BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the Application of Columbia)	
Gas of Ohio, Inc. for Approval of a General)	Case No. 08-1344-GA-EXM
Exemption of Certain Natural Gas Commodity)	
Sales Services or Ancillary Services)	

RECEIVED-DOCKETING DIV

PREPARED TESTIMONY

of

Stephen E. Puican Rates & Tariffs/Energy & Water Division

Staff Ex.

PREPARED TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN E. PUICAN

- 2 1. Q. Would you please state your name and business address?
- A. My name is Stephen E. Puican. My business address is 180 East Broad
 Street, Columbus, Ohio.
- 5 2. Q. What is your present employment?

- A. I am currently employed as Co-Chief of the Rates & Tariffs/Energy & Water Division in the Utilities Department of the Public Utilities

 Commission of Ohio ("PUCO").
- 9 3. Q. Would you outline your academic and professional qualifications?
- 10 A. I received a B.A. degree in Economics from Kent State University in 1980 11 and an M.A. degree in Economics from Ohio State University in 1983. I was employed by the Ohio Department of Development, Division of 12 13 Energy, from May 1983 until October 1985 at which that Division was 14 incorporated into the PUCO. I have been employed in several positions at the PUCO since that time and have been Co-Chief of the Rates & 15 Tariffs/Energy & Water Division since May 2005. Prior to that, I had been 16 17 Chief of the Gas and Water Division since 1999. In both my current and 18 previous positions I have been responsible for oversight of the Utilities 19 Department's natural gas staff which includes responsibility for all GCR 20 cases, as well as other areas relating to natural gas such as contracts, certain 21 tariff provisions and rate case issues. I have also been involved in the 22 development and evolution of Ohio's customer choice programs as well as

- the transition from the Gas Cost Recovery commodity pricing mechanism to the Standard Service Offer (SSO) and Standard Choice Offer (SCO) mechanisms. I have previously testified in support of the SSO/SCO commodity pricing mechanisms.
- 5 4. Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?

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- A. I will present evidence from the auctions conducted to date that demonstrates the additional value of an SCO auction beyond the SSO-only auction.
- 10 5. Q. What evidence have you observed that demonstrates this additional value?
- 11 A. I believe the auction results themselves clearly demonstrate the additional 12 value an SCO auction creates beyond that of an SSO-only auction. Exhibit 13 SEP-1 shows a history of the various auctions since the first Dominion auction in 2006. In addition to the auction results in the Exhibit, there is 14 also a row labeled Maximum GCR Adder which shows for each Company, 15 16 an adder rate that Staff calculated to be the upper limit of what Staff would 17 view as an acceptable auction result. These maximum GCR adders were based on the historical differences between NYMEX and each Company's 18 GCR prior to the auctions. The methodology for these calculations can be 19 20 found in the Staff Reports filed on August 29, 2006 in Case No. 05-474-21 GA-ATA for Dominion, August 19, 2008 in Case No. 07-1285-GA-EXM for Vectren, and on February 23, 2010 in Case No. 08-1344-GA-EXM for 22 Columbia. The exhibit shows the results of each auction in the form of an 23

adder to the monthly NYMEX settlement price. The sum of the adder and the monthly NYMEX closing price would be the SSO or SCO rate. The exhibit also shows each Company's adder as a percentage of that Company's Maximum GCR Adder. Looking at percentages makes for a more level comparison of the auction results across companies since it would tend to compensate for any inherent structural differences among the companies that would cause differences in the costs of operating on each system.

In this testimony I will not be considering the results of the SSO period that ran from September 2008 through March 2009 for Dominion and from September 2008 through March 2010 for Vectren. I consider the results of these two auctions to be anomalies due to the timing of the auctions and the market conditions that existed immediately before and after those auctions. Because the auctions took place toward the latter part of the storage injection season (July 22, 2008 for Dominion and August 19, 2008 for Vectren), the winning auction bidders were required to purchase the gas placed in storage to that point at the price paid by Dominion and Vectren. During that period gas prices spiked dramatically and then declined by the time the auctions took place. The net result of this was that winning SSO providers were required to purchase gas from storage at a price significantly higher than the projected NYMEX price at the time the gas would be sold. Bidders thus had to incorporate that market price differential into the

auction based adder. The result was an adder (\$2.33 for Dominion and \$2.35 for Vectren) that I consider to be an outlier compared to the other auction results. Although this leaves only two valid data points for Vectren and Columbia, it is nonetheless all of the useful empirical data we have available.

