BEFORE THE

## PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the Application of ) Columbus Southern Power Company for , Approval of its Electric Security Plan ) Including Related Accounting Authority; ) and an Amendment to its Corporate ) Separation Plan; and the Sale or Transfer Of Certain Generating Assets )

In the Matter of the Application of ,
Ohio Power Company for Approval of ) of its Electric Security Plan Including ) Related Accounting Authority; and an Amendment to its Corporate Separation Plan
-

Case No. 08-917-EL-SSO
)

Case No. 08-918-EL-SSO


JONATHAN A. LESSER, PH.D.
ON BEHALF OF
INDUSTRIAL ENERGY USERS- OHIO

June 30, 2011

Samuel C. Randazzo (Trial Attorney)
Frank P. Dir
McNees Wallace \& Nurick LLC
21 E. State Street, $17^{\text {th }}$ Floor
Columbus, OH 43215
Telephone: 614-469-8000
Fax: 614-469-4653
sam@mwncmh.com
fdarr@mwncmh.com
Attorneys for Industrial Energy Users-Ohio

This is to certify that the images appearing are an accurate and complete reproduction of a cage file document delivered in the regular course of business. Technician $\qquad$ Date Processed


## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ..... 1
II. BACKGROUND OF THE PROCEEDING ..... 5
2. AEP's Choice of an Option Model to Value POLR Risk ..... 5
3. The Black-Scholes and Black Option Models ..... 7
III. AEP OHIO'S COST TO PROVIDE POLR SERVICE IS NOT EQUAL TO ITS CUSTOMERS' OPTION VALUE ..... 12
4. AEP Ohio's POLR Costs Do Not Include Costs Associated with Consumers Leaving SSO Service ..... 12
5. Customer Option Value to Return to SSO Service is Not Equal to AEP Ohio's Cost. ..... 13
IV. THE BLACK MODEL IS NOT APPRORIATE TO ESTIMATE SSO CUSTOMERS' OPTION VALUES ..... 17
6. The Black Model is Not Appropriate For Use In This Case Because Several Essential Assumptions Of The Black Model Are Not Met. ..... 18
7. AEP Ohio's Claims Regarding The Black Model Are Overstated. ..... 25
V. AEP OHIO HAS USED INCORRECT INPUT VALUES IN THE BLACK MODEL ..... 26
VI. AEP OHIO HAS NOT IDENTIFIED ITS ACTUAL POLR-RELATED COSTS ..... 31
VII. CONCLUSION: AEP OHIO HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF ..... 34

## I. INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

## PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, TITLE, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

My name is Jonathan A. Lesser. I am President of Continental Economics, Inc., an economic consulting firm that provides litigation, valuation, and strategic services to law firms, industry, and government agencies. My business address is 6 Real Place, Sandia Park, NM 87047.

## PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS, EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE, AND EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND.

I am an economist specializing in litigation support and market analysis in the energy industry. I have over 25 years of experience in the energy industry working with utilities, consumer groups, competitive power producers and marketers, and government entities. I have provided expert testimony before state utility commissions in Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, lllinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, and Vermont, as well as before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), state legislative committees, and before international regulators and courts of law.

Before founding Continental Economics, I was a Partner in the Energy Practice with the consulting firm Bates White, LLC. Prior to that, I was the Director of Regulated Planning for the Vermont Department of Public Service. Previously, I was employed as a Senior Managing Economist at Navigant Consulting. Prior to that, I was the Manager, Economic Analysis, for Green Mountain Power Corporation. I also spent seven years as an Energy Policy Specialist with the Washington State Energy Office, and I worked for Idaho

Power Corporation and the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee (an electric industry trade group), where I specialized in electric load and price forecasting.

I hold MA and PhD degrees in economics from the University of Washington and a $B S$, with honors, in mathematics and economics from the University of New Mexico. My doctoral fields of specialization were applied microeconomics, econometrics and statistics, and industrial organization and antitrust. I also completed the doctoral sequence of courses in Finance, and have developed empirical models to value options associated with electric contracts. I am the coauthor of three textbooks, including Environmental Economics and Policy (1997), Fundamentals of Energy Regulation (2007), and, most recently, Principles of Utility Corporate Finance (2011). I have attached a copy of my curriculum vita as Exhibit JAL-1.

## Q ARE YOU A MEMBER OF ANY PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS?

Yes. I am a member of the International Association for Energy Economics, the Energy Bar Association, and the Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis.

## Q ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING?

I am testifying on behalf of Industrial Energy Users-Ohio.
Q WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?
I have been asked to respond to the testimony submitted by Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company (collectively "AEP Ohio" or
"the Company") witnesses Laura Thomas, ${ }^{1}$ Dr. Chantale LaCasse, ${ }^{2}$ and Dr. Anil Makhija, ${ }^{3}$ regarding AEP Ohio's use of an option pricing model to value its provider of last resort ("POLR") obligation during its current Electric Security Plan ("ESP"), which expires on December 31, 2011. I will explain why the option model used by AEP Ohio as the basis for establishing POLR charges levied on its Standard Service Offer ("SSO") customers does not correctly establish POLR charges that compensate utilities "for customers who shop and then return to [the utility] for generation service" as described by the Ohio Supreme Court in its April 19, 2011 opinion, In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 512, 517 (2011) (citing Constellation NewEnergy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 104 Ohio St.3d 530, ๆ 39 , fn. 5). I will also explain that AEP Ohio has presented no evidence supporting its purported actual out of pocket costs for serving as the POLR. Finally, I will explain that AEP Ohio has presented no evidence justifying a non-cost based POLR rider. See id. at 519 .

## Q PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR CONCLUSIONS.

A AEP Ohio proposes to set its POLR charges based on what it terms the "option value" to AEP Ohio customers for the right, but not the obligation, to return to SSO service. To estimate this option value, AEP Ohio uses what is called the "Black" model, named after economist Fisher Black. The Black model

[^0]is a variant of the more well-known "Black-Scholes" option pricing model, and is used to price so-called "European" futures options.

In brief, my conclusions regarding AEP Ohio's use of this model to estimate its POLR-related costs are as follows:

## AEP Ohio's Cost To Provide POLR Service Is Not Equal To Its Customers' Option Value- Described in Section III of Testimony.

(1) Despite the Ohio Supreme Court's clear language that AEP Ohio may be able to recover the POLR-related costs the Company incurs from "standing ready to service customers who shop and return," AEP Ohio continues to insist that its POLR-related costs precisely equal the option value to SSO customers. AEP Ohio is fundamentally wrong. AEP Ohio not only includes as its POLR obligation cost the option value of SSO customers returning to SSO service, it also includes the option value of SSO customers leaving AEP Ohio to take service with competitive retail electric service ("CRES") providers. Fundamentally, POLR costs do not include costs to AEP Ohio stemming from SSO customers deciding to purchase from CRES providers.
(2) The cost to AEP Ohio of providing POLR service is not equal to the overall option value its customers have for having to return to SSO service. AEP Ohio's costs stem from standing ready to serve customers who return to SSO service. The cost of doing so will include either costs related to a competitive procurement that auctions off AEP Ohio's POLR risk to competitive suppliers, who would then provide the electric energy needs of customers returning to SSO service, or some other form of energy hedge purchased directly by AEP Ohio. However, AEP Ohio has presented no evidence of the cost of any hedging activity.

## The Black Model Is Not Appropriate To Estimate SSO Customers' Option Values- Described in Section IV of Testimony.

(3) Even if, arguendo, AEP Ohio's cost to provide POLR service did equal its distribution customer's overall option value, the Black model used by AEP Ohio is not appropriate to estimate that option value, because key assumptions that underlie that model's use in the context of valuing futures options do not apply. Specifically, the Black model makes the following assumptions that are not met in this case: (a) markets are perfect and customers will always act in their economic best interest; (b)
price volatility is constant and is reflected by the PJM wholesale market price, even though consumers pay a retail price; (c) the strike price, i.e., AEP Ohio's ESP price, is constant; (d) returns are lognormally distributed; and (e) the option to be priced is a European option.
(4) AEP Ohio's claims regarding the Black model are overstated. Specifically, the Black model is not an appropriate method to calculate: (a) the cost of the risk to AEP Ohio of serving as a POLR provider; (b) the "value" received by AEP's customers; or (c) the simultaneous value of a "put" and "call" option.

## AEP Has Used Incorrect Volatility Input Values In The Black ModelDescribed in Section V of Testimony.

(5) Even if, arguendo, one determined that the Black model could be used to value SSO customers' option values to return, AEP Ohio uses inappropriate volatility values in the option pricing model that render the estimates derived from its use of the Black model incorrect and excessive.

AEP Has Not Identified Its Actual POLR-Related Costs- Described in Section VI of Testimony.
(6) AEP Ohio has not identified, let alone substantiated, any actual POLR related costs. Therefore, AEP Ohio has failed to demonstrate that its POLR related costs meet the "known and measurable" standard that is basic to ratemaking and should not be included as a nonbypassable charge in its rates.

## II. BACKGROUND OF THE PROCEEDING

1. AEP's Choice of an Option Model to Value POLR Risk

## Q WHAT IS THE GENESIS OF THIS PROCEEDING?

A In 2008, AEP Ohio calculated and valued its POLR-related risk using what is called the Black-Scholes option pricing model. According to AEP Ohio witness Craig Baker, "customers have the right to leave the utility and take service from an alternative supplier as well as the right to return to AEP Ohio's ESP pricing if future market price fluctuations make it advantageous for them to do so. AEP

Ohio is holding the other side of that arrangement; AEP Ohio is obligated to stand ready to handle whatever load fluctuations may result from such switching." ${ }^{4}$

Based on his reasoning, Mr. Baker concluded that an option pricing model, specifically the Black-Scholes option pricing model, was the appropriate way to value this risk, stating "When determining the cost of AEP Ohio 's POLR obligation, it is important to realize that in financial terms, such one-sided rights that customers receive through retail choice are equivalent to a series of options on power. ${ }^{55}$ Using the Black-Scholes model, AEP Ohio determined that its POLR costs were $\$ 108.2$ million for Columbus Southern Power ("CSP") and $\$ 60.9$ million for Ohio Power Company ("OPC") each year of the ESP.

## Q IN ITS RECENT DECISION, DID THE OHIO SUPREME COURT DETERMINE THAT AEP OHIO'S COST OF PROVIDING POLR SERVICE EQUALED ITS CUSTOMERS' OPTION VALUE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABILITY TO RETURN TO SSO SERVICE?

A
No. In its April 19, 2011 decision, the Court stated, "We have carefully reviewed the record, and we can find no evidence suggesting that AEP Ohio's POLR charge is related to any costs it will incur." ${ }^{\prime 6}$ The Court further stated:

Contrary to the order, this formula simply does not reveal "the cost to the Companies to be the POLR and carry the risks associated therewith." The record shows that the model does not even purport
${ }^{4}$ In the Matter of the Application of Columbus Southern Power Co. for Approval of an Electric Security Plan; an Amendment to its Corporate Separation Plan; and the Sale or Transfer of Certain Generating Assets, Case Nos. 08-917-EL-SSO et al., Direct Testimony of J. Craig Baker on Behalf of Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company, July 31,2008 ("Baker Direct"), at 30:1-5 ("ESP l").

5
ld. at 30:20-23.
$6 \quad$ In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 128 Ohio St.3d512, 518 at ๆ 25 (2011)
to estimate costs, but instead tries to quantify "the value of the optionality [to shop for power] that is provided to customers under Senate Bill 221." Value to customers (what the model shows) and cost to AEP Ohio (the purported basis of the order) are simply not the same thing. ${ }^{\text {? }}$

The Court concluded that AEP Ohio had not presented any evidence of the costs the Company would incur from having to serve customers who wished to return to SSO service.

## Q DID THE COURT DEFINE THE SCOPE OF AEP'S POLR RISK?

A Yes. In this same decision the Ohio Supreme Court defined POLR risk as the obligation "to stand ready to accept returning customers." This admonition is a continuation of well-established Ohio authority, as the Ohio Supreme Court has consistently described POLR charges as compensating utilities for standing ready to serve "customers who shop and then return." 9

## 2. The Black-Scholes and Black Option Models

## Q CAN YOU DESCRIBE THE "BLACK" MODEL IN SIMPLE TERMS?

Yes. The genesis of the Black model, and the better known BlackScholes model that preceded it, was a straightforward question: how does one value a stock option? This model can also be used to value commodity spot options, including electricity, that are widely traded in liquid markets.

[^1]To understand the Black model, let me begin by describing the BlackScholes model on which it is based. The Black-Scholes model is easiest to describe by using examples that describe the model and its inputs. For example, suppose the price of AEP stock closed at $\$ 37$ today. And suppose I am offered an option that will give me the right, but not the obligation, to purchase one share of AEP stock six months from today at a price of $\$ 40$. That price is called the strike price and this type of option is called a European call option, because it has a fixed exercise date. If AEP's stock increases to $\$ 45$ tomorrow, I cannot exercise my option to buy one share of AEP stock for $\$ 40$ tomorrow because under the terms of the option I can only exercise it six months from now. A European put option would give me the right, but not the obligation, to sell one share of AEP stock six months from today at a price of $\$ 40$.

If, on that day six months from now, AEP's stock price is actually $\$ 45$, I will earn $\$ 5$ profit, because I can exercise my call option to buy the share of stock for $\$ 40$ and immediately sell it for $\$ 45$. Of course, the price of AEP's stock may not be $\$ 45$ six months from today. In fact, the price could fall to less than $\$ 40$. In that case, my call option would be worthless, but a put option would be worth the difference between $\$ 40$ and the stock's closing price.

Intuitively, the value of the call option to buy one share of AEP's stock six months from today depends on the likelihood that the price will be greater than the $\$ 40$ strike price at that time. And, because stock prices follow what is called a "random walk," the likelihood of the market price exceeding the $\$ 40$ strike price six months from today depends on how volatile the stock price is.

