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Description of Document: Volume 2 Prefiled Direct Testimonies of Daniel E. High, Thomas R. Zelina and William E. Avera

COMPANY EX. NO.

# BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the Application of Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company, Individually and, if ) Case No. 11-351-EL-AIR Their Proposed Merger is Approved, as a Case No. 11-352-EL-AIR ) Merged Company (collectively, AEP Ohio) ) for an Increase in Electric Distribution Rates) In the Matter of the Application of Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company, Individually and, if ) Case No. 11-353-EL-ATA Their Proposed Merger is Approved, as a Case No. 11-354-EL-ATA Merged Company (collectively, AEP Ohio) ) for Tariff Approval In the Matter of the Application of Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company, Individually and, if Case No. 11-356-EL-AAM ) Their Proposed Merger is Approved, as a Case No. 11-358-EL-AAM Merged Company (collectively, AEP Ohio) ) for Approval to Change Accounting Methods )

#### PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DANIEL E. HIGH ON BEHALF OF COLUMBUS SOUTHERN POWER COMPANY AND OHIO POWER COMPANY

Management Policies, Practices & Organizations

**Operating Income** 

Rate Base

Allocations

Rate of Return

X Rates and Tariffs

Other

Filed March 14th, 2011

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# BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DANIEL E. HIGH ON BEHALF OF COLUMBUS SOUTHERN POWER COMPANY AND OHIO POWER COMPANY

1		I. PERSONAL DATA
2	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, BUSINESS ADDRESS, AND POSITION.
3	A.	My name is Daniel High. My business address is 1 Riverside Plaza, Columbus,
4		Ohio 43215. I currently hold the position of Regulatory Consultant I in the
5		Regulated Pricing and Analysis department for the American Electric Power
6		Service Corporation, a subsidiary of American Electric Power Company, Inc.
7		(AEP).
8		II. BACKGROUND
9	Q.	PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
10		AND BUSINESS EXPERIENCE.
11	A.	In December 1989, I received a Bachelors of Science Degree in Energy
12		Management from West Liberty University. In May 1997, I received a Masters of
13		Business Administration degree from Ashland University.
14		In February 1990, I joined Columbus Southern Power Company as a Marketing
15		and Customer Services Representative in the Marketing and Customer Services
16		Department of the Columbus Region. In August 1998, I joined the Regulated
17		Pricing & Analysis Department as a Regulatory Consultant. From 2006 through
18		2008, I performed duties as a Regulatory Consultant in Transmission &

1		Interconnection Services under the Regulatory Services Department, where I was
2		responsible for rate design and maintaining wholesale contracts. In January 2009,
3		I returned to Regulated Pricing & Analysis under the Regulatory Services
4		Department as a Regulatory Consultant. My responsibilities include preparation
5		of cost-of-service studies, rate design and tariff provisions for the AEP operating
6		companies, and special contracts and pricing for retail and wholesale customers.
7	Q.	HAVE YOU TAKEN ANY COURSES IN COST ALLOCATION AND
8		RATE DESIGN?
9	A.	Yes. In 1999, I attended the Edison Electric Institute's (EEI) school on cost
10		allocation and rate design. In 2003, I also attended EEI's advanced cost
11		allocation and rate design school.
12	Q.	FOR WHOM ARE YOU TESTIFYING IN THIS PROCEEDING?
13	A.	I am testifying on behalf of AEP Ohio, which is an operating unit of AEP and is
14		comprised of Columbus Southern Power (CSP) and Ohio Power (OPCo). I will
15		refer to AEP Ohio throughout my testimony as CSP, OPCo or collectively as AEP
16		Ohio or the Company.
17	Q.	HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TESTIMONY BEFORE ANY
18		REGULATORY COMMISSIONS?
19	А.	Yes. I have submitted testimony on behalf of Kentucky Power Company before
20		the Public Service Commission of Kentucky. I have also submitted testimony on
21		behalf of Indiana Michigan Power Company before the Michigan Public Service
22		Commission.

1 III. CLASS COST-OF-SERVICE STUDY 2 **Q**. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY? 3 A. The purpose of my testimony is to support and describe the development of the 4 Company's class cost-of-service studies, which allocate the total Ohio retail jurisdiction rate base, revenues and expenses to each rate schedule. A class cost-5 6 of-service study was prepared for both CSP and OPCo. 7 0. ARE YOU SPONSORING ANY SCHEDULES RELATED TO THE CLASS 8 **COST-OF-SERVICE STUDIES?** 9 Yes, I am sponsoring the following schedules: A. 10 Schedule E-3.1 (CSP) 11 Schedule E-3.1 (OPCo) 12 Schedule E-3.2 (CSP) 13 Schedule E-3.2 (OPCo) 14 PLEASE DESCRIBE THESE SCHEDULES. 0. 15 Schedule E-3.1 (for both CSP and OPCo) is the customer component only of the A. 16 class cost-of-service study for test year ended May 31, 2011 (three-month actual 17 and nine-month forecast). Schedule E-3.2 (for both CSP and OPCo) is the class 18 cost-of-service study for test year ended May 31, 2011 (three-month actual and 19 nine-month forecast). 20 PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF A 0. 21 CLASS COST-OF-SERVICE ALLOCATION STUDY.

A. Class cost-of-service studies are prepared to determine the revenue requirement
for the services offered by the utility and to determine the costs that different

classes of customers impose on the utility system. A class cost-of-service
 allocation study is a basic analytical tool used in utility rate design. When all of
 the jurisdictional costs are allocated to the various customer classes, the result is a
 class cost responsibility study that is a guide in establishing rates based on costs.

# 5 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW YOU PREPARED THE CLASS COST-OF6 SERVICE STUDIES.

An Excel spreadsheet was used to prepare the class cost-of-service studies. The Excel spreadsheet permits the analyst to use two types of allocation factors – those which are generated externally and input to the spreadsheet and those which are developed internally as a result of the allocation process built into the spreadsheet. An example of an external allocation factor would be the total number of secondary customers served at distribution level (DIST\_SERV). An example of an internal factor would be the net plant allocation factor (NP).

# 14 Q. WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF THE DATA USED TO PREPARE THE 15 COST-OF-SERVICE STUDY?

16 Α. Separate jurisdictional allocations of distribution rate base, revenue and expenses 17 were prepared for both CSP and OPCo, and are supported by Company witness 18 The CSP and OPCo retail jurisdictional rate base and expense Caudill. 19 components are assigned to the different customer classes using the standard 20 three-step process to assign costs: functionalization, classification, and finally, 21 allocation. This jurisdictional information has already been functionalized and 22 identified as related to the distribution function.

# 1 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE CLASSIFICATION STEP OF THE PROCESS.

A. The next step is to separate the functionalized costs into the classifications of demand costs (costs that are based on the demand or kW/kVa imposed by the customer), or customer costs (costs that are directly related to the number of customers served).

6 The cost classifications used in the Company's cost-of-service studies 7 include the following:

Function	Classification
Distribution	Demand, Customer
Customer Service	Customer

9 Generally, the distribution system costs are affected by either the peak 10 demand imposed on the distribution facilities or by the number of customers 11 served. Demand-related distribution costs reflect the size of the class of 12 customer's electrical load served, while customer related distribution costs are 13 primarily related to the number of customers. The classification process provides 14 a basis on which to allocate different categories of costs (demand or customer) to 15 the Company's classes.

# 16

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# Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ALLOCATION STEP OF THE PROCESS.

A. The final step is to allocate the costs among the classes of customers based on
how the costs are incurred for each class. Customer classes are determined and
grouped according to the nature of service provided, voltage level and the load

usage characteristics. In general, the five principle customer classes are
 residential, commercial, industrial, outdoor lighting and street lighting. The need
 to subdivide these classes depends on the individual utility's customer base.

4 The allocation process involves dividing the functionalized and classified 5 costs among the customer classes. The objective in this process is to determine a 6 reasonable, appropriate and understandable method to assign the costs. Some 7 costs are directly assignable to a single class, or even a single customer. For 8 instance, the equipment used wholly for public street and highway lighting are 9 directly assigned to the street lighting class. Most costs, however, are attributable 10 to more than one customer class. These are joint costs and must be allocated to 11 customer classes by an allocation methodology that is based on the manner in 12 which the costs are caused by those different classes. The joint costs are incurred 13 based on the capacity demanded or the number of customers. In many instances, 14 the classification process will lead to an allocation methodology. For example, 15 costs associated with reading customer meters will vary with the number of 16 customers as well as the complexity of reading the meter, so meter reading costs 17 are allocated to the classes based on a weighted customer allocation factor. A 18 weighted customer allocation factor is developed by multiplying the number of 19 customers in each class by a factor representing the difference in cost associated 20 with providing that service to different types of customers.

When this process is completed and all of the costs are allocated to the customer classes, the result is a fully allocated cost-of-service study that establishes cost responsibility and the test year rate of return earned from each

1		class, making it possible to determine the rates each class of customer should pay	
2		based on costs that are just and reasonable.	
3	Q.	WHAT CRITERIA MUST BE ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THAT THE	
4		ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO THE CUSTOMERS IS APPROPRIATE?	
5	A.	Generally, the following criteria should be used to determine the appropriateness	
6		of an allocation methodology:	
7		1) The method should reflect the planning and operating	
8		characteristics of the utility's system.	
9		2) The method should recognize customer class characteristics such	
10		as peak demand on the system, diversity characteristics, number of	
11		customers, etc.	
12		3) The method should produce stable results on a year-to-year basis.	
13		4) Customers who benefit from the use of the system should also bear	
14		appropriate cost responsibility for the system.	
15	Q.	DOES THE ALLOCATION METHOD EMPLOYED BY THE COMPANY	
16		MEET THESE OBJECTIVES?	
17	A.	Yes, it does. The allocation methodology utilized in the Company's cost-of-	
18		service studies was chosen based on the criteria listed above.	
19		IV. ALLOCATION BASIS	
20	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ALLOCATION OF ELECTRIC PLANT IN	
21		SERVICE.	
22	A.	Electric Plant in Service is identified as distribution, intangible and general plant.	

# 1 Q. HOW WERE THE DISTRIBUTION PLANT ACCOUNTS ALLOCATED?

2 A. The Company, for class allocation purposes, used the summer and winter peak 3 method to assign customer costs to reflect two seasonal peaks (six Coincident 4 Peaks (CP)). The six CP distribution demand allocation factor assigns costs based on the class contribution to the average of CSP and OPCo's six monthly CPs on 5 6 the primary distribution facilities (DIST CPD). The six months that were used to 7 derive the primary distribution demand allocation factors were the three summer 8 months of June, July, August and the three winter months of December, January 9 and February for the test period ended May 31, 2011.

Distribution plant is classified as demand and customer related, and allocated to the customer classes using factors based on demand levels or number of customers. Distribution plant Accounts 360 through 368 were classified solely as demand-related for class allocation purposes. Accounts 360, 361 and 362 were allocated to the distribution customer classes based on their contributions to the average of the Company's six monthly peak demands on the primary distribution system (DIST\_CPD) as mentioned previously.

Accounts 364 through 367 were split into primary and secondary voltage functions based upon information contained in the Company's distribution engineering records. The primary portions of Accounts 364 through 367 were allocated using the DIST\_CPD and the secondary component of Accounts 364 through 367 were allocated based on a combination of each class' 12-month maximum demand and the summation of individual customers' annual maximum demands in each class served from those facilities reflecting the fact that some

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secondary facilities serve only one customer, while others serve two or more customers (DIST\_POLES, DIST\_OHLINES and DIST\_UGLINES).

3 Account 368, Transformers, was split into primary and secondary voltage 4 functions based upon information contained in the Company's distribution 5 engineering records to determine the functional use of the equipment. The 6 primary portion of Account 368 was allocated using DIST CPD and the 7 secondary portion was allocated using the appropriate secondary voltage demand 8 allocation factor based on a combination of each class' 12-month maximum 9 demand and the summation of individual customers' annual maximum demands 10 (DIST TRANSF).

Account 369, Services, was classified as customer-related and was
allocated using the average number of secondary customers served
(DIST SERV).

14 Account 370, Meters, was allocated using the average number of 15 customers weighted by a factor which considers the cost differential of various 16 metering installations (DIST METERS). Account 371, Install on Customer 17 Premises, and Account 372, Leased Property on Customer Premises, were directly 18 assigned to the outdoor lighting class (DIST OL). Account 373, Street Lighting, 19 was directly assigned to the street lighting class (DIST SL). General and 20 intangible plant investment reflects a composite demand and customer 21 classification. General and intangible plant investment is allocated on the basis of 22 payroll labor (LABOR M).

# 1 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ALLOCATION OF ACCUMULATED

# 2 **PROVISION FOR DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION.**

A. The components of Accumulated Provision for Depreciation and Amortization
were classified and allocated in a fashion similar to Electric Plant in Service.

# 5 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ALLOCATION OF WORKING CAPITAL.

A. The components of distribution working capital allowance include materials &
supplies and other prepayments (insurance, etc.). Materials & supplies were
allocated based on distribution electric plant in service; and prepayments were
allocated using factors developed from gross plant relationships.

# 10 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ALLOCATION OF RATE BASE OFFSETS.

A. Customer Deposits were assigned based on an analysis of accounting records;
 prepayment pension expenses were allocated based on O&M labor; and Customer
 Advances, Deferred Taxes and Deferred Investment Tax Credits were allocated
 based on distribution electric plant in service.

### 15 Q. HOW WERE REVENUES DEVELOPED FOR EACH CLASS?

A. Test year retail sales revenues were directly assigned to each class. Forfeited
 discounts and miscellaneous service revenues were directly assigned based on an
 analysis of accounting records. The functional components of rent from electric
 property and other electric revenue were allocated to classes based on distribution
 electric plant in service.

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# Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ALLOCATION OF DISTRIBUTION O&M AMONG THE VARIOUS CUSTOMER CLASSES.

3 A. Distribution O&M expenses were functionalized and classified according to the 4 associated distribution plant accounts and allocated accordingly. Accounts 581, 5 Load Dispatching operation expense and 582, Station Equipment operation 6 expense, were allocated using the primary distribution demand allocation factor 7 (DIST\_CPD). Account 583, Overhead Lines operation expense, was allocated 8 based upon the same allocation used for plant Account 365, Overhead Lines. 9 Account 584, Underground Lines operation expense, was allocated based upon 10 the same allocation used for plant Accounts 366, Underground Conduit, and 367 11 Underground Lines. Account 585, Street Lighting operation expense, was 12 classified as customer-related and directly assigned to the street lighting class. 13 Account 586, Meters operation expense, was classified customer-related and 14 allocated in the same manner as meter plant. Account 587, Customer Installations 15 operation expense, was classified as customer-related and allocated based on 16 primary customers (DIST PCUST).

17Accounts 588, Miscellaneous Distribution expense, and 589, Rent18expense, were allocated on total distribution plant and classified accordingly.19Account 580, Supervision & Engineering operation expense, was classified as20demand- and customer-related and allocated using the allocated subtotal of21Accounts 581 through 589.

Accounts 591, Structures maintenance expense, and 592, Station Equipment maintenance expense, were classified as demand-related and allocated

1 on the primary distribution demand allocation factor (DIST CPD). Accounts 2 593, 594, and 595, Maintenance of Overhead Lines, Underground Lines, and 3 Transformers, respectively, were functionalized and classified according to the 4 associated distribution plant accounts and allocated accordingly. Account 596, 5 Street Lighting maintenance expense, was classified as customer-related and 6 directly assigned to the street lighting class. Account 597, Meters maintenance 7 expense, was classified as customer-related and allocated in the same manner as 8 meter plant. Account 598, Miscellaneous Distribution maintenance expense, was 9 classified as customer-related and directly assigned to the outdoor lighting class. 10 Account 590, Supervision & Engineering maintenance expense, was classified 11 and allocated based on the sum of the allocated O&M expense Accounts 591 12 through 598.

# Q. CAN YOU EXPLAIN HOW CUSTOMER ACCOUNTS (ACCOUNTS 901905), CUSTOMER SERVICES AND INFORMATION AND SALES EXPENSE (ACCOUNTS 907-916) WERE ALLOCATED?

16 A. Account 902, Meter Reading expense, was allocated to those classes with meter 17 installations based upon an average number of customers weighted to reflect 18 differences in meter reading requirements. Account 903, Customer Records 19 expense, was divided into two categories, costs related to the customer call center 20 and other records and collections expenses. Call center costs were first split into 21 residential and all other customers based on the actual number of calls received. 22 The residential tariff class was directly assigned call center costs based on the 23 actual number of calls received by the call center. The remaining call center costs

were allocated among the other tariffs (excluding outdoor lighting) based on the
number of customers in those classes. The other records and collections expenses
were allocated to all classes based on the number of customers. Account 904,
Uncollectible Accounts, which is primarily associated with losses related to
uncollected rent revenues, was allocated based on an allocated total of rents from
non-associated companies and rent from electric property.

7 Accounts 901 and 905 were allocated based on the sum of the allocated 8 accounts 902, 903 and 904. Factoring Expense, recorded in Account 426, and 9 Interest on Customer Deposits, recorded in Account 431, were also shown as 10 Customer Accounts Expense as those costs are directly related to customer 11 account activities. The cost associated with Factoring Expense was allocated 12 using current sales revenue. The cost associated with Interest on Customer 13 Deposits was allocated based on customer deposits held by customer class. All 14 customer accounting expenses were classified as customer-related.

15 Costs associated with Customer Service and Information and Sales 16 Expense, Accounts 907-916, were allocated using the allocated total of Customer 17 Accounts (901-905), because of the general nature of these costs which include 18 supervision, labor and materials, support efforts to provide services to all 19 customer classes. All customer accounting, customer services and sales expense 20 accounts were classified as customer-related.

# 1 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ALLOCATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE & 2 GENERAL (A&G) EXPENSE.

A. Regulatory expense was allocated based on class revenue levels. Property
insurance and associated business development expense were allocated based on
the distribution plant allocation factor. All other A&G expenses were
functionalized, classified and allocated based on the allocated labor (Labor\_M)
allocation factor.

# 8 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ALLOCATION OF DEPRECIATION AND 9 AMORTIZATION EXPENSE.

10 A. The functionalized components of depreciation and amortization expense were
11 allocated using the corresponding plant items.

12 Q. HOW WERE TAXES OTHER THAN INCOME TAXES ALLOCATED TO

- 13 EACH CLASS?
- A. Taxes other than income taxes were allocated according to the basis for each tax.
  Payroll taxes are labor related and therefore allocated using the allocated labor
  (LABOR\_M) allocation factor. Taxes associated with property and miscellaneous
  taxes such as sales and use were allocated based on the internally derived
  allocated class net plant ratios.
- 19 Regulatory fees, franchise and commercial activity taxes were allocated
  20 using the sales revenue allocation factor.

# 1 Q. HOW WERE INCOME TAXES ASSIGNED TO THE RETAIL CLASSES?

A. State and Current Federal Income Taxes were computed class by class using the
 applicable tax rates. Individual Schedule M items, Deferred Federal Income
 Taxes, and Deferred Investment Tax Credits were allocated based on
 corresponding allocated costs to which the items relate. Deductible interest
 expense was calculated using a formula to synchronize with allocated rate base.

# 7 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE SCHEDULE 3.1 (FOR BOTH CSP AND OPCO).

8 A. Schedule E-3.1 (CSP) and Schedule E-3.1 (OPCo) include the customer
9 component only of the class cost-of-service studies. Schedule E-3.1 was
10 developed to meet the Ohio Administrative Code filing requirements under
11 Appendix A.

Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE CURRENT OVERALL AND CLASS
 EARNED RATE OF RETURN ON RATE BASE FOR EACH CLASS
 SHOWN IN BOTH THE CSP AND OPCO CLASS COST-OF-SERVICE
 STUDIES (SCHEDULE E-3.2) THAT YOU PREPARED.

A. For test year ending May 31, 2011 (three-month actual and nine-month forecast),
the resulting earned distribution rates of return, prior to any increase in rates, are
shown on the following page:

CLASS	CSP	OPCo
Total Retail	5.98%	4.72%
Residential (RR/RS)	6.83%	4.15%
General Service – Small (GS-1)	4.01%	5.18%
General Service - Low Load Factor (GS-2)	6.67%	3.06%
General Service – Medium Load Factor (GS-3)	2.47%	5.15%
General Service – Large (GS-4)	N.M.*	N.M.*
Electric Heating Schools (EHS)		-10.36%
Electric Heating General (EHG)		3.29%
School Service (SS)		1.80%
Outdoor Lighting (AL/OL)	4.08%	-1.05%
Street Lighting (SL)	7.31%	4.73%

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2 \* Result is not meaningful due to minimal rate base for class.

3 Q. HOW ARE THE CLASS COST-OF-SERVICE ALLOCATION STUDIES

4 USED IN THIS PROCEEDING?

A. Company witness Zelina discusses how he uses the results of the class cost-ofservice allocation studies to determine the requested rate increase by customer
class and subsequently to design the proposed rates.

8 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY?

9 A. Yes.

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of Daniel E. High has been served upon the below-named counsel via First Class mail, postage prepaid, this 14<sup>th</sup> day of March, 2011.

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COMPANY EX. NO.

### BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the Application of ) Columbus Southern Power Company and ) Ohio Power Company, Individually and, if ) Their Proposed Merger is Approved, as a ) Merged Company (collectively, AEP Ohio) ) for an Increase in Electric Distribution Rates)

Ohio Power Company, Individually and, if

Their Proposed Merger is Approved, as a

Merged Company (collectively AEP Ohio)

In the Matter of the Application of Columbus Southern Power Company and

for Tariff Approval

Case No. 11-352-EL-AIR

Case No. 11-351-EL-AIR

Case No. 11-353-EL-ATA Case No. 11-354-EL-ATA

In the Matter of the Application of Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company, Individually and, if Their Proposed Merger is Approved, as a Merged Company (collectively AEP Ohio) for Approval to Change Accounting Methods

Case No. 11-356-EL-AAM Case No. 11-358-EL-AAM

#### PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF THOMAS R. ZELINA ON BEHALF OF COLUMBUS SOUTHERN POWER COMPANY AND OHIO POWER COMPANY

Management Policies, Practices & Organizations

**Operating Income** 

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Filed March 14<sup>th</sup>, 2011

# INDEX TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF THOMAS R. ZELINA

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# BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISION OF OHIO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF THOMAS R. ZELINA ON BEHALF OF COLUMBUS SOUTHERN POWER COMPANY AND OHIO POWER COMPANY

1		I. PERSONAL DATA
2	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
3	A.	My name is Thomas R. Zelina. My business address is 1 Riverside Plaza, Columbus,
4		Ohio 43215.
5	Q.	BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?
6	A.	I am employed by American Electric Power Service Corporation (AEPSC), a subsidiary
7		of American Electric Power Company, Inc. (AEP), as Manager-Regulated Pricing and
8		Analysis. AEP Ohio is an operating unit of AEP and is comprised of Columbus Southern
9		Power (CSP) and Ohio Power Company (OPCo), hereby collectively referred to as AEP
10		Ohio or the Company.
11	Q.	PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL
12		BACKGROUND.
13	A.	I graduated from West Virginia University with a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil
14		Engineering in 1984 and a Master of Science degree in Civil Engineering in 1986. I am
15		also a licensed Professional Engineer in the state of Ohio. In 1993, I earned a Master of
16		Business Administration degree from The Ohio State University. In 2010, I completed
17		the New Mexico State Rate Fundamentals Course. In 1989, I joined AEPSC as an
18		engineer in the Civil Engineering Department. Since that time, I have progressed through

1		various engineering and management positions and moved into my current position of	
2		Manager-Regulated Pricing and Analysis in September 2010.	
3	Q.	WHAT ARE YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS MANAGER-REGULATED	
4		PRICING AND ANALYSIS?	
5	A.	My responsibilities include the oversight of the preparation of cost of service and rate	
6		design analysis for the AEP operating companies in Ohio, Michigan, Indiana and	
7		Kentucky.	
8		II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY	
9	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?	
10	A.	The purpose of my testimony is to sponsor or co-sponsor certain Schedules and certain	
11		rate elements shown on the Company's Tariff Schedules proposed in this filing.	
12		III. COMMENTS ON SCHEDULES	
13	Q.	WHAT SCHEDULES ARE YOU SPONSORING OR CO-SPONSORING?	
14	A.	I am sponsoring or co-sponsoring the following Schedules:	
15		• C-2.1, Operating Revenue	
16		• C-3.1 thru C-3.6, C-3.21 (CSP only) and C-3.22 (CSP only), Rider Revenue	
17		• E-4, Class and Schedule Revenue Summary	
18		• E-4.1, Test Year Revenue, Proposed vs. Current Rates	
19		• E-5, Typical Bill Comparison	
20	0.	WHAT PORTION OF SCHEDULE C-2.1 ARE YOU SPONSORING?	
	<b>Y</b> '		
21	<b>х</b> • А.	I am sponsoring the unadjusted base revenue as calculated in Column K, Page 2 of 2, on	

1 2 based upon test year billing determinants (three months actual and nine months forecasted for the period ending May 31, 2011) and current rates.

# 3 Q. WHAT PORTION OF SCHEDULES C-3.1 THRU C-3.6, C-3.21 AND C-3.22 ARE 4 YOU CO-SPONSORING?

5 Α. I am co-sponsoring the rider revenue adjustments shown on Schedules C-3.1 thru C-3.6, 6 C-3.21 (CSP only) and C-3.22 (CSP only). The rider revenue for each tariff is calculated 7 on Schedule E-4.1 by multiplying the billing determinants by the current approved rider rates. Company witness Moore sponsors the calculation of the proposed rider rates. 8 9 Consistent with the removal of rider-related rate base and expense amounts supported by 10 Company witness Mitchell, rider-related revenues have been removed from the cost of 11 service because these revenues and associated expenses are collected and recovered 12 separately through the various Commission-approved riders.

13 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN SCHEDULE E-4.