6 6. Q. What conclusions can you draw from the information on Exhibit SEP-1?

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Looking at the numbers for Dominion, there is a pattern of declining auction results since the initial SSO auction. For Vectren, the results show the same pattern although we do not have a valid SSO-only auction result for reference. For Columbia, we have two SSO-only auction results which show a decline from 2010 to 2011. Looking at the results in percentage terms, Dominion's initial SSO auction resulted in an adder which was 57.6 percent of its maximum GCR adder. This compares to 63.1 percent for Columbia in 2010 and 61.4 percent in 2011. For the reasons discussed above we do not have an SSO auction result for Vectren that would be useful in this analysis. Dominion's first SCO auction in 2009 produced only a modest reduction from \$1.44 to \$1.40 but produced significant reductions in each of the next two years, dropping to \$1.20 in 2010 and to \$1.00 in 2011. In terms of the percentage of the maximum GCR adder, it declined from 56 percent in 2009 to 48 percent in 2010 and 40 percent in 2011. For Vectren the percentages were 65.7 in 2010 and 57.2 in 2011. Although the decline for Vectren is less dramatic than for Dominion, this is likely

attributable to its smaller size making it somewhat less desirable than either Dominion or Columbia. This is further evidenced by the smaller number of marketers participating in the two Vectren SCO auctions. The results of Columbia's two SSO auctions are 63.1 percent of its maximum GCR adder in 2010 and 61.4 percent in 2011. These numbers compare with Dominion's initial SSO result of 57.6%. The subsequent decline in Dominion's adders is, in my opinion, attributable to the transition from the SSO to the SCO. By contrast, Columbia has received two virtually identical auction results for its two SSO auctions. While Dominion and Vectren both saw a twenty-cent reduction from 2010 to 2011, Columbia saw only a fivecent decline. There is no apparent reason to believe those results would differ markedly in any future Columbia SSO-only auction. An SSO adder of approximately \$1.90 or approximately 62% of the historical maximum GCR adder, appears to be the value marketers place on participating in Columbia's SSO program.

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- 7. Q. Are there other results from the auctions to date that you believe support your position that the SCO provides benefits in excess of an SSO-only auction?
 - A. Yes. I believe the degree of participation in the various auctions also demonstrates the greater value marketers place on the SCO auction as opposed to an SSO-only auction. Exhibit SEP-2 is a listing of marketers that have participated in at least one of the auctions held to date. The

identity of the specific marketers is not relevant so they are shown as letters A through AD. Each marketer's participation in a particular auction is denoted by a "D" for Dominion, "V" for Vectren and "C" for Columbia. In addition, any marketer that is not a certified CRNGS provider is highlighted. I will focus on the last three Dominion auctions since these had both an SCO and a separate SSO component. Vectren by contrast conducts only an SCO auction with the SSO customers assigned on a pro rata basis to the winning SCO bidders. In the Dominion auctions, the participants showed a clear preference for the SCO auction. In the 2009 – 2010 auction, there were eleven total bidders, all of which were certified, with one participating in only the SSO auction. All the others participated in either the SCO only or both the SCO and SSO auctions. In the 2010 - 2011 auction, there were fourteen total bidders, all but two of which were certified. In the 2011 – 2012 auction, there were sixteen total bidders and again only two uncertified. There are two conclusions I draw from these results. First, that there is a clear preference for the SCO auction over the SSO auction with only one bidder in 2009 and two bidders in each of 2010 and 2011 participating in only the SSO auction. The second point is that the need to be certified as a CRNGS provider does not appear to be an impediment to attraction participation in the auction with the sixteen bidders in 2011 being the highest number to participate in any of Dominion's auctions.