The Black-Scholes model calculates a spot option value. That is, the option value associated with buying or selling an asset (e.g., stocks, bonds, gold, corn, etc.) on a fixed date in the future. The value of the spot option depends on a number of factors, including the volatility of the underlying asset's market price, the time until the option expires, and the risk-free interest rate. The value of a call option always falls within the shaded area shown in Figure $1 .{ }^{10}$

Figure 1: Call Option Value


The reasons are as follows. First, ignoring the purchase price of the option itself, the value of the option can never be less than zero. For example, if I purchase a call option on AEP stock with a strike price of $\$ 40$, but the actual market price on the exercise date is $\$ 35$, I simply will not exercise the option. Second, the value of an option can never be greater than the price of the asset. If the price of AEP stock is $\$ 45$ on the exercise date, the value of the option cannot be greater than
\$45. This defines the leftmost boundary of the shaded area, because along that line the value of the call option equals the asset price. Once the asset price exceeds the strike price, then the value of the option is positive. For example, if the price of AEP stock is $\$ 45$ and the option has a $\$ 40$ strike price, then the value of the option is $\$ 45-\$ 40=\$ 5$. The rightmost border of the shaded area is the line along which the call option value just equals the asset price less the strike price.

The market value of the call option when it is purchased will fall along the dashed line inside the shaded area. For example, if the strike price of the AEP stock option is $\$ 40$ and that is also the price of the stock the day the option itself is purchased, then the value of the call option must be positive. The reason is that, because the price of AEP stock is volatile, there is a non-zero probability that the price of the stock on the exercise date will be greater than $\$ 40$. Hence, the value of the option must be greater than zero. In fact, the value of the option today is, in essence, the expected net present value of the option on its exercise date. In Figure 1, the value of the option today is labeled as point $\mathbf{c}$. The BlackScholes option valuation model provides a compact formula for determining the value of call and put options.

## Q HOW DOES THE BLACK MODEL DIFFER FROM THE BLACK-SCHOLES MODEL?

Black extended the Black-Scholes model to value futures options, and this extension is known as the Black model. A futures option is a right, but not the
obligation, to enter into a futures contract. ${ }^{11}$ A futures contract is just a standardized contract for the sale or delivery of a commodity, like corn or electricity, or a financial instrument, like a U.S. Treasury bond, at a specified time in the future. Futures contracts are actively traded in liquid markets, such as the New York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX") or the Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT").

## ARE THERE ELECTRICITY FUTURES CONTRACTS?

Yes. For example, electricity futures contracts for delivery of power to the PJM West Hub during peak hours are traded on NYMEX. The size of each contract is 80 megawatt-hours ("MWh") delivered at a rate of 5 MW per peak hour over the 16 -hour period from 7AM to 11PM, Monday-Friday. ${ }^{12}$

On Tuesday, June 14, 2011, the price of the August futures contract closed at $\$ 67.40 / \mathrm{MWh}$. Thus, if you purchased one futures contract for delivery in August 2011, you would be agreeing to pay $\$ 67.40 / \mathrm{MWh}$ for 80 MWh of electricity to be delivered in August. If you sold that futures contract, you would agree to deliver 80 MWh of electricity at a price of $\$ 67.40 / \mathrm{MWh}$ during peakhours in August.

## Q IF YOU BUY AN ELECTRICITY FUTURES OPTION, DO YOU HAVE TO PHYSICALLY TAKE THE ELECTRICITY?

A No. In fact, in most cases, holders do not take physical delivery. Instead, the contracts can be used to hedge risk. Suppose you hold one August 2011

[^2]electricity futures call option with a strike price of $\$ 69 / \mathrm{MWh}$. Suppose that on July 30 , the closing price is $\$ 70.00 / \mathrm{MWh}$. If you exercise your option on that date, you will earn: $80 \mathrm{MWh} \times(\$ 70 / \mathrm{MWh}-\$ 69 / \mathrm{MWh})=\$ 80$, and you will now hold a contract entitling you to 80 MWh of electricity delivered in August at the current futures price. Thus, whereas a spot option provides the right, but not the obligation to buy or sell an asset, a futures option provides the right, but not the obligation, to enter into a specific futures contract. Either type of option can be used to hedge risk.

## III. AEP OHIO'S COST TO PROVIDE POLR SERVICE IS NOT EQUAL TO ITS CUSTOMERS' OPTION VALUE

## 1. AEP Ohio's POLR Costs Do Not Include Costs Associated with Consumers Leaving SSO Service

Q DOES AEP OHIO'S PROPOSED POLR CHARGE INCLUDE THE OPTION VALUE ATTRIBUTED TO CUSTOMERS FOR LEAVING SSO SERVICE TO TAKE SERVICE FROM CRES PROVIDERS?

A Yes. AEP's proposed POLR charge improperly includes the option value attributed to customers leaving SSO service to take service from CRES providers. According to AEP Ohio, the component related to customers leaving to take service from CRES providers accounts for $88 \%$ of the Company's POLR option value as calculated by its new constrained option pricing model. ${ }^{13}$ In its original direct testimony relating to the unconstrained option model AEP witness Baker calculated this component as $90 \%$ of the Company's POLR option value. ${ }^{14}$
${ }^{13}$ See In the Matter of the Application of Columbus Southern Power Co. and Ohio Power Co. for Authority to Establish a Standard Service Offer Pursuant to Sectio 4928.143. Ohio Revised Code, in the Form of an Electric Security Plan, Case No. 11-346-EL-SSO, et al., AEP Ohio response to OCC INT-037 ("ESP $/{ }^{\prime \prime}$ ).

This is known as the "First-Leave Cost Component." Hence, under AEP Ohio's own hypothesis, only $10 \%$ of the POLR option value is related to customers returning to POLR service--which is the risk for which they may be compensated.

Q IS INCLUDING THE OPTION VALUE PURPORTEDLY RECEIVED BY CUSTOMERS LEAVING SSO SERVICE TO TAKE SERVICE FROM CRES PROVIDERS A LEGITIMATE COMPONENT OF AEP OHIO'S POLR CHARGE?

A No. The "First-Leave Cost Component" is the option value attributed to migrating customers. This is not a noncompetitive cost, but instead is a competitive cost of providing generation service. Migration away from the SSO results when market prices are expected to be lower than the SSO price for the foreseeable future. This is a risk of competitive markets, not a risk of being a POLR provider. When this occurs, AEP Ohio may sell any surplus generation into the PJM markets, so it is compensated for its generation at market prices and no additional POLR compensation is necessary or appropriate.

## 2. Customer Option Value to Return to SSO Service is Not Equal to AEP Ohio's Cost

Q AEP OHIO WITNESS MAKHIJA TESTIFIES THAT THE VALUE OF THE POLR OPTION TO AEP OHIO CUSTOMERS IS, BY DEFINITION, EQUAL TO THE COST INCURRED BY AEP OHIO. DO YOU AGREE?

A No. Dr. Makhija states that, "the benefits provided to the customers cannot appear out of thin air. Someone has to provide these benefits, and for that party it constitutes a cost. The cost to the utility that provides the POLR
optionality is no more or less than the value of the option received by the customers. ${ }^{15}$ That is incorrect.

To understand why, suppose you have been wandering in the desert and are extremely thirsty. In fact, you are so thirsty that you would pay $\$ 100$ for a bottle of water. Suddenly, you come to a grocery store. You rush in and discover the stores sells large bottles of cold water for one dollar. You reach into the cooler for a bottle and start drinking it before you reach the cash register.

Feeling refreshed, you pay the cashier a dollar for the bottle of water you have consumed. You would have been willing to pay up to $\$ 100$ for the bottle of water. So, you received $\$ 99$ worth of additional benefit, what economists call "consumer's surplus." Now, consider this transaction from the store's point of view. If selling the bottle of water cost the store two dollars, based on the actual cost to stock and sell the bottle of water, presumably the store would not sell it for less than two dollars. Thus, it must be the case that the store's cost was less than one dollar. In fact, suppose the store's cost was 75 cents. In that case, the store benefited by 25 cents, what economists call "producer's surplus." Clearly, the value of the bottle of water to you was much different than the cost of the water to the store.

## Q DOES THIS SAME PRINCIPLE APPLY TO FINANCIAL OPTIONS?

Yes. For example, the reason someone will buy a call option is that he values the option at least as much as its market price. Similarly, the reason someone will sell that same call option is that the revenue he receives from
selling the option is greater than the expected cost. The market price is determined by the interactions of those wishing to buy the option and those wishing to sell, settling when last buyer values the option the same as the last seller values it. Dr. Makhija's statement applies only for the last (marginal) buyer and seller. For all others, the value of the option to the buyer is greater than the cost to the seller.

The fact that I can buy a futures option today for delivery of electricity into PJM in August at a known average market price does not mean I will buy that option. I will only do so if I value the option at least as much as its market price today. As the futures option for peak-hour August delivery continues to be traded until the market for it closes (on July 31), its price will change, reflecting changes in buyers' and sellers' expectations of actual market prices during the month of August. However, these expectations are not necessarily related to the seller's cost.

Q AEP OHIO WITNESS THOMAS SAYS THE POLR CHARGE REFLECTS THE COST OF PROVIDING CUSTOMERS WITH THE OPTION TO SWITCH. DO YOU AGREE?

No. Ms. Thomas, like Dr. Makhija, wrongly presumes that the value of the option to AEP Ohio consumers equals the cost to AEP Ohio. ${ }^{16}$ Ironically, to bolster her argument Ms. Thomas quotes the language in the Ohio Supreme's Court's decision that POLR charges compensating utilities for standing ready to serve customers who shop and return. ${ }^{17}$ However, Ms. Thomas ignores the
language in this same opinion, which clearly states that the value received by customers does not necessarily equal the cost to AEP to provide this option. See In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 512, 518 (2011) ("Even assuming that AEP accurately priced the option, we fail to see how the amount a customer would be willing to pay for the right to shop necessarily establishes AEP's costs to bear the attendant risks.")

Q AEP OHIO WITNESS LACASSE COMPARES AEP OHIO'S PROPOSED POLR CHARGE TO THE RESULTS OF TWO COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS. IS THIS AN "APPLES TO APPLES" COMPARISON?

No. The studies that Dr. LaCasse relies upon provide calculated "premiums" above cost included in winning bids for SSO-type supply products. ${ }^{18}$ In all of these cases, the "premiums" are collected as part of bypassable charges. This is very different from AEP Ohio's proposed POLR charge, which is nonbypassable other than for those very few customers who choose not to pay the POLR charge after switching. The POLR charge that would be required by a competitive supplier would be higher for a bypassable POLR charge than it would be for a non-bypassable POLR charge under the same circumstances. The reason for this is simple. Assuming a fixed POLR charge, a non-bypassable charge would be imposed on more customers, and thus would be lower on a per customer basis than a bypassable charge which would be paid for by fewer customers to the extent shopping occurred. Thus, all else equal, one would expect that AEP Ohio's non-bypassable POLR charge would be lower than
estimates of competitive bypassable POLR charges. Therefore, it is likely that AEP's calculated POLR charge is too high.

Even leaving aside this substantial difference in the two types of "premiums", AEP Witness LaCasse also admits that the premiums she identified encompass more than just the shopping related risk identified in those studies. ${ }^{19}$ This includes, without limitation, uncertainty in demand, cost component risk, and shopping related risk.

The studies relied on by Dr. LaCasse inappropriately compare an effectively non-bypassable POLR charge with a bypassable POLR charge. These studies also analyze "premiums" which include factors other than the POLR charge. As a result, these studies are not relevant to this dispute, and should not be credited by the Commission.

## Q HAS AEP OHIO PURSUED A COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCESS OR TAKEN OTHER STEPS TO INSURE AGAINST ITS PURPORTED POLR RISK?

A To my knowledge, AEP Ohio has not pursued a competitive bidding process similar to the studies analyzed by Dr. LaCasse. AEP Ohio has also failed to present any evidence establishing that it has taken any steps to insure against its purported POLR risk, such as engaging in hedging transactions to limit this risk, or any evidence of any costs it has incurred related to the purported POLR risk.

## IV. THE BLACK MODEL IS NOT APPRORIATE TO ESTIMATE SSO CUSTOMERS' OPTION VALUES

19
See LaCasse Direct at 9:18-20.
\{C34720: \}

Q

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION OF YOUR TESTIMONY?
In the previous section, I discussed why AEP Ohio customers' option value to return to SSO service is distinct from AEP Ohio's cost of "standing ready to serve customers who shop and return." In this section, I review the Black model itself and show that, even if, arguendo, one somehow concluded that AEP Ohio's cost was equal to customer option value, the Black model is not an appropriate model to use to estimate that option value.

1. The Black Model Is Not Appropriate For Use In This Case Because Several Essential Assumptions Of The Black Model Are Not Met.

Q WHAT ASSUMPTIONS FORM THE BASIS FOR THE BLACK MODEL?
The model assumes the following:

1. Markets are perfect and there are no transactions costs.
2. Price volatility is constant.
3. The risk-free interest rate is constant over time.
4. The strike price is constant.
5. The returns on the underlying asset are distributed lognormally.
6. The option can be exercised only on the expiration date (European option).
Q ARE THESE ASSUMPTIONS SO RESTRICTIVE THAT THE MODEL CANNOT BE USED TO VALUE ANY OPTIONS?

No. Despite the limiting assumptions, the Black model, like the betterknown Black-Scholes model, is a useful tool that can quickly estimate the value of a futures option. Options traders may not rely solely on these models, but they are extremely useful to establish initial estimates of option values. Moreover, the data used to estimate option values is all observable. Option prices then change over time based on market factors, including the expectations of market
participants. However, the Black model is not appropriate for use to calculate AEP Ohio's POLR costs, as described in detail below. DO THE SIX ASSUMPTIONS HOLD SUFFICIENTLY TO USE THE BLACK MODEL TO ESTIMATE THE AEP CUSTOMERS' OPTION VALUE OF POLR SERVICE?

No. In my opinion, the Black model should not be used to value the option value of AEP Ohio customers to return to SSO service, because too many of the assumptions underlying the model do not apply. Moreover, the Black model is not designed to calculate the value received by the purchaser of an option, or the cost incurred by the seller of an option. Instead, this model is designed to price options for the purpose of engaging in financial transactions, including hedging. As AEP Ohio is attempting to use the model for purposes beyond which it was designed, AEP Ohio's proposed use of the Black model is inappropriate.