14 A. Schedule E-4 is the revenue summary schedule showing distribution revenues at current 15 rates and at the proposed rate level. This schedule is a summary of the sales, current 16 revenue, proposed revenue by rate schedule as computed in Schedule E-4.1 and the 17 percent of revenue each rate schedule contributes to total distribution service revenue. In 18 addition, Schedule E-4 displays the amount and percent increase proposed by rate 19 schedule.

20

# Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN SCHEDULE E-4.1.

A. Schedule E-4.1 provides the detail of the revenue calculations by rate schedule as
 summarized in Schedule E-4. This Schedule also presents the billing determinants
 associated with the respective rate schedules. The sales revenues for the 12 months

1 ended May 31, 2011 are based upon historical data for the three months ended August 31, 2 2010 and kWh sales and customer forecasts by revenue class for the nine months ended 3 May 31, 2011. The forecast was applied to historical billing units to develop projected 4 billing units by rate schedule for the 9-month forecast period. The projected billing units 5 were added to the actual billing units for the 3-month historical period to determine the 6 total billing units by rate schedule for the test year. These billing units were then 7 multiplied by current rates and the proposed rates to determine the current and projected 8 base distribution revenues by rate schedule.

9

### Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN SCHEDULE E-5.

A. Schedule E-5 is a typical bill comparison that presents the effect of the proposed rates on
 customer bills. Schedule E-5 shows the amount and percentage difference for a total bill
 at various consumption levels for the various rate schedules.

13

### IV. RATE DESIGN

### 14 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE GENERAL APPROACH TO RATE DESIGN.

A. In general, the Company's approach is to design rates and rate components which reflect the underlying costs to the Company. The primary objective is to design rates to reflect as nearly as possible the costs of providing each customer class with electric distribution service. In keeping with this objective, the Company proposes to apply the rate increase, excluding the proposed riders, to produce the same proposed rate of return for each customer class based on CSP's and OPCo's class cost-of-service study as sponsored by Company witness High in Schedule E-3.2.

In addition, as discussed by Company witness Hamrock, the proposed rates were designed to include a greater portion of the fixed distribution costs in fixed monthly

charges and/or demand charges to better align rates with costs. This also reduces the impact of distribution revenue fluctuations based on energy usage by customers.

1

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In this proceeding, we are focused on distribution-related costs. Distributionrelated costs are classified as either customer-related or primary/secondary demandcustomer-related costs are proposed to be collected through customer charges, with the rates designed to collect all customer-related costs through the customer charge. In addition, whenever possible, distribution demand costs are proposed to be collected through demand charges. For customers without demand meters, the distribution demand costs are proposed to be collected through energy charges per kWh.

# 10 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY THE PROPOSED CSP RATES ARE IDENTICAL TO 11 THE OPCO RATES ON AN INDIVIDUAL TARIFF BASIS.

A. We anticipate that the merger of CSP and OPCo will be completed by the time the new distribution rates are implemented. In anticipation of a new merged Ohio Power Company, a single set of distribution rates was designed to be applicable to both traditional CSP and OPCo rate areas. For rate design purposes, this was accomplished by combining CSP's and OPCo's proposed class revenue and billing determinants. The combined rates are shown in both the proposed CSP and OPCo Tariff Sheets. Separate rates for CSP and OPCo were also computed on an individual company basis.

# 19Q.PLEASE EXPLAIN THE CHANGES TO THE COMPANY'S RESIDENTIAL20SERVICE RATE DESIGN.

A. The costs of providing distribution service do not vary with volumetric usage and would
 ideally be collected through a monthly fixed charge or through demand charges. Since
 most residential customers do not have meters capable of measuring demands, residential

distribution demand costs are generally collected through per kWh energy charges. To collect the distribution demand costs, the Company is proposing a single per kWh energy charge applicable to all residential energy usage. One exception to this is the optional demand-metered residential service schedules, which include a monthly demand charge and no per kWh distribution energy charge. Customer-related costs for all residential customers are collected through a monthly customer charge established at the full customer cost.

# 8 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY A SINGLE ENERGY USAGE BLOCK WAS USED IN 9 THE RESIDENTIAL RATE DESIGN AS OPPOSED TO A BLOCKED RATE 10 DESIGN.

11 Previously, the portion of the customer-related costs not collected through the customer A. 12 charge was recovered through the first block of the energy rate. The proposed rate 13 design, which is based on full cost customer charges, eliminates the declining block 14 energy rate structure. While varied arguments can be made for the appropriateness of a 15 declining block rate design, the reality is that in today's environment such a design does 16 not necessarily encourage customers to efficiently use electricity. In fact, it can provide 17 the opposite price signal that the more you use, the less it costs per kWh. As such, the 18 Company believes it is time to eliminate this declining block structure in conjunction 19 with the establishment of the monthly customer charge based on the total customer-20 related costs.

# 1Q.PLEASE EXPLAIN THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED SMALL GENERAL2SERVICE RATE DESIGN.

A. The small general service schedule (GS-1) is applicable for general service to customers
with maximum demands of less than 10 kW. Similar to residential service customers,
small general service customers do not have demand metering and will pay distribution
demand costs through a single per kWh energy charge applicable to all usage blocks.
Customer related costs are proposed to be collected through the full cost customer charge.

# 8 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE COMPANY'S 9 COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL SERVICE RATE DESIGN.

10 A. OPCo and CSP currently have several commercial and industrial schedules applicable to 11 customers with demands greater than 10 kW. Schedules GS-2 and GS-3 are companion 12 schedules available to customers depending upon the load factor and size (demand) of the 13 customer. Schedule GS-2 is generally more beneficial for lower load factor customers 14 whereas Schedule GS-3 is generally more beneficial for higher load factor customers. 15 Schedule GS-4 is applicable to larger customers and/or customers served at higher 16 voltage levels. Customers have the opportunity to choose the rate schedule best suited to 17 their usage characteristics. This design is a legacy from when the Company's rates were 18 bundled and no longer makes sense in the context of rates for distribution service only. 19 In addition, OPCo currently has several end-use schedules (EHG, EHS and SS) for 20 electric heating service and school service customers which have been in the process of 21 elimination as approved by the Commission in the 1970's.

The costs of providing distribution service do not vary with volumetric usage, but vary based on the size (demand) of the customer and the voltage level at which the

customer is served due to the equipment required. Since all customers in this group have
demand meters, distribution demand costs are proposed to be collected through demand
charges which vary by voltage level. Because distribution costs do not vary with energy
usage, distribution demand charges and full cost customer charges have been designed
for all customers served under the demand-metered service schedules as a group,
differentiated only by service voltage level. Thus the proposed rate design better reflects
cost causation principles.

8 In the proposed rate design, all customers receiving service at a particular voltage 9 level will pay the same distribution demand charge per kW and customer charge per 10 month, regardless of whether that customer previously took service under current 11 Schedule GS-2, GS-3 or GS-4. For the purposes of distribution charges, the current 12 Schedules GS-2, GS-3, GS-4, EHG, EHS and SS customers will all be served under the 13 proposed Schedule GS-2.

### 14

# Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE PROPOSED LIGHTING RATE DESIGN.

15 A. Similar to the other rate designs, lighting rates are designed based on the costs of 16 providing this service to customers. The costs of providing Outdoor/Area Lighting and 17 Street Lighting service to customers include installation of lamps and fixtures as well as 18 lamp maintenance and energy consumed. Such charges are primarily a fixed monthly 19 charge based upon the type of lamp, fixture and other facilities installed.

20

21

# Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN OTHER PROPOSED RATES (IRP-D, AFS and SBS) WHICH YOU ARE SPONSORING.

A. Distribution charges proposed in Schedule IRP-D (Interruptible Power – Discretionary)
 are identical to the distribution charges proposed in Schedule GS-2. Schedule AFS

1 (Alternate Feed Service) is being added for customers requesting redundant facilities for 2 reliability purposes. The distribution demand charges proposed in Schedule AFS are 3 consistent with the proposed Schedule GS-2 demand charges. AFS customers will pay an 4 additional monthly charge for each kW of AFS capacity, which accounts for the added 5 cost of providing such service. For Schedule SBS (Standby Service), backup distribution 6 demand charges and maintenance energy charges are calculated consistent with the 7 proposed Schedule GS-2 demand charges.

# 8 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY?

9 A. Yes.

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of Thomas R. Zelina has been served upon the below-named counsel via First Class mail, postage prepaid, this 14<sup>th</sup> day of March, 2011.

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COMPANY EX. NO.

# BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO

In the Matter of the Application of )	
Columbus Southern Power Company and )	
Ohio Power Company, Individually and, if )	Case No. 11-351-EL-AIR
Their Proposed Merger is Approved, as a )	Case No. 11-352-EL-AIR
Merged Company (collectively, AEP Ohio) )	
for an Increase in Electric Distribution Rates)	
In the Matter of the Application of )	
Columbus Southern Power Company and )	
Ohio Power Company, Individually and, if )	Case No. 11-353-EL-ATA
Their Proposed Merger is Approved, as a )	Case No. 11-354-EL-ATA
Merged Company (collectively, AEP Ohio) )	
for Tariff Approval )	
In the Matter of the Application of )	
Columbus Southern Power Company and )	
Ohio Power Company, Individually and, if )	Case No. 11-356-EL-AAM
Their Proposed Merger is Approved, as a )	Case No. 11-358-EL-AAM
Merged Company (collectively, AEP Ohio) )	
for Approval to Change Accounting )	
Methods	

#### PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. AVERA ON BEHALF OF COLUMBUS SOUTHERN POWER COMPANY AND OHIO POWER COMPANY

Management Policies, Practices & Organizations

**Operating Income** 

Rate Base

Allocations

### X Rate of Return

Rates and Tariffs

Other

Filed March 14<sup>th</sup>, 2011

# DIRECT TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. AVERA

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<u>Exhibit</u>

# **Description**

Exhibit WEA-1	Qualifications of William E. Avera
Exhibit WEA-2	DCF Model – Utility Proxy Group
Exhibit WEA-3	Sustainable Growth Rate – Utility Proxy Group
Exhibit WEA-4	DCF Model – Non-Utility Proxy Group
Exhibit WEA-5	Sustainable Growth Rate – Non-Utility Proxy Group
Exhibit WEA-6	Capital Asset Pricing Model – Utility Proxy Group
Exhibit WEA-7	Capital Asset Pricing Model - Non-Utility Proxy Group
Exhibit WEA-8	Expected Earnings Approach – Utility Proxy Group
Exhibit WEA-9	Flotation Cost Adjustment Factor
Exhibit WEA-10	Capital Structure – Utility Proxy Group
### BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. AVERA ON BEHALF OF COLUMBUS SOUTHERN POWER COMPANY AND OHIO POWER COMPANY

#### I. INTRODUCTION

2 A. William E. Avera, 3907 Red River, Austin, Texas, 78751.

### 3 Q. IN WHAT CAPACITY ARE YOU EMPLOYED?

4 A. I am the President of FINCAP, Inc., a firm providing financial, economic, and
5 policy consulting services to business and government.

#### A. Qualifications

### 6 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE.

7 Α. I received a B.A. degree with a major in economics from Emory University. After 8 serving in the U.S. Navy, I entered the doctoral program in economics at the 9 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Upon receiving my Ph.D., I joined 10 the faculty at the University of North Carolina and taught finance in the Graduate 11 School of Business. I subsequently accepted a position at the University of Texas 12 at Austin where I taught courses in financial management and investment 13 analysis. I then went to work for International Paper Company in New York City 14 as Manager of Financial Education, a position in which I had responsibility for all 15 corporate education programs in finance, accounting, and economics.

In 1977, I joined the staff of the Public Utility Commission of Texas
("PUCT") as Director of the Economic Research Division. During my tenure at
the PUCT, I managed a division responsible for financial analysis, cost allocation

1	and rate design, economic and financial research, and data processing systems,
2	and I testified in cases on a variety of financial and economic issues. Since
3	leaving the PUCT, I have been engaged as a consultant. I have participated in a
4	wide range of assignments involving utility-related matters on behalf of utilities,
5	industrial customers, municipalities, and regulatory commissions. I have
6	previously testified before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"),
7	as well as the Federal Communications Commission, the Surface Transportation
8	Board (and its predecessor, the Interstate Commerce Commission), the Canadian
9	Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, and regulatory agencies,
10	courts, and legislative committees in over 40 states, including the Public Utilities
11	Commission of Ohio ("PUCO" or the "Commission").
12	In 1995, I was appointed by the PUCT to the Synchronous Interconnection
13	Committee to advise the Texas legislature on the costs and benefits of connecting
14	Texas to the national electric transmission grid. In addition, I served as an outside
15	director of Georgia System Operations Corporation, the system operator for
16	electric cooperatives in Georgia.
1 <b>7</b>	I have served as Lecturer in the Finance Department at the University of
18	Texas at Austin and taught in the evening graduate program at St. Edward's
19	University for twenty years. In addition, I have lectured on economic and
20	regulatory topics in programs sponsored by universities and industry groups. I
21	have taught in hundreds of educational programs for financial analysts in
22	programs sponsored by the Association for Investment Management and
23	Research, the Financial Analysts Review, and local financial analysts societies.
24	These programs have been presented in Asia, Europe, and North America,
25	including the Financial Analysts Seminar at Northwestern University. I hold the
26	Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA <sup>®</sup> ) designation and have served as Vice

1 President for Membership of the Financial Management Association. I have also 2 served on the Board of Directors of the North Carolina Society of Financial 3 Analysts. I was elected Vice Chairman of the National Association of Regulatory 4 Commissioners ("NARUC") Subcommittee on Economics and appointed to 5 NARUC's Technical Subcommittee on the National Energy Act. I have also 6 served as an officer of various other professional organizations and societies. A 7 resume containing the details of my experience and qualifications is attached as 8 Exhibit WEA-1.

#### B. Overview

9 Q. FOR WHOM ARE YOU TESTIFYING IN THIS CASE?

A. I am testifying on behalf of AEP Ohio, which is an operating unit of American
 Electric Power Company, Inc. ("AEP") and is comprised of Columbus Southern
 Power Company ("CSP") and Ohio Power Company ("OPCo"), hereby

13 collectively referred to as AEP Ohio or the Company.

### 14 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

A. The purpose of my testimony is to present to the PUCO my independent
assessment of the fair rate of return on equity ("ROE") that CSP and OPCo should
be authorized to earn on their investment in providing electric utility service. In
addition, I also examined the reasonableness of the Company's capital structure,
considering both the specific risks faced by AEP Ohio, as well as other industry
guidelines.

### 21 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE BASIS OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND

### 22 CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE ISSUES ON WHICH YOU ARE 23 TESTIFYING IN THIS CASE.

A. To prepare my testimony, I used information from a variety of sources that would
normally be relied upon by a person in my capacity. In connection with the

1		present filing, I considered and relied upon corporate disclosures, publicly
2		available financial reports and filings, and other published information relating to
3		the Company and its parent company, AEP. I also reviewed information relating
4		generally to capital market conditions and specifically to investor perceptions,
5		requirements, and expectations for electric utilities. These sources, coupled with
6		my experience in the fields of finance and utility regulation, have given me a
7		working knowledge of the issues relevant to investors' required return for AEP
8		Ohio, and they form the basis of my analyses and conclusions.
9	Q.	WHAT IS THE PRACTICAL TEST OF THE REASONABLENESS OF
10		THE ROE USED IN SETTING A UTILITY'S RATES?
11	A.	The ROE compensates common equity investors for the use of their capital to
12		finance the plant and equipment necessary to provide utility service. Investors
13		commit capital only if they expect to earn a return on their investment
14		commensurate with returns available from alternative investments with
15		comparable risks. To be consistent with sound regulatory economics and the
16		standards set forth by the Supreme Court in the Bluefield <sup>1</sup> and Hope <sup>2</sup> cases, a
17		utility's allowed ROE should be sufficient to: (1) fairly compensate investors for
18		capital invested in the utility, (2) enable the utility to offer a return adequate to
19		attract new capital on reasonable terms, and (3) maintain the utility's financial
20		integrity.
21	Q.	HOW IS YOUR TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?
22	A.	I first reviewed the operations and finances of CSP and OPCo and the general
23		conditions in the electric utility industry and the capital markets. With this as a
24		background, I conducted various well-accepted quantitative analyses to estimate

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923). <sup>2</sup> Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).

1	the current cost of equity, including alternative applications of the discounted cash
2	flow ("DCF") model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"), and also
3	made reference to expected earned rates of return for utilities. Based on the cost
4	of equity estimates indicated by my analyses, the Company's ROE was evaluated
5	taking into account the specific risks and potential challenges for their
6	jurisdictional electric utility operations in Ohio, as well as flotation costs, which
7	are properly considered in setting a fair rate of return on equity.

#### C. Summary of Conclusions

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### WHAT ARE YOUR FINDINGS REGARDING THE FAIR RATE OF

### 9 **RETURN ON EQUITY FOR THE COMPANY?**

10 A. Based on the results of my analyses and the economic requirements necessary to

11 support continuous access to capital, I recommend an ROE for the AEP Ohio

- 12 from the middle of my 10.55 percent to 11.55 percent reasonable range, or 11.15
  - percent. The bases for my conclusion are summarized below:
    - In order to reflect the risks and prospects associated with the Company's jurisdictional utility operations, my analyses focused on a proxy group of other electric utilities with comparable investment risks. Consistent with the fact that utilities must compete for capital with firms outside their own industry, I also referenced a proxy group of comparable risk companies in the non-utility sector of the economy;
    - Because investors' required return on equity is unobservable and no single method should be viewed in isolation, I applied both the DCF and CAPM methods, as well as the expected earnings approach, to estimate a fair ROE;
    - Based on the results of these analyses, and giving less weight to extremes at the high and low ends of the range, I concluded that the cost of equity for the proxy groups of utilities and non-utility companies is in the 10.4 percent to 11.4 percent range, or 10.55 percent to 11.55 percent after incorporating a minimal adjustment to account for the impact of common equity flotation costs;
    - The reasonableness of an 11.15 percent ROE for AEP Ohio, which falls at the midpoint of my reasonable range, is also supported by the exposures

1 2		associated with environmental mandates, the need to consider the expected upward trend in capital costs, and the need to support access to capital.
3	Q.	WHAT OTHER EVIDENCE DID YOU CONSIDER IN EVALUATING
4		YOUR ROE RECOMMENDATION IN THIS CASE?
5	A.	My recommendation was reinforced by the following findings:
6 7 8		• Sensitivity to financial market and regulatory uncertainties has increased dramatically and investors recognize that constructive regulation is a key ingredient in supporting utility credit standing and financial integrity; and,
9 10 11 12		• Providing the AEP Ohio with the opportunity to earn a return that reflects these realities is an essential ingredient to support AEP Ohio's financial position, which ultimately benefits customers by ensuring reliable service at lower long-run costs.
13	Q.	WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION AS TO THE REASONABLENESS OF
14		THE COMPANY'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE?
15	Α.	Based on my evaluation, I concluded that a common equity ratio of 52.8 percent
16		represents a reasonable capitalization for AEP Ohio. This conclusion was based
17		on the following findings:
18 19 20		• The common equity ratio implied by AEP Ohio's combined capital structure falls within the range of capitalizations maintained by the proxy group of utilities based on data at year-end and near-term expectations;
21 22		<ul> <li>The additional leverage implied by the Company's obligations under operating leases warrant a more conservative financial posture; and,</li> </ul>
23 24 25		• The requested capitalization reflects the need to support the credit standing and financial flexibility of the AEP Ohio as it seeks to fund system investments and meet the requirements of their customers.
		II. FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSES
26	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION?
27	A.	As a predicate to subsequent quantitative analyses, this section briefly reviews the
28		operations and finances of CSP and OPCo. In addition, it examines the risks and

29 prospects for the electric utility industry and conditions in the capital markets and

the general economy. An understanding of the fundamental factors driving the
 risks and prospects of electric utilities is essential in developing an informed
 opinion of investors' expectations and requirements that are the basis of a fair rate
 of return.

A. Columbus Southern Power Company and Ohio Power Company
5 Q. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE AEP OHIO AND ITS ELECTRIC UTILITY
6 OPERATIONS.

7 Α. Both CSP and OPCo are wholly-owned subsidiaries of AEP principally engaged 8 in providing electric generation, transmission, and distribution utility service. 9 CSP provides service to approximately 749,000 retail customers in Ohio, in 10 addition to supplying and marketing electric power at wholesale to other electric 11 utilities, municipalities and other market participants. CSP's two separate service 12 territories include portions of twenty-five Ohio counties, with one area including 13 the City of Columbus and the other being a predominantly rural area in south central Ohio. 14

15 OPCo provides electric utility service to approximately 710,000 retail 16 customers in the northwestern, east central, eastern and southern sections of Ohio. 17 Like CSP, OPCo also provides electric power at wholesale, including to its 18 affiliate, Wheeling Power Company ("WPCo"). WPCo, which purchases all of its 19 electric power needs from OPCo, provides electric service to approximately 20 41,000 retail customers in northern West Virginia. At September 30, 2010, CSP 21 had total assets of \$4.4 billion, with OPCo's assets amounting to \$8.7 billion. In 22 October 2010, the Company filed an application to merge with the PUCO, which 23 would result in a combined rate structure.

24Together, AEP Ohio operates over 12,200 megawatts ("MW") of25generating capacity and, along with other operating subsidiaries of AEP, are

1parties to an interconnection agreement that defines how they share the costs and2benefits associated with their respective generating plants. The Company's3transmission and distribution facilities consist of over 46,000 miles of4transmission and distribution lines. CSP and OPCo are members of PJM5Interconnection, LLC ("PJM"), a FERC-approved transmission organization, and6as part of the AEP-East zone provide regional transmission service pursuant to the7PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff.

8 CSP and OPCo operate as functionally separated utilities and provide 9 "default" retail electric service to retail customers at unbundled rates. The electric 10 market framework in Ohio remains in transition, although approval of the Electric 11 Security Plan ("ESP") provides near-term clarity through 2011. The ESP 12 established rates for standard offer service and provides for a fuel adjustment 13 clause mechanism, subject to specific rate caps. Certain amounts over the 14 authorized percentage increase allowed under the caps can be deferred for future 15 recovery. Under the ESP, the Company is also subject to a Significantly 16 Excessive Earnings Test ("SEET"), which requires that the PUCO evaluate the 17 earned rates of return of each electric utility with an approved ESP.

### 18 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE AEP SYSTEM.

A. AEP delivers electricity to more than 5 million customers across 11 states,
including Ohio, Indiana, West Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky, Michigan, Tennessee,
Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas. AEP is one of the largest electric
utilities in the U.S., with its combined utility system including over 38,000 MW
of generating capacity and over 225,000 miles of transmission and distribution
lines. AEP's electric utility subsidiaries rely primarily on coal-fired generation,
which makes up approximately 76 percent of total capacity in the Eastern zone of

1		the AEP system that includes AEP Ohio. During 2009, AEP's revenues totaled
2		approximately \$13.5 billion, with total assets at year-end of \$48.3 billion.
3	Q.	WHERE DOES AEP OHIO OBTAIN THE CAPITAL USED TO FINANCE
4		ITS INVESTMENT IN ELECTRIC UTILITY PLANT?
5	А.	As wholly-owned subsidiaries of AEP, the CSP and OPCo obtain common equity
6		capital solely from their parent, whose common stock is publicly traded on the
7		New York Stock Exchange. In addition to capital supplied by AEP, CSP and
8		OPCo also issue debt securities directly under their own names.
9	Q.	WHAT CREDIT RATINGS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO AEP OHIO?
10	А.	Currently, CSP and OPCo are assigned a corporate credit rating of "BBB" by
11		Standard & Poor's Corporation (S&P). Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) has
12		assigned an issuer rating of "A3" to CSP, with OPCo's issuer rating being one
13		notch lower at "Baa1". Meanwhile, Fitch Ratings Ltd. (Fitch) has assigned a
14		"BBB+" issuer default rating to CSP, while rating OPCo one notch lower at
15		"BBB".

### B. Risks for AEP Ohio

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### HOW HAVE INVESTORS' RISK PERCEPTIONS FOR THE UTILITY INDUSTRY EVOLVED?

A. Implementation of structural change, along with other factors impacting the
economy and the industry, has caused investors to rethink their assessment of the
relative risks associated with utilities. The past decade witnessed steady erosion
in credit quality throughout the utility industry, both as a result of revised
perceptions of the risks in the industry and the weakened finances of the utilities
themselves. S&P recently reported that the majority of the companies in the

- 1 utility sector now fall in the triple-B rating category.<sup>3</sup> In December 2009, S&P
  - observed with respect to the industry's future that:

Looming costs associated with environmental compliance, slack demand caused by economic weakness, the potential for permanent demand destruction caused by changes in consumer behavior and closing of manufacturing facilities, and numerous regulatory filings seeking recovery of costs are some of the significant challenges the industry has to deal with.<sup>4</sup>

9 Q. DOES THE COMPANY ANTICIPATE THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL

### 10 CAPITAL GOING FORWARD?

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- 11 A. Yes. AEP Ohio will require capital investment to provide for necessary
- 12 maintenance and replacements of its utility infrastructure, as well as to fund new
- 13 investment in electric generation, transmission and distribution facilities. AEP
- 14 plans to invest an additional \$2.6 billion in utility assets during 2011 and \$2.9
- 15 billion in 2012,<sup>5</sup> while combined construction expenditures at CSP and OPCo are
- 16 anticipated to total over \$454 million in 2011 alone.<sup>6</sup> In addition, AEP Ohio must
- 17 refinance scheduled maturities of \$195 million in 2012 and \$806 million in 2013.
- 18 Support for AEP Ohio's financial integrity and flexibility will be instrumental in
- 19 attracting the capital required to fund these needs in an effective manner.