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- 1 8. Q. The Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel argues that the difference in tax rates between the gross receipts tax, which applies to SSO sales, and the higher sales tax rates which apply to SCO sales ensures that customers will pay more under the SCO than the SSO. How do you respond to this assertion?
- 6 A. I prepared Exhibit SEP-3 to calculate the impact of the difference in tax rates. I first took the NYMEX closing prices for the months shown in the 7 exhibit in column (2) and added Columbia's applicable monthly SSO adder 8 9 to arrive at the total rate in column (3). I then multiplied this rate by 10 Columbia's monthly SSO sales volumes to arrive at the total bill in column (4). I then applied Columbia's gross receipts tax of 4.987% to arrive at 11 column (5) and a sales tax rate of 7% to arrive at column (6)¹. The 12 difference between these two columns is the tax delta shown in column (7). 13 The total impact of the tax differential in that twelve month period is 14 \$10,169,260. I then calculated how much of a difference in the SCO 15 auction adder would be required to generate sufficient savings to offset this 16 tax differential. Dividing the tax delta by the Mcf sales in column (1) 17 18 resulted in a differential of just over twelve-cents per Mcf. The conclusion 19 is that if auction participants bid a premium of at least thirteen-cents as the added value of the SCO above the SSO, that premium will more than offset 20

I chose 7% as a representative rate since 47 of 88 counties have a 7% rate, only 1 has a higher rate and the remaining 40 are lower.

- 1 the tax impact.
- Q. Do you believe the auction results to date demonstrate at least a thirteencent premium?
- A. Yes they do. As I discussed above, I would argue that the reduction in 4 5 Dominion's adder from \$1.44 in its initial SSO auction to \$1.00 in the most 6 recent SCO auction is due to the additional value the SCO brings to 7 consumers beyond the value of the SSO. Taking an even more conservative 8 approach however, we can compensate for any impact that differences in 9 market conditions may have had on that forty-four cent price differential by comparing the results of the Dominion and Vectren SCO auctions in 2010 10 and 2011 with Columbia's SSO auction results in the same time period. As 11 12 I noted above, Dominion and Vectren both saw a twenty-cent reduction in the SCO adder from 2010 to 2011, while Columbia saw only a five-cent 13 decline in the SSO adder. This fifteen-cent net difference is a conservative 14 15 estimate of the added value marketers put on the SCO. In my opinion the 16 auction results to date put the SCO premium between forty-four and 17 fifteen-cents per Mcf. Even at the low end, this premium more than offsets the impact of the tax rate differential. 18
- 19 10. Q. In both the 2010 and 2011 Dominion auctions, the SSO auction produced
 20 the same result as the SCO auction. How do you account for this result in
 21 light of your testimony that bidders put a premium on the SCO auction?
- A. The fact that the 2010 and 2011 auctions saw the same result for both

auctions in my opinion simply means we got a lower SSO auction result than we would have gotten in the absence of the SCO auction. It is simply not reasonable to assume that the SSO result would have been the same had it been a stand-alone SSO auction. As I illustrated in Exhibit SEP-2 it is the desirability of earning a direct retail relationship with SCO customers that drives interest in the SCO auctions and that in turn brings an interest to the SSO auction that otherwise would not materialize. The result is a lower bid price in both auctions due to the existence of the SCO. The fact that the SSO and SCO auction results were the same in 2010 and 2011 does not change that conclusion. We have an SCO model that unquestionably produces substantial savings to customers. We should not endanger these savings by rejecting this proven model and going backward to an SSO-only model with only the hope that it produces the same results. In my opinion the reversion to an SSO-only auction would jeopardize the progress we have made to date in terms of high levels of participation in the auctions and the resulting cost savings to customers.