Q IS IT REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE FIRST ASSUMPTION, MARKETS ARE PERFECT AND THERE ARE NO TRANSACTIONS COSTS, HOLDS FOR CUSTOMERS DECIDING TO RETURN TO SSO SERVICE?

No. The Black model assumes perfectly rational consumers and zero transactions costs. These are reasonable assumptions for traders in futures markets, such as NYMEX or the CBOT. Those markets are designed to minimize transactions costs and traders typically develop complex trading strategies based on their own expectations about the future.

In contrast, most electricity consumers are not options traders. They probably do not follow wholesale electric prices in PJM closely. Moreover, the fixed price options consumers can sign up for with CRES providers are designed so that consumers do not have to spend their time evaluating the wholesale
market. Furthermore, under many of those options, consumers are committed to staying with a CRES provider for a defined time frame, meaning they do not have the option to return to SSO service within that time frame.

Second, a consumer who wishes to return to SSO service cannot do so instantaneously. The consumer must contact AEP Ohio and arrange to have the Company start providing him with service on a specified date (this date is potentially limited by switching rules imposed by the Commission and by contract). That is quite different from the options trader who will make buy and sell decisions on a minute-to-minute basis.

Q DOES THE "PERFECTLY RATIONAL CUSTOMER" EXPECTATION ASSUME THAT CUSTOMERS WILL ALWAYS ACT PERFECTLY IN THEIR ECONOMIC SELF-INTEREST?

Yes. The Black model assumes that market participants will always act in their economic self-interest. For the purposes of this analysis, this means that the Black model assumes that all customers will switch to a CRES provider whenever market prices are lower than the strike price, and will switch back to AEP whenever market prices rise above the strike price. As recognized by AEP Witness LaCasse, not all customers will necessarily switch to a CRES provider the moment that it may be advantageous to do so. ${ }^{20}$ This means that the Black model's assumption that customers will always and immediately act in their economic self-interest is not met, and AEP's POLR calculation is accordingly overstated.

[^3]
## Q DOES THE SECOND ASSUMPTION HOLD, THAT PRICE VOLATILITY IS CONSTANT?

A No. From an empirical standpoint, the historic volatility of an asset can change over time. The price of AEP's stock, for example, may be more volatile this year then it was last year. Similarly, electricity prices may be more volatile during some periods than during others.

From an option pricing standpoint, however, what we want to use in the Black model is the future volatility of the asset. Although historic volatility is one predictor of future volatility, future volatility cannot be directly observed. (In addition, AEP Ohio provides no evidence that historic PJM wholesale market volatility has remained constant.) It turns out, however, that one can calculate implied volatilities for an option based on the prices at which options trade. ${ }^{21}$ These implied volatilities are forward looking. Moreover, it also turns out that these implied volatilities depend on the option's strike price and the option's time to maturity.

As volatility is not constant in this case, the second assumption of the Black model is not met. ${ }^{22}$ This means that AEP Ohio's calculated POLR charge may be overstated, and is additional evidence that the Black model is not an appropriate choice to determine POLR costs.

[^4]
## Q WHY IS THE STRIKE PRICE NOT CONSTANT?

A The strike price in AEP Ohio's model is the ESP price. However, the ESP price varies over the term of the ESP period. Specifically, the fuel cost added onto the base generation price changes over time. This violates one of the fundamental assumptions of the Black model.

Furthermore, the ESP price is correlated with the PJM market price. This violates another fundamental assumption of the Black model. Specifically, the ESP price is, in part, based on AEP Ohic's fuel costs, and fuel prices affect the market price of electricity in PJM. Thus, the ESP price is correlated with the underlying market price, even if the underlying market price-the competitive benchmark price--is an artificial construct put together by AEP Ohio itseif.

Q CAN OPTIONS BE VALUED IF THE STRIKE PRICE IS CORRELATED WITH THE PRICE OF THE UNDERLYING ASSET?

Yes. However, one cannot use either the Black-Scholes or Black models to do so. Instead, such options must be valued using empirical models, such as monte-carlo models that examine the option's value under multiple price paths. As the strike price is correlated to the price of the underlying asset in this case, AEP Ohio's purported POLR charge again may be overstated.

Q THE FIFTH ASSUMPTION IS THAT RETURNS ARE LOGNORMALLY DISTRIBUTED. WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?

A Most of us are familiar with a bell-shaped curve, which corresponds to a normal distribution. For example, if I measured the heights of a random sample of 1,000 adults, the heights would be distributed like a normal bell-shaped curve.

A lognormal distribution is one where the logarithm of the underlying values is normally distributed, hence the term "lognormal."

The Black-Scholes and Black models assume that returns on the asset are lognormally distributed. For example, suppose we measure the daily returns on a stock that does not pay dividends. (A dividend paying stock's returns are more complex because of the dividend payments themselves.) The daily return is just the ratio of today's stock price divided by yesterday's, minus one. So, if XYZ Corporation's stock closed at $\$ 50 /$ share yesterday and closed at $\$ 52$ today, the return would equal $\$ 52 / \$ 50=1.04-1=4.0 \%$.

Assuming XYZ Corp. has not fundamentally changed over the relevant period, we could examine the daily returns over, say, a one-year period. Next, we would calculate the logarithms of each of the daily returns. If the resulting distribution of those daily returns looked like a bell-shaped curve, then the returns are lognormally distributed. Empirically, this has been found to be true for stocks.

Q ARE THE "RETURNS" ON PJM WHOLESALE ELECTRIC PRICES LOGNORMALLY DISTRIBUTED?

A The distribution of the daily price changes in the PJM wholesale market is not clear. For example, according to Michael Guth, Managing Director of Risk Management Consulting, "Most pricing models and software used in the power industry assume prices are lognormally distributed and their returns are normally
distributed. As shown in this article, other distributions fit power price data much better than either the lognormal or normal distribution."23

Even if the underlying PJM wholesale market is lognormal, the distribution of retail prices paid by consumers is almost certainly not lognormal. The value of the option to return will depend on the volatility of the retail market price, i.e., the competitive benchmark price. Given the multitude of competitively priced alternatives, including fixed price options that last 1-3 years, there is simply no basis to conclude that the distribution of retail price "returns" is lognormally distributed. Accordingly, this assumption of the Black model is not met, and the POLR charge may be overstated.

Q THE SIXTH AND FINAL ASSUMPTION CONCERNS WHEN THE OPTION TO RETURN CAN BE EXERCISED. DOES THAT CONFORM TO THE DEFINITION OF A EUROPEAN OPTION?

No. A European option has a fixed exercise date. Because customers can return to SSO service whenever they please, their option more closely resembles what is called an American option. Unlike a European option, an American option can be exercised at any time up to its expiration date.

Q AEP OHIO STATES THAT ITS NEW MODEL VALUES CUSTOMERS' OPTION AS A SERIES EUROPEAN OPTIONS. IS THE VALUE OF A SERIES OF EUROPEAN OPTIONS THE SAME AS THE VALUE OF AN AMERICAN OPTION?

A
No. Valuing a series of European futures options with the Black model, as AEP Ohio has done, is unlikely to be a reasonable approximation of an American

[^5]futures option. Because the Black model uses a European option model, it is not appropriate for use in this case.
2. AEP Ohio's Claims Regarding The Black Model Are Overstated.

Q AEP OHIO WITNESS THOMAS CLAIMS THE PROPOSED POLR CHARGE REFLECTS "THE COST OF THE RISK OF PROVIDING CUSTOMERS THE OPTION TO SWITCH SUPPLIERS AND RETURN TO THE COMPANY AT SSO GENERATION RATES WHEN CUSTOMERS CHOOSE TO DO SO."24 DO YOU AGREE THAT THE BLACK MODEL CALCULATES THE COST OF THIS RISK?

No. As discussed above, the Black model calculates the initial market value of an option. The option also provides a calculation for market participants to calculate an arbitrage value for the asset underlying the option. However, nothing in the Black model is intended to estimate the cost of the risk to the seller of an option (AEP Ohio) of providing this option. The Black model simply is not designed to estimate the potential risk assumed by the seller of an option, as this risk is dependent on factors outside of the Black model, such as the actual out of pocket cost to AEP Ohio of providing energy to returning customers and AEP Ohio's potential hedging of this risk through other transactions.

Q AEP OHIO WITNESS MAKHIJA CLAIMS THAT AEP'S COST OF PROVIDING "THE POLR OPTIONALITY IS NO MORE OR LESS THAN THE VALUE OF THE OPTIONS RECEIVED BY THE CUSTOMERS."25 DO YOU AGREE THAT THE BLACK MODEL CALCULATES THE VALUE OF THE OPTIONS RECEIVED BY THE CUSTOMERS?

No. The Black model was designed to price options for the purpose of hedging transactions for the underlying asset, and the actual price of an option is then subject to traditional market forces. The Black model was not designed to

[^6]A

A
calculate the "value" of the options received by AEP Ohio's customers. Moreover, as discussed above, the value of the options received by customers has no relationship to the cost incurred by AEP Ohio, as each customer will value this optionality differently.

Q DOES THE BLACK MODEL CALCULATE A "PUT" OPTION AND A "CALL" OPTION SIMULTANEOUSLY?

No. The Black model does not calculate a "put" option and a "call" option simultaneously. Two different equations are used in the Black model to value European put and call futures options, respectively, just as there are two different equations in the Black Scholes model to value European put and call spot options.

## V. AEP OHIO HAS USED INCORRECT INPUT VALUES IN THE BLACK MODEL

Q IF ONE ASSUMES THAT USING THE BLACK MODEL CAN BE USED TO VALUE CUSTOMERS' POLR OPTION VALUE, HAS AEP OHIO USED THE CORRECT INPUTS?

No. Even if, arguendo, one assumes the Black model provides a valid estimate of consumers' option value to return to SSO service and that this option value equals AEP Ohio's cost to provide POLR service, the Company has still used incorrect values in the model. Specifically, AEP Ohio has used the wrong volatility estimate.

Q WHAT VOLATILITY ESTIMATE DOES AEP OHIO USE?

AEP Ohio used an estimate of the volatility of the PJM wholesale market in the Black Model. That is the wrong volatility for valuing the option to return to \{C34720: \}

SSO service because customers do not pay the wholesale market price. Rather, they pay a retail market price, which AEP assumes is the competitive benchmark price.

Q WHAT IS THE COMPETITIVE BENCHMARK PRICE?

A The competitive benchmark price was developed by AEP Ohio using a variety of estimated values, some of which are simply assumed by AEP Ohio itself. The volatility of the competitive benchmark price is significantly less than the volatility of the PJM wholesale market price, meaning that AEP Ohio overestimates option value in the Black model.

Q PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY THE VOLATILITY OF THE COMPETITIVE BENCHMARK PRICE IS LESS THAN THE VOLATILITY OF THE PJM WHOLESALE MARKET PRICE.

The competitive benchmark price components were set out by Staff witness Daniel Johnson in his original testimony in the proceeding, in Exhibit DRJ-1. ${ }^{26}$ The competitive benchmark price begins with the "ATC simple swap" price, which is just the "around-the-clock" (i.e., peak and off-peak hours) forward price in the PJM market. To that ATC price, however, is added the basis differential between the AEP Dayton hub price and the AEP load zone, a load following/shaping adjustment, a capacity cost equal to the PJM market price of capacity during the period of the ESP, as determined in the RPM auction, an assumed cost for ancillary services, an assumed cost associated with distribution
and transmission system losses, an assumed cost for transaction risk, an offset for congestion costs, and an assumed retail administration fee.

The competitive benchmark price thus adds to the PJM market price what are essentially a number of fixed costs. As such, the volatility of the PJM market price is effectively "dampened" by the fixed costs. For example, in Mr. Johnson's Exhibit DJB-1, he adjusted the competitive benchmark price estimate developed by AEP witness Baker. Mr. Johnson assumed an average PJM market price of $\$ 48.24 / \mathrm{MWh}$. For CSP residential customers, Mr. Johnson added to that PJM market price an additional $\$ 34.69$ in fixed costs, arriving at an overall competitive benchmark price price of $\$ 82.93 / \mathrm{MWh}$.

In estimating option value using the Black model, AEP Ohio used as the "market" price the competitive benchmark price. The reason is that AEP assumed customer switching back to POLR would take place if the competitive benchmark price exceeded the ESP. However, AEP Ohio used the volatility estimate for just the PJM market price, not the competitive benchmark price. Yet, it is the volatility of the latter that determines the POLR option value. As such, AEP Ohio has used the wrong volatility measure in its model and significantly overestimated the correct volatility.

Q CAN YOU PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE SHOWING THAT THE VOLATILITY OF THE COMPETITIVE BENCHMARK PRICE, WHICH INCLUDES FIXED COSTS, IS LOWER THAN THE VOLATILITY OF JUST THE PJM MARKET PRICE? whose average equaled his ATC swap price of $\$ 48.24$. To evaluate the impacts of adding the fixed price components of the competitive benchmark price, 1
constructed a set of 365 daily prices such that daily returns would have a corresponding annual volatility of approximately 0.333 , or $33.3 \%$, the value that Thomas reports in her Exhibit LJT-4. ${ }^{27}$ I then added to each of the randomized PJM daily prices the $\$ 34.69$ in other costs that Mr. Johnson determined as making up the remainder of the competitive benchmark price, recalculated the daily returns, and estimated the resulting volatility, which averaged around $19.5 \%{ }^{28}$

Because AEP Ohio used assumed different competitive benchmark price component values for the residential, commercial, and industrial customer classes, the volatilities for each classes' "market price" would also be different, unlike AEP Ohio's assumption of constant volatilities for all three customer classes.

## Q IF CUSTOMERS WHO PURCHASE ELECTRICITY FROM CRES PROVIDERS

 RECEIVE FIXED PRICE OFFERS, DOES THAT AFFECT THE VOLATILITY ESTIMATE THAT SHOULD BE USED?A Yes. For example, CRES providers offer commercial and industrial customers fixed price offers of varying durations, but they are predominantly for specified terms such as one, two, or three years. Customers who sign up for such contracts have limited switching abilities, reducing their option value to return to SSO service. For example, a customer who signs up for a three-year

27 Because I used a set of 365 random numbers, the actual volatility will differ slightly. I also repeated the exercise numerous times using a monte-carlo approach to confirm that the volatility of the individual samples would average very close to the AEP Ohio's $33.3 \%$ value.