### 20 Q. IS THE POTENTIAL FOR ENERGY MARKET VOLATILITY AN

### 21 ONGOING CONCERN FOR INVESTORS?

22 A. Yes. In recent years utilities and their customers have had to contend with

23 dramatic fluctuations in fuel costs due to ongoing price volatility in the spot

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Standard & Poor's Corporation, "Ratings Trend In U.S. Electric Utility Sector Turns More Negative In First Quarter Of 2010," *RatingsDirect* (Apr. 16, 2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Standard & Poor's Corporation, "U.S. Regulated Electric Utilities Head Into 2010 With Familiar Concerns," *RatingsDirect* (Dec. 28, 2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> American Electric Power Company, Inc., *BMO Capital Markets 6<sup>th</sup> Annual Utilities Conference* (Nov. 30, 2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Direct Testimony of Joseph Hamrock at Exhibit JH-1, Case No. 10-1261-EL-UNC.

1 markets, and investors recognize the potential for further turmoil in energy 2 markets. In times of extreme volatility, utilities can quickly find themselves in a 3 significant under-recovery position with respect to power costs, which can 4 severely stress liquidity. Coal has historically provided relative stability with 5 respect to fuel costs, but prices experienced significant volatility over the 2007 – 6 2009 time period. The power industry and its customers have also had to contend 7 with dramatic fluctuations in gas costs due to ongoing price volatility in the spot 8 markets.

9 While current expectations for significantly lower power prices reflect 10 weaker fundamentals affecting current load and fuel prices, investors recognize 11 the potential that such trends could quickly reverse. S&P observed that "shortterm price volatility from numerous possibilities ... is always possible,"<sup>7</sup> while 12 Fitch noted, "uncertainty regarding fuel prices, in particular natural gas costs, has 13 made planning for the future even more problematic."<sup>8</sup> Moody's concluded that 14 15 utilities remain exposed to fluctuations in energy prices, observing, "This view, 16 that commodity prices remain low, could easily be proved incorrect, due to the evidence of historical volatility."9 17

18 Q. ARE CSP AND OPCO PROTECTED FROM EXPOSURE TO

19 FLUCTUATIONS IN POWER SUPPLY COSTS THROUGH THE ESP?

A. To a limited extent, yes. If applied as intended, the ESP supports the Company's
 financial integrity and is an example of constructive regulation. But even for
 utilities with energy cost adjustment mechanisms in place, there can be a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Standard & Poor's Corporation, "Top 10 Investor Questions: U.S. Regulated Electric Utilities," *RatingsDirect* (Jan. 22, 2010).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Fitch Ratings, Ltd., "Electric Utility Capital Spending: The Show Will Go On," Global Power U.S. and Canada Special Report (Oct. 14, 2009).
 <sup>9</sup> Moody's Investors Service, "U.S. Electric Utilities: Uncertain Times Ahead; Strengthening Balance

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Moody's Investors Service, "U.S. Electric Utilities: Uncertain Times Ahead; Strengthening Balance Sheets Now Would Protect Credit," *Special Comment* (Oct. 28, 2010).

1		significant lag between the time the utility actually incurs the expenditure and
2		when it is recovered from ratepayers. As a result, the ESP does not insulate AEP
3		Ohio from the need to finance deferred power production and supply costs.
4		Indeed, despite the significant investment of resources to manage fuel
5		procurement, investors are aware that the best that AEP Ohio can do is to recover
6		its actual costs. In other words, the Company earns no return on fuel costs and are
7		exposed to disallowances for imprudence in its fuel procurement.
8	Q.	WHAT OTHER FINANCIAL PRESSURES IMPACT INVESTORS' RISK
9		ASSESSMENT OF AEP OHIO?
10	Α.	Investors are aware of the financial and regulatory pressures faced by utilities
11		associated with rising costs and the need to undertake significant capital
12		investments. As Moody's observed:
13 14 15		Utilities remain exposed to large, long-term capital investment challenges, volatile commodity prices and legal judgments that can wreak havoc on even the strongest liquidity profiles. <sup>10</sup>
16		Similarly, S&P noted that cost increases and capital projects, along with uncertain
17		load growth, were a significant challenge to the utility industry. <sup>11</sup> Fitch reached
18		similar conclusions:
19 20 21		The combination of high capital expenditures and relatively weak electricity demand will continue to pressure credit quality and require base rate increases in 2010 and beyond. <sup>12</sup>
22		As noted earlier, investors anticipate that the Company and AEP will undertake
23		significant electric utility capital expenditures. While providing the infrastructure

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Moody's Investors Service, "U.S. Electric Utilities Face Challenges Beyond Near-Term," *Industry Outlook* (January 2010).
 <sup>11</sup> Standard & Poor's Corporation, "Industry Economic And Ratings Outlook," *RatingsDirect* (Feb. 2, New York, N

 <sup>2010).
 &</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Fitch Ratings Ltd., "U.S. Utilities, Power, and Gas 2010 Outlook," Global Power North America Special

Report (Dec. 4, 2009).

1 necessary to meet the energy needs of customers is certainly desirable, it imposes 2 additional financial responsibilities on AEP Ohio.

3 0. ARE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS ALSO AFFECTING 4 **INVESTORS' EVALUATION OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES, INCLUDING** 5 **AEP OHIO?** 

6 Α. Yes. Although AEP Ohio's exposure has been moderated through its ability to 7 recoup certain environmental-related expenditures through the ESP, utilities are 8 confronting increased environmental pressures that could impose significant 9 uncertainties and costs. Moody's noted that "the prospect for new environmental 10 emission legislation - particularly concerning carbon dioxide - represents the biggest emerging issue for electric utilities."<sup>13</sup> While the momentum for carbon 11 12 emissions legislation has slowed, expectations for eventual regulations continue to 13 pose uncertainty. Fitch recently concluded, "Prospects of costly environmental 14 regulations will create uncertainty for investors in the electricity business in 2011."<sup>14</sup> With respect to AEP Ohio, Moody's concluded: 15

16 Most of the electric generation in Ohio – about 80% – is derived from coal-fired facilities. This exposure to coal-fired generation 18 puts incremental risks on the state amid the prospect of 19 increasingly stringent environmental regulations - especially regarding carbon dioxide emissions.<sup>15</sup> 20

17

21 S&P confirmed this view, noting that, "material compliance costs related to 22 multiple forthcoming and pending emissions rules could pressure credit quality."16 23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Moody's Investors Service, "U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Utilities," Industry Outlook (Jan. 2009). <sup>14</sup> Fitch Ratings Ltd., "2011 Outlook: U.S. Utilities, Power, and Gas," Global Power North America Special Report (Dec. 20, 2010)

Moody's Investors Service, "Investor-Owned Electric Utilities in Ohio," Special Comment (Feb. 2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Standard & Poor's Corporation, "Ohio Power Co.," RatingsDirect (Dec. 16, 2010).

### C. Impact of Capital Market Conditions

1	Q.	WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT CAPITAL MARKET
2		CONDITIONS?
3	A.	The deep financial and real estate crisis that the country experienced in late 2008,
4		and continuing into 2009 led to unprecedented price fluctuations in the capital
5		markets as investors dramatically revised their risk perceptions and required
6		returns. As a result of investors' trepidation to commit capital, stock prices
7		declined sharply while the yields on corporate bonds experienced a dramatic
8		increase.
9		With respect to utilities specifically, as of December 2010, the Dow Jones
10		Utility Average stock index remained approximately 25 percent below the
11		previous high reached in May 2008. This prolonged sell-off in common stocks
12		and sharp fluctuations in utility bond yields reflect the fact that the utility industry
13		is not immune to the impact of financial market turmoil and the ongoing
14		economic downturn. As the Edison Electric Institute ("EEI") noted in a letter to
15		congressional representatives in September 2008 as the financial crisis intensified,
16		capital market uncertainties have serious implications for utilities and their
17		customers:
18 19 20 21 22		In the wake of the continuing upheaval on Wall Street, capital markets are all but immobilized, and short-term borrowing costs to utilities have already increased substantially. If the financial crisis is not resolved quickly, financial pressures on utilities will intensify sharply, resulting in higher costs to our customers and, ultimately,
23		could compromise service reliability. <sup>17</sup>
24		Similarly, an October 1, 2008 Wall Street Journal report confirmed that utilities
25		had been forced to delay borrowing or pursue more costly alternatives to raise

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Letter to House of Representatives, Thomas R. Kuhn, President, Edison Electric Institute (Sep. 24, 2008).

1	funds. <sup>18</sup> In December 2008, Fitch confirmed "sharp repricing of and aversion to
2	risk in the investment community," and noted that the disruptions in financial
3	markets and the fundamental shift in investors' risk perceptions had increased the
4	cost of capital for utilities. <sup>19</sup>
5	While conditions have improved significantly since the depths of the
6	crisis, investors have nonetheless had to confront ongoing fluctuations in share
7	prices and stress in the credit markets. As the Wall Street Journal noted in
8	February 2010:
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Stocks pulled out of a 167-point hole with a late rally Friday, capping a wild week reminiscent of the most volatile days of the credit crisis It was a return to the unusual relationships, or correlations, seen at major flash points over the past two years when investors fled risky assets and jumped into safe havens. This market behavior, which has reasserted itself repeatedly since the financial crisis began, suggests that investment decisions are still being driven more by government support and liquidity concerns than market
17	fundamentals. <sup>20</sup>
18	In response to renewed capital market uncertainties initiated by ongoing
19	concerns over the European sovereign debt crisis and the sustainability of
20	economic growth, investors have repeatedly fled to the safety of U.S. Treasury
21	bonds, and stock prices have experienced renewed volatility. The dramatic rise in
22	the price of gold and other commodities also attests to investors' heightened
23	concerns over prospective challenges and risks, including the overhanging threat
24	of inflation and renewed economic turmoil. With respect to electric utilities, Fitch
25	observed that, "the outlook for the sector would be adversely affected by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Smith, Rebecca, "Corporate News: Utilities' Plans Hit by Credit Markets," Wall Street Journal at B4

 <sup>(</sup>Oct. 1, 2008).
 <sup>19</sup> Fitch Ratings Ltd., "U.S. Utilities, Power and Gas 2009 Outlook," *Global Power North America Special Report* (Dec. 22. 2008).
 <sup>20</sup> Gongloff, Mark, "Stock Rebound Is a Crisis Flashback – Late Surge Recalls Market's Volatility at Peak of Credit Difficulties; Unusual Correlations," *Wall Street Journal* at B1 (Feb. 6, 2010).

significantly higher inflation and interest rates.<sup>21</sup> Uncertainties surrounding
 economic and capital market conditions heighten the risks faced by electric
 utilities, which, as described earlier, face a variety of operating and financial
 challenges.

### 5Q.HOW DO INTEREST RATES ON LONG-TERM BONDS COMPARE6WITH THOSE PROJECTED FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS?

A. Table WEA-1 below compares current interest rates on 30-year Treasury bonds,
triple-A rated corporate bonds, and double-A rated utility bonds with near-term
projections from the Value Line Investment Survey ("Value Line"), IHS Global
Insight, Blue Chip Financial Forecasts ("Blue Chip"), and the Energy Information
Administration ("EIA"), which is a statistical agency of the U.S. Department of
Energy ("DOE"):

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Fitch Ratings Ltd., "2011 Outlook: U.S. Utilities, Power, and Gas," *Global Power North America Special Report* (Dec. 20, 2010).

### TABLE WEA-1 INTEREST RATE TRENDS

	<u>2012</u>	<u>2013</u>	2014	2015	Current (a)
30-Yr. Treasury		—			
Value Line (b)	4.7%	5.5%	5.8%		4.0%
IHS Global Insight (c)	3.8%	5.0%	5.1%	6.0%	4.0%
Blue Chip (d)	4.8%	5.2%	5.4%	5.5%	4.0%
AAA Corporate					
Value Line (b)	5.6%	6.0%	6.5%		4.8%
IHS Global Insight (c)	4.7%	6.0%	6.2%	6.8%	4.8%
Blue Chip (d)	5.4%	5.8%	6.1%	6.3%	4.8%
S&P (e)	6.7%	7.7%	7.6%		4.8%
AA Utility					:
IHS Global Insight (c)	5.0%	6.2%	6.4%	7.2%	5.0%
EIA (f)	5.5%	6.4%	7.0%	7.4%	5.0%

(a) Based on monthly average bond yields for the six-month period Aug. 2010 - Jan. 2011 reported at www.credittrends.moodys.com and http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases /h15/data.htm.

(b) The Value Line Investment Survey, Forecast for the U.S. Economy (Nov. 26, 2010).

(c) IHS Global Insight, U.S. Economic Outlook at 19 (September 2010).

(d) Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 29, No. 12 (Dec. 1, 2010).

(e) Standard & Poor's Corporation, "U.S. Economic Forecast: A More Prosperous 2011?," *RatingsDirect* (Jan. 5, 2011).

(f) Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2011 Early Release (Dec. 16, 2010).

As evidenced above, there is a clear consensus that the cost of permanent capital will be higher in the 2012-2015 timeframe than it is currently. As a result, current cost of capital estimates are likely to understate investors' requirements at the time the outcome of this proceeding becomes effective and beyond.

7

8

### Q. WHAT DO THESE EVENTS IMPLY WITH RESPECT TO THE ROE FOR

### **AEP OHIO?**

9 A. No one knows the future of our complex global economy. We know that the
10 financial crisis had been building for a long time, and few predicted that the
11 economy would fall as rapidly as it has, or that corporate bond yields would
12 fluctuate as dramatically as they did. While conditions in the economy and

13 capital markets appear to have stabilized significantly since 2009, investors

1 continue to react swiftly and negatively to any future signs of trouble in the 2 financial system or economy. The fact remains that the electric utility industry 3 requires significant new capital investment. Given the importance of reliable 4 electric utility service, it would be unwise to ignore investors' increased 5 sensitivity to risk and future capital market trends in evaluating a fair ROE in this 6 case. Similarly, AEP Ohio's capital structure must also preserve the financial 7 flexibility necessary to maintain access to capital even during times of 8 unfavorable market conditions.

#### **III. CAPITAL MARKET ESTIMATES**

#### 9 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION?

10 A. This section presents capital market estimates of the cost of equity. First, I 11 address the concept of the cost of common equity, along with the risk-return 12 tradeoff principle fundamental to capital markets. Next, I describe DCF and 13 CAPM analyses conducted to estimate the cost of common equity for benchmark 14 groups of comparable risk firms and evaluate expected earned rates of return for 15 utilities. Finally, I examine flotation costs, which are properly considered in 16 evaluating a fair rate of return on equity.

#### Α. **Economic Standards**

#### 17 0. WHAT ROLE DOES THE RATE OF RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY 18 PLAY IN A UTILITY'S RATES?

19 The return on common equity is the cost of inducing and retaining investment in Α. 20the utility's physical plant and assets. This investment is necessary to finance the 21 asset base needed to provide utility service. Investors will commit money to a 22 particular investment only if they expect it to produce a return commensurate with 23 those from other investments with comparable risks. Moreover, the return on

1		common equity is integral in achieving the sound regulatory objectives of rates
2		that are sufficient to: 1) fairly compensate capital investment in the utility, 2)
3		enable the utility to offer a return adequate to attract new capital on reasonable
4		terms, and 3) maintain the utility's financial integrity. Meeting these objectives
5		allows the utility to fulfill its obligation to provide reliable service while meeting
6		the needs of customers through necessary system expansion.
7	Q.	WHAT FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC PRINCIPLE UNDERLIES THE
8	-	COST OF EQUITY CONCEPT?
9	A.	The fundamental economic principle underlying the cost of equity concept is the
10		notion that investors are risk averse. In capital markets where relatively risk-free
11		assets are available (e.g., U.S. Treasury securities), investors can be induced to
12		hold riskier assets only if they are offered a premium, or additional return, above
13		the rate of return on a risk-free asset. Because all assets compete with each other
14		for investor funds, riskier assets must yield a higher expected rate of return than
15		safer assets to induce investors to invest and hold them.
16		Given this risk-return tradeoff, the required rate of return $(k)$ from an asset
17		(i) can generally be expressed as:
18		$k_i = R_f + RP_i$
19 20		where: $R_{\rm f}$ = Risk-free rate of return, and $RP_{\rm i}$ = Risk premium required to hold riskier asset i.
21		Thus, the required rate of return for a particular asset at any time is a function of:
22		(1) the yield on risk-free assets, and (2) the asset's relative risk, with investors
23		demanding correspondingly larger risk premiums for bearing greater risk.

1

Q.

IS THERE EVIDENCE THAT THE RISK-RETURN TRADEOFF
---

2 PRINCIPLE ACTUALLY OPERATES IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS? 3 A. Yes. The risk-return tradeoff can be readily documented in segments of the 4 capital markets where required rates of return can be directly inferred from market 5 data and where generally accepted measures of risk exist. Bond yields, for 6 example, reflect investors' expected rates of return, and bond ratings measure the 7 risk of individual bond issues. The observed yields on government securities. 8 which are considered free of default risk, and bonds of various rating categories 9 demonstrate that the risk-return tradeoff does, in fact, exist in the capital markets.

# 10 Q. DOES THE RISK-RETURN TRADEOFF OBSERVED WITH FIXED 11 INCOME SECURITIES EXTEND TO COMMON STOCKS AND OTHER 12 ASSETS?

13 Α. It is generally accepted that the risk-return tradeoff evidenced with long-term debt 14 extends to all assets. Documenting the risk-return tradeoff for assets other than 15 fixed income securities, however, is complicated by two factors. First, there is no 16 standard measure of risk applicable to all assets. Second, for most assets -17 including common stock – required rates of return cannot be directly observed. 18 Yet there is every reason to believe that investors exhibit risk aversion in deciding 19 whether or not to hold common stocks and other assets, just as when choosing 20among fixed-income securities.

### 21 Q. IS THIS RISK-RETURN TRADEOFF LIMITED TO DIFFERENCES 22 BETWEEN FIRMS?

A. No. The risk-return tradeoff principle applies not only to investments in different
 firms, but also to different securities issued by the same firm. The securities
 issued by a utility vary considerably in risk because they have different
 characteristics and priorities. Long-term debt is senior among all capital in its

claim on a utility's net revenues and is, therefore, the least risky. The last
 investors in line are common shareholders. They receive only the net revenues, if
 any, remaining after all other claimants have been paid. As a result, the rate of
 return that investors require from a utility's common stock, the most junior and
 riskiest of its securities, must be considerably higher than the yield offered by the
 utility's senior, long-term debt.

### Q. WHAT DOES THE ABOVE DISCUSSION IMPLY WITH RESPECT TO 8 ESTIMATING THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY FOR A UTILITY?

9 Although the cost of common equity cannot be observed directly, it is a function Α. 10 of the returns available from other investment alternatives and the risks to which 11 the equity capital is exposed. Because it is not readily observable, the cost of 12 common equity for a particular utility must be estimated by analyzing information 13 about capital market conditions generally, assessing the relative risks of the 14 company specifically, and employing various quantitative methods that focus on 15 investors' required rates of return. These various quantitative methods typically 16 attempt to infer investors' required rates of return from stock prices, interest rates, 17 or other capital market data.

## 18 Q. DID YOU RELY ON A SINGLE METHOD TO ESTIMATE THE COST OF 19 COMMON EQUITY?

A. No. In my opinion, no single method or model should be relied on by itself to
determine a utility's cost of common equity because no single approach can be
regarded as definitive. Therefore, I applied both the DCF and CAPM methods to
estimate the cost of common equity. In addition, I also evaluated a fair ROE
using an earnings approach based on investors' current expectations in the capital
markets. In my opinion, comparing estimates produced by one method with those

produced by other approaches ensures that the estimates of the cost of common
 equity pass fundamental tests of reasonableness and economic logic.

**B.** Comparable Risk Proxy Groups

### **3** Q. HOW DID YOU IMPLEMENT THESE QUANTITATIVE METHODS TO

### 4 ESTIMATE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY FOR THE COMPANY?

5 A. Application of the DCF model and other quantitative methods to estimate the cost 6 of common equity requires observable capital market data, such as stock prices. 7 Moreover, even for a firm with publicly traded stock, the cost of common equity 8 can only be estimated. As a result, applying quantitative models using observable 9 market data only produces an estimate that inherently includes some degree of 10 observation error. Thus, the accepted approach to increase confidence in the 11 results is to apply the DCF model and other quantitative methods to a proxy group 12 of publicly traded companies that investors regard as risk-comparable.

13 Q. WHAT SPECIFIC PROXY GROUP OF UTILITIES DID YOU RELY ON

### 14 FOR YOUR ANALYSIS?

15 A. In order to reflect the risks and prospects associated with AEP Ohio's 16 jurisdictional utility operations, my DCF analyses focused on a reference group of 17 other utilities composed of those companies classified by Value Line as electric 18 utilities with: (1) S&P corporate credit ratings of "BBB-" to "BBB+", (2) a Value 19 Line Safety Rank of "2" or "3", 3) a Value Line Financial Strength Rating of 20 "B+" to "A", and (4) a market capitalization of \$1.6 billion or greater. In 21 addition, I eliminated four utilities (Allegheny Energy, Inc., FirstEnergy Corp., 22 Northeast Utilities, and Progress Energy, Inc.) that otherwise would have been in 23 the proxy group, but are not appropriate for inclusion because they are currently 24 involved in a major merger or acquisition. These criteria resulted in a proxy

group composed of 22 companies, which I will refer to as the "Utility Proxy
 Group."

### 3 Q. WHAT OTHER PROXY GROUP DID YOU CONSIDER IN EVALUATING 4 A FAIR ROE?

5 Α. Under the regulatory standards established by Hope and Bluefield, the salient 6 criterion in establishing a meaningful benchmark to evaluate a fair ROE is relative 7 risk, not the particular business activity or degree of regulation. With regulation 8 taking the place of competitive market forces, required returns for utilities should 9 be in line with those of non-utility firms of comparable risk operating under the 10 constraints of free competition. Consistent with this accepted regulatory standard, 11 I also applied the DCF model to a reference group of comparable risk companies 12 in the non-utility sectors of the economy. I refer to this group as the "Non-Utility 13 Proxy Group".

### 14 Q. DO UTILITIES HAVE TO COMPETE WITH NON-REGULATED FIRMS 15 FOR CAPITAL?

A. Yes. The cost of capital is an opportunity cost based on the returns that investors
could realize by putting their money in other alternatives. Clearly, the total
capital invested in utility stocks is only the tip of the iceberg of total common
stock investment, and there are a plethora of other enterprises available to
investors beyond those in the utility industry. Utilities must compete for capital,
not just against firms in their own industry, but with other investment
opportunities of comparable risk.

Q. IS IT CONSISTENT WITH THE *BLUEFIELD* AND *HOPE* CASES TO
 CONSIDER REQUIRED RETURNS FOR NON-UTILITY COMPANIES?

- 25 A. Yes. Returns in the competitive sector of the economy form the very
- 26 underpinning for utility ROEs because regulation purports to serve as a substitute

1		for the actions of competitive markets. The Supreme Court has recognized that it
2		is the degree of risk, not the nature of the business, which is relevant in evaluating
3		an allowed ROE for a utility. The Bluefield case refers to "business undertakings
4		attended with comparable risks and uncertainties." It does not restrict
5		consideration to other utilities. Similarly, the Hope case states:
6 7 8		By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. <sup>22</sup>
9		As in the Bluefield decision, there is nothing to restrict "other enterprises" solely
10		to the utility industry.
11		Indeed, in teaching regulatory policy I usually observe that in the early
12		applications of the comparable earnings approach, utilities were explicitly
13		eliminated due to a concern about circularity. In other words, soon after the Hope
14		decision regulatory commissions did not want to get involved in circular logic by
15		looking to the returns of utilities that were established by the same or similar
16		regulatory commissions in the same geographic region. To avoid circularity,
17		regulators looked only to the returns of non-utility companies.
18	Q.	DOES CONSIDERATION OF THE RESULTS FOR THE NON-UTILITY
19		PROXY GROUP MAKE THE ESTIMATION OF THE COST OF EQUITY
20		USING THE DCF MODEL MORE RELIABLE?
21	А.	Yes. The estimates of growth from the DCF model depend on analysts' forecasts.
22		It is possible for utility growth rates to be distorted by short-term trends in the
23		industry or the industry falling into favor or disfavor by analysts. The result of
24		such distortions would be to bias the DCF estimates for utilities. For example,

<sup>22</sup> Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co. (320 U.S. 391, 1944).

1		Value Line recently observed that near-term growth rates understate the longer-
2		term expectations for gas utilities:
3 4 5 6 7 8 9		Natural Gas Utility stocks have fallen near the bottom of our Industry spectrum for Timeliness. Accordingly, short-term investors would probably do best to find a group with better prospects over the coming six to 12 months. Longer-term, we expect these businesses to rebound. An improved economic environment, coupled with stronger pricing, should boost results across this sector over the coming years. <sup>23</sup>
10		Because the Non-Utility Proxy Group includes low risk companies from many
11		industries, it diversifies away any distortion that may be caused by the ebb and
12		flow of enthusiasm for a particular sector.
13	Q.	WHAT CRITERIA DID YOU APPLY TO DEVELOP THE NON-UTILITY
14		PROXY GROUP?
15	A.	My comparable risk proxy group was composed of those U.S. companies
16		followed by Value Line that: 1) pay common dividends; 2) have a Safety Rank of
17		"1"; 3) have a Financial Strength Rating of "B++" or greater; 4) have a beta of
18		0.85 or less; and, 5) have an investment grade corporate credit rating from S&P.
19	Q.	DO THESE CRITERIA PROVIDE OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE TO
20		EVALUATE INVESTORS' RISK PERCEPTIONS?
21	A.	Yes. Credit ratings are assigned by independent rating agencies for the purpose of
22		providing investors with a broad assessment of the creditworthiness of a firm.
23		Ratings generally extend from triple-A (the highest) to D (in default). Other
24		symbols (e.g., "A+") are used to show relative standing within a category.
25		Because the rating agencies' evaluation includes virtually all of the factors
26		normally considered important in assessing a firm's relative credit standing,
27		corporate credit ratings provide a broad, objective measure of overall investment

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> The Value Line Investment Survey at 445 (Mar. 12, 2010).

risk that is readily available to investors. Widely cited in the investment
 community and referenced by investors, credit ratings are also frequently used as
 a primary risk indicator in establishing proxy groups to estimate the cost of
 common equity.