- 17 11. Q. What is your recommendation for the Commission?
- A. I recommend the Commission authorize Columbia to proceed with an SCO auction beginning in 2012 and continuing each year thereafter unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
- 21 12. Q. Does this conclude your testimony?
- A. Yes, it does.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVCE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing was served by regular U.S. mail, postage prepaid, and/or by e-mail on July 8, 2011, upon the following:

Stephen A Reills

PARTIES OF RECORD:

Stephen B. Steeple Brooke E. Leslie Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. 200 Civic Center Drive P.O. Box 117 Columbus, OH 43216-0117 sseiple@nisource.com bleslie@nisource.com

Steven M. Sherman Krieg DeVault LLP One Indiana Square, Suite 2800 Indianapolis, IN 46204 ssherman@kdlegal.com

John Dosker Stand Energy Corporation 1077 Celestial Street, Suite 110 Cincinnati, OH 45202-1113 jdosker@stand-energy.com

Barth E. Royer Bell & Royer Co., LPA 33 South Grant Avenue Columbus, OH 43215-3927 BarthRoyer@aol.com David C. Rinebolt Colleen L. Mooney Ohio Partners for Affordable Energy 231 West Lima Street P.O. Box 1793 Findlay, OH 45839-1793 drinebolt@aol.com cmooney2@columbus.rr.com

Larry Gearhardt
Ohio Farm Bureau Federation
280 North High Street
P.O. Box 182383
Columbus, OH 43218-2383
Igearhardt@ofbf.org

Glenn Krassen Bricker & Eckler LLP 1375 East Ninth Street, Suite 1500 Cleveland, OH 44114-1718 gkrassen@bricker.com

David Boehm
Boehm, Kurtz and Lowry
36 East 7th Street, Suite 1510
Cincinnati, OH 45202-4454
dboehm@bkllawfirm.com

Samuel C. Randazzo McNees, Wallace & Nurik 21 East State Street, 17th Floor Columbus, OH 43215-4228 sam@mwncmh.com

Stephan A. Ariyan Sempra Energy Trading LLC 58 Commerce Road Stamford, CT 06902 Stephan.ariyan@rbssempra.com

Michael D. Dortch Kravitz Brown & Dortch LLC 65 E. State Street, Suite 200 Columbus, OH 43215-4277 mdortch@kravitzllc.com

Lance M. Keiffer 700 Adams Street, Suite 250 Toledo, OH 43064-5859 lkeiffer@co.lucas.oh.us

Sheila H. McAdams Marsh & McAdams 204 W. Wayne Street Maumee, OH 43537 sheilahmca@aol.com

Thomas R. Hays 3315 Centennial Road, Suite A-2 Sylvania, OH 43560 hayslaw@buckeye-express.com Lawrence Sauer Office of the Ohio Consumers; Counsel 10 West Broad Street, Suite 1800 Columbus, OH 43215-3485 sauer@occ.state.oh.us

W. Jonathan Airey Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease LLP 52 E. Gay Street P.O. Box 1008 Columbus, OH 43216-1008 wjairey@vorys.com

Lisa M. Simpkins
Christopher D. Young
Constellation Energy Resources
111 Market Place, Suite 500
Baltimore, MD 21202
Lisa.simpkins@constellation.com
Christopher.young@constellation.com

Paul Goldberg 5330 Searman Road Oregon, OH 43616 pgoldberg@ci.oregon.oh.us

Carrie E. Carbone
Bracewell & Guiliani LLP
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3800
Dallas, TX 75202-2711
Carrie.carbone@bgllp.com

Paul Skaff Leatherman, Wintzler, Dombey & Hart 353 Elm Street Perrysburg, OH 43551 paulskaff@justice.com James E. Moan 4930 Holland-Sylvania Road Sylvania, OH 43560 jimmoan@hotmail.com

Leslie A. Kovacik
City of Toledo
Dept. of Law
420 Madison Avenue, Suite 100
Toledo, OH 43604-1219
Leslie.kovacik@toledo.oh.gov

Gary A. Jeffries
Dominion Retail, Inc.
501 Martindale Street, Suite 400
Pittsburgh, PA 15212-5844
Gary.jeffries@dom.com

Chris Hendrix
Director of Markets & Compliance
Energy Regulations & Legislation
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
2001 Southeast 10th Street
Bentonville, Arkansas 72716-0550
Chris.hendrix@wal-mart.com

Dane Stinson
Bailey & Cavalieri LLC
10 W. Broad Street, Suite, 2100
Columbus, OH 43215
Dane.stinson@baileycavalieri.com