28
The daily return on the electric price equals the logarithm of the ratio of price on day $t$ divided by the price on day $t-1$, i.e., $\ln \left(P_{1} / P_{t-1}\right)$. The daily volatility is just the standard deviation of these returns. To calculate the annualized volatility, the daily volatility value is multiplied by the square root of the number of trading days per year, typically assumed to be 252. A copy of these workpapers is attached hereto as Exhibit JAL-2.
\{C34720: \}
fixed price contract at the start of a three-year ESP would not have the option to switch back to SSO, and thus could have no option value for switching back.

## Q <br> IF CUSTOMERS ARE EVALUATING FIXED PRICE OFFERS FOR DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS, THEN SHOULD THEIR OPTION VALUES OF RETURNING TO SSO SERVICE BE BASED ON VOLATILITY IN THE PJM MARKET?

A Absolutely not. This is another fundamental error of the AEP Ohio option model framework. The AEP Ohio model assumes that customers who purchase from CRES suppliers pay the daily PJM market price, thus experiencing significant price fluctuations. However, even correcting for the competitive benchmark price fixed price "adders" that AEP assumes, the actual price volatility still does not reflect the actual economic comparisons on which customers will base SSO-return decisions.

Instead, customers who have switched to CRES providers will face different volatilities, and thus have different option values, depending on the type of CRES service they purchased. For example, a customer could sign up for a CRES offer that provided a fixed price for one year that was below the ESP price. Unless the CRES provider defaults, that customer will never switch back to the ESP during the first year. The volatility of the PJM market price has no bearing on that customer's rational economic decisions. Moreover, that customer's option values would not be properly valued as a series of monthly European options because the customer would not have the option to switch prior to the end of the one-year contract. Instead, for that customer, the option value would be properly determined based on a one-year European option.

## VI. AEP OHIO HAS NOT IDENTIFIED ITS ACTUAL POLR-RELATED COSTS

Q HOW DOES AEP OHIO PLAN TO MEET RETURNING CUSTOMER DEMAND?

A Based on my experience in the industry and standard industry best practices, I would presume AEP Ohio uses the long-term forecasts of customer demand it prepares and then evaluates alternative resource porffolios, taking account of the uncertainty over future PJM market prices, environmental regulations, fossil fuel prices, and so forth.

Q CAN AEP OHIO "STAND READY TO SERVICE" SSO CUSTOMERS BY COMPARING PJM MARKET PRICES FOR ENERGY AND CAPACITY TO THE COST OF ITS OWN GENERATING RESOURCES?

A Yes. Prudent utilities will evaluate all options for providing energy and capacity, including PJM pricing. As I have no reason to believe that AEP is not prudent, I would presume AEP Ohio planners evaluate all resource alternatives, including purchases from the market, as well as evaluate the cost of potential hedging strategies that meet the increased demand for energy and capacity if customers return to SSO service.

Q IF CUSTOMERS RETURN TO SSO SERVICE, WILL AEP OHIO NEED TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL ENERGY?

A Yes. AEP Ohio would need to obtain more energy or reduce off-system sales of surplus energy. Alternatively, AEP Ohio could auction off its POLR obligation to wholesale providers, as was done by FirstEnergy. In fact, this approach is discussed by Dr. LaCasse in her testimony, stating

A common method used by [electric distribution utilities] without generation assets to manage the costs and risks
associated with POLR obligations is to transfer these risks to procure supply for their SSO customers using a competitive bidding process for full-requirements contracts. ... A competitive procurement process is used to arrive at a market determination of the costs associated with providing full-requirements [sic] service and all related risks. ${ }^{29}$

Q WOULD ALL BIDDERS INTO SUCH A COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT BID EXACTLY THE SAME AMOUNT TO PROVIDE FULL REQUIREMENTS SERVICE TO SSO CUSTOMERS?

A It is theoretically possible, but to the extent that competitive bidders have different risk management strategies, different portfolios, and so forth, it is doubfful that all bidders would bid the exact same amount.

Q WOULD AEP OHIO NEED TO ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL CAPACITY TO SERVE RETURNING SSO CUSTOMERS?

A
No. Because AEP Ohio elected the FRR option, rather than participate in PJM's RPM capacity market, the Company is already obligated to satisfy PJM's resource adequacy (capacity) requirement. When a customer returns to SSO service, AEP has no need to secure any additional capacity resources. Likewise, when a customer is supplied by a CRES, AEP Ohio is paid by the CRES for supplying that capacity. Thus, AEP Ohio's capacity costs are independent of customers returning to SSO service.

Q DR. LACASSE STATES THAT THE VALUE OF THE OPTION MEASURES THE EXPECTED COST TO THE ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION UTILITY ("EDU") ON AN A PRIORI BASIS. ${ }^{30}$ DO YOU AGREE?

A No. Moreover, Dr. LaCasse's own description of a competitive procurement process that I quoted previously demonstrates why. First, the value
$29 \quad$ See LaCasse Direct Testimony at 8:1-7.
$30 \quad$ Id at 12:20
\{C34720: \}
of the option to consumers to return to POLR is not the same as the market price of such an option, even if such an option existed. Second, the fact that competitive bidders will bid different amounts to take on all of the EDU's risk shows that bidders have different expectations of the costs to provide SSO service and take on the EDU's POLR risk. It is the bids that are the a priori expected cost-including a risk-based return—of taking on the POLR risk. The fact that bidders have different expectations of the costs of providing SSO service for the EDU, and assuming all of the EDU's POLR risk, proves that AEP Ohio's cost to provide POLR service is not equal its customers' option value.

## Q HAS AEP OHIO IDENTIFIED ANY CATEGORIES OF COSTS THAT IT WILL.

 INCUR AS A RESULT OF CUSTOMERS RETURNING TO SSO SERVICE?A Other than Dr. LaCasse's general and unsupported statement regarding forgone revenues from off-system sales, no. And, Dr. LaCasse does not quantify that cost.

Q DR. MAKHIJA STATES THAT THE COST OF POLR RISK EQUALS THE DECREASE IN SHAREHOLDERS EQUITY STEMMING FROM THE INCREASED RISK PREMIUM THAT IS REQUIRED TO COMPENSATE AEP OHIO SHAREHOLDERS? ${ }^{31}$ DO YOU AGREE?

No. Dr. Makhija assumes that there is an actual cost to AEP for bearing this risk, and that AEP Ohio has not taken (and cannot take) any steps to hedge this risk. Moreover, this cost is clearly not the same as the option value to AEP Ohio consumers to return to SSO service, for the simple reason that the option value to consumers will depend on their perception of future market risk, whereas
the equity premium cost will depend on AEP shareholders' view of AEP Ohio's risk and how that risk is itself hedged as part of a broader investment portfolio.

## VII. CONCLUSION: AEP OHIO HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF <br> Q IN YOUR OPINION, HAS AEP OHIO PROVIDED CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE COST OF WHAT THE OHIO SUPREME COURT TERMED, "STANDING READY TO SERVICE CUSTOMERS WHO SHOP AND THEN RETURN?"

A No. AEP Ohio has not provided any estimates of the actual cost it would incur to stand ready to serve customers who returned to SSO service. The best evidence of those costs would be if AEP Ohio held a competitive procurement and allowed firms to bid on taking on all of the Company's POLR risk-though of course this would include risks other than POLR risk as acknowledged by Dr. LaCasse. This would provide clear evidence of a known-and-measurable cost born by AEP. I am not aware of AEP Ohio having done so.

In the absence of a competitive procurement, AEP Ohio could demonstrate how POLR risk would require it to obtain additional energy and capacity resources to hedge its POLR risk. AEP Ohio has not provided any such estimates. Again, such estimates would provide a known-and-measurable cost of POLR service.

Q DID EITHER MS. THOMAS, DR. LACASSE, OR DR. MAKHIJA PROVIDE ANY EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE COST TO AEP OHIO, SUCH AS THE COST ASSOCIATED WITH A COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT THAT AUCTIONS OFF AEP OHIO'S POLR RISK?

A
No. Therefore, AEP Ohio's cost is not known and measurable and, as such, not properly included as a nonbypassable charge in its rates.

10
2 A
DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?
Yes.

## Certificate Of Service

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Direct Testimony of Jonathan A. Lesser, Ph.D. on Behalf of Industrial Energy Users-Ohio was served upon the following parties of record this $30^{\text {th }}$ day of June 2011, via electronic transmission, hand-delivery or first class mail, postage prepaid.

Steven T. Nourse
Matthew J. Satterwhite
American Electric Power Service Corporation
1 Riverside Plaza, $29^{\text {th }}$ Floor
Columbus, OH 43215
Selwyn J. R. Dias
Columbus Southern Power Company
Ohio Power Company
850 Tech Center Dr.
Gahanna, OH 43230
Daniel R. Conway
Porter Wright Morris \& Arthur
Huntington Center
41 S. High Street
Columbus, OH 43215
On Behalf of Columbus Southern Power and Ohio Power Company

David F. Boehm
Michael L. Kurtz
Boehm, Kurtz \& Lowry
36 East Seventh Street, Suite 1510
Cincinnati, OH 45202
on Behalf of Ohio Energy Group
John W. Bentine
Mark S. Yurick
Chester, Willcox \& Saxbe LLP
65 East State Street, Suite 1000
Columbus, OH 43215-4213
on Behalf of The Kroger Co.


Janine L. Migden-Ostrander
Consumers' Counsel
Maureen R. Grady, Counsel of Record
Terry L. Etter
Michael E. Idzkowski
Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel
10 West Broad Street, Suite 1800
Columbus, OH 43215-3485
On Behalf of the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel

Barth E. Royer, Counsel of Record
Bell \& Royer Co. LPA
33 South Grant Avenue
Columbus, OH 43215-3927
Nolan Moser
Air \& Energy Program Manager
The Ohio Environmental Council
1207 Grandview Avenue, Suite 201
Columbus, OH 43212-3449
Trent A. Dougherty
Staff Attorney
The Ohio Environmental Council
1207 Grandview Avenue, Suite 201
Columbus, OH 43212-3449
On Behalf of The Ohio Environmental. Council.

Richard L. Sites
Ohio Hospital Association
155 E. Broad Street, $15^{\text {hh }}$ Floor
Columbus, OH 43215-3620
Thomas O'Brien
Matthew Warnock
Bricker \& Eckler
100 South Third Street
Columbus, OH 43215
On Behalf of the Ohio Hospital Association
David I. Fein
Cynthia Fonner
Constellation Energy Group
550 W. Washington Street, Suite 300
Chicago, IL 60661
On Behalf of Constellation Energy Group
Bobby Singh
Integrys Energy Services, Inc.
300 West Wilson Bridge Road, Suite 350
Worthington, OH 43085
On Behalf of Integrys Energy Services, Inc.
M. Howard Petricoff

Lija Kaleps-Clark
Vorys, Sater, Seymour \& Pease LLP
52 E. Gay Street
Columbus, OH 43215
On Behalf of Exelon Generation Company LLC
M. Howard Petricoff

Stephen M. Howard
Michael Setterini
Vorys, Sater, Seymour \& Pease LLP
52 E . Gay Street
Columbus, OH 43215
On Behalf of Constellation New Energy and Constellation New Energy Commodities Group, Direct Energy Services, LLC, Integrys Energy Services, Inc., National Energy Marketers Association, Ohio School of Business Officials, Ohio School Boards Association, Buckeye Association of School Administrators, and EnerNoc, Inc.

Craig G. Goodman
National Energy Marketers Association
3333 K. Street, N.W., Suite 110
Washington, D.C. 20007
On Behalf of National Energy Marketers
Association
David C. Rinebolt
Colleen L. Mooney
Ohio Partners for Affordable Energy
231 West Lima Street
Findlay, OH 45839
On Behalf of Ohio Partners for Affordable Energy

Barth Royer
Bell \& Royer Co. LPA
33 South Grant Avenue
Columbus, OH 43215-3927
Gary Jeffries
Dominion Resources Services
501 Martindale Street, Suite 400
Pittsburgh, PA 15212-5817
On Behalf of Dominion Retail, Inc.
Henry W. Eckhart
1200 Chambers Road, Suite 106
Columbus, OH 43212
henryeckhart@aol.com
On Behalf of The Sierra Club, Ohio Chapter, and the Natural Resources Defense Council.