While credit ratings provide the most widely referenced benchmark for 5 6 investment risks, other quality rankings published by investment advisory services 7 also provide relative assessments of risks that are considered by investors in 8 forming their expectations for common stocks. Value Line's primary risk 9 indicator is its Safety Rank, which ranges from "1" (Safest) to "5" (Riskiest). 10 This overall risk measure is intended to capture the total risk of a stock, and incorporates elements of stock price stability and financial strength. Given that 11 12 Value Line is perhaps the most widely available source of investment advisory 13 information, its Safety Rank provides useful guidance regarding the risk 14 perceptions of investors.

15 The Financial Strength Rating is designed as a guide to overall financial strength and creditworthiness, with the key inputs including financial leverage, 16 17 business volatility measures, and company size. Value Line's Financial Strength Ratings range from "A++" (strongest) down to "C" (weakest) in nine steps. 18 19 Finally, Value Line's beta measures the volatility of a security's price relative to 20 the market as a whole. A stock that tends to respond less to market movements 21 has a beta less than 1.00, while stocks that tend to move more than the market 22 have betas greater than 1.00.

### 23 Q. HOW DO THE OVERALL RISKS OF YOUR PROXY GROUPS 24 COMPARE WITH THE COMPANY?

A. Table WEA-2 compares the Utility Proxy Group with the Non-Utility Proxy
Group and AEP Ohio across four key indicators of investment risk. Because the

Company has no publicly traded common stock, the Value Line risk measures

shown reflect those published for its parent, AEP:

2

3

4

1

### TABLE WEA-2 COMPARISON OF RISK INDICATORS

	S&P	Value Line		
	Credit <u>Rating</u>	Safety <u>Rank</u>	Financial <u>Strength</u>	<u>Beta</u>
Utility Group	BBB	3	<b>B+</b> +	0.74
Non-Utility Proxy Group	Α	1	A+	0.70
AEP Ohio	BBB	3	B++	0.70

Q. DOES THIS COMPARISON INDICATE THAT INVESTORS WOULD
VIEW THE FIRMS IN YOUR PROXY GROUPS AS RISK-COMPARABLE
TO AEP OHIO?

8 A. Yes. As discussed earlier, AEP Ohio, like its parent, AEP, is rated "BBB" by S&P, 9 which is identical to the average corporate credit rating for the utilities in the 10 Utility Proxy Group. Similarly, the average Safety Rank and Financial Strength 11 Rating for the Utility Proxy group is the same as that assigned to AEP, while 12 AEP's beta value is only marginally lower than the average for the proxy group of 13 other utilities. Considered together, a comparison of these objective measures, 14 which consider a broad spectrum of risks, including financial and business 15 position, and exposure to company specific factors, indicates that investors would 16 likely conclude that the overall investment risks for AEP Ohio are comparable to 17 those of the firms in the Utility Proxy Group. 18

With respect to the Non-Utility Proxy Group, its average credit ratings,
Safety Rank, and Financial Strength Rating suggest less risk than for AEP Ohio,
with its 0.70 average beta indicating identical risk. While the impact of
differences in regulation is reflected in objective risk measures, my analyses
conservatively focus on a lower-risk group of non-utility firms.

#### C. Discounted Cash Flow Analyses

# 1Q.HOW IS THE DCF MODEL USED TO ESTIMATE THE COST OF2COMMON EQUITY?

3 A. DCF models attempt to replicate the market valuation process that sets the price 4 investors are willing to pay for a share of a company's stock. The model rests on 5 the assumption that investors evaluate the risks and expected rates of return from 6 all securities in the capital markets. Given these expectations, the price of each 7 stock is adjusted by the market until investors are adequately compensated for the 8 risks they bear. Therefore, we can look to the market to determine what investors 9 believe a share of common stock is worth. By estimating the cash flows investors 10 expect to receive from the stock in the way of future dividends and capital gains, 11 we can calculate their required rate of return. That is, the cost of equity is the 12 discount rate that equates the current price of a share of stock with the present 13 value of all expected cash flows from the stock. The general form of the DCF 14 model is expressed as follows:

$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{(1+k_e)^1} + \frac{D_2}{(1+k_e)^2} + \dots + \frac{D_t}{(1+k_e)^t} + \frac{P_t}{(1+k_e)^t}$$

16	where:	$P_0 = Current price per share;$
17		$P_t$ = Expected future price per share in period t;
18		$D_t$ = Expected dividend per share in period t;
19		$k_e = Cost of common equity.$

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### Q. WHAT FORM OF THE DCF MODEL IS CUSTOMARILY USED TO

### ESTIMATE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY IN RATE CASES?

A. Rather than developing annual estimates of cash flows into perpetuity, the DCF
 model can be simplified to a "constant growth" form:<sup>24</sup>

$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{k_e - g}$$

where: g = Investors' long-term growth expectations.

7 The cost of common equity (ke) can be isolated by rearranging terms within the
8 equation:

$$k_e = \frac{D_1}{P_0} + g$$

10This constant growth form of the DCF model recognizes that the rate of return to11stockholders consists of two parts: 1) dividend yield  $(D_1/P_0)$ ; and, 2) growth (g).12In other words, investors expect to receive a portion of their total return in the13form of current dividends and the remainder through price appreciation.

### 14 Q. WHAT FORM OF THE DCF MODEL DID YOU USE?

A. I applied the constant growth DCF model to estimate the cost of common equity
 for the Company, which is the form of the model most commonly relied on to
 establish the cost of common equity for traditional regulated utilities and the
 method most often referenced by regulators.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> The constant growth DCF model is dependent on a number of strict assumptions, which in practice are never met. These include a constant growth rate for both dividends and earnings; a stable dividend payout ratio; the discount rate exceeds the growth rate; a constant growth rate for book value and price; a constant earned rate of return on book value; no sales of stock at a price above or below book value; a constant price-earnings ratio; a constant discount rate (*i.e.*, no changes in risk or interest rate levels and a flat yield curve); and all of the above extend to infinity.

#### **Q**.

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#### HOW IS THE CONSTANT GROWTH FORM OF THE DCF MODEL

**TYPICALLY USED TO ESTIMATE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY?** 

A. The first step in implementing the constant growth DCF model is to determine the expected dividend yield (D<sub>1</sub>/P<sub>0</sub>) for the firm in question. This is usually calculated based on an estimate of dividends to be paid in the coming year divided by the current price of the stock. The second, and more controversial, step is to estimate investors' long-term growth expectations (g) for the firm. The final step is to sum the firm's dividend yield and estimated growth rate to arrive at an estimate of its cost of common equity.

## 10 Q. HOW WAS THE DIVIDEND YIELD FOR THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP 11 DETERMINED?

A. Estimates of dividends to be paid by each of these utilities over the next twelve
months, obtained from Value Line, served as D<sub>1</sub>. This annual dividend was then
divided by the corresponding stock price for each utility to arrive at the expected
dividend yield. The expected dividends, stock prices, and resulting dividend
yields for the firms in the utility proxy group are presented on Exhibit WEA-2.
As shown there, dividend yields for the firms in the Utility Proxy Group ranged
from 3.0 percent to 5.6 percent.

### 19 Q. WHAT IS THE NEXT STEP IN APPLYING THE CONSTANT GROWTH 20 DCF MODEL?

A. The next step is to evaluate long-term growth expectations, or "g", for the firm in question. In constant growth DCF theory, earnings, dividends, book value, and market price are all assumed to grow in lockstep, and the growth horizon of the DCF model is infinite. But implementation of the DCF model is more than just a theoretical exercise; it is an attempt to replicate the mechanism investors used to arrive at observable stock prices. A wide variety of techniques can be used to

- derive growth rates, but the only "g" that matters in applying the DCF model is
   the value that investors expect.
- Q. ARE HISTORICAL GROWTH RATES LIKELY TO BE
   REPRESENTATIVE OF INVESTORS' EXPECTATIONS FOR
  - UTILITIES?

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6 Α. No. If past trends in earnings, dividends, and book value are to be representative 7 of investors' expectations for the future, then the historical conditions giving rise 8 to these growth rates should be expected to continue. That is clearly not the case 9 for utilities, where structural and industry changes have led to declining 10 dividends, earnings pressure, and, in many cases, significant write-offs. While 11 these conditions serve to depress historical growth measures, they are not 12 representative of long-term expectations for the utility industry or the expectations 13 that investors have incorporated into current market prices. As a result, historical 14 growth measures for utilities do not currently meet the requirements of the DCF 15 model.

### 16 Q. WHAT ARE INVESTORS MOST LIKELY TO CONSIDER IN

### 17 DEVELOPING THEIR LONG-TERM GROWTH EXPECTATIONS?

While the DCF model is technically concerned with growth in dividend cash 18 Α. 19 flows, implementation of this DCF model is solely concerned with replicating the 20 forward-looking evaluation of real-world investors. In the case of utilities, 21 dividend growth rates are not likely to provide a meaningful guide to investors' 22 current growth expectations. This is because utilities have significantly altered 23 their dividend policies in response to more accentuated business risks in the 24 industry, with the payout ratio for electric utilities falling from approximately 80 percent historically to on the order of 60 percent.<sup>25</sup> As a result of this trend 25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> The Value Line Investment Survey (Sep. 15, 1995 at 161, Feb. 4, 2011 at 2237).

1	towards a more conservative payout ratio, dividend growth in the utility industry
2	has remained largely stagnant as utilities conserve financial resources to provide a
3	hedge against heightened uncertainties.
4	As payout ratios for firms in the utility industry trended downward,
5	investors' focus has increasingly shifted from dividends to earnings as a measure
6	of long-term growth. Future trends in earnings, which provide the source for
7	future dividends and ultimately support share prices, play a pivotal role in
8	determining investors' long-term growth expectations. The importance of
9	earnings in evaluating investors' expectations and requirements is well accepted
10	in the investment community. As noted in Finding Reality in Reported Earnings
11	published by the Association for Investment Management and Research:
12	[E]arnings, presumably, are the basis for the investment benefits that
13	we all seek. "Healthy earnings equal healthy investment benefits"
14	seems a logical equation, but earnings are also a scorecard by which
15	we compare companies, a filter through which we assess
16 17	management, and a crystal ball in which we try to foretell future performance. <sup>26</sup>
18	Value Line's near-term projections and its Timeliness Rank, which is the principal
19	investment rating assigned to each individual stock, are also based primarily on
20	various quantitative analyses of earnings. As Value Line explained:
21	The future earnings rank accounts for 65% in the determination of
22	relative price change in the future; the other two variables (current
23	earnings rank and current price rank) explain 35%. <sup>27</sup>
24	The fact that investment advisory services focus primarily on growth in
25	earnings indicates that the investment community regards this as a superior
26	indicator of future long-term growth. Indeed, "A Study of Financial Analysts:

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Association for Investment Management and Research, "Finding Reality in Reported Earnings: An Overview" at 1 (Dec. 4, 1996).
 <sup>27</sup> The Value Line Investment Survey, Subscriber's Guide at 53.

1		Practice and Theory," published in the Financial Analysts Journal, reported the
2		results of a survey conducted to determine what analytical techniques investment
3		analysts actually use. <sup>28</sup> Respondents were asked to rank the relative importance
4		of earnings, dividends, cash flow, and book value in analyzing securities. Of the
5		297 analysts that responded, only 3 ranked dividends first while 276 ranked it last.
6		The article concluded:
7 8		Earnings and cash flow are considered far more important than book value and dividends. <sup>29</sup>
9		In 2007, the Financial Analysts Journal reported the results of a study of the
10		relationship between valuations based on alternative multiples and actual market
11		prices, which concluded, "In all cases studied, earnings dominated operating cash
12		flows and dividends." <sup>30</sup>
13	Q.	DO THE GROWTH RATE PROJECTIONS OF SECURITY ANALYSTS
14		CONSIDER HISTORICAL TRENDS?
15	Α.	Yes. Professional security analysts study historical trends extensively in
16		developing their projections of future earnings. Hence, to the extent there is any
17		useful information in historical patterns, that information is incorporated into
18		analysts' growth forecasts.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Block, Stanley B., "A Study of Financial Analysts: Practice and Theory", *Financial Analysts Journal* (July/August 1999).
 <sup>29</sup> *Id.* at 88.
 <sup>30</sup> Liu, Jing, Nissim, Doron, & Thomas, Jacob, "Is Cash Flow King in Valuations?," *Financial Analysts Journal*, Vol. 63, No. 2 at 56 (March/April 2007).

### 1 Q. WHAT ARE SECURITY ANALYSTS CURRENTLY PROJECTING IN

# 2 THE WAY OF GROWTH FOR THE FIRMS IN THE UTILITY PROXY 3 GROUP?

A. The earnings growth projections for each of the firms in the Utility Proxy Group
reported by Value Line, Thomson Reuters ("IBES"), and Zacks Investment
Research ("Zacks") are displayed on Exhibit WEA-2.<sup>31</sup>

7 Q. SOME ARGUE THAT ANALYSTS' ASSESSMENTS OF GROWTH RATES
8 ARE BIASED. DO YOU BELIEVE THESE PROJECTIONS ARE
9 INAPPROPRIATE FOR ESTIMATING INVESTORS' REQUIRED
10 RETURN USING THE DCF MODEL?

11A.No. In applying the DCF model to estimate the cost of common equity, the only12relevant growth rate is the forward-looking expectations of investors that are13captured in current stock prices. Investors, just like securities analysts and others14in the investment community, do not know how the future will actually turn out.15They can only make investment decisions based on their best estimate of what the16future holds in the way of long-term growth for a particular stock, and securities17prices are constantly adjusting to reflect their assessment of available information.

Any claims that analysts' estimates are not relied upon by investors are illogical given the reality of a competitive market for investment advice. If financial analysts' forecasts do not add value to investors' decision making, then it is irrational for investors to pay for these estimates. Similarly, those financial analysts who fail to provide reliable forecasts will lose out in competitive markets relative to those analysts whose forecasts investors find more credible. The reality that analyst estimates are routinely referenced in the financial media and in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Formerly I/B/E/S International, Inc., IBES growth rates are now compiled and published by Thomson Reuters.

investment advisory publications (e.g., Value Line) implies that investors use them as a basis for their expectations.

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3 The continued success of investment services such as Thompson Reuters 4 and Value Line, and the fact that projected growth rates from such sources are 5 widely referenced, provides strong evidence that investors give considerable 6 weight to analysts' earnings projections in forming their expectations for future 7 growth. While the projections of securities analysts may be proven optimistic or 8 pessimistic in hindsight, this is irrelevant in assessing the expected growth that 9 investors have incorporated into current stock prices, and any bias in analysts' 10 forecasts – whether pessimistic or optimistic – is irrelevant if investors share 11 analysts' views. Earnings growth projections of security analysts provide the 12 most frequently referenced guide to investors' views and are widely accepted in 13 applying the DCF model. As explained in New Regulatory Finance:

14 Because of the dominance of institutional investors and their 15 influence on individual investors, analysts' forecasts of long-run 16 growth rates provide a sound basis for estimating required returns. 17 Financial analysts exert a strong influence on the expectations of 18 many investors who do not possess the resources to make their 19 own forecasts, that is, they are a cause of g [growth]. The accuracy 20 of these forecasts in the sense of whether they turn out to be 21 correct is not an issue here, as long as they reflect widely held expectations.<sup>32</sup> 22

Q. HOW ELSE ARE INVESTORS' EXPECTATIONS OF FUTURE LONG TERM GROWTH PROSPECTS OFTEN ESTIMATED WHEN APPLYING
 THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL?

A. In constant growth theory, growth in book equity will be equal to the product of
the earnings retention ratio (one minus the dividend payout ratio) and the earned
rate of return on book equity. Furthermore, if the earned rate of return and the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," Public Utilities Reports, Inc. at 298 (2006).

payout ratio are constant over time, growth in earnings and dividends will be equal to growth in book value. Despite the fact that these conditions are never met in practice, this "sustainable growth" approach may provide a rough guide for evaluating a firm's growth prospects and is frequently proposed in regulatory proceedings.

The sustainable growth rate is calculated by the formula, g = br+sv, where "b" is the expected retention ratio, "r" is the expected earned return on equity, "s" is the percent of common equity expected to be issued annually as new common stock, and "v" is the equity accretion rate.

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### Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE "SV" TERM?

A. Under DCF theory, the "sv" factor is a component of the growth rate designed to
capture the impact of issuing new common stock at a price above, or below, book
value. When a company's stock price is greater than its book value per share, the
per-share contribution in excess of book value associated with new stock issues
will accrue to the current shareholders. This increase to the book value of existing
shareholders leads to higher expected earnings and dividends, with the "sv" factor
incorporating this additional growth component.

### 18 Q. WHAT GROWTH RATE DOES THE EARNINGS RETENTION METHOD 19 SUGGEST FOR THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?

A. The sustainable, "br+sv" growth rates for each firm in the Utility Proxy Group are summarized on Exhibit WEA-2, with the underlying details being presented on Exhibit WEA-3. For each firm, the expected retention ratio (b) was calculated based on Value Line's projected dividends and earnings per share. Likewise, each firm's expected earned rate of return (r) was computed by dividing projected earnings per share by projected net book value. Because Value Line reports endof-year book values, an adjustment factor was incorporated to compute an average
1		rate of return over the year, consistent with the theory underlying this approach to
2		estimating investors' growth expectations. Meanwhile, the percent of common
3		equity expected to be issued annually as new common stock (s) was equal to the
4		product of the projected market-to-book ratio and growth in common shares
5		outstanding, while the equity accretion rate (v) was computed as 1 minus the
6		inverse of the projected market-to-book ratio.
7	Q.	WHAT COST OF COMMON EQUITY ESTIMATES WERE IMPLIED
8		FOR THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP USING THE DCF MODEL?
9	A.	After combining the dividend yields and respective growth projections for each
10		utility, the resulting cost of common equity estimates are shown on Exhibit
11		WEA-2.
12	Q.	IN EVALUATING THE RESULTS OF THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF
13		MODEL, IS IT APPROPRIATE TO ELIMINATE ESTIMATES THAT ARE
14		EXTREME LOW OR HIGH OUTLIERS?
15	A.	Yes. In applying quantitative methods to estimate the cost of equity, it is essential
16		that the resulting values pass fundamental tests of reasonableness and economic
17		logic. Accordingly, DCF estimates that are implausibly low or high should be
18		eliminated when evaluating the results of this method.
19	Q.	HOW DID YOU EVALUATE DCF ESTIMATES AT THE LOW END OF
20		THE RANGE?
21	A.	It is a basic economic principle that investors can be induced to hold more risky
22		assets only if they expect to earn a return to compensate them for their risk
23		bearing. As a result, the rate of return that investors require from a utility's
24		common stock, the most junior and riskiest of its securities, must be considerably
25		higher than the yield offered by senior, long-term debt. Consistent with this
16		principle the DCF results must be adjusted to eliminate estimates that are

1		determined to be extreme low outliers when compared against the yields available
2		to investors from less risky utility bonds.
3	Q.	WHAT DOES THIS TEST OF LOGIC IMPLY WITH RESPECT TO THE
4		DCF RESULTS FOR THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?
5	A.	As noted earlier, the average S&P corporate credit rating for the Utility proxy
6		Group is "BBB", which is identical to AEP Ohio. Companies rated "BBB-",
7		"BBB", and "BBB+" are all considered part of the triple-B rating category, with
8		Moody's monthly yields on triple-B bonds averaging approximately 6.1 percent in
9		January 2011. <sup>33</sup> It is inconceivable that investors are not requiring a substantially
10		higher rate of return for holding common stock. Consistent with this principle,
11		the DCF results for the Utility Proxy Group must be adjusted to eliminate
1 <b>2</b>		estimates that are determined to be extreme low outliers when compared against
13		the yields available to investors from less risky utility bonds.
14	Q.	HAVE SIMILAR TESTS BEEN APPLIED BY REGULATORS?
15	А.	Yes. FERC has noted that adjustments are justified where applications of the
16		DCF approach produce illogical results. FERC evaluates DCF results against
17		observable yields on long-term public utility debt and has recognized that it is
18		appropriate to eliminate estimates that do not sufficiently exceed this threshold.
1 <b>9</b>		In a 2002 opinion establishing its current precedent for determining ROEs for
20		electric utilities, for example, FERC noted:
21		An adjustment to this data is appropriate in the case of PG&E's
22		low-end return of 8.42 percent, which is comparable to the average
23		Moody's "A" grade public utility bond yield of 8.06 percent, for
24 25		October 1999. Because investors cannot be expected to purchase
4.1		NOCK H OPDE WHEEL DAN IESS FINK IDAE NICK, VIEION ESSEDDADV IDE

<sup>33</sup> Moody's Investors Service, www.credittrends.com.

1 2		same return, this low-end return cannot be considered reliable in this case. <sup>34</sup>
3		Similarly, in its August 2006 decision in Kern River Gas Transmission Company,
4		FERC noted that:
5 6 7		[T]he 7.31 and 7.32 percent costs of equity for El Paso and Williams found by the ALJ are only 110 and 122 basis points above that average yield for public utility debt. <sup>35</sup>
8		The Commission upheld the opinion of Staff and the Administrative Law Judge
9		that cost of equity estimates for these two proxy group companies "were too low
10		to be credible." <sup>36</sup>
11		The practice of eliminating low-end outliers has been affirmed in
12		numerous FERC proceedings, <sup>37</sup> and in its its April 15, 2010 decision in SoCal
13		Edison, FERC affirmed that, "it is reasonable to exclude any company whose
14		low-end ROE fails to exceed the average bond yield by about 100 basis points or
15		more." <sup>38</sup>
16	Q.	WHAT ELSE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN EVALUATING DCF
17		ESTIMATES AT THE LOW END OF THE RANGE?
18	А.	As indicated earlier, while corporate bond yields have declined substantially as
19		the worst of the financial crisis has abated, it is generally expected that long-term
20		interest rates will rise as the recession ends and the economy returns to a more
21		normal pattern of growth. As shown in Table WEA-3 below, forecasts of IHS
22		Global Insight and the EIA imply an average triple-B bond yield of 7.15 percent
23		over the period 2012-2015:

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Southern California Edison Company, 92 FERC ¶ 61,070 at p. 22 (2000).
 <sup>35</sup> Kern River Gas Transmission Company, Opinion No. 486, 117 FERC ¶ 61,077 at P 140 & n. 227 (2006).
 <sup>36</sup> Id.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> See, e.g., Virginia Electric Power Co., 123 FERC ¶ 61,098 at P 64 (2008).
 <sup>38</sup> Southern California Edison Co., 131 FERC ¶ 61,020 at P 55 (2010) ("SoCal Edison").

		Projected AA Utility Yield	
		IHS Global Insight (a)	6.20%
		EIA (b)	6.58%
		Average	6.39%
		BBB - AA Yield Spread (c)	0.76%
		Implied Triple-B Utility Yield	7.15%
		(a) IHS Global Insight, U.S. Economic Outlook a 2010).	t 19 (September
		(b) Energy Information Administration, Annual E.	nergy Outlook 2011
		<ul> <li>(c) Based on monthly average bond yields for the August 2010 - January 2011.</li> </ul>	six-month period
3		The increase in debt yields anticipated by IHS Gl	obal Insight and EIA is also
4		supported by the widely-referenced Blue Chip Fin	nancial Forecasts, which projects
5		that yields on corporate bonds will climb on the c	rder of 130 basis points through
6		the period 2012-2016. <sup>39</sup>	· · · · ·
7	Q.	WHAT DOES THIS TEST OF LOGIC IMPLY	WITH RESPECT TO THE
8		DCF RESULTS FOR THE UTILITY PROXY	GROUP?
9	A.	As shown on Exhibit WEA-2, fifteen low-end DO	CF estimates ranged from 1.9
10		percent to 7.3 percent. Nine of these values were	essentially at or below current
11		utility bond yields, with a cost of equity estimate	of 7.3 percent being barely
12		above the yield on triple-B utility bonds expected	during the period 2012-2015.
13		In light of the risk-return tradeoff principle and the	e test applied in SoCal Edison, it
14		is inconceivable that investors are not requiring a	substantially higher rate of
15		return for holding common stock, which is the ris	kiest of a utility's securities. As

TABLE WEA-3 IMPLIED BBB BOND YIELD

2012-15

<sup>39</sup> Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 29, No. 12 (Dec. 1, 2010).

1 a result, consistent with the test of economic logic applied by FERC and the 2 upward trend expected for utility bond yields, these values provide little guidance 3 as to the returns investors require from utility common stocks and should be 4 excluded. 5 **Q**. WHAT COST OF COMMON EQUITY ESTIMATES ARE IMPLIED BY

# 6 YOUR DCF RESULTS FOR THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?

7 Α. As shown on Exhibit WEA-2 and summarized in Table WEA-4, below, after 8 eliminating illogical values, application of the constant growth DCF model 9 resulted in average cost of common equity estimates ranging from 9.7 percent to 10 10.9 percent:

11 12

DCF RESULTS - UTILITY PROXY GROUP

Growth Rate	Average Cost of Equity
Value Line	10.9%
IBES	10.8%
Zacks	10.8%
br+sv	9.7%

**TABLE WEA-4** 

### 13 Q. WHAT WERE THE RESULTS OF YOUR DCF ANALYSIS FOR THE

### 14 **NON-UTILITY PROXY GROUP?**

15 A. The results of my constant growth DCF analysis for the Non-Utility Proxy Group, 16 which mirror those for the proxy group of utilities, are presented in Exhibit 17 WEA-4. I noted earlier that values that are implausibly low or high should be 18 eliminated when evaluating the results of any quantitative method used to 19 estimate the cost of equity. As highlighted on Exhibit WEA-4, in addition to 20 illogical low-end values, various DCF estimates for the firms in the Non-Utility 21 Proxy Group exceeded 17.0 percent. I determined that, when compared with the 22 balance of the remaining estimates, these values could be considered implausible 23 and should be excluded. This is also consistent with the precedent adopted by

FERC, which has established that estimates found to be "extreme outliers" should be disregarded in interpreting the results of the DCF model.<sup>40</sup> As shown on Exhibit WEA-4 and summarized in Table WEA-5, below, after eliminating illogical low- and high-end values, application of the constant growth DCF model resulted in cost of common equity estimates on the order of at least 12 percent:

### 7 8

# TABLE WEA-5 DCF RESULTS – NON-UTILITY GROUP

Average Cost of Equity
12.0%
12.4%
12.5%
12.1%

9 As discussed earlier, reference to the Non-Utility Proxy Group is consistent with 10 established regulatory principles. Required returns for utilities should be in line 11 with those of non-utility firms of comparable risk operating under the constraints 12 of free competition.

