60	7.53	4.78	9.30	10.05	
Rollins, Inc.	0.80	7.53	4.78	10.80	11.18	
Sherwin-Williams	0.70	7.53	4.78	10.05	10.62	
Smucker (J.M.)	0.70	7.53	4.78	10.05	10.62	
Sara Lee Corp.	0.80	7.53	4.78	10.80	11.18	
Stericycle Inc.	0.70	7.53	4.78	10.05	10.62	
Safeway Inc.	0.70	7.53	4.78	10.05	10.62	
Stryker Corp.	0.80	7.53	4.78	10.80	11.18	
TJX Companies	0.80	7.53	4.78	10.80	11.18	
Walgreen Co.	0.75	7.53	4.78	10.43	10.90	
WD-40 Co.	0.75	7.53	4.78	10.43	10.90	
Weis Markets	0.65	7.53	4.78	9.67	10.33	
Watson Pharmac.	0.75	7.53	4.78	10.43	10.90	
Berkley (W.R.)	0.70	7.53	4.78	10.05	10.62	
West Pharmac. Svcs.	0.80	7.53	4.78	10.80	11.18	
World Wrestling Ent.	0.80	7.53	4.78	10.80	11.18	
Alleghany Corp.	0.80	7.53	4.78	10.80	11.18	
Average				10.29 %	10.79 %	10.54 %
Median				10.43 %	10.90 %	10.67 %

Notes:

- (1) From Schedule 11, page 2, note 1.
- (2) From Schedule 11, page 2, note 2.
- (3) Derived from the model shown on Schedule 11, page 2, note 3.
- From page 3 of Schedule 9. Derived from the model shown on Schedule 11, page 2, note 4.
- (5) Average of CAPM and ECAPM cost rates.

Ohio-American Water Company  
Derivation of the Floatation Cost Adjustment to the Cost of Common Equity

Equity Issuances and Floatation Costs of American Water Works Co., Inc. Since 2008

Date	Transaction (1)	[Column 1] Shares Issued	[Column 2] Market Price per Share	[Column 3] Offering Price per Share	[Column 4] Market Price (2)	[Column 5] Underwriting Discount	[Column 6] Net Proceeds per Share (3)	[Column 7] Gross Equity Issue before Costs (4)	[Column 8] Total Net Proceeds (5)	[Column 9] Total Floatation Costs (6)	[Column 10] Floatation Cost Percentage (7)
04/28/08	Secondary Equity Offering	63,173,300	\$ 21.5000	\$ 21.5000	\$ -	\$ 0.8450	\$ 20.6550	\$ 1,388,225,950	\$ 1,317,479,172	\$ 40,746,779	3.00%
08/10/09	Primary Equity Offering	11,500,000	\$ 17.4900	\$ 17.2500	\$ 0.2400	\$ 0.5180	\$ 16.7320	\$ 201,135,000	\$ 192,418,000	\$ 8,717,000	4.33%
08/10/09	Secondary Equity Offering	18,400,000	\$ 17.4900	\$ 17.2500	\$ 0.2400	\$ 0.5180	\$ 16.7320	\$ 321,816,000	\$ 307,868,800	\$ 13,947,200	4.33%
08/18/09	Secondary Equity Offering	35,000,000	\$ 18.3400	\$ 19.2500	\$ 0.0900	\$ 0.5780	\$ 18.6720	\$ 678,900,000	\$ 653,520,000	\$ 23,380,000	3.45%
11/23/09	Secondary Equity Offering	37,351,617	\$ 21.6300	\$ 21.6300	\$ -	\$ 0.6469	\$ 20.9811	\$ 807,915,478	\$ 785,678,011	\$ 24,237,464	3.00%
								\$ 3,385,992,426	\$ 3,254,963,983	\$ 111,028,443	3.30%

Floatation Cost Adjustment

Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies	Average Dividend Yield	Average Projected EPS Growth Rate	Adjusted Dividend Yield	Average DCF Cost Rate Unadjusted for Floatation (8)	DCF Cost Rate Adjusted for Floatation (9)	Floatation Cost Adjustment (10)
	3.36 %	6.51 %	3.47 %	9.99 %	10.10 %	0.12 %

Notes are on page 2 of this Schedule.