Matthew Warnock
Bricker \& Eckier
100 South Third Street
Columbus, OH 43215
Kevin Schmidt
The Ohio Manufacturers' Association
33 North High Street
Columbus, OH 43215

## On Behalf of The Ohio Manufacturers’ <br> Association <br> Larry Gearhardt <br> Ohio Farm Bureau Federation <br> 280 North High Street, P.O. Box 182383 <br> Columbus, OH 43218 <br> On Behalf of the Ohio Farm Bureau <br> Federation

Keith C. Nusbaum
Sonnenschein Nath \& Rosenthal
1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020-1089
Clinton A. Vince
Emma F. Hand
Daniel D. Bamowski
Douglas G. Bonner
Sonnenschein Nath \& Rosenthal
1301 K Street NW
Suite 600, East Tower
Washington, DC 20005
On Behalf of Ormet Primary Aluminum
Corporation

Benjamin Edwards
Law Offices of John L. Alden
One East Livingston Ave.
Columbus, OH 43215
On Behalf of ConsumerPowerline
Grace C. Wung
McDermott Will \& Emery LLP
600 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
Douglas M. Mancino
McDermott Will \& Emery LLP
2049 Century Park East
Suite 300
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Steve W. Chriss
Manager, State Rate Proceedings
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
2001 SE $10^{\text {th }}$ Street
Bentonville, AR 72716
On Behalf of the Wal-Mart Stores East LP, Macy's Inc., and Sam's Club East, LP

Sally W. Bloomfield
Terrence O'Donnell
Bricker \& Eckler
100 South Third Street
Columbus, OH 43215

On Behalf of American Wind Energy association, Wind on the Wires and Ohio Advanced Energy<br>C. Todd Jones<br>Christopher Miller<br>Gregory Dunn<br>Schottenstein Zox and Dunn Co., LPA<br>250 West Street<br>Columbus, OH 43215

On Behalf of the Association of independent
Colleges and Universities of Ohio
Douglas M. Mancino
McDermott Will \& Emery LLP
2049 Century Park East
Suite 3800
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Gregory K. Lawrence
McDermott Will \& Emery LLC
28 State Street
Boston, MA 02109
Steven Huhman
Vice President
MSCG
200 Westchester Ave.
Purchase, NY 10577
On Behalf of Morgan Stanley Capital
Group, Inc.
Glenn D. Magee
Abbott Nutrition
6480 Busch Blvd.
Columbus, OH 43229
On Behalf of Abbott Nutrition

Mark A. Hayden<br>Managing Counsel<br>FIRSTENERGY SERVICE COMPANY<br>76 South Main Street<br>Akron, OH 44308<br>James F. Lang<br>Laura C. McBride<br>$N$. Trevor Alexander<br>Calfee, Halter \& Griswold LLP<br>1400 KeyBank Center<br>800 Superior Ave.<br>Cleveland, OH 44114<br>On Behalf of Firstenergy Solutions Corp.<br>Michael Smaiz<br>Joseph Maskovyak<br>Ohio Poverty Law Center<br>555 Buttles Avenue<br>Columbus, OH 43215<br>On Behalf of Ohio Poverty Law Center and<br>Appalachian Peace \& Justice Network<br>Cheryl Maxfield<br>John Jones<br>Thomas Lindgren<br>Werner Margard<br>Assistant Attorneys General<br>Public Utilities Section<br>180 Easi Broad Street<br>Columbus, OH 43215<br>On Behalf of the Public Utilities Commission of OHIO<br>Greta See<br>Attorney Examiner<br>Public Utilities Commission of Ohio<br>180 East Broad Street, $12^{\text {th }}$ Floor<br>Columbus, OH 43215<br>Attorney Examiner

# Jonathan A. Lesser, Ph.D. 

President

## Summary of experience

Dr. Jonathan Lesser is the President of Continental Economics, Inc., and has over 25 years of experience working for regulated utilities, government, and as an economic consultant. He has analyzed critical economic and regulatory issues affecting the energy industry, including cost-benefit analysis of transmission, generation, and distribution investment, gas and electric utility structure and operations, generating asset valuation under uncertainty, mergers and acquisitions, cost allocation and rate design, resource investment decision strategies, cost of capital, depreciation, risk management, incentive regulation, economic impact studies of energy infrastructure development, including FERC hydroelectric relicensing applications, and general regulatory policy.

Dr. Lesser has prepared expert testimony and reports in cases before utility commissions in numerous states; before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC); before international regulators in Belize, Guatemala, Mexico, and Puerto Rico; in commercial litigation cases; and before legislative committees in Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Texas, Vermont, and Washington State. He has also served as an independent arbiter in disputes involving regulatory treatment of utilities and valuation of energy generation assets.
Dr. Lesser has designed economic models to value nuclear, fossil fuel, and renewable generating assets, as well as long-term power contracts in the presence of market, regulatory, and environmental uncertainty. He is the coauthor of three textbooks: Environmental Economics and Policy, Fundamentals of Energy Regulation, and Principles of Utility Corporate Finance. He is also the author of numerous academic and trade press articles, and a contributing columnist and Editorial Board member for Natural Gas \& Electricity.

## Areas of expertise

- Utility rate regulation - cost of capital, depreciation, cost of service, cost allocation, rate design, and alternative regulatory structures
- Economic impact analysis and input-output studies
- Load forecasting
- Energy asset valuation and due diligence
- Commercial damages estimation
- Cost-benefit analysis
- Regulatory policy and market design
- Environmental compliance and litigation
- Market power analysis


## Selected expert testimony and reports

## Portland Natural Gas Shippers

- FERC rate proceeding regarding the rate application by Northern Border Pipeline Company (Re: Portland Natural Gas Transmission System, Docket No. RP10-729-000)
- FERC rate proceeding regarding the rate application by Northern Border Pipeline Company (Re: Portland Natural Gas Transmission System, Docket No. RP08-306-000) Subject: Natural gas supplies, economic lifetime, and depreciation rates.


## Independent Power Producers of New York

- FERC proceeding (New York Independent System Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER11-2224-000)

Subject: Reasonableness of the proposed installed capacity demand curves and cost of new entry values proposed by the New York Independent System Operator.

## Maryland Public Service Commission

- Merger application of FirstEnergy Corporation and Allegheny Energy, Inc. ( $/ / M / O$ FirstEnergy Corp and Allegheny Energy, Inc., Case No. 9233)

Subject: Proposed merger between FirstEnergy Corporation and Allegheny Energy. Testimony described the structure and results of a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the proposed merger met the state's positive benefits test, and included analysis of market power and merger synergies.

## Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound

- Proceeding before the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (Petition of Massachusetts Electric Company and Nantucket Electric Company each d/b/a National Grid For Approval of Proposed Long-Term Contracts for Renewable Energy With Cape Wind Associates, LLC, Pursuant to G.L. c. 169, §83, Case No. D.P.U. 10-54)

Subject: Approval of Proposed Long-Term Contracts for Renewable Energy With Cape Wind Associates, LLC.

## Brookfield Energy Marketing, LLC

- FERC proceeding (New England Power Generators Association, et al. v. ISO New England, Inc., Docket Nos. ER10-787-000, ER10-50-000, and EL10-57-000 (consolidated)).

Subject: Proposed forward capacity market payments for imported capacity into ISO-NE.

## Public Service Company of New Mexico

- Proceeding before the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (Case No. 10-00086-UT)

Subject: Load forecast for future test year, residential price elasticity study.

## M-S-R Public Power Agency

- FERC proceeding (Southern California Edison Co., Docket No. ER09-187-000 and ER10-160-000)

Subject: Allowed rate of return for construction work in progress (CWIP) expenditures for certain transmission facilities.

- FERC proceeding (Southern California Edison Co., Docket No. ER10-160-000)

Subject: Allowed rate of return for construction work in progress (CWIP) expenditures for certain transmission facilities.

## Financial Marketers

- FERC proceeding (Black Oak Energy, LLC v PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. EL08-014-002)

Subject: Allocation of surplus transmission line losses under the PJM tariff.

## Southwest Gas Corporation and Salt River Project

- FERC proceeding regarding rate application of El Paso Natural Gas Company (Docket No. RP08-426-000)

Subject: Analysis of proposed capital structure and recommended capital structure adjustments

## New York Regional Interconnect, Inc.

- Proceeding before the New York Public Service Commission (Case No. 06-T-0650)

Subject: Analysis of economic and public policy benefits of a proposed high-voltage transmission line.

## Occidental Chemical Corporation

- FERC Proceeding (Westar Energy, Inc. ER07-1344-000)

Subject: Compliance of wholesale power sales agreement with FERC standards

## EPIC Merchant Energy, LLC, et al.

- FERC Proceeding (Ameren Services Company v. Midwest Independent System Operator, Inc., Docket Nos. EL07-86-000, EL07-88-000, EL07-92-000 (Consolidated)

Subject: Allocation of revenue sufficiency guarantee costs.

## Cottonwood Energy, LP

- Proceeding before the Public Utility Commission of Texas (Application of Kelson Transmission Company, LLC for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity for the Amended Proposed Canal to Deweyville 345 kV Transmission Line with Chambers, Hardin, Jasper, Jefferson, Liberty, Newton, and Orange Counties, Docket No. 34611, SOAH Docket No. 473-08-3341)

Subject: Benefits of transmission capacity investments.

## Redbud Energy, LP

- Proceeding before the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (Request of Public Service Company of Oklahoma for the OkIahoma Corporation Commission to Retain an Independent Evaluator, Cause No. PUD 200700418)

Subject: Reasonableness of PSO's 2008 RFP design.

## The NRG Companies

- FERC Proceeding (ISO New England Inc. and New England Power Pool, Docket No. ER08-1209-000)

Subject: Compensation of Rejected De-list Bids Under ISO-NE's Forward Capacity Market Design

## Dynegy Power Marketing, LLC

- FERC proceeding, KeySpan-Ravenswood, LLC v. New York Independent System Operator, Inc., Docket No. EL05-17-000

Subject: Estimation of damages accruing to Dynegy arising from a failure by the NYISO to accurately calculate locational installed capacity requirements in NYISO during the summer of 2002.

## Constellation Energy Group

- FERC proceeding (MaryIand Public Utility Commission, et al., v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, Docket No. EL08-67-000)

Subject: "Just and reasonableness" of PJM’s Reliability Pricing Mechanism.

## Government of Belize, Public Utility Commission

- Proceeding before the Belize Public Utility Commission, In the Matter of the Public Utilities Commission Initial Decision in the 2008 Annual Review Proceeding for Belize Electricity Limited.

Subject: Arbitration and Independent Expert's report, in dispute between the Belize PUC and Belize Electricity Limited in an annual electric rate tariff review, as required under Belize law.

## Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

- Technical hearings on wholesale electric capacity market design.

Subject: Analysis of proposal to revise RTO capacity market design developed by the American Forest and Paper Association.

## Dogwood Energy, LLC

- Proceeding before the Missouri Public Service Commission, In the Matter of the Application of Aquila, Inc., d/b/a Aquila Networks - MPS and Aquila Case No. EO-20080046, Networks - L\&P for Authority to Transfer Operational Control of Certain Transmission Assets to the Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc., Case No. EO-2008-0046.

Subject: Cost-benefit analysis to determine whether Aquila should join either the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) or the Southwest Power Pool (SPP).

## Competitive Power Ventures, LLC

- FERC proceeding (Re: New York Independent System Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER08-283-000)
Subject: Revisions to the installed capacity (ICAP) market demand curves in the New York control area, which are designed to provide economic incentives for new generation development.


## Empresa Eléctrica de Guatemala

- Rate proceeding before the Comisión Nacional de Energía Eléctrica Subject: Rate of return for an electric distribution company


## Electric Power Supply Association

- FERC proceeding (Re: Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER07-1182-000)

Subject: Critique of cost-benefit analysis by MISO Independent Market Monitor concluding that permanent establishment of Broad Constrained Area mitigation was appropriate.

## Constellation Energy Commodities Group, LLC

- FERC proceeding regarding rate application for ancillary services by Ameren Energy (Re: Ameren Energy Marketing Company and Ameren Energy, Inc., Docket Nos. ER07-169-000 and ER07-170-000)
Subject: Analysis and testimony on appropriate "opportunity cost" rates for ancillary services, including regulation service and spinning reserve service. Case settled prior to testimony being filed.


## Suiza Dairy Corporation and Vaquería Tres Monjitas, Inc.

- Rate proceeding before the Office of Milk Industry Regulatory Administration of Puerto Rico.

Subject: Analysis and testimony on the appropriate rate of return for regulated milk processors in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

## DPL Inc.

- Proceeding before the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (DPL, Inc. and its subsidiaries v. William W. Wilkins, Tax Commissioner of Ohio, Case No. 2004-A-1437)

Subject: Economic impacts of generation investment and qualification of electric utility investments as "manufacturing" investments for purposes of state investment tax credits.

## IGI Resources, LLC and BP Canada Energy Marketing Corp.

- FERC proceeding regarding the rate application by Gas Transmission Northwest Corporation (Re: Gas Transmission Northwest, Docket No. RP06-407-000)

Subject: Natural gas supplies, economic lifetime, and depreciation rates.

## Baltimore Gas and Electric Co.

- Maryland Public Service Commission (Case No. 9099)

Subject: Standard Offer Service pricing. Testimony focused on factors driving electric price increases since 1999, and estimates of rates under continued regulation

- Maryland Public Service Commission (Case No. 9073)

Subject: Stranded costs of generation. Testimony focused on analysis of benefits of competitive wholesale power industry.

- Maryland Public Service Commission (Case No. 9063)

Subject: Optimal structure of Maryland's electric industry. Testimony focused on the benefits of competitive wholesale electric markets. Presented independent estimates of benefits of restructuring since 1999.

## Pemex-Gas y Petroquímica Básica

- Expert report in a rate proceeding. Presented analysis before the Comisión Reguladora de Energía on the appropriate rate of return for the natural gas pipeline industry.


## BP Canada Marketing Corp.

- FERC proceeding regarding the rate application by Northern Border Pipeline Company (Re: Northern Border Pipeline, Docket No. RP06-072-000)
Subject: Natural gas supplies, economic lifetime, and depreciation rates.


## Transmission Agency of Northern California

- FERC rate proceeding (Re: Pacific Gas \& Electric Company, Docket No. ER10-2026000)

Subject: Analysis of appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital. Case settled prior to filing expert testimony.

- FERC rate proceeding (Re: Pacific Gas \& Electric Company, Docket No. ER09-1521000)

Subject: Analysis of appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital. Case settled prior to filing expert testimony.

- FERC rate proceeding (Re: Pacific Gas \& Electric Company, Docket No. ER08-1318000)

Subject: Analysis of appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital. Case settled prior to filing expert testimony.

- FERC rate proceeding (Re: Pacific Gas \& Electric Company, Docket No. ER07-1213000)

Subject: Analysis of appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital. Case settled prior to filing expert testimony.

- FERC rate proceeding (Re: Pacific Gas \& Electric Company, Docket No. ER06-1325000)

Subject: Analysis of appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital. Case settled prior to filing expert testimony.

- FERC rate proceeding (Re: Pacific Gas \& Electric Company, Docket No. ER05-1284000)

Subject: Analysis of appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital. Case settled prior to filing expert testimony.

- FERC rate proceeding (Re: Pacific Gas \& Electric Company, Docket Nos. ER03-409000, ER03-666-000)

Subject: Analysis and development of recommendation for the appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital.