# D. Capital Asset Pricing Model

# 13 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE CAPM.

A. The CAPM is a theory of market equilibrium that measures risk using the beta
coefficient. Assuming investors are fully diversified, the relevant risk of an
individual asset (e.g., common stock) is its volatility relative to the market as a
whole, with beta reflecting the tendency of a stock's price to follow changes in the
market. The CAPM is mathematically expressed as:

<sup>40</sup> See, e.g., Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 109 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 205 (2004).

1		$Rj = Rf + \beta j(Rm - Rf)$
2 3 4 5		where: $R_j$ = required rate of return for stock j; $R_f$ = risk-free rate; $R_m$ = expected return on the market portfolio; and, $\beta_j$ = beta, or systematic risk, for stock j.
6		Like the DCF model, the CAPM is an ex-ante, or forward-looking model based
7		on expectations of the future. As a result, in order to produce a meaningful
8		estimate of investors' required rate of return, the CAPM must be applied using
9		estimates that reflect the expectations of actual investors in the market, not with
10		backward-looking, historical data.
11	Q.	HOW DID YOU APPLY THE CAPM TO ESTIMATE THE COST OF
12		COMMON EQUITY?
13	A.	Application of the CAPM to the Utility Proxy Group based on a forward-looking
14		estimate for investors' required rate of return from common stocks is presented on
15		Exhibit WEA-6. In order to capture the expectations of today's investors in
16		current capital markets, the expected market rate of return was estimated by
17		conducting a DCF analysis on the dividend paying firms in the S&P 500.
18		The dividend yield for each firm was calculated based on the annual
19		indicated dividend payment obtained from Value Line, increased by one-years'
20		growth using the rate discussed subsequently $(1 + g)$ to convert them to year-
21		ahead dividend yields presumed by the constant growth DCF model. The growth
22		rate was equal to the consensus earnings growth projections for each firm
23		published by IBES, with each firm's dividend yield and growth rate being
24		weighted by its proportionate share of total market value. Based on the weighted
25		average of the projections for the 354 individual firms, current estimates imply an
26		average growth rate over the next five years of 10.6 percent. Combining this
27		average growth rate with a year-ahead dividend yield of 2.5 percent results in a
28		current cost of common equity estimate for the market as a whole $(R_m)$ of

1		approximately 13.1 percent. Subtracting a 4.5 percent risk-free rate based on the
2		average yield on 30-year Treasury bonds produced a market equity risk premium
3		of 8.6 percent.
4	Q.	WHAT WAS THE SOURCE OF THE BETA VALUES YOU USED TO
5		APPLY THE CAPM?
6	A.	I relied on the beta values reported by Value Line, which in my experience is the
7		most widely referenced source for beta in regulatory proceedings. As noted in
8		New Regulatory Finance:
9 10 11		Value Line is the largest and most widely circulated independent investment advisory service, and influences the expectations of a large number of institutional and individual investors Value
12 13 14		broadly based market index, and they are adjusted for the regression tendency of betas to converge to 1.00. <sup>41</sup>
15	Q.	WHAT ELSE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN APPLYING THE CAPM?
15 16	<b>Q.</b> A.	WHAT ELSE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN APPLYING THE CAPM? As explained by <i>Morningstar</i> :
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<b>Q.</b> A.	<ul> <li>WHAT ELSE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN APPLYING THE CAPM?</li> <li>As explained by <i>Morningstar</i>:</li> <li>One of the most remarkable discoveries of modern finance is that of a relationship between firm size and return. The relationship cuts across the entire size spectrum but is most evident among smaller companies, which have higher returns on average than larger ones.<sup>42</sup></li> </ul>
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	<b>Q.</b> A.	<ul> <li>WHAT ELSE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN APPLYING THE CAPM?</li> <li>As explained by <i>Morningstar</i>:</li> <li>One of the most remarkable discoveries of modern finance is that of a relationship between firm size and return. The relationship cuts across the entire size spectrum but is most evident among smaller companies, which have higher returns on average than larger ones.<sup>42</sup></li> <li>Because empirical research indicates that the CAPM does not fully account for</li> </ul>
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 22 23	<b>Q.</b> A.	<ul> <li>WHAT ELSE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN APPLYING THE CAPM?</li> <li>As explained by <i>Morningstar</i>:</li> <li>One of the most remarkable discoveries of modern finance is that of a relationship between firm size and return. The relationship cuts across the entire size spectrum but is most evident among smaller companies, which have higher returns on average than larger ones.<sup>42</sup></li> <li>Because empirical research indicates that the CAPM does not fully account for observed differences in rates of return attributable to firm size, a modification is</li> </ul>
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 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Morin, Roger A., "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports* at 71 (2006).
 <sup>42</sup> Morningstar, "Ibbotson SBBI 2010 Valuation Yearbook," at p. 85 (footnote omitted).

1		coefficient. The need for the size adjustment arises because differences in
2		investors' required rates of return that are related to firm size are not fully
3		captured by beta. To account for this, Morningstar has developed size premiums
4		that need to be added to the theoretical CAPM cost of equity estimates to account
5		for the level of a firm's market capitalization in determining the CAPM cost of
6		equity. <sup>43</sup> Accordingly, my CAPM analyses incorporated an adjustment to
7		recognize the impact of size distinctions, as measured by the average market
8		capitalization for the respective proxy groups.
9	Q.	WHAT COST OF EQUITY ESTIMATE WAS INDICATED FOR THE
10		UTILITY PROXY GROUP BASED ON THIS FORWARD-LOOKING
11		APPLICATION OF THE CAPM?
12	А.	The average market capitalization of the Utility Proxy Group is \$8.2 billion.
13		Based on data from Morningstar, this means that the theoretical CAPM cost of
14		equity estimate must be increased by 74 basis points to account for the industry
15		group's relative size. As shown on Exhibit WEA-6, adjusting the theoretical
16		CAPM result to incorporate this size adjustment results in an average indicated
17		cost of common equity of 11.6 percent.
18	Q.	WHAT COST OF COMMON EQUITY WAS INDICATED FOR THE NON-
19		UTILITY PROXY GROUP BASED ON THIS FORWARD-LOOKING
20		APPLICATION OF THE CAPM?
21	Α.	As shown on Exhibit WEA-7, applying the forward-looking CAPM approach to
22		the firms in the Non-Utility Proxy Group results in an average implied cost of
23		common equity of 10.2 percent.

<sup>43</sup> *Id.* at Table C-1.

# 1Q.SHOULD THE CAPM APPROACH BE APPLIED USING HISTORICAL2RATES OF RETURN?

3 A. No. The CAPM cost of common equity estimate is calibrated from investors' 4 required risk premium between Treasury bonds and common stocks. In response 5 to heightened uncertainties, investors have repeatedly sought a safe haven in U.S. 6 government bonds and this "flight to safety" has pushed Treasury yields 7 significantly lower while yield spreads for corporate debt have widened. This 8 distortion not only impacts the absolute level of the CAPM cost of equity 9 estimate, but it affects estimated risk premiums. Economic logic would suggest 10 that investors' required risk premium for common stocks over Treasury bonds has 11 also increased.

12 Meanwhile, backward-looking approaches incorrectly assume that 13 investors' assessment of the required risk premium between Treasury bonds and 14 common stocks is constant, and equal to some historical average. At no time in 15 recent history has the fallacy of this assumption been demonstrated more 16 concretely. This incongruity between investors' current expectations and 17 historical risk premiums is particularly relevant during periods of heightened 18 uncertainty and rapidly changing capital market conditions, such as those 19 experienced recently.44

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> FERC has previously rejected CAPM methodologies based on historical data because whatever historical relationships existed between debt and equity securities may no longer hold. See Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 40 F.E.R.C. P63,053, at pp. 65,208 -09 (1987), aff'd, Opinion No. 314, 44 F.E.R.C. P61,253 at 65,208.

# E. Expected Earnings Approach

1	Q.	WHAT OTHER ANALYSES DID YOU CONDUCT TO ESTIMATE THE
2		COST OF COMMON EQUITY?
3	A.	As I noted earlier, I also evaluated the cost of common equity using the expected
4		earnings method. Reference to rates of return available from alternative
5		investments of comparable risk can provide an important benchmark in assessing
6		the return necessary to assure confidence in the financial integrity of a firm and its
7		ability to attract capital. This expected earnings approach is consistent with the
8		economic underpinnings for a fair rate of return established by the U.S. Supreme
9		Court in Bluefield and Hope. Moreover, it avoids the complexities and limitations
10		of capital market methods and instead focuses on the returns earned on book
11		equity, which are readily available to investors.
12	0	WHAT ECONOMIC PREMISE UNDERLIES THE EXPECTED
	·Y	WHAT ECONOMIC TREADED ON PERDED THE PAR ECTED
13	γ.	EARNINGS APPROACH?
13 14	A.	EARNINGS APPROACH? The simple, but powerful concept underlying the expected earnings approach is
13 14 15	۹.	EARNINGS APPROACH? The simple, but powerful concept underlying the expected earnings approach is that investors compare each investment alternative with the next best opportunity.
13 14 15 16	<b>ч</b> .	EARNINGS APPROACH? The simple, but powerful concept underlying the expected earnings approach is that investors compare each investment alternative with the next best opportunity. If the utility is unable to offer a return similar to that available from other
13 14 15 16 17	<b>А</b> .	EARNINGS APPROACH? The simple, but powerful concept underlying the expected earnings approach is that investors compare each investment alternative with the next best opportunity. If the utility is unable to offer a return similar to that available from other opportunities of comparable risk, investors will become unwilling to supply the
13 14 15 16 17 18	<b>д.</b>	EARNINGS APPROACH? The simple, but powerful concept underlying the expected earnings approach is that investors compare each investment alternative with the next best opportunity. If the utility is unable to offer a return similar to that available from other opportunities of comparable risk, investors will become unwilling to supply the capital on reasonable terms. For existing investors, denying the utility an
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	<b>А</b> .	EARNINGS APPROACH? The simple, but powerful concept underlying the expected earnings approach is that investors compare each investment alternative with the next best opportunity. If the utility is unable to offer a return similar to that available from other opportunities of comparable risk, investors will become unwilling to supply the capital on reasonable terms. For existing investors, denying the utility an opportunity to earn what is available from other similar risk alternatives prevents
<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> </ol>	Α.	EARNINGS APPROACH? The simple, but powerful concept underlying the expected earnings approach is that investors compare each investment alternative with the next best opportunity. If the utility is unable to offer a return similar to that available from other opportunities of comparable risk, investors will become unwilling to supply the capital on reasonable terms. For existing investors, denying the utility an opportunity to earn what is available from other similar risk alternatives prevents them from earning their opportunity cost of capital. In this situation the
<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> </ol>	<b>А</b> .	EARNINGS APPROACH? The simple, but powerful concept underlying the expected earnings approach is that investors compare each investment alternative with the next best opportunity. If the utility is unable to offer a return similar to that available from other opportunities of comparable risk, investors will become unwilling to supply the capital on reasonable terms. For existing investors, denying the utility an opportunity to earn what is available from other similar risk alternatives prevents them from earning their opportunity cost of capital. In this situation the government is effectively taking the value of investors' capital without adequate

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# Q. HOW IS THE COMPARISON OF OPPORTUNITY COSTS TYPICALLY IMPLEMENTED?

3 Α. The traditional comparable earnings test identifies a group of companies that are 4 believed to be comparable in risk to the utility. The actual earnings of those 5 companies on the book value of their investment are then compared to the 6 allowed return of the utility. While the traditional comparable earnings test is 7 implemented using historical data taken from the accounting records, it is also 8 common to use projections of returns on book investment, such as those published 9 by recognized investment advisory publications (e.g., Value Line). Because these 10 returns on book value equity are analogous to the allowed return on a utility's rate 11 base, this measure of opportunity costs results in a direct, "apples to apples" 12 comparison.

13 Moreover, regulators do not set the returns that investors earn in the 14 capital markets – they can only establish the allowed return on the value of a 15 utility's investment, as reflected on its accounting records. As a result, the 16 expected earnings approach provides a direct guide to ensure that the allowed 17 ROE is similar to what other utilities of comparable risk will earn on invested 18 capital. This opportunity cost test does not require theoretical models to 19 indirectly infer investors' perceptions from stock prices or other market data. As 20 long as the proxy companies are similar in risk, their expected earned returns on 21 invested capital provide a direct benchmark for investors' opportunity costs that is 22 independent of fluctuating stock prices, market-to-book ratios, debates over DCF 23 growth rates, or the limitations inherent in any theoretical model of investor 24 behavior.

# 1Q.WHAT RATES OF RETURN ON EQUITY ARE INDICATED FOR2ELECTRIC UTILITIES BASED ON THE EXPECTED EARNINGS3APPROACH?

4 Value Line reports that its analysts anticipate an average rate of return on common A. 5 equity for the electric utility industry of 10.5 percent in 2011 and over its 2013-2015 forecast horizon.<sup>45</sup> Meanwhile, for the firms in the Utility Proxy Group 6 7 specifically, the returns on common equity projected by Value Line over its 8 forecast horizon are shown on Exhibit WEA-8. Consistent with the rationale 9 underlying the development of the br+sv growth rates, these year-end values were 10 converted to average returns using the same adjustment factor discussed earlier 11 and developed on Exhibit WEA-3. As shown on Exhibit WEA-8, Value Line's 12 projections for the Utility Proxy Group suggest an average ROE of 11.0 percent.

# F. Flotation Costs

# 13 Q. WHAT OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ARE RELEVANT IN SETTING THE

# 14 **RETURN ON EQUITY FOR A UTILITY?**

15 Α. The common equity used to finance the investment in utility assets is provided 16 from either the sale of stock in the capital markets or from retained earnings not 17 paid out as dividends. When equity is raised through the sale of common stock, 18 there are costs associated with "floating" the new equity securities. These 19 flotation costs include services such as legal, accounting, and printing, as well as 20 the fees and discounts paid to compensate brokers for selling the stock to the 21 public. Also, some argue that the "market pressure" from the additional supply of 22 common stock and other market factors may further reduce the amount of funds a 23 utility nets when it issues common equity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> The Value Line Investment Survey at 2237 (Feb. 4, 2011).

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Q.

# IS THERE AN ESTABLISHED MECHANISM FOR A UTILITY TO RECOGNIZE EQUITY ISSUANCE COSTS?

3 No. While debt flotation costs are recorded on the books of the utility, amortized Α. 4 over the life of the issue, and thus increase the effective cost of debt capital, there 5 is no similar accounting treatment to ensure that equity flotation costs are 6 recorded and ultimately recognized. No rate of return is authorized on flotation 7 costs necessarily incurred to obtain a portion of the equity capital used to finance 8 plant. In other words, equity flotation costs are not included in a utility's rate base 9 because neither that portion of the gross proceeds from the sale of common stock 10 used to pay flotation costs is available to invest in plant and equipment, nor are 11 flotation costs capitalized as an intangible asset. Unless some provision is made to 12 recognize these issuance costs, a utility's revenue requirements will not fully reflect 13 all of the costs incurred for the use of investors' funds. Because there is no 14 accounting convention to accumulate the flotation costs associated with equity 15 issues, they must be accounted for indirectly, with an upward adjustment to the 16 cost of equity being the most logical mechanism.

# 17 Q. WHAT IS THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ADJUSTMENT TO THE "BARE

# BONES" COST OF EQUITY TO ACCOUNT FOR ISSUANCE COSTS?

19A.There are any number of ways in which a flotation cost adjustment can be20calculated, and the adjustment can range from just a few basis points to more than21a full percent. One of the most common methods used to account for flotation22costs in regulatory proceedings is to apply an average flotation-cost percentage to23a utility's dividend yield. Based on a review of the finance literature, New24Regulatory Finance concluded:

1 2 3		The flotation cost allowance requires an estimated adjustment to the return on equity of approximately 5% to 10%, depending on the size and risk of the issue. <sup>46</sup>
4		Alternatively, a study of data from Morgan Stanley regarding issuance costs
5		associated with utility common stock issuances suggests an average flotation cost
6		percentage of 3.6%, <sup>47</sup> with AEP incurring issuance costs equal to approximately
7		3.02 percent of the gross proceeds from its 2009 public offering of common
8		stock. <sup>48</sup> Applying this 3.02 percent expense percentage for AEP to a
9		representative dividend yield of 5.0 percent implies a minimum flotation cost
10		adjustment on the order of 15 basis points.
11	Q.	HAS THE PUCO STAFF RECOGNIZED THAT FLOTATION COSTS ARE
12		PROPERLY CONSIDERED IN ESTABLISHING A FAIR ROE?
13	A.	Yes. For example, in Case No. 07-551-EL-AIR involving Cleveland Electric
14		Illuminating Company, the Staff concluded, "allowance must be made for
15		issuance and other costs" associated with raising common equity capital. <sup>49</sup> As
16		shown on Exhibit WEA-9, applying the Staff's issuance cost methodology to AEP
17		results in a flotation cost adjustment factor of 1.02059.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Roger A. Morin, "New Regulatory Finance," *Public Utilities Reports, Inc.* at 323 (1994).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Application of Yankee Gas Services Company for a Rate Increase, DPUC Docket No. 04-06-01, Direct Testimony of George J. Eckenroth (Jul. 2, 2004) at Exhibit GJE-11.1. Updating the results presented by Mr. Eckenroth through April 2005 also resulted in an average flotation cost percentage of 3.6%.
 <sup>48</sup> American Electric Power Company, Inc., Prospectus Supplement (To Prospectus dated December 22, 2008) (Apr. 1, 2009). Net proceeds from AEP's sale of 69 million shares of common stock raised approximately \$1.64 billion of additional equity capital.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> A report by the Staff of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Case No. 07-551-EL-AIR et al. at 17 and Schedule D-1.1 (Dec. 4, 2007).

# IV. RETURN ON EQUITY FOR AEP OHIO

### WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION? 1 0. 2 A, In addition to presenting my conclusions regarding a fair ROE for the Company, 3 this section also discusses the relationship between ROE and preservation of a 4 utility's financial integrity and the ability to attract capital. In addition, I evaluate 5 the reasonableness of the Company's requested capital structure. **Summary of Quantitative Results** A. 6 **Q**. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF YOUR QUANTITATIVE 7 ANALYSES. 8 Α. The cost of common equity estimates produced by the various capital market 9 oriented analyses described in my testimony are summarized in Table WEA-6, 10 below: 11 **TABLE WEA-6** 12 SUMMARY OF QUANTITATIVE RESULTS DCF **Utility Non-Utility** Earnings Growth Value Line 12.0% 10.9% IBES 10.8% 12.4% Zacks 10.8% 12.5% br + sv9.7% 12.1% 10.2% **CAPM** 11.6% **Expected Earnings** Value Line 2013-15 10.5% Utility Proxy Group 11.0% 10.8% 11.8% <u>Average</u> 13 Based on my assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses inherent in each 14 method, and conservatively giving less emphasis to the upper- and lower-most 15 boundaries of the range of results, I concluded that the cost of common equity

16 indicated by my analyses is in the 10.4 percent to 11.4 percent range. After

incorporating a minimal adjustment for flotation costs of 15 basis points to my
 "bare bones" cost of equity range,<sup>50</sup> I concluded that my analyses indicate a fair
 ROE in the 10.55 percent to 11.55 percent range.

## A. Implications for Financial Integrity

# 4 Q. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO ALLOW AEP OHIO AN ADEQUATE ROE?

A. Given the importance of the utility industry to the economy and society, it is
essential to maintain reliable and economical service to all consumers. While
AEP Ohio remains committed to providing reliable electric service, a utility's
ability to fulfill its mandate can be compromised if it lacks the necessary financial
wherewithal or is unable to earn a return sufficient to attract capital.

10 As documented earlier, the major rating agencies have warned of exposure 11 to uncertainties associated with ongoing capital expenditure requirements, 12 uncertain economic and financial market conditions, uncertain environmental 13 compliance costs, and the potential for continued energy price volatility. 14 Investors understand just how swiftly unforeseen circumstances can lead to 15 deterioration in a utility's financial condition, and stakeholders have discovered 16 first hand how difficult and complex it can be to remedy the situation after the 17 fact.

18 While providing the infrastructure necessary to enhance the power system 19 and meet the energy needs of customers is certainly desirable, it imposes 20 additional financial responsibilities on the AEP Ohio and its parent, AEP. Indeed, 21 despite the dramatic and sustained fall in utility stock prices, AEP issued new 22 common shares even at depressed prices in order to meet its capital needs and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Alternatively, applying the PUCO Staff's flotation cost adjustment factor of 1.02059 developed in Exhibit WEA-9 would result in a flotation cost adjustment of approximately 20 basis points.

support financial strength. For a utility with an obligation to provide reliable
service, investors' increased reticence to supply additional capital during times of
crisis highlights the necessity of preserving the flexibility necessary to overcome
periods of adverse capital market conditions. These considerations heighten the
importance of allowing the Company an adequate ROE.

# Q. WHAT ROLE DOES REGULATION PLAY IN ENSURING THAT THE COMPANY HAS ACCESS TO CAPITAL UNDER REASONABLE TERMS AND ON A SUSTAINABLE BASIS?

9 A. Considering investors' heightened awareness of the risks associated with the 10 utility industry and the damage that results when a utility's financial flexibility is 11 compromised, the continuation of supportive regulation remains crucial to the 12 AEP Ohio's access to capital. Investors recognize that regulation has its own 13 risks, and that constructive regulation is a key ingredient in supporting utility 14 credit ratings and financial integrity, particularly during times of adverse 15 conditions. 16 Fitch concluded, "[G]iven the lingering rate of unemployment and voter 17 concerns about the economy, there could well be pockets of adverse rate

18 decisions, and those companies with little financial cushion could suffer adverse

19 effects." <sup>51</sup> S&P has also emphasized the need for regulatory support, concluding,

20 "the quality of regulation is at the forefront of our analysis of utility

21 creditworthiness."<sup>52</sup> Similarly, Moody's concluded:

For the longer term, however, we are becoming increasingly
 concerned about possible changes to our fundamental assumptions
 about regulatory risk, particularly the prospect of a more adversarial

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Fitch Ratings Ltd., "U.S. Utilities, Power and Gas 2010 Outlook," *Global Power North America Special Report* (Dec. 4, 2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Standard & Poor's Corporation, "Assessing U.S. Utility Regulatory Environments," *RatingsDirect* (Nov. 7, 2008).

political (and therefore regulatory) environment. A prolonged 1 2 recessionary climate with high unemployment, or an intense period of inflation, could make cost recovery more uncertain.53 3 4 Moody's recently noted that it is "watching Ohio's next round of regulatory restructuring initiatives."54 5 6 Q. **DO CUSTOMERS BENEFIT BY ENHANCING THE UTILITY'S** 7 FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY? 8 Α. Yes. Providing a return that is both commensurate with those available from 9 investments of corresponding risk and sufficient to maintain the ability to attract 10 capital, even under duress, is consistent with the economic requirements 11 embodied in the U.S. Supreme Court's Bluefield and Hope decisions; but it is also 12 in customers' best interests. Ultimately, it is customers and the service area 13 economy that enjoy the benefits that come from ensuring that the utility has the 14 financial wherewithal to take whatever actions are required to ensure a reliable 15 energy supply. By the same token, customers also bear a significant burden of 16 higher capital costs and reduced levels of service when the ability of the utility to 17 attract capital is impaired.

# **B.** Capital Structure

IS AN EVALUATION OF THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE MAINTAINED BY
 A UTILITY RELEVANT IN ASSESSING ITS RETURN ON EQUITY?
 A. Yes. Other things equal, a higher debt ratio, or lower common equity ratio,
 translates into increased financial risk for all investors. A greater amount of debt
 means more investors have a senior claim on available cash flow, thereby

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Moody's Investors Service, "U.S. Regulated Electric Utilities, Six-Month Update," *Industry Outlook* (July 2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Moody's Investors Service, "U.S. Electric Utilities: Uncertain Times Ahead; Strengthening Balance Sheets Now Would Protect Credit," *Special Comment* (Oct. 28, 2010).