Ohio-American Water Company  
Notes to Accompany the  
Derivation of the Floatation Cost Adjustment to the Cost of Common Equity

- (1) Company-provided.
- (2) Column 2 – Column 3.
- (3) Column 2 – the sum of columns 4 and 5.
- (4) Column 1 \* Column 2.
- (5) Column 1 \* Column 6.
- (6) Column 1 \* (the sum of columns 4 and 5).
- (7) (Column 7 – Column 8) divided by Column 7.
- (8) Using the average growth rate from Schedule 7.
- (9) Adjustment for flotation costs based on adjusting the average DCF constant growth cost rate in accordance with the following:

$$K = \frac{D(1 + 0.5g)}{P(1 - F)} + g,$$

where  $g$  is the growth factor and  $F$  is the percentage of flotation costs.

- (10) Flotation cost adjustment of 0.12% equals the difference between the flotation adjusted average DCF cost rate of 10.11% and the unadjusted average DCF cost rate of 9.99% of the proxy group of nine water companies.

Source of Information:

Company provided information

## Ohio-American Water Company

### Derivation of Investment Risk Adjustment Based upon

**Ibbotson Associates' Size Premia for the Decile Portfolios of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ**

41(3)

\*From Ibbotson 2011 Yearbook

**Notes:**

- (1) From Page 2 of this Schedule.
- (2) Gleaned from Column (D) on the bottom of this page. The appropriate decile (Column (A)) corresponds to the market capitalization of the proxy group, which is found in Column 1.
- (3) Corresponding risk premium to the decile is provided on Column (E) on the bottom of this page.
- (4) Line No. 1a Column 3 – Line No. 2 Column 3 and Line No. 1b, Column 3 – Line No. 3 of Column 3 etc.. For example, the 4.51% in Column 4, Line No. 2 is derived as follows 4.51% = 6.36% - 1.85%.

Ohio-American Water Company  
Market Capitalization of Ohio-American Water Company and  
the Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Company	Common Stock Shares Outstanding at Fiscal Year End 2010 (millions)	Book Value per Share at Fiscal Year End 2010 (1)	Total Common Equity at Fiscal Year End 2010 (millions)	Closing Stock Market Price on June 17, 2011	Market-to-Book Ratio on June 17, 2011 (2)	Market Capitalization on June 17, 2011 (3) (millions)
Ohio-American Water Company	NA	NA	\$ 49,863 (4)	NA	181.3 % (5)	\$ 90,402 (6)
Based Upon the Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies						
Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies						
American States Water Co.	18,631	\$ 20,284	\$ 377,541	\$ 33,520	165.4 %	\$ 624,506
American Water Works Co., Inc.	174,996	\$ 23,614	\$ 4,132,272	\$ 29,140	123.4	\$ 5,099,383
Aqua America, Inc.	138,449	\$ 8,481	\$ 1,174,254	\$ 21,520	253.7	\$ 2,979,423
Artesian Resources Corp.	7,637	\$ 12,459	\$ 95,146	\$ 19,220	184.3	\$ 146,783
California Water Service Group	41,666 (7)	\$ 10,453	\$ 435,526	\$ 18,140	173.5	\$ 755,821
Connecticut Water Service, Inc.	8,677	\$ 13,134	\$ 113,963	\$ 24,930	189.8	\$ 216,314
Middlesex Water Company	15,566	\$ 11,132	\$ 173,279	\$ 18,980	170.5	\$ 295,443
SJW Corporation	18,552	\$ 13,747	\$ 255,032	\$ 23,000	167.3	\$ 426,685
York Water Company	12,692	\$ 7,190	\$ 91,257	\$ 16,790	233.5	\$ 213,100
Average	48,541	\$ 13,386	\$ 760,919	\$ 22,804	181.3 %	\$ 1,195,273

NA= Not Available

Notes: (1) Column 3 / Column 1.  
(2) Column 4 / Column 2.  
(3) Column 5 \* Column 3.

(4) From Financial Statements of Ohio-American Water Company for Fiscal Year End 2010.

(5) The market-to-book ratio of Ohio-American Water Company on June 17, 2011 is assumed to be equal to the market-to-book ratio of the Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies at June 17, 2011.

(6) Ohio-American Water Company's common stock, if traded, would trade at a market-to-book ratio equal to the average market-to-book ratio at June 17, 2011 of the Proxy Group of Nine Water Companies, 181.3%, and Ohio-American Water Company's market capitalization on June 17, 2011 would therefore have been \$90,402 million.

(7) Adjusted for 2-for-1 stock split on June 13, 2011.

Source of Information: 2010 Annual Forms 10K  
yahoo.finance.com