## State of New Jersey Board of Public Utilities

- Merger application of Public Service Enterprise Group and Exelon Corporation (I/M/O The Joint Petition Of Public Service Electric And Gas Company And Exelon Corporation For Approval Of A Change In Control Of Public Service Electric And Gas Company And Related Authorizations, BPU Docket No. EM05020106, OAL Docket No. PUC-1874-050)

Subject: Proposed merger between Exelon Corporation and PSEG Corporation. Testimony described the structure and results of a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the proposed merger met the state's positive benefits test, and included analysis of market power, value of changes in nuclear plant operations, and merger synergies.

## Sierra Pacific Power Corp.

- FERC proceeding regarding the rate application by Paiute Pipeline Company (Re Paiute Pipeline Company Docket No. RP05-163-000)

Subject: Depreciation analysis, negative salvage, and natural gas supplies. Case settled prior to filing expert testimony.

## Matanuska Electric

- Regulatory Commission of Alaska rate proceeding (In the Matter of the Revision to Current Depreciation Rates Filed by Chugach Electric Association, Inc., Docket No. U-04-102)

Subject: Analysis of the reasonableness of Chugach electric's depreciation study.

## Duke Energy North America, LLC

- FERC proceeding (Re: Devon Power, LLC, et al., Docket No. ER03-563-030) Subject: Appropriate market design for locational installed generating capacity in the New England market to ensure system reliability.


## Keyspan-Ravenswood, LLC

- FERC proceeding, KeySpan-Ravenswood, LLC v. New York Independent System Operator, Inc., Docket No. EL05-17-000

Subject: Estimation of damages arising from a failure by the NYISO to accurately calculate locational installed capacity requirements in New York City during the summer of 2002.

## Electric Power Supply Association

- FERC proceeding (Re: PJM Interconnection, LLC, Docket No. EL03-236-002)

Subject: Analysis and critique of proposed pivotal supplier tests for market power in PJM identified load pockets.

## Vermont Department of Public Service

- Vermont Public Service Board Rate Proceeding, Concurrent proceedings: Re: Green Mountain Power Corp., Dockets No. 7175 and 7176. Subject: Cost of capital and allowed return on equity under cost of service regulation, as well as under a proposed alternative regulation proposal.
- Vermont Public Service Board Rate Proceeding, Re: Shoreham Telephone Company, Docket No. 6914. Subject: Analysis and development of recommendations for the appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital.
- Vermont Public Service Board Rate Proceeding, Re: Vermont Electric Power Company, Docket No. 6860. Subject: Development of a least-cost transmission system investment strategy to analyze the prudence of a major high-voltage transmission system upgrade proposed by the Vermont Electric Power Company.
- Vermont Public Service Board Rate Proceeding, Re: Central Vermont Public Service Company, Docket No. 6867 . Subject: Analysis and development of recommendations for the appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital.
- Re: Green Mountain Power Corporation, Docket No. 6866. Subject: Analysis and development of recommendations for the appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital.


## Pipeline Shippers Group

- FERC proceeding regarding the rate application of Northern Natural Gas Company (Re: Northern Natural Gas Company, Docket No. RP03-398-000)

Subject: Gas supply analysis to determine pipeline depreciation rates as part of an overall rate proceeding.

## Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corp.

- Oklahoma Corporation Commission rate proceeding (Re: Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corporation, Docket No. 03-088)
Subject: Analysis and development of recommendations for the appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital.
- Arkansas Public Service Commission rate proceeding, In the Matter of the Application of Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corporation for a General Change in Rates and Tariffs, Docket No. 05-006-U. Subject: Analysis and development of recommendations for the appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital.
- Arkansas Public Service Commission rate proceeding, In the Matter of the Application of Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corporation for a General Change in Rates and Tariffs, Docket No. 02-24-U. Subject: Analysis and development of recommendations for the appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital.


## Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC

- Vermont Public Service Board proceeding (Re: Petition of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee for a Certificate of Public Good, Docket No. 6812)

Subject: Analysis of the economic benefits of nuclear plant generating capacity expansion as required for an application for a Certificate of Public Good.

## Central Illinois Lighting Company

- Mlinois Commerce Commission rate proceeding (Re: Central Illinois Lighting Company, Docket No. 02-0837)

Subject: Analysis and development of recommendations for the appropriate return on equity, capital structure, and overall cost of capital.

## Citizens Utilities Corp.

- Vermont Public Service Board rate proceeding (Tariff Filing of Citizens Communications Company requesting a rate increase in the amount of $40.02 \%$ to take effect December 15, 2001, Docket No. 6596)

Subject: Analysis of the prudence and economic used-and-usefulness of Citizens' long-term purchase of generation from Hydro Quebec, including the estimated environmental costs and benefits of the purchase.

## Dynegy LNG Production, LP

- FERC proceeding (Re; Dynegy LNG Production Terminal, LP, Docket No. CP01-423000). September 2001

Subject: Analysis of market power impacts of proposed LNG facility development.

## Missouri Gas Energy Corp.

- FERC rate proceeding (Re: Kansas Pipeline Corporation, Docket No. RP99-485-000) Subject: Gas supply analysis to determine pipeline depreciation rates as part of an overall rate proceeding.


## Green Mountain Power Corp.

- Vermont Public Service Board rate proceeding, In the Matter of Green Mountain Power Corporation requesting a 12.93\% Rate Increase to take effect January 22, 1999, Docket No. 6107. Subject: Analysis of the appropriate discount rate, treatment of environmental costs, and the treatment of risk and uncertainty as part of a major power-purchase agreement with Hydro-Quebec.
- Vermont Public Service Board rate proceeding, Investigation into the Department of Public Service's Proposed Energy Efficiency Utility, Docket No. 5980. Subject: Analysis of distributed utility planning methodologies and environmental costs.
- Vermont Public Service Board rate proceeding, Tariff Filing of Green Mountain Power Corporation requesting a 16.7\% Rate Increase to take effect 7/31/97, Docket No. 5983. Subject: Analysis of distributed utility planning methodologies and avoided electricity costs.
- Vermont Public Service Board rate proceeding, Tariff Filing of Green Mountain Power Corporation requesting a $16.7 \%$ Rate Increase to take effect 7/31/97, Docket No. 5983. Subject: Valuation of a long-term power purchase contract with HydroQuebec in the context of a determination of prudence and economic used-andusefulness.


## United Illuminating Company

- Connecticut Dept. of Public Utility Control proceeding (Application of the United Illuminating Company for Recovery of Stranded Costs, Docket No. 99-03-04)
Subject: Development and application of dynamic programming models to estimate nuclear plant stranded costs.


## OTHER COMMERCIAL LITIGATION EXPERIENCE

- IMO Industries v. Transamerica. Estimated the appropriate discount rate to use for estimating damages over time associated with a failure of the insurance companies to reimburse asbestos-related damage claims and the resulting losses to the firm's value.
- John C. Lincoln Hospital v. Maricopa County. Performed statistical analysis to determine the value of a class of unpaid hospital insurance claims.
- Catamount/Brownell, LLC. v. Randy Rowland. Prepared an expert report on the damages associated with breach of commercial lease.
- Lyubner v. Sizzling Platters, Inc.. Performed an econometric analysis of damage claims based on sales impacts associated with advertising.
- Pietro v. Pietro. Estimated pension benefits arising from a divorce case.
- Nat'l. Association of Electric Manufacturers v. Sorrell. Testified on the costs of labeling fluorescent lamps and the impacts of labeling laws on the demand for electricity.


## Arbitration Cases

TransCanada Hydro Northeast, Inc. v. Town of Littleton, New Hampshire, (CPR File No. G-09-24).

Subject: dispute regarding valuation for property tax purposes of a hydroelectric facility located on the Connecticut River.

Served as neutral on a three-person arbitration panel.
Belize Electricity Limited v. Belize Public Utilities Commission (Claim No. 512 of 2008).

Subject: Proceeding before the Supreme Court of Belize alleging that the Final Decision by the Belize Public Utilities Commission setting electric rates and tariffs for the 2008-2009 period were unreasonable and non-compensatory.

Prepared independent report on behalf of the Belize Supreme Court for arbitration of the dispute.

## Selected business consulting experience

- For an environmental advocacy group, critically evaluated the financial implications of operating restrictions for an off-shore wind generating facility stemming from requirements under the U.S. Endangered Species Act.
- For a major investor-owned utility in the US, prepared a new system of short-term peak and energy forecasting models.
- For a major wholesale electric generation company, prepared comprehensive economic impact studies for use in FERC hydroelectric relicensing proceedings.
- For a major investor-owned utility in the Southwest US, prepared a detailed econometric model and wrote a comprehensive report on residential price elasticity that was required by regulators.
- For a major investor-owned utility in the Southwest US, developed a methodology to value nuclear plant leases that incorporated future uncertainty regarding greenhouse gas regulations.
- Faculty member, PURC/World Bank International Training Program on Utility Regulation and Strategy, University of Florida, Public Utility Research Center, Gainesville, FL, 2008-2009. Courses taught:
- Sector Issues: Basic Techniques-Energy
- Sector Issues in Rate Design: Energy
- Sector Issues in Rate Design: Energy-Case Studies
- Transmission Pricing Issues
- For a major solar energy firm, evaluated costs and benefits of alternative solar technologies; assisted with siting and transmission access issues.
- For industrial customers in the State of Vermont, prepared a position paper on the impacts of demand side management funding on electric rates and competitiveness.
- For a major New York brokerage firm, performed a fairness opinion valuation of a gas-fired electric generating facility.
- For electric utilities undergoing restructuring, developed comprehensive economic models to value buyer offers associated with nuclear power plant divestitures.
- For a large municipal electric utility in Florida, analyzed real option values of alternative proposed purchased generation contracts whose strike prices were tied to future natural gas and oil prices, and developed contract recommendations.
- For a municipal electric utility in Florida, developed an analytical model to determine risk-return tradeoffs of alternative generation portfolios, identify an efficient frontier of generation asset portfolios, and recommended asset purchase and sale strategies.
- For Central Vermont Public Service Corp. and Green Mountain Power Corp., developed analyses of distribution capacity investments accounting for uncertainty over future peak load growth.
- For a major electric utility in Latin America, developed risk management strategies for hedging natural gas supplies with minimal up-front investment; prepared training materials for utility staff; and wrote the utility's risk management Policies and Procedures Manual.
- For a major nuclear plant owner and operator in the U.S., prepared reports of the economic benefits of nuclear plant operation and development.
- For the Electric Power Supply Association, prepared numerous policy papers addressing wholesale electric market design and competition.
- For the California Energy Commission, developed a new policy approach to renewables feed-in tariffs and developed portfolio analysis models to develop an "efficient frontier" of generation portfolios for the state.
- For a major nuclear plant owner and operator, assessed the likelihood of relicensing a specific nuclear plant in New England, given state regulatory concerns over on-site spent fuel storage.
- For a large investor-owned utility in the Southeast, analyzed alternative environmental compliance strategies that directly incorporated uncertainty over future emissions costs, environmental regulations, and alternative pollution control technology effectiveness.
- For a Special Legislative Committee of the Province of New Brunswick, served as an expert advisor on the development of a deregulated electric power market.
- For the Bonneville Power Administration, developed models to assess the economic impacts of local generation resource development in Washington State and Oregon.
- For an electric utility in the Pacific Northwest, assisted in negotiations surrounding relicensing of a large hydroelectric generating facility.
- Served as an expert advisor for the Northwest Power Planning Council regarding future power supplies, load growth, and economic growth.


## Education

- Ph.D., Economics, University of Washington
- M.A., Economics, University of Washington
- B.S., Mathematics and Economics (with honors), University of New Mexico


## Employment History

- 2009-Present: Continental Economics, President.
- 2004-2009: Bates White, LLC, Partner, Energy Practice.
- 2003-2004: Vermont Dept. of Public Service, Director of Planning.
- 1998-2003: Navigant Consulting, Senior Managing Economist.
- 1993-1998: Green Mountain Power Corporation, Manager, Economic Analysis.
- 1986-1993: Washington State Energy Office, Energy Policy Specialist.
- 1984-1986: Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee, Energy Economist.
- 1983-1984: Idaho Power Corporation, 1982-1983. Load Forecasting Analyst.


## Professional activities

- Reviewer, Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Reviewer, The Energy Journal
- Reviewer, Energy


## Professional associations

- Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis
- Energy Bar Association
- International Association for Energy Economics


## Publications

## Peer-reviewed journal articles

- Lesser, J., "Gresham's Law of Green Energy," Regulation, Winter 2010-2011, pp. 1218.
- Lesser, J., and E. Nicholson, "Abandon all Hope? FERC's Evolving Standards for Identifying Comparable Firms and Estimating the Rate of Return," Energy Law Journal 30 (April 2009): 105-132.
- Lesser, J. and X. Su. "Design of an Economically Efficient Feed-in Tariff Structure for Renewable Energy Development." Energy Policy 36 (March 2008) 981-990.
- Lesser, J. "The Economic Used-and-Useful Test: Its Origins and Implications for a Restructured Electric Industry." Energy Law Journal 23 (November 2002): 349-82.
- Lesser, J., and C. Feinstein. "Electric Utility Restructuring, Regulation of Distribution Utilities, and the Fallacy of 'Avoided Cost' Rules." Journal of Regulatory Economics 15 (January 1999): 93-110.
* Lesser, J., and C. Feinstein. "Defining Distributed Utility Planning." The Energy Journal, Special Issue, Distributed Resources: Toward a New Paradigm (1998): 4162.
- Lesser, J., and R. Zerbe. "What Can Economic Analysis Contribute to the Sustainability Debate?" Contemporary Policy Issues 13 (July 1995): 88-100.
- Lesser, J., and R. Zerbe. "The Discount Rate for Environmental Projects." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 13 (Winter 1994): 140-56.
- Lesser, J., and D. Dodds. "Can Utility Commissions Improve on Environmental Regulations?" Land Economics 70 (February 1994): 63-76.
- Lesser, J. "Estimating the Economic Impacts of Geothermal Resource Development." Geothermics 24 (Winter 1994): 52-69.
- Lesser, J. "Application of Stochastic Dominance Tests to Utility Resource Planning Under Uncertainty." Energy 15 (December 1990): 949-61.
- Lesser, J. "Resale of the Columbia River Treaty Downstream Power Benefits: One Road From Here to There." Natural Resources Journal 30 (July 1990): 609-28.
- Lesser, J., and J. Weber. "The 65 M.P.H. Speed Limit and the Demand for Gasoline: A Case Study for the State of Washington." Energy Systems and Policy 13 (July 1989): 191-203.
- Lesser, J. "The Economics of Preference Power." Research in Law and Economics 12 (1989): 131-51.