1 reducing the certainty that each will receive his contractual payments. This 2 increases the risks to which lenders are exposed, and they require correspondingly 3 higher rates of interest. From common shareholders' standpoint, a higher debt 4 ratio means that there are proportionately more investors ahead of them, thereby 5 increasing the uncertainty as to the amount of cash flow, if any, that will remain. WHAT COMMON EQUITY RATIO IS IMPLICIT IN THE COMPANY'S 6 Q. 7 **REQUESTED CAPITAL STRUCTURE?** 8 Α. Common equity as a percent of the capital sources used to compute the overall 9 rate of return for AEP Ohio is approximately 52.8 percent on a combined basis. 10 Q. HOW CAN THE COMPANY'S REQUESTED CAPITAL STRUCTURE BE 11 **EVALUATED?** 12 A. It is generally accepted that the norms established by comparable firms provide 13 one valid benchmark against which to evaluate the reasonableness of a utility's 14 capital structure. The capital structure maintained by other electric utilities should 15 reflect their collective efforts to finance themselves so as to minimize capital costs 16 while preserving their financial integrity and ability to attract capital. Moreover, 17 these industry capital structures should also incorporate the requirements of 18 investors (both debt and equity), as well as the influence of regulators. 19 **Q**. WHAT WAS THE AVERAGE CAPITALIZATION MAINTAINED BY THE 20 **UTILITY PROXY GROUP?** 21 Α. As shown on Exhibit WEA-10, for the firms in the Utility Proxy Group, common 22 equity ratios at December 31, 2009 ranged between 42.3 percent and 63.4 percent

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and averaged 48.8 percent of long-term capital.

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# Q. WHAT CAPITALIZATION IS REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP GOING FORWARD?

A. As shown on Exhibit WEA-10, Value Line expects an average common equity
ratio for the Utility Proxy Group of 51.4 percent for its three-to-five year forecast
horizon, with the individual common equity ratios ranging from 41.0 percent to
6 67.0 percent.

Q. WHAT IMPLICATION DOES THE INCREASING RISK OF THE
8 UTILITY INDUSTRY HAVE FOR THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE

# 9 MAINTAINED BY AEP OHIO?

10 As discussed earlier, utilities are facing energy market volatility, rising cost A. 11 structures, the need to finance significant capital investment plans, uncertainties 12 over accommodating economic and financial market uncertainties, and ongoing 13 regulatory risks. Taken together, these considerations warrant a stronger balance 14 sheet to deal with an increasingly uncertain environment. A more conservative 15 financial profile, in the form of a higher common equity ratio, is consistent with 16 increasing uncertainties and the need to maintain the continuous access to capital 17 that is required to fund operations and necessary system investment, including 18 times of adverse capital market conditions.

19Moody's has repeatedly warned investors of the risks associated with debt20leverage and fixed obligations and advised utilities not to squander the21opportunity to strengthen the balance sheet as a buffer against future22uncertainties.<sup>55</sup> More recently, Moody's concluded:

From a credit perspective, we believe a strong balance sheet coupled with abundant sources of liquidity represents one of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Moody's Investors Service, "Storm Clouds Gathering on the Horizon for the North American Electric Utility Sector," *Special Comment* (Aug. 2007); "U.S. Electric Utility Sector," *Industry Outlook* (Jan. 2008).

1 2		best defenses against business and operating risk and potential negative ratings actions. <sup>56</sup>
3		Similarly, S&P noted that, "we generally consider a debt to capital level of 50% or
4		greater to be aggressive or highly leveraged for utilities." <sup>57</sup> Fitch affirmed that it
5		expects regulated utilities "to extend their conservative balance sheet stance in
6		2010," and employ "a judicious mix of debt and equity to finance high levels of
7		planned investments."58
8	Q.	WHAT OTHER FACTORS DO INVESTORS CONSIDER IN THEIR
9		ASSESSMENT OF A COMPANY'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE?
10	А.	Depending on their specific attributes, contractual agreements or other obligations
11		that require the utility to make specified payments may be treated as debt in
12		evaluating AEP Ohio's financial risk. Because investors consider the debt impact
13		of such fixed obligations in assessing a utility's financial position, they imply
14		greater risk and reduced financial flexibility. In order to offset the resulting debt
15		equivalent, the utility must rebalance its capital structure by increasing its
16		common equity in order to restore its effective capitalization ratios to previous
17		levels.
18		These commitments have been repeatedly cited by major bond rating
19		agencies in connection with assessments of utility financial risks, <sup>59</sup> with S&P
20		adjusting AEP Ohio's reported debt amounts upward to include debt equivalents

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Moody's Investors Service, "U.S. Electric Utilities Face Challenges Beyond Near-Term," Industry

Moody's Investors Service, "O.S. Electric Outlies Face Channelinger 2-57 Standard & Poor's Corporation, "Ratings Roundup: U.S. Electric Utility Sector Maintained Strong
 Credit Quality In A Gloomy 2009," *RatingsDirect* (Jan. 26, 2010).
 <sup>58</sup> Fitch Ratings Ltd., "U.S. Utilities, Power, and Gas 2010 Outlook," *Global Power North America Special*

*Report* (Dec. 4, 2009). <sup>59</sup> See, *e.g.*, Standard & Poor's Corporation, "Implications Of Operating Leases On Analysis Of U.S. Electric Utilities," *RatingsDirect* (Jan. 15, 2008)

associated with lease obligations.<sup>60</sup> Unless the Company takes action to offset this additional financial risk by maintaining a higher equity ratio, the resulting leverage will weaken AEP Ohio's creditworthiness and imply greater risk.

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# 4 Q. HOW DOES THE COMPANY'S COMBINED COMMON EQUITY RATIO 5 COMPARE WITH THOSE MAINTAINED BY THE REFERENCE GROUP 6 OF UTILITIES?

7 A. AEP Ohio's 52.8 percent common equity ratio is consistent with the range of 8 capitalizations maintained by the Utility Proxy Group, as well as Value Line's 9 expectations for these utilities over the near-term. Moreover, while industry 10 averages provide one benchmark for comparison, each firm must select its 11 capitalization based on the risks and prospects it faces, as well as its specific 12 needs to access the capital markets. A public utility with an obligation to serve 13 must maintain ready access to capital under reasonable terms so that it can meet 14 the service requirements of its customers. The need for access becomes even 15 more important when the company has capital requirements over a period of 16 years, and financing must be continuously available, even during unfavorable 17 capital market conditions.

Financial flexibility plays a crucial role in ensuring the wherewithal to meet the needs of customers, and utilities with higher leverage may be foreclosed from additional borrowing, especially during times of stress. AEP Ohio's capital structure reflects the Company's ongoing efforts to maintain its credit standing and support access to capital on reasonable terms.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Standard & Poor's Corporation, "Ohio Power Co.," *RatingsDirect* (Dec. 16, 2010); Standard & Poor's Corporation, "Columbus Southern Power Co.," *RatingsDirect* (Dec. 16, 2010).

# C. Return on Equity Range Recommendation

1	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF YOUR ANALYSES.
2	Α.	Reflecting the fact that investors' required return on equity is unobservable and no
3		single method should be viewed in isolation, I used both the DCF and CAPM
4		methods and referenced expected earned rates of return for utilities. In order to
5		reflect the risks and prospects associated with AEP Ohio's utility operations, my
6		analyses focused on a proxy group of other electric utilities. Consistent with the
7		fact that utilities must compete for capital with firms outside their own industry, I
8		also referenced a proxy group of low-risk companies in the non-utility sectors of
9		the economy.
10		As noted earlier, I concluded that the cost of common equity indicated by
11		my analyses is in the 10.4 percent to 11.4 percent range, or 10.55 percent to 11.55
12		percent after incorporating a minimum adjustment for flotation costs.
13	Q.	WHAT THEN IS YOUR CONCLUSION AS TO A FAIR ROE FOR AEP
14		OHIO?
15	А.	Considering capital market expectations, the potential exposures faced by AEP
16		Ohio, and the economic requirements necessary to maintain financial integrity
17		and support additional capital investment even under adverse circumstances, it is
18		my opinion that the midpoint of this range, or 11.15 percent, represents a fair and
19		reasonable ROE for the Company.
20		Apart from the results of the quantitative methods summarized above, it is
21		crucial to recognize the importance of supporting AEP Ohio's financial position
22		so that the Company remains prepared to respond to unforeseen events that may
23		materialize in the future. Recent challenges in the economic and financial market
24		environment highlight the imperative of maintaining AEP Ohio's financial
25		strength in attracting the capital needed to secure reliable service at a lower cost

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1for customers. The reasonableness of my recommended ROE is reinforced by the2fact that current cost of capital estimates are likely to understate investors'3requirements at the time the outcome of this proceeding becomes effective and4beyond.

# 5 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR PRE-FILED DIRECT TESTIMONY?

6 A. Yes.

Exhibit WEA-1 Page 1 of 6

# WILLIAM E. AVERA

FINCAP, INC. Financial Concepts and Applications *Economic and Financial Counsel*  3907 Red River Austin, Texas 78751 (512) 458–4644 FAX (512) 458–4768 fincap@texas.net

# Summary of Qualifications

Ph.D. in economics and finance; Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA<sup>®</sup>) designation; extensive expert witness testimony before courts, alternative dispute resolution panels, regulatory agencies and legislative committees; lectured in executive education programs around the world on ethics, investment analysis, and regulation; undergraduate and graduate teaching in business and economics; appointed to leadership positions in government, industry, academia, and the military.

# **Employment**

Principal, FINCAP, Inc. (Sep. 1979 to present)

Director, Economic Research Division, Public Utility Commission of Texas (Dec. 1977 to Aug. 1979)

Manager, Financial Education, International Paper Company New York City (Feb. 1977 to Nov. 1977) Financial, economic and policy consulting to business and government. Perform business and public policy research, cost/benefit analyses and financial modeling, valuation of businesses (almost 200 entities valued), estimation of damages, statistical and industry studies. Provide strategy advice and educational services in public and private sectors, and serve as expert witness before regulatory agencies, legislative committees, arbitration panels, and courts.

Responsible for research and testimony preparation on rate of return, rate structure, and econometric analysis dealing with energy, telecommunications, water and sewer utilities. Testified in major rate cases and appeared before legislative committees and served as Chief Economist for agency. Administered state and federal grant funds. Communicated frequently with political leaders and representatives from consumer groups, media, and investment community.

Directed corporate education programs in accounting, finance, and economics. Developed course materials, recruited and trained instructors, liaison within the company and with academic institutions. Prepared operating budget and designed financial controls for corporate professional development program. Lecturer in Finance, The University of Texas at Austin (Sep. 1979 to May 1981) Assistant Professor of Finance, (Sep. 1975 to May 1977)

Assistant Professor of Business, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Sep. 1972 to Jul. 1975)

# Education

Ph.D., Economics and Finance, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Jan. 1969 to Aug. 1972) Taught graduate and undergraduate courses in financial management and investment theory. Conducted research in business and public policy. Named Outstanding Graduate Business Professor and received various administrative appointments.

Taught in BBA, MBA, and Ph.D. programs. Created project course in finance, Financial Management for Women, and participated in developing Small Business Management sequence. Organized the North Carolina Institute for Investment Research, a group of financial institutions that supported academic research. Faculty advisor to the Media Board, which funds student publications and broadcast stations.

Elective courses included financial management, public finance, monetary theory, and econometrics. Awarded the Stonier Fellowship by the American Bankers' Association and University Teaching Fellowship. Taught statistics, macroeconomics, and microeconomics.

Dissertation: The Geometric Mean Strategy as a Theory of Multiperiod Portfolio Choice

B.A., Economics, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia (Sep. 1961 to Jun. 1965) Active in extracurricular activities, president of the Barkley Forum (debate team), Emory Religious Association, and Delta Tau Delta chapter. Individual awards and team championships at national collegiate debate tournaments.

# **Professional Associations**

Received Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation in 1977; Vice President for Membership, Financial Management Association; President, Austin Chapter of Planning Executives Institute; Board of Directors, North Carolina Society of Financial Analysts; Candidate Curriculum Committee, Association for Investment Management and Research; Executive Committee of Southern Finance Association; Vice Chair, Staff Subcommittee on Economics and National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC); Appointed to NARUC Technical Subcommittee on the National Energy Act.

# **Teaching in Executive Education Programs**

<u>University-Sponsored Programs</u>: Central Michigan University, Duke University, Louisiana State University, National Defense University, National University of Singapore, Texas A&M University, University of Kansas, University of North Carolina, University of Texas.

<u>Business and Government-Sponsored Programs:</u> Advanced Seminar on Earnings Regulation, American Public Welfare Association, Association for Investment Management and Research, Congressional Fellows Program, Cost of Capital Workshop, Electricity Consumers Resource Council, Financial Analysts Association of Indonesia, Financial Analysts Review, Financial Analysts Seminar at Northwestern University, Governor's Executive Development Program of Texas, Louisiana Association of Business and Industry, National Association of Purchasing Management, National Association of Tire Dealers, Planning Executives Institute, School of Banking of the South, State of Wisconsin Investment Board, Stock Exchange of Thailand, Texas Association of State Sponsored Computer Centers, Texas Bankers' Association, Texas Bar Association, Texas Savings and Loan League, Texas Society of CPAs, Tokyo Association of Foreign Banks, Union Bank of Switzerland, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Navy, U.S. Veterans Administration, in addition to Texas state agencies and major corporations.

Presented papers for Mills B. Lane Lecture Series at the University of Georgia and Heubner Lectures at the University of Pennsylvania. Taught graduate courses in finance and economics for evening program at St. Edward's University in Austin from January 1979 through 1998.

# **Expert Witness Testimony**

Testified in over 300 cases before regulatory agencies addressing cost of capital, regulatory policy, rate design, and other economic and financial issues.

<u>Federal Agencies</u>: Federal Communications Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Surface Transportation Board, Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission.

<u>State Regulatory Agencies</u>: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

Testified in 42 cases before federal and state courts, arbitration panels, and alternative dispute tribunals (89 depositions given) regarding damages, valuation, antitrust liability, fiduciary duties, and other economic and financial issues.

# **Board Positions and Other Professional Activities**

Audit Committee and Outside Director, Georgia System Operations Corporation (electric system operator for member-owned electric cooperatives in Georgia); Chairman, Board of Print Depot, Inc. and FINCAP, Inc.; Co-chair, Synchronous Interconnection Committee, appointed by Public Utility Commission of Texas and approved by governor; Appointed by Hays County Commission to Citizens Advisory Committee of Habitat Conservation Plan, Operator of AAA Ranch, a certified organic producer of agricultural products; Appointed to Organic Livestock Advisory Committee by Texas Agricultural Commissioner Susan Combs; Appointed by Texas Railroad Commissioners to study group for *The UP/SP Merger: An Assessment of the Impacts on the State of Texas; Appointed* by Hawaii Public Utilities Commission to team reviewing affiliate relationships of Hawaiian Electric Industries; Chairman, Energy Task Force, Greater Austin-San Antonio Corridor Council; Consultant to Public Utility Commission of Texas on cogeneration policy and other matters; Consultant to

Public Service Commission of New Mexico on cogeneration policy; Evaluator of Energy Research Grant Proposals for Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board.

# **Community Activities**

Board of Directors, Sustainable Food Center; Chair, Board of Deacons, Finance Committee, and Elder, Central Presbyterian Church of Austin; Founding Member, Orange-Chatham County (N.C.) Legal Aid Screening Committee.

# **Military**

Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve (retired after 28 years service); Commanding Officer, Naval Special Warfare Engineering (SEAL) Support Unit; Officer-in-Charge of SWIFT patrol boat in Vietnam; Enlisted service as weather analyst (advanced to second class petty officer).

# **Bibliography**

# Monographs

- Ethics and the Investment Professional (video, workbook, and instructor's guide) and Ethics Challenge Today (video), Association for Investment Management and Research (1995)
- "Definition of Industry Ethics and Development of a Code" and "Applying Ethics in the Real World," in *Good Ethics: The Essential Element of a Firm's Success*, Association for Investment Management and Research (1994)
- "On the Use of Security Analysts' Growth Projections in the DCF Model," with Bruce H. Fairchild in *Earnings Regulation Under Inflation*, J. R. Foster and S. R. Holmberg, eds. Institute for Study of Regulation (1982)
- An Examination of the Concept of Using Relative Customer Class Risk to Set Target Rates of Return in Electric Cost-of-Service Studies, with Bruce H. Fairchild, Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON) (1981); portions reprinted in Public Utilities Fortnightly (Nov. 11, 1982)
- "Usefulness of Current Values to Investors and Creditors," Research Study on Current-Value Accounting Measurements and Utility, George M. Scott, ed., Touche Ross Foundation (1978)
- "The Geometric Mean Strategy and Common Stock Investment Management," with Henry A. Latané in Life Insurance Investment Policies, David Cummins, ed. (1977)
- Investment Companies: Analysis of Current Operations and Future Prospects, with J. Finley Lee and Glenn L. Wood, American College of Life Underwriters (1975)

# Articles

"Should Analysts Own the Stocks they Cover?" The Financial Journalist, (March 2002)

- "Liquidity, Exchange Listing, and Common Stock Performance," with John C. Groth and Kerry Cooper, *Journal of Economics and Business* (Spring 1985); reprinted by National Association of Security Dealers
- "The Energy Crisis and the Homeowner: The Grief Process," *Texas Business Review* (Jan.-Feb. 1980); reprinted in *The Energy Picture: Problems and Prospects*, J. E. Pluta, ed., Bureau of Business Research (1980)
- "Use of IFPS at the Public Utility Commission of Texas," Proceedings of the IFPS Users Group Annual Meeting (1979)

- "Production Capacity Allocation: Conversion, CWIP, and One-Armed Economics," Proceedings of the NARUC Biennial Regulatory Information Conference (1978)
- "Some Thoughts on the Rate of Return to Public Utility Companies," with Bruce H. Fairchild in Proceedings of the NARUC Biennial Regulatory Information Conference (1978)
- "A New Capital Budgeting Measure: The Integration of Time, Liquidity, and Uncertainty," with David Cordell in *Proceedings of the Southwestern Finance Association* (1977)
- "Usefulness of Current Values to Investors and Creditors," in Inflation Accounting/Indexing and Stock Behavior (1977)
- "Consumer Expectations and the Economy," Texas Business Review (Nov. 1976)
- "Portfolio Performance Evaluation and Long-run Capital Growth," with Henry A. Latané in Proceedings of the Eastern Finance Association (1973)
- Book reviews in Journal of Finance and Financial Review. Abstracts for CFA Digest. Articles in Carolina Financial Times.

## Selected Papers and Presentations

- "Economic Perspective on Water Marketing in Texas," 2009 Water Law Institute, The University of Texas School of Law, Austin, TX (Dec. 2009).
- "Estimating Utility Cost of Equity in Financial Turmoil," SNL EXNET 15<sup>th</sup> Annual FERC Briefing, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 2009)
- "The Who, What, When, How, and Why of Ethics," San Antonio Financial Analysts Society (Jan. 16, 2002). Similar presentation given to the Austin Society of Financial Analysts (Jan. 17, 2002)
- "Ethics for Financial Analysts," Sponsored by Canadian Council of Financial Analysts: delivered in Calgary, Edmonton, Regina, and Winnipeg, June 1997. Similar presentations given to Austin Society of Financial Analysts (Mar. 1994), San Antonio Society of Financial Analysts (Nov. 1985), and St. Louis Society of Financial Analysts (Feb. 1986)
- "Cost of Capital for Multi-Divisional Corporations," Financial Management Association, New Orleans, Louisiana (Oct. 1996)
- "Ethics and the Treasury Function," Government Treasurers Organization of Texas, Corpus Christi, Texas (Jun. 1996)
- "A Cooperative Future," Iowa Association of Electric Cooperatives, Des Moines (December 1995). Similar presentations given to National G & T Conference, Irving, Texas (June 1995), Kentucky Association of Electric Cooperatives Annual Meeting, Louisville (Nov. 1994), Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives Annual Meeting, Richmond (July 1994), and Carolina Electric Cooperatives Annual Meeting, Raleigh (Mar. 1994)
- "Information Superhighway Warnings: Speed Bumps on Wall Street and Detours from the Economy," Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants Natural Gas, Telecommunications and Electric Industries Conference, Austin (Apr. 1995)
- "Economic/Wall Street Outlook," Carolinas Council of the Institute of Management Accountants, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina (May 1994). Similar presentation given to Bell Operating Company Accounting Witness Conference, Santa Fe, New Mexico (Apr. 1993)
- "Regulatory Developments in Telecommunications," Regional Holding Company Financial and Accounting Conference, San Antonio (Sep. 1993)

- "Estimating the Cost of Capital During the 1990s: Issues and Directions," The National Society of Rate of Return Analysts, Washington, D.C. (May 1992)
- "Making Utility Regulation Work at the Public Utility Commission of Texas," Center for Legal and Regulatory Studies, University of Texas, Austin (June 1991)
- "Can Regulation Compete for the Hearts and Minds of Industrial Customers," Emerging Issues of Competition in the Electric Utility Industry Conference, Austin (May 1988)
- "The Role of Utilities in Fostering New Energy Technologies," Emerging Energy Technologies in Texas Conference, Austin (Mar. 1988)
- "The Regulators' Perspective," Bellcore Economic Analysis Conference, San Antonio (Nov. 1987)
- "Public Utility Commissions and the Nuclear Plant Contractor," Construction Litigation Superconference, Laguna Beach, California (Dec. 1986)
- "Development of Cogeneration Policies in Texas," University of Georgia Fifth Annual Public Utilities Conference, Atlanta (Sep. 1985)
- "Wheeling for Power Sales," Energy Bureau Cogeneration Conference, Houston (Nov. 1985).
- "Asymmetric Discounting of Information and Relative Liquidity: Some Empirical Evidence for Common Stocks" (with John Groth and Kerry Cooper), Southern Finance Association, New Orleans (Nov. 1982)
- "Used and Useful Planning Models," Planning Executive Institute, 27th Corporate Planning Conference, Los Angeles (Nov. 1979)
- "Staff Input to Commission Rate of Return Decisions," The National Society of Rate of Return Analysts, New York (Oct. 1979)
- ""Discounted Cash Life: A New Measure of the Time Dimension in Capital Budgeting," with David Cordell, Southern Finance Association, New Orleans (Nov. 1978)
- "The Relative Value of Statistics of Ex Post Common Stock Distributions to Explain Variance," with Charles G. Martin, Southern Finance Association, Atlanta (Nov. 1977)
- "An ANOVA Representation of Common Stock Returns as a Framework for the Allocation of Portfolio Management Effort," with Charles G. Martin, Financial Management Association, Montreal (Oct. 1976)
- "A Growth-Optimal Portfolio Selection Model with Finite Horizon," with Henry A. Latané, American Finance Association, San Francisco (Dec. 1974)
- "An Optimal Approach to the Finance Decision," with Henry A. Latané, Southern Finance Association, Atlanta (Nov. 1974)
- "A Pragmatic Approach to the Capital Structure Decision Based on Long-Run Growth," with Henry A. Latané, Financial Management Association, San Diego (Oct. 1974)
- "Growth Rates, Expected Returns, and Variance in Portfolio Selection and Performance Evaluation," with Henry A. Latané, Econometric Society, Oslo, Norway (Aug. 1973)

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DCF MODEL

# UTILITY PROXY GROUP

		(a)	(a)		<b>(</b> 4)	(c)	(p)	(e)	(J)	( <del>I</del> )	Ð	Ð
		Di	vidend Yield	Ŧ		Growth	ı Rates		Cos	t of Equit	y Estimat	es
	Company	<u>Price</u>	<u>Dividends</u>	<u>Yield</u>	<u>V Line</u>	<u>IBES</u>	<u>Zacks</u>	<u>br+sv</u>	<u>V Line</u>	IBES	Zacks	<u>brtsv</u>
Ļ	Alliant Energy	\$ 37.63	\$ 1.70	4.5%	7.0%	7.3%	3.5%	6.1%	11.5%	11.8%	8.0%	10.7%
ы	Ameren Corp.	\$ 29.02	\$ 1.54	5.3%	-2.5%	-2.0%	-2.0%	2.5%	2.8%	3.3%	3.3%	7.8%
3	American Elec Pwr	\$ 36.66	\$ 1.84	5.0%	3.0%	3.1%	4.0%	4.8%	8.0%	8.1%	<del>3</del> .0%	9.8%
4	Cleco Corp.	\$ 31.45	\$ 1.08	3.4%	9.5%	3.0%	7.0%	5.5%	12.9%	6.4%	10.4%	8.9%
ß	<b>Constellation Energy</b>	\$ 32.00	\$ 0.96	3.0%	7.0%	%6.6	6.9%	4.9%	10.0%	12.9%	12.9%	2.9%
9	DTE Energy Co.	\$ 46.89	\$ 2.30	4.9%	6.5%	5.2%	5.0%	3.9%	11.4%	10.1%	%6.6	8.8%
7	Entergy Corp.	\$ 73.50	\$ 3.38	4.6%	2.0%	2.0%	1.5%	4.5%	6.6%	6.6%	6.1%	9.1%
8	Exelon Corp.	\$ 43.20	\$ 2.10	4.9%	-3.0%	-0.8%	-2.5%	5.1%	1.9%	4.1%	2.4%	%6.6
6	Great Plains Energy	\$ 19.95	\$ 0.87	4.4%	4.5%	8.9%	9.0%	2.4%	8.9%	13.3%	13.4%	6.8%
10	Hawaiian Elec.	\$ 24.89	\$ 1.24	5.0%	11.5%	7.5%	9.5%	4.2%	16.5%	12.5%	14.5%	9.2%
11	IDACORP, Inc.	\$ 38.29	\$ 1.20	3.1%	5.5%	4.7%	4.7%	5.0%	8.6%	7.8%	7.8%	8.1%
11	Integrys Energy Group	\$ 48.17	\$ 2.72	5.6%	11.0%	%6.7	10.4%	3.2%	16.6%	13.5%	16.0%	8.8%
13	OGE Energy Corp.	\$ 45.96	\$ 1.50	3.3%	6.5%	7.3%	5.5%	%9.7	9.8%	10.6%	8.8%	10.8%
14	PG&E Corp.	\$ 47.00	\$ 1.92	4.1%	6.0%	6.5%	7.7%	6.7%	10.1%	10.6%	11.8%	10.7%
15	Pinnacle West Capital	\$ 42.11	\$ 2.10	5.0%	6.0%	6.2%	6.5%	3.7%	11.0%	11.2%	11.5%	8.6%
16	<b>Portland General Elec.</b>	\$ 22.28	\$ 1.07	4.8%	3.0%	5.0%	5.6%	3.7%	7.8%	9.8%	10.4%	8.5%
17	PPL Corp.	\$ 25.83	\$ 1.40	5.4%	3.0%	3.6%	2.6%	10.4%	8.4%	9.0%	8.0%	15.8%
18	Pub Sv Enterprise Grp	\$ 32.50	\$ 1.40	4.3%	2.0%	3.0%	0.5%	7.0%	6.3%	~7.3%	4.8%	11.3%
19	SCANA Corp.	\$ 42.50	\$ 1.92	4.5%	3.5%	5.1%	5.0%	5.4%	8.0%	9.6%	9.5%	10.0%
30	Sempra Energy	\$ 52.58	\$ 1.68	3.2%	1.0%	5.0%	2.0%	5.7%	4.2%	8.2%	10.2%	8.9%
21	Westar Energy	\$ 25.96	\$ 1.26	4.9%	8.5%	6.1%	4.7%	4.9%	13.4%	11.0%	9.6%	9.7%
ដ	Wisconsin Energy	\$ 60.32	\$ 2.10	3.5%	9.5%	10.2%	8.5%	6.5%	13.0%	<u>13.7%</u>	<u>12.0%</u>	<u>10.0%</u>
÷	Average (g)	•		•	•				10. <del>9%</del>	10.8%	10.8%	%L'6

Recent price and estimated dividend for next 12 mos. from The Value Line Investment Survey, *Summary and Index* (Feb. 4, 2011). The Value Line Investment Survey (Nov. 26, & Dec. 24, 2010, Feb. 4, 2011).