Brian J. Ballenger Ballenger & Moore 3401 Woodville Road, Suite C Toledo, OH 43619 ballengerlawbjb@sbcglobal.net

Shaun Forkin
Mike Griffiths
ProLiance Energy, LLC
2 Prestige Place, Suite 150
Miamisburg, OH 45342
sforkin@proliance.com
mgriffiths@proliance.com

David M. Perlman Bracewell & Guiliani LLP 2000 K Street, NW, Suite 500 Washington DC 20006-1872 David.perlman@bgllp.com

John W. Bentine
Mark S. Yurick
Chester, Willcox & Saxbe
65 E. State Street, Suite 1000
Columbus, OH 43215
jbentine@cwslaw.com
myurick@cwslaw.com

M. Howard Petricoff
Stephen M. Howard
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease LLP
52 East Gay Street
P.O. Box 1008
Columbus, OH 43216-1008
mhpetricoff@vorys.com

SSO/SCO Auction Results

	<u>Dominior</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>Vectren</u>		Columbia	Ī
Maximum GCR Adder:	\$2.50		\$2.36		\$3.06	
Auction Adders:						
10/06 - 8/08	\$1.44	57.6%				
9/08 - 3/09	\$2.33	93.2%	\$2.35	99.6%		
4/09 - 3/10	\$1.40	56.0%	\$2.35	99.6%		
4/10 - 3/11	\$1.20	48.0%	\$1.55	65.7%	\$1.93	63.1%
4/11 - 3/12	\$1.00	40.0%	\$1.35	57.2%	\$1.88	61.4%

SSO/SCO Auction Participation

	2006-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010	2010	2010-2011	2011	2011-2012
Supplier	SSO	850	SCO	SSO	sco	oss	oos	880
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SSO/SCO Auction Participation

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Exhibit__SEP-3

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8) SCO Delta
	Mcf Sales	NYMEX	Total Rate	Total Billed	With Ex.Tax	With Sls. Tax	Tax Delta	@ 13 Cents
May-10	3,502,371	\$4.717	\$6.647	\$23,280,260	\$24,441,247	\$24,909,878	\$468,632	\$455,308
Jun-10	1,958,716	\$4.774	\$6.704	\$13,131,232	\$13,786,087	\$14,050,418	\$264,332	\$254,633
Jul-10	1,465,460	\$3.651	\$5.581	\$8,178,732	\$8,586,606	\$8,751,244	\$164,638	\$190,510
Aug-10	1,290,665	\$3.837	\$5.767	\$7,443,265	\$7,814,461	\$7,964,294	\$149,833	\$167,786
Sep-10	1,309,770	\$3.292	\$5.222	\$6,839,619	\$7,180,711	\$7,318,392	\$137,682	\$170,270
Oct-10	2,122,315	\$4.267	\$6.197	\$13,151,986	\$13,807,876	\$14,072,625	\$264,749	\$275,901
Nov-10	4,986,914	\$4.216	\$6.146	\$30,649,573	\$32,178,068	\$32,795,044	\$616,976	\$648,299
Dec-10	11,332,969	\$4.316	\$6.246	\$70,785,724	\$74,315,808	\$75,740,725	\$1,424,917	\$1,473,286
Jan-11	17,224,929	\$3.793	\$5.723	\$98,578,269	\$103,494,367	\$105,478,747	\$1,984,381	\$2,239,241
Feb-11	16,219,242	\$4.240	\$6.170	\$100,072,723	\$105,063,350	\$107,077,814	\$2,014,464	\$2,108,501
Mar-11	12,219,272	\$4.377	\$6.307	\$77,066,949	\$80,910,277	\$82,461,635	\$1,551 <i>,</i> 358	\$1,588,505
Apr-11	9,023,685	\$4.326	\$6.206	\$56,000,989	\$58,793,758	\$59,921,058	\$1,127,300	\$1,173,079
Total	82,656,308			\$505,179,322	\$530,372,614	\$540,541,874	\$10,169,260	\$10,745,320

Tax Impact: (7)/(1) = 12.3 cents per Mcf