## Books and contributed chapters

- Lesser, J., and L.R. Giacchino, Principles of Utility Corporate Finance, (Vienna, VA: Public Utilities Reports, 2011).
- Lesser, J., and L.R. Giacchino. Fundamentals of Energy Regulation, (Vienna, VA: Public Utilities Reports, 2007).
- Lesser, J., and R. Zerbe. "A Practitioner's Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis." In Handbook of Public Finance, edited by F. Thompson, (New York: Rowan and Allenheld, 1998), 221-68.
- Lesser, J., D. Dodds, and R. Zerbe. Environmental Economics and Policy, (Reading: MA: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997).


## Trade press publications

- Lesser, J., "Nuclear Fallout," Natural Gas \& Electricity (May 2011):31-33.
- Lesser, I., "Texas Two-Step: EPA's Greenhouse Gas Permitting Takeover," Natural Gas \& Electricity (March 2011):21-23.
- Lesser, J., "Looking Forward: Energy and the Environment through 2012," Natural Gas \& Electricity (January 2011):30-32.
- Lesser, J., "First-Mover Disadvantage: Offshore Wind's False Economic Promises," Natural Gas \& Electricity (November 2010): 26-28.
- Lesser, J., "Will the BP Disaster Affect Natural Gas and Electricity Markets?," Natural Gas \& Electricity (August 2010): 23-24.
- Lesser, J., "Renewable Energy and the Fallacy of 'Green' Jobs," The Electricity Journal (August 2010):45-53.
- Lesser, I., "Let the Tough Choices Begin: Affordable or Green?," Natural Gas \& Electricity (June 2010): 27-29.
- Lesser, J., "Will Shale Gas Production be Damaged by Too Many Fraccing Complaints?," Natural Gas \& Electricity (April 2010): 31-32.
- Lesser, J., "As the Climate Turns: The Saga Continues," Natural Gas \& Electricity (February 2010): 29-32.
- Lesser, J. and N. Puga, "Public Policy and Private Interests: Why Transmission Planning and Cost-Allocation Methods Continue to Stifle Renewable Energy Policy Goals," The Electricity Journal (December 2009): 7-19.
- Lesser, J, "Short Circuit: Will Electric Cars Provide Energy and Environmental Salvation?" Natural Gas \& Electricity (November 2009): 27-28.
- Lesser, J., "Green is the New Red: The High Cost of Green Jobs," Natural Gas \& Electricity (August 2009): 31-32.
- Lesser, J., "Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions: EPA Gets Down," Natural Gas \& Electricity (June 2009): 31-32.
- Lesser, J., "Being Reasonable While Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act," Natural Gas \& Electricity (April 2009): 30-32.
- Lesser, J., "Renewables, Becoming Cheaper, Are Suddenly Passé," Natural Gas \& Electricity (February 2009): 30-32.
- Lesser, J., "Measuring the Costs and the Benefits of Energy Development," Natural Gas \& Electricity (December 2008): 30-32.
- Lesser, J., "Comparing the Benefits and the Costs of Energy Development," Natural Gas \& Electricity (October 2008): 31-32.
- Lesser, J., "New Source Review Is Still Anything but Routine," Natural Gas \& Electricity (August 2008): 31-32.
- Lesser, J., and N. Puga, "PV versus Solar Thermal," Public Utilities Fortnightly 146 (July 2008), pp. 16-20, 27.
- Lesser, J., "Cap-and-Trade for Gasoline?," Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2008, A14.
- Lesser, J., "Kansas Secretary Unilaterally Bans Coal Plants," Natural Gas \& Electricity (June 2008): 30-32.
- Lesser, J., "Seeing Through a Glass, Darkly, Banks Approach Coal-Fired Power Financing," Natural Gas \& Electricity (April 2008): 29-31.
- Lesser, J., "The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007: No Subsidy Left Behind," Natural Gas \& Electricity (February 2008): 29-31.
- Lesser, J., "Control of Greenhouse Gases: Difficult with Either Cap-and-Trade or Tax-and-Spend." Natural Gas \& Electricity (December 2007): 28-31.
- Lesser, J., "Déjà vu All Over Again: The Grass was not Greener Under Utility Regulation." The Electricity Journal 20 (December 2007): 35-39.
- Lesser, J., "Blowin' in the Wind: Renewable Energy Mandates, Electric Rates, and Environmental Quality." Natural Gas \& Electricity (October 2007): 26-28.
- Lesser, J., "No Leg to Stand On." Natural Gas \& Electricity (August 2007): 28-31.
- Lesser, J., "Goldilocks Chills Out." Natural Gas \& Electricity (July 2007): 26-28.
- Lesser, J., "Goldilocks and the Three Climates." Natural Gas \& Electricity (April 2007): 22-24.
- Lesser, J., "Command-and-Control Still Lurks in Every Legislature." Natural Gas \& Electricity (February 2007): 8-12.
- Lesser, J., and G. Israilevich, "The Capacity Market Enigma." Public Utilities Fortnightly 143 (December 2005): 38-42.
- Lesser, J., "Overblown Promises: The Hidden Costs of Symbolic Environmentalism." Livin' Vermont 1 (January/February 2005): 7, 27.
- Lesser, J., "Regulation by Litigation." Public Utilities Fortnightly 142 (October 2004): 24-29.
- Lesser, J., "ROE: The Gorilla is Still at the Door." Public Utilities Fortnightly 144 (July 2004): 19-23.
- Lesser, J., and S. Chapel, "Keys to Transmission and Distribution Reliability." Public Utilities Fortnightly 142 (April 2004): 58-62.
- Lesser, J. , "DCF Utility Valuation: Still the Gold Standard?" Public Utilities Fortnightly 141 (February 15, 2003): 14-21.
- Lesser, J., "Welcome to the New Era of Resource Planning: Why Restructuring May Lead to More Complex Regulation, Not Less." The Electricity Journal 15 (July 2002): 20-28.
- Lesser, J., and C. Feinstein, "Identifying Applications for Distributed Generation: Hype vs. Hope." Public Utilities Fortnightly 140 (June 1, 2002): 20-28.
- Lesser, J., et al., "Utility Resource Planning: The Need for a New Approach." Public Utilities Fortnightly 140 (January 15, 2002): 24-27.
- Lesser, J., "Distribution Utilities: Forgotten Orphans of Electric Restructuring?" Public Utilities Fortnightly 137 (March 1, 1999): 50-55.
- Lesser, J., "Regulating Distribution Utilities in a Restructured World." The Electricity Journal 12 (January/February 1999): 40-48.
- Lesser, J., "Is it How Much or Who Pays? A Response to Rothkopf." The Electricity Journal 10 (December 1997): 17-22.
- Lesser, J., and M. Ainspan, "Using Markets to Value Stranded Costs." The Electricity Journal (October 1996): 66-74.
- Lesser, J., "Economic Analysis of Distributed Resources: An Introduction." Proceedings, First Annual Conference on Distributed Resources, Electric Power Research Institute, Kansas City, MO, July 1995.
- Lesser, J., "Distributed Resources as a Competitive Opportunity: The Small Utility Perspective." Proceedings, First Annual Conference on Distributed Resources, Electric Power Research Institute, Kansas City, MO, July 1995.
- Lesser, J., and M. Ainspan, "Retail Wheeling: Deja vu All Over Again?" The Electricity Journal 7 (April 1994): 33-49.
- Lesser, J., "An Economically Rational Approach to Least-Cost Planning: Comment." The Electricity Journal 4 (October 1991).
- Lesser, J., "Long-Term Utility Planning Under Uncertainty: A New Approach." Paper presented for the Electric Power Research Institute: Innovations in Pricing and Planning, May 1990.
- Lesser, J., "Centralized vs. Decentralized Resource Acquisition: Implications for Bidding Strategies." Public Utilities Fortnightly (June 1990).
- Lesser, J., "Most Value-The Right Measure for the Wrong Market?" The Electricity Journal 2 (December 1989): 47-51.


## Selected speaking engagements

- "The Failures of Transmission Planning and Policy," Harvard Electric Policy Group, February 25, 2010.
- "Financing the Smart Grid," Energy Bar Association Seminar, Washington, DC, December 4, 2009.
- "Renewable Power: At the Crossroads of Economics and Policy," Presentation to the Utilities State Government Organization, Newport, Rhode Island, July 13, 2009.
- "The Stimulus Act and Laws they Didn't Teach You in Law School," presentation to the $27^{\text {th }}$ National Regulatory Conference, Williamsburg, VA, May 19, 2009.
- "Rate Recovery for Capital Intensive Generation: Rate Base and Construction Work in Progress," Law Seminars International, Las Vegas, NV, February 5, 2009.
- "Financial Risks Faced by Regulated Utilities: Implications for the Cost of Capital and Ratemaking Policies," Law Seminars International, Las Vegas, NV, February 7, 2008.
* "Alternative Regulatory Structures and Tariff Mechanisms: Practical approaches to providing low-cost, environmentally responsible energy and how to avoid some dangerous pitfalls." Western Energy Institute, October 1, 2007.
- "Economics and Energy Regulation." Law Seminars International, Washington, DC, March 15-16, 2007.
- "Energy in the Northeast: Resource Adequacy \& Reliability." Law Seminars International, Boston, MA, October 16-17, 2006.
- "Energy in the Southwest: New Directions in Energy Markets and Regulations." Law Seminars International, Santa Fe, NM, July 14, 2006.
- "Energy and the Environment." Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, South Royalton, VT, March 10, 2006.
- "Electricity and Natural Gas Regulation: An Introduction." Law Seminars International, Washington, DC, March 17-18, 2005.


### 0.333 annual volatility 0.020977 daily return volatility annual vol 0.339308012 




$\qquad$

荡宸
商品䯸


送


 ．
 1.002483591䔍





 $8890 \tau L L 660$

$9 \tau 6188 L \angle 60$ | on |
| :---: |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |


0.161479545
0.761750987 0.876394579 0.324675127 0.739978529
0.364292616 0.900666572
 0.07160942 0.383544656等
 m
${ }_{0}$
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
 0.887603659 0.575522327 0.068045531
0.591818207
 0.626659657
0.874473693

0.25999232 0.258993232 | o 0 |
| :--- |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |

 0.599070866
0.633841402 0.993743961 0.356083786
0.367472145

 0.777026847
0.001581291 0.268776384 0.556032247
0.808864906
 0.576650605 0.547064804
0.287162281 0.287162281
0.65238307 0.356536459
0813786039
0.126041203

 0.100921018
0.412900822 0.102404994
0.08697374



 \begin{tabular}{l}
9 <br>
0 <br>
\hline 0 <br>
\hline 0 <br>
\hline

 구․ 

응 <br>
0 <br>
\hline 0 <br>
8 <br>
8 <br>
0 <br>
0
\end{tabular}


 0
0
0
囟
0
0
0
0 9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 DSt6z6t00
$S \angle I t 00900.0$ $\infty$
N
0
0
0
0
 0
N
0
0
0
0
0 응
 n荡器范登
 흒 응
品
on
on

0管 | 용 |
| :--- |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |品 o 웅 N

品品
哭 0.011618131 0.006334513
0.020015852
0.00657
$-0.020109676$ 0.008436997
-0.000419019 0.013158521
0.011558276路苞
和荡品弟

 LO90zoeto

 N



 0.017916046 0.002369011
-0.004012311 $-0.022310198$ 0.024444012
 0.024924512 -0.025122449
-0.018537003
等 0.007569967 0.012415426
-0.017373283 m
m
m
n
an
on on 65666962000
8659 0.010192959
0.022446152





[^7][^8][^9]$-0.003640073$筑 -0.043680701
0.009476374 $-0.013900933$ -0.011432461
-0.03434474 -0003434474
-0.012658125 -0.012658125
0.011148566 믕
 0.021089487 -0.055692068
0000974151
资登



咨㗊合 0.001473833
 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

 0.015818558 -0.010141732
-0.001581813 -0.001581813
0.007307056 0.045046087 0.001800906 0.032978614 -0.018739778
0.025421805 0.025421806
-0.001381511 0.001760573䛔 0.013667409 0.010233625
0.001026134 0.003168305 -0.014010645
0.036911457

### 0.996359927

君 M 0956319299 1.009476374 0.996565526 | N |
| :---: |
| N |
| N |
| N |
| 0 |

芴骨范签
 N第
苞道逮式

 1.001473833壽
 ～～ 1.076469889 융

 1045046087
 N
N
O
0
0
on
on 0.974578194器 1.007760573
0.975986568 0.975986568
1013667409
解资


蔕 n
n
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 $-0.002045795$ ت 0.005377207 $-0.00620379$ 0.004477858呂 -0.00224467
0.007037777 0.000796622苟


-0.001249015
-0.016551782
 0.019435387
-0.025860951 0.021746402 $-0.000699944$ 0.022047717悥
 ELZZZZLZO：
 Z $\angle \mathrm{FOLC} 6000^{\circ}$ LZちをSLEOO：
 8595899500
5888272000 $9 \downarrow \varepsilon 9922000$ LO8LE66E00－
$95985 \angle 6100$ LZSOIEDEO
LOBLE6EEOO 0.007047736 $8 \angle 262 \in 0000$ ت
－
O
0
0
0
0
0 ャ 2 EL6T5E0 0 -0.0065147
-0.007791976

号

 ～
 N
．
0
0
0
0
0
0 0.008079704
-0.019934386 0.037255719 c．025676672 0.015592337 0.009241921
 003697406


[^10] 7
0
0
0
0
0
0岃
 -0004174031
-0004676297
 $-0.006982248$ 0.003903079
-0.001624432 픔
 -0.010068889
0.009567845管简慦 o
号
N
of
of
0 Lロ\＆bธbotoo N