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Thomson ReutersCompany in Context Report (Feb. 1, 2011). www.zacks.com (retrieved Feb. 2, 2011).

See Schedule 3. ଟ କି ତ ଟି ତ କ ଭି

Sum of dividend yield and respective growth rate Excludes highlighted figures.

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Exhibit WEA-3 Page 1 of 2

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# BR + SV GROWTH RATE

# UTILITY PROXY GROUP

		(a)	(a)	(a)			<b>(</b> 9	(c)		(p)	(e)		
			- 2014 -				Adjustment			NS,	v" Factor		
	Company	EPS	<u>DPS</u>	BVPS	q	ᆔ	<u>Factor</u>	<u>Adjusted r</u>	br	8		ΔS	br + sv
1	Alliant Energy	\$3.60	\$1.92	\$30.60	46.7%	11.8%	1.0246	12.1%	5.6%	0.0147	0.3558	0.52%	6.1%
2	Ameren Corp.	\$2.50	\$1.54	\$35.50	38.4%	7.0%	1.0144	7.1%	2.7%	0.0122	(0.1833)	-0.22%	2.5%
ŝ	American Elec Pwr	\$3.50	\$2.00	\$34.25	42.9%	10.2%	1.0262	10.5%	4.5%	0.0108	0.2389	0.26%	4.8%
4	Cleco Corp.	\$2.75	\$1.45	\$25.75	47.3%	10.7%	1.0412	11.1%	5.3%	0.0178	0.1417	0.25%	5.5%
ŝ	<b>Constellation Energy</b>	\$3.25	\$1.00	\$45.25	69.2%	7.2%	1.0075	7.2%	5.0%	0.0052	(0.1313)	-0.07%	4.9%
\$	DTE Energy Co.	\$4.25	\$2.60	\$45.75	38.8%	9.3%	1.0250	9.5%	3.7%	0.0136	0.1682	0.23%	3.9%
~	Entergy Corp.	\$6.75	\$3.60	\$59.75	46.7%	11.3%	1.0182	11.5%	5.4%	(0.0266)	0.3361	-0.89%	4.5%
80	Exelon Corp.	\$3.50	\$2.10	\$25.00	40.0%	14.0%	1.0240	14.3%	5.7%	(0.0129)	0.5238	-0.67%	5.1%
6	Great Plains Energy	\$1.75	\$1.15	\$22.50	34.3%	7.8%	1.0251	8.0%	2.7%	0.0297	(0.0976)	-0.29%	2.4%
10	Hawaiian Elec.	\$2.00	\$1.30	\$18.00	35.0%	11.1%	1.0220	11.4%	4.0%	0.0098	0.2653	0.26%	4.2%
11	IDACORP, Inc.	\$3.10	\$1.40	\$36.50	54.8%	8.5%	1.0303	8.8%	4.8%	0.0181	0.0875	0.16%	5.0%
12	Integrys Energy Group	\$4.00	\$2.72	\$41.75	32.0%	9.6%	1.0134	9.7%	3.1%	0.0074	0.1211	%60.0	3.2%
13	OGE Energy Corp.	\$3.75	\$1.65	\$30.00	56.0%	12.5%	1.0386	13.0%	7.3%	0.0081	0.3684	0.30%	7.6%
14	PG&E Corp.	\$4.25	\$2.20	\$36.25	48.2%	11.7%	1.0384	12.2%	5.9%	0.0332	0.2368	0.79%	6.7%
15	Pinnacle West Capital	\$3.50	\$2.30	\$38.25	34.3%	9.2%	1.0339	9.5%	3.2%	0.0418	0.1000	0.42%	3.7%
16	<b>Portland General Elec.</b>	\$2.00	\$1.20	\$23.75	40.0%	8.4%	1.0327	8.7%	3.5%	0.0385	0.0500	0.19%	3.7%
17	PPL Corp.	\$2.50	\$1.60	\$22.00	36.0%	11.4%	1.0816	12.3%	4.4%	0.1435	0.4133	5.93%	10.4%
18	Pub Sv Enterprise Grp	\$3.25	\$1.50	\$26.00	53.8%	12.5%	1.0398	13.0%	7.0%	0.0000	0.3500	0.00%	7.0%
19	SCANA Corp.	\$3.50	\$2.00	\$35.25	42.9%	%6'6	1.0418	10.3%	4.4%	0.0463	0.2167	1.00%	5.4%
റ്റ	Sempra Energy	\$4.75	\$2.05	\$47.50	56.8%	10.0%	1.0230	10.2%	5.8%	(0.0085)	0.1739	-0.15%	5.7%
51	Westar Energy	\$2.40	\$1.40	\$24.20	41.7%	%6.6	1.0281	10.2%	4.2%	0.0322	0.1933	0.62%	4.9%
ជ	Wisconsin Energy	\$5.25	\$2.70	\$40.00	48.6%	13.1%	1.0277	13.5%	6.6%	(00000)	0.5000	0.00%	6.5%

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# Exhibit WEA-3 Page 2 of 2

# UTILITY PROXY GROUP

		(a)	(a)	(I)	(a)	(a)	(I)	(g)	(a)	(a)		(ų)	(a)	(a)	(g)
			- 2009 -			- 2014		Ghg	2(	014 Price				umon Shi	rres
	Company	Eq Ratio	Tot Cap	Com Eq	<u>Eq Ratio</u>	Tot Cap	Com Eq	Equity	High	<u>Low</u>	Avg.	M/B	2009	2014	Growth
	Alliant Energy	51.2%	\$5,423	\$2,777	51.5%	\$6,895	\$3,551	5.0%	\$55.00	\$40.00	\$47.50	1.552	110.66	116.00	0.95%
7	Ameren Corp.	49.1%	\$15,991	\$7,852	51.5%	\$17,600	\$9,064	2.9%	\$35.00	\$25.00	\$30.00	0.845	237.40	255.00	1.44%
ъ	American Elec Pwr	45.4%	\$28,958	\$13,147	48.0%	\$35,600	\$17,088	5.4%	\$55.00	\$35.00	\$45.00	1.314	478.05	498.00	0.82%
4	Cleco Corp.	45.8%	\$2,436	\$1,116	53.5%	\$3,150	\$1,685	8.6%	\$35.00	\$25.00	\$30.00	1.165	60.26	65.00	1.53%
ц	Constellation Energy	63.5%	\$13,701	\$8,700	67.0%	\$14,000	\$9,380	1.5%	\$50.00	\$30.00	\$40.00	0.884	200.99	207.00	0.59%
9	DTE Energy Co.	46.0%	\$13,648	\$6,278	48.0%	\$16,800	\$8,064	5.1%	\$65.00	\$45.00	\$55.00	1.202	165.40	175.00	1.13%
5	Entergy Corp.	43.1%	\$19,985	\$8,614	41.0%	\$25,200	\$10,332	3.7%	\$105.00	\$75.00	<b>00.06</b> \$	1.506	189.12	173.00	-1.77%
80	Exelon Corp.	52.4%	\$24,112	\$12,635	55.0%	\$29,200	\$16,060	4.9%	\$60.00	\$45.00	\$52.50	2.100	660.00	640.00	-0.61%
6	Great Plains Energy	46.2%	\$6,045	\$2,793	46.0%	\$7,800	\$3,588	5.1%	\$25.00	\$16.00	\$20.50	0.911	135.42	159.00	3.26%
10	Hawaiian Elec.	50.7%	\$2,841	\$1,440	52.0%	\$3,450	\$1,794	4.5%	\$30.00	\$19.00	\$24.50	1.361	95.52	00.66	0.72%
11	IDACORP, Inc.	49.8%	\$2,807	\$1,398	50.5%	\$3,750	\$1,894	6.3%	\$50.00	\$30.00	\$40.00	1.096	47.90	52.00	1.66%
12	Integrys Energy Group	53.9%	\$5,304	\$2,859	52.5%	\$6,225	\$3,268	2.7%	\$55.00	\$40.00	\$47.50	1.138	75.98	78.50	0.65%
13	OGE Energy Corp.	49.4%	\$4,130	\$2,040	49.0%	\$6,125	\$3,001	8.0%	\$55.00	\$40.00	\$47.50	1.583	97.00	99.50	0.51%
14	PG&E Corp.	47.4%	\$21,793	\$10,330	54.0%	\$28,100	\$15,174	8.0%	\$55.00	\$40.00	\$47.50	1.310	370.60	420.00	2.53%
15	<b>Pinnacle West Capital</b>	49.6%	\$6,687	\$3,317	53.5%	\$8,700	\$4,655	7.0%	\$50.00	\$35.00	\$42.50	1.111	101.43	122.00	3.76%
16	Portland General Elec.	49.7%	\$3,100	\$1,541	50.0%	\$4,275	\$2,138	6.8%	\$30.00	\$20.00	\$25.00	1.053	75.21	90.00	3.66%
17	PPL Corp.	42.5%	\$12,940	\$5,500	53.5%	\$23,300	\$12,466	17.8%	\$45.00	\$30.00	\$37.50	1.705	377.18	565.00	8.42%
18	Pub Sv Enterprise Grp	53.2%	\$16,513	\$8,785	60.0%	\$21,800	\$13,080	8.3%	\$45.00	\$35.00	\$40.00	1.538	505.99	506.00	0.00%
19	SCANA Corp.	43.2%	\$7,891	\$3,409	47.5%	\$10,900	\$5,178	8.7%	\$50.00	\$40.00	\$45.00	1.277	123.00	147.00	3.63%
20	Sempra Energy	54.1%	\$16,646	\$9,005	51.5%	\$22,000	\$11,330	4.7%	\$65.00	\$50.00	\$57.50	1.211	246.50	238.00	-0.70%
21	Westar Energy	47.4%	\$4,778	\$2,265	46.0%	\$6,520	\$2,999	5.8%	\$35.00	\$25.00	\$30.00	1.240	109.07	124.00	2.60%
5	Wisconsin Energy	47.7%	\$7,473	\$3,565	49.5%	\$9,500	\$4,703	5.7%	\$90.00	\$70.00	\$80.00	2.000	116.91	116.90	0.00%
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(a) The Value Line Investment Survey (Nov. 26, & Dec. 24, 2019, Feb. 4, 2011).
(b) Computed using the formula 2\*(1+5-Yr. Change in Equity)/(2+5 Yr. Change in Equity).
(c) Product of average year-end "r" for 2014 and Adjustment Factor.
(d) Product of change in common shares outstanding and M/B Ratio.
(e) Computed as 1 - B/M Ratio.
(f) Product of total capital and equity ratio.
(g) Five-year rate of change.
(h) Average of High and Low expected market prices divided by 2013-15 BVPS.

### DCF MODEL

### NON-UTILITY PROXY GROUP

		(a)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(đ)	(e)	(e)	(e)	(e)
		Dividend		Growth	Rates			Cost of Equi	ty Estimate	8
	Company	<u>Yield</u>	V Line	<b>IBES</b>	Zacks	<u>br+sv</u>	V Line	IBES	Zacks	br+sv
1	3M Company	2.39%	7.0%	11.9%	11.3%	12.9%	9.4%	14.3%	13.7%	15.3%
2	Abbott Labs.	3.67%	10.0%	8.9%	9.0%	15.0%	13.7%	12.6%	12.7%	18.7%
3	Alberto-Culver	1.02%	15.0%	9.4%	12.5%	8.4%	16.0%	10.4%	13.5%	9.4%
4	AT&T Inc.	6.09%	5.5%	5.7%	7.0%	5.4%	11.6%	11.8%	13.1%	11.5%
5	Automatic Data Proc.	2.93%	8.0%	10.6%	10.8%	9.5%	10.9%	13.5%	13.7%	12.4%
6	Bard (C.R.)	0.77%	9.5%	10.9%	11.8%	18.1%	10.3%	11 <b>.7%</b>	12.6%	18.9%
7	Baxter Int'l Inc.	2.45%	10.0%	9.6%	9.3%	15.5%	12.5%	12.1%	11.8%	17.9%
8	Becton, Dickinson	1.97%	9.5%	9.9%	10.8%	9.0%	11.5%	11.9%	12.8%	11.0%
9	Bristol-Myers Squibb	5.11%	8.5%	1.8%	2.0%	5.7%	13.6%	6.9%	7.1%	10.8%
10	Brown-Forman 'B'	1.90%	7.5%	10.9%	13.0%	10.6%	9.4%	12.8%	14.9%	12.5%
11	Chubb Corp.	2.55%	2.5%	8.7%	9.8%	8.0%	5.1%	11.3%	12.4%	10.5%
12	Church & Dwight	0.97%	12.0%	11.8%	12.0%	10.3%	13.0%	12.8%	13.0%	11.3%
13	Coca-Cola	2.80%	9.5%	8.7%	9.0%	9.9%	12.3%	11.5%	11.8%	12.7%
14	Colgate-Palmolive	2.76%	11.0%	9.3%	9.2%	18.1%	13.8%	12.1%	12.0%	20.8%
15	Commerce Bancshs.	2.22%	7.0%	7.0%	7.0%	7.9%	9.2%	9.2%	9.2%	10.1%
16	ConAgra Foods	3.92%	10.5%	7.7%	8.0%	8.1%	14.4%	11.6%	11.9%	12.0%
17	Costco Wholesale	1.24%	7.5%	13.3%	12.9%	8.2%	8.7%	14.5%	14.1%	9.5%
18	Cullen/Frost Bankers	2.96%	4.5%	8.5%	8.0%	5.7%	7.5%	11.5%	11.0%	8.6%
19	CVS Caremark Corp.	1.42%	9.5%	10.1%	12.0%	7.8%	10.9%	11.5%	13.4%	9.2%
20	Ecolab Inc.	1.41%	12.0%	13.2%	13.2%	19.6%	13.4%	14.6%	14.6%	21.0%
21	Exxon Mobil Corp.	2.26%	6.0%	12.1%	8.4%	13.5%	8.3%	14.4%	10.7%	15.7%
22	Gen'l Mills	3.02%	9.5%	7.7%	8.0%	9.3%	12.5%	10.7%	11.0%	12.3%
23	Heinz (H.J.)	3.85%	6.5%	7.0%	8.0%	13.9%	10.4%	10.9%	11.9%	17.8%
24	Hormel Foods	2.01%	10.5%	10.0%	9.3%	10.7%	12.5%	12.0%	11.3%	12.7%
25	Int'i Business Mach.	1.77%	13.0%	11.5%	9.3%	20.4%	14.8%	13.3%	11.1%	22.2%
26	Johnson & Johnson	3.44%	4.5%	6.0%	5.8%	10.8%	7.9%	9.4%	9.2%	14.2%
27	Kellogg	3.14%	9.5%	8.6%	9.0%	9.7%	12.6%	11.7%	12.1%	12.9%
28	Kimberly-Clark	4.09%	6.5%	7.5%	8.7%	18.6%	10.6%	11.6%	12.8%	22.7%
29	Kraft Foods	3.71%	8.0%	8.4%	8.0%	10.7%	11.7%	12.1%	11.7%	14.4%
30	Lilly (Eli)	5.64%	-2.5%	-6.4%	-5.3%	8.4%	3.1%	-0.8%	0.3%	14.0%
31	Lockheed Martin	3.78%	10.0%	8.1%	6.8%	20.3%	13.8%	11.9%	10.6%	24.1%
32	Lorillard Inc.	6.06%	10.5%	6.0%	6.0%	10.9%	16.6%	12.1%	12.1%	17.0%
33	McCormick & Co.	2.24%	8.5%	9.6%	9.5%	13.3%	10.7%	11.8%	11.7%	15.6%
34	McDonald's Corp.	3.25%	9.5%	9.8%	9.3%	10.7%	12.8%	13.1%	12.6%	13.9%
35	McKesson Corp.	0.98%	10.0%	14.2%	11.0%	11.7%	11.0%	15.2%	12.0%	12.7%
36	Medtronic, Inc.	2.47%	7.5%	8.8%	8.4%	11.7%	10.0%	11.3%	10.9%	14.1%
37	Microsoft Corp.	2.26%	12.5%	11.3%	11.7%	15.3%	14.8%	13.6%	14.0%	17.5%
38	NIKE, Inc. 'B'	1.49%	9.5%	10.9%	12.5%	12.2%	11.0%	12.4%	14.0%	13.7%
39	Northrop Grumman	2.82%	12.5%	11.0%	11.1%	7.9%	15.3%	13.8%	13.9%	10.7%
40	PepsiCo, Inc.	2.91%	11.0%	8.9%	9.5%	14.5%	13.9%	11.8%	12.4%	17.4%
41	Pfizer, Inc.	4.50%	5.0%	2.8%	3.5%	7.0%	9.5%	7.3%	8.0%	11.5%
42	Procter & Gamble	3.01%	8.0%	8.9%	9.2%	7.2%	11.0%	11.9%	12.2%	10.3%
43	Raytheon Co.	3.02%	10.0%	8.0%	10.0%	8.6%	13.0%	11.0%	13.0%	11.6%
44	Stryker Corp.	1.26%	12.5%	10.9%	11 4%	13.6%	13.8%	12.2%	12.7%	14.9%
45	Sysca Corp.	3 47%	8.0%	10.0%	9.7%	14.2%	11.5%	13.5%	13.2%	17.6%
46	TIX Companies	1.28%	13.5%	14 5%	14.4%	11 1%	14.8%	15.8%	15.7%	12.4%
-* 47	United Parcel Serv.	2.59%	9,0%	11 7%	11 5%	17.9%	11.6%	14.3%	14.1%	20.5%
48	Verizon Communic	5.63%	4.0%	6.7%	14.9%	5.7%	9.6%	11.8%	20.5%	11.3%
49	Walgreen Co.	1.68%	11 5%	13.4%	13.0%	9.7 % 9.4%	12.7%	15 1%	14.7%	10.1%
50	Wal-Mart Stores	2.16%	10.0%	10.7%	11 3%	0.9%	12.2%	12.9%	13.5%	12.1%
51	Waste Management	3.52%	5 5%	0.6%	11.0%	5.2%	Q (1%)	13.1%	14 5%	87%
	Average (f)		G.G /0	2.0 10		Job /0	12 09/	17 4%	12 5%	19 19
							14.V /Q	0/ 2 بکد		VO

(a) www.valueline.com (retrieved Jan. 28, 2011).

(b) Thomson Reuters Company in Context Report (Jan. 28, 2011).

(c) www.zacks.com (retrieved Jan. 31, 2011).

(d) See Schedule 5.

(e) Sum of dividend yield and respective growth rate.

(f) Excludes highlighted figures.

## BR + SV GROWTH RATE

## NON-UTILITY PROXY GROUP

		(a)	(a)	(a)			(b)	(c)		(d)	(e)	1	
	_	********	2014 -				Adjust.		_	"\$1	" Factor		
	<u>Company</u>	<u>EPS</u>	<u>DPS</u>	<u>BVPS</u>	<u>b</u>	<u> </u>	Factor	<u>Adj. r</u>	<u>br</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>v</u>	<u>9v</u>	br+sv
1	3M Company	\$7.60	\$3.10	\$40.05	59.2%	19.0%	1.0818	20.5%	12.2%	0.0106	0.6731	0.71%	12.9%
2	Abbott Labs.	\$5.70	\$2.18	\$22.05	61.8%	25.9%	1.0384	26.8%	16.6%	(0.0197)	0.7900	-1.56%	15.0%
3	Alberto-Culver	\$2.35	\$0.55	\$17.85	76.6%	13.2%	1.0315	13.6%	10.4%	(0.0330)	0.6033	-1.99%	8.4%
4	AT&T inc.	\$3.25	\$2.00	\$24.05	38.5%	13.5%	1.0327	14.0%	5.4%	(0.0001)	0.4656	-0.01%	5.4%
5	Automatic Data Proc.	\$3.45	\$1.60	\$22.95	53.6%	15.0%	1.0786	16.2%	8.7%	0.0111	0.7039	0.78%	9.5%
6	Bard (C.R.)	\$7.75	\$0.85	\$31.45	89.0%	24.6%	1.0255	25.3%	22.5%	(0.0564)	0.7754	-4.37%	18.1%
7	Baxter Int'l Inc.	\$5.85	\$1.50	\$22.90	74.4%	25.5%	1.0560	27.0%	20.1%	(0.0633)	0.7224	-4.57%	15.5%
8	Becton, Dickinson	\$7.65	\$2.20	\$34.10	71.2%	22.4%	1.0306	23.1%	16.5%	(0.1030)	0.7216	-7.43%	9.0%
9	Bristol-Myers Squibb	\$2.35	\$1.54	\$11.65	34.5%	20.2%	1.0263	20.7%	7.1%	(0.0212)	0.6671	-1.42%	5.7%
10	Brown-Forman 'B'	\$4.50	\$1.48	\$20.40	67.1%	22.1%	1.0372	22.9%	15.4%	(0.0640)	0.7368	-4.71%	10.6%
11	Chubb Corp.	\$7.00	\$1.60	\$64.85	77.1%	10.8%	1.0184	11.0%	8.5%	(0.0319)	0.1632	-0.52%	8.0%
12	Church & Dwight	\$5.80	\$1.00	\$39.25	82.8%	14.8%	1.0465	15.5%	12.8%	(0.0414)	0.6075	-2.52%	10.3%
13	Coca-Cola	\$4.95	\$2.48	\$18.20	49.9%	27.2%	1.0479	28.5%	14.2%	(0.0526)	0.8267	-4.34%	9.9%.
14	Colgate-Palmolive	\$7.20	\$3.20	\$13.25	55.6%	54.3%	1.0671	58.0%	32.2%	(0.1557)	0.9086	-14.15%	18.1%
15	Commerce Bancshs.	\$3.35	\$1.15	\$32.10	65.7%	10.4%	1.0480	10.9%	7.2%	0.0240	0.2867	0.69%	7.9%
16	ConAgra Foods	\$2.35	\$1.00	\$15.00	57.4%	15.7%	1.0288	16.1%	9.3%	(0.0217)	0.5385	-1.17%	8.1%
17	Costco Wholesale	\$4.20	\$0.95	\$33.50	77.4%	12.5%	1.0315	12.9%	10.0%	(0.0301)	0.5939	~1.79%	8.2%
18	Cullen/Frost Bankers	\$4.35	\$2.10	\$44.00	51.7%	9.9%	1.0382	10.3%	5.3%	0.0132	0.2667	0.35%	5.7%
19	CVS Caremark Corp.	\$4.00	\$0.56	\$38.15	86.0%	10.5%	1.0268	10.8%	9.3%	(0.0395)	0.3642	-1.44%	7.8%
20	Ecolab Inc.	\$3.60	\$0.85	\$14.45	76.4%	24.9%	1.0530	26.2%	20.0%	(0.0056)	0.7592	-0.43%	19.6%
21	Exxon Mobil Corp.	\$9.35	\$2.05	\$45.50	78.1%	20.5%	1.0546	21.7%	16.9%	(0.0578)	0.5956	-3.44%	13.5%
22	Gen'l Mills	\$3.15	\$1.36	\$11.95	56.8%	26.4%	1.0318	27.2%	15.5%	(0.0809)	0.7610	-6.16%	9.3%
23	Heinz (H.J.)	\$4.10	\$2.32	\$14.65	43.4%	28.0%	1.0908	30.5%	13.3%	0.0085	0.7830	0.66%	13.9%
24	Hormel Foods	\$2.10	\$0.70	\$13.55	66.7%	15.5%	1.0527	16.3%	10.9%	(0.0025)	0.6387	-0.16%	10.7%
25	Int'l Business Mach.	\$18.00	\$3.60	\$48.75	80.0%	36.9%	1.0856	40.1%	32.1%	(0.1501)	0.7759	-11.65%	20.4%
26	Johnson & Johnson	\$5.85	\$2.65	\$27.60	54.7%	21.2%	1.0378	22.0%	12.0%	(0.0185)	0.6846	-1.26%	10.8%
27	Kellogg	\$5.10	\$1.88	\$9.95	63.1%	51.3%	1.0352	53.1%	33.5%	(0.2690)	0.8829	-23.75%	9.7%
28	Kimberly-Clark	\$6.25	\$2.75	\$15.55	56.0%	40.2%	1.0140	40.8%	22.8%	(0.0506)	0.8363	-4.24%	18.6%
29	Kraft Foods	\$3.00	\$1.40	\$24.00	53.3%	12.5%	1.0480	13.1%	7.0%	0.0716	0.5200	3.72%	10.7%
30	Lilly (Eli)	\$3.40	\$2.20	\$15.60	35.3%	21.8%	1.0636	23.2%	8.2%	0.0032	0.6716	0.21%	8.4%
31	Lockheed Martin	\$13.25	\$3.50	\$31.25	73.6%	42.4%	1.0882	<b>46.</b> 1%	34.0%	(0.1663)	0.8188	-13.62%	20.3%
32	Lorillard Inc.	\$9.85	\$5.80	\$11.10	41.1%	88.7%	1.2773	113.3%	46.6%	(0.3852)	0.9260	-35.67%	10.9%
33	McCormick & Co.	\$3.50	\$1.36	\$18.95	61.1%	18.5%	1.0649	19.7%	12.0%	0.0178	0.7293	1.30%	13.3%
34	McDonald's Corp.	\$6.05	\$3.00	\$19.00	50.4%	31.8%	1.0303	32.8%	16.5%	(0.0734)	0.8000	-5.87%	10.7%
35	McKesson Corp.	\$6.80	\$0.72	\$46.65	89.4%	14.6%	1.0421	15.2%	13.6%	(0.0380)	0.4957	-1.88%	11.7%
36	Medtronic, Inc.	\$4.50	\$1.18	\$25.95	73.8%	17.3%	1.0597	18.4%	13.6%	(0.0326)	0.5848	-1.91%	11.7%
37	Microsoft Corp.	\$3.35	\$0.96	\$10.75	71.3%	31.2%	1.0763	33.5%	23.9%	(0.1104)	0.7850	-8.66%	15.3%
38	NIKE, Inc. 'B'	\$5.65	\$1.50	\$34.60	73.5%	16.3%	1.0643	17.4%	12.8%	(0.0085)	0.6358	-0.54%	12.2%
39	Northrop Grumman	\$10.25	\$2.50	\$68.00	75.6%	15.1%	1.0293	15.5%	11 <b>.7%</b>	(0.0783)	0.4868	-3.81%	7.9%
40	PepsiCo, Inc.	\$6.40	\$2.34	\$24.00	63.4%	26.7%	1.0724	28.6%	18.1%	(0.0449)	0.8118	-3.64%	14.5%
41	Pfizer, Inc.	\$2.05	\$1.16	\$13.00	43.4%	15.8%	1.0154	16.0%	7.0%	-	0.5273	0.00%	7.0%
42	Procter & Gamble	\$5.25	\$2.18	\$29.45	58.5%	17.8%	1.0230	18.2%	10.7%	(0.0495)	0.6900	-3.41%	7.2%
43	Raytheon Co.	\$7.20	\$2.00	\$38.65	72.2%	18.6%	1.0231	19.1%	13.8%	(0.0870)	0.5932	-5.16%	8.6%
44	Stryker Corp.	\$5.35	\$0.84	\$32.75	84.3%	16.3%	1.0660	17.4%	14.7%	(0.0144)	0.7213	-1.04%	13.6%
45	Sysco Corp.	\$2.75	\$1.10	\$10.10	60.0%	27.2%	1.0502	28.6%	17.2%	(0.0385)	0.7756	-2.98%	14.2%
46	TJX Companies	\$4.80	\$0.80	\$12.75	83.3%	37.6%	1.0374	39.1%	32.5%	(0.2565)	0.8355	-21.43%	11.1%
47	United Parcel Serv.	\$5.50	\$2.20	\$19.30	60.0%	28.5%	1.0912	31.1%	18.7%	(0.0090)	0.8245	-0.75%	17.9%
48	Verizon Communic.	\$3.05	\$1.96	\$18.95	35.7%	16.1%	1.0250	16.5%	5.9%	(0.0032)	0.6555	-0.21%	5.7%
49	Walgreen Co.	\$3.65	\$1.00	\$21.15	72.6%	17.3%	1.0252	17 <b>.7%</b>	12.8%	(0.0684)	0.6475	-4.43%	8.4%
50	Wal-Mart Stores	\$6.05	\$1.75	\$23.40	71.1%	25.9%	1.0072	26.0%	18.5%	(0.1157)	0.7400	-8.56%	<b>9.9%</b>
51	Waste Management	\$2.90	\$1.60	\$15.30	44.8%	19.0%	1.0079	19.1%	8.6%	(0.0515)	0.6600	-3.40%	5.2%
### BR + SV GROWTH RATE

### NON-UTILITY PROXY GROUP

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		(a) Cor	(a) umon Equi	(f)	(a)	(a) 114 Price		(g)	(a) Com	(a) mon Shaa	(f)
	Company	2009	2014	Chg.	High	Low	Ave.	M/B	2009	2014	Growth
1	3M Company	\$12,764	\$28,975	17.8%	\$135.00	\$110.00	\$122.50	3.059	710.60	723.00	0.35%
2	Abbott Labs.	\$72,856	\$33 550	8.0%	\$115.00	C05.00	\$105.00	4 767	1551.00	1 520 00	_A 41%
3	Alberto-Culver	\$1 107	\$1.640	6.5%	\$50.00	\$40.00	\$45.00	2 521	98.76	92.00	_1 31%
4	AT&T Inc.	\$102 339	\$141 895	6.8%	\$50.00	\$40.00	\$45.00	1 871	5901.00	5 900 00	-1.01%
5	Automatic Data Proc	\$5 323	\$141,070 \$11 700	17 1%	\$00.00 \$85.00	\$70.00	\$77.50	3 377	501 20	510.00	0.22%
6	Bard (C R )	\$2 104	#11,700 #2 630	5 794	\$155.00	\$125.00	¢140.00	4 452	05.03	00.00	1 279/
7	Baytar Int'l Inc	\$2,179 \$7 101	#2,0.7V \$10,400	11.00/	\$155.00	#75 00	#140.00	2,402	70.72 400.02	50.00	-1.27 70
, 8	Becton Dickinson	\$5 142	\$12,000 \$2 095	6 39/	\$70.00 \$125.00	\$75.00 \$110.00	#02.00 ¢100 50	3 503	227 00	205.00	-1.70%
9	Bristol-Myers Souibb	\$14 795	20,700 610 120	5.4%	\$100.00	\$110.00	\$122.00	3.092	1 700 50	1 450 00	-2.0770
10	Brown-Forman 'B'	\$1 905	\$17,200 \$7.750	J.470 770/	\$40.00 \$\$5.00	\$30.00 #70.00	\$33.00 \$77.50	3.004	1,709.00	195.00	1 ( 00/
11	Chubb Corn	01,070 615 604	\$4,700 \$10,000	2.2%	965.UU	\$70.00 #770.00	\$77.3U	3.799	220.01	130.00	-1.00%
10	Church & Durichs	#10,00 <del>4</del>	\$10,000 \$10,000	J.0%	\$110.00	\$70.00	\$77.30 ¢100.00	1.193	20 Er	290.00	1.(20)
12	Com Cole	\$1,002 #24,500	Φ2,000	9.7%	\$110.00	\$90.00	\$100.00 ¢105.00	2.240	70.55	00.00	-1.03%
1.0	Colorio Balmoliva	#24,777 #2.117	\$40,000 #< 100	10.1%	\$115.00	\$90.00	\$105.00	5./09	2,305.00	2,200.00	-0.91%
12	Corgane-Failmonive	\$3,110 \$1,007	\$0,100 00.000	14.4%	\$160.00	\$130.00	\$145.00	10.943	494.17	460.00	-1.42%
15	Commerce bancsns.	\$1,880	\$3,050	10.1%	\$50.00	\$40.00	\$45.00	1.402	87.26	95.00	1.71%
10	ConAgra roous	\$4,721	\$6,300	5.9%	\$35.00	\$30.00	\$32.50	2.167	441.66	420.00	-1.00%
17	Costco wholesale	\$10,018	\$13,725	0.5%	\$90.00	\$75.00	\$82.50	2.403	435.97	410.00	-1.22%
10	Cullen/Prost Dankers	\$1,894	\$2,775	7.9%	\$65.00	\$55.00	\$60.00	1.304	60.04	63.00	0.97%
19	CVS Caremark Corp.	\$35,768	\$46,750	5.5%	\$65.00	\$55.00	\$60.00	1.573	1,391.00	1,225.00	-2.51%
20	Ecolab Inc.	\$2,001	\$3,400	11.2%	\$65.00	\$55.00	\$60.D0	4.152	236.60	235.00	-0.14%
21	Exxon Mobil Corp.	\$110,569	\$191,000	11.6%	\$125.00	\$100.00	\$112.50	2.473	4,727.00	4,200.00	-2.34%
22	Gen'l Mills	\$5,175	\$7,115	6.6%	\$55.00	\$45.00	\$50.00	4.184	656.00	595.00	-1.93%
23	Heinz (H.J.)	\$1,891	\$4,700	20.0%	\$75.00	\$60.00	\$67.50	4.608	318.06	321.00	0.18%
24	Hormel Foods	\$2,124	\$3,600	11.1%	\$40.00	\$35.00	\$37.50	2.768	267.19	266.00	-0.09%
25	Int'l Business Mach.	\$22,755	\$53,650	18.7%	\$240.00	\$195.00	\$217.50	4.462	1,305.30	1,100.00	-3.36%
26	Johnson & Johnson	\$50,588	\$73,850	7.9%	\$95.00	\$80.00	\$87.50	3.170	2,754,30	2,675.00	-0.58%
27	Kellogg	\$2,272	\$3,230	7.3%	\$95.00	\$75.00	\$85.00	8.543	381.38	325.00	-3.15%
28	Kimberly-Clark	\$5,406	\$6,220	2.8%	\$105.00	\$85.00	\$95.00	6.109	417.00	400.00	-0.83%
2 <del>9</del>	Kraft Foods	\$25,972	\$42,000	10.1%	\$55.00	\$45.00	\$50.00	2.083	1,477.90	1,750.00	3.44%
30	Lilly (Eli)	\$9,524	\$18,000	13.6%	\$50.00	\$45.00	\$47.50	3.045	1,149.00	1,155.00	0.10%
31	Lockheed Martin	\$4,129	\$10,000	19.4%	\$190.00	\$155.00	\$172.50	5.520	372.90	320.00	-3.01%
32	Lorillard Inc.	\$87	\$1,500	76.7%	\$165.00	\$135.00	\$150.00	13.514	156.00	135.00	-2.85%
33	McCormick & Co.	\$1,335	\$2,555	13.9%	\$75.00	\$65.00	\$70.00	3.694	131.80	135.00	0.48%
34	McDonald's Corp.	\$14,034	\$19,000	6.2%	\$105.00	\$85.00	\$95.00	5.000	1,076.70	1,000.00	-1.47%
35	McKesson Corp.	\$7,532	\$11,480	8.8%	\$100.00	\$85.00	\$92.50	1.983	271.00	246.00	-1.92%
36	Medtronic, Inc.	\$14,629	\$26,600	12.7%	\$70.00	\$55.00	\$62.50	2.408	1,097.30	1,025.00	-1.35%
37	Microsoft Corp.	\$39,558	\$85,000	16.5%	\$55.00	\$45.00	\$50.00	4.651	8,908.00	7,900.00	-2.37%
38	NIKE, Inc. 'B'	\$8,693	\$16,550	13.7%	\$105.00	\$85.00	\$95.00	2.746	485.50	478.00	-0.31%
39	Northrop Grumman	\$12,687	\$17,000	6.0%	\$145.00	\$120.00	\$132.50	1.949	306.87	250.00	-4.02%
40	PepsiCo, Inc.	\$17,442	\$36,015	15.6%	\$140.00	\$115.00	\$127.50	5.313	1,565.00	1,500.00	-0.84%
41	Pfizer, Inc.	\$90,014	\$105,000	3.1%	\$30.00	\$25.00	\$27.50	2.115	8,070.00	8,070.00	0.00%
42	Procter & Gamble	\$63,099	\$79,455	4.7%	\$105.00	\$85.00	\$95.00	3.226	2,917.00	2,700.00	-1.53%
43	Raytheon Co.	\$9,827	\$12,375	4.7%	\$105.00	\$85.00	\$95.00	2.458	383.20	320.00	-3.54%
44	Stryker Corp.	\$6,595	\$12,775	14.1%	\$130.00	\$105.00	\$117.50	3.588	397.90	390.00	-0.40%
45	Sysco Corp.	\$3,450	\$5,700	10.6%	\$50.00	\$40.00	\$45.00	4.455	590.03	565.00	-0.86%
46	TJX Companies	\$2,889	\$4,200	7.8%	\$85.00	\$70.00	\$77.50	6.078	409.39	330.00	-4.22%
47	United Parcel Serv.	\$7,630	\$19,035	20.1%	\$120.00	\$100.00	\$110.00	5.699	992.85	985.00	-0.16%
48	Verizon Communic.	\$41,600	\$53,439	5.1%	\$60.00	\$50.00	\$55.00	2.902	2,835.70	2,820.00	-0.11%
49	Walgreen Co.	\$14,376	\$18,500	5.2%	\$65.00	\$55.00	\$60.00	2.837	988.56	875.00	-2.41%
50	Wal-Mart Stores	\$70,749	\$76,025	1.4%	\$100.00	\$80.00	\$90.00	3.846	3,786.00	3,250.00	-3.01%
51	Waste Management	\$6,285	\$6,800	1.6%	\$50.00	\$40.00	\$45.00	<b>2.94</b> 1	486.12	445.00	-1.75%

(a) www.valueline.com (retrieved Jan. 28, 2011).

(b) Computed using the formula 2\*(1+5-Yr. Change in Equity)/(2+5 Yr. Change in Equity).

(c) Product of year-end "r" for 2014 and Adjustment Factor.

(d) Product of change in common shares outstanding and M/B Ratio.

(e) Computed as 1 - B/M Ratio.

(f) Five-year rate of change.

(g) Average of High and Low expected market prices divided by 2013-15 BVPS.

# CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL

# Exhibit WEA-6 Page 1 of 1

### **UTILITY PROXY GROUP**

<u>Market Rate of Return</u>	
Dividend Yield (a) 2.5%	
Growth Rate (b) 10.6%	:
Market Return (c)	13.1%
Less: Risk-Free Rate (d)	
Long-term Treasury Bond Yield	4.5%
Market Risk Premium (e)	8.6%
<u>Utility Proxy Group Beta (f)</u>	0.74
<u>Utility Proxy Group Risk Premium (g)</u>	6.3%
<u>Plus: Risk-free Rate (d)</u>	
Long-term Treasury Bond Yield	4.5%
Unadjusted CAPM (h)	10.8%
Size Adjustment (i)	0.7%
Implied Cost of Equity (j)	11.6%

(a) Weighted average dividend yield for the dividend paying firms in the S&P 500 from www.valueline.com (retrieved Nov. 5, 2010).

(b) Weighted average of IBES earnings growth rates for the dividend paying firms in the S&P 500 (retrieved Nov. 10, 2010).

(c) (a) + (b)

- (d) Average yield on 30-year Treasury bonds for January 2011 from the Federal Reserve Board at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Monthly/H15\_TCMNOM\_Y20.txt.
- (e) (c) (d).
- (f) The Value Line Investment Survey (Nov. 26, & Dec. 24, 2010, Feb. 4, 2011).

(g) (e) x (f).

- (h) (d) + (g).
- (i) Morningstar, "Ibbotson SBBI 2010 Valuation Yearbook," at Table C-1 (2010).
- (j) (h) + (i).

# CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL

# Exhibit WEA-7 Page 1 of 1

## NON-UTILITY PROXY GROUP

Dividend Yield (a)2.5%Growth Rate (b)10.6%Market Return (c)13.1%Less: Risk-Free Rate (d)13.1%Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Market Risk Premium (e)8.6%Non-Utility Proxy Group Beta (f)0.70Utility Proxy Group Risk Premium (g)6.1%Plus: Risk-free Rate (d)4.5%Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Unadjusted CAPM (h)10.6%Size Adjustment (i)-0.4%Implied Cost of Equity (j)10.2%	<u>Market Rate of Return</u>		
Growth Rate (b)10.6%Market Return (c)13.1%Less: Risk-Free Rate (d) Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Market Risk Premium (e)8.6%Non-Utility Proxy Group Beta (f)0.70Utility Proxy Group Risk Premium (g)6.1%Plus: Risk-free Rate (d) Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Unadjusted CAPM (h)10.6%Size Adjustment (i)-0.4%Implied Cost of Equity (j)10.2%	Dividend Yield (a)	2.5%	
Market Return (c)13.1%Less: Risk-Free Rate (d) Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Market Risk Premium (e)8.6%Non-Utility Proxy Group Beta (f)0.70Utility Proxy Group Risk Premium (g)6.1%Plus: Risk-free Rate (d) Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Unadjusted CAPM (h)10.6%Size Adjustment (i)-0.4%Implied Cost of Equity (j)10.2%	Growth Rate (b)	10.6%	
Less: Risk-Free Rate (d)Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Market Risk Premium (e)8.6%Non-Utility Proxy Group Beta (f)0.70Utility Proxy Group Risk Premium (g)6.1%Plus: Risk-free Rate (d)4.5%Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Unadjusted CAPM (h)10.6%Size Adjustment (i)-0.4%Implied Cost of Equity (j)10.2%	Market Return (c)		13.1%
Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Market Risk Premium (e)8.6%Non-Utility Proxy Group Beta (f)0.70Utility Proxy Group Risk Premium (g)6.1%Plus: Risk-free Rate (d) Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Unadjusted CAPM (h)10.6%Size Adjustment (i)-0.4%Implied Cost of Equity (j)10.2%	Less: Risk-Free Rate (d)		:
Market Risk Premium (e)8.6%Non-Utility Proxy Group Beta (f)0.70Utility Proxy Group Risk Premium (g)6.1%Plus: Risk-free Rate (d) Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Unadjusted CAPM (h)10.6%Size Adjustment (i)-0.4%Implied Cost of Equity (j)10.2%	Long-term Treasury Bond Yield		4.5%
Non-Utility Proxy Group Beta (f)0.70Utility Proxy Group Risk Premium (g)6.1%Plus: Risk-free Rate (d) Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Unadjusted CAPM (h)10.6%Size Adjustment (i)-0.4%Implied Cost of Equity (j)10.2%	<u>Market Risk Premium (e)</u>		8.6%
Utility Proxy Group Risk Premium (g)6.1%Plus: Risk-free Rate (d) Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Unadjusted CAPM (h)10.6%Size Adjustment (i)-0.4%Implied Cost of Equity (j)10.2%	Non-Utility Proxy Group Beta (f)		0.70
Plus: Risk-free Rate (d) Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Unadjusted CAPM (h)10.6%Size Adjustment (i)-0.4%Implied Cost of Equity (j)10.2%	<u>Utility Proxy Group Risk Premium (g)</u>		6.1%
Long-term Treasury Bond Yield4.5%Unadjusted CAPM (h)10.6%Size Adjustment (i)-0.4%Implied Cost of Equity (j)10.2%	<u>Plus: Risk-free Rate (d)</u>		
Unadjusted CAPM (h)10.6%Size Adjustment (i)-0.4%Implied Cost of Equity (j)10.2%	Long-term Treasury Bond Yield		4.5%
Size Adjustment (i) -0.4% Implied Cost of Equity (j) 10.2%	Unadjusted CAPM (h)		10.6%
Implied Cost of Equity (j) 10.2%	Size Adjustment (i)		-0.4%
	Implied Cost of Equity (j)		10.2%

(a) Weighted average dividend yield for the dividend paying firms in the S&P 500 from www.valueline.com (retrieved Nov. 5, 2010).

(b) Weighted average of IBES earnings growth rates for the dividend paying firms in the S&P 500 (retrieved Nov. 10, 2010).

(c) (a) + (b)

(d) Average yield on 30-year Treasury bonds for January 2011 from the Federal Reserve Board at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Monthly/H15\_TCMNOM\_Y20.txt.

(e) (c) - (d).

(f) www.valueline.com (retrieved Oct. 29, 2010).

(g) (e) x (f).

- (h) (d) + (g).
- (i) Morningstar, "Ibbotson SBBI 2010 Valuation Yearbook," at Table C-1 (2010).
- (j) (h) + (i).

## **EXPECTED EARNINGS APPROACH**

# Exhibit WEA-8 Page 1 of 1

# **UTILITY PROXY GROUP**

		(a)	(b)	(c)
		<b>Expected Return</b>	Adjustment	Adjusted Return
	Company	<u>on Common Equity</u>	<b>Factor</b>	<u>on Common Equity</u>
1	Alliant Energy	12.0%	1.0246	12.3%
2	Ameren Corp.	7.0%	1.0144	7.1%
3	American Elec Pwr	10.5%	1.0262	10.8%
4	Cleco Corp.	10.5%	1.0412	10.9%
5	Constellation Energy	7.0%	1.0075	7.1%
6	DTE Energy Co.	9.0%	1.0250	9.2%
7	Entergy Corp.	11.5%	1.0182	11.7%
8	Exelon Corp.	14.0%	1.0240	14.3%
9	Great Plains Energy	7.5%	1.0251	7.7%
10	Hawaiian Elec.	10.5%	1.0220	10.7%
11	IDACORP, Inc.	8.5%	1.0303	8.8%
12	Integrys Energy Group	10.0%	1.0134	10.1%
13	OGE Energy Corp.	12.5%	1.0386	13.0%
14	PG&E Corp.	12.0%	1.0384	12.5%
15	Pinnacle West Capital	8.5%	1.0339	8.8%
16	Portland General Elec.	8.5%	1.0327	8.8%
17	PPL Corp.	11.5%	1.0816	12.4%
18	Pub Sv Enterprise Grp	12.5%	1.0398	13.0%
19	SCANA Corp.	10.0%	1.0418	10.4%
20	Sempra Energy	10.5%	1.0230	10.7%
21	Westar Energy	10.0%	1.0281	10.3%
22	Wisconsin Energy	13.0%	1.0277	13.4%
	Average (d)			11.0%

(a) 3-5 year projections from The Value Line Investment Survey (Nov. 26 & Dec. 24, 2010, Feb. 4, 2011).

- (b) Adjustment to convert year-end "r" to an average rate of return from Schedule 3.
- (c) (a) x (b).

(d) Excludes highlighted figures.

FL(	OTATION COST ADJUSTMENT FACTOR	Exhibit Pre	: WEA-9
<u>n</u> d	CO STAFF		26 1 01 1
		\$ N	fillions
(1)	Retained Earnings <sup>1</sup>	\$	4,451
[]	Total Common Equity <sup>1</sup>	\$	13,140
(3)	Ratio of (1) to (2)		0.33874
(4)	Issuance Cost Percentage (f) <sup>2</sup>		3.02%
(5)	External Equity Ratio (w) [1.0 - (3)]		0.66126
(9)	Net Adjustment Factor [w/(1-f) + (1-w)]		1.02059

<sup>1</sup> American Electric Power Co., Consolidated Balance Sheet at Dec. 31, 2009, 2009 Form 10-K Report.

<sup>2</sup> American Electric Power Company, Inc., Prospectus Supplement (To Prospectus dated December 22, 2008) (Apr. 1, 2009).

CAPITAL STRUCTURE

**Exhibit WEA-10** Page 1 of 1

# UTILITY PROXY GROUP

		At Fisc	al Year-End 2	009 (a)	Value	Line Projec	ted (b)
		Long-term		Common	Long-term		Common
	Company	Debt	Preferred	Equity	Debt	Other	Equity
	Alliant Energy	45.4%	4.4%	50.2%	45.0%	3.5%	51.5%
2	Ameren Corp.	47.6%	0.0%	52.4%	47.5%	1.0%	51.5%
e	American Elec Pwr	57.0%	0.2%	42.8%	52.0%	0.0%	48.0%
Ŧ	Cleco Corp.	54.4%	0.0%	45.6%	46.5%	0.0%	53.5%
ю	Constellation Energy	35.2%	1.4%	63.4%	32.0%	1.0%	67.0%
9	DTE Energy Co.	51.1%	2.1%	46.7%	52.0%	0,0%	48.0%
5	Entergy Corp.	56.1%	1.5%	42.3%	58.0%	1.0%	41.0%
ø	Exelon Corp.	47.8%	0.4%	51.9%	45.0%	0.0%	55.0%
6	Great Plains Energy	53.2%	0.6%	46.2%	53.5%	0.5%	46.0%
10	Hawaiian Elec.	48.0%	1.2%	50.7%	47.0%	1.0%	52.0%
11	IDACORP, Inc.	50.3%	0.0%	49.7%	49.5%	0.0%	50.5%
12	Integrys Energy Group	46.3%	0.9%	52.7%	46.5%	1.0%	52.5%
13	OGE Energy Corp.	53.6%	0.0%	46.4%	51.0%	0.0%	49.0%
14	PG&E Corp.	50.3%	1.2%	48.5%	45.0%	1.0%	54.0%
15	Pinnacle West Capital	52.2%	0.0%	47.8%	46.5%	0.0%	53.5%
16	Portland General Elec.	53.1%	0.0%	46.9%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%
17	PPL Corp.	55.1%	0.0%	44.9%	45.5%	1.0%	53.5%
18	Pub Sv Enterprise Grp	44.1%	0.5%	55.4%	40.0%	0.0%	60.0%
19	SCANA Corp.	57.0%	0.0%	43.0%	52.5%	0.0%	47.5%
30	Sempra Energy	46.5%	0.6%	52.9%	47.5%	1.0%	51.5%
21	Westar Energy	52.3%	0.5%	47.2%	53.5%	0.5%	46.0%
53	Wisconsin Energy	53.7%	0.4%	45.9%	50.5%	0.0%	49.5%
	Average	50.5%	0.7%	48.8%	48.0%	0.6%	51.4%

(a) Company Form 10-K and Annual Reports.
(b) The Value Line Investment Survey (Nov. 26, & Dec. 24, 2010, Feb. 4, 2011).

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of William E. Avera has been served upon the below-named counsel via First Class mail, postage prepaid, this 14<sup>th</sup> day of March, 2011.

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