晜


莶
虽
0
0
0
0
0
0
0品
 크응舜㓣第 0.004441415
0.004100467 0.006966301 -0.004412021
0.007339796解
 드․




品
m
m
m
号
o


 9
0
0
0 प्0
N
on
on
on




 0.01347599
0.024053684 -0.024053684
0.010968758 S281825100
$85 \angle 89600^{\circ} 0$







 $\begin{array}{cc}m \\ \cdots & N \\ \cdots & \text { m } \\ \text { m } \\ m \\ m & m\end{array}$

 H
N
N

$m$
$m$


 N


柰
 N
带容













 0.006866104
号 $0_{0}^{0}$
N
0
0
0 -0.00615079
-0.005664755 VL9972000
SSLD99sto
 0.00843206
0.003612
0.099332075 $-0.00644513$ 0.018837141
-0.00780998
0







 ＂
咢
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 $\infty$
品
0
0
0
0
0
0

0 | 8 |
| :--- |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 8 |

等 -0.00304233
0.019849649


 -0.00942644
-0.00521886
 -0.0208181
-0.0084771
-0.01466239 -0.01406239
-0.0262471







[^11]0.31959927怤俞
品高 N想登 그ㅁㅜㅜㅇ


 N
䔍

芴

 하쑹








 N








 $\begin{array}{ll}0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 8 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \end{array}$



 | $n$ |
| :---: |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 | 8



会


 | 4 |
| :--- | $\square$

H
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 N
侖
合
－


 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 $\square$
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
 9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
N
合
0



 -1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
俞 $\begin{array}{ll}\text { N } \\ \text { N } \\ \text { N } \\ 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0\end{array}$


 | $\stackrel{a}{ल}$ |
| :---: |
| $\stackrel{y}{\infty}$ |
| $\stackrel{y}{c}$ |
| $\underset{0}{7}$ |
| 0 | 0

$\stackrel{0}{7}$
$\stackrel{0}{8}$
0
0
0
0
0





 $0.677114392 \quad 44.78314899$







志


珨管
 41.0307617
40.68468975品





 충

答




莒

## 


$\begin{array}{lll}166 & 0.20211848 & 0.32076932 \\ 167 & 0.99127914 & 0.33141465\end{array}$






套器
资宮

解资















-000602247
0.015298749
-000632134
-001059366耧
芯
0
0
0









领
橧

 4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0



 | N |
| :--- |
| N |
| o |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |



 $m$
$m_{1}$
y
0
0
0
0
0
0
0










0.010910835
0.027613306
$\qquad$

## 




 $\infty$
$m$
$\infty$
$\infty$
$\infty$
$m$
$m$
$m$
$\sim$
$m$
$m$
$m$


等若



 39.15242355








品茄范



曾

葡

强寻壵菏



受菷
答


 크․哭
$\frac{0}{4}$
0
0
0
綈

 $8862988 \varepsilon^{\circ}$

高管

 | 承 |
| :---: |
| 等 |







[^12]
管品葡 H
范䇾


会
筑 N感
蓇宮
范呂
 긍 N
N
N
N．
O．
0 N商苞
 प
呂
品
部䓵
䫆薄第





 | $m$ |
| :---: |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |



 $\qquad$ N荷筞





 $\overrightarrow{3}$
ज
ते
$\vec{\sigma}$








关登




 a
N
N
N
N
の
o




等
 $\begin{array}{ll}0.683032408 & 36.83047056 \\ 0.605544839 & 37.08876343\end{array}$ $\begin{array}{ll}.939386273 & 3833468335 \\ 0.713435977 & 38.79318954\end{array}$


 $\begin{array}{ll}0.326549252 & 36.98163759 \\ 0.379314299 & 36.74478722\end{array}$ $\begin{array}{rr}0.379314299 & 36.74478722 \\ 0.28842497 & 36.31967272\end{array}$ $\begin{array}{rr}0.28842407 & 36.317672726 \\ 0.863279116 & 3717360236\end{array}$ $\begin{array}{ll}0.844847456 & 37.98190677 \\ 0.616120484 & 38.21865732\end{array}$ $\begin{array}{ll}0.616120484 & 38.21865732 \\ 0.340485545 & 37.89186447\end{array}$ $0.656145826 \quad 3821408456$ $0.405786441 \quad 38.02393264$




 $\begin{array}{ll}0.015319345 & 40.38538063 \\ 0.458634334 & 40.29757287\end{array}$ $\begin{array}{ll}0.458634334 & 40.29757287 \\ 0.349638959 & 39.97365631\end{array}$
 $\begin{array}{ll}0.272457527 & 39.71910972 \\ 0.43728638 & 39.58802279\end{array}$ $\begin{array}{rr}0.43728638 & 39.58302279 \\ 0.5231485 & 39.63629461\end{array}$























# 0.34496392 0.34740236 0.32837585 0.3272171 031606026 0.34069513 0.32708454 0.32330822 0.34021512 $W$ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   N $\stackrel{0}{\infty}$ $\underset{\sim}{\infty}$ $\underset{\sim}{\infty}$ $\cdots$范 荡 品椥 욷熟荡商    N 珨管篤  筞 or  云舞嫘解 眇告    

[^13]$\circ$
0
告
N
0
0
0
0
0
尔 ～～ 응
M
莒
a
0 m
W
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
$i$
 $-0.006816946$ $n$
0
0
0

A
0
0
0
0
0
 9
0
0
0
0
a
a
0
0
0

会
on
N
0
0
0

资


 un
N
N
N
0
0
0
0
0
0壵 $\circ$
0
0
7
7
0
0
0
0
0家 긍
 $m$
$n$
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
 H
品
0
0
0
0
0
0
0





 | $N$ |
| :---: |
| $N$ |
|  |
|  |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |

 m
N
N
N
ò
0

0 | 9 |
| :--- |
| 9 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| $\circ$ |
| 0 | $\circ$

0
0
0
0
0
0
0


 1.016274576
0.98500241
0.98214022 1.010773781
1.022681726
 0.979016357
1.012805276 0.990834698
0.993183054 0.978741295 $m$
0
M
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 $\begin{array}{ll}\text { H } \\ \\ \text { N } \\ 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \\ 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0\end{array}$












 0.994185804
1.016784753

 0
0
0
0
0
0
g
g

0 | $\stackrel{\sim}{N}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |
|  |
| 0 |

 $m$
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0




 | 0 |
| :---: |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
| 0 |





 \begin{tabular}{ll}
0.779226356 \& 38.06215173 <br>
\hline .235649597048

 

0.235649058 <br>
0195144969 \& 36.83185242 <br>
\& 0.852750 <br>
\hline 3
\end{tabular}

荡


苟















岩号















## 






[^0]:    1 Direct Testimony of Laura Thomas on Behalf of Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company, Case Nos. 08-917-EL-UNC and 08-918-EL-UNC, June 6, 2011 ("Thomas Direct").
    2 Direct Testimony of Chantale LaCasse on Behalf of Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company, Case Nos 08-917-EL-UNC and 08-918-EL-UNC, June 6, 2011 ("LaCasse Direct").
    ${ }^{3}$ Direct Testimony of Anil Makhija on Behalf of Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company, Case Nos. 08-917-EL-UNC and 08-918-EL-UNC, June 6, 2011 ("Makhija Direct").

[^1]:    7 Id. at 9126 (emphasis added).
    $8 \quad$ Id. at 517 , 123 (emphasis added).
    ${ }^{9}$ In re Application of Ormet Primary Aluminum Corp., 2011-Ohio-2377, If15 (May 24, 2011) (emph. added), quoting Constellation NewEnergy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 104 Ohio St.3d 530, $\ddagger$, 39 fn. 5.

[^2]:    11 See id. pp. 294-98 for a discussion.
    12 The full contract terms can be found at: www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/electricity/pim-western-hub-peak-calendar-month-real-time-Imp contract specifications.html .

[^3]:    ${ }^{20}$ See LaCasse Direct Testimony at 14:15-17.
    \{C34720: \}

[^4]:    ${ }^{21}$ For a discussion, see J. Hull, Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives, $7^{\text {th }}$ ed., (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall 2009) (Hull), pp.296-7.

    As I discuss in the next section. AEP Ohio has also used the wrong estimate of volatility.

[^5]:    ${ }^{23}$ M. Guth, "Benefits of Accurately Determining Electricity Price Distributions: Better Risk Metrics, Beating the Market on Trades," undated article. Available at: http;//michaelguth.com/economist/tradejournals/benefitsaccurately.htm .

[^6]:    ${ }^{24}$ See Thomas Direct Testimony at 11:17-18.
    ${ }^{25}$ See Makhija Direct Testimony at 4:1-2.
    \{C34720: \}

[^7]:    0.979890324
    1.008436997 1.008436097 1.013158521 1.011558276 0.974613414
    解
     m
    言
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0 0.9974613
    0.970075147
    
    
    
    
    
    
    志
     킁
    盒等
    
     N 0.981462997 0.994129326
    1.016179442
    

    号

    录 | 0.989807041 |
    | :--- |
    | 0.977553848 |

    
     0.998546903
    0.991259684
     N第答
     50.23672576
    
     51.37136113 52.33037892 52.88683462
    51.92751004
    51.33539192 51.20523205
    49.69562305
    5
     50.62090353
    51.5187786
    
    
    
     51.11502606
    
    
     52.06459017
    51.48148138
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     $\begin{array}{ll}N & 0 \\ N & 0 \\ \text { N } \\ \text { N } \\ \text { N }\end{array}$尔荡
    
    $\qquad$黄 0.492029925
    0.733420559 H
    范 0.643224195
    0.96717292 0.808854193
     0.18922874
    0.29120554品鬲
    品
    合
    0岛
     0.027896089 0.56481189
    0.946431056 0.946434056
    0.269842771 0.4001589
    0.136548497 0.990060152 N
     0.801368262
    0.54490545点品 0.141053699
    0.875187598
    
     N
    N
    N
    ou
    0
    0
    
     0.777900037
     0.201722648 0.398611736俞

     | $\stackrel{2}{7}$ |
    | :---: |

    
    
    
    
    
    .0 .006205419 م⿵
    N
    N
    ö
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0告品
     to6s089000－
    
    黄荡
     둥 $-0.00631116$
    
     27056000 0
    橘荡 0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0为 0.006236685
     0.004243519 0.009117614 0.008713949 0.002887857
    -0.000961693俞岩 $-0.015491545$
    
     0.000332226 $-0.004495886$
    
    
    㰲 등
    
    

[^8]:    第
    N
    N
    0
    0
    0
    
    宸
    
    罟
    䲘 N
    
    苐
     N 1.001778368
    0.982418488筥咢

     | 总 |
    | :---: |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |

    吉
    
    羂
    
    苟 に．
    合
    ले
    ले
    जे
     율
    
    
    
    
    
     M
    烒
    鬲
    
    
    
     ～ت
    ت
    品告
    
    品 No
    
    品
    
    
     प
    第
    0
    0
    0
    0
    第 74.94596966
    77.33079693 76.50869126
    76.27559209 N
    或
    录 둥荡荡 $\infty$
    0
    0
    0 N
    on
    on
    on
    on
    on
    
    言
    
    
     0.883003439
    0.174327318
    0.90504358
     N 0.75762633 0.338982046
    0.847095835
    声 0.728791344
    0.775558112 0.226663317 N n
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    皆 N
    
    
    
     0.961868617 o 0.304238325 0.442085428
    0.340055111 0.27749107 0.17120578
    0.492482861说
     0.241897773
    成䈏第
    产
    
    
    
     sion
    

[^9]:    -0.002003674
    0.015259875
     응 0.000162853 0.004711243 0004205085
     -0000162483
    -0.019029446 968 2t 50000 ＂
    

     ．骨号 | $\infty$ |
    | :---: |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 0 | 0.003880361 $256+860000^{\circ}$

    $2226800000-$
    
    
    
     N N
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0皆 Hy
    o
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0 몽
    
    第
    荡
    总
    0
    0 N
    年
    呂
    0
    0 0.003379741
    0.006587957 0.006587957 응
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    品
    
    

[^10]:    
    

[^11]:    0.032773763
    -0.01221126
    0.0159617
     0.011141171
    0.013660103 0.015673374烒
    
    苞合 플
    
    
     M曾
    
    告
    
     or
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0志䓂烒篤品
    贸
    先告处
    号
    
    苞
    
    翟
    
    
    
    
    
     0.989540381
     1.015673374
    1.039811052
    
     0.996369866
    0.981838923 1.013451711 1.005741703
    1.014778287 0.989802093 1.029699029
    0.987725717
    0.9721563 0.972158633
    0.99800305 0.978447107
    0.993939821 0.995940254㓱
     จtelacziot
    
    高
    
    高答 1.007981777
    0.994927311
     0.97709038 0.999335721 1.006751024 0.991191592 N
    a
    and
    品 0.985418517
    
    送
    
    

    资 | 0.256014363 |
    | :--- |
    | 55.26613989 |
    | .0650 |品

     $\begin{array}{ll}0.450990598 & 58.26867682 \\ 0.318834893 & 57.69866212\end{array}$ $\begin{array}{ll}0.880112161 & 59.15730268 \\ \mathrm{G} 431181202 & 58.94294303\end{array}$ $\begin{array}{lr}\text { C431181202 } & 58.9423263 \\ 0.191129227 & 57.8821086 \\ 0.73793201 & 58.6559824\end{array}$ 0.737932501588 .6659824
    
    放衰柰跔㗊总劣第 57.31870287
    
    
    
    登
    剚 E N哭等
    
    骨
    
    莒资
    
    
    
    
    

[^12]:    䔺烒商
    镪高
    部和荷
    
    
    等岩
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    高品
    
    黄荡
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    

[^13]:    
     จ62585900\％
    
    容

     | n |
    | :---: |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 0 |
    | 8 |

     -0.00129999
    -0.01153061
    0.00469543
    
    
     on
    00
    00
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    0
    
    
    
    
    
     $6605 \varepsilon 5000^{-}$
    $610658800^{\circ}$
    $6 \angle 090800^{\circ}$
    
     カTSs $28800^{\circ}$
    69988000
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    

